A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….……………….. 37 1.3 The German offensive of 1942………………………………………………….….. 39 1.2.1 Preparing for a new Summer………………………………………………………… 39 1.2.2 Operation Blau………………………………………………………………….…… 44 1.2.3 Operation Uranus and Operation Saturn………………………………………..…… 48 1.4 1943: The last chance for victory………………………………………….…….… 51 1.4.1 From Stalingrad to Kursk………………………………………………………..…... 51 1.4.2 The state of the Wehrmacht and the German strategic situation in 1943………….… 54 1.5 Planning the Kursk offensive………………………………………………...……. 56 1.5.1 Plan Zitadelle……………………………………………………………….……….. 56 1.5.2 Early warning signs………………………………………………………..………… 57 4 1.6 Operation Zitadelle…………………………………………………………………. 60 1.6.1 Execution of Zitadelle………………………………………………….……………. 60 1.6.2 Beyond Zitadelle…………………………………………………………….………. 63 1.6.3 Zitadelle as a failure………………………………………………………….……… 64 Chapter 2, Disagreements before and during Operation Zitadelle……………………... 65 2.1 Disagreements before Operation Zitadelle……………………………………...….65 2.1.1 How to proceed in 1943, who wanted to take which action?...................................... 65 2.1.2 Delay and Soviet build-up……………………………………………………….…... 70 2.1.3 Concerns about an allied attack…………………………………………………….... 75 2.1.4 Wunderwaffen (Wonder weapons)………………………………………………….. 77 2.1.5 Estimation and underestimation of Soviet forces………………………………….… 79 2.1.6 Did anyone try to sabotage the operation once Plan ‘Zitadelle’ was decided upon?... 81 2.2 Problems during Operation Zitadelle………………………………………….……… 82 2.2.1 Surprise or lack of surprise?......................................................................................... 82 2.2.2 The 9. Army failure……………………………………………………………..…… 84 2.2.3 Wunderwaffen in action……………………………………………………….…….. 86 2.2.4 Zitadelle as an impossible operation……………………………………………...…. 88 2.2.5 Who can be “blamed” for the failed offensive at Kursk?............................................ 93 Chapter 3, The war for posterity………………………………………………..………… 96 3.1 Zitadelle as a crucial point of the war……………………………………..………. 99 3.2 Fore-hand or back-hand?........................................................................................ 102 5 3.3 Where should the German offensive be launched?............................................... 105 3.4 The importance of delay………………………………………………………….. 108 3.5 Concerns about Wunderwaffen………………………………………………….. 111 3.6 Walter Model’s portrayal………………………………………………………….113 3.7 Underestimation of the Red Army and the German plight……………….……..116 3.8 Zitadelle, ‘the Lost victory’……………………………………………………..….118 Chapter 4, Conclusive remarks and answer to the research question……………...…. 121 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………. 123 Archive Sources…………………………………………………………………………… 123 Printed Primary Sources…………………………………………………………………. 124 Secondary Sources…………………………………………………….…………....…….. 126 Webpages………………………………………………………………..………………… 134 Attachments……………………………………………………………………………….. 135 Glossary……………………………………………………………………………………. 135 Brief biographies of German generals………………………………………………..…. 137 Maps………………………………………………………………………………….……. 143 6 Introduction Generals writing about past wars and battles is not a new concept. During the Gallic Wars that Julius Caesar conducted he wrote a history of the war that was published in Rome called ‘Comentarii de Bello Gallico’ (The Gallic Wars). Caesar’s work was written with a third person perspective and covered the major events of the campaigns that he fought in Gaul in the period between 58-50 BC. The most important battle in the literary work was the Siege of Alesia where Caesar decisively defeated the large Gallic rebellion led by Vercingetorix. Caesar’s account was written with the intention to advance his political career in Rome. In other words, his motive was not to tell the truth, but rather to make himself sound even more brilliant than he undoubtably was. When using ‘The Gallic Wars’ for historical writing it is necessary to keep in mind that the source is full of exaggerations and other biases in favour of Caesar.2 At Alesia Caesar claimed to have defeated a Gallic force that numbered 250,000 men, yet modern estimates conclude that the Gallic force was likely not larger than 100,000 men, which still would have represented a large army at the time. The defeated Vercingetorix could not contradict Caesar’s claim by writing his own account, as he was paraded as a prize in Rome and later killed in captivity. In any case, the result of the war is well known and if Caesar exaggerated the numbers at Alesia or ‘failed to mention’ that he lost a skirmish or minor battle it would not have been highly significant, as he won the war and Gaul was incorporated into the expanding Roman Republic. It does, however, signify that generals, like others, like to get credit for their triumphs and even increase the scale of them, while downplaying any setbacks that might dent their credentials.3 For generals who were on the winning side in wars, writings memoirs has been a way of remaining in the public image and making money while doing it. An example of this is Ulysses Sam Grant, Union Commander in chief during the American Civil War. After his presidency he had financial problems, and he published several articles and eventually a book where he retold his experiences from the Mexican-American War and the Civil War. His articles were well received, and the editor persuaded him to retell all his experiences in a book. He finished the book a short period before his death and it was published posthumously. 2, Luciano Canfora, Julius Caesar- The People’s dictator, Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 2006, pp. 10- 11. 3Jon Kielland-Lund, «Cæsars største seier, Alesia år 52 fvt.» in Heine Wang and Per Erik Olsen (Eds.) Militær historie Nr. 5, 2017, Skallestad : Ares forlag : Skallestad, 2017, pp.4-15, at pp.14-15. 7 The book was a large commercial success and generated some $450,000 (which in modern terms represents about $12,000,000) in royalties for Grant’s widow. His book was positively regarded by most critics and served as blueprint for similar publications.4 The way in which Grant’s book became such a best seller may well have influenced future generals when they considered telling their own stories. The Second World War is a conflict with a large degree of post war literary publications from both sides. In post-war Germany it became popular for former generals to write about their wartime experiences. These included men who commanded Army Groups in the Soviet Union, like Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, former Chief of Staff in the German Army Heinz Guderian, General Erhard Raus who served on the Eastern front and many others. 5 Writing about the war was not limited to generals, German tank commanders and fighter pilots also published extensive books retelling their war time experiences, like Otto Carius’ book “Tigers in the mud”.6 Their published memoirs were written with different intentions. It was important to many of these generals to distance themselves from the conduct of the war, and what they regarded as military mistakes committed by Hitler. The books by these various generals almost always included views as to “what went wrong”, why the German Army lost a specific battle or the war as a whole.7 These books offer a unique perspective on the war and seem to make the reader able to delve into the minds of some of the people who took key decisions in the German conduct of the war. If one, however, thinks that perhaps these people had an agenda when writing their memoirs and sought to distance themselves from decisions they supported or championed they become much more problematic as historical sources for military historians. This paper seeks to explore the post war