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LEADERSHIP AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL:CANADIAN MILITARY HISTORY DOCTRINE ANDASOVIET CASESTUDY Associated Press 9504220378 Muscovites are dwarfed by this giant image of Marshal Zhukov hanging from the Lenin Library, 22 April 1995. by Hugues Canuel Introduction upon the post-Cold-War experience, but they equally reflect the long tradition of Canadian military service in the ore than 15 years have passed since the fall of the framework of the major conflicts of the 20th Century.3 MBerlin Wall. The Canadian Forces (CF) is continuing Furthermore, and given the fundamental nature of the to adapt to the complexities of the post-Cold-War era. underlying principles, the authors of the new leadership As much in Canada as in the rest of the Western world, doctrine have accepted the challenge of elaborating the ‘peace dividends’ were achieved at the same time as the upon a theory applicable to all levels of command – strategic, ‘New World Order’ sank into instability. The 1990s were operational, and tactical – for all ongoing operations difficult years for Canadian military personnel. While conducted by units deployed overseas, as well as for those suffering stringent reductions to their budgets, as well tasked with the smooth running of activities at home, in as to their actual numbers, there was a concurrent and both line and staff positions.4 unexpected increase in overseas military operations. The difficulties that were encountered during some of these deployments, as well as several disciplinary incidents that took place in Canada, attained such notoriety that Commander Hugues Canuel is the Executive Assistant to the Chief Canadian authorities saw fit to effect a robust turnaround.1 of the Maritime Staff at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Collège militaire royal This process eventually culminated in the creation de Saint-Jean, as well as a Master of Arts degree from the Royal of a new military ethos, as well as a new doctrine Military College of Canada. Commander Canuel also completed the dealing with leadership for the Canadian Forces.2 The Command and Staff Course and earned a Master’s degree in documents that are their embodiment are based largely Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in 2006. Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 77 This claim to a universal application of Canadian doctrine never- theless poses concerns when the time comes to disentangle the fundamental constraints that are neces- sary to the success of the command exercised at a particular level.5 However, this article does not aim to dismantle the fundamental theories of the doctrine. It is, above all, aimed at demonstrating that it remains necessary to identify precisely among the numerous elements of the general theoretical framework those that are truly essential elements for the leader to successfully operate at a given level of command. To do so, DND photo AR2008-JO11-181 the approach adopted will be to isolate the essential principles of Leadership at the Operational Level while applying Such a definition, while being relatively neutral, is not the Modern Model of the Canadian Forces to the study at all satisfactory in the framework of this study because of a Historic Figure involved in combats that were radically the aim here is to identify the attributes of a commander different from recent Western military experience. exercising effective leadership specifically at the operational level. It thus becomes necessary to define General (later Marshal) Georgi Konstantinovich this concept not only in military terms but in a manner Zhukov played a critical role leading armies of the that places the emphasis upon the effectiveness of Soviet Union during the Second World War. It is his fulfilling a given mission. The Canadian Model rests experience as a commander at the operational level on the upon such a definition: “...[To] Lead, Motivate and East Front, particularly from the summer of 1941, until Empower” in such a way that a group of individuals the end of the following winter, which provides one fulfills a mission in a professional and ethical manner, of the most amazing frameworks to put the Canadian while also developing or improving upon the capacities Model of operational level command to the test.6 Although that contribute to the group’s success.8 the Zhukov case study is quite different from the most recent operational experiences of the Canadian Forces, it A bonus, from an efficiency perspective to this nevertheless confirms the validity of some fundamental concept of leadership within the Canadian Model, principles that were isolated by this author with the Canadian reflects the adoption of the “Stratified Theory of prototypes of the post-Cold-War period, and during all Systems.” This theory distinguishes between the two ongoing operations. First, however, it will be necessary to functions of leading people in the execution of their conduct an intuitive analysis of the theoretical Canadian mission and daily tasks, and leading the institution, Model in order to identify a key responsibility that is central thanks to the development of strategic and professional to each of the five criteria of leadership efficiency found capacities required by the organization.9 This duality therein. These responsibilities will then be applied to the is dynamic, since the roles and responsibilities attributed to a case study in order to measure the nature of Zhukov’s leader within the heart of a military organization evolve success as an operational leader during the desperate months during an individual’s career. The individual may generally of fighting undertaken by a Red Army faltering under the expect to concentrate upon the first category when at battering blows of the German Wehrmacht. the bottom of the hierarchy. Later, the individual plays an increasingly important role in the leadership of the The Canadian Forces Leadership Model institution as progression to the top of the pyramid occurs. During the vague time period that constitutes the midst study dealing with leadership must first clarify the of this upward progression, individuals may find themselves Aterm. The modern definition can be summarized in positions that authorize and even obligate them to simply as: “The process by which an individual can carry out two functions simultaneously, although to varying influence a group of people to attain a common goal.”7 degrees according to circumstances.10 78 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009 The Canadian Forces Leadership Model thus rests the elements that are truly fundamental, and even more upon two principal functions – to lead the people and so at the operational level. The process must include to lead the institution – to which different effectiveness a broader discussion about the nature of command at dimensions are applied, and from which importance the operational level in order to identify the framework varies according to the hierarchical responsibilities addressed in this article. previously mentioned.11 The following five dimensions comprise an efficient framework necessary to the execution Leadership at the Operational Level of the mission while respecting the professional and ethical aspects required from members of the Canadian Forces: anadian military doctrine recognizes three degrees C of operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. 1. Mission success; The operational level is described as follows: “The level of command at which one employs forces to attain strategic 2. Internal integration; objectives in a theatre or a zone of operations through the conception, organisation, and planning of campaigns 15 3. Member well-being and commitment; and large operations.” The conflicts of the first industrial MILITARY HISTORY era clearly illustrated the need to establish a new military 4. External adaptability; and discipline in order to bridge the gap between the establishment of great political/military objectives preceding 5. Military ethos.12 the battles (strategy), and the application of military might on the battlefield (tactics). This concept is directly The first dimension constitutes the essential inherited from the expanded vision first developed in result, namely, the success of the mission that can become Prussia during the 19th Century, and it was used by the the ultimate aim of the leader – while the next three Soviet Red Army between the two world wars under dimensions are elements that facilitate the mission’s the banner of Operational Art. success. Faced with the essential result (success of the mission) and the empowerment results (internal integration, well-being of subordinates, and adaptability to the outside world), the military ethos deals with the execution of the mission by which the general standards fix the limits to be respected while aiming for the desired results.13 This theoretical structure provides a very useful framework when it comes to clarifying leadership of the Canadian Forces. In contrast, as noted in the introduction, its formulation is meant for all levels of command as well as for all current and ongoing operations, and this can make its practical application difficult within a specified context. In the figure illustrating the functional responsibilities of Canadian leaders, different statements of responsibility are presented under the two major leadership functions, as well as for each effectiveness dimension. Even though they are specific, these statements vary greatly within a given dimension. Under the function,
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