This dissertation has bean microfilmedexactly as r e c e iv e d 68—8882

SMITH, Thomas Alexander, 1936- y L'UNION POUR LA NOUVELLE REPUBLIQUE: GAULLISM IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. The Ohio State University, Ph.D.t 1967 Political Science, general

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan (£) Copyright by

Thomas Alexander Smith

1966 L'UNION POUR LA NOUVELLE REPUBLIQUE: GAULLISM IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Thomas Alexander Smith, B.A., A.M.

******

The Ohio State University 1967

Approved by

U Adviser Department of Political Science ACKNOWLEDGMENT S

At this time I would like to acknowledge a debt to several individuals who have contributed so much to this work. First, to the late Professor Edgar S. Furniss whose deep Insight into the workings of the French polity aided me Immeasurably in my attempts to understand the nature of the UNB. and its role in the Fifth Republic. His encouragement and friendship will never be forgotten. Secondly, to Professor James A. Robinson who agreed to supervise the completion of the dissertation after Professor Furniss*s tragic death, and to Professor Andrew Axllne who painstakingly read the dissertation and whose comments were so helpful 1 am extremely grateful. Thirdly, to my wife, Camille, who never lost faith in the project and who laboriously typed the initial draft of this dissertation, I can never repay in full the debt. It is to her and the memory of Professor Furniss that I humbly dedicate this study.

ii VITA

November 12t 1936 Born - Reidsvllle, North Carolina 1960 ...... B.A., Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, North Carolina

1963 ...... M.A., Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1963 ...... Instructor, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia 1964 - 1965 . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 1966 - 1967 . . Lecturer, Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

PUBLICATIONS "Algeria and the French Moderes," The Western Political Quarterly» March 1965, pp.116-134.

FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii VITA ...... ill LIST OF T A B L E S ...... v Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. THE BURDEN OF ALGERIA: THE UNR IN SEARCH OF ARO L E ...... 13 III. THE BURDEN OF ALGERIA: RESOLUTION OF THE INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT . . 50 IV. DE GAULLE AND THE U N R ...... 123 V. THE UNR ELITE: ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS ...... 186 VI. THE UNR E L E C T O R A T E ...... 217 VII. CONCLUSION ...... 258 APPENDIX ...... 270 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 272

lv LIST OF TABLES Table Page

I The Party with which Voters Identify Most C l o s e l y ...... 226

II Percentage of 1956 Party Supporters Who Voted UNR in 1958 242

III Percentage of 1958 Party Supporters Who Voted UNR in 1962 243

IV Percentage of Party Voters Who Felt Closest to the U N R ...... 244

V Percentage of Interested, Uninterested and No Response Voters at Time of First Round Balloting on November 23, 1958 ...... 248 VI Percentage of Strong and Weak Participants in 1958 Election on the Left, Right, for the UNR and "other" G r o u p s ...... 250

VII Percentage of Stated Party Preference of Weak Participators...... 251

VIII Percentages Concerning Time Voter Made Party Decision for Vote of November 23, 1958 • . 254

IX UNR Deputies Who Voted Against Their Majority and Government Positions...... 264

v I INTRODUCTION

France is today a country governed for the most part by a single Individual, General de Gaulle, who apparently depends upon only a few trusted confidants In determining the destinies of his nation.^ These confidants, moreover, do not tend to be the traditional politicians who played such a large part in the Fourth Republic, but, rather, they are much more likely to come from the administrative and 2 large business sections of French society. So far as the continuity of executive power is concerned, the ascension to power of General de Gaulle has given the country its most stable period in many years. The age of the rise and fall of governments seems to be a thing of the past — for the time being at least. The coalitions of numerous parties which were neces­ sary in earlier years for the formation of cabinets are no

^See, e.g., Pierre Viansson-Ponte, "Ceux Qui Ont l'Oreille du General," RgalitSs. May 1965, pp.64-67; and also his article in Le Monde, May 9, 1962. 2 E.g., Henry Ehrmann, "French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests," Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1961, pp. 554-55. -1- 2. longer needed: Gaulllsts and their allies control an abso­ lute majority of the seats In the lower house, the National Assembly. Not only are several parties no longer necessary for the formation of governments, but they fall to pose a real danger to the cabinet's stability. In fact, the great political parties which dominated the politics of the Fourth Republic for the most part have been submerged by the Gaulllst tide. The Independents and Radicals for all prac­ tical purposes have been decimated, whereas the Communist and Socialist parliamentary strength is still below what we might expect normally. The bankruptcy of the Democratic Left in France at the present time is nowhere more apparent than in the machinations of recent months by the older parties to submerge their differences at the time of the 1965 Presidential elections.^ In the Fifth Republic a new parliamentary formation has come into being in place of the traditional parties: L'Union pour la Nouvelle Republique (UNR); or to be more correct and include the small number of left-wing Gaullists who joined the UNR in 1962: L'Union pour la Nouvelle Republique-Union Democratique du Travail. In­ deed, as we have already suggested, it has become the most important of the political groupings and in recent years has come close to capturing an absolute majority of the seats in the National Assembly. Throughout the Fifth Republic it has

^See, e.g., Andre Philip's Le Monde. October 7-13, 1965, Weekly Edition. 3 . been the major political party in terms of parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, the UNR-UDT has received little scholar­ ly attention. The basic reason for this state of affairs would seem to lie in any lack of apparent real power exer­ cised by political parties in the Fifth Republic. The very institution which in the past has been identified with their Influence, the National Assembly, has seen its strength eroded in the last few years. There can be no denying the fact that political parties have receded from the limelight as a force in French politics. Thus, pressure group activity is no longer centered around Parliament as it once was. The primary target for the great interests now seems to be concentrated upon the bureaucracy/ Moreover, the use of the referendum by the President has enabled him to by-pass the legislature and ultimately the parties when he so decides. The generous employment of Article 16 of the Constitution is important in this respect. Policy now is determined elsewhere. The President has become such a dominant figure in France today that all major decisions apparently have been determined by General de Gaulle himself or in consultation with a few highly placed bureaucrats and confidants. In­ deed, the question arises as to why there is a need for

^See Bernard E. Brown, "Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic," The Journal of Politics. August 1963, pp. 509- 25. 4 . political parties at all. Recognizing this state of af­ fairs a well-known Gaullist opined that their function in the future will be mainly as propagandizers of public policy. In a word, they are unlikely to have a major role as decision-makers.'* Moreover, the many statements of de Gaulle himself over the years have not been calculated to enhance the respect of the citizenry for parties; indeed, he has been very critical of them. Hence, little interest has been shown in the UNR. The fact that power seems to have shifted decisively from the legislature to the executive in general and to de Gaulle in particular has probably encouraged scholars to conclude that a study of parties is not especially fruitful. Whereas many writers have given General de Gaulle and his political views exhaustive treatment, few of them have given more than passing attention to the UNR. The very group which propelled him into power has thus been largely ignored. Nevertheless, a study of the UNR might offer a mean­ ingful contribution to the literature of political science. Several reasons might be offered. In the first place, we might justify such a study for a very simple reason, namely that the Party Itself has been largely Ignored by scholars. To our knowledge, there is not a thorough

^Apparently, as we shall see, many Gaullists do not seem to mind that the UNR is to play a secondary role. See, e.g., Edmond Michelet, Le Gaullisme, Passionnante Aventure, Paris: Fayard, 1962, pp. 152ff. 5. treatment In English or French of the Gaullist Party itself. Hence, an addition to the literature of French politics con­ cerned with a political group having a numerical majority in the National Assembly would seem to have some utility in itself. Secondly, it is rather obvious that as the largest French party by far, the UNR is possibly a great source for stability in the Republic today. After all, it enables President de Gaulle to put through his programs by allowing him to form a government which in turn can rely upon obe­ dient deputies. Whereas de Gaulle's rule is highly personal it would be stretching the imagination to label France a dictatorship, since parties are allowed to compete for power. It was the perceptive Raymond Aron who once pointed out that in the final analysis the stability of the Gaullist regime depends upon a majority of favorable votes in Parliament. It is the UNR which has faithfully given him that majority. If nothing else, the UNR certainly tends to perform a legiti­ mate function in French politics today. The initiative may come from the Elysee but the final stamp of approval "in normal times" must come from Parliament* This fact alone should make it worthy of study. Our prior observation about the necessity of parties for "Republican legality" might also be considered in this light. A third possible justification for the study of the UNR is that its rise to power may mean something more than 6. a mere alteration in political elites. Indeed, such an assumption appears to characterize several of the contribu­ tors to a recent well-publicized study of French politics and society.** If we are witnessing the rise of new social groups to positions of power, we should expect to find them in the governmental majority, the UNR elite. Thus a more thorough treatment of the UNR would seem to be in order to determine if France herself is undergoing fundamental changes in her political elite. If she is casting up new forces, we should be able to discover them easily enough.

The UNR still remains in many ways an anomaly; the imposing figure of General de Gaulle makes it so. We can conceive of a Conservative Party without Macmillan, or a Christian Democratic Union without Adenauer, but it is much more difficult to think of a UNR without de Gaulle. Indeed, the UNR Itself has fostered this notion. The struggle for power within the Party as early as 1958 between those members clustered around the leadership of Soustelle and Delbecque and those men who followed the lead of Albin Chalandon is instructive. The former group argued for a large, highly disciplined mass party of the Right which implicitly stood above the whims of any single individual, including de Gaulle; Chalandon, on the other hand, seems

£ Stanley Hoffman et al.. » In. Search of France. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. to have reasoned that the sole purpose for the existence of the UNR should be Its unquestioning obedience to the whims of de Gaulle; that wherever the General might turn in his political intrigues, the Movement should do likewise. It was the latter group, with the help of the President, which won out in the power struggle. Soustelle was driven out of the Party, ostensibly because of his support of the settler cause in Algeria. What was the nature of these two factions? How did each perceive the role of the Party? Were there fundamental differences? What were their role-expectations regarding General de Gaulle? Moreover, did they tend to come from different social backgrounds? Raymond Aron for one has suggested that peasants and small business elements tend to be very patriotic in France.^ If that is true we might expect to find a concentration of these groups in the Soustelle-Delbecque "faction." The factional struggle offers other challenges to the scholar. For example, to what extent is the UNR merely a tool of one man1s views? Are there any issues of importance in which the opinions of the Party have triumphed over the opposition of de Gaulle? To what extent has the latter been influenced by the Party itself? Conversely, has the UNR served as a guide for General de Gaulle? Assuming he is so dominant, can any party so dependent upon one man survive his departure from the scene? Can the heterogeneous

^Raymond Aron, France: The New Republic. New York: Random House, 1960. 8. interests which compose the UNR hold together over the long run? Does the purge of the "Algerian diehards" from the Party signify greater unity or does it portend more diffi­ culties? To find the answers we would need to study the various elements which make up the Party as well as their perceptions regarding their opponents, de Gaulle, and the Party Itself. Moreover, what about the recruitment processes in the UNR? From what can be surmised it seems that the UNR, if we subtract a handful of old Social Republican stalwarts, has created what is substantially a new elite. Certainly few of its members today have well-known names in politics. Is a new "political class" emerging? If so, what are its social characteristics? Is it part of the new middle class which is supposedly becoming so important for France? In general, are there structural changes taking place within the political class? A study of the occupational and social backgrounds of UNR members should prove enlightening to the student. Finally, there seems to be an inherent instability in the French system in that its citizens always have shown themselves responsive to new parties; and the Gaullists have been favored by such an attitude among voters. Is this fickleness on the part of Frenchmen a result of their lack of positive party identification? Since identification, as studies suggest, does tend to be relatively weak, it may be that voters can be more easily subjected to demagogic and emotional appeals also. 9. The literature dealing with the UNR is, to say the least, very sparse. As we have suggested, there are sev­ eral explanations for this state of affairs. The tremendous dominating influence of General de Gaulle, the decline of Parliament and party politics in general, and the relative newness of the UNR itself have all probably played a part in fostering a lack of interest in the UNR by scholars. Be that as it may, the major portion of the material for this project will have to be gleaned from general accounts about French parties and politics from recent and current news­ papers, periodicals and scholarly journals. No less astute a scholar than Rene Remond has remarked that the UNR is a difficult subject to penetrate in any 8 meaningful way for several reasons. Unlike the parties of the Fourth Republic, its candidates are relative new­ comers to political life. The average Gaullist deputy, unlike his counterpart of pre-1958, is much less likely to be in the public eye, and his conflicts with other UNR members probably will be kept within the confines of the Party. Rumors to the contrary, the UNR for several years has displayed a monolithic unity in public. The UNR, moreover, is difficult to comprehend because of its apparent lack of a strong social base. Its public

®Ren& Remond, "L'Enlgme de l’UNR," Esprit. February 1963, pp.807-819. 10. support appears to the observer as quite diffuse and amor­ phous. Unlike the Poujadists, or even the Radicals, the Gaullist voter may be found within almost any social cate­ gory. To this extent, according to Remond, he is difficult

Q to fathom. Finally, says Remond, the UNR seems to be devoid of a party Ideology or program. We may study the ideology of the Communists, the Socialists, or even the Independents, but a Gaullist Ideology is difficult to spell out, to make concrete. In this sense, it takes some of the vocabulary of the Right as well as that of the Left, but at times it sounds like neither of the great French "families" — for very significant reasons as we shall see. Remond suggests that the one sure way to understand the UNR is to conceptualize it as a "party of Government." Nonetheless, even this terminology is hazardous. A govern­ ment party, we might suppose, at the very least would occupy most of the major ministerial posts. But such men as Couve de Murvllle, Messmer and even Pompidou, who hold the more important portfolios, hardly have played a major role in the UNR and its development. Alone among the chief UNR figures could Michel Debre be included as a top Government UNR leader! Hence, it would seem that even Remond's con­ ceptualization of the UNR carries its limitations.

9Ibid. 11. Despite the difficulties incumbent upon the scholar who would understand the UNR as a political party, an effort In this direction should be made. The paucity of literature in the field in itself seemingly would be incentive enough to dictate such a study. Such an effort, of course, may require the use of somewhat different tools of analysis than those usually employed in the study of political parties. The UNR, as Remond has made clear, is a different kind of party. The lack of any substantial literature on the forces which compose the Gaullist "family1' in the Fifth Republic makes it necessary for us to pick and choose our subject- matter with care, or else the study itself could become too general, too diffuse. One often has the impression that almost anything might be included on Gaullism without fear of repetition, because writers for the most part have devoted their labors to the man de Gaulle rather than the Movement which he dominates. Nevertheless, this work does not purport to be an his­ torical study of the UNR, much less of Gaullism. It is true that two chapters will be included which are historical in design, but their inclusion was thought to be imperative for one very important reason: it is only through an examination of the UNR in its formative stages from 1958 to 1961 that we can understand its consequences for the French political sys­ tem at the present juncture. The intra-party struggles dur­ ing its first years in existence was to give to the UNR a 12. style, a role, and values which have characterized It down to the present. As we shall see, the triumph of forces within the Movement which gave their unconditional loyalty to de Gaulle has had major consequences for the development of the Fifth Republic as well as for the UNR. In conclusion, although this is a study of the UNR, it does not follow that we are able to include everything about it. We therefore will not consider the UNR as a local party. Such a treatise should be reserved for another place. Considerations of space as well as the singular inability of Gaullism to penetrate local structures in France have led us to treat the UNR within the national context of French politics. Indeed, one of the major para­ doxes of political life in France today is the existence of a strong party in the National Assembly which displays a continual weakness at the local level. Similar considerations have motivated our decision to limit the scope of our study so far as the UNR legislative parties are concerned. The Senate is a weak institution in Gaullist France and the UNR is weakly represented. On the other hand, the Party is well represented in the lower house; and while it is true that the National Assembly has been easily dominated by de Gaulle, a continuing focus of this study will be on the consequences of that domination for the UNR and the French political system. II THE BURDEN OF ALGERIA: THE UNR IN SEARCH OF A ROLE

The May 13, 1958 revolt In Algiers sounded the death knell of the Fourth Republic, and when it occurred, there were few defenders of the republic in evidence. For the fact was that by 1958 most Frenchmen were Indifferent to the plight of the Fourth Republic, while an active minority sought its downfall. Governmental instability combined with the forced retreat from one colony after another were humiliating to Frenchmen who had suffered continual set­ backs at least since the defeat and occupation by Germany. The war in Algeria simply brought matters to a head. The military, steadily winning battles but losing wars in colonial engagements, found itself alienated from many of the elements on mainland France. It tended to view the "politicians" as responsible for the decline in French power and prestige. The Army's commitment to French Algeria was absolute: it would not betray

-13- 14. its mission.^ The settlers, fearful for their very lives and property if the French Army left Algeria, perceived one government after another as taking one more step down the 2 road to a negotiated withdrawal. Many politicians, extending from a substantial number on the Socialist Left all the way over to the Poujadist Right, saw in the Algerian War a heroic 3 struggle to preserve the national honor. In a word, France was in an ugly mood. If her culture was so superior, why were so many indigent peoples asking her to leave their countries? How could she seemingly be doing so well on the battlefield, as in Indo-China, but neverthe­ less surrendering her position? How could she prosper as an industrial power yet find herself relegated to a secondary role in the world arena? To such questions as these, all too many Frenchmen found in their government the cause of 4 national decay. Two factors in particular suggest the

^For two excellent studies of the "mission" of the French Army see Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., De Gaulle and the French Army: An Appraisal of a. Civil-Military Crisis, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 196A; and James H. Meisel, The Fall of the Republic: Military Revolt in France. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. 9 The plight of the settlers has been recorded by Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil: The Rebellion. Its Causes. Its Effects. Its Future. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1939. 3 Eugen Weber, "Le Fievre de la Raison: Nationalism and the French Right," World Politics. July 1958, pp.560-79; Gordon Wright, "The Resurgence of the Right in France," Yale French Studies, Winter 1954-55, pp.3-12. ^Weber, Ibid. ; Nicholas Wahl, The Fif th Republic: France1s New Political System. New York: Random House, 1959, pp.15ff. 15. tendency on the part of the average Frenchman, as well as military and political elements, to place an ever-increasing emphasis upon patriotic appeals or symbols. First, opinion polls taken between 1956 and 1960 pointed to a greater con­ cern with the Algerian issue on the part of the citizenry as well as a willingness to applaud governments which took a hard line toward Algerian nationalism. Moreover, in this period increasingly large numbers appear to have been opti­ mistic in their views that the war was being settled in 5 France's interests. Second, the electorate demonstrated a greater willingness beginning in 1951 to support candi­ dates of the political Right, groups most susceptible in general to pro-colonialist sentiments. The steady increase in the parliamentary representation of the Independents and the Poujadists should be seen in this light.^ Right-wing Radicals, Bldaultist Popular Republicans, and even Social­ ists were far from immune to appeals of a blatantly nation- 7 allst vocabulary. Indeed, in all probability the various French elites had more pronounced views than did the populace as a whole

^See the French public opinion quarterly, Sondages; Revue Francaise de 11 Opinion Publique. 1957 (Nos. 2 and 3); 1958 (Nos. 3 and 4); 1959 (Nos. 2 and 3); and 1960 (No. 3). For a discussion of the problem, see William G. Andrews, French Politics and Algeria, New York: Meridith Publishing Company, 1962, pp. 15-22. 6Weber, op.cit.; T. Alexander Smith, "Algeria and the French Mod€res: The Politics of Immoderation," Wes tern Political Quarterly. March 1965, pp. 116-34. ^Weber, ibid. 16 . so far as the Algerian Issue was concerned. This Is not surprising since studies of other cultures In fact have g suggested that opinions among elites are more strongly held 9 and tend to display a higher degree of stability. In France, we do know that the Army felt so strongly about French Algeria that It was willing to help overthrow the 10 Fourth Republic and try to destroy Its successor. Business leaders, according to Granlck, likewise were strongly pro- 11 French Algeria. The political elite, as we might expect, was divided. Whereas the FCF, many Socialists, and a few deputies and leaders from all the other groups probably favored some form of disengagement In North Africa, It Is nevertheless significant that, with the exception of the Communists, everyone found It necessary to pay at least llp-servlce to "French Algeria." No deputy suspected of harboring thoughts about dealing with the National Liberation Front (FLN) stood a chance In the running for the premiership, a post which was open quite often throughout the Fourth

g E.g., see Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review. June 1964, pp.361-82. 9 Ibid. In this respect it might be pointed out that voting studies suggest much the same conclusion: higher socio-economic status groups are more aware and are more likely to hold strong opinions on Issues than are the lower socio-economic status groups. It is the former, moreover, which is likely to play a greater role in politics both in voting and recruitment. ^E.g., see Jacques Fauvet and Jean Planchais, La Fronde des Generaux. Paris: Arthaud, 1961. pp.13-42. 11 David Granlck, The European Executive: New York: Anchor Books, 1964. pp.16-18. Republic. Any premier who was suspected of hedging so far as the fight against the rebels was concerned automatically put his dominant position in jeopardy. It was a Socialist, Guy Mollet, who had invaded Suez in an effort to choke off aid to the rebels, and it was a leading Socialist, Robert Lacoste, who was one of the most intransigent sup­ porters of the settler position. The Radicals and Popular Republicans (MRP) were so divided on the issue that by 1958 they were unable to prevent major factions from de­ serting the ranks. The separation of Morice and Bidault from the Radicals and MRP respectively demonstrated that certain activists were no longer content with mere support for their positions. 12 To their Right the National Center of Independents and Peasants (CNIP) was firmly under the control — assuming Moderes could ever be controlled! — of its more dynamic supporters. Its party journal, France-Independante. was edited and owned by a fiery nationalist, Roger Duchet. Indeed, since 1956 the CNIP had been in the forefront in 13 demanding the destruction of the FLN. Few were the

12 Indeed, with the exception of the Communists, not a single major party was immune to the divisions resulting from the Algerian War. If it is true that the Fourth Republic was overthrown precisely because it was moving toward a settlement of the issue, then we can see why French parties became so faction-ridden in the last days of the Republic. See Furniss, France. Troubled Ally: De Gaulle* s Heritage and Pyospccts. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, p. x. 13 Smith, op.cit. 18. politicians who actually denounced suppression of the FLN, and no potential leader dared advocate such a policy openly. In the forefront of opposition to the Fourth Republic were the Gaulllsts. De Gaulle himself had created the Rally of the French People (RPF) to make the system so unstable as to simply disintegrate. Often joining their most bitter opponents, the PCF, In voting against the various governments, the Gaulllsts sought to undermine parliamentary life from within. Criticizing the government as unstable, 14 they contributed as much as anyone to Its Instability. Led by Jacques Soustelle In the National Assembly and the fiery Michel Debre In the Council of the Republic, they delivered scathing attacks upon their enemies. As time went on and General de Gaulle seemingly retired from public life and refused to give them leadership, some of them gradually allowed themselves to be reintegrated into the system by accepting ministerial portfolios. Others, however, refused to compromise in the least. Both types, nevertheless, seem to have hoped the regime would fall, thereby paving the way for a return to power by the leader of Free France.^ Rumors abounded In the days preceding May 13, 1958, that various Gaulllsts — nemely Debre, Delbecque, Chaban- Delmas and Biaggl — were In the thick of conspiracy plotting

■^Furniss, De Gaulle and the French Army. p.139. ^Michelet, oj>. clt. . pp.138-40. 19. the overthrow of the regime.^ When the Algerian revolt did take place, Gaulllsts were there to see that It was channeled In the proper direction. Led by LSon Delbecque and later Jacques Soustelle, the Gaulllsts were apparently able to persuade a reluctant army and settler leadership to call for de Gaulle's return to power. With Delbecque at his side, General Salan on May 15 stood on the balcony of the Forum In Algiers to ask for the return of General de Gaulle. From that point on the Gaulllsts were on their way "out of the wilderness." In a short time de Gaulle would become Prime Minister and a referendum would confirm 17 the electorate's support for the new institutions. Most critics seem to argue that the Algerian problem dominated all else in French political life. In a recent paper Nicholas Wahl suggests that the institutional develop­ ment of the French Republic Itself can only be understood as a reaction to the Algerian War. 18 And Bernard Brown recently observed: "Formulation of policy toward Algeria was the supreme test of the French political system from the out­ break of the rebellion in November 1954, to the signing and implementation of the Evian Accord in 1962."

^E.g., see Clark, op. cit. pp.371ff; Alexander Werth, De Gaulle, Harmondsworth,Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1965, pp.25-32. ^E.g., see Macridis and Brown, op.cit.. pp.82-91. ^Nicholas Wahl, "The Fifth Republic: 1965," Paper presented to Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-11, 1965, pp.1-16. 20. When the various Gaullist groups met in Jacques Soustelle's office in the fall of 1958 to consider the possibility of coordinating their activities for the approach­ ing legislative elections probably few of them had any idea that in only a few short months they would become the bitter­ est of enemies; because at that time, in those heady days of revolutionary fervor, a Gaullist was one who passionately believed in not only General de Gaulle but, in addition, also supported French Algeria. As the two ideals were soon made to diverge by the General himself, many of the latter's fol­ lowers would be faced with painful choice: a restructuring of their values or a separation from the Movement itself. Either choice was likely to be painful, and the bland assur­ ances by certain leading Gaulllsts that they were privy to their leader's anti-integrationist sentiments prior to his return to power probably should be taken with a grain of salt. The fact is that many of them simply assumed he was favorable to French Algeria; hence, so were they. Others certainly were hostile to the integratlonist argument but found it prudent to keep their opinions to themselves or at least work quietly behind the scenes. An example of such confusion would be Edmond Michelet's Impassioned work on Gaullism in which he claims that the integratlonists, namely Soustelle, should not have been disillusioned by subsequent Fifth Republic policy. Yet, he himself, on February 18 of 1958, hardly three months before the Revolution, had lent his 21. signature to a fierce Social Republican document demanding the retention of Algeria as part of France. 19 Undoubtedly, many of them probably accepted the arguments of the inte­ gratlonists half-heartedly at best and, when given the chance by de Gaulle, were only too willing to make their more liberal views known. At that meeting on October 1, there were, among others, several groups and their representatives present. The major ones seem to have been the following: Soustelle, Edmond Michelet, and Michel Debre for the "Gaulllsts in power"; Roger Frey and Chaban-Delmas for the Social Republicans; The Civic Union of the Referendum led by Chaban-Delmas; Pierre Picard was the representative of the vocal Algerian diehard group, the Union for French Renewal (URF), of which Soustelle also was a member; The Republican Convention of Delbecque and Mme. Marie-Madeleine Fourcade; All Mallem for the Center of Information and National Action for Algeria and the Sahara (CIANAS); "Workers Committees," formed during the recent referendum and led by Andre Jarrot and Albert Marcenet; and Jacques Veyssi&re as a representative of the Civil Servants. o n It was the delegates from these groups who

^^The costs of supporting French Algeria at that time were minimal, of course, since de Gaulle's views were not known. Moreover, it was a method by which Gaulllsts could damn the Fourth Republic. 20Soustelle, op.cit.. p.68; also see Jacques Fauvet, "La Strategle des Formations Politiques d'Avril & Novembre 1958" in Jean Touchard (ed.), Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958. Paris: A. Colin, 1960, p. 16n. 22. coopted themselves Into the leadership of the UNR. They were the leaders of the various Gaullist groups which had been In existence for some time but most of which were to be quite short-lived. 21 At that first meeting then, the following Gaulllsts became Central Committee members: Soustelle, Debre, Chaban-Delmas, Frey, Chalandon, Jarrot, Veyssilre, Fourcade, Picard, Marcenet, Michelet, Delbecque and All Mallem. Two days later Frey was named Secretary- General and Albln Chalandon, a banker, was chosen Treasurer. The Gaulllsts evidently did not Intend to form a single party In the beginning. Each of the groups presumably was to keep Its autonomy; hence, the Central Committee Itself was simply a body of group leaders. The UNR Itself was to be a sort of electoral cartel on the order of the CNIP In which nominations could be made and constituency fights between Gaulllsts avoided. According to Secretary-General Frey, "the chief purpose of the UNR is to prevent the various Gaullist movements from presenting several candidates in the 22 same constituency ..." The parent body would try to adjust the interests of each faction represented in the Central Committee. However, Intentions do not always carry the day and the autonomy of the various factions was soon eroded. The unifying factors seemingly were of more Importance than the

2^Fauvet, ^b 1d . ^Quoted in lb Id. p.16. 23. divisive forces within the Movement. It appears that the common loyalty to de Gaulle, the lack of any apparent con­ flict over Algeria, the ephemeral nature of several of the groups which had been created only a short time before to specifically get out the vote at the Referendum, the elec­ toral necessities, and the fact that many Gaulllsts held membership in more than one of the sub-groups all served to create very quickly a single Gaullist party. According to Jacques Fauvet many Gaulllsts in the various sub-groups were simply old RPF stalwarts who may have become inactive after its dissolution. They had ties which were more binding than their loyalty to the recently created organizations. When de Gaulle had left the political wars, they had followed him into oblivion. Although they had become inactive in politics, however, they only needed the return of their leader to reactivate themselves. In particular, among the leaders forming the UNR are (or were) individuals who belonged to more than one group. For example, Soustelle was a member of the URF as well as the URAS. Again, Chaban-Delmas was president of both the Social Republican deputies and the Civic Union for the Referendum. Gaulllsts belonging to more than a single group certainly were not uncommon. It is not surprising that by election time in November 1958, most of these sub-groups had dissolved or were of no Importance. 23 On the other hand, it

23Ibid.. p.17. 24. is true that the Republican Convention was not absorbed totally into the UNR but remained a sub-group within the larger Gaullist body. As we shall see subsequently, it was to go so far as to present candidates against the UNR, and on November 2, 1958 several Convention members would leave the UNR and form the "pro-integrationlst" Renewal and 2 / Fidelity, presenting themselves as the "true" Gaulllsts. If sub-group conflicts were not pronounced, as one might have expected, the same cannot be said about personal relationships. For no sooner was the UNR created than intra­ party bickering arose, and for a year and a half there was some doubt that the party would be able to withstand the strain of Intramural warfare. The truth was, quite simply, that the vague word "Gaullism," when applied to specific political issues or programs, tended to become rather meaningless. More than one commentator has noted how varied the political makeup of the UNR is. At one time or another it has included everything from "crypto-fascists” to left-wing "socialists," each calling itself "Gaullist." Gaulllsts ranging all the way from the far left Movement for the Community (MPC) of Dauer and Rodet 2 5 to the inte- gratlonist followers of Jacques Soustelle could agree on

^ S o m e of the struggles have been described quite well in Jacques Dauer and Michel Rodet, Le 13 Mai Sans Complots. Paris: La Fensie Moderne, 1959, pp.149-63. ^See ibid. for a statement of the "left-wing" Gaullist position. 25. certain tenets: (1) It was necessary that France Increase her status and rank In the world; (2) It was necessary that a strong state be established oblivious to the particular Interests; (3) It was necessary that the powers of the National Assembly be curtailed; (4) It was necessary that economic and social structures be brought up-to-date; and, to accomplish the above, (5) It was necessary that General de Gaulle become the supreme arbiter of the nation. Such would appear to be the basic tenets to which any Gaullist 2 g would subscribe. Beyond this point, however, disagreements soon began to take shape. The application of Gaulllsm to specific Issues by its very nature created tensions within the Move­ ment, and the General himself kept his own intentions highly secret — for very good reasons as we shall see. Moreover, the smashing success at the polls in November 1958, only a short time after the creation of the Party, brought into the UNR elements which had little in common except their stated purpose to support General de Gaulle. Thus, we find certain UNR leaders such as Albin Chalandon publicly

^^These shared values by Gaulllsts can be found in any number of works. Some of the better ones would appear to be: Rene Remond, "L'Enigme de l'UNR," Esprit. February 1963, pp.307-19; John T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, pp.85-108; Dauer and Rodet, op.cit. pp. 168ff; Soustelle, op.cit. pp.10—13; Wahl, The Fifth Republic. pp. 61-62. 26 .

criticizing the economic policy of the Debre Government. 27 Whereas the Independent Finay was the obvious target of criticism, it was difficult to see how the Prime Minister himself could remain unscathed by such attacks. The Algerian question, however, created the greatest amount of controversy in the UNR ranks. Before it finally was resolved, it had produced a bitter conflict which de­ fined the nature of the factional struggle itself. Factions and issues were determined in terms of the North African problem. Since General de Gaulle only gradually made his intentions clear to the nation, his followers were left to depend upon their own resources. The more militant among them never ceased to claim de Gaulle as a defender of "French Algeria," whereas the less committed elements — at least in the early days of the Fifth Republic — tended to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that de Gaulle would reveal his policy on North Africa. As events were to demonstrate subsequently, the latter Gaulllsts were the more prudent. A beaten Jacques Soustelle would bitterly argue that the defence of French Algeria and Gaulllsm were inseparable: de Gaulle had betrayed Gaulllsm. 2 8

^Chalandon was arguing for a less restrictive economic policy which would give a higher priority to expansion than to monetary stability. Hence, government cuts in spending programs as well as higher taxes and interest rates were condemned by the UNR leader.

