Karl-Heinz Frieser. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005. xx + 507 pp. $47.50, cloth, ISBN 978-1-59114-294-2. Evan Mawdsley. Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. London: Hodder, 2005. xxvi + 502 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-340-80808-5. Reviewed by James V. Koch Published on H-German (June, 2006) The world does not lack for military histories are written about in the historical surveys that of World War II, general or specific. Hence, when college students and others read. They appeal pri‐ new ones appear, it is legitimate to ask, do they marily to specialists who continue to dissect these really provide new information, insights or inter‐ campaigns, both of which are classics in the realm pretations? Both Frieser's look at the astonishing of conventional land warfare. six-week 1940 German campaign in the West that Frieser argues persuasively that Germany drove France out of the war and Mawdsley's ex‐ took several huge risks by attacking France, amination of the titanic 1941-45 German/Soviet Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (the West‐ battle on the Eastern front meet that test. Both ern Allies) on May 10, 1940. Germany was unpre‐ provide new data, or at least bring together in one pared for anything more than a very short war book data that have been dispersed over many lo‐ and chose a strategy (thrusting through the sup‐ cations. Further, both authors look at these cam‐ posedly impenetrable Ardennes, crossing the paigns a bit differently than previous researchers Meuse, and driving to the Atlantic Coast) that and prod us to reformulate our understanding of could have been frustrated in a half-dozen ways critical aspects of these battles. Even so, neither is by the Western Allies, especially France. France, likely to have much effect on how these battles however, was led by sclerotic political and mili‐ H-Net Reviews tary leaders, often lacked the desire to fght and Frieser's narration of Sichelschnitt is but‐ was almost always tardy in its actions. Sometimes tressed by extensive data--including production French sloth was measured in hours (the failure numbers, weapon comparisons and useful logisti‐ to occupy and defend a critical bridge over the Se‐ cal information in addition to troop numbers and mois River) and sometimes in days (the failure to dispositions. The data and discussion serve to un‐ mount a timely counter attack against the Ger‐ derline both the numerical and the marginal man Sedan bridgehead). Alas, for France, this was qualitative equipment inferiority of the Wehrma‐ a campaign that was decided in its frst fve days. cht in 1940 relative to its Allied opponents. More By May 14, the Germans had exited from the Ar‐ than anything else, Frieser relates German suc‐ dennes, crossed the Meuse on a wide front, ex‐ cesses to their reliance upon mission-oriented tac‐ panded their bridgehead and were driving to the tics (Auftragstaktik) that gave individual German Atlantic Coast, which they would reach on May commanders down to the squad level objectives 20. to be accomplished and then accorded them great This story of the Sichelschnitt drive to the discretion in determining how best to fulfill them. coast and the encirclement of Allied troops by the Frieser contrasts this with the French tendency to Germans has been told many times, often by par‐ give commanders detailed, rather inflexible or‐ ticipants such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von ders often based upon rehearsed map exercises. Manstein, or by gifted storytellers such as Andre The dynamic nature of the battlefield and the dis‐ Beufre and Alistair Horne.[1] Where Frieser's ac‐ tinct communications disadvantage of the French count excels is in his highlighting of the numerous (few radios) generated numerous disasters for risks the Germans assumed and in describing them. Indeed, the French military feld headquar‐ small unit actions and individual heroics that ters at the Chateau de Vincennes did not possess a turned individual engagements into German vic‐ single radio and therefore the front-line troops tories. Frieser's status as a Bundeswehr officer no might not receive new orders for as long as forty- doubt enhanced his ability to recover and de‐ eight hours. scribe these critical points in the German thrust Similarly, Mawdsley's examination of the (for example, when an enterprising and brave largest continuous land battle ever fought---the German Feldwebel of the Tenth Panzer Division life-or-death struggle between Germany and the captured a key set of bunkers across the Meuse Soviet Union--presents extensive data to support River on May 13, 1940). his description of this campaign. Indeed, except The 1940 campaign in the West usually is de‐ for David Glantz, no other published source on scribed as an example of Blitzkrieg, a term Frieser the Eastern front has presented such detailed asserts has been bastardized by both the press troop, equipment and economic data in such an and military people. The 1940 campaign, he ar‐ accessible fashion.