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Russia Intelligence RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 1 N°61 - September 13 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN c P. 1-4 Politics & Government Viktor Zubkov : the Petersburg KREMLIN c Viktor Zubkov : the « hard core » takes over Petersburg « hard core » takes over The serious business in anticipation of the succession of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin has just FOCUS begun in Moscow. September 12, the head of government, Mikhail Fradkov, submitted his resig- c Yuri Chayka, a public nation to the Russian president, who accepted it after having given a strong (and apparently sin- prosecutor on a tight-rope cere) homage. A few minutes later, the president of the state Duma, Boris Gryzlov, declared that DIPLOMACY the Kremlin had retained the candidature of the head of the Federal financial monitoring agency c The new Russian priorities (Rosfinmonitoring), Viktor Zubkov, 65, to succeed Mikhail Fradkov. An announcement which in Asia was all the more surprising since the entire corps of Moscow observers took it for granted that in ALERT case of such a reshuffle, Sergey Ivanov would be the next Prime minister. c Mikhail Margelov to head Viktor Zubkov is not an unknown quantity for the readers of Russia Intelligence. In our edition the Council of Europe of last March 2, we revealed his rise in Russian power circles. As a matter of fact, the future Prime parliamentary assembly? minister (his candidature will be confirmed by the parliament September 14) is a part of the Pu- INTERVIEW tinist first circle. Born in 1941 in the Urals, he is a 1965 graduate of the Institute of agriculture in c Alain Blum (EHESS) Leningrad. His rise began truly beginning in 1985 : he then found himself assigned responsibility within the Communist party. Viktor Zubkov in 1991 is the first secretary of the executive commit- tee for the district of Priozersky of the Leningrad region. This is the time when became acquainted P. 4-6 Business & Networks with Vladimir Putin and Boris Gryzlov. According to information gathered by Russia Intelligence, ENERGY Viktor Zubkov would have facilitated the transfer of plots of land for construction by the well-known c Europe : a new challenge dacha cooperative “Ozero”. Located in Solovyovka on the banks of lake Komsolmoskoe, the latter visible for Gazprom included, it should be recalled, among its founding members Vladimir Putin (a the time in charge ALERT of external relations for the Saint Petersburg municipality), Vladimir Yakunin (head of the RZhD, c Lukoil and Gazprom soon in Somalia ? the Russian railways), Vladimir Smirnov, (TENEX – read also articles page 2 and 6), Nikolay Shamalov and Viktor Myachin, joint shareholders of the Rossia bank of Yuri Kovalchuk. From FOCUS c Nuclear : the first steps January 1992 to November 1993, Viktor Zubkov presented himself for the post of governor of the toward reform Leningrad region, but he collected only 8.5% of the votes (Boris Gryzlov was then his campaign man- BEHIND THE SCENE ager). Vice minister of finance from 2001 to 2004, he assumed the leadership in 2004 of Rosfinmon- c Shtokman : Gazprom itoring, the financial investigation squad, which he headed until his surprise nomination. Viktor waits hand and foot Zubkov is therefore, as can be seen, a trusted associate of Vladimir Putin. He is in addition the fa- on Yuri Kovalchuk’s friends ther-in-law of the Defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, whose surprise nomination last February also follows the same pattern. Viktor Zubkov is also very close to Viktor Ivanov, the presidential assistant who has a controlling hand on nominations and who we had previously indicated had P. 7-8 Regions & CIS strengthened his position in the Kremlin (Russia Intelligence n°49 of February 16 2007). FOCUS The main question is certainly to know if the promotion of Viktor Zubkov makes of latter the c Why Kamchatka is again long awaited successor to Vladimir Putin. His profile and also his age lead most Moscow sources becoming strategic for Russia Intelligence to doubt this scenario. Viktor Zubkov could remain Prime minister after CAUCASUS March 2008, reproducing the trajectory of Mikhail Fradkov, who also “came out of nowhere” and c Ingushetia, the weak link was installed before the presidential vote of 2004. The other question concerns the reason that led Vladimir Putin to delay, or even to abandon, the Sergey Ivanov option. The first vice Prime min- SUBSCRIPTION ister, very much in view in the media at the side of the president since the beginning of summer, Print Edition seemed well on the way. A veteran, like Vladimir Putin, of the KGB external intelligence services, (23 issues, airmailed overseas) he shares with him the same weltanschauung. But we also know that Sergey Ivanov arouses con- €770 TTC siderable fears within the numerous Kremlin clans, whom he is not obligated to and to whom he The Web Pack had given