^Soustelle, op. cit. 27. The struggle for party supremacy began to unfold al­ most as soon as the UNR was founded* and before it was resolved the UNR was split into two warring groups. One rather clearly defined faction led by Soustelle* Debre and Delbecque argued quite simply that Algeria was part of France and that as such it was criminal to dispose of it. Debre himself had exclaimed in 1957 that resistance to constitutional authority was a moral necessity if the 29 Republic should attempt to sever Itself from Algeria. Soustelle had been one of the major “destroyers of govern­ ments" from 1956 to 1958 in an effort to prevent anything other than relentless struggle against the FLN. These leaders differed, of course* in the degree of their militancy in defense of their positions. Some of them were outright fascists who gloried in revolution. They would be among the first to leave the UNR and seek the over­ throw of the regime. Still others would leave long after their influence had waned, still hardly able to believe that De Gaulle had adopted a course contrary to theirs. A few of them would go into the underground eventually. Still others would painfully submit to the will of General de

^®It is Ironic that this man himself was to preside over the liquidation of French Algeria. His repeated attempts to resign as well as a refusal to give up close advisers known for activist sympathizers would seem to reflect a desire for the very policies he was opposing in his role as Prime Inisterl See Pierre Viansson Ponte, The King and His Court. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964, pp.169-75. 28. Gaulle. To them, unconditional support for their leader had a higher value than their belief in French Algeria. Hence, before the Algerian problem was finally resolved, they would find themselves In the company of new intra-party allies whom they might have opposed in other circumstances. Examples of the first type would be Thomazo and Blaggi, always revo­ lutionaries and never able to compromise with the "system." Soustelle, Delbecque and Benouville would represent the second type, whereas Debre and Frey might be representatives of the third group. Indeed, our thesis here is that the role of the UNR as a political force in French society at the present time can be understood largely in terms of the party’s bringing such men as Debre and Frey into line and casting aside its more Intransigent supporters. Having once done so, it became the pliant tool of General de Gaulle. A second, more heterogeneous group did not commit itself quite so strongly to French Algeria. These Gaulllsts, whatever their differences — and they were many — were characterized above all by an unwavering support for the policies of General de Gaulle. They are what we might call

O A the Gaullist "unconditionals." They may have joined the

^®The word "inconditionel" originally seems to have been applied to Gaulllsts by their opponents as a form of derision. Supposedly, Gaulllsts had no ideas of their own; all they were capable of doing was to follow de Gaulle as if they were slaves. It was not long, however, before UNR figures were seizing upon the word as though it were a badge of pride. 29 . UNR either out of devotion to the name of General de Gaulle or simply out of sheer opportunism. Again, they may have been strong supporters of French Algeria but their loyalty to their leader came first in their structure of values; when he made his wishes known, they were quite willing to give up their defense of French power in North Africa. Their views tended to change as the President gradually unfolded before the public his own views. In a word, their opinions varied with the statements of General de Gaulle. For the sake of convenience we might conclude that there were two basic values found among the Gaulllsts in their approach to political questions: (1) French Algeria or (2) unconditional support for General de Gaulle. 31

^ W e are assuming that UNR politicians believed in some things more than in others. He are arguing that "French Algeria" and "unconditlonallsm" are the "core" values simply because in the definition of problems between 1958-61, the relationship of the UNR to de Gaulle and its stance on Algeria became the two most important issues which divided men in the Party. It is true, of course, that an individual deputy may have backed de Gaulle because he knew that in doing so he stood a better chance to retain his parliamentary seat. Presumably all deputies wished to retain their seats! It was, however, through the process of issue-definition and the consequent rising tensions that forced them in fact either to choose de Gaulle or French Algeria. In the final analysis, their choice was a rather clear-cut one forced upon them by events. On the other hand, even if it could be successfully demonstrated that our division of the UNR elite into two warring camps with two basic values was unjustified from a strictly empirical standpoint the assumption Itself would provide a useful way in which to look at the Gaullist Movement. In a word, it is a convenient way by which UNR figures might be differentiated from one another. 30.

Individuals In each "group" may have disagreed quite heartily concerning other values and, in fact, In most cases, may have found more in common with men who were their bitter opponents. However, their willingness to attach such high levels of significance either to French Algeria or to unconditional support of General de Gaulle meant that, whatever else they might have in common, compromise and mutual support were out of the question. 3 2 It is interesting to note that'the division within the UNR ranks over "French Algeria" or "unconditlonalism"

^Gaulllsts are placed in the "French Algeria" cate­ gory if: (1) they publicly criticized the North African policy of General de Gaulle; (2) if they resigned from the parliamentary group or from the UNR itself in protest against de Gaulle's policies in Algeria; or (3) if they were asked to resign from the government because of their strong integrationist views. According to these criteria the following Gaulllsts might be considered as especially favorable to French Algeria: Blaggi, Soustelle, Arrighi, Cornut-Gentille, Delbecque, Moatti, Thomazo, Mlriot, Picard, Beraudier, Battesti, Poutier, Duflot, Vllledleu, Morel, Denis, Chelha, Miciat, Vaschetti, Dronne, Fabre, Vitel, Luciani, Camlno, Nader, Chapalaln, Cathala, Dumont. Certain UNR leaders, of course, were very closely related to the Algerian diehard elements but reluctantly came to a parting of ways as de Gaulle's own ideas were clarified: Debre, Frey, Mme. Fourcade, Terrenolre, Triboulet, Neuwirth and Chaban-Delmas, for example. Still other Gaulllsts of a more "leftist" persuasion never were partic­ ularly sympathetic to the integrationist cause. Indeed, many of them would continue to remain outside the UNR it­ self, although a few would join the group when it fused with the UDT. Some of them were strong exponents of so- called "socialist" solution whereas others were "enlightened capitalists." They all were devoted, however, to de Gaulle as well as his North African policy. The following men are among the more prominent: Chalandon, Villon, Capltant, Blllotte, Marcenet, Baumel, Malraux, Barberot, Romana-Petit, Clostermann, Corniglion-Molnier, Dassault, Hamon, Dauer, Rodet. The better-known members of General de Gaulle's personal staff, it is said, are sympathetic to the "opening to the Left" (Guichard, Foccard, LaFrance). 31. found its parallel emerging over what the role of the Party should be in French society. If it is true that cross­ cutting cleavages reduce tensions, then this type of con- flict actually increased hostilities. 33 What happened was that men who divided over Algeria divided similarly over the question of party role. Hence, there was a tendency for the factions to divide into two warring camps without benefit of cross-pressures. Williams and Harrison, it is true, point out with some exasperation that past alliances among various Gaullists was no measure for predicting who would be allies in the Fifth Republic. While this is true, it nevertheless can be argued that the choice men were forced to make -- a choice de Gaulle helped them make with a vengeance — between a man and a particular policy go far in explaining most party divisions. If men were committed above all to French Algeria they conceived of the Party exercising a different role from what it would if they were committed more strongly to a policy of leaving the settlement of the issue to General de Gaulle. We might say that the stakes for which each faction was playing were so high that compromise in the final analysis was simply out of the question. When men disagree fundamentally over certain political questions, the dominant

^This point of view, so dear to pluralists, probably has been stated best by David B. Truman, The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Publlc Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960. 32. faction is likely to seek the destruction of the weaker one, which is In fact what happened in the course of time. The plain truth was that Gaulllsm as uncondltionalism and Gaulllsm in support of French Algeria were perceived as incompatible ideals when General de Gaulle's views became known. In almost every book written about French politics, the UNR is pictured as a party rent by so many divisions that one is amazed how such a structure is held together at all.^ Nevertheless, whereas Gaulllsts may have had their differences over economic or social policy, such issues remained of little consequence so long as the Algerian issue continued. Economic and social issues were submerged in the conflict over Algeria since they were of so much q 5 less intensity. With the triumph of the unconditionals we see the UNR still operating as a unified force employing little public criticism of Government policy despite the possibilities of retribution by aggrieved interests. Even in late 1966 the pressure of farmer groups could force only a few deputies to protest governmental policy in the face of upcoming legislative elections. Significantly, they would

3^E.g., see Macrldls and Brown, op.cit.. pp.293-94.

35E.g., see Andrews, op.cit.: Wahl, "The Fifth Republic: 1965." 33. not vote against their Government.^ Such was the triumph wrought by the loyal followers of the General. It will be pointed out in the course of this work that internal divisions have been exaggerated. The ultimate victory achieved by the unconditionals may very well explain subsequent Gaullist legislative behavior. We would suggest that having once given total loyalty to de Gaulle in this struggle with the exponents of French Algeria, they could not easily change their ways once that great struggle had been settled. For those deputies not sufficiently socialized into Gaullist unity, the threat of dissolution was probably enough. So long as de Gaulle is in power his dominating presence will thwart any centrifugal tendencies which may exist in the ranks. His demonstrated ability to carry unknown figures into office on his coattail, as well as that "mystique" which apparently binds Gaullists to each other should be a sufficiently unifying force. How, then, was the Party role viewed by the two fac­ tions? For their part, the French Algerians argued on the whole in favor of: (1) a well-defined and coherent doctrine; (2) a mass democratic party which would recruit extensively; (3) an alliance with, and an appeal to, the more rightist groups within the National Assembly; and (4) an electoral

O £ Such patterns of behavior had become all too famil­ iar by this time: even in 1960 and 1964, when peasant agi­ tation was quite pronounced, the unity of the parliamentar­ ians remained complete. 34. alliance which would facilitate "national" control over party candidates. Conversely, the unconditionals tended to favor: (1) a non-doctrInal approach; (2) a cadre-type party organization; (3) a more broadly-based parliamentary alliance which would include not only the right and center groups but also certain elements on the non-Communlst left; and (4) an electoral alliance which would facilitate victory for all supporters of General de Gaulle irrespective of political persuasion. We will now consider each of these conflicts in some detail. (1) The dispute over doctrine. It has been implied earlier that Gaulllsm is simply a faith in one man, although certain Gaulllsts, it is true, have attempted to weld it into a sort of political philosophy. 3 7 Our aim in this section is much more modest in that we wish to demonstrate the link between the French-Algeria-unconditional orientations on the one hand and the perceptions of party role as seen by the UNR leaders. So far as the strong supporter of the settler position was concerned, the issue was quite clear. "Gaulllsm" was much more than a single man. It was a doc­ trine which was superior even to the individual who lent his name to the Movement. 38 More specifically, it was the

3?E.g., see Michelet, op.cit.: Soustelle, op.cit.: Michel Debr€, Servir La Nation. Asni&res: Consell National de UNR-UDT, 1963. ^Soustelle makes this point quite clear in his L * Esperance Trahie, pp.8-11. 35. defease of French Algeria, and the Movement should spell out In detail Its plans for Algeria. One comes away with the feeling after reading statements by Soustelle or Delbecque, the two most prominent supporters of a party doctrine, that for them the doctrine In effect Is simply 3 9 the maintenance of French power in North Africa. In short, in calling for a party doctrine the Algerian die- hards were trying to tie the Party irrevocably to a particular policy in North Africa and in turn to force their will upon de Gaulle, if necessary. A majority party in Parliament controlled by such elements could be assured that their ideas concerning Algeria would carry the day. De Gaulle would become a captive of the majority. As Leon Delbecque put it in a sharp rejoinder to unconditionalist Albin Chalandon*s plea that no limitations be placed upon the General: "Shall we be the party . . . that arbitrates? Or shall we rather have our own personality, on the under­ standing that we give unconditional support to Gaullist ideology?"^® His own reply was in the affirmative. Doc­ trinal support of French Algeria was the plan, and support­ ers of this position envisioned a party firmly committed

^ Ibid.; also, see Delbeque's verbal exchange with Chalandon at a meeting of the National Council of the UNR in the summer of 1959 as reported in Bullet in de Presse de 1* UNR. July 11, 1959. ^^Ibid.; also, Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, De Gaulle's Republic. London: Longmans, 1961, p.H8n. 36. to that course, committed so firmly that they could dictate to the Elvsee if the need arose. The unconditionals, on the other hand, were in sharp disagreement with this position. They saw quite plainly that the support for a rigid party program of the Algerian diehards was in effect an attempt either to submerge them, or if necessary, to bring de Gaulle himself ultimately to heel. 41 Afraid that by opposition they might incur the General's wrath and risk parliamentary dissolution, feeling that in any case de Gaulle was the only force which could settle the Algerian problem peacefully, or simply devoting themselves totally to the leader of Free France, these Gaulllsts, as most Frenchmen, were Inclined to turn the whole problem over to the General as the only hope against civil strife. Moreover, the General's style, his delphic utterances, and his proclivity for keeping his intentions secret might not harmonize well with a stated UNR doctrinal position. It logically followed that if the party should submit totally to de Gaulle, then it should not evolve a program of its own. Indeed, if it were to do so, the UNR might find Itself at odds with the policies of the man whom it had pledged to follow. Such a conflict would have been

^^As we shall see, non-ideology was to be turned into a virtue by Gaullist leaders. It is a constant theme in the pronouncements of the present Secretary-General of the party, Jacques Baumel. See his remarks, for instance, in La Nation. July 13, 1964 and October 9, 1964. 37. a source of embarrassment, to say the least. To interpret the twists and turns of presidential policy initiatives nec­ essitated total Ideological flexibility for the Party. In a word, a non-doctrinaire stance was most appropriate for the existing situation, as Gaullist leader Raymond Triboulet has observed. 43 Even today, when the Algerian issue has faded as a major concern, we still do not find the Gaullists attempting to elaborate a doctrine. The fear of embarrassment if they move ahead of de Gaulle and are caught "holding the bag" is 44 apparently real enough, as several commentators have noted. Gaullists therefore depicted ideology as a hangover of the despised Fourth Republic, as fit only for the discredited "parties of yesterday." Mindfully aware of the total dependence upon de Gaulle, they have refused to elaborate a doctrine which might prove embarrassing if the President ruled counter to their suggestions. Chalandon's argument that "we are a tool of the General; he is not ours" has been 45 obeyed consistently. Moreover, they invariably have empha­ sized that the problems of the modern world demand technical solutions. Ideology, they have argued, has no utility for

^^An interpretation of the de Gaulle-UNR relationship will be given in Chapter IV. ^See, for example, Pierre Avril and Roger Pinto, Le Regime Politioue de la Ve Republique. Paris: R. Pichon and Durand-Auzlas. ^Quoted in Avril and Pinto, p.285. 38. industrial society. The trouble with the politics of the Fourth Republic was that the parties and the politicians were impractical and lacked the necessary skills for coping with present-day needs. 4 6 The consequences of non-doctrinairism for the UNR should be pointed out. In the first place, it determined the power relationship within the Movement. If there was to be no clear statement of doctrine, the resolution of the Algerian issue could not be determined by the Party. For make no mistake about it, the leadership of the two factions could have come to an agreement over social and economic policies,^ whereas Algeria was an entirely different mat­ ter. And if the Movement could not define the issue, then the definition must be made elsewhere, namely the Elysee. The unconditionals claimed that since "true" Gaullists gave absolute loyalty to de Gaulle and since de Gaulle had not made his wishes known at that time, the Party was called upon to leave the problem to the General. We can only sus­ pect that some of the leaders surely must have known that de Gaulle's views and theirs about Algerian policy were similar, and that to wed the party to a hard line

4^A good statement of this point of view may be found in an article by Jacques Baumel: "Le Gaulllsme et son Avenir," Nouvelle Frontifere. January 1964, pp. 36-38. ^E.g.» see Macridis and Brown, op. cit. It should be noted in particular that Soustelle could hardly be called a man of the Right so far as economic and social issues were concerned. See Edmond Taylor in The Reporter, December 11, 1958. 39. Implied alliances and tactics which might easily have swept them aside in a nationalist outburst. 48 Certainly such men as Chaban-Delmas, Michelet and Chalandon knew that the settlers and the Army were highly suspicious of their motives. By having the problem pushed upward, they were in fact gaining acceptance of their policy as well as maintaining their own positions of influence within the Party. Secondly, by refusing to develop a doctrine, the UNR could accommodate itself more easily to the style of General de Gaulle. We shall have more to say on this point subsequently. Suffice it to say for the present that the tendency on the part of the General to keep his critics as well as his followers in the dark as to his intentions might have proved quite embarrassing to the UNR had it committed itself in advance of the President. By becoming an unconditional supporter of the General, its leadership could be sure that no conflicts between them and de Gaulle would result from different interpretations of political reality. (2) The Dispute over Organization. In addition to the dispute about the necessity for a party doctrine, the UNR leadership was in profound disagreement as to what type

^®As we shall suggest, the climate during and immed­ iately prior to the election campaign in November 1958 must have been in itself an eye-opening experience for the less intense and committed Gaulllsts! 40. of party organization should be set up. Interestingly enough, the lines of division were similar in each case. Those Gaullists who took a positive attitude in relation to the question of the need for doctrine tended to argue in favor of the development of a "mass" party. What they favored, in other words, was a systematic and intensive drive to recruit a large dues-paying membership for the Party. Moreover, they demanded a highly articulated structure in which each level of the party would play a part in policy formation. They wanted, that is to say, a party of militants. Clothing their desire to control the levers of power in ideological verbiage, such men as Delbecque and Soustelle argued for the necessity of "party democracy." As Soustelle put it: What must the UNR be? I would like to respond very briefly to this question in saying in particular that the UNR in this Republic must be a party, let us say frankly, which is the organized and concerted expression of . . . the majority opinion. The question has been raised often, and it will be raised until the end of time, if a political organization such as ours should be a party of cadres or a party of the masses . . . . I will say that In our French and Gaullist tradition, the UNR must be a party of the people . . . The UNR must be a popular, open party imbued with a spirit of action. He and his friends knew quite well that if the leadership of the UNR was to exercise control over the organization, their own influence was likely to decline. The leadership as a whole was more amenable to de Gaulle than to any particular

^ Bullet in de Presse. July 11, 1959. 41. program. By swamping the leadership with properly Indoct­ rinated militants they could hope to dominate the situation, but to do so required a recruitment campaign as well as a strengthening of the powers of the party base. In French politics there is some evidence that militants in most parties are less flexible in their attitudes than are parliamentary leaders, so Soustelle might have expected some success in his endeavors.^ Finally, the French Algerians could hope to excite parliamentary Gaullists into supporting their position by playing on the theme that the UNR power in Parliament was insignificant and, in relation to its numbers, that a merely passive party role was being planned for it by the leader­ ship. In addition, the not insignificant sympathy within the caucus for French Algeria should be mentioned in this regard.^ The strategy was simple: control the party organl zatlon and through the latter, the parliamentary party; and by assuring your dominance of the caucus, you could make the Government and, if need be, de Gaulle, do your bidding. It was quite simple -- in theory. 52 The opponents of a party doctrine, on the other hand, opposed the concept of a mass and "democratic" party. They

■*®Williams and Harrison, op . cit. , p.116. 51Ibid. 52E.g., see Pierre Viansson-Ponte, Risques et Chances de la Veme Republiaue. Paris: Plon, 1959, pp.32-33. 42. justified their positions by arguing that the raison d 'gtre of the UNR was to support General de Gaulle. 53 Hence, the UNR must be flexible enough to follow its leader in any direction he might take it without causing undue disturbance within the Movement. Influence, then, must be concentrated with the leadership to assure a quick response to change* The type of party the unconditionals called for was "a party of cadres." What they desired, in effect, was a very loosely organized structure which would lend Itself to rigid controls at the top by government and parliamentary leaders, and by de Gaulle. Knowing very well how high the stakes were, they took several steps in the course of time to reduce the influence of the Soustellians. Their fears are reflected in a statement by Chalandon: Certainly there are some anti-Gaullists in the country, but more dangerous than they are those who are Gaullists on the condition that General de Gaulle agree with them and act as they wish him to. There are, and there will be, attempts to integrate the UNR into a bloc to force the hand of General de Gaulle and make of him a prisoner. The UNR must remain separated from all such maneuvers: it must remain free, always at the disposal of the President of the Republic .... This fidelity imposes on us the duty of following him in all areas in which the national interest is engaged .... That is a ques­ tion essentially of international policy, of the community, and of Algeria.54

^The most persuasive and eloquant arguments for this position are associated with the names of Chalandon and Chaban-Delmas. ^Bulletin de Presse de UNR. July 11, 1959. 43. As we shall see In the next chapter, the Bordeaux Congress In the autumn of 1959 was especially Important for the Uncondltionals: at that time they were able to prevent a projected recruitment drive for members, to legitimate this control over the organization and the nominating process. (3) The Dispute over Alliances at the Parliamentary Level. In this case, as In (1) and (2), similar divisions of opinion tended to reassert themselves within the UNR. The uncondltionals argued that the UNR should seek to play the role of a "neo-radical" party. As that ex-Radical Chaban-Delmas put It so well: "The UNR will be like the Radicals in the best years of the Third Republic — shifting either to the Left or to the Right but always governing."^ It will be remembered that the Radicals of the Fourth Republic exercised an influence far out of proportion to their actual numbers in the National Assembly. Their con­ tribution to the various governments was quite substantial in that they contributed so many of the premiers between 1945 and 1958. Because they had such close contacts with both the Left and Right, the Radicals could easily shift as needs dictated. Holding a delicate balance in the center of the political spectrum, they made themselves the key to coalition governments. The fact that historically they had

^Quoted in Jacques Chapsal, La V^me Republique. Paris: Les Cours de Droit, 1962-63, p.132. 44. derived from the Left and tended to favor its vocabulary, but on the other hand could claim a social base deriving from the Right, meant they could serve as a bridge between C £ contending factions. Chalandon and Chaban-Delmas, among others, wished the UNR to assume a position in the Center of the National Assembly where it could shift between Right and Left as contingencies dictated. However, the UNR should try to govern, carefully holding the balance of power and at the very least making its support necessary for any government. Such a party would ally itself with the Socialists as well as the Moderates; circumstances, the chances for dominating the coalition, and the respective powers of the various coalitions would determine the choice. It was Roger Frey who alluded to this point in 1958 when he said: "The UNR will be the great Party of the Center . . . the great Party of administration, capable of avoiding violent shifts be- 5 7 tween the Left and the Right." The argument that the UNR should be the radicals of the Fifth Republic has certain advantages. For one thing, it assures ministerial portfolios for its leaders since they will be able to take part in almost any government. Note, moreover, how the role of "neo-radical" party corres-

^ F o r an excellent study of the Radicals, see Francis de Tarr, The French Radical Party: From Harriot to MendSs- France. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. ^ L e Monde, November 27, 1958. 45. ponds so closely with the role of "cadre" party. The neo­ radical party must assure its leaders of the maximum flexi­ bility to engage in tactical maneuvers. As such the parlia­ mentary party cannot allow its organizational membership to dictate to it. If the militants played a key part in the formation of policy, a slow process of coalition-building would be required and flexibility would be inhibited. Since the parliamentary group has greater knowledge of the tactical necessities, a tight control by the organization would merely cause needless delay; hence, it is imperative that deputies have absolute freedom vis-h-vis the militants. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that a party doctrine and neo-radicalism are incompatible. If the UNR is to shift either to the left or the right, it must avoid taking abso­ lutist positions which might alienate potential allies. To take a strong stand on the Algerian issue would have the effect of doing just that; for whereas support might be picked up from the CNIF and the MRP, the chances were that the SF10 and the moderate left would balk at forming an alliance. In a word, to be a center grouping Implies a greater attachment to consensus-building than to doctrine, Lastly, as a "masse de manoeuvre" 58 the UNR could lend itself more easily to the aims of General de Gaulle. Since his clos­ est followers were to be found in Parliament, he naturally

^®Viansson-Ponte, ibid. 46. wished that the role of the parliamentary party be expanded relative to that of the organization. Moreover, since deputies were highly dependent upon him for re-election, he could force them into line by threatening dissolution of the legislature. Militants were not so easily controlled. 59 Again, his interests, as we shall see, in keeping the leftist parties strong enough to balance the French Algerians im­ plied the building of bridges to the Left. The Soustellians quite naturally took an opposing line. Since they believed in the doctrine of French Algeria, they unequlvocably sought allies who were of similar views. The logic of their situation led them to favor a parliamentary alliance of all "nationalists," namely as Intergroup led by the CNIP, the Popular Republicans of Bldault, the Morlce Radicals, and the UNR. It would be an alliance wedded firmly to the Right and would exclude the Left from any power. With such a coalition a strong North African policy would be guaranteed and the Government would be directed by national­ ist sympathizers. Moreover, the Elysee would be neutralized as a result. (4) The Dispute over Electoral Alliances. The disa­ greements as to whether the UNR should anchor Itself in the

^ F o r a good discussion, see Jacques Fauvet, "La Strategic des Formations Polltiques d'Avril S Novembre 1958," in Jean Touchard (Ed.), I^e Refereadum de Septembre et Lea Elections de Novembre 1958. Paris: A. Colin, 1960, pp.9-20. 60ibid. center or on the Right at the parliamentary plane were to be found outside of Parliament also. In 1958* the uncon­ ditionals, who believed the UNR should be a center grouping, argued that electoral arrangements be made with the Social­ ists and Radicals as well as with the parties of the Right. Since the question of French Algeria was paramount for the Soustellians, they naturally sought to ally themselves with men who shared their views. Indeed, some time before the November 1958 legislative elections, Soustelle, trying to seize the initiative from his opponents within the Move­ ment, came to an agreement with Bidault, Morice, and Duchet to present a common list of "nationals" so that the integra- tionist vote would not be split between rival candidates. In particular, Soustelle calculated that an electoral alliance with the Right, coming as it did when the momentum of the recent Referendum and the use of nationalist symbols might be exploited, 61 would eliminate the forces of the Lef t. This tactic was opposed by many of the other Gaullist leaders who had no desire to see a Parliament controlled by the Right. Indeed, some leaders like Michel Debre and Roger Frey who might have agreed on most issues with Soustelle were hesitant about following the latter's lead in this case. Arguing that "Gaullism" did not belong to any single ten­ dency but, rather, that it must unite Frenchmen of all

61Ibid. 48. * shades under its banner, certain leaders sought to broaden the representation of all parties. They emphasized that the UNR should avoid being labeled a "Party of the Right." According to Secretary-General Roger Frey, the UNR in the Fifth Republic would be a "great Party of the center." As we shall see, their reaction was quite understandable: they had no desire to see the National Assembly dominated by the "Nationals." The divisions in this case, however, do not seem to follow the rather clear lines we have seen previously. Men like Debre and Frey, ordinarily so sympathetic to Soustelle in the early days of the Fifth Republic, did not share the latter's enthusiasm for an alliance with the rightist groups alone. Hence, they were to join anti- Soustellians like Michelet, Chalandon, and Chaban-Delmas in thwarting him ultimately. Until now it has been argued in a very general way that factional disputes resulted from the relative priority various Gaullist leaders gave to the Algerian problem. Moreover, it has been suggested that the role which most UNR leaders conceived for the new Party was itself con­ ditioned by their respective attitudes towards de Gaulle and the North African crisis. As we shall see, the Unconditionals won control of the Movement quite early in the formative years of the UNR which enabled them to stamp the Party with a particular orientation which it bears even at the present juncture. In order to develop 49. these views more fully perhaps it would be advantageous to discuss in some detail a few of the key events and major crises through which the UNR passed, thereby hopefully sup- plying a richer understanding of the Party upon which the stability of the Fifth Republic has depended. In a word, it is necessary to demonstrate in detail the points we have previously raised. Ill THE BURDEN OF ALGERIA: THE RESOLUTION OF THE INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT

Immediately following the first meeting of the Central Committee of the UNR on October 1, 1958, quarreling between the various sub-group leaders became somewhat pronounced as members defending the settler views jockeyed for position with the more flexible elements. Several of the Social Republican deputies were apparently upset over what they felt was Soustelle1s unwillingness or negligence in consult­ ing them concerning the creation of the UNR. Moreover, they reportably were bothered by what they considered to be Soustelle*s tendency to create local organizations which were independent of their influence. They were especially fearful of losing control over the nominations of various Gaullist candidates.^ As a small group, they had exper­ ienced a high degree of Influence: with a changing environ­ ment, they saw power slipping from their hands.

^-L'AnnSe Politique. 1958. p. 129.

-50- 51. Since General de Gaulle apparently had not taken a positive stance one way or another on party affairs, the situation was quite fluid. True, he had made his wishes known at the October 3 meeting of the Central Committee that he would prefer that the party forego the naming of a party president — namely Soustelle — and instead accept a "collegial" direction. In this sense, it might have been taken as an attempt to tame the more dynamic elements of 2 May 13. So far as the Algerian question was concerned, however, all members for the moment were seemingly at one with Jacques Soustelle and his friends. On October 13, 1958, Soustelle, attempting to seize the initiative in the Movement, announced he favored a union "coordinating as much as possible with those who have partaken for a long time in the ideal of the construction of French Algeria." Those individuals he had in mind were Duchet of the CNIP, Bidault of the Christian Democrats, and Morice of the Republican Center. In a word, Soustelle, to protect his ideal of French Algeria, was pushing for an electoral alliance at the coming November elections with the traditional French Right. Indeed, since the numerical strength of the Bidault and Morice groups was rather insig­ nificant, the alliance was, in effect, to be composed of

^This point will be discussed in more detail below. 52. 3 Gaullists and Independents. It was anticipated that by coordinating their activities in the various constituencies, by not standing against one another, "national" candidates 4 would be able to submerge the Left in a Gaulllst tide.