[3] However, where Frieser de‐ gues, was not planned as a "lightning war" and scribes small unit actions and even the actions of the Germans had minimal ability to carry one out. individual soldiers, Mawdsley's approach is If Sichelschnitt turned out to be "lightning war," broader. He focuses on armies, not individuals, this result was largely a function of French incom‐ unless they were in command (for example, petence, German luck at critical points and the ac‐ Friedrich von Paulus or Georgi Zhukov). Where tual insubordination of German commanders in Frieser's story bubbles with anecdotes, Mawds‐ the feld such as Guderian and Erwin Rommel. ley's vista is more expansive, and his attention fo‐ Still, Frieser is not the frst to make these points. cuses on huge battles such as Moscow, Leningrad, [2] Stalingrad and Kursk. In the course of these analy‐ ses, however, he does offer several provocative 2 H-Net Reviews views, for example, that the 1937-38 Soviet purges because he has no ax to grind, although he con‐ did not destroy the Soviet Army's leadership fesses to being a historian of Russia. cadre, and that Zhukov was the outstanding mili‐ The increased availability of Russian sources tary commander of the entire war. Mawdsley also over the past two decades and the continuing pio‐ pays considerable attention to major topical is‐ neering work of Glantz (who has published more sues such as the Soviet economy and partisan than thirty volumes on the Eastern front) and the warfare. estimable work of Mueller and Ueberschaer[7] en‐ The more Olympian focus of this book is un‐ able Mawdsley to provide a variety of reinterpre‐ derstandable, since the 1941-45 campaign on the tations of earlier histories noted above. Some‐ Eastern front, when compared to the 1940 Ger‐ times this reconsideration occurs when he shines man invasion of the West, eventually involved six light on events that the Soviets preferred to hide times as many personnel, generated almost one (examples include two unsuccessful offensives led hundred times as many casualties (if civilians are by Zhukov in 1942) and other times via his skillful included) and lasted about thirty times as long. If expose of the self-supporting narratives of Ger‐ one wants the story of the exploits and agony of man generals who in the postwar years attempted individual Eastern front soldiers, then one should to blame their failings on Adolf Hitler. look elsewhere. Setting aside the treasure trove of valuable Mawdsley's strength is as an explicator of the data Mawdsley provides, the most valuable por‐ major forces that determined the outcome of this, tions of the book emerge when he asks salient the most destructive land battle of all time. He questions that arise from the entire campaign, for sets the scene for all major battles, describes the example, why did it take the Soviet Union, which strategic options available to the participants, enjoyed numerical superiority and frequent briefly describes the course of these battles, totes equipment superiority over Germany, so long to up the results and discusses their implications. In defeat the Germans? Additionally, did Soviet abili‐ this, his approach does not differ markedly from ty to out-produce the Germans and demographi‐ existing histories of the eastern front such as John cally overwhelm them ultimately determine the Erickson, Glantz and Glantz and Jonathan House, outcome? With respect to the frst question, he [4] except that Mawdsley often provides more tar‐ concludes that political blindness, frequently in‐ geted supporting data and his conclusions may ept leadership, and the backwardness of the Sovi‐ therefore be less susceptible to quibbles than oth‐ et Union and its peoples in 1941 were critical. er efforts. With respect to both the frst and second ques‐ Mawdsley believes that he has written a his‐ tions, he notes Mark Harrison's argument that tory that neither relies predominantly on German military issues determined the war until 1942; af‐ sources (as did most early Western histories such ter that, economic and demographic issues did.[8] as those by Alan Clark and Paul Carell), nor exclu‐ Glantz, however, believes that the evolution of So‐ sively on Soviet sources (most of which are sus‐ viet military doctrine and the command structure pect on one count or another).[5] As he notes, were most the important influences on the out‐ "[t]he general histories of the Nazi-Soviet war, come.[9] Mawdsley concludes both were impor‐ even the larger ones, have focused on one side or tant. the other" (p. xxi)--including reputable works that Mawdsley is one of the frst military histori‐ incorporated Soviet sources such as those of ans to pay substantial attention to Joseph Stalin's Alexander Werth, Earl Ziemke and Erickson.[6] speeches.