no guarantees for after 2008 (Igor Sechin – who Sergey Ivanov, rightly or wrongly, sus- (Print Edition pects of having “set a trap” for him in the media during the Sychev affair, which involved this ter- + PDF + archives acess) ribly mutilated draftee in a Ural barrack in late 2005 – felt particularly targeted according to in- € 880 TTC formation we have gathered. The Premium The elevation of Viktor Zubkov also leaves open the scenario, long considered as emerging from Subscription science fiction but which could be unwise to exclude in view of the essentially Byzantine nature of (Print Edition + PDF + access the Russian political game : a “faked departure” for Vladimir Putin. The latter could leave the Krem- to all the website contents) lin in March 2008, as the constitution obliges…to better return on the scene in place of a Viktor € 1200 TTC Zubkov who would have then fulfilled his ultimate mission in the service of his friend. d www.russia-intelligence.fr RIA61 13/09/07 1:26 Page 2 RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government FOCUS c Yuri Chayka, a public prosecutor on a tight-rope August 27 may seem in retrospect as the finest hour for Rus- against Sergey Vasilev, a businessman who unofficially control- sia’s General prosecutor. In announcing to Vladimir Putin in led the oil terminal for the “northern capital”, an assets sought the Kremlin that the investigation of the murder of journalist by Barsukov. Anna Politkovskaya was concluded and that the godfather of the Tambov group - Saint Petersburg’s principal mafia organi- This case must be followed with the utmost attention be- sation had been locked up, Yuri Chayka thought he had esta- cause it is likely to spill over against the core of the Putin net- blished himself as the hero against all the dangers of this post- works in Saint Petersburg. Several close associates of the pre- vacation season, (Russia Intelligence n°60 of August 30 2007). sident had at one time or another business But the cards changed completely in the space of a few days. dealings with Barsukov. First of all, Vladi- mir Smirnov, the boss of TENEX, the state The Politkovskaya case : an accusation that evaporates. firm specialised in uranium enrichment It was with obvious satisfaction that Yuri Chaika had told of the (read page 6). In the mid-1990s Barsukov interrogation of ten suspects in the Politkovskaya case. Among contolled, with Smirnov, the private secu- those was found an FSB lieutenant-colonel, Pavel Ryaguzov, two rity agency Rif Security, which was nota- agents of the Interior ministry research service, Dmitry Lebe- bly charged with the surveillances of the dev and Oleg Alimov, as well as an anti-gang squad member, Ser- Ozero cooperative dachas. As a reminder, gey Khadzhikurbanov, which seemed to indicate that the inves- Vladimir Barsukov this very exclusive village hosted Smirnov tigation had been thorough. Yuri Chayka had also established a himself, Andrey Fursenko, the Science link between the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya and the minister, Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of the railways, and a cer- one of Paul Khlebnikoff, the editor in chief of the Russian edi- tain Vladimir Putin. Smirnov and Barsukov, would find them- tion of Forbes shot to death in 2004, and the former vice presi- selves a few years later at the Saint Petersburg Hydrocarbon dent of the Russian central bank, Andrey Kozlov (Russia Intel- company (PTK) : Smirnov was the president of the administra- ligence n°41 of October 13 2006). The latter point was all the tive council, while Barsukov occupied from 1998 to 2000 the more surprising since the Kozlov case had been said to have been post of assistant director general. solved in the spring and the presumed killers jailed. Vladimir Barsukov also controlled a number of affiliates of Yuri Chayka in any case thought he had two winners. The sol- Surgutneftegaz, including Kirishinefteorgsintez, specialised ving of the Politkovskaya case, a few days from the first anni- in refined products. And, readers of Russia Intelligence know versary of the death of the Novaya gazeta journalist, was made since operation Baikal and the purchase of Yuganskneftegaz, to order to bolster the image of the Russian president in the of the importance and influence of the networks linked to Sur- West. It was also meant, for the public prosecutor, to underline gutneftegaz (n°6 of February 11 2005 and n°43 of November 10 the efficiency of his services on the eve of the creation of a Com- 2006). We need mention only Yuri Kovalchuk, the head of the mittee for investigation, a quasi-autonomous structure of the Rossia bank, and Alexey Mordashov of Severstal. Prosecutor’s office whose presidency Vladimir Putin had assi- gned to Alexandre Bastyrkin, one of his former university class- Finally, Vladimir Barsukov testified in 2004 before German mates (Russia Intelligence n°58 of June 28 2007).
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