This was not an unrealistic hope. The Independents in particular had done well in recent years at the polls and were more united than at any time in their turbulent history. As critics of the Fourth Republic and defenders of French Algeria, they could hope to benefit from the name of the General.^ Opposition to Soustelle's plans in the Central Com­ mittee was instantaneous. Some of the members, in addition to being angry with him for not consulting them in his decisions, felt also that he was attempting to use the UNR for his own ends.** Edmond Michelet was to suggest subsequently that Soustelle was trying to introduce "the undesirable elements born of May 13" into the Movement, presumably meaning the "Fascists" and "Vichyites" which he

3 See the remarks by Jacques Fauvet in Jean Touchard (ed.), Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958. Paris: A. Colin, 1960, p.17. ^Pierre Avril and Roger Pinto, Le Regime Politique de la Ve Republique. Paris: R. Pichon et Durand-Auziers, 1964, p.279; and Jacques Chapsal, JLa Veme Republique. Paris: Les Cours de Droit. 1962-63, pp.29-30. '’E.g., see T. Alexander Smith, "Algeria and the French Moderns: The Politics of Immoderation?" Western Political Quarterly. March 1965, pp.116-34. g Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France. Troubled Ally: De Gaulle1s Heritage and Prospects. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp.384-85. 53. associated with the settler population in Algeria.7 Three other factors, however, appear to have been decisive in thwarting Soustelle. One factor, possibly the most decisive one, was the apparent intervention of O General de Gaulle against the projected alliance. It is believed that his opposition to the agreement was decisive for the Minister of Justice Debre and Secretary-General Frey who ordinarily might have been expected to have 9 favored Soustelle. Their devotion to the cause of a French presence in North Africa would seemingly have led them to favour Soustelle's position. Second, the UNR did not wish to become a Party linked exclusively to the politi- 10 cal Right. Gaulllsts had claimed for a very long time that Gaulllsm represented all Frenchmen at one time or an­ other — at least when the latter were devoted to the "gen­ eral interest." To tie themselves exclusively to the politi­ cal right would have been a betrayal of that belief; rather, they liked to emphasize that they represented all patriot­ ic Frenchmen, no matter what their political origins,^

7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, "France: 1958," in David Butler et al. . Elections Abroad. London: Macmillan and Co., 1959, p.35. ^Furniss, op . cit. ^ F o r a good discussion, see Stanley Hoffmann, "The French Constitution of 1958: The Final Text and its Prospects," American Political Science Review. June 1959, pp. 358-82 . 54. They had argued that the Party was neither to the left nor to the right but in reality was a center grouping which appealed to all Frenchmen who were tired of the old slogans, ideologies, and parties. Indeed, Jacques Fauvet goes so far as to attribute the rejection of the alliance by the UNR to 12 this belief. Moreover, a few members of the Central Com­ mittee long had been hostile to the political Right in France and considered themselves as having much more in common with the Left than with the Right. 13 These men saw Gaullism as a force for social reconstruction and were likely to be happy in the company of ex-Vichyites and other ’'reactionary" forces. Michelet, Jarrot, Marcenet, Veyssiere and even Chalandon would seem to be of this type. Finally, although it is difficult to prove, one should not forget that the political climate of the time in itself was enough to frighten ordinarily sympathetic Gaullists awa y . ^ It was in just such an atmosphere that allowed works by left-wing Gaullists to be seized by the press; which led Jacques Soustelle to call the faithful Colonel Barberot a "crypto-Communist"; which allowed a Michelet to be labeled a traitor; and which condemned a Chaban-Delmas

l^jacques Fauvet, op.cit. ^ J o h n T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, pp.85-107. ^E.g., see Chapsal, op . cit. p.29. 55. as "a man of the System."^ An alliance of the Right would possibly have produced a National Assembly composed of fiery Gaullists, Rightists and Algerian deputies. Gaullist "liberals" hardly could have relished such a balance of forces. The extreme nationalism of the more militant of the French Algeria school hardly could have endeared itself to compromisers like Chaban-Delmas and Frey or to liberals like Michelet. In a word, such men might have perceived their very political lives as potentially endangered by the "alliance of the Four." Whatever the reasons for their indecisions, the Central Committe repudiated Soustelle's projected agreement with Duchet, Bidault, and Morice. The former's carefully laid plans came to naught. He sought de Gaulle's aid but was rejected, having been told by the General not to link himself with the old-line "politicians."^^ Chaban-Delmas and Frey led an attack in the Central Committee against the accord.^ Michelet was highly critical of the Party for nominating such men as Biaggi; and, moreover, he was upset over certain nominations made by Delbecque's Republican Convention.

1**The inflammatory nature of the campaign has received much comment. For example, see Philip Williams and Martin Harrison, op.cit.. pp.13-32, 54; and their De Gaulle * s Republic. London: Longman's, Second Edition, 1961, pp.90ff. ^Jacques Soustelle, L 'Esperance Trahie. Paris: Editions de L'Alma, 1962, pp.70-74. ^Jean-AndrS Faucher, La Cinqui&me Republique. Paris: Editions Galic, 1962, p.32. 56. Again, old Social Republicans, as we have seen, felt they had not been properly consulted. 18 For some reason Delbecque refused to follow Soustelle, perhaps because of a disgruntle- ment over the nominations. 19 Why Frey and Debr€ refused at this time to support Soustelle also seems somewhat strange since they were such fervent defenders of "French Algeria." It may have been that the influence of General de Gaulle was decisive in this case, although we cannot know for sure., 20 Discussions were said to have been heated and Soustelle reportedly threatened to resign unless he got his way. 21 In the end, however, a compromise was reached which, while not repudiating the alliance itself, extended it to other parties as well. With Michelet and Soustelle standing at his side, Frey, on October 17, read the following bulletin to the press: The UNR has unanimously agreed not to nominate candidates in constituencies where the partisans of General de Gaulle are standing. In the same spirit the UNR congratulates itself on agreements already concluded in 34 departements in order to avoid the multiplication of candidates and the dispersal of republican and national votes. To this end, the UNR proposes to extend this initiative to all other departements in order to realize the large union which the country needs for renewal. To this end, it charges its Secretary-

18Roy C. Macrldis and Bernard E. Brown, The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity. Homewood( Illinois: The Dorsey Press, p.250. 19Fauvet, o p . cit. 9 oE.g., see Williams and Harrison in Elections Abroad. p.35. 21 Fauvet, op.cit.. p.18. 57. General to make contact with other national political formations* among which are the National Center of Independents* the Christian Democrats* the Republi­ can Center and the Radical Socialist Party.22 A split had been avoided* and a compromise had resulted. Soustelle's commitments were to be accepted so far as they went — but no farther. That is to say* the accords laboriously arranged in some 34 departements would be allowed to stand. 23 From that point on* agreements with other parties in addition to the more right-wing groups were to be concluded. Moreover, government ministers, and this Included the disliked Guy Mollet* were not to be, opposed in the campaign by the UNR. The definition of who was a "National" and a "Republican" was to be extended to the Left. Finally* it might be noted that nothing was said about doctrine in the communique other than that candidates to be supported must be "national" and/or "republican." Apparently, the conflict was so pronounced that any doc­ trinal unity was impossible to attain; hence it was neces­ sary to avoid spelling out any principles* especially those relating to Algeria. 24 Soon, even the compromise was to break down* however. The need for a party so recently established to make nomina­ tions in so many constituencies was a staggering task in

22Ibid. 23Ibid., pp.18-19. 24Ibid.. p.18. 58. itself. To think the nominations could have been made peacefully by men who differed so profoundly among them­ selves would have been expecting far too much. The pres­ sures placed upon the Central Committee evidently were quite pronounced. According to a bitter Jacques Soustelle: The candidates were chosen and nominated in great disorder, inevitable in a newly-formed organization. The members of the Central Committee were pressured . . . to submit to this or that nomination. A certain number of present UNR deputies who would not now be seen dead in my company owe their nominations and their seats to m e . ^ On October 29, the question of nominations in the Seine Departement (Paris) produced a schism within the highest reaches of the UNR. As the largest and most popu­ lous area, the stakes for its control were very high. More­ over, the RPF had run well there and, as French opinion polls have suggested, the general fickleness of the more urbane electorate would seem to make it an area where the UNR could expect to do well. As part of this agreement with the CNIP, the Christian Democrats, and the Morice Republican Center, Soustelle had arranged that the four groups would not place candidates in opposition to each other. Nevertheless, the UNR drove a hard bargain in its dealings with the other par­ ties by demanding two-thirds of all the constituencies within the Seine. The others refused to accept this demand as reas­ onable. The suspicions between the groups increased and it

^Soustelle, op . ci t. » pp. 68-69. 59. was necessary to negotiate constituency by constituency. 2 ° A key man in thwarting Soustelle in this regard was Edmond Michelet. It was during this period that Michelet, the Senator from the Seine and naturally vitally interested in its politics, led a struggle within the Central Committee against the several UNR nominations which had already been concluded. Threatening at one time to resign if he did not get his way, he was particularly incensed, as a man of the Left, by the selection of Biaggi (in the 14th constituency), an activist par excellence, as well as with several of the choices of 27 Delbecque's Republican Convention. Similarly, he must have been uneasy to find himself running under the same banner in the same departement with a man like Colonel Thomazo. The latter, an activist, was to back the notorious General 28 Chassean against an old Gaullist, Chaban-Delmas. Biaggi, himself, repeatedly threatened to split the UNR unless he, 29 Battesti, and Thomazo received nominations from the Party. Moreover, Michelet wished to increase the number of Gaullist nominations among newcomers to the UNR rather than reward the former parliamentarians. In this endeavor, he was opposed

9 g Fauvet, op.cit.. p.18. 2^Macridis and Brown, op.cit.. pp.250-251. 2®Williams and Harrison, De Gaulle * s Republic. p.114. ^These intrigues have been considered by two "left- wing" Gaullists, Jacques Dauer and Michel Rodet. See their Le 13 Mai Sans Complots, Paris: La Pensde Moderne, 1959, pp.162-63. 60. both by Soustelle and Frey. Ironically enough, he found himself here in agreement on this point with Delbecque, whose Republican Convention had not been integrated totally with the UNR at that time. 3 0 Delbecque, as Soustelle and Frey, wanted "Nationalists" but he wished to name them himself (finding Delbecque in agreement with Michelet shows once again that politics makes strange bedfellows). Actually, the agreements so laboriously constructed by Soustelle with the other parties were to break down not 31 only in Paris but elsewhere as well. In particular, the CNIP was incensed when UNR Army officers were presented against well-known Independents — "Colonels of division" as Duchet later was to remark bitterly. Soustelle had to content himself for the most part with a few local pacts as, for instance, in his own area around Lyons and in Lille where Delbecque in particular had a great deal of influence. 32 Even in his own departement. the distrust was so profound between the two parties that he waited until one minute before the midnight deadline to file his own list of candi­ dates. The Independents, however, respected the accords and thus did not choose to oppose the UNR. 33

on J Fauvet, op.cit.. p.l8n. 31Ibid.. p.18; Williams and Harrison in Elections Abroad, pp.13-55. ^Williams and Harrison, Ibid. . p.36. ^ L e Monde. December 4, 1958; also Macrldis and Brown, op.cit.. p.251. 61. For the time being, then, the leadership, despite Its disagreements, at least papered over its arguments suffic­ iently to maintain a semblance of unity before the public* The bitter struggles over the nominations were on the whole kept out of the public eye, though the competition between activists and liberals, as well as between party centralizers and those who wished to control the local scene must have been intense. 34 More ominous signs of disunity, however, appeared on the horizon. On November 2, several of the more disillus­ ioned elements in Delbecque's sub-group, the Republican Convention, quit the UNR to form their own Gaullist party, although their leader refused to follow them. They called it "Renewal and Fidelity." Upset over what they considered the tendency of the UNR to favor former parliamentarians at the expense of militants in the naming of candidates for the upcoming elections, and feeling that the Republican Conven­ tion in general had been cheated in the awarding of nominal tions, these Gaullists, despite Delbecque1s apparent attempts at moderating the dispute, refused to continue in

O K the Party fold. Apparently the question of Algeria was not the immediate cause for the break — that was to come later. Although Renewal and Fidelity was generally

^ L'Annee Politique. 1960, p.129; Soustelle, op.cit. . pp.68-69. Perhaps when and if Soustelle writes his study of Gaullism, we shall gain greater knowledge of the vital function of making nominations as carried out by the UNR. 1 Annie Politique. 19 58, p.133; Fauvet, op.cit.: and Williams and Harrison, De Gaulle's Republie. p.104. 62. considered to be to the "right" of the UNR, these men seemed to be more dissatisfied with the UNR for allegedly denying 3 6 the patronage which they felt was their due. The elections of November 23 and November 30 resulted 37 in a smashing triumph for the UNR. Receiving a higher percentage of the vote on the first ballot than any other party, 3 8 it employed its excellent position to enlarge its vote in the run-off. In all, the UNR won 189 out of the 465 seats at stake on the mainland of France. Already the party was taking on certain aspects of the behavior which have characterized its action down to the present time. For example, ideology had been relegated to an insignificant role within the Party. "French Algeria" was supported but even here party statements tended to emphasize the linkage of the issue to General de Gaulle. The leadership seemed to say the problem was his and that they would simply follow his lead. The UNR election campaign had placed its major emphasis on Party fidelity to de Gaulle, its willingness to abide by his decisions, and its importance in French renewal and its hostility to the old system -- positions which all

^Fauvet, ibid. Probably their best known figure who was denied a UNR nomination was a prominent leader of "May 13," Guy Rlbeaud. See Mary Bromberger and Serge Brooberger et al.. Barricades et Colonels: 24 Janvier 1960. Paris: A. Fayard, 1960, p.62. ^The UNR electorate will be considered in more detail in a later chapter. ^®The Party received 17.6 per cent of the vote. 63. 39 major UNR figures could accept. It was Roger Frey* speak­ ing Immediately prior to the runoff (November 26), who re­ flected this attitude when he said the UNR would be "the great Party of the Center" and "the great Party of adminis­ tration, capable of avoiding excessively violent shifts between the Left and the Right.And it wasted little time in trying to prove this point. The refusal to ally itself exclusively with the Right and its publicized standing aside for certain well-known men of the Left as well as its appearance as the center Gaullist group (between the Center for Republican Reform on the Left and Renewal and Fidelity on the Right) all were calculated to give it a centrist image.^ In particular, the refusal to contest seats held by government ministers and its highly publicized backing of certain Socialist leaders (e.g., Mollet and Lacoste) as well as its desisting for several "moderates" opposed to extremists (e.g., Tixier-Vignacour) also lent an air of 42 reality to its claims as a center grouping. Such a stance

could hardly have appealed to Delbecque and Soustelle who

despised the politics of a minister like Guy Mollet. In

fact, Delbecque*s Republican Convention group simply refused

^This point of view permeates the works of Williams and Harrison. ^ Le Monde. November 22, 1958.

^•'•Ib i d .; Macridis and Brown, p. 251. ^Williams and Harrison in Elections Abroad. p. 79. 64. to go along with the UNR. Instead, the former contested several constituencies In which ministers were standing for election. This tactic hardly endeared Delbecque and A the activists to the uncondltlonals. The UNR's highly successful campaign failed, however, to draw the factions closer together after the election. Especially, the refusal of General de Gaulle to reveal his Intentions clearly led the antagonists to argue all the more heatedly that the General's policy was, in fact, their policy. All the while, apparently, the battles were carried on, quietly for the most part, but sometimes breaking out into the open for public consumption. Actually, as it was, the situation at the beginning of 1959 was not especially

favorable to the followers of Soustelle.

In the first place, de Gaulle, if he did not openly oppose Algerian integration, certainly did not encourage Its proponents to any extent. In party matters he seems to have been actively encouraging those of his supporters who were 4 4 less than totally committed to Integration. Moreover, his order on October 9, 1958 for all officers in Algeria to withdraw from the Committee of Public Safety and his removal of General Salan from his post of command must have caused uneasiness to more than one activist. All the while he

■ — - 1 ..... 43 Jean Blondel, "The French General Election of November 1958," Parliamentary Affairs. 1958-59, pp.47-59. ^This point should become more clear in the course of this chapter. 65. steadfastly refused to state publicly and clearly that he was for the Integration of Algeria with France. Secondly* the municipal elections of March 8 and 15 and the Senatorial election of April 26 were severe set­ backs not only to the UNR as a whole but more particularly* to the Soustellians. In the former* the UNR vote was much less than they hoped for. They were particularly distraught over their poor showing in the larger urban areas. 4 5 Of the 103 municipalities* the UNR was able to control only 17. Traditional France had reasserted herself at the local level. In the latter case, the UNR Senate representation was infer- A £ lor to that of the old RPF. Each of these elections gave considerable weight to those arguments which pictured the UNR as a national Party with few local roots. As for the activists* according to Williams and Harrison* they had made a revolution in de Gaulle's name* and a meaningful victory at the local level was necessary to prove to de Gaulle that the country was behind him. They could argue* and did* that

See the comments by Jacques Fauvet in Le Monde, March 22-3* 1959. The method of electing Senators in France gives a disproportionate weight to local factors* and* consequent­ ly, the local "notables" have played the major part in determining the composition of the Senate itself. Hence* unlike the National Assembly which is dominated by the UNR* the Senate has tended to reflect the traditional party balance of forces. Due to Gaullist control of the lower house, the Government, and the Presidency* the upper house has displayed little influence in the Fifth Republic. ^^For a good study in English of the RPF* see Robert G. Neumann, "Formation and Transformation of Gaullism In France," Wes tern Political Quarterly. June 1953* pp. 250- 74. 66. the smashing UNR victory in 1958 showed popular support for the cause of "French Algeria" by noting the large number of its opponents who were beaten. De Gaulle might now decide, however, to take the nation in a different direction by arguing that it was not necessarily committed to integra­ tion. Moreover, if the Party were to build a powerful mass base with a large supply of militants, it presumably needed strong local roots; however, its very weakness locally would seem to have precluded such a development. These defeats, then, were no aid to the activists in their desire to dominate 47 the UNR.

The Senatorial campaign demonstrated quite clearly the

fierce battle going on behind the scenes for the UNR soul. The struggle in Algeria was a case in point. There, the two major UNR antagonists, Soustelle and Chalandon, sup­ ported different candidates! Soustelle backed a list in­ cluding one of the more prominent colons. Alain Sevigny, whereas Chalandon, and Neuwirth, supported a list on which the name of the well-known "liberal" Baujard appeared. UNR candidates were on each list, but it was noticed that Baujard and Sevigny were singled out for endorsement by each of the two factions.48 Bitterness was quite pronounced and it is

^Williams and Harrison, De Gaulle1 a Republic. p.113.

48Ibid.. p.202. 67. reported that resignations were threatened on each side; however, they were unwilling at that time to carry out their threats. 49 As Soustelle was to remark bitterly some time after Sevigny's defeat: "Against those men chosen by his own party, Chalandon supported his own candidates who, curiously enough, were Moslems notoriously linked to the FLN."^ For Soustelle there was nothing more evil than the FLN, and for Chalandon to have favored candidates in any way connected with it was in effect to have committed treason. Chalandon1s conduct was understandable, but Neuwirth's position was not. In past years he had been a reliable ally of Soustelle's, but at that time the costs were negligible. Progressively, the question of North Africa was forcing men to take a clear stand in support of one side or the other, and Chalandon was known to be close to the Elysee. A middle position was becoming more and more difficult to maintain in the struggle. Soustelle's way of defining the issue made this fact apparent for all to see. Small wonder that the struggle was so bitter! Actually, a trial of strength between the two factions had taken place in April, approximately a month prior to the conflict over which candidates were to be supported in Algeria. At that time the UNR deputies elected their

49Ibid.. p.116.

SOsoustelle, op.cit., p.135. 68. parliamentary chairman. The two contenders were the "un- conditional" Louis Terrenoire and activist Jean-Baptiste Biaggi. Terrenoire won by 124 votes to 72. The fact that Biaggi, generally considered to be one of the most extreme activists, could garner 72 votes against Terrenoire, who could hardly be called, even in that period, a vigorous proponent for a liberal solution in Algeria, was significant. Indeed, according to Faucher, he could be classed as an "opportunist" rather than the supporter of special programs.^ The retention of Algeria apparently was so important to many members that they would support an outright radical whose career had been marked by a hostility to parliamentary government. We can only speculate how many votes a slightly less marked Soustellian might have received! Nevertheless, once again the more moderate leadership had obtained a tactical victory within the Party. By June'1959, factionalism within the UNR had become quite pronounced and much of the criticism by the activists was directed against Albin Chalandon. He, more than any other UNR figure, symbolized the "liberal" Gaullist, and he had made no secret of his preferences. As the new Secretary-General of the UNR he had staunchly favored a

^According to Faucher, op.cit.. p.105, Terrenoire should be classed as an "opportunist" rather than as a supporter of any particular program. See also Williams and Harrison, op.cit.. p.116. 5^E.g., see Le Monde, April 19, 1959. conception of the UNR as a "Party giving total allegiance to General de Gaulle." He desired a party which was pro- foundly liberal. 5 2 At the same time he had led the Party into a sort of Independent stance vis-5-vis the Debre Government by issuing periodic criticisms of economic policy as enunciated by Independents Antoine Plnay and Jacques Rueff. Significantly, de Gaulle does not seem to have objected,probably because Pinay, a popular figure, could be undermined; and,moreover, if the policy proved too unpopular, he could safely retreat into the lofty heights, leaving others to take the blame. Be that as it may, Chalandon supported a more dynamic policy which would give greater priority to expansionary forces rather than inflationary-combatting devices such as tighter money. Moreover, he was critical of the Government for not doing more in the social welfare field. It was his great hope that such a stance might win more voters to Gaullism who would ordinarily favor the left-wing groups. He wished to keep the Party firmly to the Center of the political spec- C O trum. Tactically, if he could encourage strained relations between the CNIP and the UNR through his criticisms of Pinay, he might weaken the rightist and hence activist Influences within his own Party by separating them from their allies

33E.g., See Lie Monde. April 19, 1959. 53Ibid., November 23, 1958. 70. to the right.^ In his endeavor to give the UNR a "modern," non-rightist image, he apparently found rather generalized support among all factions. Neither Soustelle nor Delbecque were said to have disagreed with him over economic policy.^ The fact that the Rueff program hit hardest some of the very interests whose votes were most Important — i.e., farmers and workers — supposedly would give the UNR deputies in

•a their criticism of Pinay a cushion against a vengeful elector­ ate in the future.^ Undoubtedly, the program was unpopular in many quarters. Even the CNIP found it prudent to criticize their President Pinay. 5 7 Finally, the UNR hoped to project its image as an Independent entity in its own right, capable 5 8 of addressing itself to the great problems. Chalandon sought, in addition, the retention of Party power at the very top levels, because quite naturally the leadership was more amenable to de Gaulle and to a "liberal" solution in Algeria. 59 Hence, he had opposed such broadening of the base of party support or of any strengthening of the

^Thia point has been made by Pierre Avril. See his L 1Evolution Politique et Constitutionelie de la Ve Republiaue: 1959-1960, Paris: R.Pinchon and R.Durand-Auzias, 1964, p.281. ^^Macridis and Brown, op.cit.. p.294. ^E.g., see Avril and Pinto, op.cit.. pp.285-87. 5 7E.g., see Furniss, op.cit.. pp.512-14. e o Williams and Harrison, op.cit.. p.116. C Q For a good discussion, see Pierre Vlansson-Ponte in Le Monde, July 23-29, 1959. Weekly Edition. 71. organization. To have favored a greater voice for the mili­ tants or to have carried out an extensive campaign to recruit new members might have Increased the chances that the UNR would become less than a pliant tool for de Gaulle and that the "liberals" possibly would have been driven to the defensive. In a word, he wished to keep the scope of party conflict within the narrow bounds of the leadership, but to do so, he had to oppose an extension of party "democracy. His opposition to Sevigny during the Senate elections, his support for electoral alliances with the more leftist and traditional parties in the legislative elections of 1958, and, in general, his support for "liberals" had enraged the activists. Now the latter decided to act. On June 21, at a gathering of the Nord Federation, Soustelle recommended that their most famous son, Leon Delbecque, make a bid for the position of Secretary-General of the UNR. Delbecque agreed and immediately publicly criticized Chalandon. The latter was to be brought down once and for all; and it was said he confided to de Gaulle that he would probably be unable to withstand the pressure to depose him.^ Apparently, the conflict between the two

^®The idea of politics as essentially the privitlzation and socialization of conflict is found in the work of E. E. Schattschneider. See his The Semi-Sovereign People, Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1960, pp.1-46. 61Le Monde. July 23-29, 1959. Weekly Edition. 72. activists and Chalandon during the Senatorial election was the last straw as far as the former were concerned., 6 2 for they were now ready to bring the intra-party conflict out into the open. In order to reduce the power of the Secretary-General, Soustelle and Delbecque demanded that he be assisted by an "executive delegation." 6 3 On June 23, 1959, the Central Committee hastily met to discuss the schism within the leadership. A compromise of sorts was reached which, it appears, was more favorable to Soustelle and Delbecque. First, to placate the friends of Chalandon, the Central Committee renewed "its confidence" in the Secretary-General and refused to dismiss him.. It was argued that when Chalandon was selected on February 6, 1959, as Secretary-General by a unanimous show of hands in the Central Committee, he was considered to be an interim appointment only. In fact, it was expressly stated that his tenure was to last "until the National Congress in June." Hence,- unwilling to render a decision which might disrupt irreparably the Party, the leadership decided that no decision was the best decision. Soustelle and Delbecque could be placated by pointing out that the position itself would have to be disposed of in a very short time anyway, so there was no necessity in rendering

62Ibld.■ June 18-24, 1959. Weekly Edition 63Ibld. 73. a verdict at that moment. 64 We might well imagine, further­ more, that the activist leader would have expected greater support in a party congress than in the confines of the Central Committee where the Elys&e could keep a check on the leaders; hence, they probably did not resist too strongly the pressures by their colleagues to the effect that they bide their time. This is merely speculation, however. Secondly, Delbecque and Soustelle won from the Central Committee a concession that a committee of four members henceforth would "assist" Chalandon in his duties. They particularly wished to restrict his statements to the press which, they argued, were contrary to party policy. The men chosen were: Delbecque, Picard, Marcenet and Neuwirth. The first two men were, without a doubt, extremely hostile to Chalandon. As for Marcenet and Neuwirth, there is room for doubt. Neuwirth until this time had been an old confidant of Soustelle but he generally was considered quite flexible in his views, a man likely to go the way of the more powerful forces.^ In the end, he was to become a bitter opponent of Soustelle.Marcenet, himself, did not appear to have been especially close to Soustelle. Whereas his ideas at

^^Avril, op.cit. p.281. 6 5 Williams and Harrison, op.cit.: Faucher, op.clt.pp. 21-22. ^Soustelle’s bitterness can be seen in a reading of his recent book, A New Road for Ffrance. Robert Speller and Sons, 1965. 74. this time were not clear, his subsequent behavior puts him in the category of the "unconditional," a label he proudly 6 7 wore. It therefore appears that the body which was to assist Chalandon was itself divided rather equally between activists and the more moderate elements, What at first appears to have been a hindrance to Chalandon may not have been so at all.

Thirdly, the Central Committee agreed to increase its size from 13 to 31 members by bringing in 18 militants, This decision was apparently a concession to Delbecque and the activists who had argued for some time that elements from the "base " should participate to a greater extent in party policies, They naturally hoped to diminish the dominant position of the government and par1lamentary elements within the party organization; precisely what Chalandon wished to prevent.„ 68 Throughout the summer Delbecque, spurred on by the concessions which he had obtained from the leadership, kept up a sustained attack against Chalandon. Posing as a simple militant of lower class origins In opposition to Chalandon*s status as a rich banker with few contacts among ordinary people, he made an appeal to status frustrations and resentments of the less privileged militants. More-

Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise. Debats Parlementaires. Assmblee Nationale. December 7, 1960, p. 4395. 68L1Annee Politique. 1959. pp.l26ff, 130-33. 75. over, he constantly pointed out that the post of Secretary- General was occupied by an Incumbent who had never held public office In his life. 6 9 Indeed, at a meeting of the National Council In July, the conflict between the two factions almost led to an open break. To Chalandon's argument that "there are . . . attempts to commit the UNR to a bloc which can force the hand of General de Gaulle," Delbecque shot back that the Secretary-General was trying to place the epithet "anti-Gaullist" on anyone with whom he disagreed.^ Neither side, however, seemed willing to take the responsibility for an outright parting of ways, so the arguments were put aside for the time being. It was agreed that a final resolution of the conflict would have to wait until the first National Party Congress planned for the following Novenber.^ The Algerian problem continued to dominate the politi­ cal scene throughout the summer and the fall. De Gaullefs refusal to utter the word "integration" and his reference to a "peace of the brave" were disheartening to the passionate believers in rie Prancaise and to those who considered the FLN as little more than cutthroats or gangsters. From

^Pierre Viansson-Ponte, The King and His Court. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965, pp.159-60; also, Williams and Harrison, op . cit.. pp.116-17. ^®UNR Bulletin de Presse. Number 5, July 1959. ^^Le Monde. July 23-29, 1959. Weekly Edition. 76. time to time it had been rumored that an accord would be established between the Algerian deputies and the UNR in the National Assembly which would make the UNR, in effect, Independent of both the Elysee and the Matlgnon. Soustelle had pushed hard for such an agreement whereas Chalandon had opposed it resolutely. 7 2 The fact that an accord was not reached suggests that Chalandon prevailed. Evidently, the recent electoral set-backs were warning enough to the relatively unknown Gaullist deputies. If de Gaulle had dissolved Parliament, they might be in severe trouble; and it is said that it was an open secret that the last thing he wished was an agreement between the UNR and the

Algerians.ai j 73 Suddenly on September 16, 1959, de Gaulle made his famous speech in which he offered self-determination to the Algerian populace once the area had been pacified. Algerians were offered three choices: outright secession, total identification with metropolitan France, or close links between two separate entities. 74 While claiming the populace was pro-French and praising the Army for its pro­ gress in pacification, the President nonetheless enraged

72Ibid., May 7-13, Weekly Edition. 73Ibid. 7^French Embassy, Mai or Addresses. Statements. and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: May 19. 1958 - January 31. 1964. New York: Press and Information Division, 1964, pp.52-56. 77. many Algerian diehards by giving Algeria the chance to opt out of the French polity.7^ The reaction of the activists was immediate. The Algerian deputies as well as the pro- French Algeria political leadership, namely Duchet, Bidault and Korice, were highly critical of the speech; however, they failed to persuade their old supporter, Soustelle, to follow their lead. The latter, who at that time was visiting North America, refused to countenance open opposition to the President. Instead, he refused to condemn the right of self- determination for Algeria, saying that to do so would com­ promise his long-standing championship of the democratic principle itself. Indeed, he argued, to oppose an election would be to admit implicitly that Algerians did not support France. Rather, he simply advised his followers in a letter to come out for the "Francisation" of Algeria.7** The atmosphere in late September and early October was extremely tense so we shall probably never know exactly how near France was to open civil strife, but rumors were rife 77 concerning the possibility of a new Algiers rebellion. It was rumored that a Bidault government might be formed. The Christian Democrat would have found strong favor among the UNR, Independent and MRP dputies — easily enough

^Bromberger and Bromberger, op . cit. . pp.52ff. 76Ibid., p.52. 77Ibid., pp.53-66. 78. support to form a majority. Only de Gaulle stood In the way. 7 8 As for Debre, his honeymoon with the activists had long since passed. Their disillusionment with the Prime 79 Minister was said to be nearly total by now. At the time (September 21) the creation of the Rassemblement pour 11Algerie Francaise. an organization joining together many of the leading activist politicians in France to defend French sovereignty in North Africa, simply Inflamed passions still further. Decrying even the legality of de Gaulle's raising the question of Algerian sovereignty, the RAF sought to create a climate of opinion which would limit his freedom of maneuver. The same old warriors for French Algeria were present among the leaders in the new organization: Bidault and Duchet. More serious for the UNR was the fact that two of its deputies were to be found in the RAF leadership, the activists Biaggi and 80 Arrighi. Colonel Thomazo also was a member of the group. With ties in the Army and Algerian circles, the RAF potent- ially could be a formidable opponent indeed. 81 The creation of the RAF was an ominous development for the UNR, because its major aim was to drive a wedge

7®Pierre Viansson-Ponte, Risques et Chances de la V^me Republique. Paris: Plon, 1959, pp.32-33. 79Ibid. ®®Avril, op.cit.. p.282. Q 1 Bromberger and Bromberger, op.cit.. pp.53-58. 79. In the Gaullist majority over the Algerian Issue. 8 2 Hope­ fully, dissident UNR deputies would then leave the Gaulllsts and join the 1FAS or Algerian groups. 8 3 With a French Algerian majority thus formed,the RAF could look to the pleasant possibility of a Bidault Government — probably even an eventual Soustelle one. Prime Minister Debre and most UNR deputies were favorable to French Algeria, of course, but the RAF realized quite well that in case of an activist conflict with de Gaulle, the Gaulllsts might not prove especially reliable. 84 In the meantime, the UNR was undergoing great stress within its ranks. Soustelle's refusal to break with de Gaulle by resigning from the Government and his support for the policy of self-determination as well as Delbecque's willingness to follow the former's lead were plus factors for the Party. Each man thereby contented himself with opting for the "Franclsation" of Algeria. 8 5 According to the Brombergers, Delbecque, particularly, was placed under much pressure to join the RAF and leave the UNR, and he seems to have been highly favorable to the new group. Nonetheless, he could not bring himself to part with his

82Viansson-Ponte, op.cit. 8 3Bromberger and Bromberger, op.cit.. p.57.

