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The German Side of the Hill: Nazi Conquest and Exploitation of Italy, 1943-45

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The German Side of the Hill: Nazi Conquest and Exploitation of Italy, 1943-45 The German Side of the Hill: Nazi Conquest and Exploitation of Italy, 1943-45 Timothy D. Saxon Ruckersville, VA B.A., Averett College, 1977 M.Div., Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1980 M.A., University of Virginia, 1987 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Corcoran Department of History University of Virginia January 1999 © Copyright by Timothy Dale Saxon All Rights Reserved January 1999 11 ABSTRACT The view that German and Allied forces fought a senseless campaign for haly during the Second World War prevails in many histories of that conflict. They present the battle for Italy as a bitterly-contested. prolonged fight up the peninsula. wasting Allied men and resources. Evidence contradicting this judgment shows that Italy's political, economic, geographic, and military assets between the years 1943 and 1945 made it a prize worth winning. Allied leaders never grasped this fact nor made an effective effort to deny Germany this valuable asset. The German defense ofItaly secured the loyalty of Axis allies in Eastern Europe and permitted the establishment of a Fascist Italian puppet state under Benito Mussolini. Moreover, Germany reaped an enormous harvest of agricultural and economic products in Italy. German estimates that Italy contributed between fifteen and twenty­ five percent of total output in late 1944 show that it was truly a prize worth winning. The Italian economy provided large quantities of consumer goods for Germany, freeing up industrial plants in the Reich for military production. In late 1944, Italian manufacturers shifted operations and directly supported German forces fighting in Italy. Italian skilled labor contributed substantially to the German 'economic miracle' of 1944. The battle for Italy further aided Germany in pressuring Switzerland to supply vital goods and keep open rail lines through the Swiss Alps without which German troops could not have survived in Italy. The Swiss, surrounded by German forces, used their lIa isolation as a convenient reason to reject Allies entreaties that they reduce assistance to Hitler. Occupation of northern Italy also kept Allied air forces far from the Reich's southern boundaries and allowed the continued Gennan exploitation of the natural resources in the Balkans, a key asset that fed the Gennan war machine. Finally, Germany enlisted substantial numbers of Italian laborers and troops who supported its fighting forces and served in antipartisan units. Italian workers kept vital rail lines repaired while Fascist Italian divisions supplemented defenses in coastal and Alpine sectors. Moreover, Italian military equipment captured in 1943 assisted in rebuilding German units crippled in the summer campaign of 1944. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACf ........................................................ ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................... 0 •• ix TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................... 0. 0 xi MAP 1: THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS .... 0. xii CHAPTER 1 ITALY 1943: A PRIZE WORTH WINNING? .................... , ....... 0.. 1 INTRODUCfION ............................ 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 1 RECENT IDSTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN ...... 0 •• 2 THE LINGERING WOUNDS OF WAR ............................ 0. 0 5 GRAND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ITALlAN CAMPAIGN ..................... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0.. 9 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................. 0 •• 9 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS .............. 0 •••••••••••••• 0. 10 GEOGRAPIDCAL CONSIDERATIONS .................... 0 • • • •• 16 MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS .............................. 0. 21 ALLIED GOALS IN ITALY ........................................ 27 GERMAN GOALS IN ITALY 0 •••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 0. 30 CHART I-I ................................................ 0 • •• 40 CHAPTER 2 GOTTERDAMMERUNG IN THE DESERT ............. 0 •••••••••••••• " 43 THE AXIS RESPONSE TO OPERATION TORCH . ... 44 IV THE SLIDE TO SURRENDER: ITALIAN STRATEGIC WEAKNESS.. 53 THE ITALIAN DILEMMA ..................................... 56 CHART II-I ................................................... 57 THE GERMAN SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. .. 69 CONCLUSION. .. 81 CHAPTER 3 DEFEAT AND RETRENCHMENT: MEDITERRANEAN DEFENSES . .. 83 INTRODUCflON . .. 83 THE MARCH ALARM: GERMAN INVASION PLANS FOR SWITZERLAND . .. 84 DIVERGENT COURSES. .. 90 CONFERENCE AT KLESSHEIM: IllTLER AND MUSSOLINI MEET (8-10 APRIL 1943) .............. " .... " ..... " ............. 91 FINALE IN NORTH AFRICA: FOOLS FOR THE FiIHRER .......... 95 THE AXIS STRATEGIC SITUATION AFfER TUNISIA .............. 97 THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION ............................... 