Howard Grier on When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army

David Glantz, Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xiii + 414 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-0717-4. Reviewed by Howard D. Grier Published on H-German (April, 1996) David Glantz, America's foremost Soviet mili‐ grad in November 1942. Here the authors depict a tary historian, joins with Jonathan House, Asso‐ Red Army fghting two vicious foes -- the Nazi jug‐ ciate Professor of History at Gordon College in gernaut and Joseph Stalin himself. As German Georgia, to bring us an important and long-need‐ armies swept ever deeper into Soviet territory, ed study. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Stalin repeatedly refused to heed his military ad‐ Army Stopped Hitler demolishes several myths visers, usually with disastrous results. The third and clarifies dozens of unanswered questions. section deals with the turn of the tide from No‐ The book is divided into four sections. In the vember 1942 to December 1943. Glantz and House first part, the authors examine the Red Army from show how the Red Army effectively responded to 1918 to 1941, and set forth their thesis that the the Nazi threat as skilled commanders like Mar‐ Red Army did not achieve victory in the East sim‐ shal Georgi Zhukov, Marshal Aleksandr ply by copying German tactics. In fact, Blitzkrieg- Vasilevsky, and General Alexei Antonov planned style, mobile tactics had been devised and em‐ and executed effective offensive operations of ployed by Russian troops during the Russian Civil their own. Stalin began to show faith in his subor‐ War, decades prior to World War II. The authors dinates, although he often times set goals that also analyze the catastrophic effect of Stalin's were still too ambitious. The fnal portion of the purge of the military, and repeatedly demonstrate book concerns the period from January 1944 until how it hampered Soviet military performance. A May 1945, with a brief section included on the So‐ brief section on the Winter War provides addi‐ viet war against Japan in August 1945. The au‐ tional information on that often neglected con‐ thors give a fne account of how the Red Army flict. conquered eastern Europe and captured Berlin. Glantz and House conclude their work with fve The narrative then examines the frst period extremely useful appendices containing statistical of the Eastern Campaign, from the German inva‐ data on relative troop strengths at various periods sion in June 1941 to the Soviet offensive at Stalin‐ H-Net Reviews of the war, casualty tables, and information on So‐ refused to budge in that sector; some revision to viet arms production. Marshal Zhukov's reputation of never having lost The authors provide answers to many nag‐ a battle is thus required. The authors also ques‐ ging questions that remain unresolved a half-cen‐ tion the long-held assumption that General tury after the war's end by shifting the emphasis Friedrich von Paulus could have broken out of from the German viewpoint to that of the Soviets. Stalingrad had Hitler permitted the attempt. Lack For example, this work refutes the notion, frst ad‐ of fuel, ammunition, and transport space ruled vanced by the Nazi government, that Stalin was out such a breakout. The book is also well docu‐ preparing an invasion of Europe when the Ger‐ mented; sixty pages of notes follow three hundred mans struck. The authors also convincingly pages of text. Most notes refer the reader to Rus‐ demonstrate that the German drive on Moscow sian authors who had access to Soviet archives, was not halted solely due to logistics and weather, but there are some references to interviews and but also by determined and persistent resistance archival material as well. Finally, there is a valu‐ by the Red Army. Furthermore, the narrative able discussion of materials in Soviet archives makes several points generally absent from Ger‐ and an essay assessing information released to man accounts of the war. Snow and mud, for in‐ this point. stance, also existed on the Russian side of the Despite these impressive contributions, there front. Most German studies explain the problems are some minor problems. The work suffers from the weather caused for the Wehrmacht, but do poor editing. Marshal Leonid Govorov, for exam‐ not explain how the Red Army continued to func‐ ple, is once listed as Govarov (192), and German tion in spite of the weather. Perhaps more impor‐ General Lothar Rendulic is named correctly in the tant, we learn that the Red Army, like the index, but referred to as Rendulac throughout the Wehrmacht, suffered from personnel shortages. text. In addition, a chart listing the initial deploy‐ German accounts frequently refer to the suppos‐ ment of German forces participating in Operation edly inexhaustible food of Soviet troops and Barbarossa omits Army Group South's Panzer‐ equipment, but Glantz and House reveal that this gruppe 1 (32). There are inconsistencies in the actually reflects the Soviets' ability to strip troops notes as well. Occasionally a work is cited by its and equipment from other sectors of the front in subtitle, while full bibliographic references are order to achieve crushing superiority at break‐ sometimes given and sometimes not. The lack of a through sectors. Time after time the Russians de‐ bibliography hampers easy access to the authors' ceived the Germans regarding the site of upcom‐ sources. While the focus of this work is admittedly ing Soviet offensives. on the Soviet side of the war, the authors rely too Besides providing correctives on topics such heavily on the often misleading memoirs of Field as these, the authors provide much that is new. Marshal Erich von Manstein and General Heinz For the frst time historians have accurate num‐ Guderian. In addition, George Blau's 1955 study, bers of Soviet troop strengths and casualties. In The German Campaign in Russia, long super‐ addition, Glantz and House reveal that when the seded, is cited throughout. Some references, Red Army launched its offensive at Stalingrad, an moreover, are quite confusing, such as the cita‐ even larger operation (in terms of troops and re‐ tion of Vasili Chuikov's memoirs for Hitler's dis‐ sources allocated) occurred simultaneously. This missal of Guderian as Chief of the German Gener‐ operation, which previous Soviet accounts re‐ al Staff (258, 373, n. 5). ferred to as a feint, was designed to wipe out Ger‐ Nonetheless, the merits of this work far out‐ many's Army Group Center. Yet German defenses weigh its deficiencies. There is much in this 2 H-Net Reviews monograph for anyone interested in the war in the East. This book belongs in every college li‐ brary and on the shelves of all World War II histo‐ rians. Copyright (c) 1996 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected]. If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-german Citation: Howard D. Grier. Review of Glantz, David; House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. H-German, H-Net Reviews. April, 1996. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=376 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 3.

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