LEADERSHIP AT THE OPERATIONAL

LEVEL:CANADIAN MILITARY HISTORY DOCTRINE ANDASOVIET CASESTUDY Associated Press 9504220378

Muscovites are dwarfed by this giant image of Marshal Zhukov hanging from the Lenin Library, 22 April 1995.

by Hugues Canuel

Introduction upon the post-Cold-War experience, but they equally reflect the long tradition of Canadian military service in the ore than 15 years have passed since the fall of the framework of the major conflicts of the 20th Century.3 MBerlin Wall. The Canadian Forces (CF) is continuing Furthermore, and given the fundamental nature of the to adapt to the complexities of the post-Cold-War era. underlying principles, the authors of the new leadership As much in Canada as in the rest of the Western world, doctrine have accepted the challenge of elaborating the ‘peace dividends’ were achieved at the same time as the upon a theory applicable to all levels of command – strategic, ‘New World Order’ sank into instability. The 1990s were operational, and tactical – for all ongoing operations difficult years for Canadian military personnel. While conducted by units deployed overseas, as well as for those suffering stringent reductions to their budgets, as well tasked with the smooth running of activities at home, in as to their actual numbers, there was a concurrent and both line and staff positions.4 unexpected increase in overseas military operations. The difficulties that were encountered during some of these deployments, as well as several disciplinary incidents that took place in Canada, attained such notoriety that Commander Hugues Canuel is the Executive Assistant to the Chief Canadian authorities saw fit to effect a robust turnaround.1 of the Maritime Staff at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Collège militaire royal This process eventually culminated in the creation de Saint-Jean, as well as a Master of Arts degree from the Royal of a new military ethos, as well as a new doctrine Military College of Canada. Commander Canuel also completed the dealing with leadership for the Canadian Forces.2 The Command and Staff Course and earned a Master’s degree in documents that are their embodiment are based largely Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in 2006.

Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 77 This claim to a universal application of Canadian doctrine never- theless poses concerns when the time comes to disentangle the fundamental constraints that are neces- sary to the success of the command exercised at a particular level.5 However, this article does not aim to dismantle the fundamental theories of the doctrine. It is, above all, aimed at demonstrating that it remains necessary to identify precisely among the numerous elements of the general theoretical framework those that are truly essential elements for the leader to successfully operate at a given level of command. To do so, DND photo AR2008-JO11-181 the approach adopted will be to isolate the essential principles of Leadership at the Operational Level while applying Such a definition, while being relatively neutral, is not the Modern Model of the Canadian Forces to the study at all satisfactory in the framework of this study because of a Historic Figure involved in combats that were radically the aim here is to identify the attributes of a commander different from recent Western military experience. exercising effective leadership specifically at the operational level. It thus becomes necessary to define General (later Marshal) Georgi Konstantinovich this concept not only in military terms but in a manner Zhukov played a critical role leading armies of the that places the emphasis upon the effectiveness of during the Second World War. It is his fulfilling a given mission. The Canadian Model rests experience as a commander at the operational level on the upon such a definition: “...[To] Lead, Motivate and East Front, particularly from the summer of 1941, until Empower” in such a way that a group of individuals the end of the following winter, which provides one fulfills a mission in a professional and ethical manner, of the most amazing frameworks to put the Canadian while also developing or improving upon the capacities Model of operational level command to the test.6 Although that contribute to the group’s success.8 the Zhukov case study is quite different from the most recent operational experiences of the Canadian Forces, it A bonus, from an efficiency perspective to this nevertheless confirms the validity of some fundamental concept of leadership within the Canadian Model, principles that were isolated by this author with the Canadian reflects the adoption of the “Stratified Theory of prototypes of the post-Cold-War period, and during all Systems.” This theory distinguishes between the two ongoing operations. First, however, it will be necessary to functions of leading people in the execution of their conduct an intuitive analysis of the theoretical Canadian mission and daily tasks, and leading the institution, Model in order to identify a key responsibility that is central thanks to the development of strategic and professional to each of the five criteria of leadership efficiency found capacities required by the organization.9 This duality therein. These responsibilities will then be applied to the is dynamic, since the roles and responsibilities attributed to a case study in order to measure the nature of Zhukov’s leader within the heart of a military organization evolve success as an operational leader during the desperate months during an individual’s career. The individual may generally of fighting undertaken by a faltering under the expect to concentrate upon the first category when at battering blows of the German . the bottom of the hierarchy. Later, the individual plays an increasingly important role in the leadership of the The Canadian Forces Leadership Model institution as progression to the top of the pyramid occurs. During the vague time period that constitutes the midst study dealing with leadership must first clarify the of this upward progression, individuals may find themselves Aterm. The modern definition can be summarized in positions that authorize and even obligate them to simply as: “The process by which an individual can carry out two functions simultaneously, although to varying influence a group of people to attain a common goal.”7 degrees according to circumstances.10

