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Russland–Analysen www.laender-analysen.de/russland Nr. 403 | 08.06.2021 Russland–Analysen • Duma-Wahlen • Repressionen ■ KOMMENTAR Schrumpfende Freiräume für Russlands Medien 25 Die Duma-Wahlen 2021: Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall – oder doch Esther Somfalvy (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität nicht? 2 Bremen) Boris Ginzburg und Alexander Libman (Freie Universität Berlin) Russland drosselte Twitter, um Inhalte zu zensieren 27 Informationskriege, Oppositionskoordination und die Dumawahl Natalia Krapiva (Access Now) im Jahr 2021 4 ■ Regina Smyth (Indiana University und Woodrow Wilson Center, DEKODER »Hätten wir eine andere Wahl gehabt? Nein.« 30 Washington D.C.) Konstantin Gaase und Leonid Wolkow Wird das Putin-Regime überleben? 6 ■ DOKUMENTATION Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (Universität Bonn) Repressive Gesetze, die von Wladimir Putin am 30. Dezember 2020 Vorbereitung auf die Parlamentswahlen 2021 8 unterzeichnet wurden 35 Andrei Semenov (Zentrum für vergleichende Geschichts- und Politische Strafverfahren nach den Protesten im Januar 2021 37 Politikwissenschaft, Staatliche Universität Perm) April-Chronik der Repressionen: Der Journalist Ilja Asar hat Buch geführt 40 Vor den Dumawahlen weitet Russland die elektronische Überblick: Hochverrat, Spionage und Staatsgeheimnisse 47 Stimmabgabe aus – warum und mit welchen potenziellen Folgen? 10 »Haben Sie Angst vor…?« Umfrageergebnisse Stas Gorelik (George Washington-Universität, Washington D.C. / des Lewada-Zentrums 48 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen) Teilnehmende an den Protesten aus Solidarität mit Alexej Nawalnyj Bedingungen der Wahlbeobachtung durch Bürger in der am 21. April 2021: Alter und Protesterfahrung 49 Russischen Föderation vor den Dumawahlen 2021 12 Hat der Protest einen Anführer? Wie stehen die Protestierenden Tatyana Hilscher-Bogussevich (Hemmingen) zu Nawalnyj? 50 Lewada-Umfrage: Wie steht die russische Bevölkerung zu Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen autoritärer Politik 13 Protestierenden? 52 Michael Rochlitz (Universität Bremen) »Ausländische Agenten« laut Justizministerium der Russischen Föderation nach Kategorien 52 Michail Mischustin als ambitionierter »Systemadministrator« des Russische Online-Zeitung Meduza kämpft ums Überleben 53 Putinismus 15 Amnesty International: Die Polizei identifiziert friedliche Fabian Burkhardt (Leibniz-Institut für Ost- und Demonstrierende mit Gesichtserkennungstechnologie 54 Südosteuropaforschung, Regensburg) Human Rights Watch: Der Fall des Menschenrechtsanwalts Bürger:innen und der starke Mann: Erwachen, soziale Klassen und Iwan Pawlow und neue repressive Gesetze 54 sozialer Niedergang in Russlands Autokratie 18 »Ausländische Agenten«: Medien 56 Tomila Lankina (London School of Economics and Political Science) Liste der unerwünschten ausländischen und internationalen Nichtregierungsorganisationen 58 Fear and Loathing in Russia: Repressionen als Stellungnahmen zum Beschluss der russischen Herrschaftsinstrument des Kremls 20 Generalstaatsanwaltschaft, deutsche Nichtregierungsorganisationen Vladimir Gel’man (Europäische Universität in St. Petersburg und als in Russland unerwünschte Organisationen zu erklären 59 Universität Helsinki) Ausländische-Agenten-Gesetz vor der Duma-Wahl 2021 ■ CHRONIK ausgeweitet 23 3. – 14. Mai 2021 62 Max Bader (Universität Leiden) Leibniz-Institut für Leibniz-Institut für Zentrum für Osteuropa- und Deutsche Gesellschaft für Deutsches Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Agrarentwicklung in Ost- und Südosteuropa- internationale Studien Osteuropakunde Polen-Institut an der Universität Bremen Transformationsökonomien forschung (ZOiS) gGmbH Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen Russland-Analysen Nr. 403, 08.06.2021 2 KOMMENTAR Die Duma-Wahlen 2021: Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall – oder doch nicht? Boris Ginzburg und Alexander Libman (Freie Universität Berlin) ür elektoral-autoritäre Staatsysteme wie Russland zeug, welches es bei den bevorstehenden Wahlen zu nut- Fgeben Wahlen immer einen Anlass zur Sorge. Die- zen gilt. In den letzten Jahren gab es mehrere Episoden ses Mal jedoch hat die russische Führung besondere auf regionaler und lokaler Ebene, in denen die russi- Gründe, sich Sorgen um die anstehenden Duma-Wah- schen Wähler:innen anders abstimmten, als der Kreml len im Herbst 2021 zu machen. es erwartet hatte. Die Opposition hofft deshalb darauf, Russland tritt aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht in eher dass das »Schlaue Abstimmen« für ähnliche Überra- schlechter Verfassung in das Wahljahr ein. Seit 2013 leidet schungen während der Duma-Wahlen 2021 sorgen wird. das Land an einer stagnierenden Wirtschaft. Die Covid- Infolgedessen sind die bevorstehenden Wahlen 19-Pandemie hat Russland mit geschätzten 260.000 sowohl für das Regime als auch für die