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2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

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2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes March 2016 INCSR 2016 Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Table of Contents ...................................................................................... i Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs ......... i Money Laundering and Financial Crimes ................................................ i Common Abbreviations .......................................................................... vi Definitions ................................................................................................ ix Money Laundering and Financial Crimes ............................................... 1 Legislative Basis for the INCSR ............................................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 3 Bilateral Activities ..................................................................................... 4 Training and Technical Assistance ......................................................... 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ............................. 5 Department of Homeland Security .......................................................... 6 Customs and Border Protection .............................................................. 6 Homeland Security Investigations ........................................................... 6 Department of Justice .............................................................................. 8 Federal Buareu of Investigation ...................................................................... 8 Drug Enforcement Administration ................................................................... 8 Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section; and the Counterterrorism Section ........................................................................................................ 9 Department of State ................................................................................ 13 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) ............................. 15 Department of the Treasury ................................................................... 16 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ......................................................... 16 Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations .................................................. 16 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ............................................. 17 Office of Technical Assistance .............................................................. 18 Treaties, Agreements, and Asset Sharing ............................................ 20 Treaties .................................................................................................... 20 Agreements ............................................................................................. 20 Asset Sharing .......................................................................................... 21 Multilateral Organizations and Programs ............................................. 23 The Financial Action Task Force and FATF-Style Regional Bodies.... 23 The Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Group of Experts to Control Money Laundering ................................................................................................................. 25 ii INCSR 2016 Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units .............................. 27 United Nations Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism ............................ 28 Major Money Laundering Countries ...................................................... 32 Countries and Jurisdictions Table ........................................................ 36 Comparative Table Key .......................................................................... 37 Comparative Table .................................................................................. 40 Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern ........................................ 57 Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 58 Antigua and Barbuda .............................................................................. 61 Argentina ................................................................................................. 64 Australia .................................................................................................. 66 Austria ..................................................................................................... 70 Bahamas .................................................................................................. 72 Belize ....................................................................................................... 74 Bolivia ...................................................................................................... 77 Brazil ........................................................................................................ 79 British Virgin Islands .............................................................................. 81 Burma ...................................................................................................... 83 Cambodia ................................................................................................ 87 Canada ..................................................................................................... 90 Cayman Islands ...................................................................................... 92 China, People’s Republic of ................................................................... 95 Colombia ................................................................................................. 97 Costa Rica ............................................................................................. 100 Curacao ................................................................................................. 103 Cyprus ................................................................................................... 106 Dominican Republic ............................................................................. 110 France .................................................................................................... 112 Germany ................................................................................................ 115 Greece ................................................................................................... 117 Guatemala ............................................................................................. 120 Guernsey ............................................................................................... 123 Guinea-Bissau ....................................................................................... 125 Haiti ........................................................................................................ 128 iii INCSR 2016 Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Hong Kong ............................................................................................ 130 India ....................................................................................................... 132 Indonesia ............................................................................................... 135 Iran ......................................................................................................... 138 Iraq ......................................................................................................... 140 Isle of Man ............................................................................................. 143 Israel ...................................................................................................... 146 Italy ........................................................................................................ 148 Japan ..................................................................................................... 151 Jersey .................................................................................................... 153 Kenya ..................................................................................................... 156 Latvia ..................................................................................................... 160 Lebanon ................................................................................................. 163 Liechtenstein ......................................................................................... 166 Luxembourg .......................................................................................... 168 Macau .................................................................................................... 171 Mexico ................................................................................................... 173 Netherlands ........................................................................................... 175 Nigeria ................................................................................................... 178 Pakistan ................................................................................................
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