78 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 The Canadian Forces Leadership Model thus rests the elements that are truly fundamental, and even more upon two principal functions – to lead the people and so at the operational level. The process must include to lead the institution – to which different effectiveness a broader discussion about the nature of command at dimensions are applied, and from which importance the operational level in order to identify the framework varies according to the hierarchical responsibilities addressed in this article. previously mentioned.11 The following five dimensions comprise an efficient framework necessary to the execution Leadership at the Operational Level of the mission while respecting the professional and ethical aspects required from members of the Canadian Forces: anadian military doctrine recognizes three degrees C of operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. 1. Mission success; The operational level is described as follows: “The level of command at which one employs forces to attain strategic 2. Internal integration; objectives in a theatre or a zone of operations through the conception, organisation, and planning of campaigns 15 3. Member well-being and commitment; and large operations.” The conflicts of the first industrial MILITARY HISTORY era clearly illustrated the need to establish a new military 4. External adaptability; and discipline in order to bridge the gap between the establishment of great political/military objectives preceding 5. Military ethos.12 the battles (strategy), and the application of military might on the battlefield (tactics). This concept is directly The first dimension constitutes the essential inherited from the expanded vision first developed in result, namely, the success of the mission that can become Prussia during the 19th Century, and it was used by the the ultimate aim of the leader – while the next three Soviet Red Army between the two world wars under dimensions are elements that facilitate the mission’s the banner of Operational Art. success. Faced with the essential result (success of the mission) and the empowerment results (internal integration, well-being of subordinates, and adaptability to the outside world), the military ethos deals with the execution of the mission by which the general standards fix the limits to be respected while aiming for the desired results.13

This theoretical structure provides a very useful framework when it comes to clarifying leadership of the Canadian Forces. In contrast, as noted in the introduction, its formulation is meant for all levels of command as well as for all current and ongoing operations, and this can make its practical application difficult within a specified context. In the figure illustrating the functional responsibilities of Canadian leaders, different statements of responsibility are presented under the two major leadership functions, as well as for each effectiveness dimension. Even though they are specific, these statements vary greatly within a given dimension. Under the function, Leading People, for example, the effectiveness dimension linked to Mission Success may be filled by a range of responsibilities, from an assessment of personal competence and the pursuit of self-perfection, to achievement and management of the resources necessary to carry out one’s duties. The function Leading the Institution, on the other hand, can be measured under the criterion of effectiveness dimension, “external adaptability” by the responsibilities of initiating change, as well as that of conducting routine reporting on information destined for the outside world.14

This spectrum of disparate responsibilities, although all applicable at different levels according to circumstances, can hinder the reader in understanding what the essential

practices really are that are necessary to provide effective Art Resource ART315328 leadership for the different levels of command. Thus, it becomes necessary to try to refine this model to stress Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke.

Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 79 Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth While the Second World War would Karl Bernhard von Moltke (the Elder), “It is his [Zhukov’s] become known as the Golden Age of victor of the German unification wars experience... Operational Art, it appeared initially of the 1860s and of the Franco-Prussian that the Cold War would deal it a final particularly from the war of 1870-1871, is often recognized blow. Several observers imagined that as the first genuine practitioner of summer of 1941... the strategy of nuclear dissuasion the Operational Art.16 Specifically, he which provides one of adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty established the procedures and means Organization (NATO) during the 1950s the most amazing necessary to coordinate the movement and 1960s would eliminate the need to and the procurement of large-scale frameworks to put study the movement and utilization of goods and services destined for the the Canadian Model large armed groups.18 However, difficulties massive armies that then dominated experienced in the field with tried of operational the European battlefields, and they and tested procedures by most of the benefited from increasing mobility level command to Western powers during the period of and lethality, right up until their mutual the test.” decolonization, and, particularly, the neutralization in the trenches of the failure experienced by the United States First World War. The new Red Army in Vietnam, signalled a renewed interest in then adopted and refined the German precepts by Operational Art. Ultimately, in further confirmation of applying the lessons learned from this conflict, as well this trend, the Atlantic Alliance adopted a strategy of Flexible as from experience gained in the battles that would Response that included the need to employ a grand scale follow the Communist Revolution of 1917. The term of conventional military forces. This movement led to Operational Art is likewise attributed to a school of the formal adoption of Operational Art in the doctrine thought inspired during the 1920s through the writings of all NATO member states, Canada included.19 This of General A.A. Svechin, whose vision was formally appreciation of the nature of the operational level allows implanted in Soviet doctrine during the course of the one to clearly identify the responsibilities essential to following decade by Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskiy.17 the success of a leader exercising his authority at this level. And intuitive analysis of the Canadian Model leads to the conclusion that for each of the five effectiveness dimensions mentioned earlier,20 and found under the dimension of Leading People, the following responsibilities are indispensable in the effective exercise of leadership at the operational level:

1. To clarify objectives and intentions;

2. To oversee, to inspect, to correct, and to evaluate;

3. To supervise and educate subordinates, and to establish the standards and programs of activities;

4. To anticipate the future; and

5. To seek and to accept responsibilities.

It should not be deduced from this list that the other statements of responsibility are not pertinent, or that they are not as essential at the operational level, or that they do not necessarily relate to the range of operations. However, the five responsibilities selected herein are all required, regardless of the mission or the operational context.

However, this intuitive analysis, based upon the particular demands at the operational level of commanding in the Canadian Forces context, needs to be validated to ensure its legitimacy. The application of these concepts to the experience that General Zhukov lived through, under the extremely difficult context of the invasion of the

Associated Press 370511036 Soviet Union by Germany, allows for a determination of the relevance of this leadership model at the Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky. operational level.

80 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 General Georgi Zhukov: An Operational Leader Zhukov embarked upon a dazzling career in the cavalry, which led eventually to his specialization with armour he study of General Zhukov as an operational leader during the hiatus between the two world wars, under the Tis complicated by the system of command particular supervision of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the aforementioned to the Red Army during that era. The Soviet system proponent of the Operational Art. Subsequent to his was largely decentralized until the German invasion survival of the Stalinist purges of 1937/1938, General Zhukov of 22 . Immediately following the invasion, distinguished himself during the battles that pitted the an in-depth reorganization led to the creation of a new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) against Japan and very different structure.21 Under the leadership of a in 1939, which then led to his appointment as Chief of new war cabinet (GOKO) that united the most important Staff of the Red Army in January 1941.24 He held this members of the Communist Party and dictated the – position during the commencement of fighting between political/military priorities, the Stavka the USSR and Germany in June 1941, was created to assume the form of a and was thus included in the Stavka true headquarters, with a system of “Canadian military from its inception. However, as a result of

joint armies that were completely subject doctrine recognizes his opposition to the strategic priorities MILITARY HISTORY to the GOKO, and tasked with the three degrees of expressed by Stalin during the course production of large and strategic plans of that summer, General Zhukov lost his coordinating the whole Soviet military operations: strategic, position as Chief of Staff. He then became effort.22 The administrative military districts operational, the first commander of the new Front were then abandoned in favour of creating and tactical.” of the Strategic Reserve in August 1941, geographic Fronts23 uniting many Army while remaining a member of Stavka.25 and leading them operationally. For the purpose of this study, we presume that the Stavka was the German code name was directing Soviet military activities at a strategic level for the invasion of the USSR. Its purpose was to under the political direction of GOKO, while, at the Front, occupy the European part of the nation, and to the military commanders were exercising their leadership eventually draw a continuous line of occupation along at the operational level. the Ural Mountains, from Arkhangelsk in the Arctic, to Astrakan on the coast of the Caspian Sea.26 The This clarification does not apply to General Zhukov, countering Soviet strategy necessitated the sacrifice as he was busy on both levels. Having joined the ranks of the forces deployed along the original border, and it of the Red Army at the start of the Russian civil war, depended upon the establishment of successive lines of defence. This deployment within the immense Russian steppe, or grasslands, was intended to exhaust the German . These defences were aimed at slowing the enemy while at the same time causing irremediable losses to Wehrmacht formations. Additionally, it allowed the Soviet authorities to assemble the required forces to push an exhausted enemy into a series of counter-offensives, and to recapture their own territory.27