84Ibid. 85Ibid., p.56; also, see James H. Meisel, The Fall of the Republic; Military Revolt in France. Ann Arbor: Univer­ sity of Michigan Press, 1962, pp.51-59. 80 . 86 old comrades. The mystique of the Gaulllst mission exer­ cised too profound an Influence on him at that time in all probability. The break with one's comrades and beliefs was too painful. He was after Chalandon's head, and French Algeria was part of his strategy to unseat the latter from his position as Secretary-General. If either he or Soustelle had left the Party, irreparable harm might have been done to the UNR in this period. From the activist standpoint, how­ ever, it might have saved French Algeria — at least for several years. Delbecque, in Soustelle's absence, carried the leader­ ship struggle into the top echelons of the Party. Already, in mid-September, he and Chalandon had come to verbal blows in the enlarged Central Committee over whether or not the UNR should come out for "Francisation." 8 7 Chalandon, joined by the chairman of the group in the National Assembly, Terrenoire, as well as Chaban-Delmas and Neuwirth, had argued, as we would expect, that the UNR should take no specific stand but, rather, that it should do nothing to compromise the position of General de Gaulle as arbiter of the Party and the nation. Delbecque, Thomazo, and Picard demanded in this meeting that the Party expressly declare itself for "Francisation." 8 8 After much haggling, the final

Q f. Bromberger and Bromberger, ibid.. pp.53-62. ^^Ibid.. pp.55-56; Avril, op.cit.. p.282. ®®Le, Monde, September 20, 1959. 81. communique seemingly suggests that the deliberation had re­ sulted In a compromise: "The UNR will faithfully accomplish its mission which is to support completely the Chief of State ... until the day of the final choice when the entire population has been able to measure the inanity of any separatist solution. 8 9 Even this statement, however, was much too mild for many of the Algerian diehards. Eighteen Gaulllsts refused to vote for the final communique. They had wished for the statement to include a reference to the promises made by General de Gaulle in June of 1958 concerning 90 the question of Algeria. It seems they wanted to put the Party in the position of having to repudiate its leader in the event he failed to support French domination of Algeria. It was soon after this meeting of the Central Commit­ tee that Thomazo, Arrighi, Biaggi and Battesti, having now concluded the UNR would not follow them, joined with the Algerian diehards to form the RAF. A debate ensued between Chalandon and Delbecque over membership in the new group with Delbecque arguing in favor of the principle of dual 91 membership. Once again, however, Chalandon had the votes.

The Central Committee acted swiftly by prohibiting member- 92 ship in both the RAF and the UNR. Rather than risk an

Q Q Quoted in Avril, op.cit.. p.282; see also, the Le Monde issues of September 20, 21, and 27, 1959. 1Annee Politique, 1959, p.106; Avril, ibid.. p.282n. 91Bromberger and Bromberger, op.cit.. p.56. 1 Annee Politique. 1959 . pp.106-7. 82. open break with the Party, Biaggi and Arrighi resigned from the activist organization. To emphasize its opposition to the UNR members belonging to other groups, the Central Com­ mittee on October 8 prohibited membership in all groups formed since June l f 1958. 9 3 The failure by the RAF in September, however, to detach the activists from the UNR did not deter it from trying again. Amid rumors of a new "May 13," political assassina­ tion, and secret trips by well-known figures between Paris and Algiers, the "ultras" brought great pressure to bear on the Gaullist deputies. They were encouraged — or told — to leave the UNR National Assembly caucus and to .join the IFAS or Algerian groups. In a scene to be carefully staged, many UNR activists would leave their delegation and march dramatically out of the National Assembly building. Soon, it was estimated by an exuberant Pascal Arrighi, as many as fifty deputies would desert the Gaulllsts for the "ultras." 9 4 In a word, the latter planned the dismemberment of the UNR majority out of which would arise a new highly nationalist and rightist coalition. 9 5 As a result of these pressures and counter-pressures, the lines began to harden between the two major tendencies

^Avril, op.cit. , p.282; L * Annee Politique. 1959, pp. 106-7. ^Bromberger and Bromberger, op.cit.. p.62, ^ ~*Ibid . , pp.59-64; Viansson-Ponte, op . cit. , pp.32-34. 83. within the UNR leadership: the stakes of the game were high and each side knew it. The "leftists" (Chalandon, Michelet and Maurice-Bokanowski) found themselves with some valuable allies, Chaban-Delmas, Triboulet and Neuwirth, generally considered to be "opportunists" on major issues, rushed to their side as did Terrenoire and a rather reluctant Mine. Fourcade. 96 Surely they all must have sensed a triumphant rightist coalition would be in no mood to forgive the hesitant and the opposed. Almost as one, they turned on the forces of Soustelle, Delbecque and Blaggl. 97 On October 14, nine deputies resigned from the UNR parliamentary group when, at a meeting of the caucus, Souchal introduced a motion in favor of "Francisation" which Terrenoire, the group chairman, promptly referred to the Political Bureau of the group, thereby preventing a vote: the UNR would present no such motion to the National Assembly. The Political Bureau was composed mainly of unconditionals, and under the leadership of President Terrenoire the motion would be bottled up effectively in committee. 9 8

^^She was a nationalist but she worshipped de Gaulle. See Viansson-PontS, The King and His Court. pp.188-89. 9 7Faucher, op.cit.. p.115. ^®For an explanation of the purposes of the Political Bureau as well as the parliamentary groups themselves, see Jean Waline, "Les Groupes Parlementaires en France," Revue du Droit Publique et la Science Politique. Number 6, 1961, pp.1171-1237. 84. This refusal to allow a vote was the pretense for several resignations by activists from the Group: Souchal, Thomazo, Cathala, Battesti, Brasset, Brice, Arrighi, Biaggi and Delbecque. 9 9 The tipoff for the great revolt had taken place, it is said.^"®^ Arrighi, speaking for the dissidents, read the following crisp declaration to the press: "Because they have been forbidden from taking part in Franclsation. nine deputies today have resigned from the UNR. Others will follow."101 The UNR, not to say the Government, was thrown into turmoil. Lucien Neuwirth announced that killers had set 102 out to liquidate him as well as other key figures. Albin Chalandon ominously forecast a connection between the resig­ nation from the UNR and a revolt: "Parallel to these resig- nations, a real political subversion is being prepared." 103 Also, Terrenoire was frightened, it is said. Bidault, it was reported, would soon replace Debre as Prime Minister. An Algiers uprising, supported by the Army, was thought to be imminent. Immediately following a vote in the National Assembly, four of the deputies who had resigned from the UNR but who

99 Le Monde. October 15, 1959; Avril, op.cit.. pp.282, 282n. ^^Bromberger and Bromberger, op . cit. . p.62. ^•^Ibid. . pp.62-63. Italics are those of the author. 10? Le Monde. October 15-21, 1959. Weekly Edition; also Bromberger and Bromberger, op.cit. . p.63. 103 Le Monde. October 15-21, 1959. Weekly Edition. 85 . had voted subsequently for the Government apparently had second thoughts and applied for re-admlssion into the UNR parliamentary group. The UNR leadership was In no mood to forgive, however. 10 4 De Gaulle, himself, It Is said, encouraged the leadership to use the resignations as an excuse for ridding the UNR of these people once and for all.^®"* An appearance by Debre before the Central Com­ mittee In the role of a party leader -- his first as such -- would seem to confirm this interpretation. As Pierre Viansson-Ponte has pointed out, the situation must have been serious indeed when the Prime Minister takes the lead of his majority, especially considering the President's personal aversion to a close relationship between the K >6 Government and the Parliament. Moreover, Debre's be­ havior at this time apparently was in sharp contrast to his 107 initial tolerance of Gaulllsts who had joined the RAF. What he did was to call for the expulsion from the UNR of the nine men who had resigned from the parliamentary group. As the personal representative of the General and a man with

1Annee Politique. 1959, p.121. 10 5Anden Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows, New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960, p.241. 106Le Monde. October 15-21, 1959. Weekly Edition, As we shall see, this attitude tends to characterize his political style. ^^Faucher, op . cit. . p.115. 86. strong ties in Algeria, his status was sufficient to effect the desired ends. All nine deputies, including the redoubt- able Delbecque, were not reinstated. 108 The new "May 13" did not occur. In the immediate future, only one other deputy (Moatti) resigned. The Army kept the peace in Algeria, thereby preventing demonstrations which might have brought enough pressure on the Government to have forced a change in men and policy. A bitter Arrighi 10 9 supposedly remarked: "The Army has betrayed us!" As reported above, in the National Assembly the fifty deputies who were supposed to have left the UNR tamely submitted to Debre's government statement on Algeria confirming support for General de Gaulle's September 16 speech. Not a single UNR deputy voted against the Government, much less left the group. Of the nine men who resigned, four actually voted for the government! The other five did not participate. Indeed, of the 205 UNR members who participated in the vote, all of them voted "for" — even Delbecque! The rumored revolt

had, . fizzled i j out. n o Once again, the UNR had maintained its unity despite threats, blandishments and appeals to the national honor.

^®®Le. Monde. October 15-21, 1959. Weekly Edition. 10 9Bromberger and Bromberger, op . cit. ^^®Le Monde. October 15-21, 1959. Weekly Edition. 87. The men who easily might have led a sizeable group into opposition, Soustelle and Delbecque, either felt the time was inappropriate or that the ties which bound them to the leader of Free France were too firm to be cast aside. Even at the height of the crisis, according to the Brombergers, Delbecque would defend General de Gaulle's moral stature against a critical Thomazo.^^ Soustelle himself would wait several more months before finally cutting himself off from Gaullism. So far as the great majority of Gaullists was con­ cerned, their unconditional support for the Government, despite their reputed sympathy for the views of the activists, 112 was probably based in the main on two rather enduring factors: (1) The Gaullist mystique: that faith in a man and a common heritage which binds men to one another no matter how much they may momentarily disagree. 113 As Jean Waline has put it: It is necessary not to forget that the UNR parlia­ mentarian who belongs to the group composing the majority has often been elected by proclaiming himself faithful to a man and a policy, the one as defined by General de Gaulle. Until now these personal sentiments have been in effect the funda-

^■^^Bromberger and Bromberger, op . ci t. H^Viansson-Ponte, Risaues et Chances de la Veme Republique,pp.32-33. ^■^Leo Hamon, Partis Politiques et D&politisa tion , " In Georges Vedel (ed.), La Depolitiaation: Mythe ou Realite, Paris: A. Colin, 1962, pp.115-44; Hamon's "Members of the French Parliament," International Social Science Journal. Number 4, 1961, pp. 545-66. 88. 114 mental principle of disciples in the group. The behaviour of Delbecque and Soustelle can be explained in this way, it would appear. Moreover, the "years in the wilderness" probably had only strengthened their ties and their desire to retain power once "May 13" had thrust leadership upon them. Indeed, most deputies were not simply new recruits to political life as is so often assumed; rather, they had had connections with Gaullism in the past.^^ (2) A vote against the Government might have meant the dissolution of Parliament. In that event the UNR might have been forced to face the opposition of the French President himself. The UNR was in a rather tenuous position, to say the least. Their setback both in the local and Senatorial elections certainly should have driven that point home quite clearly. A party which had not done well electorally since 1958 was in no position to take on General de Gaulle. The first Ass is es Nationales (National Congress) of the UNR was held in Bordeaux from November 13 to 15 of 1959. Although the UNR had rid itself of nine activist deputies the Soustellians were far from prepared to give up the battle. They had received a setback, but they could look

^^Waline, op.cit. , pp.1211-12. *15E.g., see Mattel Dogan, "Changement de Regime et Changement de Personnel" in Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958. pp. 241-77 . 1 1 £ E.g., see Williams and Harrison, op.cit.. p.116. 89. to much assistance from party militants who, they hoped, would lend them support at the large party gathering. Moreover, It will be remembered, the factions had agreed that the Congress Itself was to be the forum which would decide which Interpretation of the party's role was to be followed In the future. In a word, Bordeaux was to de­ termine the winners in the struggle and was to make the new power arrangements legitimate. Even before the Congress opened, the Soustellians were making known their opposition to existing arrangements. Their leader publicly criticized the continued exclusion of the deputies who nevertheless applied for membership in the parliamentary group. Certain federations themselves expressed concern over both the exclusion of the deputies as well as the general tenor of governmental policy in Algeria (namely, RhSne, Algier, Haute-Garonne, and Meurthe- et-Moselle). The Rhdne, for example, called for the reinte­ gration of the ousted parliamentarians "in the spirit of reconcilation" and for "the most French solution in Algeria, against any secession."„117 The choice of Bordeaux itself apparently was an im­ portant aspect of the struggle between the two factions. At the National Council meeting in July it was announced that the location for the gathering would be either Bordeaux

' Annee Po li t iq ue . 19 59, p.124. 90. 1 1 fl or Nice. That the former was chosen appears to be sig­ nificant for two reasons. In the first place, Bordeaux is the home of Chaban-Delmas who occupied the office of Mayor of the city. No friend of the "ultras," he would be expected to create conditions, if possible, which would not be in the interests of the friends of Soustelle. For example, galleries conceivably can be a means to influence the opinions of the delegates. If the latter find strong support for particular issues and candidates among those present in the halls, they might possibly construe it as the public will — especially if they were wavering or lacked strong opinions on a given subject. Chaban, as leader of the Party in this area, would have a strong opportunity to influence the seating of the galleries since his organi­ zation and friends would be well-placed to round up the necessary people. Moreover, his supporters would have been able to perform various services for the delegates them­ selves — e.g., rooms, services, etc. -- that might have made the latter more favorably disposed. Indeed, it has been suggested that he did use his position as host to strengthen the forces of unconditionalism. Actually we do not know to what extent or by what means Chaban-Delmas’s people attempted to influence the selection in the galleries, although several writers claim he was hard at work attempting

118Le Monde. July 23-29, 1959. Weekly Edition. 91. 119 to do so. As It was. he must not have been especially successful since all accounts of the Congress seem to agree that the delegates were very favorably disposed to the 120 act ivls ts. Secondly. Chaban-Delmas's organization could have played a role in the selection of the delegates themselves. It has been argued that, like the Radical Party, various UNR members frantically sold tickets permitting entry into the halls of the Congress. Therefore, the delegations did not reflect in reality the real power of such federation. 121 Presumably, the federation in which the Congress is held would have an advantage in this respect since tickets could be sold on the spot. However, there is little concrete evidence to suggest that Chaban-Delmas and his friends benefitted from this practice, so we should be careful about taking at face value the assertion by a few scholars 122 that this was in fact what happened. Possibly because it was the largest federation, the

119 Chapsal, op.cit., p.133. 120We do not know to what extent or by what means Chaban-Delmas and his friends attempted to influence the selection of the galleries, although several writers have given the President of the National Assembly much credit for having made an attempt to do so. As events were to prove, he must not have been especially successful, since all accounts of the Congress seem to agree that the dele­ gates were quite favorably disposed to the activists. Cf. Williams and Harrison, op.cit., p.118; and L 1Annee Politique, 19 59. pp. 133-35. 121Williams and Harrison, op.cit. 122 Ibid. 92 . arrangements for the meetings were made by the Seine Party 123 of which Michelet was the leader. Assuming he was in fact the head of his group, he could hardly have been ex­ pected to have been friendly to the Soustellians. More­ over, as the largest federation, the Seine had a strong voice in decisions taken at the Congress. According to Williams and Harrison, the leaders anticipated the struggle at the Congress by somehow encouraging the membership sud­ denly to swell tremendously, thereby giving it an even 124 larger voice than it ordinarily could have expected. The subsequent choice of Chaban-Delmas1 a territory would seem to confirm the view that the unconditionals had won a tactical victory. At the National Council meeting of the previous July, many of those figures present had appar- ently wished to have Nice as the location. 125 Was their disagreement related to the functional quarrel? We do not know for sure. After all, Nice is an excellent vacation retreat for many a tourist. Moreover, no major Gaullist activist resided in the area. All the elaborate plans developed by the unconditionals in their bid to control the tenor of the Congress, however,

12^Chapsal, op.cit., p.134. The Party rules do not give the Parisian groups the power to select the time and place of the National Congress. In fact, the Article 17 of the rules simply states that the disposition of this problem is to be rendered by the Central Committee. See Statuts de UNR-UDT: Somnaire. Asnieres, 1963.

1240p .cit. ~*~2**Le Monde, June 25-July 1, 1959. Weekly Edition. 93. were not successful. Observers appear to be unanimous in the view that the delegates themselves were overwhelmingly Soustellist in spirit and that the latter were not lax them­ selves in trying to make arrangements favorable to their cause. 126 The halls were full of integrationist partisans who booed unconditional speakers and their names. Fights broke out from time to time. Soustelle's demands for sanctions against the "treasonous press" and his call for the return of Delbecque, Cathala, Brice, and Souchal to the 127 fold was greeted with a thunderous ovation. To keep a firm control over Party policy in such a climate, the leader­ ship attempted to rig the resolutions committee in order to tone down the statements on Algeria which might have brought 128 the Movement into conflict with de Gaulle. It was in this atmosphere that a curious spectacle took place, a scene suggesting the great tensions which must have existed in the halls of the Congress. Ali Mallem, as rapporteur of the relevant committee dealing with the pro­ jected resolution on Algeria, had taken part in drafting a paragraph which would have put the UNR on record as favoring negotiations with the FLN. Since he had met with de Gaulle personally on several recent occasions, the content of his

^ * Annee Politique. 1959. p.134; Williams and Harrison, op.cit.; Dauer and Rodet, op.cit.. pp.55-56. 1 Annee Politique. 1959, pp.133-35. l^Slbid.; also, Williams and Harrison, op.cit. 94 . report held a lively interest for the delegates. The re­ port presumably would give them an Indication of the thinking 12 9 of the French President. In fact, the text had already been turned over to the press and the delegates when All Mallem proceeded to go to the rostrum and contradict: his own signed report. Completing his fiercely anti-FLN speech, the delegates, according to Soustelle, were stupefied. Rene Moatti, an integrationist who would soon leave the UNR, then asked Mallem which report, the written or oral one, he stood by. The latter replied that the oral presentation expressed 130 his true feelings. He received a rousing ovation. An example such as the one cited above goes to show the tensions generated at the National Congress as a result of the struggle for power between the factions. Had All 131 Mallem been intimidated as has been suggested? Or was he "indoctrinated" or pressured by Lucien Neuwirth? Or, as a decent man, was he led ultimately to express his true 132 sentiments when an auspicious moment presented itself? We cannot be sure. Certainly his personal initiative in 1961 to meet with FLN leaders as well as his constant support for de Gaulle's policy do not lend special support to this

Annee Politique, 1959 , p.133. ^•^See his L'Esperance Trahie. p.134; also Williams and Harrison, o p£ i t. 131Dauer and Rodet, op.cit. ^■^Soustellc, op . cit. 95. interpretation. All we can say is that the pressures weigh­ ing upon Ali Mallem and others must have been extremely intense. The Algerian issue did not favor compromise and accommodation on the part of politicians to one another’s views. If the delegates themselves were favorably disposed to "French Algeria" and the leaders who supported it 133 the unconditionals were not to be deterred. There can be little doubt that despite its favored position with the delegates, the activists were highly unsuccessful at the Congress. Indeed, this writer would suggest that this meeting is a watershed in the development of the UNR itself. This Congress had been defined by the participants themselves in the course of several months as the ultimate arena for the settlement of their differences. As such, the implica­ tions of the meetings for future party development were great indeed. If, as Soustelle says, "they" -- he names Chalandon, Neuwirth, Richard, Chaban-Delmas and Terrenoire -- were upset by the response to All Mallem1s sponstaneous out­ burst, the unconditionals never allowed Soustelle to seize the initiative. Indeed, the latter admits as much in saying that these men, receiving their instructions from the Elysee through Guichard, were able to prevail in the final analysis,

Dauer and Rodet, Williams and Harrison, and Faucher as well as Soustelle are in general agreement on this point. 1^Sou8telle, op . c i t. . pp.134-35. 96. even against the sentiments of the Congress. 134 That the activists received a setback from which they never were to recover becomes quite clear when we study the outcome of the struggle as found for the most part in the final resolutions and choices of personnel. Hence, the unconditionals won in several areas: (1) they were streng­ thened in the Central Committee; (2) they retained their influence by naming one of their own as the new Secretary- General; (3) they persuaded the delegates to accept their concept of the ’’cadre" as opposed to the "mass" party; and (4) in general, they defined once and for all the role of the Party as a pliant tool of General de Gaulle by refusing to elaborate a doctrine. Let us cover these points in more detail. It will be remembered that Soustelle*s strength among the delegates was not insignificant. Certainly he held a strong position in several key delegations (e.g., Algerie, RhSne, Bouches-du-RhSne and Meurthe-et-Moselle) but he seemed to lose consistently to the forces of unconditional- 135 ism. Thus, an ad, hoc committee charged with preparing the final motion on Algeria refused to follow Soustelle's 13 6 advice and condemn "secession" specifically. Indeed, the statement was rather non-committal so far as any specific policy was concerned, although it did reflect an essential

Soustelle, op . cit. . pp.134-35. Annee Politique . 1954, p.133. 136goustelle, op.cit.. p.134. 97. stance favored by the unconditionals: de Gaulle must have a completely free hand in settling the Algerian issue and the UNR must faithfully abide by his decision. The final motion simply read: As guide and arbiter of the nation, General de Gaulle can count entirely on our Union to fulfill all the great tasks which he assumes, particularly when he recognizes for the Algerian people the right to freely determine their destiny, and .... thanks to the Constantine Plan, he gives them every reason to opt for France.137

A potential struggle between the Party and de Gaulle on the

Algerian question thus was averted. The Soustellians might have won their point on the floor had a vote been taken, but the backrooms belonged to other men. Moreover, the new Central Committee was even less pro-Soustelle than was the old one. So far as Algeria was concerned, when the original thirteen Gaullists formed the UNR, Soustelle probably always could count on Delbecque and Picard, the good will of Debre, Mme. Fourcade and Frey, and the cautious allegiance of All Mallem and Chaban-Delmas. VeyssiSre, Jarrot, and Marcenet could have been expected to remain at least quiet in the absence of an Elyseen initiative. Probably only Michelet and Chalandon were unalterably hostile. Since that time, however, the increas­ ing pressures General de Gaulle was bringing to bear upon

^^UNR Resolutions, Bordeaux, November 13-15, 1959, p.8. ^ ® I t is therefore, rather puzzling to see Macridis and Brown suggesting that a compromise was reached between the two tendencies over this question. Op.cit.. pp.296-97. 98. his followers had had the effect of reducing Soustelle's in­ fluence. Since the beginning of the year the size of the Central Committee had been increased beyond the original thirteen members. It had been decided that UNR ministers, the presidents of the two parliamentary groups, the presi­ dent of the National Assembly, four deputies and two non­ parliamentarians would compose the leading body of the UNR. Nevertheless, because most of the original thirteen members occupied these stated positions anyway, the total size had increased only by three to sixteen. In a word, it seems the leadership simply co-opted itself into the top places! For example, the four deputies were Delbecque, Picard, All Mallem and Marcenet, whereas the two non­ parliamentarians were Veyssiere and Mme. Fourcade. However, in early July it was agreed that the UNR parliamentary bureau would be added to the Central Committee, thereby adding eighteen members. The consequence of this decision was to increase the number of parliamentarians 139 relative to the militants. This decision apparently had played a part in Delbecque's opposition to Chalandon that summer when he sought to have himself replace the Secretary- General. The undoubted dominance now of the party organiza­ tion by parliamentarians was used by Delbecque to arouse the militants against the leadership. The criticism seemingly

had some effect because Chalandon himself -- encouraged by

Monde, June 25-July 1, 1959. 99. by Frey 140 — suggested that the National Council, which met in July, choose eighteen militants for the Central Committee. Although ministers, deputies and Senators would still hold a majority, Chalandon probably hoped that some of the sting could be taken out of Delbecque1s campaign for his seat. The latest changes which resulted in enlarging the Central Committee had, if anything, resulted in weakening the hand of the Soustellians on the party machinery. Assuming all the militants elected at the National Council were pro-Soustelle, which was highly unlikely, the balance would still favor the parliamentarians. Like the Radicals and the MRP, the UNR had successfully enabled its parlia­ mentarians to control the deciding votes in case of a show- down. The alterations to the Central Committee at Bordeaux were largely in harmony with the halting but inevitable trends we have just been discussing: in a word, the minis­ terial and parliamentary elements had reinforced their

140This is precisely the behavior we would have ex­ pected from Frey, always the man to keep his political fences mended. Indeed, whatever his orientation in the days when he was closely allied with Delbecque and Soustelle he was by 1962 apparently committed to a "neo-radical" party. See Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde, August 30 - September 5, 1962, Weekly Edition. ^ H e Monde, June 25 - July 1, 1959. ^■^As the CNIP and MRP leadership, the UNR leaders appear to be more "flexible" and less doctrinaire than their militants. 100. control over the Movement. Among the twenty-five newly elected members, it is interesting to note that the RhSne and the Bouches-du-Rh8ne were excluded entirely from any representation! Conversely, Chaban-Delmas1s Gironde won three places, whereas the Seine Federation of Michelet and Chalandon received seven seats. 143 The number of Algerian representatives was reduced to only one — a real blow to Soustelle. As has been pointed out, this balance hardly 144 reflected the views of the Congress as a whole. The UNR was, therefore, separating itself gradually but surely from the forces of French Algeria. If the integrationists could be said to have won a victory at the Congress, it would be in the resignation of Secretary-General Chalandon. Nevertheless, even in this case, the victory was far from conclusive. As de Gaulle's number one lieutenant within the organization and a man who had displayed not the least sympathy for the activists, he had become, as we have seen, a major irritant to the Soustel- lians. It will be remembered that at the National Council meeting in July he had promised to resign at the National Congress. This he now did; however, his replacement was, if anything, just as much the unconditional. Senator Jacques Richard, the new Central Committee's choice as its Secretary-

'Annee Politique. 1959, p.134.

l44rbid. ; also, see Macridis and Brown, op .cit. xox. General, had a reputation as a faithful supporter of the GeneraX and, so far as we know, he had few cXose contacts with the activists. At the time of his seXection he was reputed to be a "moderate." X4 5 Though the SousteXXians finaXXy had secured the resignation of ChaXandon, they were unabXe to repXace him with a man more amenabXe to their own views. More serious for the activists was their faiXure to set the framework for the development of a mass party which might have placed some restraint upon the freedom of the President in the future. In fact, the Xeadership did pre­ cisely the opposite by taking precautions which would assure its dominance, at the expense of the militants, over the organization. SousteXXe's and Delbecque's calls for a mass party with a democratic structure fell on deaf ears. The final motion on the internal organization of the Movement read: "The Assises Nationales issues the call . . . that the great structures of the UNR . . . be placed under the direction of 'an outstanding national figure (responsable).'" And it was necessary that under his tutelage a "true election service must control, anticipate, and prepare at an appropriate time the electoral consultations of all types," and he would set up "a local electoral service, charged with filing,

^■^^Chapsal, op . cit. , p.133; Soustelle, op.cit.. p.136; Macridis and Brown, op.cit. 102. organizing and aiding the local UNR electors .... In the future, this national leader was to be the Secretary- General himself. Furthermore, the motion goes on to read that "after having taken account of the possibilities for the UNR . . . the National Congress estimated that our action must largely flow from the leadership of the Party in extending our service to intervene, notably in departements lacking parliamentarians,"^^ There it is. The UNR leadership had formalized at Bordeaux for the future its unlimited control over the party organization. The significance of this statement is great, to say the least. Specifically, the national leadership can name candidates for national elections; it can veto nominees for local elections; it can arbitrate between ballots for its candidate; and it can discipline departement unions and individual members; and these powers, finally, can be changed only by a two-thirds vote in the National Congress or a four-fifths vote in the National Committee. With this control it has shunned down to the present days any real effort to increase significantly the 148 number of party members. Without organizational res­ traints placed upon it by the membership, the parliamentar­ ians would continue to play the role of a "cadre" party or

^ ^ UMR Resolutions« op.cit. . p.37. Italics are the author * s. l47Ibid.. p.38. 148 UNR Resolutions. op.cit., pp.35-38. 103. "masse de manoeuvre" as Chalandon and Chaban-Delmas had wished. A leadership more liberal than Its base could thereby insure that the more conservative militants would be contained. At least, through their "colonization" of the Central Committee the Government could be assured that party, government and policy would not diverge. Indeed, in the future this is precisely what was to happen. True to the interest of the Bordeaux leaders, the UNR would never become a mass party. Figures alone would suggest that the Gaullists so far have not drawn substantial numbers of Party stalwarts to their side despite impressive showings in both 1958 and 1962. For example, in the populous Paris region where the Party had garnered many of its votes in 1958, only 1,500 persons claimed a party card by the 149 middle of 1959. Several years later commentators were will remarking on the paucity of militants within the ranks of the UNR. In more than one way this meeting was of great historical significance for the Movement! Finally, the UNR refused at Bordeaux to elaborate a clear and concise doctrine by which the Party could be

^^^See the article by Viansson-Ponte in JLe Monde. July 30-August 5, 1959. Weekly Edition; also, Williams and Harrison, op.cit., p.217. By 1964 memberships in the UNR numbered approximately 90,000 adherents in metropolitan France. This figure is similar to that of the declining SF10! See Jean Chariot, "Les Forces Politiques En France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. February 1964, pp.86-94. identified on its own merits. Instead* the unconditionals won a key victory in effect by tying the party's doctrine to the coattails of General de Gaulle. Thus* as we have seen, whereas Soustelle had attempted to make "French Algeria" the major component of Gaullist doctrine by calling for Francisation, the UNR could not bring itself to follow his lead. The final declaration, already quoted, made it quite clear that the Party was going to leave the initiative to General de Gaulle. Even in an area which had long been part and parcel of the intellectual baggage of many old-line Gaullists, namely the so-called association 150 of labor and capital, the UNR was strongly silent. The closest the final motion came to raising the issue at all was when it said the "UNR is determined to influence the abolition of the proletarian condition of life so as to destroy the Cap!tallst-Marxist dilemma." 151 More significantly, the Congress emphasized in its final statement that "General de Gaulle can count on the 15 2 Union completely in all the great tasks which he assumes." This resolution had been given its theoretical underpinnings in an interesting speech delivered by Chaban-Delmas to the delegates. Always the realist, and frankly recognizing the existing state of affairs in which Parliament and the

^•^UNR Resolutions. op.cit.. pp.1-3. 151Ibid.. p.3. 1 52 Ibid. Italics are the author's. 105 . Government had been relegated to a purely secondary position in decision-making, the President of the National Assembly came forth with his now-famous "two-sectors" Interpretation of the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic. One sector was designated as "Presidential," whereas the other was called "open". In the "Presidential sector" were included Algeria, foreign affairs, the French Community and National Defense. These were the "reserved domains" of the Chief of State who in turn was in no way responsible to a parlia­ mentary majority. Here, the Government itself was to carry out the wishes of the Elysee while the Parliament and the political parties were not to encroach upon the President's prerogatives. General de Gaulle as "arbiter" was responsible only to the French people in the final analysis. In the "open" sector, on the other hand, were included primarily social and economic policy, administration of programs and patronage. In this sector the Parliament and the parties were free to operate; in addition, residual powers were to be held by Parliament rather than the President. As Chaban put it to his audience: In the first sector the Government executes, in the second it may initiate. For the UNR, in the first case it must follow de Gaulle without fail; in the second, it anticipates the event. In the latter case, we find our true originality. 153

l^Quoted in L ' Annee Politique. 1959 . pp.134-35. 106. In one speech Chaban-Delmas had justified the subordin­ ation of Parliament and the parties to de Gaulle In the most Important fields. In particular, the Algerian problem was defined as belonging to the French President. Never was there a better statement of unconditionalism. A bitter Soustelle could only reply that the "idea of 'reserved sectors' . . . is not an interpretation of the Constitution 154 but a violation of it." Bordeaux, therefore, marked a turning point for the UNR. Despite the pro-Soustelle sentiments of delegates, the unconditional leadership, buoyed by the quiet support from the Elysee, had wrested control from the activists. From that point on the latter would offer little in the way of a systematic challenge to the UNR. Bordeaux had been defined by each faction as the place where their funda­ mental disagreements over ideology and power relationships would be resolved; and because the stakes were so high, the losing faction would have great difficulty in regaining lost 155 ground in the future. Unconditionals had successfully resisted two major efforts within two months to take over the Party. They had strengthened control of the party organization and in particular they had successfully fought

^■^Soustelle, op. cit. , p.135; also, his A New Road for France, p.81. ^■■^Again, it is strange to find Macridis and Brown referring to the outcome of the National Congress as a "com­ promise" (op.cit., p.297). In fact it was a victory for such men as Chalandon, Chaban-Delmas, Terrenoire, Triboulet, and Richard. Soustelle himself admits that his forces lost the battle — and the war. See L 1Esperance Trahie. pp.134-35. 107 . attempts to make of the UNR a mass "democratic" party having a large base which might become Independent of their Influ­ ence, not to mention de Gaulle's. They had refused to com­ mit the Movement to a specific doctrine, but, rather they had defined the party's role as giving total support to the policies of General de Gaulle. In effect, they had suc- cessfuly persuaded the UNR to give de Gaulle a free hand in Algeria. As men who needed to win and hold political office, they had realistically concluded -- as the recent elections must have shown them conclusively — that their fortunes were inextricably linked with de Gaulle's. Many a UNR man may have preferred Soustelle's doctrine, but he knew his electorate preferred the General. This point of view was especially prevalent among the deputies at the meeting. It was they, after all, who had to face the populace. Terrenoire's comment that "the electors have not elected us because of who we are, but because of [de Gaulle]" was a 156 striking but honest admission of political realities. The risks were great and the unconditionals might have been quite literally destroyed had they failed. Certainly France would be a far different polity today had they not won this battle. Some commentators would go so far as to say democracy itself would be non-existent at the present time had they lost.