nicht-syste- Todesfällen von April bis November 2020 hart getrof- mische Opposition alles andere als »business as usual«. fen (https://laender-analysen.de/russland-analysen/400/ Dies wird höchstwahrscheinlich die Strategien der uebersterblichkeit-der-wahre-opferzoll-von-corona-in- Akteure merklich beeinflussen. Um seine Chancen russland/). Auch die im Vergleich zu den meisten ande- zu optimieren, wird sich der Kreml hauptsächlich auf ren großen Volkswirtschaften viel geringere Bereitstel- sein reiches Repertoire an manipulativen und repres- lung staatlicher wirtschaftlicher Unterstützung für die siven Maßnahmen gegen seine Gegner verlassen wie Bevölkerung und die heimischen Unternehmen sind auf (1) die Verabschiedung neuer repressiver Gesetze, weitere Faktoren, die sich negativ auf die russischen die den Zweck verfolgen, die »Smart-Voting«-Strate- Bürger:innen auswirken (https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/ gie zu behindern, (2) die gewalttätige Niederschlagung 396629-pandemiya-so-skidkoy-rossiya-vydelila-na- friedlicher Demonstrationen, (3) Desinformationstak- pomoshch-naseleniyu-i-biznesu-v-70-raz-menshe). Die tiken mit dem Ziel, Keile zwischen die verschiedenen Pandemie trug deshalb zum weiteren Rückgang von Segmente der nicht-systemischen Opposition zu trei- Putins Popularität bei, die bereits nach der Renten- ben, und (4) die Schaffung von Kreml-loyalen pseudo- reform von 2018 eine abnehmende Tendenz aufwies oppositionellen Parteien (zum Beispiel die Partei Nowye (https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84052). Ein gewisses Ljudi (Neue Leute), die erst im Jahr 2020 gegründet Maß an Unzufriedenheit mit Putin wurzelt zudem in worden war, https://meduza.io/feature/2020/01/10/v- der Dauer seiner Herrschaft: Die russische Gesellschaft rossii-poyavyatsya-neskolko-novyh-partiy-vklyuchaya- zeigt ganz ähnlich wie viele Gesellschaften in ande- partiyu-razrabotchika-igry-world-of-tanks-oni-budut- ren Staaten Anzeichen politischer Ermüdung von Prä- sozdavat-oschuschenie-politicheskoy-konkurentsii), um sident Wladimir Putin, der nun schon seit zwei Jahr- einige der regimekritischen Stimmen zu absorbieren. zehnten im Amt ist. Nicht zu vergessen sind (5) auch die Pläne der russ- Neben diesen längerfristigen Entwicklungen gibt es ländischen Zentralen Wahlkommission, die diesjäh- noch mehrere aktuelle politische Ereignisse, die die rus- rigen Wahlen erstmals auf drei aufeinanderfolgende sische Staatsführung nervös machen dürften. Die Rück- Wahltage auszudehnen (bisher wurden Wahlen immer kehr von Alexej Nawalnyj nach Russland sowie seine an einem Wahltag durchgeführt). Diese Praxis wurde anschließende Verhaftung wird ihn wahrscheinlich zum bereits bei dem Verfassungsreferendum 2020 einge- unbestrittenen Anführer der russischen nicht-systemi- führt, als offiziellen Grund nannte der Kreml damals schen Opposition aufsteigen lassen (der nun auch die die Corona-Pandemie. Hierdurch wird die Arbeit von Anerkennung der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft Wahlbeobachter:innen erheblich erschwert und Wahl- genießen wird). Des Weiteren haben die Proteste in Bela- manipulationen zugunsten der Regierungspartei Eini- rus im Jahr 2020 gezeigt, dass sogar sorgfältig geplante ges Russland bewusst antizipiert. Der Kreml könnte Wahlen zu unerwarteten Protesten führen können. In (6) ebenfalls versuchen, Nawalnyjs weiteres körperli- den Augen der russischen Führung sind die Ereignisse ches und geistiges Wohlbefinden im Gefängnis als Mit- in Belarus und die »Causa Nawalnyj« Ausprägungen der tel zur Erpressung seines Teams und zur Einschränkung aggressiven Haltung des Westens, die Wachsamkeit sei- der Handlungen seiner Anhänger:innen zu instrumen- tens des Kremls erfordert. talisieren. Nicht auszuschließen ist auch der Versuch des Währenddessen dürften die Wahlen 2021 auch in Kremls, (7) die russischen Bürger:innen um sich herum den Augen der nicht-systemischen Opposition Russ- politisch zu konsolidieren (ähnlich wie nach der Krim- lands wie eine einmalige Gelegenheit aussehen. Das Annexion 2014). So könnte das Regime mithilfe sei- »Smart-Voting«-System bietet der Opposition ein Werk- ner Propagandaressourcen versuchen, die letzten geziel- Russland-Analysen Nr. 403, 08.06.2021 3 ten Sanktionen (»targeted sanctions«) des Westens gegen ist aber, dass die Bereitschaft der systemischen Opposi- russische Einzelpersonen als »Sanktionen gegen ganz tion, mit Nawalnyj zusammenzuarbeiten, keinesfalls als Russland« (»comprehensive sanctions«) zu porträtieren eine Selbstverständlichkeit angesehen werden darf. Dies und/oder sich erneut auf das Mittel des militärischen offenbart der Artikel von »Jabloko«-Parteichef Grigorij Säbelrasselns gegenüber seinen Nachbarstaaten einzulas- Jawlinskij. Darin warnt Jawlinskij seine Leser:innen vor sen. Interessanterweise schließt eine solche Entwicklung Nawalnyjs nationalistischen und populistischen Wur- zum
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