This difficult period extended from August 1941 to December 1942, and, although it was a defensive phase of the overall Soviet strategy, it represents one of the best opportunities to measure the value of the

DefenseImagery.Mil HD-SN-99-02756 operational leadership of General Zhukov. Although Zhukov (centre) with General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery at General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Frankfurt at war’s end, 10 June 1945. he accumulated more defeats

Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 81 than tactical victories in the field during this period, to sustain the “900 day siege” that the old tsarist capital these operations did not diminish his success at the of Leningrad would ultimately endure. As a result of operational level in the attainment of “strategic objectives his actions, inestimable German human and materiel in a theatre or zone of operations.”28 Whether it is as resources were immobilized during this siege.29 Even the commander of the Front of the Strategic Reserve during the very costly defeat, in November and at the battle of Ielnia during August 1941, or as December 1942, endured by General Zhukov during the representative of Stavka at Leningrad during the Operation Mars, the overall Soviet strategy was following month, General Zhukov did not succeed served by immobilizing the German Army Central in halting the German steamroller. However, in the Group, preventing it from sending reinforcements toward first instance, he managed to slow considerably the the south to save the VI German Army, which was by momentum of the Wehrmacht toward Moscow, and, in then completely surrounded at Stalingrad.30 the other, to lay down the necessary defences in order The Defence of Moscow and the Canadian Model

bove all, the defence of AMoscow and the Soviet counter-offensive of December 1941 afford us the clearest illustration of Zhukov’s effectiveness as an operational leader. Although the vastness of the Soviet territory had, to this point, resulted in the retreat of the Red Army, the GOKO decided to stand fast at the Soviet capital. Meanwhile, the Stavka had estimated that German offensive capabilities within their Central Army Group would soon reach a breaking point, due to the great distance from the German homeland, as well as to the upcoming effects of the Russian winter. Since the end of September 1941, German troops had been unable to proceed further, due to heavy rainfall and an autumn that rendered the roads of the Russian grasslands practically useless for armoured operations and the transportation of troops. Nonetheless, the frosty conditions of November 1941 reversed this situation. And General Zhukov had been recalled to Leningrad in October – hardly a month after the German Army had launched Operation Typhoon, with the aim of attempting to drive through to Moscow by mid-November 1941.31

In order to assure the mission’s success (the main result and the first effectiveness dimension in Canadian terms), General Zhukov had to first outline his intentions and objectives (the statement of responsibility) to support the strategic purpose or target of saving Moscow in both the short and

Map by Christopher Johnson the long term. The Front was now less than 150 kilometres from Operation Barbarossa.

82 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 the Soviet capital, or mid- way between Smolensk and Moscow. General Zhukov recognized the urgent need to establish three lines of fortifications between the Front and the capital in order to continue the essential task of wearing out the German troops during their advance.32 However, this defensive goal was not complete in and of itself, as halting the Central Army