^^LVAnnee Politique. 1959, p.135. 108. The UNR was never again to have a lively and exciting Assises Nationales. The gatherings in Strasbourg in March 1961 and in Nice in November 1963, for example, were ex­ tremely dull in comparison with Bordeaux. The latter demonstrated ideals in conflict; subsequent Congresses simply emphasized the unity of Gaullism in the face of the "parties of yesterday." Even a veiled complaint against official policy at Strasbourg and Nice -- as Chalandon's criticism of Giscard d'Estaing's financial orthodoxy or Sanguinetti*s speech on military priorities — received little real attention either from the press or the dele­ gates.^^ Bordeaux had been the first and only truly important Congress in the short history of the UNR. In the future, the major function of such gatherings appears to have been mainly to renew periodically the militants1 faith in their. Party. 158 The UNR leadership was not about to relinquish the initiative it had seized at Bordeaux by allowing the activists to agitate for French Algeria without paying the consequences. Conversely, neither were the activists ready to submit. The Algiers revolt of January 24, 1960 provided the occasion for still another intra-party conflict. When

1-^Charlot, op.cit.

158This consequence of party conventions probably never has been more succinctly stated by anyone than by Pendleton Herring in The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, Inc., 1940, Chapter 16. 109. Ortiz and Lagaillarde raised their barricade in Algiers the Government was thrown In a quandary. It could not let the population in Algiers disobey Paris, but, on the other hand, whether it could rely upon the Army to restore order was a troubling question. When the Council of Ministers met with de Gaulle in the Chair to discuss what action should be taken, Gaullist unconditionals Michelet and Malraux demanded that the rebellion be ruthlessly suppressed. Soustelle, Triboulet and Cornut-Gentille advocated "moderation." The former, in fact, made an impassioned plea for an understand­ ing of the Algerian situation. It was finally decided that Debre would journey to North Africa for a first-hand observa- tion on the scene before any final decision would be taken. 15 9 This cabinet dispute reflected quite well the faction­ alism we have been talking about all along. Michelet and Malraux, left-wing Gaullists with no sympathy for the settler viewpoint, were brought into immediate conflict with the two men favorable to the integrationist cause, Soustelle and Cornut-Gentille. The attitude of Debre, however, is particularly intriguing to the observer, since he gives such a good picture of the dilemma of many a Gaullist: how to support French Algeria and yet loyally obey de Gaulle at the same time. Debre, as most Gaullist leaders, ultimately chose de Gaulle, but he found great difficulty in separating

^"^Soustelle, op.cit. pp.138-44; L f Annee Politique. 1960. p.11. 110. himself from the activists, many of whom remained his closest advisers almost until the end of his tenure. 160 In this particular cabinet meeting, he appears to have been uneasy at being drawn in two directions at the same time; thus, he apparently welcomed a chance to defer the decision by going to Algeria for a first-hand observation. Indeed, he seems to have been cool to the suggestion that punishment be 161 meted out to the people behind the barricades. As most Gaullists, he would soon find the pull of unconditionalism too great to resist. The Army, however, refused to side with the insurgents at that time, and the revolt did not spread into other areas, thereby strengthening the settlers' power vls-S-vis Paris. The repercussions within the UNR were not long in coming. That same month Ernest Denis, a deputy from Del- becque's Nord Federation, resigned from the UNR immediately 162 following the riots. In the powerful Parisian federation, tensions had been mounting since the revolt. M. Devraigne, President of the Parisian Municipal Council, let it be known that he was sympathetic to the settlers' cause when it

^^Chapsal, op.cit. . pp.64ff; Viansson-Ponte, The King and His Court. pp.174-75. ^^Soustelle, op.cit. . p.145. 162 Avril, op.cit., p.284. 1 1 1 . 163 occurred, and, on February 1, Vaschettl was excluded from the Seine Federation for expressing sympathy for the rebel- 164 lion. The case of several other deputies (Devraigne, Grlotteray, Foulquier, and Moskovitch) was referred to a disciplinary committee at the same time. 16 5 In the first week of February 1960 de Gaulle finally asked Soustelle to resign from the Government, pointing out to the latter that their policies were no longer In harmony. 16 6 Cornut-Gentille, who also had advocated restraint in Algeria, was forced out although Triboulet was not. In Soustelle's case the firing was bound to cause a great deal of soul-searching by many a Gaullist. He was not only the best-known Gaullist but he was also the leader and symbol of the French Algeria forces. In fact, with Delbecque's exclusion he had been the only major "May 13" figure left around which the Gaullist activists could rally. Moreover, as the leader of a major faction within the Party, his dismissal was not likely to be taken lightly by his closest followers. De Gaulle apparently felt strong enough, however, to demand his resignation since the Army had remained loyal in January.

* Anne e Politique. 1960. p.10. 164Ibid.. p.18. 165Ibid.

^ S o u s t e l l e , op.cit., p.163. Soustelle makes much of the fact that he was removed without the apparent knowledge of Prime Minister Debre whose signature was necessary if constitutional niceties were to be observed. 112. After his resignation from the Government* Soustelle continued to speak out strongly in favor of French Algeria and against governmental policy.In February, a dele­ gation from the UNR composed of Chaban-Delmas, Triboulet and Richard — the National Assembly President, the presi­ dent of the group in the National Assembly and the UNR Secretary-General — visited Soustelle. According to Soustelle, they advised him that if he would refrain from speaking on Algerian policy for six months, a key position in the Movement would be awarded to him. He refused and a campaign was launched against him. 168 Significantly, Debre — now the out-and-out unconditional — wrote to him that "the UNR has value, meaning and legitimacy only insofar as its actions espouse totally the policy initiatives of General de Gaulle." 16 9 Furthermore, the Prime Minister argued that a leader of the Movement who takes positions contrary to those of General de Gaulle is "automatically excluded" from the UNR. It is difficult to imagine any political party in the Western democracies placing a greater restraint on dissidence! Debre was now raising arguments

^ 1Annee Politique. I9 60, pp.41-45; Soustelle, op.cit., p.166. ^■^Soustelle, ibid . . p.165.

169Ibld.. p.166. 113. which would justify kicking his old friend out of the UNR as well as the Government.^"7® To his credit, Debre's argu­ ment that the leader is never wrong was faithfully adhered to by the Prime Minister in the future. For example, as a long-time opponent of presidential government, he subse­ quently became its major defender in 1962. Not unexpectedly, Soustelle replied that the doctrine of Gaullism is superior to any individual and, moreover, that it embraces the concept of French Algeria as set forth in the founding principles of the Party. He continued: "I am one of the founders of the UNR. I hoped that it would be a great democratic party where, thanks to the free dis­ cussion between loyal friends, the doctrine of the new regime would be elaborated."^^ The decision to exclude Soustelle from the UNR pro­ voked a deep crisis in the heart of the Party, but the leadership was prepared for any eventuality. Hence, a week after the Soustelle-Debre exchange of letters, Debre, at a meeting of the Central Committee (March 22), called for the automatic exclusion of Soustelle if his comments to the press on Algeria did not stop immediately. Protests by Picard, Dumont, and Morel fell on deaf ears. Debre, followed by

170 Ibid. 171Ibid.. p.170. 114. Chaban-Delmas, Michelet, Triboulet, Richard, Bokanowski, Terrenoire, Frey and Foyer won the day, however. 17 2 Soustelle, himself, hoped to delay any decision by the leadership to exclude him long enough to rally his own followers to battle. He could depend on such federations as the Nord, Rhone, and Algerie as well as localities like Toulouse (where Rene Battesti was leader). He also had strong support in the Var, Pas-de-Calais, Doubs, Avignon, 173 and the Alpes-Maritimes. Therefore, he claimed that only an Arbitration Committee as provided by the party rules would propose dismissing him and only then after hearing his case. The recommendation could then be considered by the 174 Central Committee itself. Chaban-Delmas, however, hastily called a meeting of the Central Committee on April 25 which immediately proceeded to vote Soustelle out of the Party by a large majority — admittedly on questionable grounds of party legality since the Arbitration Committee did not even 175 allow Soustelle a hearing. As we have said repeatedly, the stakes in the game were too high to encourage adherence to legal niceties.

172Ibid.. pp.173-77. 173L * Annee Politique. 19 60. p.41. 174 Soustelle, op.cit.. pp.177-78. 17 5The rules governing such cases may be found in Statuts de UNR-UDT; Sommaire. op.cit.. pp.9-10. 115. The repercussions were not long In coming. The Rhone Federation declared Itself "autonomous" of the Central Com­ mittee and the Secretary-General and called for a special party Congress. Its leaders In the National Assembly, Beraudier and Meriot, resigned from the group. The General Secretariat retaliated by simply creating an alternative Rhone Federation. In the Nord, where Delbecque had broken with the Central Committee as early as October 1959,^^ the leaders called for a "Special Congress"; 17 8 and from Algiers, where the federation had resigned almost en bloc in March, Chelha quit the UNR group in the National Assembly. Pierre Picard (Seine-et-Oise) and Moatti (Seine) also resigned. 179 The final occasion for the exodus of substantial num­ bers of activists from the UNR was in the months immediately prior to and after the Referendum of January 1961. De Gaulle at that time decided to submit to the French population the proposal for giving the Algerian population self-determina­ tion rather than allowing Parliament the right of decision. Actually, the French populace was to legitimate his speech of September 1959. Until the time that the Algerian people could make its wishes known, the Government was empowered to

^•^L'Annee Politique. 1960, p.41; Soustelle, op.cit. , pp.177-78. ^■^Soustelle, ibid . . p.168. * Annee Politique . 19 60. p.41. ^•^Ibld. i Avril and Pinto, op.cit.. p.284. 116. issue decrees which in the meantime would allow a certain 180 degree of autonomy to the territory. The decision of the Gaullists to seek a "yes" vote reportedly created much tension within the UNR. Some commentators expected a major split to occur. For the activists the Referendum was only one more indication that de Gaulle was willing to cut France adrift from Algeria, and his decision, moreover, to by-pass Parliament was highly resented by them. Debre, quite worried, found it necessary to intervene once again to 181 plead the case of the Government. The split was not long in coming; Vaschetti (Seine), not unexpectedly due to his connections over the years with Soustelle, quit the group at the time of the Referendum. Eight days earlier a manifesto hostile to the Government's position had been issued by ten other deputies saying: "The Algerian policy of the Power has fragmented the magnificent 182 spirit of union, fraternity and the hopes of 1958." The deputies who signed the statement were the following: Dronne (Sarthe), Fabre (Var), Poutier (Seine), Vitel (Var) , Luciani (Somme), Camino (Basses-Pyrenees), Nader (Finistere), Chapalain (Sarthe), Duflet (Pas-de-Calais) and Villedieu (Calvados). Fabre and Camino resigned at the time, although

1 O A E.g., note the General's address to the populace on January 6, 1961. Major Addresses. Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle. op.cit., pp.111-12. 'Annee Politique. 1961. pp.3-5. 18 2 Le Monde. December 28-29, 1960. 117 . the eight others did not. Their case was deferred to the parliamentary group's political bureau which, however, ex- eluded only one of them, namely Poutier. 183 An interesting question relates to the timing of the resignations from the UNR. Why had they taken place so late, long after the activists had any real chance to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in the party battle? We can only speculate what would have happened had they summoned the courage to leave the UNR in late 1959. If they had with­ drawn earlier and tried to rally support to their side it is possible that many of them might be in key positions at the present time. It seems almost as if their resignations were more on the order of futile protests than an expectation that the separations would accomplish anything concrete. The question is: Why? We would merely suggest that the charis­ matic figure of de Gaulle is at least a partial explanation. Having followed him during the war and having brought him to power in 1958, they simply could not believe he would sacri­ fice their interests. Moreover, his vague and often contra­ dictory utterances about Algeria naturally led them to believe what they wanted to believe: namely, that he supported French Algeria. It actually took Soustelle's expulsion from the UNR and the Referendum of 1961 to convince many activist deputies that they had lost the way, although we might have

^®^Avril and Pinto, op.cit. 118. expected that Bordeaux would have been convincing enough evidence for them. The fact that such outside commentators as Jacques Fauvet and Maurice Duverger had predicted early that de Gaulle would attempt a retrenchment In Algeria Is significant In this regard. Being less involved, they could be more objective. We can still see Delbecque defending de Gaulle against Thomazo in late 1959 and Soustelle*s admission that, despite repeated warnings, he did not think de Gaulle would betray him in the final analysis. Such behavior is not unlike Soviet Communists who until the very end refused to raise the possibility that Stalin himself was responsible for their misfortunes* If the leader is infallible, he cannot err; therefore, 184 others must be responsible for his actions. Gaullist dissidence did not always come from the Right. It did not take the Moslem UNR deputies very long to perceive the direction of de Gaulle's Algerian policy. In March 1961, eight of them, as members of a parliamentary intergroup, the Algerian Democratic Rally, signed a mani­ festo which called for direct negotiations with the GPRA. The manifesto led to an outcry within the UNR for discip-

^^Edmond Michelet's argument that his old colleague, Soustelle, became an opponent because he had been denied a ministerial portfolio by de Gaulle probably tells us more about the motives of Michelet than about Soustelle's. Certainly the letter's sustained denunciations of the Fourth Republic must have denied him many a post in the governments -- at least we might suppose. 119. linary action against the men. The Political Bureau im­ mediately called a meeting to decide what action, if any, should be taken. It was agreed that disciplinary action would be necessary in only two cases, namely Ali Mallem and Benhacine. These two Gaullists were deemed "instigators" of the declaration; hence, their exclusion from the group 185 was agreed upon by the Bureau. Several days later, five other UNR Moslem deputies requested the reintegration of the two men into the group but they were refused satisfaction for the time being. This latest intra-party conflict was different in kind from those schisms which had preceded it. In the other cases, the leadership was faced with controlling elements which sought to prevent any governmental overtures toward accommodating Algerian nationalism. In the case of the Moslem deputies, the leadership was unwilling to anticipate the moves of Charles de Gaulle toward changing the status of Algeria. In both cases, however, the leadership displayed quite convincingly its devotion to unconditionalism: if it would not attempt to thwart General de Gaulle1s initiatives, neither would it anticipate them.

■*"®^Waline, op . ci t. ; and L * Anne e Politique . 1961. pp.37- 38. The actual reason for the ouster of these men was said to have been an initiative taken by them to contact certain FLN leaders in Germany. Cf. Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde. March 12-13, 1961. ^“®^Waline, op . ci t. : L 1 Annee Politique. 1961. pp.37-38. 120. Hence, the UNR had defined its role in terms of uncon­ ditional support for General de Gaulle, and its leadership had structured the party in such a way as to make it seem that unconditionals controlled the levers of power in the party organization. By the middle of 1961 the UNR was con­ veying to observers the impression of a party which displayed monolithic unity. From time to time we would hear talk about a certain amount of bickering within the majority because the latter was consulted so seldom over policy. Both Debre and later Pompidou usually then would agree to take the leader­ ship into the Government's confidence and the "crisis" would end. To the Government's credit it must be stated that ministers did appear before interested deputies to explain governmental programs and, occasionally, Debre or 187 Pompidou would attend a parliamentary caucus. However, these consultations in reality merely smoothed ruffled feelings because the Government itself was controlled from Olympian heights by that leader of Free France, Charles de Gaulle; and the latter was not about to give the UNR a part in the making of policy. His apparent refusal to consult it on a single major issue in the past several years seems quite evident. We are not surprised to see him refusing to bring the Party into his confidence in the realm of foreign

IQ 7 E.g., see Claude Emeri, "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, September 1963, pp.728-39. 121. policy, but the evidence would seem to suggest that he like­ wise has refused consistently to consult the UNR on domestic issues as well. The refusal to recall Parliament during the farmers revolt in 1962, the unwillingness to dissolve it in 1962 when the party leadership felt the time was propitious, his criticism of the miners strike of 1963 when the Party was favorable to concessions, and the small part the UNR played in organizing the 1965 Presidential election are only four, albeit major, instances of the lack of UNR influence in making policy at this juncture. Indeed, as we shall see below, de Gaulle had done everything possible to restrict the Party’s sphere of influence. In conclusion, de Gaulle had emerged triumphant, but he could only have achieved such an unchallenged position because the UNR had been captured by men who perceived their interests as similar to his. That was exactly what the great struggle within the Party had been about; namely, whether there were certain values which even the French President could challenge at his peril. The early years of the Fifth Republic, particularly between 1958 and 1961, had been years in which a single issue had so dominated political life that many politicians judged the Republic itself by its ability to prosecute to a successful conclusion the war with the FLN. They had helped to overthrow one Republic and they were willing to overthrow their own creation if it did not do their bidding. The intra-party conflict within the UNR 122 . reflected these larger divisions within the body politic.

The success of the UNR in separating itself from the activists enabled the parliamentary majority to uphold the

Gaullist state which would have been endangered had the activists succeeded in gaining control of the Party.

Commentators all too often forget that if the Legislature of the Fifth Republic seems so passive it is because men govern it who have waged an epic struggle to defend a particular individual's absolute authority in the French state — and their own careers as well. They and their leader have endured too much together and have too many interests in common to change their ways; hence, the con­ stant battery of criticisms in the press about autocratic rule and parliamentary weakness in France are rather meaningless. The parliamentary leadership does not seem to worry too much about its diminished role, although, it is true, the leaders apparently would prefer to be consulted more often. If the Fifth Republic is to be altered as so many opponents of personal rule wish, it is necessary first that either de Gaulle leave the scene or that the voters alter the majority. Either course would likely usher in rather sharp changes in the patterns of authority in France, as Gaullist opponents so fervently w i s h . IV DE GAULLE AND THE UNR

Americans who observe the great game of politics know that the President of the United States must belong to a political party if he is to win the highest office. More­ over, they expect him to act at times as a partisan. True, they may decry what they regard as excessive partisanship, but they nevertheless seem to expect him to lead his party. American presidents, therefore, must play various roles, 1 depending upon the necessities of the time. According to his own preferences and the objective conditions prevailing, he may take a position which tends to place him above the party squabbles, or conversely, he may attempt more often than not to identify himself with his chosen party. Eisenhower would be a politician of the first type, whereas Truman would be an example of the second sort. But no mat­ ter what their inclinations, American presidents are called

^“Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidencv. New York: Mentor Books, 1956.

-123- 124. upon constantly to reinforce or renew their partisan ties because it is to the latter that they owe their nominations and, at least in part, their elections. After all, two major purposes of political parties are the selection of candidates and the mobilization of the electorate behind them.-u 2 Contrast the American situation with the France of Charles de Gaulle. Whereas voters are mobilized by the parties behind certain candidates, the fact remains that the present incumbent has never been nominated by the party which favors him, namely the UNR. Moreover, the last thing de Gaulle would acknowledge is that he is a partisan political leader. His works and speeches are replete with fulminations against political parties. The latter are vilified as nationally divisive, proponents of particular interests, and barriers to that almost divine communion 3 between the leader and his followers. Hence, while they may be tolerated, they are never to be entrusted with the national destiny. Stated simply, for Charles de Gaulle parties are not quite legitimate. His refusal, in fact,

‘See, e.g., E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1942, pp.30ff. E.g., see The War Memories of Charles de Gaulle, Salvation: 1914-1946. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, pp.272ff. For studies on the plebiscitary aspects of the Gaullist regime, see Remond, op.cit.. and Henry Ehrmann, "Direct Democracy in France," American Political Science Review. December 1963, pp.883-90. 125. to allow the UNR the right to use his name in 1958 was justified in terms of the inherent partisanship of any party, including the ones which support him. Only de Gaulle could represent all Frenchmen!^ It is in its relationship with General de Gaulle that the problems as well as the opportunities arise for the UNR.’’ The latter must accommodate itself to his political style; i.e., the ways in which he uses political power. The ten­ dency on the part of the French President to make decisions in splendid isolation from the UNR leadership has left the Party in the dark more often than not concerning policy in the Fifth Republic. Unconditionalist ideology is in part a reaction to this situation; a functional necessity to cope with the strains which might arise between the leader and his followers. Moreover, the official hostility In the Fifth Republic to political parties simply adds another dimension to the Gaullist dilemma. Let us discuss the ways in which de Gaulle uses his influence to assure his continuing domin­ ance over the UNR, and secondly, the manner in which the latter has adjusted itself to that dominance. It is these two interrelated problems which will require our attention in the course of this chapter. By understanding de Gaulle

^See Major Addresses. Statements. and Press Conferences of General de Gaulle« pp.22-23. ^Since its opportunities arise mainly in the electoral realm, we shall save this problem for consideration in a subsequent chapter. 126. as a decision-maker we would hope to better understand the place of the UNR in the French system at the present time. Hence, if we must digress temporarily to a discussion of the President himself, it is only because we believe that the UNR and de Gaulle are inexorably linked. The comparative study of presidential politics should tell us something in this regard. Richard E. Neustadt has developed a theory of presidential power which, unfortunately, 6 has never been subjected to comparative scrutiny. In his excellent book, he examines the various uses of presidential power by Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower. He is of the opinion that the "strong" leader displayed the following major attributes: a belief that the presidential chair was made only for himself; a total engagement in politics; a love of power for its own sake; and a flair for playing subordinates off against one another in such a way that key decisions would be "pushed up" to the President himself. Thus, a strong president loves the game of politics, is confident in his abilities, and attempts always to keep his

^Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Polit ics of Leadership, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960. A rather obvious limitation in attempting to apply Neustadt's "theory" is that the latter does not lend itself easily to quantification. We therefore are faced with the problem of trying to sift conjecture or rumor from the facts in our observation of the individual's decision-making style. 127 . options open. In a word, he seeks and enjoys the exercise ofr power. 7

Neustadt is highly impressed with the way in which Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised power, but we would submit that General de Gaulle's presidential style is an even better example of how the "effective" chief executive would act. De Gaulle's confidence in himself would appear to be if anything even more unbounded than was Roosevelt's. The unwavering belief that only he is capable of guiding the destinies of France has been commented upon endlessly by both the serious and the light-hearted critics. For ex­ ample, it is often pointed out that he regards himself -- indeed, he has said so -- as the repository of French legitimacy. A man who can exclaim that everyone has been, is, or will be a Gaullist and who can tell an audience before the 1965 presidential election that without him France would experience chaos, hardly seems to lack confidence in his ability to rule! While such expressions may be passed off as simply electoral rhetoric, they nevertheless would appear

^Neustadt (Ibid. p.10) equates power with the ability to persuade. In this context it also might imply "control over uncertainty." As Michel Crozier has pointed out: "The power of A over B depends upon A's ability to predict B's behavior and on the uncertainty of B about A's behavior. As long as the requirements of action create situations of uncertainty, the individuals who have to face them have power over those who are affected by the results of their choice." See The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p.158. 128. to reflect a deeper faith in one's ability to dominate men and events* As more than one critic has noted, de Gaulle has shown himself to be quite astute in keeping the opposition off balance. Very often he will announce suddenly a change in the direction of policy, thereby catching everyone off guard. Similarly, he will deliberately encourage others to believe he is planning one course of action while all the time Intending to act in precisely the opposite way. Indeed, he ultimately may choose to follow a policy he has sworn to shun. Moreover, he has a tendency to announce his intentions at the last possible minute. By doing so he is able to achieve a maximum freedom of action and to prevent 8 his being out-maneuvered by opposition elements. In a word, de Gaulle can keep his options open if his enemies (not to say his friends) are kept in the dark as to his real inten- 9 tions. Finally, as Roosevelt, he has proved a master at playing off various individuals and groups against one another. Evidently, he has been fearful lest coteries inde­ pendent of him should spring up to share in decision-making.^

®Avril and Pinto, op.cit.. pp.285-85. 9 Maurice Duverger in Roy C. Macridis (Ed.), De Gaulle; Implacable Ally. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, p .XV. ^E.g., see ibid.; Maurice Duverger, "M. Debre Existe- t-Il?H, La Nef. July 1959, pp.3-8; Viansson-Fonte, The King and His Court. pp.41-42; Joel Blocker in Newsweek. December 13, 1965, p.43. A theory of executive power might well be developed along the lines suggested by Neustadt. We are 129. As we shall see presently, in the case of the UNR he appears to have been content not only with taming a few recalcritant Gaullists but, rather, with undermining the Party Itself. The Gaullist uses of power are particularly apparent in his handling of the Algerian affair. Stating on several occasions that France would never leave Algeria, he never­ theless ultimately presided over the liquidation of French power in that unfortunate war-torn country. 12 When the struggle was officially brought to a halt in 1962, de Gaulle had cast aside many an old ally to achieve his objective. arguing here that de Gaulle uses his power in essentially the same manner that Roosevelt did. There are, of course, differences in "style" due to personality, cultural and historical factors, but the characteristic ways in which they interacted with members of the political elite with whom they came in contact appear to be quite similar. In passing, it might be noted that the fall from grace of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union possibly could be interpreted in this sense. It has been suggested that he was overthrown when he attempted to weaken the position of the Communist Parity. That many of his former friends and proteges within the Party rose to denounce him has been offered as evidence that he was threatening its existence as the major force in Soviet society. By liberating himself from party restraints he could have altered more easily the economic structure of the country. In filling key positions in the CPSU with his family and friends as well as carrying out several reorganiza­ tions, he supposedly hoped to increase his freedom of action. ^ O u r argument in this respect is rather at odds with recent statements by Wahl and Hoffmann which tend to con­ centrate on the weakness of the UNR itself and thereby to explain de Gaulle's attitude toward it in almost sorrowful terms! Wahl, op.cit.; and Stanley Hoffman, "Succession and Stability in France," Journal of International Affairs. No.l, 1964, pp.86-103. 12However, for the view that de Gaulle possibly was forced against his will into concessions in North Africa, see Meisel, op.cit.. pp.260-62. 130. Nora Beloff has described so well how General de Gaulle had come to the conclusion prior to his return to power that Algeria was moving toward independence. However, it was necessary to keep the loyalty of the Army Intact, which could only be accomplished by "leaving everyone uncertain of his intentions." Thus, in May 1960, he was visiting Army camps and telling the officers that Algerian independence was "absurd" and "unthinkable." A year later he was still claiming that he would never negotiate with the rebels. Not only Army officers but many thousands of Moslems believed in the French commitment to protect them from the onslaught of the FLN.13 Suddenly, de Gaulle agreed to turn over Algeria to the rebels: Great concern has often and rightly been expressed at the U.N. and elsewhere over the appallingly high casualties among the Arab nationalists during the seven terrible years of war. But little is ever said by either side of the many thousands of friends of France who have subsequently died because they be­ lieved de Gaulle's promises. But Machlavelli was right: the Prince, after double- crossing everyone, was stronger at home and abroad than ever before. ^ Institutional devices have proved quite satisfactory for General de Gaulle in his quest to control political men and events. In this respect, the rise of the Elysee staff,

13Nora Beloff, The General Savs No: Britain1s Exclusion from Europe. London: Penguin Books, 1963, p.26. 14Ibid.. pp.26-27. 131. especially, has been significant. Because the vastly streng­ thened presidency of the Fifth Republic needed its own sources of information and because de Gaulle was hardly the type of politician who would depend upon other power struc­ tures if he could avoid doing so, the rise of a "White House" staff was all but inevitable. Indeed, the size of the presidential staff by 1964 had almost doubled from thirty-six in 1959 to fifty-two members.^ Moreover, most of these policy advisers were experts taken from the highest reaches of the civil service, although in the early days there were proportionately more political careerists to be found among the General's closest confidants.^ It has been argued that he pays much attention to the advice of these men, most of whom graduated from the elite Grandes Ecoles and who are de- voted to their chief. 17 The implications of this development of a complex presidential staff are momentous since de Gaulle now is able to maintain his influence to a greater extent than otherwise would have been possible. He is assured of expert advice by men unknown to the public and with no independent power bases of their own: their strength derives from his confidence in

■^Wahl, op. ci t., pp.3-4. 16Ibid.; Blocker, op.cit.: Pierre Viansson-Ponte, "Aux Qui Ont l'Oreille du General," Realites. May 1965, pp.64-67. ^Viansson-Ponte, ibid.: Blocker, ibid.; Wahl, op.cit.t Cook, ibid.; F. F. Ridley, "French Technocracy and Compara­ tive Government," Political Studies. February 1966, pp.34- 52. 132. them. They summarize proposals originating in the Prime Minister’s office, in the offices of other ministers, and they check on drafts requiring the President's signature originating in the legislature. They also prepare memoranda on policy questions which are of special interest to the President and, in general, they try to facilitate the flow of communications by keeping in touch with civil servants and ministers when drafting proposals. 18 As Roosevelt, de Gaulle has employed his personal staff as a means by which his own power can be enhanced. Specifi­ cally, he has used the Glysee staff to ensure his domination of the Government — and through the latter, Parliament and the UNR: after all, several UNR leaders sat in the Government and the latter was responsible to it. To weaken the Govern­ ment was ultimately to weaken the UNR. According to the 1958 Constitution, the Government "shall determine and direct the policy of the Nation" 19 and is responsible to Parliament; hence, it does have substantial legal powers should it desire to exercise its prerogatives. De Gaulle, as might be expected, apparently has con­ sidered the Government as a potential source of opposition, and has sought to weaken its position. Such a stance is quite understandable when it is realized that Premier Debre and some

18E.g., see Wahl, op.cit. 19Article 20. 133. of his closest advisers were far from hospitable to de Gaulle's Initiatives In North Africa. 2 0 Indeed, some of them were very sympathetic to the settler cause. De Gaulle could hardly have been expected to rely upon such men. Since the stakes were so high, the President sought to reinforce as much as possible his continuing dominance over the ministers. He did so in several ways. For one thing, de Gaulle, it will be remembered, is quite adept at playing individuals off against one another to his own benefit. While this point has been recognized by many commentators on his foreign politics, few of them have pointed out that his domestic "style" is very similar. He has used his highly skilled, secretive and anonymous personal staff to force independent-minded ministers to do his bidding. As Roosevelt, he appears not to mind bruising a few egos if it will accomplish his ends. Indeed, his presidential staff appears to relish the perpetual struggles its members encounter with ministers. 21 Even Debre, despite his devotion to the leader of Free France, has not emerged unscathed from such battles. For example, during the most heated moments of the Algerian struggle the word supposedly was "leaked" by the presidential staff to party elements on

^Chapsal, op . c it. » p.171; Wahl, op . ci t. , p.6; Faucher, op.cit., p.170.