97 THE ITALIAN DOMESTIC SITUATION .................... 99 "DIE WEHRWIRTSCHAFfS ITALIEN": ITALY'S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. .. 101 THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE STRATEGY: AXIS PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE ........ 104 ULTRA. .. 104 AXIS DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS (APRIL - JULY 1943) .. 108 TAKING THE ENEMY'S MEASURE ....................... 108 v DEBATING ALLIED INTENTIONS ....................... III SITUATION IN THE AIR: LUFTWAFFE PLANS AND OPERATIONS ....................................... 115 GERMAN LOGISTICS .................................... 120 TROOP DEPLOYMENTS ................................. 121 CONCLUSION. .. 126 CHART ill-I. .. 128 CHAPTER 4 THE STRUGGLE FOR SICILY. .. 131 INTRODUCfION . .. 131 PRELUDE TO INVASION: PANTELLERIA AND THE PELAGIAN ISLANDS .................................................... 132 ASSAULT ON SICILY. .. 138 EMBATTLED ISLE: ANOTHER SICILIAN CAMPAIGN ........ 140 INVASION AND COUNTERATTACKS ........................ 142 BITTER BATTLES: FIGHTING FOR SICILY. .. 149 DENYING THE ALLIES VICTORY: THE GERMAN EVACUATION OF SICILY . .. 156 CONCLUSION. .. 165 CHAPTERS FROM AVALANCHE TO STALEMATE ................................ 170 ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATION. .. 170 THE STRATEGIC SITUATION . .. 171 vi ALLIED STRATEGY AND PLANNING AFTER SICILY 0 0 0 0 0 0 o. 176 AXIS PREPARATIONS 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 ••• 0 •• 0 0 0 0 ••• 0 • • • • • • •• 177 THE INVASION OF ITALY ....... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 178 ULTRA AND THE DECISION TO LAND AT SALERNO ........ 178 CALABRIA, TARANTO, AND SALERNO .. 0 ••••••••••• 0 • • • • • •• 180 AVALANCHE AT SALERNO o. 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••• 0 • • • •• 181 OPERATION "ACHSE" ............................... 0 • • • • • • • • • • •• 192 PREPARATION FOR ACHSE ... 0 ••••••••••••••••• 0 0 • • • • • • • • • •• 192 THE ITALO-GERMAN WAR FOR ITALY ...................... 195 ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ITALY o. 0 ••••••••• 0 ••••••••••• 0 ••• 0 • •• 205 DEFENDING ITALy ...... 0 •••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••• 000 ••••• 214 THE SWISS ROLE IN LATE 1943 0.......... .. 216 EXTRACTING THE COST: THE DEFENSE OF ITALY, FALL 1943 ••••••••• 0 •• 0 •••••••••• 0 0 • 0 • 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • •• 217 THE EVACUATION OF CORSICA AND SARDINIA 0.' •••••••••• 218 THE DECISION WHERE TO DEFEND ITALY .... 0 • • • • • • • • • • •• 222 CONCLUSION ...... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 0 •••••••• 0 • •• 225 CHARTV-3 227 CHAPTER 6 HOLDING THE LINE ............... 0 • 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 • • • • • •• 229 INTRODUCTION ......... 0 0 •••••• 0 •••••••••••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 229 BLOODY STALEMATE AT CASSINO. .. 230 VII TERMOLI ............................................... 231 ORTONA ................................................ 234 ANZIO . .. 238 SUPPLY SITUATION. .. 244 OPERATION STRANGLE. .. 246 ECONOMICS ..................................................... 249 LABOR AND PRODUCfION .................................. 253 GERMAN ATROCITIES AND THE ITALIAN HOLOCAUST ......... 257 THE BREAKOUT FROM ANZIO AND CONQUEST OF ROME ...... 260 CONCLUSION. .. 264 CHAPTER VI CHARTS .......................................... " 266 CHART VI-I. .. 266 CHART VI-2 . .. 268 CHART VI-3 . .. 269 CHAPTER 7 BREAKTHROUGH TO BOGDOWN: THE FIGHT FROM DIADEM TO THE GOTHIC LINE. .. 270 INTRODUCTION: DIADEM AND DEFEAT ........................ 270 THE GERMAN SITUATION .................................. 271 GROUND FORCES ....................................... 273 LUFTWAFFE AND ITALIAN FASCIST AIR FORCES. .. 275 LOGISTICS .............................................. 278 Vlll THE GUSTAV LINE GIVES ....................................... 281 THE THOUSAND YEAR REICH LOSES THE ETERNAL CITY . 286 THE PURSUIT ................................................... 288 THE PARTISAN WAR ........................................ 290 DEFENSE OF THE GOTHIC UNE ............................... " 297 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ........................................... 300 CONCLUSION .................................................. " 306 CHAPTER VII CHARTS ......................................... " 308 CHART VII-I ................................................. 308 CHART VII-2 ............................................... " 309 CHART VII-3 ................................................. 310 CHAPTER 8 FINALE ............................................................ " 312 WINTER BA TILES. .. 312 DISINTEGRATION: THE ITALIAN WAR ECONOMY COLLAPSES . 314 RAILROADS AND EMPTY COAL CARS ....................... 314 CHART VIII-I ................................................ 317 SWITZERLAND SLAMS THE DOOR SHUT ................... 318 TOTAL WAR, TOTAL DEFEAT .. .. 322 CONCLUSION .................................................. " 329 CHART VIII-3 ...............................................
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