Group at Moscow’s doorstep MILITARY HISTORY by the end of 1941 would not only postpone the final assault until the following spring but it would also give the Wehrmacht several months to concentrate its forces at a time and place of its choosing. Therefore, General Zhukov established that an offensive component was essential to the defence Associated Press 4108010101 of the capital, as it was not Burning buildings in the background as Germans enter the city of Smolensk on their drive to Moscow, only necessary to halt the August 1941. German advance but it must equally repulse the enemy to the extent that it would cause a retreat for the first outcome and third effectiveness dimension) demanded time since the launch of Operation Barbarossa. This retreat of General Zhukov that he supervise and educate his to a new line would also facilitate the resistance of the Red subordinates, and that he establish the required standards Army during the course of renewed fighting in the spring. and activities (expression of responsibility). Despite the development of the theory of Operational Art at the core The establishment of new and fortified lines within the of the Red Army between the two wars, General Zhukov vast emptiness of the Russian grass plains that surrounded fully understood that the purges of 1937/1938 and the Moscow, as well as the constitution of vast reserves of rapid mobilization of 1941 meant that the majority of manpower and materiel necessary for a renewed counter- Soviet officers were not ready to apply the military offensive, represented almost-insurmountable challenges doctrine that was in place.34 He was then compelled to to the Soviets during the autumn of 1941. A high degree install a system in which the forces that were at his of internal integration (the expected outcome and the disposal – whether they were the formations already second effectiveness dimension) was needed to assure badly-off as a result of their deployments to the Front the success of the Western Front. General Zhukov constantly or the new divisions that had been assembled during those supervised, inspected, corrected, and evaluated (expression chaotic months – could execute the tasks assigned to them. of responsibility) the preparations for war undertaken by his troops, as well as their performance during the The crisis of 1941 did conduct of operations. He always kept himself abreast not allow Zhukov to supervise “However, as a result of the Front’s ongoing developments, not only by and educate his subordinates extensive and appropriate use of intelligence and in the modern sense of the of his [Zhukov’s] communications but also by conducting regular visits to term. Nevertheless, he regularly opposition to the the commanders of subordinates undergoing training. endeavoured to promulgate strategic priorities Whenever he was unable to undertake such informative written instructions on the missions, he reassured himself by deploying certain key conduct of operations, based expressed by Stalin members of his own staff to the field to observe first-hand upon the experience that during the course how events were unfolding, and – of equal importance – to had been rapidly acquired of that summer, report upon the performance of his subordinates.33 during the first months of the invasion. He insisted General Zhukov lost As the management of the soldiers was largely particularly upon the need to his position as dependent upon the professionalism of their officers, the avoid disastrous frontal attacks Chief of Staff.” well-being and the engagement of the members (expected against the enemy positions

Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 83 in favour of changing movements and infiltration of their Thus, while the Front of Briansk was ordered to most-exposed positions.35 Taking equal advantage of the block this second flank of the German movement, slowdown of the German advance during the autumn, General Zhukov concentrated the efforts of the Western General Zhukov insisted that the formations sent to him as Front by first immobilizing (December 1941), and then further reinforcements would not be divided up to furnish pushing (January 1942) the enemy aside while retaking the replacements conveyed directly to the Front. First Kalinine. This forced a general retreat of the Wehrmacht and foremost, he installed a new system by which in order to stabilize the Front on the most favourable these newly-constituted divisions would first establish positions, but at a greater distance from Moscow, for themselves at the rear in order to pursue a short but the remainder of 1942.37 This success directly resulted intensive training program. This training was based equally from General Zhukov’s capacity to judge the enemy’s upon the combat lessons learned from the viewpoint of intentions, and to formulate a plan while the German the division leaders and the experience gained in the field Armies were acting exactly as he had anticipated all at the tactical level.36 along. Of further note, Zhukov insisted upon maintaining an efficient military intelligence service (information However, all the efforts exerted for the defence of gathering) at his Army Corps throughout the war.38 Moscow would not have achieved much had General Zhukov not first established the required lines of fortification, With the Soviet capital literally having been saved or had he not undertaken a counter-offensive at a given by Zhukov, he demonstrated the same deep sense of military place and time, based upon the movements and intentions of ethos (the fifth effectiveness dimension, which is linked an enemy that previously had taken the initiative and held the to mission conduct), by conducting ongoing evaluations advantage. General Zhukov subsequently developed a certain and accepting responsibility (expression of responsibility). capacity to predict the future (expression of responsibility) in This was a remarkable fact, given that during this period, order to maximize the adaptation to the outside world Stalin and his henchmen regularly ordered the execution (expected result and fourth effectiveness dimension) of the of generals who were perceived as having failed in forces at his disposal. Zhukov believed that upon confronting their fight against the enemy. General Zhukov did not the fortification established by the Soviets on the direct route hesitate to accept the command of forces that were the from Smolensk to Moscow, the Central Army Group would, most critical to the Front, thereby defending the most above all, endeavour to conduct an encircling manoeuvre. As cherished and precious objectives from Stalin’s viewpoint. a result, it would approach the capital from the northwest Zhukov was personally threatened with death in October after having seized the town of Kalinine, and from the 1941 by V.I. Molotov, the Commissioner for Foreign southwest, while transiting the towns of Tulsa and Kaluga. Affairs and an influential member of GOKO, if he lost DND photo AR2009-A004-019