^Blocker, op.cit.: Wahl, op . cit. 134. the "progressive left" that one of de Gaulle's closest ad- visers had characterized Debre as a "weak leader." 22 As one political figure pointed out in commenting on this episode: "Since 1958, [de Gaulle] has lived by the contra- dictions of other men." 23 Moreover, de Gaulle's personal staff will work in policy areas supposedly reserved only for the ministers. Often, in important matters, a staff member may be given the responsibility of developing his own policy preferences. Indeed, he will be encouraged to compete with the minister for the support of the President. 24 In fact, de Gaulle may ask for policy proposals on the same subject from both the responsible minister and the staff adviser. Ultimately he may use the report for the purpose of arguing with the minister. 2 5 Finally, the President seems to have encouraged individual ministers to deal with him directly rather than going through the appropriate channel, namely the office of the Prime Minister.

^Faucher, op.cit. . p.169. 23Ibid.. p.170. 24Wahl, op.cit.. pp.3ff; Blocker, op.cit. 25Blocker, ibid. ^Duverger in La Nef. op.cit. In this respect, it is strange to see Wahl referring to de Gaulle as "acute and sarcastic Eisenhower" in his dealings with his staff. Indeed, Wahl's own data could support precisely the opposite conclusion. 135. The result of these interpersonal conflicts is to en­ hance the powers of the French President, since the final right of decision is, in effect, "pushed up" to de Gaulle himself. The conflicting elements being dependent upon him are unable to evolve a stable power relationship among themselves; hence, issues are less likely to be settled further down the hierarchy. Indeed, from reports reaching the press, the battle for influence between the Elysee staff and the Government has been quite fierce. As expected, the General can keep his options open more easily and thereby perceive to a greater extent the ramifications of any policy he might decide to opt for. The final decision is not so likely to be forced upon him. He can make it more in his own time and to his own choosing. 27

De Gaulle has done more, however, than simply play individual ministers off against staff officials. In many cases, he has chosen to ignore the former. He has entrusted many of the more important matters of state not to prominent political ministers but to members of his anonymous personal 28 staff. It seems as if he prefers men who are unknown to the public when great tasks must be performed. Pompidou (un-

^Compare Neustadt's observations about Roosevelt in this connection with Wahl's comments about de Gaulle's decision on educational policy. Ibid.. p.3. 2®See Olivier Todd "Heir to de Gaulle?" New Statesman, August 6 , 1965, p.181; also, his "De Gaulle's Gambit," New Statesman. October 22, 1965, p.588. 136. til 1962), Guichard, and Foccart have been given duties we might have expected the Government to perform. Not Prime Minister Debre, but Louis Joxe and Pompidou conducted the secret missions which were to lead to the Evian Treaty of 1962. The Matignon seems to have been in the dark regarding 29 developments in North Africa. De Gaulle, furthermore, seemingly has brought his in­ fluence to bear upon the method by which meetings of the Cabinet have been conducted. Since he has been able to define the means by which decisions are arrived at in such gatherings, he has determined the types of decisions which would result. 30 By insisting upon ministerial specialization and an elaborate division of labor within the Cabinet, he has prevented the development of "collective responsibility." Indeed, the concept apparently was never admitted into the discussions: Soustelle's claim that so emotional a problem as the Algerian issue was never brought up in a cabinet meeting gives eloquent testimony to this interpretation. 31 As a rule, each minister is simply instructed to present a narrow brief upon which the President himself is to pass

O Q At least according to Soustelle, op.cit., chapters III-IV. We can readily understand de Gaulle's hesitancy in informing Debr€ of developments in North Africa since pro­ settler sentiment was reputed to be quite pronounced at the Mat ignon. 30To our knowledge, he has not been challenged in Council on this point. ^Soustelle, op . cit. . p.131. 137. 32 judgment. Debate tends to be prohibited. Those cabinet

officials who would be generalists are quickly brought to heel — as poor Antoine Pinay discovered. 33 It is possible that generalists, unlike the specialists, might surreptitiously allocate to themselves additional powers of decision-making, thereby competing with de Gaulle. With an increasing "colonization" of ministerial posts by civil servants since

the advent of the Fifth Republic, it is likely that meetings are conducted according to specialist procedures. 3 4 On the other hand, let us not push this point to ex­ tremes. True, de Gaulle was a powerful force, but it is unlikely that he could have dominated the Cabinet with such apparent ease had the Prime Minister put up a fight. It seems that Debre put up only a little resistance when "his" ministers went over his head and appealed directly to the Glysee, although it is true writers are not agreed on this point. 3 5 The Prime Minister's unconditionalism prevented the development of a counterweight to presidential power as the 1958 Constitution had intended. As Maurice Duverger aptly remarked as early as 1959, a major reason the Consti-

^Viansson-Ponte, The King and His Court, pp.42-44. ■a o Ibid.. pp.42-44, 131; also, see his comments in Le Monde. July 23-29, 1959. Weekly Edition. ^Wahl suggests, however, that recently de Gaulle has relaxed his controls somewhat. Op.cit.. p.6 . 3^E.g., Cf. Wahl, ibid., and Duverger, op.cit.. for two different interpretations. 138. tution was not evolving as Debre had expected was inherent In the slavish devotion of the Prime Minister to the leader of Free France. 3 6 Debre indeed may have complained from time to time to de Gaulle, but the latter apparently never let it bother him.3^ A more ominous development from the Government's standpoint has been the growth of what has been called a "parallel government" within the confines of the Elysee.33 There, about fifteen confidants on General de Gaulle's personal staff are responsible for certain policy areas which correspond somewhat to the various ministries of the Government. Indeed, a practice of setting up functional committees (e.g., Algerian Affairs, National Defense, Economic Affairs and European Affairs) to deal with prob­ lems of interest to the President served to undercut the position of the Prime Minister. After all, whereas the President had the constitutional right to assume the chair in meetings of the Council of Ministers, he could not do likewise so far as inter-ministerial conferences were concerned; here, the Prime Minister could be chairman. In particular, de Gaulle wished to weaken the influence of the Algerian diehards who apparently had some influence in

36Ibid. 3^Much has been made of Debre's intransigence, but the fact remains that the former Premier gave way to de Gaulle on almost every major front; i.e., on Algeria and constitutional reform. But cf. Chapsal, op.cit. for a sympathetic interpretation. 3 fiBlocker, op.cit. 139. 39 the Matignon. The Elysee committees served to do just that. They gave the General expert Information, Increased his options because he could depend upon alternative sources of Information, and they were chaired by expert officials who had his confidence.^ The Elysee committees, first created during the Al­ gerian crisis, have gone far in undermining the powers of the Government. 41 Recently, however, de Gaulle has seen fit to create more short-lived committees and to limit the jur­ isdiction of the older committees. Thus, small groups have been set up to deal with everything from miners1 strikes to the price of milk, only to be disbanded ultimately. In the way of a Roosevelt, he apparently does not wish to see power centers become too stable. By increasing uncertainty, he would appear to have increased his own authority. Whereas he continues to employ his Elysee staff and its committees as a counterweight to the Government, there has been some evidence recently that de Gaulle now is relying on cabinet officials to a greater extent than in earlier years. Perhaps he does so because, after having weakened the Cabinet so much, he now wishes to restore a perceived imbalance between the Elysee and the Matignon. Such would

^Viansson-Ponte in The King and His Court, p.41. ^Viansson-Ponte in Realites; Meisel, op.cit.. p.50; Blocker, op.cit. ^Chapsal, op.cit. . p. 61. 140. be a logical development If our Interpretation of his be­ havior is correct. As Roosevelt, he would not wish his staff to extend its influence over his freedom of action any more than a government-of-the-day. Besides, the major positions are not so likely to be held by politicians any­ way. Or it may be that with the selection of Georges Pompidou as Prime Minister, he now feels that the Cabinet is isolated sufficiently from parliamentary influences to relinquish his grip somewhat. Pompidou was de Gaulle's chief of staff at the Elysee and, unlike Debre, he appears not to resent de Gaulle's settling of inter-ministerial conflicts. Likewise, he seemingly has no objection if individual ministers deal directly with the President instead of consulting first with the Prime Minister. In a word, he seems to remain the chief of staff who facilitates the flow of communications to his leader. Under his leader­ ship it is unlikely that the Government will remain more

J A than an appendage to the Elysee, De Gaulle, then, has displayed a sure instinct for the uses of power. He has demonstrated a remarkable ability to play upon the contradictions of others in order to increase his own freedom to maneuver. He has brought the Government under effective control to such an extent that the concept of the dual executive as written into the 1958 Constitution

^See Maurice Duverger in Le Monde. August 1-7, 1963, Weekly Edition; and Wahl, op.cit. Government so far as the major Issues of the day are con­ cerned. De Gaulle is, in effect, a prime minister without any of the restraints found in parliamentary systems. His ability to influence others is in no small way responsible for this state of affairs.

It might be contested that in our attempts to under­ stand the French President we have under-estimated the im­ portance of his ideology. This criticism can be met in a number of ways. We might answer by saying that we have been trying to understand how he employs his power resource, not the ends for which it is used. Indeed, we might go even further and suggest that too much emphasis has been placed upon the ideological aspect of the problem. Much has been written about the importance of his writings for an under- standing of his actions; 43 however, it seldom occurs to writers to ask whether or not ideology is a purely secondary phenomenon for de Gaulle, having little importance for his political behavior. The constant shifts in his policy alone 44 would suggest that this may be the case. We have already

^ O n e of the best is Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero As History," Wo rid Politics. 1960-61, pp. 140-55. ^^Among the small number of commentators who have warned against taking de Gaulle's Ideological pronouncements too seriously as a guide in predicting the French leader's behavior are: Raymond Aron in a U.S. News and World Report interview of April 22, 1963; Duverger in Macridis (Ed.), op.cit.; Alfred Fabre-Luce, The Trial of Charles de Gaulle. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1963, p.53; William Schlamm, "The Death of Gaullism," National Review. January 25, 1966, 142 . seen how the problem arose In a connection with the UNR. It will be remembered that the Party refused to evolve a doctrine, precisely because it could not predict what de Gaulle might do!• 4 5 Finally, it has been pointed out in this regard that he is castigated by his enemies of the Left at the very moment he is carrying out much of their program against his friends on the Right. If our inter­ pretation of his behavior is correct, then it should not be surprising to the observer. 46 Of course, we are not arguing here that de Gaulle's skills in bending others to his will was the fundamental reason that decision-making came to rest more and more in his hands. In fact, probably the major cause lay in the Algerian War. On this point the major commentators are in pp. 63-66; and Paul Reynaud, The Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle. New York: Odyssey Press, 1964. ^ I n a recent biography of de Gaulle, Alexander Werth (De Gaulle: A Political Biography. Penguin Books: Middlesex, England, 1965, pp.7-10) interestingly com­ ments that to really understand the French President we must realize that throughout his career the latter has been a rebel against all authority; in a word, his politics is rebellion personified. A man with such a personality might well behave in the manner of the individual we have been describing. Suspicious of the influence and motives of others, he tried to keep any independent power structure from arising which might threaten his own independence. Whereas this is only speculation so far as de Gaulle is concerned, we do know that such behavior patterns seem to be characteristic of French culture. For two different aspects of this problem cf. Edmond Taylor, The Reporter, September 12, 1965; and Crozier, op . c it. ^Jean-Marie Domenach, "De Gaulle Contre Lui-Memp," Nouvelle Frontiere, January 1964, pp. 22-24. 143. agreement. 47 Quite simply, the potential opposition was sil­ enced because it knew that only de Gaulle could save France from civil war, chaos, and/or military dictatorship.^® Note, for example, how quickly the opposition from the political parties became evident once the Evian Treaty was signed. On the other hand — and this brings us to the heart of our subject -- de Gaulle's imposing figure as well as the Algerian imbroglio make us all too often forget that French political stability in general and de Gaulle's ulti­ mate control in particular, at least within the framework of a democratic society, rest upon a near parliamentary majority composing the UNR. He can only cut a dashing figure on the domestic and international stage because of this supportive element. Indeed, in looking over most works dealing with French politics, the reader is likely to come away with the impression that the vagaries of French poli­ tics are dependent upon the Elysee Palace. As we said earlier, if they are, it is only because in the final analysis the UNR is there to give the President its unconditional backing. 4 9

^E.g., see Wahl, op.cit. ; Hoffmann, op.cit. : Duverger in La Nef. 4 8An interesting interpretation in this connection can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," paper presented to Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York: September 6-10, 1966. 4 9Among the few major commentators who do not forget this point the names of Maurice Duverger and Raymond Aron might be mentioned. See Duverger in Le^ Monde. August 1-7, 1963, Weekly Edition, as well as the issue of January 9-15, 1964; and Raymond Aron in L* Annee Politique. 1960. p. V. 144. Perhaps now we are better able to perceive the UNR- de Gaulle relationship. As we have seen, the political style of the General to a great extent has enabled him to dominate the Government. Since the latter is where the UNR conceivably would exercise its major power, it follows that its potential influence is choked off right from the beginning. In a parliamentary regime such as in Great Britain, the Government is composed for the most part of the party leadership. The UNR, however, has been denied most of the major portfolios by de Gaulle; it is the "technocrats" who are dominant.^ The UNR, then, does not perform the recruitment function we would normally expect. In Bagehot's words, the "buckle" which links party to government is missing. Hence, the Movement lacks any real responsibility for policy-making. Moreover, unlike the parties in the American system, the UNR so far has not nominated the presidential candidate, and, anyway, its particular leader denies any allegiance to it. Hence, the nominating function of presidents performed by American parties likewise is absent in this regard. If our interpretation of de Gaulle's uses of "presi­ dential power" is correct, it should express his relation­ ship with the UNR as well as with other structures. We

^ F o r a statement of some of the problems faced by the Gaullists see Georges Lavau, "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. June 1963, pp. 433-43. 145. think that it does. Quite simply, de Gaulle consistently has sought to weaken "his11 Party and, in this effort, he has displayed a contempt for it as well as an apparent fear of its potential as a restraint upon his freedom of action. During the Algerian crisis a minority faction within the UNR, as we have seen, offered a challenge not only to de Gaulle personally but to the very existence of the Republic; and the response of the General was quite under­ standable. Once the issue had been settled, however, we might have expected his attitude to have changed. After all, the Party now gave him its total loyalty; and Gaullists never cease to assure others that de Gaulle is not opposed to parties as such, but only the multi-party system as it exists in France. Moreover, if he wished to reconstruct political life in France as he and his followers professed, it was that a "rationalized” party system would be neces­ sary to assure the continuity of his policies once he had left the scene. Ergo, he would try to breathe life into the Movement. The trouble with this argument, however, is not only the basic assumptions it makes about the importance of party systems, but, more important in this context, the assumptions it makes about de Gaulle's values. In a word, it assumes the quest for power in itself ranks lower on his 14 6. scale of values than a particular vision concerning the nature of French society.^ Those commentators who expected — or hoped -- that the President would encourage the development of a strong majority party were doomed to disappointment. If our in­ terpretation of his behavior is correct, however, they should not have been surprised: de Gaulle attempts to keep other men and structures totally dependent upon him; to collaborate with the UNR in any meaningful sense would imply a dependence upon it. Paradoxically, either wittingly or unwittingly, he has acted as a conservative force in pre­ serving the very multi-party system he professes to detest. In this sense he has not been an agent of change in French society so much as a conservative force. The arguments concerning the relationship between the UNR and its leader are mere assertions, however. Now it is necessary to bring the evidence to bear upon the problem. In order that our case may be strengthened, we shall try to show the ways in which de Gaulle has interacted with the UNR over a period of time. Whereas the weight of his influ­ ence has been more pronounced in some periods than others, the nature of the relationship between the Movement and the General has remained relatively constant.

^ S e e Fabre-Luce, op.cit. A recent argument that de Gaulle's foreign policy is essentially short-run rather than long-range in its thrust may be found in Michel Gordey, "Changeless de Gaulle," The New Republic. December 18, 1965, pp.16-19. 147. As we have seen, the attempt in 1958 to bring together all the disparate Gaullist groups under the banner of the UNR was to a large extent successful. For the most part only a few disgruntled left-wing Gaullists chose to stay out of the Movement. 5 2 But Gaullism meant different things to different people. All factions wished to strengthen the state and restore the glories of France, but from that point on difficulties arose. 5 3 It was particularly over the question of Algeria that divergent views became most pro­ nounced. It will be remembered that it was ultimately this colonial problem which drove a strong minority out of the Party and into open conflict with the regime. At the time of de Gaulle's return to power, France was bathing in the glories of nationalist slogans, slogans 54 which specifically emphasized "Algerie Francaise.11 And the sentimental leadership was lodged in fiery Gaullists like Soustelle and Delbecque. It was they who had eased the May 13 rebellion into Gaullist channels by winning over a suspicious Army and a European population. 5 5 For such men the betrayal of French Algeria was the supreme error.

^See Williams and Harrison in Butler (Ed.), op.cit.. pp.16, 45, 88; and Dauer and Rodet, Le 13 Mai Sans Complots. pp. 149-56. ^Dauer and Rodet, Les Orphelins du Gaullism. pp.9-11, 192-94. ^Andrews, op . cit. ^^Clark, op.cit.. pp.382ff. 148. Moreover* it was they who took the lead in forming the UNR and apparently dominated the Movement in its formative stage.^ The election results of November 1958, in which not a single left-wing Gaullist was elected, appears to have been a resounding success for the nationalist Right: it was the Gaullists and CNIP who dominated the stage.^ De Gaulle had several options. He might have allowed events to carry him along, much in the manner of the various Fourth Republic governments, hoping that a force maleure originating from the outside world would solve the problem for him. 5 8 Emotions within the political elite and the nation were such at the time that he probably would have received a ringing endorsement. Non-decision making, though, was totally out of character for de Gaulle. More­ over, France herself would lose control over events. As one writer has suggested, de Gaulle was prepared to leave Algeria, but he was unwilling to give the impression that France was forced out. 5 9 On the other hand, the inability of France to win the war, the increasing disgust on the

■^According to Soustelle, at least. See op. cit. p.68. ■^Smith, op . ci t. ^®See the delightful work of Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, especially pp.136-47. ^Hoffmann, "De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History," op.cit. 149. part of Allies and a United States seeking popularity in the "Third1* world, the drain of resources which hindered de Gaulle's nuclear and European ambitions, carried its disadvantages also. Conversely, in this period he might have opted for a progressive withdrawal from Algeria. This policy, however, was fraught with dangers in that civil war might have resulted, leading to the possible overthrow of de Gaulle himself*

Contrary to what many of his closest followers ex­ pected, de Gaulle chose the second option, clothing his real intentions in vague pronouncements, often retreating momentarily in the face of overwhelming odds. He eventually led France out of Algeria.^ To win, however, he needed to bring the UNR under control. As a result of its sheer numerical strength in the National Assembly, the UNR with the aid of the CN1F and a few other deputies could thwart the General's efforts at disengagement in Algeria, It also will be remembered that in the year following the May 13 revolt several UNR figures sat in the Government -- and they were for French Algerial

De Gaulle's problem, therefore, became one of contain­ ing his more zealous followers. Leading Gaullists such as

Soustelle apparently felt that a renewal of the political elite was warranted. Only those men and women who were

^ B u t cf. Meisel, op . c i t. , pp. 262-63. 150. properly "national" were suited for leadership (e.g. ele­ ments favorable to French Algeria). It will be recalled that he favored a "grand coalition" in Parliament, composed of the forces grouping themselves around himself, Duchet, Bidault and Horice.^ Such a coalition might call itself "Gaullist," but its sheer potential power did not mean it would necessarily follow its leader if he sacrificed the great principle which united so many disparate elements. Hence, de Gaulle had to avoid the deadly embrace of those who spoke in his name. In general, since the activists' very raison d'etre was linked to the Algerian question and since their commit­ ment appeared to be total, the liquidation of that problem in favor of Moslem nationalism implied the diminishment of a powerful restraint upon de Gaulle's freedom of action. Conversely, it implied the weakening of the UNR as a major force in French political life since the very men who were supporting its autonomy and institutional power were strongly committed to French Algeria. In other words, the fortunes of de Gaulle as a leader and the evolution of events in North Africa were inextricably linked. If he could out-maneuver his potential enemies in retreating from Algeria, he likewise could liberate himself from a major

restraint upon his freedom of action.

^1This point will be discussed in greater detail below. 151. In essence, so far as the UNR was concerned, de Gaulle had to do two things: he had to detach it, first from the activists outside its ranks and, secondly, from those within its ranks. In order to do so, he threw the full weight of his influence and prestige on the side of the uncondition- als. 6 2 The latter, as we have seen, gave him its total loyalty which he rewarded by placing the Party in a subordin­ ate position. In 1963, Jacques Fauvet could write that by keeping the UNR at a distance and refusing to consult its leaders, de Gaulle was denying it the major role we might have expected it to play due to its numerical preponderance in Parliament. 6 q Moreover, he found it necessary to turn to the very elements he detested, or so he said: the "old- line" parties and their leaders. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that he wished to weaken "his" Party vis-I-vis the other political groups. 64 Gaullism, which preached French renewal, was to be driven by its leader and his closest confidants into shoring up that very multi- partyism which it had railed against throughout the Fourth Republic. Given the political style which we have been discussing, such behavior by the General should not seem

6 2 De Gaulle never seems to have believed that politi­ cal parties are useful instruments in imposing structural changes. See Francois Goguel's remarks in Hoffmann (Ed.), In Search of France. p. 399 . ^ L e Monde. September 19-25, 1965, Weekly Edition. ^Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde, April 23-29, 1959, Weekly Edition. 152. surprising. In the end, he was able to triumph: the UNR was reduced to a purely secondary role and de Gaulle's influence was more pronounced than ever. How was be able to triumph so completely? To begin, a portent of things to come might have been gleaned from de Gaulle's refusal to allow the UNR to cam­ paign under his banner. Unlike the RFF, the UNR was to be denied the General's personal appellation. This refusal was rationalized by Gaullists basically in the following way: de Gaulle was a national institution, and as such he was above all parties; hence he could belong to no single group­ ing since that would make a partisan of him. As events un­ folded, however, the UNR under the skillful leadership of Soustelle, nevertheless was able to present itself success­ fully to the voters as "his" party. Actually, as events were to demonstrate, the decision to refuse to the UNR the use of his name did the Movement little harm at the polls. Voters seemed to have little trouble deciphering which party was Gaullist. In the second place, it was necessary to force the more dynamic of the May 13th elements in the Party to toe the line since their connections with Algerian activists and the Army made them a particularly potent threat to the

^^Butler, op.cit., p.44ff; also, Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," in Angus Campbell et al, Elections and the Political Order, New York: John Wiley, 1966, pp.334-44. General. Potentially, they had not only overt force on their side but, even more important, they were more highly committed to French Algeria than to de Gaulle.^ As these elements looked to Soustelle, especially, for leadership, de Gaulle was led to neutralize the position of a man origi­ nally reputed to be his closest lieutenant. Certainly he was the best-known and most popular Gaullist: his impassioned defense of French Algeria and French national goals in the National Assembly, his hatred of and refusal to compromise with the Fourth Republic, and his reputation as an engineer of the May 13 revolution endeared him to many of the Gaullist faithful.^ Soustelle was the motor in the formation of the UNR. It was in his office that the various Gaullist factions met to pool their resources by creating a single party for contesting the elections to the National Assembly in 1938. As a result of his dominant position there was strong sup­ port for naming him the Party's first president. There could be no doubt that if he assumed leadership of the Move­ ment, Soustelle would guide Gaullism in the direction of a strong French Algeria orientation. 6 ft However, the word was

^E v e n the casual reader of Soustelle's L 'Esperance Trahie is made aware of this point. Cf. pp. 8-10. ^Actually, according both to Clark and Meisel, Soustelle probably had little to do with initiating the May 13 revolt. Indeed, he was not even in Algeria when it occurred! Cf. Meisel, op.cit., pp.23-24; and Clark, op.cit.. pp.380-81. ^ S e e Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde. July 23-29, 1959, Weekly Edition. 154. passed presumably through a staff official of General de Gaulle, Olivier Guichard, 6 9 that the leader of Free France did not feel the UNR should name a president. Indeed, so great was the prestige of Soustelle, that at the first meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, some two hours after the formation of the UNR on October 1, 1959, there was a move to give him the highest position in the Party. De Gaulle at this point supposedly made his own wishes known.^ There should not be a single leader; rather, a "collegial" direction was deemed more approp­ riate. ^ Therefore, two days later, instead of electing a president, the Central Committee simply chose Albin Chalandon as its Treasurer and Roger Frey as General Secre­ tary. Nevertheless, de Gaulle ultimately had to step in on three separate occasions to deter Soustelle1s elevation to the presidency of the Movement. 7 2 In making the Central Committee the policy-making body of the organi­ zation rather than making Soustelle*s its leader, de Gaulle was able to count upon the support of the unconditionals. Some of them, as Debre and Frey, were nominally supporters of Soustelle but they also would accede to the wishes of

^ S e e Chapsal, op . ci t. , pp.131-32. ^Raymond Barrillon in Le. Monde, November 27-December 3, 1958, Weekly Edition. 71Chapsal, op.cit. ^Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde, July 23-29, 1959, Weekly Edit ion. 155. their Chief. Others* notably Michelet and Chalandon, had no sympathy in the least for the settler position. How­ ever* most of them could be depended upon to wait for de Gaulle's signal before taking a position: Mme. Fourcade or Chaban-Delmas* for example. 73 It appears* then* that de Gaulle's wish to prevent Soustelle's ascension to the presidency of the UNR was sufficient justification so far as most members of the Central Committee were concerned. Soustelle and his friends were denied more than the presidency of the Movement* however. De Gaulle refused to support the Party leadership in its demands for a type of electoral system which* it believed* would assure Gaullism a decisive victory in the election of November 1958. This is not the place to discuss the relationship between elec­ toral systems and party systems. For our purposes it is enough to state that the UNR leadership favored the estab­ lishment of departement lists with two ballots (scrutin de liste ma1 oritaire &, deux tours) over the single-member constituency at the arrondisement level with two ballots. The former, argued the UNR leaders* would facilitate the coordination of agreements made at the national level and as a new party* the UNR itself could not call upon candi­ dates with close ties at the local level. Moreover, the list system would enhance the influence of the more populous areas as opposed to the country; it might harm the Communists

^Faucher, op . cit. * pp. 91-96; Viansson-ponte , The King and His Court * pp. 188-89, 169-76. 156 . who would find difficulty in. making alliances in the second round. Departement lists theoretically would have enabled the Gaullist to crush not only Communists but Socialists, *7 A Radicals and Popular Republicans as well. In a word, not only Gaullists but the "nationals" and rightists in general would have been favored by such an electoral system. 7 5 In the heart of the Government, Soustelle and Debre, joined by the Independent, Pinay, argued their case with Socialist and Radical spokesmen. 7 6 Premier de Gaulle, however, would do nothing to strengthen those elements which spoke in his name. Although he apparently had opposed the scrut in d 1arrondis ement in 1944, this great empiricist was favorably disposed to it in 1958. 7 7 Unlike his followers, whose principles seem to have remained inflexible, he recognized the changed circum- stances of 1958. 7 8 He understood quite well that a Gaullist landslide might well create a coherent Parliament potentially Independent of his control. Far better to preserve multi- partylsm so as to play the various groups off against one another! Hence, "an opening to the left" was appropriate under the circumstances.

^ S e e Maurice Duverger, "Paradoxes d'Une Reforme Elec- torale," in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. pp.225-26. 7 5Jean Blondel, "The French General Election of November 1959," Parliamentary Affairs. 1958-59, pp.47-49; Williams and Harrison in Butler (Ed.), o p .cit.. pp.32-40. ^Duverger, op . cit. , p.226. 77Ibid.. p.224. 78Ibid. 157.

