Country Reports on Terrorism 2011
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Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 July 2012 United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism Released April 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. 1 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports on Terrorism Africa Overview, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, The Partnership for East African Regional Counterterrorism, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda East Asia and Pacific Overview, China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Indonesia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand Europe Overview, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom Middle East and North Africa Overview, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel (including West Bank and Gaza), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen South and Central Asia Overview, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Western Hemisphere Overview, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) 1. Terrorist Safe Havens a. Strategies, Tactics, Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens 2 b. International Conventions and Protocols Matrix 2. Support for Pakistan 3. Collaboration with Saudi Arabia 4. Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World 5. Outreach through Foreign Broadcast Media 6. Basic Education in Muslim Countries Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Ansar al-Islam Army of Islam Asbat al-Ansar Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) Hamas Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Hizballah Indian Mujahedeen (IM) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hizballah Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba Lashkar i Jhangvi Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) National Liberation Army (ELN) Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al-Qa’ida (AQ) 3 Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS) Al-Shabaab (AS) Shining Path (SL) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms NCTC Statistical Annex Supplement on Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens 4 CHAPTER 1 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT The death of Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida’s founder and sole leader for the past 22 years, highlighted a landmark year in the global effort to counter terrorism. In addition to being an iconic leader whose personal story had a profound attraction for violent extremists, bin Ladin was also a prime advocate of the group’s focus on the United States as a terrorist target. Even in the years when he had to limit and manage his contacts with the rest of the organization, it was clear from the trove of information collected from the compound in Abbotabad, Pakistan, that he remained deeply involved in directing its operations and setting its strategy. Bin Ladin was not the only top al-Qa’ida leader who was removed from the battlefield in 2011. In June, Ilyas Kashmiri, one of the most capable terrorist operatives in South Asia, was killed in Pakistan. Also in June, Harun Fazul, an architect of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the foremost member of al-Qa’ida in East Africa, was killed in Somalia by the Transitional Federal Government. In August, Atiya Abdul Rahman, al-Qa’ida’s second-in- command after bin Ladin’s death and a senior operational commander, was killed in Pakistan. In September, Anwar al-Aulaqi, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s chief of external operations, was killed in Yemen. The loss of bin Ladin and these other key operatives puts the network on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse. These successes are attributable, in large part, to global counterterrorism cooperation, which has put considerable pressure on the al-Qa’ida core leadership in Pakistan. But despite blows in western Pakistan, al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and its adherents remain adaptable. They have shown resilience; retain the capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks; and, thus, constitute an enduring and serious threat to our national security. As al-Qa’ida’s core has gotten weaker, we have seen the rise of affiliated groups around the world. Among these al-Qa’ida affiliates, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) represents a particularly serious threat. At year’s end, AQAP had taken control of territory in southern Yemen and was exploiting unrest in that country to advance plots against regional and Western interests. In the Sahel, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), historically the weakest of the al-Qa’ida affiliates, saw its coffers filled in 2011 with kidnapping ransoms – a practice that other terrorist groups are also using to considerable advantage. These resources, together with AQIM’s efforts to take advantage of the instability in Libya and Mali, have raised concern about this group’s trajectory. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab pursued a diverse set of targets, demonstrating that it had both the willingness and ability to conduct attacks outside of Somalia. In all, al-Shabaab’s 2011 attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 people. Among its most deadly attacks were a string of armed assaults in May that killed over 120 people, a June attack on African Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers that killed 13, and an October vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on a government compound in Mogadishu that killed about 70. In 5 Somalia, however, al-Shabaab has been weakened over the past year as a result of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and Kenyan and Ethiopian military offensives that forced the group’s retreat from key locations including Mogadishu. In other areas that have been critically important theaters over the last decade, we recognize a persistent threat. With the United States withdrawal of its final forces from Iraq, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to confront the al-Qa’ida affiliate there, showing substantial capability against the group. Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) suffered leadership losses and continued to fail to mobilize a Sunni community that turned decisively against it after the carnage in the previous decade. However, AQI is resilient, as noted by its intermittent high-profile attacks in country, and likely to carry out additional attacks into the foreseeable future. In fact, towards the end of 2011, AQI was believed to be extending its reach into Syria and seeking to exploit the popular uprising against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Asad. Despite the counterterrorism successes in disrupting and degrading the capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, al-Qa’ida and violent extremist ideology and rhetoric continued to spread in some parts of the word. For example, while not a formal al-Qa’ida affiliate, elements of the group known as Boko Haram launched widespread attacks across Nigeria, including one in August against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, which signaled their ambition and capability to attack non-Nigerian targets. The Sinai Peninsula is another area of concern. A number of loosely knit militant groups have formed in the Sinai, with some claiming ties and allegiance to al-Qa’ida – though no formal links have been discovered. Also in August, a group of heavily armed militants who entered southern Israel through the Sinai conducted a series of coordinated attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets near Eilat, killing eight. Although there were no terrorist attacks in the United States in 2011, we remain concerned about threats to the homeland. In the last several years, individuals who appear to have been trained by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have operated within U.S. borders. Najibullah Zazi, a U.S. lawful permanent resident, obtained training in Pakistan and, in 2010, pled guilty to charges that he was planning to set off several bombs in the United States. And on October 14, 2011, Nigerian national Umar Abdulmutallab pled guilty to all charges against him in U.S. federal court in Michigan regarding his unsuccessful attempt on December 25, 2009, to detonate an explosive aboard a flight bound for Detroit, Michigan at the behest of AQAP. While these individuals had direct ties to international terrorist groups, separate incidents involving so-called “lone wolf” terrorists also pose a threat to the U.S.