84 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 Moscow to the enemy.39 Nevertheless, General Zhukov Under the function Leadership, it is essential above all did not hesitate to express himself liberally to his for the operational leader to exercise the following superiors all throughout the conflict.40 His behaviour responsibilities to: demonstrated the embodiment of unshakeable character that was repeatedly tested during the most sombre moments 1. Define his objectives and intentions in order to reach in the Red Army’s history. And he always refused to the essential result, meaning the success of a mission; sacrifice the operational efficiency of his forces to satisfy some of the most hopeless schemes of Stalin. 2. Oversee, inspect, correct, and evaluate the planning and the execution of those plans (the first expected Conclusion result dealing with internal integration);

eneral Zhukov carried out his 3. Supervise and educate subordinates “General Zhukov Gleadership at the operational level (the second expected result dealing in conditions that were unimaginable in recognized the with internal integration); the current Canadian military context. urgent need to MILITARY HISTORY Routinely, he led the movements of 4. Predict the future in order to adapt establish three lines millions of men and thousands of tanks. to the outside world (third expected He could (and did) suffer the loss of of fortifications result); and tens of thousands of soldiers during between the Front a single day of battle. The welfare of a 5. Seek and accept responsibilities and the capital...” country depended upon these operations, within the conduct of a mission. while the threat of execution constantly hovered over his head should he fail. Nevertheless, it During this same period, General Zhukov exercised was during this period when the balance of power several other operational responsibilities in addition to those favoured the enemy that General Zhukov demonstrated stated above within the five effectiveness dimensions. He his composure as a commander at the operational equally led the institution by influencing the Soviet strategy level. Exemplified by the lesser operations at Ielnia, and by virtue of the role he played within the Stavka. However, also during the defence of Moscow, which was quite while the Canadian Model is formulated to cover command desperate, and even during his crushing defeat during as much at the strategic and tactical levels as at the Operation Mars, this Soviet general achieved the strategic operational level, the successful exercise of leadership at this objectives that were assigned to his theatre of operations. last level rests upon the continued execution of the five essential responsibilities identified in this article. The study The success of General Zhukov is attributed to of General Zhukov’s experiences in comparison to the his continued application of establishing essential theoretical Canadian Model developed in the context responsibilities, which today are found elsewhere, such of the post-Cold-War era demonstrates the fundamental as in the leadership model of Canadian Forces doctrine. nature of these elements, and it validates the practice of The study of this Soviet leader during the Second World operational leadership through a range of ongoing operations. War has demonstrated that the successful exercise of the commander at the operational level depends upon attaining specific results within the general model.

NOTES

1. The origins of these reforms are, for the most part, 2. A complete statement of the ethos of the Canadian 4. Department of National Defence publication found in several reports published in 1997, Forces is found in the Department of National A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the including the Report of the Commission of Defence (DND) publication A-PA-005-000/ Canadian Forces-Conceptual Foundations Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces AP-001, Duty with Honour – The Profession of (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, to Somalia, A Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons Arms in Canada (Kingston, ON: Canadian 2005), pp. xi-xv. This publication “...provides an of the Somalia Affair (Ottawa: Procurement and Defence Academy, 2003), pp. 24-34. The new extended discussion of the theories and ideas Services Canada, 1997). The list of these reports doctrine of leadership is found in the DND underpinning the doctrinal manual.” p. i. is contained in a letter from the Minister of publication A-PA-005-000/A-P-003, Leadership Foreword by General Hillier. National Defence to the Prime Minister, which in the Canadian Forces- Doctrine (Kingston, 5. The different levels of strategic, operational, and was made public that same year. See Douglas ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005). tactical command are defined according to Young, Letter from Minister Young to the Prime 3. See General R.J. Hillier’s news release on this the Canadian doctrine in the Department of Minister, dated 25 March 1997; accessible at subject in Chief of the Defence Staff letter, National Defence publication, B-GG-005-004/ . Forces, dated 15 April 2005, pp. 1-2. Procurement and Services Canada, 2000), pp. 2-7.

Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 85 6. Although General Zhukov has been routinely 22. Formed on 30 June 1941, the new Committee on advance toward Leningrad and the ensuing siege recognized in Western literature under his title of National Defence (GOKO-Gosudarstvennyi from 8 August 1941 to 18 January 1944 are Field Marshal of the Soviet Union, he had only Komitet Oborony) assumed political control described in detail by Harrison Evans Salisbury in received this rank in February 1943. As this of the Soviet military effort under the personal The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad, 2nd Edition article deals with the period 1941-1942, the rank direction of Stalin. The general headquarters (New York: Dalapo, 2003). of general will be used whenever Zhukov’s name of the USSR (commonly called Stavka in 30. Operation Mars was initiated by Zhukov on is mentioned. Western literature instead of SSSR, Stavka 25 November 1942, while 7. Liberal translation of the definition that was Glavnovo Komandovanyia Vooruzhennykh Sil) commenced on 19 November. The latter was formulated by Professor Peter G. Northouse in was established on 23 June under the direction targeted at defeating the German troops as they Leadership: Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition of the Commissioner (equivalent of Soviet advanced toward the Caucasus Mountains to the (Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), Minister) of Defence, S.K. Timoshenko. See south. Operation Uranus was an unprecedented p. 3: “Leadership is a process whereby an Otto Preston Chaney, “Marshal Zhukov as a success, resulting in the destruction of the individual influences a group of individuals Military Leader,” extract from Military VI German Army at Stalingrad and a general to achieve a common goal.” Leadership and Command: The John Briggs offensive by the Red Army to retake the Ukraine 8. Leadership in the Canadian Forces-Conceptual Cincinnati Lectures, 1988, under the direction during the course of 1943. Operation Mars Foundations, p. 131. of Henry S. Bausum (Lexington, VA: The VMI was aimed at eliminating the great salient of 9. Ibid., p. 2. Foundation, 1989), p. 97 and pp. 100-101, Rzhev, occupied by the Central Army Group, but 10. Ibid., p. 4. See also Leadership in the Canadian Also see Erickson, The Soviet High Command, this plan failed. However, it still remained the Forces-Doctrine, p. 6. pp. 598-599. strategic objective of Zhukov to immobilize 11. Table 4-1, Responsibilities of CF leaders as 23. Each time the word appears in italics in this the Central Army Group, despite suffering they relate to major functions and effectiveness article, the expression Front is cited as a Russian extreme losses. Therefore, he transformed a dimensions, in Leadership in the Canadian word and not an English expression. In context, tactical defeat into an operational success. Glantz Forces-Conceptual Foundations, pp. 48-49. Front signifies command of the armed corps. and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 129-139. 12. Ministry of National Defence, Leadership in the That is how, for example, in June 1941, the troops The authors provided an in-depth treatment of this Canadian Forces Doctrine, p. 3-4. assigned to the military districts of Leningrad key aspect of the episode, which was largely 13. This last criterion certainly reflects upon the were transferred to the North Front. The ignored in Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red statement of ethos found in Duty with Honour, Strategic Reserve Front was created similarly by Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 pp. 24-34. The theoretical basis supporting using diverse formations that were not already (Lawrence KA University Press of Kansas, 1999). the choice of five criteria of efficiency is found occupied in defending the borders. See David 31. For a detailed treatment of the preparations and of in Leadership in the Canadian Forces- M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans the execution of the Defence of Moscow Fundamental Concepts, pp. 18-23. Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler during the period October-December 1941, see 14. Table 4-1, Leadership in the Canadian (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, Fugate and Dvoretsky, Thunder on the Dneipr, Forces-Conceptual Foundations, pp. 48-49. 1995), p. 39. pp. 267-299, and Glantz and House, When 15. Operations of Canadian Forces, pp.1-5. 24. Tony Le Tissier presented a good summary on Titans Clashed. pp. 78-91. 