De Gaulle, then, did not wish to encourage a strong

"national" vote at the polls. To preserve a "balance" in Parliament, he needed the representation of Socialists, Radicals and Popular Republicans. If the latter did well, he could expect a counterweight to the activists in the National Assembly. In weighing the various alternatives, we see him relying more upon the advice of his personal staff than upon the Gaullist politicians or Government ministers. 7 9 As we would expect, he appears to have "played his cards close to his vest" in order that his 80 options might be kept open. Until September 30, 1958, it was rumored that the UNR preference would be adopted. At a Council of Ministers that day, however, the anti- Gaullist position was formally adopted by the General. In Council, there was no weighing of the various alterna­ tives, no consultations. Rather, there was simply an an­ nouncement of his decision, taking everyone, especially those who spoke in his name, by surprise. 81 The apparent desire to preserve an "equilibrium" among the parties led de Gaulle to sacrifice the interests of "his" Party to the

7 9E.g., Soustelle suggests that the major sources of influence on de Gaulle in choosing the single-member con­ stituency were Pompidou and Guichard. Soustelle, op.cit.. p . 68. 8 0In this connection, it has been argued that President Johnson's well-known hostility to "leaks" to the press derive from his supposed belief that his control of situations is increased if the public is not privy to his intentions until he decides to make his move. Q I Soustelle, op.cit. 158. very groups he had inveighed against over the years. It was said that he had concluded that the results of the Referendum of September 28, 1958 portended dire consequences for the anti-Gaullists in the upcoming election. 8 2

De Gaulle did not stop here in his attempts to diminish the influence of the activist Gaullists, however. Soustelle's projected alliance with the parties of Duchet, Bidault and Morice is a good case in point. Since the purpose of such an alliance, it will be remembered, was to return an activist and rightist majority to the National Assembly, the attempt could hardly have been congenial to the General. Such a group, if coherent, could severely limit his freedom of 8 3 action in North Africa. There is evidence, moreover, that the four leaders hoped to form a single intergroup in 84 Parliament. Once again de Gaulle had to interfere with the plans of his nominal allies in order to save his supposed enemies on the left. Through their strength, paradoxically, he could hope to dominate Parliament. Multi-partyism would be his salvation! Soustelle himself had wasted little time in planning the campaign. By defining the major issue as one of

8 2Duverger, op.cit., p.226; Chapsal, op.cit.. pp.23-24. ®^Chapsal, ibid., pp.29-30; Avril and Pinto, op.cit.. p. 279; Fauvet in Touchard (Ed.), op. cit.. pp.16-19. ®^Raymond Barrillon in Le Monde. November 27 - December 3, 1958, Weekly Edition. 159. "nationals" — i.e., those who favored French Algeria -- versus the forces of "decadance," he sought to seize the initiative within the Movement. If others would accept his definition of the basic issue of the campaign and if they would remain passive, he could expect to dominate the nomination processes within the UNR. 8 5 The nomination of candidates itself would be determined by the fervor of their support for winning the war in North Africa. As we have seen, however, his fellow Gaullists refused 86 to follow his lead for various reasons. When their op­ position to the projected alliance became pronounced, Soustelle solicited the aid of General de Gaulle. The latter, while not expressly criticizing the "alliance of the four," told Soustelle he should avoid linking himself o y with the old-line "politicians." Meanwhile, however, Olivier Guichard, chief of the Elysee staff, reportedly conveyed a message from de Gaulle to the UNR leaders that the General was opposed to an exclusive electoral agreement with Duchet, Bidault and Morice. Apparently the effort was decisive. 8 8 His intervention in this regard, according to

8 5This way of looking at politics is associated with the work of E. E. Schattschneider, op.cit. Q £ See Chapter III. ^Soustelle, op . cit. . pp. 70-74. Q Q Fauvet, op.cit.. p.17. 160. Philip Williams, in all probability dashed Soustelle's hopes, since it is quite likely that men such as Roger Frey and Michel Debre ordinarily would have followed him.®® After several heated Central Committee meetings and the interference of de Gaulle, Soustelle, who apparently had 90 threatened to resign from the Party, finally relented. It was agreed that the accords negotiated in some thirty- four departements by Soustelle before the party explosion had occurred would be allowed to stand; however, it was implied that arrangements with parties other than the CNIP, the Republican Center and the Christian Democrats would be welcomed. Gaullism — and this was what its leader wished -- was to embrace the Left as well as the Right; it could in­ clude all Frenchmen, not merely those among them who took a 91 particular position on the Algerian question. The prevention of an alliance with the Right and the refusal to agree to the type of electoral law favored by the UNR leadership were not the only means by which de Gaulle sought, on the one hand, to strengthen liberal and uncon­ ditional Gaullists within the UNR, and, conversely, to weaken the Party Itself in relation to its political opponents outside the Gaullist fold. In addition, he first seems to

®^Williams and Barrison in Butler (Ed.), op.cit., p . 35 . ^Barrillon, oja. cit. 91Fauvet, op.c it. . pp.18-19. 161. have persuaded the UNR not to stand against Government min­ isters in 1958. Secondly, it is said that he prevented UNR leaders from gerrymandering electoral districts at the ex­ pense of certain well-known figures of the Fourth Republic. In the first case, at the same time that it was announced that the UNR would enter into alliances with parties other than the ones favored by Soustelle, it was pointed out also that the "Central Committee has decided not to nominate candidates in constituencies where the ministers of General 92 de Gaulle are running." This meant, for example, that the 93 hated Guy Mollet would not be opposed. Certain of the Fourth Republic politicians of the left thus would be spared.

In the second case, it appears that the UNR leaders in the Government fully intended that election districts be so arranged that some of their more prominent enemies in the

Fourth Republic be gerrymandered out of political existence. Hence, not only Communists but some well-known leftists were discriminated against. 94 However, General de Gaulle, it is said, personally intervened once more to force a redrawing of certain districts. In particular those constituencies in which two strong anti-activists, Pierre Mend&s-France and

92Ibid., p.18.

^Blondel, op .cit. It will be recalled, in fact, that Delbecque's Republican Convention refused to adhere to this stipulation.

94Ibid.; also Duverger, op.cit., pp. 229-30. 162. Frangois Mitterand, were standing for election, were re-drawn to favor their return to Parliament. Both men were implacable foes of the Algerian diehards and were leaders of the Gaullist opposition. Finally, we might note the paucity of well-known activists in key positions in the early years of the Fifth Republic. The very men who made the revolution were shunted aside both in the UNR as well as in other parties. In the latter case, we look in vain for such names as Lacoste, Bldault, Duchet and Morice. Soustelle, who many assumed was de Gaulle's closest confidant and who, therefore, was expected to be named Prime Minister, was denied that prize. Instead, the faithful Debre was chosen for the major posi­ tion in the Government whereas Soustelle was given the innocuous rank of Minister-Delegate to the Prime Minister. Delbecque, the leader of May 13, was given a post neither in the de Gaulle nor subsequent Debre Governments. What a reward for the activists! True, Debre, Soustelle and Cornut-Gentille presumably could be expected to defend in varying degrees the settler views but they would be opposed by such Gaullist "liberals" as Michelet, Malraux and Triboulet. Of more significance, however, was the fact that the Soustellians were refused any of the key port­ folios which they might have used to plot their own course: Foreign Affairs, Interior, War Veterans, Armed Forces. 163 . Without a doubt the composition of the Debre Government reflected the more "flexible11 opinions regarding North Africa. It has been argued that in the realm of foreign affairs General de Gaulle has a tendency to stress "equilibrium" rather than "partnership" in his relations with other states, especially the United States. 95 The same could be said for his approach to domestic politics. In the period we have been discussing so far, in other words the months immediately prior to the legislative election of 1958, we see the General supporting with a quiet vengeance the very elements which lent him little if any real support. The tremendous potential which a Soustelle-run UNR might exert in the world of politics seems to have led him tacitly to favor his enemies against those who were speaking most loudly in his name. But for de Gaulle there are no friends; only allies. For him "the world is full of opposing forces" which must be mastered. 9 6 Politics is the "war of all against all." He will seek to balance these forces, play them off against one another, and finally liberate himself from them. In those days he had to walk carefully but even here we can

see the portents for the UNR.

9^Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re- Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966, p.47. 96Ibid. 164 . Until now we have discussed the style of General de Gaulle, the ways In which he has employed his power. We have suggested that he has sought to limit the influence of the activists in particular; however, he seems to have gone somewhat further and sought to limit the power of the Movement in relation to other parties. We should not be surprised. Even a casual reading of his memoirs attests to his hostility to political parties; essentially they are little more than pleaders for special interests and barriers o 7 to national cohesion. According to one of the most res­ pected French political scientists, moreover, the General has never seemed to view political parties as essential in 98 fostering social change. Assuming this to be the case, it is hardly unexpected that he would seek to deprive the UNR of a major role in the Fifth Republic. Finally, it has been stated more than once that de Gaulle firmly believes that intermediate bodies inhibit that necessary common bond between the leader and his followers. The former should never lose touch with the masses, but he might well do so if anything stands between himself and the people or filters opinions in any way. In fact, argues this school of thought, de Gaulle believes that the public welfare can be discerned only if intermediate groups are not allowed to corrupt or misdirect the people. Hence, the provincial tours of the

^ O p . cit. 9 8Goguel, op > cit. 165. General are to be seen In this light. Needless to say, whether or not de Gaulle himself takes this view seriously, the attitude in itself does little to raise the status of political parties. 99 In particular, it should be abundantly clear by now that the General has refused consistently to consult the Party in major decisions. The list is a rather long one; for example, in agricultural and industrial crises as well as in the recent Presidential campaign the UNR simply car­ ried out orders originating in the Elysee Palace; and in the never-ending rumors about who it is that the General listens to most intently, it is interesting to note that leading members of the Movement are seldom, if ever, men­ tioned.^^ And we need hardly mention at this time the fact that throughout the Algerian crisis the UNR appears never to have been consulted. In a word, the Movement was informed of decisions after the event. Needless to say, keeping the UNR in the dark increased de Gaulle's leverage vis-3-vis the Party. If having "power" involves to a great extent one's ability to predict the behavior of others, then it seems clear that relative to

9 oEhrmann, op.cit. ^®®This point becomes apparent to anyone who peruses the various Issues of the Gaullist daily, La Nation. Also, see the articles of "Sirius" and Andre Passeron in Le Monde (November 4-10, 1965, Weekly Edition) immediately prior to the 1965 presidential election. 166. 101 de Gaulle the UNR has little power. By refusing to con­ sult his followers In advance before making decisions* de Gaulle keeps his options open by deciding more In his own time and to his own choosing — and he can confidently ex­ pect his followers to react in a predictable manner. The shifts in policy so characteristic of his political style have a similar effect, it might be added. On the other hand* it should not be forgotten that "power" in a logical and empirical sense would imply the ability to sanction. Here* de Gaulle can rely upon the dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent calling of new elections. In this respect* more than one writer has commented upon the dependence of little-known deputies on the President's personality as a 102 necessity for winning elections. Hence* it is hardly prudent to rebel against so popular a figure as de Gaulle. The relationship between the UNR and its leader* then* appears to be entirely one way: the Movement is acted upon; it is the passive part of the relationship. The Interesting point becomes: Why does the UNR accept a purely secondary role? Why has it, to our knowledge* never insisted upon a more important place in French politics? Why do UNR deputies

101Cf. Crozier, op.cit. 102 Probably the best study in this regard is Mattel Dogan* "Le Personnel Politique et la Personality Charismat- ique," Revue Francaise de Sociologie. Volume VI, 1965* pp. 305-24. See, also, L€o Hamon* "Members of the French Parliament," International Social Science Journal. No.4, 1961, pp.545-66. displaying a unity so unusual for French parties consistent­ ly return massive "yes" votes to the Government rather than 103 splitting into warring factions? Indeed, its support for de Gaulle appears to be total. Part of the answer may re­ side in the sanctions de Gaulle might apply if it refused to do his bidding. But we think there is a much more im­ portant explanation. That explanation, admittedly difficult to sustain in a statistical sense, nevertheless appears to be quite relevant to the discussion at hand. We refer here to what might be termed the Gaullist mystique, that communal bond among men which is impervious to the potentially dis­ ruptive and centrifugal elements composing contemporary Gaullism. Such ties, needless to say, are exceedingly difficult to break: witness the difficulty experienced by Soustelle and Delbecque in tearing themselves away from the man who was destroying that which they held most dear. Their naivete in hindsight appears almost ludicrous to the non-committed observer; but to the loyalist it is quite understandable. The initial rallying to de Gaulle after France fell, a choice which was drastic enough to draw to oneself the charge of treason; the common war experiences which fortified that spirit of "oneness"; that initial opti­ mism upon returning to France but only to be shunted aside by the Fourth Republic; the years spent "in the wilderness" 168. waiting for the General to be called again to duty. Such experiences, logic would tell us, steel men In their devo­ tion to a common cause and enable them to withstand divisive forces. As the very symbol of all they have lived through, de Gaulle could count, therefore, upon their undying loyalty.! 1- 104 What data do we have which, at the very least, would suggest such sentiments are distributed among the leader­ ship? At most, there are hunches and inferences, but they are suggestive of our hypothesis. First, the UNR leader­ ship itself is almost entirely composed of men who served under de Gaulle during the war years. Quite literally the Gaullist rulers arose out of the Resistance. It is as if legitimacy at the present time requires the necessary war service.For instance, of some 158 deputies who entered the National Assembly in 1958 and who were at least 21 years old in 1940, over 83 per cent seem to have been active in the Resistance. It hardly goes without saying that the more prominent leaders today were quite active.

l^4Among the various writers who have mentioned this community of sentiments among Gaullists are: Waline, op.cit.; Dogan, op.cit.; also,his "Changement de Regime et Changement de Personnel” in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. pp.256ff; Hamon, op.cit.; Chapsal, op.cit.. p.131; and Viansson-Pontfi1s The King and His Court emphasizes this sentiment of unity. ^^Dogan in Touchard (Ed*), op. cit. ^ ^ Ibid., pp. 256-57; also, his "Le Personnel Politique et Personality Charismatique,” op.cit. Secondly, to the continual amazement of more than one commentator, the UNR discipline and unity in the National Assembly despite the most extreme provocations has remained intact. The reputed heterogeneity of the UNR delegation, which encompasses everything from the views of a Louis Vallon who constantly demands the association of labor and capital to the orthodox economics of a Michel Debre would lead one to expect many votes to go against the Government. The amazing thing, however, is that they do not.^^ Even during the Algerian crisis displays of independence by Gaullist parliamentarians were relatively rare. This is a pattern 108 of behavior highly unusual for French political groups. Thirdly, although it would be extremely difficult to document, the student of the UNR is left with the distinct impression that he is observing a quasi-clandestine structure as well as a political party. It has been said that the leadership of the Fifth Republic has behaved quite often as if it were operating in the 1940's instead of the 1960's. Secretive, suspicious and participating in intrigue, their leaders, steeled by the Resistance and forged during the Nazi occupation, find it difficult to drop behavioral and speech patterns developed when they were first recruited into positions of responsibility. Witness the recent Ben

^^Waline, op . cit. ; Hamon, op . cit. 170. 109 Barka and previous Argoud affairs. So far as the UNR itself is concerned, it might be pointed out that similar attitudes appear to exist. Thus, Albin Chalandon in 1959 raised the cry of the UNR as a Res istance-type organization when he defined the UNR relationship to de Gaulle. Apparent­ ly perceiving the environment as extremely hostile, he argued that the Party should willingly submit to a leader who may, indeed should, repudiate its very existence if tactical necessities so dictated. 110 In conspiratorial organizations, leaders often find it prudent to ignore or deny any knowledge of men who carry out illegal tasks for them; such an attitude is necessary if goals are to be achieved in an atmosphere of hostility. The UNR, there­ fore, is more than a party in the usual sense; to its members it may be perceived as a band of conspirators at the ready call of its leaders. It can ignore de Gaulle's apparent lack of support if he should choose not to give it because Gaullists can know in their hearts that he is in reality at one with them! Needless to say, per­ ceived hostility from the outside world can bind a group together; hence, the air of clandestine activity so

^®^It has been observed in various places that some Gaullists still seem to behave as if they had remained in cloak-and-dagger work all along. The names of Soustelle and Frey spring immediately to mind. ^■^See the remark by Albin Chalandon as quoted in Avril and Pinto, op.cit.. p.285. 171. created Is functional for the unity of the Party.^^ More than one writer has pointed to this phenomenon. In particu­ lar, the vituperative quality in Gaullist statements about other political parties at congresses and elsewhere might be noted. The opposition is seen as essentially evil. Again, Michel Debre's outburst against opponents of de Gaulle during the campaign of 1965 is instructive in this regard.j 112 We have tried to suggest some of the reasons why the UNR appears to adjust so easily to de Gaulle's leadership and why it retains so much cohesion despite the heterogen­ eous elements which evidently make it up. A related question involves how it adjusts to the style of a leader who never consults it, a leader who is likely at any time to alter either his tactics or his strategy. In a word, how can the UNR follow the General when it has little idea as to where he may go? What the UNR has done essentially is to .evolve what might be labeled a "non-ideological ideology" 113 which enables it to adjust quickly to the General's frequent policy shifts. It will be remembered that in an earlier

^■^The functions of external hostility for group unity have been explored in Coser, op.cit. 1 12 Raymond Barrillon in Le Monde. March 21-27, 1963, Weekly Edition; Chapsal, op . cit.: Avril and Pinto, op.cit. H3such, at least, is implied in the statements of various Gaullists when they criticize ideologies as out of fashion but at the same time elevate unconditional loyalty to a single man as a noble deed in itself! 172. chapter we gave much attention to the struggle within the Party between the unconditionals who resisted any attempts to elaborate a doctrine and the activists who sought to im­ part to Gaullism a coherent set of beliefs. Specifically* the issue at stake was the Algerian question* but the larger question of a party doctrine also was raised. The resolution of the conflict at Bordeaux in the autumn of 1959 in favour of unconditionalism seemingly resolved the conflict. The view of Chalandon and others that the UNR should not commit itself to a political ideology but* rather* should simply place itself at the disposal of de Gaulle was affirmed at that time. Nevertheless, in a logical sense the maintenance of a political party would seem to require its standing for something more than sheer devotion to a single man; and various reports indeed testify to the fact that when Gaullists meet at conferences the problem of apres de Gaulle is very much on their minds.For how can the UNR justify its role in French life when he leaves the scene? How can it claim a right to govern? Indeed, how can it justify its right to exist? While many politicians may in reality prefer power over others as their chief value*

^■^^The days have long past since it was suggested by Chaban that the UNR might well go out of existence once the 1958 election was completed. The UNR uneasiness concerning the future of Gaullism has been explored by Georges Lavau* "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, September 1963* pp. 689-705. 173 . the fact remains that they find it necessary to clothe their more naked ambitions in terms of the common good — in a word, in terms of an ideology. Gaullists, not surprisingly, have attempted to manipu­ late nationalist symbols to their benefit by claiming that only they represent the real national interest* As one writer put it, the heart of Gaullist "doctrine" lies in its advocacy of the "unity of Frenchmen in the service of France." For the Gaullist the national interest is para­ mount. Thus Edmond Michelet, in an oft-quoted definition derived from the General himself, says the Gaullist is one who possesses "a certain idea of France." In an almost Identical sense, ex-Prime Minister Michel Debre speaks of "a certain conception of France." Elsewhere he refers to the good UNR-UDT member as one who consecrates himself "to serve the nation." Jacques Baumel says he is one who has "an abiding faith in France." Andre Malraux, in a somewhat different vein, thinks that France has a unique cultural role to play in the world. Again, a UNR-UDT propaganda bulletin suggests that the party is synonymous with "national re- newal...115 Of all the political parties, therefore, only the UNR speaks for the general Interest. Some Gaullist spokesmen,

1 *1 c See the special issue of Nouvelle FrontiSre. January 1964, for several statements of Gaullist philosophy. however, seem to have gone farther. Apparently, to differen­ tiate themselves from their opponents, they seem to feel com­ pelled to castigate the opposition in nothing but the most vituperative language. It has been observed that the hostility of the UNR for other political groupings seems to have become more pronounced at each of the Party congresses; it is as if the weaker the opposition becomes, the more the Movement feels compelled to criticize it. To take another example, Michel Debre's outburst prior to the 1965 president­ ial election in which the anti-Gaullist forces were referred to as "anti-France" has been commented upon in this vein. We might speculate on these observations of others and say it is almost as if the UNR leadership fears contamination by those who differ from them. Or it could be that their very weakness in the realm of policy initiation and the constant reluctance of the Government to consult them has placed its badge of inferiority upon the Movement. By lambasting a non­ member of the group you not only encourage unity in your 116 group but you justify your own role. Furthermore, the "parties of yesterday" are derided by UNR spokesmen as representatives not only of special interests but as carriers of bankrupt ideologies having no relevance to modern political parties. The UNR, on the other hand, is pictured by its propagandists as the 175.

Movement which, alone understands that modern societies must be geared to technological change. According to Secretary-

General Jacques Baumel's view the Movement is a "workshop of ideas" where Frenchmen who are tired of the old ways may

come together to discuss the unique problems of the modern era. This viewpoint is rather typical of many Gaullists:

the UNR is a non-ideological, open-minded group which places

its faith in the findings of modern science.

It is interesting to note, however, that despite its emphasis on adaptability in a scientific age and an appar­

ent effort to show how different it is and hence necessary

for French Society the UNR shows little inclination to assert itself in a positive manner. What we said in the

last chapter still holds: the Party role as defined by unconditionalism is to give blind obedience to a leader;

that is to de Gaulle. Hence, the concept of the "party as

government" is not supported in Gaullist literature. When

Gaullists speak of the "Movement" they do not mean that it

can or should transform itself into the actual government

as in parliamentary regimes such as Great Britain. Indeed,

the role of the UNR is defined by its leadership more as a

passive rather than an active instrument of political rule.H^

The organizational drive to dominate the levers of power and

^ ^See the remarks of Baumel in Nouvelle Fronti5re. op.cit.. pp.36-38. t 118Lavau, op.cit. 176. thereby engage in the making and administering of laws is strangely absent as a justification for its raison d ’etre. Moreover, there is a tendency to define the UNR in 119 terms of a policy-explanation or propaganda purpose. That is to say, the Party justifies and explains the directives of the government to the people; it attempts to make palatable to the French populace the initiatives of General de Gaulle. Indeed, Edmond Michelet, as de Gaulle himself, has cast doubts upon political parties as 120 policy-makers in the future. Jacques Baumel, in a re­ port devoted to the UNRfs role in French life, fails to mention even once its potential as a governmental party. Rather, it exists merely to help refine public opinion; to make suggestions to the government concerning new policy; and to seek which issues the public wishes brought before 121 the government. Premier Georges Pompidou describes the UNR as a "relay station between the government and the nation.«-< *<12 2 "Non-ideological" ideology and expressed passivity concerning party role would seem to have several functions for the UNR. As is the case with the Gaullist mystique,

i 1 q E.g., see Michelet, op.cit. 120 Ibid. 121 Jacques Baumel, "L'UNR-UDT: Une Formation Moderne au Service de la France," Report Delivered at Third National Congress in Nice, November 22-24, 1963, pp.5-22. 122 See "Les Forces Politiques en France," June 1963. 177. it would seem that an expressed belief in scientific tech­ niques, and a hostility for the non-believers in Gaullism and its mission serve to bind the group together. The outsider is not only perceived as backward in thought but he is likely to be an exponent of the "interests." Gaullism is more than faith in a man; it is a band of men 123 "in the service of the nation." Only the UNR stands for "grandeur." Mystique. belief in a man, faith in science, and hostility to the outsider all would appear 124 to be useful in the fostering of group unity. Passivity, on the other hand, can be employed as a rationalization for the obvious lack of consultation by the leader of the Party. Since the UNR obviously is not a government party — as anyone can see from a perusal of the relevant cabinet posts — and since de Gaulle has not seen fit to entrust it with much responsibility, UNR spokesmen, it would seem, could hardly argue that their role is that of an organizer of governmental power; hence, some other justification for the place of the Movement in French political life must be found. We might suggest that emphasizing an educative role may just meet that need. Finally, it might be suggested that non-ideology and

123i)ebre, op . ci t. , p.9.

124 Coser, op.cit. 178. the accompanying vocabulary of the "technocrat" 12 5 wedded to science, In addition to the stated belief In passivity, rationalize the exalted place of General de Gaulle In decision-making. In particular, it enables the UNR to avoid embarrassment when the President makes one of his quick changes in policy or suddenly announces a new program. Either way the Party has a built-in protection against embarrassment. It need never confront him; it need merely obey.

In its early days, then, the UNR was brought progres­ sively into line as a docile instrument in the hands of Charles de Gaulle. His distrust of parties in general, the urgencies of the Algerian situation, and his beliefs about the way authority should be exercised, all led him to distrust the potential power which might be exercised by a Gaullist party. In a concrete sense, he and members of his personal staff sought successfully to prohibit Soustelle from assuming the presidency of the UNR; they refused to allow the Party to use de Gaulle's name; they encouraged the party to repudiate Soustelle's projected electoral alliance of the "Four"; they discouraged the Party's opposition to Gaullist ministers during the elec­ tions to the National Assembly; they discouraged the de­ velopment of a mass base; and they prevented districts from

125 Ridley, op.cit. 179. being gerrymandered where key non-Gaullist leaders were running. In a word, they attempted to strengthen the hand of the "unconditionals" within the Party while at the same time reducing the UNR vis-il-vis the old line parties. In a more general sense, the French President hoped to weaken the legislature and cabinet at the expense of the presi- 12 dential power, increasingly separating himself from them. A strong legislature with a responsible government might assert independence of him. It was necessary that no coherent party system exist in Parliament or, if one did, that it be a pliable tool. For a strong party, especially one led by Algerian diehards, could in the end dominate the Elysee itself — which is probably exactly what Soustelle and Delbecque had in mind! The UNR therefore came into existence as a party apparently distrusted profoundly by the man in whose name it spoke. Its interests as a policy-making organization could hardly be maintained in the face of his hostility. His hostility alone, however, was not enough to weaken it substantially. The ever-increasing factional bickering over colonial policy drew to de Gaulle men who ordinarily might have been expected to act more independently. More­ over, the senatorial and local elections during 1959 must have brought home to many marginal and relatively unknown deputies just how closely their fate was linked with that

^^Furniss, France, Troubled Ally. pp. 399ff. 180. of the French President. Finally, we should never under­ estimate that Gaullist mystique which ties men together whatever their petty disagreements. To this day commentators never cease to be amazed by the almost total public unity demonstrated by Gaullists on roll call votes. Interestingly enough, the relationship established between de Gaulle and the UNR in the early days determined patterns of behavior which were to remain basically un­ changed in the future. If the generalization can be enter­ tained that the manner in which an organization is founded will substantially affect its subsequent behavior, then the UNR is a good test case. After the struggles of late 1958 and the early part of 1959, we see the UNR submitting more and more willingly to the dictates of the Elysee. The "French Algeria" elements, growing more isolated, gradually cut themselves off from the party — 1 or were cut off. They made a gallant effort at the Bordeaux Party Congress in 1959 to reassert themselves but the final draft was watered down in such a way as to "free" the Party to follow de Gaulle. Finally, by the time such party founders as Delbecque and Biaggi resigned or were removed the dictation of party policy had passed effectively from their hands.

De Gaulle's confidence in the UNR, however, did not increase as his influence waxed. Indeed, with the passage of time he seems to have grown more contemptuous of the

Party. Although the evidence we have is quite sparse, there 181. there is reason to suspect that his hostility to "his" Party never waned in the least. For example, the Debre cabinet was hardly a haven for UNR stalwarts since, with the ex­ ception of the Prime Minister, not a single UNR figure held another major post. Indeed, the major figures in the cabinet were career civil servants, including men such as

Couve de Murville. The real fruits of electoral victory were not to belong to the UNR. As for the integrationist leader, Soustelle, he became a mere second-rank minister.

Despite his expressed hopes, he was unable to bring to bear 127 any influence in the formation of North African policy.

De Gaulle never consulted him nor did he do anything which might have been construed as approval of the antics of such men. Delbecque, a key figure in the General's return to power, was never given an audience although anti-Gaullists 128 were so honored.

Those critics who expected de Gaulle, once the

Algerian issue was settled, to enter the fray by trying to create a viable Gaullist Party were to be sadly mis­ taken. The selection of Georges Pompidou as Prime Minister must have dashed quite a few hopes. Debre at least had been a UNR stalwart. Pompidou, however, did not even hold party membership and his political life had been that of an

127sOUstelle, op.cit.. pp.9-13, 94ff.

128viansson-Ponte in Le M o n d e . July 23-29, 1959. 182. adviser on de Gaulle's staff. True, the UNR could now claim more portfolios than in the Debre government but the posi- 129 tions themselves were hardly more important. Rumors have been circulated constantly concerning the resentment on the part of UNR officials who have not been consulted, 130 but their dirty linen has not been washed in public. If de Gaulle was not willing to give his party followers portfolios at least he might have been expected to consult them concerning electoral strategy. Interestingly enough, the UNR, from what we can tell, played little part in the 131 recent presidential campaign. The men who, on the whole, determined the way the campaign was run were not UNR figures. In fact, the Party was kept conspicuously in the background during the entire campaign. There was some speculation that after his less than spectacular showing in the first round de Gaulle might depend more upon the Party during the runoff campaign. Such was not to be the case. 132 Throughout he evidently looked to a small coterie grouped around Malraux and Pompidou for planning. Jacques Baumel, it is true, took

129Lavau, op.cit. 13 0E.g., see Emeri, op.cit.; Jean Chariot, "Les Forces Politiques en France," 'Revue Francaise de Science Politique. February 1967, pp.78-86; Le Monde. February 28-March 6 , 1964, Weekly Edition. 131 Le Monde, November 4-10, 1965, Weekly Edition; and Le Monde. November 11-17, 1965, Weekly Edition. 13 2It was said that some Gaullists felt the most prud­ ent tactics dictated remaining well in the background since the UNR lacked the popularity of General de Gaulle. See Andre Passeron in L_e Monde, November 4-10, 1965, Weekly Edition. 183. part In some of the meetings, but he apparently did not have a special role to play. He was considered, it seems, simply as another factional representative of Gaullism. 133 A major purpose of a political party is to contest elections; the UNR in 1965 could hardly be said to have fulfilled its role. As "Sirius” opined in Le Monde, the "majority party" was a laughing stock of everyone, having been told its members 134 should serve as "listening posts." Finally, de Gaulle might have shown some sympathy for the plight of the UNR by naming a successor when he decides to leave the scene. However, despite the pleas of some of his most intimate colleagues he has steadfastly refused to choose an heir-apparent. 135 This refusal to suggest a suc­ cessor has been unsettling to a UNR leadership which fully 136 realized the fragility of its majority in Parliament. For example, during the uneasy days of 1960, when de Gaulle's life was in danger, the UNR leadership showed itself to be especially fearful of the future. It is reported that in May, Chalandon, Guichard, and Chaban-Delmas, whom Delbecque was to label the 11 dauphinat-triumvir." begged de Gaulle to pick a successor. Chalandon was afraid that if something

133Ibid. 134ibid. 135 Faucher, op.cit., pp.175-76. ^3^E.g., see Olivier Todd, "De Gaulle's Gambit," op.cit 184 . happened to the President, Antoine Pinay, the Independent, might easily assume the Gaullist mantle. Chalandon and Guichard asked him to choose Chaban-Delmas. It is said de Gaulle promised them he would act, hut, as we have subsequently seen, he did not do so. 137 There is today still no successor -- and the UNR leadership remains concerned for its future. Furthermore, in the past few years, many Gaullists have favored the creation of a vice-presidency, established by a referendum, whose occupant would assume the presidency if anything happened to de Gaulle. At a meeting in Nice in November 1963, the UNR deputies actually supported such a proposal quite strongly. The Elysee, however, said nothing in its favor and the Party did not push the proposal. It had been left out on a limb in too many cases by presidential pronouncements. 138 Conversely, when the question was raised again recently, it was reported that many UNR deputies were no longer so enthusiastic: they were fearful that de , 139 Gaulle might choose someone from outside Party circles! As of this writing, de Gaulle as yet has made no decision as to a successor. Rumors had it that Pompidou was his choice for a successor, but the elevation of Debre

13 7_Faucher, . op.cit. ^ ^ L e Monde. November 21-27, 1963. ‘'“’^Olivier Todd, ibid. 185. recently as a sort of tsar over economic policy has been interpreted by some commentators as the beginning of a preparation for much bigger things. De Gaulle, however, seems to be operating here in his traditional manner by always keeping others in the dark as to his true intention. Assuming he does decide to name a successor, it is highly unlikely that he will turn to "his" party for consultation. Finally, his proclivity for encouraging competition among subordinates also might have been a factor in the return of Debre; from what we have said it would be in harmony with the manner in which he has used his presidential powers. V

THE UNR ELITE: ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

It has keen argued so far that the Algerian issue was the major cause for the deep divisions within the UNR, and that, furthermore, the conflict over what role the Party should play in the Fifth Republic were conditioned to a great extent by that struggle. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the struggle itself was resolved in favor of the parliamentary leadership rather than in favor of the supporters of "party democracy." At this time it might prove helpful to inquire more closely into the nature of this leadership. The emergence of so many new faces in the National Assembly in 1958 led more than one observer to speculate that a revolution in political leadership had taken place. It was argued in various places that the charismatic qualities of General de Gaulle had enabled political unknowns

-186- 187. to ride his coattails Into public office. The elector, In casting his ballot for the UNR was not voting for a deputy; rather, he was In reality voting for General de Gaulle and against the prominent men of the discredited Fourth Repub­ lic.^ This same phenomenon was said to be even more pertinent in 1962 when the UNR-UDT won in a landslide over the "cartel of the 'nos.*" Other writers, usually the more ideologically-oriented anti-Gaullists, ominously see 1958 as the year when "neo-capitalists" or "technocrats," namely leaders of large corporations, bankers, and higher civil servants, took effective control of French policy at the 3 expense of workers, small businessmen, and farmers. By giving attention to the social background of the Gaullist leadership it may be possible to discern more fully not only the changes occurring in the French social structure as a whole but to answer some of the questions which have been raised about the men who govern France today. At the very least, one might determine just who these parliamentar-

^E.g., see Williams and Harrison in Butler (Ed.), op .cit., pp.13-90; and Dogan, "Le Personnel Politique et la Personality Charismatique," op.cit. 2Dogan, ib id. ^Faucher, op.cit., pp.37-38, 52-53; Henri Claude, Gaullisme et Grand Capital, Paris: Editions Sociales, 1961; Henry Coston, Le Ret our d es "200 Families.11 Paris: La Librairie Frangaise, 1960, especially pp. 57-80, 90-109, 171-179. For a criticism of such approaches, see Malcolm Anderson, "The Myth of the 'Two Hundred Families,1" Political Studies. June 1965, pp. 163-78. 188. ians are, namely their career patterns, their occupations, and their social status. Marxists and others who support the elitist concept of politics usually maintain that changes in the social composition of a political elite are likely to reflect more basic alterations in the social structure itself. Therefore, in study the class composition of a political elite, scholars may learn more about social changes taking place in the society as a whole.