16. With respect to the influence of von Moltke, see Zhukov’s life, from his birth in 1896 until the 32. See the excellent map detailing the disposition Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: dawn of the Second World War, in Zhukov at the of forces that were present during the period Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Peter Oder: The Decisive Battle for Berlin (Westport, 30 September-15 November 1941 in John Paret (ed.), Makers of the Modern Strategy from CT: Praeger, 1996), pp.3-6. For a biography that is Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton NJ: complete and objective, see Otto Preston Chaney, Viking Penguin, 1989), p. 207. Keegan also offers Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 281-295, Zhukov (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma a good summary of the first six months of fighting and Bradley J. Meyer, “The Operational Art: Press, 1996). on the Eastern Front on pages 173-208. The Elder Moltke’s Campaign Plan for the 25. On the confrontation between Stalin and Zhukov 33. Chaney, “Marshal Zhukov as a Military Franco-Prussian War,” in B.J.C. McKercher and and the transfer of the latter to the Strategic Leader,” p. 106. Michael A. Hennessy (eds.), Operational Art – Reserve Front, see Chaney, “Marshal Zhukov as a 34. This resulted in the almost total abandonment of Developments in the Theories of War (Westport Military Leader,” p. 98, as well as Glantz and all expectation as to the tactical performance CT: Praeger, 1996), pp. 29-49. House, When Titans Clashed, p. 76. of the Soviet troops, placing more of an 17. On the development of Operational Art in the 26. See Matthew Cooper, The German Army emphasis upon the need to accumulate an Soviet Union during the space of two wars, see 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failures irresistible mass and crushing firepower before Jacop Kipp, “Two Views of Warsaw: The (New York: Stein and Day, 1978), pp. 259-285 for going on the offensive. Frederic Kagan, “Soviet Rusian Civil War and the Soviet Operational Art, the genesis of this operation. Operational Art: The Theory and Practice of 1920-1932,” in Operational Art, pp. 51-85, and 27. See Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, Initiative”, 1917 – 1945,” in Leadership: The John Erickson, The Soviet High Command –A pp. 38-41, as well as Brian I. Fugate and Lev Warrior’s Act (Carlisle PA: The Army War Political History 1918-1941(London: Macmillan Dvorestky, Thunder on the Dniepr: Zhukov-Stalin College Foundation Press, 2001), pp. 236-238. & Co., 1962). and the Defeat of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg (Novato, CA: 35. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 67. 18. Lawrence Freedman, “The first Two Generations Presidio Press, 1997), pp. 39-74. This second 36. Fugate and Dvorestky, Thunder on the Dneipr, of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern work offers an excellent account of the first two pp. 303-304. Strategy, pp. 735-778. years of fighting on the Eastern Front. 37. With respect to the Soviet counter-offensive of 19. The adoption of Operational Art in the USA is 28. Conforming to the Canadian definition of January 1942, see Glantz and House, When Titans detailed by Richard M. Swain in “Filling the operational level as quoted. Clashed, pp. 87-97. Void”: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army,” 29. Zhukov carried out an assault against the south 38. M. Gareev, “Zhukov: The Great Russian extract from Operational Art, pp.147-172. flank of the Central Army Group at the end of Commander,” in International Affairs: A Russian 20. 1. mission success, 2. internal integration, August 1941 near the small locality of Ielnia, Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and 3. member well-being and commitment, causing heavy losses to the Wehrmacht for the International Relations,Vol. 43, No. 1 (1997), p. 171. 4. external adaptability, and 5. military ethos. first time since the start of Operation Barbarossa, 39. Ibid., p. 170. 21. See Erickson, The Soviet High Command, thereby slowing the advance toward Moscow. 40. S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at pp.557-560, on the Soviet command structure at Fugate and Dvorestky, Thunder on the Dniepr, War, 1941 – 1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, the start of the Second World War. pp. 166-174 and pp. 176-193. The German 1970), p. 383.

86 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009