To begin, a few words might be said about the view expressed so often that the UNR deputies thrust upon the scene in 1958 were new men to politics, having little 4 contact with the life of politics before that time. Actually this is true only to a point, for if by "new," we mean men who had not served previously in the National Assembly or in the Council of the Republic (or Senate), then without a doubt the UNR is a party of novices. Thus, of the 198 UNR deputies elected in 1958, only a handful had ever served in the lower House. On the other hand, these men were not new to politics. In fact, the majority of them held or once held local office at the time they were elected to the National Assembly: 127 out of 198 were or had been general councillors, mayors, or municipal councillors.'*

^Waline, op.cit. and Macridis and Brown, op .cit.. p.262. ^Dogan in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. p.260. 189. Therefore, only 71 could properly be considered as inexper- 6 ienced in the great game of politics: General Councillors 63 Mayors and Municipal Councillors 43 Former holders of local office 71 In this connection it might be interesting to observe that the UNR share of local "notables" was far from insig­ nificant. Whereas the Independents, the "party of notables" could claim 82 per cent of its deputies had served at one time in local government, the UNR could boast that 64 per cent of its members had so served. The latter*s other major partner during the campaign, the MRP, could boast 7 66 per cent. The figure for the National Assembly as a whole was 73 per cent. Moreover, if one breaks the data down he finds that indeed the UNR deputies had long been active in some line g of political activity either at the local or national level: Deputies re-elected in 1958 16 Former deputies or senators 27 Former candidates for the upper and lower houses before 1958 49 Party leaders for several years 37 Quasi-political functions in the Fourth Republic (e.g. ministerial cabinets) 9 Total 138 "New" men 27

^Adapted from ibid. 7Ibid. ^Adapted from jbid. , p. 262. 190. Thus, even at the national level the UNR elite had taken part in political activity for some time. General de Gaulle's return to power, it appears, did not so much propel new men into power as simply men who had been unsuccessful in following him in the past. Indeed, among the 154 deputies who had never held national office, nearly one-third had attempted to win office in the elections to the National Assembly or the Council of the Republic staged during the Fourth Republic, and quite a few of them, 9 according to Dogan, did not even run as Gaullists!

These data would indicate that the UNR deputies were recruited through the more-or-less traditional channels, their distinguishing feature being a sustained commitment to Gaullism. As Maurice Duverger was to observe about UNR candidates facing the voters: "The great majority [of the UNR] derives from old RPF Gaullist 'notables.' Their per­ sonality had played an important role in their success: not so much because of their own qualities or their own style, as because of their reputation for Gaullism.It may well be that an electoral system, devised to favor the traditional parties with strong roots at the local level,11 did in fact exactly what it was devised to do: strengthen the local

9Ibid.. p. 263. 19Duverger in ibid.» p. 234. 11Ibid., p.236; and Williams and Harrison in Butler (Ed.), op.cit. 191. notables emerged victorious. The single-member constituency may have encouraged an emphasis on local Issues to the bene­ fit of the notable, as Philip Williams suggests, but General de Gaulle's stature, In addition, easily lent Itself to exploitation by his long-time supporters at the national level. 1958 was, therefore, the victory of the "Gaullist" notable, the well-known man In the country who happened to have run as a Gaullist. The elections of 1962, which resulted In a UNR-UDT landslide, found the UNR with 97 new deputies in the National Assembly. Unlike the election of 1958, which found a strong majority of the UNR membership which had been active previously in politics, this election revealed an even stronger pull of the purely charismatic qualities of General 12 de Gaulle. Of the 97 new Gaullist deputies, 51 of them, or slightly more than half, were inexperienced politicians in that they had never occupied a major national or local office. 13 Nevertheless, this point must not be pushed too far, for it must be remembered that fully 178 Gaullist

^Dogan, "Le Personnel Politique et la Personality Charismatique," op.cit. ~^Ibid.; also, Mattel Dogan, "Note Sur le Nouveau Personnel Parlementaire," in Francois Goguel (Ed.), Le Referendum d'Octobre et Les Elections de Novembre 1962." Paris: A. Colin, 1965, pp.429-32. 192. 14 politicians had hadprevious political experience. From what has been said so far, it would appear that the Gaullist parliamentary elite is not very different from other members of the National Assembly* Gaullists, as their opponents, tend to be local notables who have run for public office either at the national or local level at some time in their lives before winning a place in the National Assembly. Far from being novices at the game of politics who happen to have been aroused by Hay 13 and the return of the General to power, these deputies had long before devel­ oped an appetite for politics. That the average Gaullist deputy appears to have been a man highly motivated in the direction of politics seems fairly conclusive from what has been suggested so far.

There is, however, one factor that may well outweigh all others in importance so far as the recruitment of the UNR elite is concerned. That factor is membership in the Resistance. At least 131 of the UNR deputies elected in 15 1958 had been active in the Resistance. And 26 of the remaining 67 were less than 21 years of age in 1940, so it is hardly likely they would have taken part in the rebellion

1 / Dogan emphasizes the great changes in personnel in 1962. Surely, however, his own figures would suggest that the turnover was insufficiently substantial to warrant the assertion that a whole political class was turned out. See his "Le Personnel Politique et la Personality Charis- matique," op.cit. 1^Dogan in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. p. 257 . 193. against the Nazis!^^ In this respect, It Is Interesting to note that of the 198 deputies elected in 1958, 131 were 49 years or younger. This age group would have been from about 20 to 31 years of age in 1940. As one would expect, more­ over, few Gaullists in 1958 were over 60 years of age (only 19) whereas 48 of them ranged between 50 and 59 years. Thus, they certainly would not have been too old for resistance work.^^ The 1962 election revealed a continuation of the dominance of men who were active in the Resistance. Of the 180 UNR deputies elected in 1962 who were at least twenty years of age in 1944, fully 130 took part in resistance work. As suggested previously, certain writers have seen in the rise of Gaullism the coming to power of a "technocracy" or "neo-capitalism" of managers, industrialists, engineers, higher civil servants, and bankers who control the huge bureaucracies of both the private and public sectors of the economy. Arguing along the lines of Burnham, they perceive that the managers of various types have taken over the state and are making policy according to their own interests. In the process, farmers, small businessmen, and workers have been shunted aside in the interests of large-scale enterprises

16Ibid. 17Ibid.. p.271.

^"®Dogan, "Le Personnel Politique et la Personality Charismatique," op.cit. 194. which demand huge conglomerations of capital and a concen­ tration of existing organizations in the interests of 19 "efficiency" or "rationalization." A study to test these assertions would take us far beyond the scope of this study, since a thorough documen­ tation of the relationship of policy outputs to specific 20 interests would be necessary. On the other hand, a study of the socio-economic backgrounds of the Gaullist parlia­ mentary elite might be revealing in that if we find a concentration of managers, higher civil servants, engineers, and industrialists in its ranks relative to other groups in the National Assembly, it at least suggests that certain interests find themselves well-represented by Gaullism. In delving into the data on some 327 Gaullist deputies who have sat in the National Assembly since 1958, we find that these socio-economic types comprise a rather significant portion of the UNR delegation: 21

19 Coston, op.cit.; Claude, op.cit.: and Viansson-Ponte in Le Monde. May 9, 1962. 20 It is precisely on this point that most elite studies fail to convince. 21 The six "classes" employed here were felt to be the most appropriate in describing the French situation and are derived in part from the work of Simiand and Gurvltch. "Technocrat," a term not used by these writers, is applied to industrialists, bankers, higher civil servants, and engineers. A basic problem in separating classes is that in determining data one may arbitrarily include individuals in certain classes to which they may not belong. Hence, why should we place the small industrialist and the wealthy Administrators, industrialists, technicians (AIT) 91 (28%) Professionals and intellectuals 143 (44%) Merchant s 40 (12%) White collar 32 (10%) Farmers 19 ( 6%) Workers ___2 (.006%) Total 327 It is in the actual governing of France, moreover, that AIT's occupy such a dominating position among the various social categories listed above. As a writer has 22 recently pointed out in a popular national magazine: President de Gaulle has assembled one of the most intelligent and technically competent cabinets ever put together. It is composed exclusively of career civil servants, diplo­ mats, bankers, businessmen and lawyers -- not a politician in the lot. Almost all are graduates of one of France's career-training schools, which have given the nation the most competent civil service in Europe, if not the world .... Under the Fifth Republic, Government ministers were not so likely to come from Parliament as they did during the days of the Fourth Republic, a factor which points up

merchant in different classes? What about the salaried manager with great power who lacks the wealth of the auto­ mobile dealer? Then again, the French have a habit of giving high sounding names for quite ordinary occupations. Biographical material for this section was taken in the main from the following: Who * s Who In France: 1954 through 1965; Henry Coston, La Haute Banque et les Trusts. Paris: La Librairie Franqaise, 1958; also Coston, op.cit.; Mattel Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," in Dwaine Marvick, Political Decision-Makers. New York: The Free Press, 1961, pp.57-90; and Maurice Duverger et al. Les Elections du 2_ Janvier 19 5 6 . Paris: A. Colin, 1957; Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.i and Goguel (Ed.), the relative loss of power by that body. Nevertheless, when we observe which Parliamentarians are picked as ministers among the Gaullists, it is found that AIT's are much more likely to be chosen to occupy the top positions in the French state. Indeed, as of the beginning of 1966, some 10 of the 17 Gaullists who served the Party are recruited from that social category or are closely connected with the 23 world of big administration or industry:

AIT's 10 (63%) Professionals and intellectuals 6 (25%) Merchants 1 ( 6%) White collar 0 Farmers 0 Workers 0

It should be pointed out that there is some overlap in these figures. For example, Debre is a professor but he also ranks high in the business world; Michelet is an intellectual as well as a merchant; Terrenoire an indus­ trialist as well as a journalist; Pompidou a banker as well as a professor; and Dusseaulx a farm representative as well as an engineer. Six of these ministers, it is said, belong to the financial elite of French society: Debre, Pompidou, Maurice-Bokanowski, Missoffe, Terrenoir and Marc Jacquet. Thirteen of these seventeen men received a university education!

See "Le Retour des *200 Families,'" pp.50-80, 174- 75. The UNR figures are: Debre, Terrenoire, Missoffe (UNR Secretary-Treasurer), Pompidou, Maurice Bokanowski. 197. This recruitment of AIT elements from the National Assembly would seem to have several implications. First, a premium is apparently placed upon expertise today. This reliance upon experts tallies with the various statements about General de Gaulle's preference for men with highly developed skills rather than "politicians." It would seem that men are chosen to serve in governments because of the services they can offer that government, rather than because of any need for "political balance." Secondly, in a larger sense it should be noted that the traditional type of poli­ tician who becomes a minister is no longer of such great importance: he has given way to the higher civil servant, the industrialist, the engineer. In fact, this change in recruitment patterns suggests a shift in the base of power from Parliament to the administration. Indeed, these men are in most cases either from the same social class as the higher civil servants and/or they occupy similar occupational positions. The tendency for many higher civil servants to shift from the world of government to the world of business should be seen in this light. 24 It would seem that the Parliament is simply a source for the recruitment of men who can do particular work or offer specialized advice rather than an agency by which alternative political views are represented: it is simply another source for the recruitment of personnel.

^^Granick, op.cit. 198. In the days of the Fourth Republic men were chosen as ministers in order that the varied political tendencies could in some way be balanced so that a government could be formed. Today* this factor is of less Importance. Among the seventeen Gaullist parliamentarians alone* five civil servants* four corporation officials, and one engineer were chosen to serve in the Debre and Pompidou governments. Only one lawyer was appointed. Even the most cursory glance at a chart of, say, the Presidents of the Council in the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic would demon­ strate conclusively that their occupational backgrounds were much more likely to have been in the professional and intellectual worlds. For every Gaillard there was a Mend§s-France, a Faure, a Mollet, a Queille* a Pinay, or a Bourges-Maunoury. We may only conclude that recruitment patterns for the highest political offices have been altered radically. If anything* the AIT elements in Gaullist ranks appear to be even more pronounced today than in 1958 when the UNR first came to power. For example* in the period extend­ ing from 1959 to 1962 we find that 27 per cent of the Gaullists were from such backgrounds. Since that time* some 108 new deputies have come into the National Assembly and fully 30 per cent of these men have come frcm civil service, big business* engineering or banking. This in­ fluence shows no sign of abatement. A sample of 100 deputies 199. from all other parties in the National Assembly between 1958 and 1965 shows that only 19 per cent come from this occupational elite. Obviously, the Gaullists have a monopoly in this regard. In a recent book Henry Coston concludes that the great financial interests have gained greater control over the economic system of France than ever before; and that this rather loose alliance likewise controls the political life of the Republic itself. In his book Coston lists members of what he calls the "200 families" who dominate French economic life. UNR Government ministers, both past and present, are included in the list: Prime Minister Debre and Pompidou, Missoffe, Jacquet, Maurice-Bokanowski and Terrenoire.25 In fact, the major confidants of General de Gaulle are closely connected with the financial elite. Michel Debre, the ex-Prime Minister, comes from a family of economic scions. Present Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and Wilfried Baumgartner, recently a Finance Minister, are past presidents of the Bank of France. Frangois Misoffe, a treasurer of the UNR, as well as such close advisers to the President of the Republic as Albin Chalandon, Leon No&l, and Maurice-Bokanowski are all reputed to be support­ ers of the interests of big business. Maurice Bokanowski

250p.cit. 200 . and Chalandon are supposed to be particularly hostile to the interests of small business. That a man who is sup­ posed to embody the "national interest" has so many ad- visers from a particular milieu is ironic, to say the least. 2 6 Finally, those Gaullists who leave Parliament to be­ come ministers are much more likely to have attended uni­ versity than have parliamentarians as a whole. Whereas over 56 per cent of the UNR-UDT deputies who became govern­ ment members were university-educated, only about 30 per cent of a parliamentary sample attained higher education. This relatively low educational level of the French National Assembly when compared with the American Congress, of course, reflects the much more elitist nature of the French educational system. 2 7 In addition, it seems that, as a general rule, it might be argued that the Gaullist deputy-become-minister is much less likely to have served in local government before he entered the Parliament. Indeed, it seems that he is likely to have begun his career in politics at the national level itself. Such an observation appears to confirm Matthew's view that occupants of the highest offices in the nation are not likely to have begun their careers at the lowest levels of the political hierarchy; rather, they tend to have entered political life in a higher

^ S e e Claude, op . cit. 2 7 E.g., see the remarks of Granick, op.cit. 201. political post. Also, his hypothesis that the higher the political office, the higher the social position of its occupants likewise would seem to be confirmed. In so far as the French case is concerned, a major reason for not only the high social position of the ministers, but, more im­ portantly, their lack of experience in local government might have resulted from their having been civil servants in many cases rather than career politicians. When we turn to a comparison of Gaullist deputies as a whole and a parliamentary sample of deputies from all other parties we obtain the following results:

UNR-UDT Other AIT* s 91 (28%) 19 (19%) Professionals and intellectuals 143 (44%) 48 (48%) Merchants 40 (12%) 5 ( 5%) White Collar 32 (10%) 12 (12%) Farmers 19 ( 6%) 7 ( 7%) Workers 2 (.006%) 8 ( 8%) Total 327

In general, we see a predominance of middle class elements within the Gaullist ranks. In fact, more than 80 per cent of the UNR deputies derive from the middle and upper middle classes alone, whereas only two of them come from working class backgrounds. If the UNR-UDT is a revolutionary group as it claims, it is certainly not revolutionary in terms of its social composition. Indeed, 202 . its social support suggests that it has much more in harmony 9 Q with the traditional Right in France. m Moreover, the parliamentary sample is more representa­ tive of all social classes than is that of the UNR-UDT; nevertheless, it is, as are most bodies, far from repre­ sentative of the population as a whole. Over 70 per cent of its members comes from middle class backgrounds, whereas only 8 per cent list working class occupations. At this point an interesting question might be raised; namely, did the activists differ in their socio-economic backgrounds from the parliamentary elite as a whole? If we compare the occupational backgrounds of some thirty UNR activists (deputies, senators and ministers) whose views on the Algerian question placed them in a minority position within the Party, we find, in truth, that there are signifi­ cant differences between them and the majority. Within this UNR "counter-elite" we discover far fewer higher civil serv­ ants, industrialists or managers: AIT A Professionals and intellectuals 15 Merchants 5 White collar 2 Farmers 1 Military 3 Thus, whereas the UNR elite as a whole could claim 28 per cent of its membership as deriving from the AIT elements, the activists could lay claim to only 13 per cent (or four).

9 °Thatft is to say, the great majority of its voters tended to favor CNIP, MRP, or Radical candidates in the past. 203. Moreover, the activists were more strongly represented in the intellectual and professional groups: 50 per cent (or fifteen) of them as against 34 per cent of the total elite. What do these data suggest? Several tentative argu­ ments might be entertained. First, it is striking how few AIT elements are to be found among the activists. On the other hand, they appear to be "over-represented" so far as professionals and intellectuals are concerned. The argument that the settler position found its greatest champions among the less "modern" and industrialized sectors of French life might find partial support, however tenuously, in this connection. If it is true, as some have argued, that it was the "small man" who defended French Algeria, whereas the "great interests" were ready to settle for something less than a total victory over the FLN, then 29 these findings at the very least offer fuel for thought. Again, Gaullist vocabulary, with its emphasis on techno­ cratic vocabulary, may not offer much intellectual support for such elements. Secondly, the numerous intellectuals and professionals found among the activists is much more typical of the occupational composition of parliament prior to the rise of

^"Activists" included here are those UNR members who were so critical of de Gaulle's Algerian policy that they resigned from the parliamentary group, the Party, and/or the Government. 204. 30 Gaullism and the Fifth Republic. Indeed, writers, doctors, lawyers and the like formed the backbone of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. If it is true that such politicians display a propensity for abstractions, debate and the manipulation of symbols, it is easy to see how the Algeria debate became so emotion-laden. It would seem that nationalist symbols could easily arouse such men. Converse­ ly, it has been noted often that individuals who are con­ nected with large organizations in urban areas are less likely to display chauvinistic attitudes than are their 31 rural, small town, or small business opposites.

It is only when we study intra-class differences that we discover some of the more revealing aspects of the problem of social class and political power. Thus, in a comparison of Gaullists (108) who have entered the National Assembly most recently with the parliamentary sample of all other parties, we can draw some tentative conclusions -- or at least raise some problems. For example, the parliamentary sample includes a much higher percentage of teachers and professors (18 per cent) than do the Gaullists (3 per cent). On the other hand, the Gaullists, as we said earlier, have a much higher percentage of corporate officials, engineers, higher civil servants and bankers. The fact that teachers

30 See the Dogan contributors in Harvlck (Ed.), op.cit.: and in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit. ^ S e e Emmanuel Beau de Lomenie, L 1 Algerie Trahie Par L 1Argent. Paris: 1957. 205. have been associated traditionally with the more leftist parties, notably the Socialists, whereas the right-wing parties have understandably collected more business support is only a partial explanation for this distributional support among the occupations; there may be deeper forces at work in the French body politic at the present time* Therefore, an hypothesis suggested at the beginning of this chapter might be entertained, namely: decreases in the powers of parliamentary bodies mean that professionals who live by the pen, speech and as manipulators of symbols increasingly compose a less significant portion of those parliaments. Hence, an upsetting of the balance between legislative and executive organs will mean that the former bodies will be less likely to perform the necessary functions for certain types of individuals, namely those functions relating to self-expression and persuasion. Increasingly, we should expect a new elite to come to the front, one which places a high emphasis on such qualities as expertise, teamwork and the solution of specific, not abstract problems. In France, we note that the Fifth Republic personnel in the National Assembly tends to be rather different from that of the Fourth Republic: the lawyer, teacher, professor, writer and journalist is giving way to the business executive, military officer, architect, engineer, banker and civil servant. Moreover, it should be noted that Gaullists in many cases do not retain a continuing desire to participate in the National Assembly. For example, there were at least 206. 104 changes between 1962 and the present time. Why this lack of stability? Part of the answer may relate to new men entering politics with much zeal only to lose their fervor when conditions become more settled. Probably a more basic explanation may have to do with the loss of power by the National Assembly itself. Men who wish to influence the destinies of their nation are not likely to remain quiet while the great decisions are almost completely controlled by another branch. The new man in politics with an almost religious zeal is not likely to be satisfied with the mundane problems of daily politics. If we compare the National Assembly In 1966 with the last one of the Fourth Republic, some interesting results are obtained. Thus, lawyers are indeed decreasing in numbers (from 13 per cent to 9 per cent). Teachers show a very small increase, but, significantly, the party which dominates the legislature can claim only 2 members of that profession! The fact that most of these teachers come from the more leftist parties makes us wonder how permanent will be the changes ushered in by General de Gaulle. After all, in a country in which education is in all probability administered by anti-Gaullists, significant opposition to Gaullist poli­ cies in the future is likely to ensue. Thirdly, journalists and writers no longer play a great role in parliamentary life. They have decreased from 5 per cent of the total number of legislators in the Fourth 207 . Republic to only 1 per cent at the present time. Conversely, the percentage of white collar and lower civil service elements has increased tremendously; from 3 per cent to 13 per cent. And if any more confirmation were needed to point out the basic changes in legislative personnel, at least in so far as occupations are concerned, then the fact that corporate officials, higher civil servants, military officers and architects composed 15 per cent of the deputies in the Fourth Republic, but today they make up an astounding 53 per cent. Changes have taken place in the Fifth Republic, to say the least. In the final analysis, it may be that an increasingly white collarized world is taking over that last bastion of individualism, the legislative scene. The high percentage of professionals found in the U.S. Congress, principally lawyers, possibly represents in no small sense the tremend­ ous staying power of that institution in relation to the Executive and the Administration. Congressmen still seem to command much respect in this country; one wonders if that is still the case in Fifth Republic France. There does seem to be the belief on the part of the public that legislative Influence implies national humiliation. 3 2 When the means for self-expression are denied to occupational groups which are used to it in their daily lives, then it is only natural that they will seek an outlet elsewhere.

^Leo Hamon, "Members of the French Parliament," Inter­ national Social Science Journal. No.4, 1961, pp.545-66. 208. The fact that the Parliament is employed in France today as a ratifying body above all else is not likely to facilitate entry through its doors of men who are likely to think in the abstract or in terms of great ideological principles; rather, it is men who are accustomed to the solution of concrete problems on a day-by-day basis who are likely to become parliamentarians. In a word, it is being suggested here that the greater the power a legislature has, the greater the "intellectual" support It is likely to have. In many ways, of course, the French case is very dif­ ferent from most other Western countries. For example, the French physician, unlike his American and British counter­ parts, is a common fixture, in national politics. Why this is so is not so easily explained. Certainly there is no evidence that doctors in France are in any way denied pres­ tige and respect, a factor which might encourage political 33 activity; indeed, the contrary is true. It may be that the European physician, unlike the American one, also plays the role of intellectual in the most narrow sense; hence, he is expected to take a rather large part in political life as well as to understand complex questions. Thus, he naturally takes a much greater interest in politics than his American and British counterparts. After all he, too,

33por a study of opinions about physicians in particu­ lar and medicine in general, see Sondages, No.2, 1960. 209. as well as the writer, is an "intellectual" -- and he feels a common attachment. 34

Moreover, the number of French politicians who are lawyers, while large, is not nearly so great as in the U.S. The importance of lawyers for political life has been com- mented upon quite often. 35 It seems that their knowledge of the law, their abilities as compromisers and conciliators, their oratorical qualities, and the furtherance of their legal careers through political activity have all helped lead them into politics. Nevertheless, the American lawyer is much more likely to be found in the national legislature. Why? Historical reasons may offer an explanation. The French lawyer, on the other hand, is not the only "intel­ lectual" who is likely to enter politics. The doctor, writer, and journalist also tend to display much interest in political questions. Furthermore, the voter in France will, in all probability, show a much greater tolerance of intellect in general than will his American counterpart. Indeed, the latter is likely to view the man who lives by pen as lacking in "common sense," a "visionary," or as a dangerous "radical." Hence, whereas teachers, professors, and writers are likely to be suspect in this country, the

S^For an interesting study of the contrasts between American and European intellectuals and their relations with other groups, see Ludwig von Mises, The Anti-Capitalist Mentality. New York: Van Nostrand, 1960. ^Dogan in Marvick (Ed.), o p .cit.: also, Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision- Makers , New York: Random House, 1954, pp.30-32. 210. lawyer, alone among the Intellectuals, is favored by the general population. Admittedly, this interpretation is highly subjective, but it may offer some clue to recruitment patterns into politics. Again, the favorable attitude with which the French populace views the men of intellect may explain why independent businessmen are more likely to be found in the American Congress than in the National Assembly. In the U.S. the businessman enjoys high prestige; he is seen as having an abundance of "common sense." On the other hand, in France the businessman must share the spotlight with the intellectual and the man of great education. In a more general sense the following hypothesis might be offered: stable democratic political systems existing in societies which are characterized by class mobility are likely to have national legislatures composed almost entirely of upper class legislators. How can we make such a state­ ment? In the first place, we find that In systems with mobile class structures occupational rather than ascriptive O g considerations determine status. Hence men tend to favor politicians for public office who have achieved high status as defined by their societies. Hence, such lower class groups as workers or peasants are unlikely to be represented to any great extent.

^E.g., see Seymour M.Lipset, "Democracy and the Social System," In Harry Eckstein (Ed.), Internal War; Problems and Approaches. New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp.267-333. 211. Conversely, political orders which lack consensus and which are characterized by rigid class structures will tend to have a more equal distribution among all classes in their national legislatures. Working class elements are likely to be particularly well represented In such societies. In a sense these societies are more "democratic'1 to the extent that their national legislatures will have a sprinkling of representation from all classes. Indeed, the lower classes are likely to look to their own groups for representation since they perceive their own interests as fundamentally opposed to those of the rest of society. A comparison of the social classes represented in the parliaments of the U.S., Great Britain, and France, conclusively demonstrates that France has the greatest number of workers and peasants in her National Assembly, whereas the American representa­ tion is almost nil. Great Britain stands between France and the U.S. Similarly, the class structure seems to be the most rigid in France and most fluid in the U.S. Whereas the British class structure is rather rigid, there is much evidence that the French lower classes feel a much greater sense of alienation from other classes than do their British counterparts. Class differences in Great Britain may be very pronounced, but it is unlikely that they are felt so strongly as in France. 3 7

^See, e.g., Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Despair. New York: Collier Books, 1962. 212 .

In this chapter we have described a particular elite. We have suggested, moreover, that the French political elite has been undergoing changes with the advent of the Fifth Republic. Has the alteration in elites reflected changes in substantive issues? An answer to this question is diffi­ cult to say the least, but we can offer a few suggestions. In the first place, it has been claimed that the economic policy of the Fifth Republic favors large business interests at the expense of small business and the peasants. Hence, supposedly there has been a systematic effort to encourage business concentrations which will eliminate the small and inefficient producers. 3 8 Agricultural policy has also come under attack to the extent that the government has shown itself unwilling to subsidize farmers and, in fact, encour­ ages the pooling of land resources. In a word, there is said to be a "rationalization" of the French economy taking place at the present time characterized by greater efforts in economic planning while at the same time private property rights are preserved intact. The transfer of the Finance Ministry from that friend of small business, Antoine-Pinay, to such men as Baumgartner and Giscard d'Estaing — men who derive from the world of big business -- Is said to be sig- 39 nificant in this regard.

3 8This point probably has been pushed most strongly by Coston. See op.cit. 3 Q Ibid. See the remarks of Roger Duchet, a friend of small business and the farmers, at the Congress of the CNIP, as published in France-Independante. December 14, 1960. 213. Some scholars purport to see a tacit collusion between the great business Interests and the higher civil servants. For example, it Is maintained that the members of these two groups usually come from similar social backgrounds and are in steady contact with one another. Moreover, and this is especially important,it has been noted in recent years that there have been career movements from the civil service elite over to high positions in the corporate world of big business, thereby encouraging similarities in outlook be­ tween the two groups. The bright young man who makes it to the top of the civil service ladder will often give up his career in the government for the more lucrative one in high finance or business. 4 0 Hence, a community of interests, a similarity in outlook and attitudes, and even friendships bind the two great interests. Moreover, those civil servants who run the great nationalized banks and businesses are not likely to have basically different attitudes from their opposite numbers in the private sector. 41 It is when we turn to the greatest issue which has confronted France since World War II that the influence of the business interests appear to be pronounced. That issue is, of course, the Algerian question. It has been pointed out elsewhere that among French Moderates those deputies

40 Granick, op.cit. ^^See Henry W. Ehrmann, "The French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests," Administrative Science Quarterly. March 1961, pp.534-55. 214. with large business connections were almost unanimous in their support for a negotiated settlement In Algeria with the National Liberation Front, whereas parliamentarians who had close connections with the peasant and small business i 2 worlds took positions as "Algerian diehards." Signifi­ cantly, those deputies who left the CNIP to follow General de Gaulle were led by three government ministers who like­ wise are members of the "200 families" -- Louis Jacquinot, Giscard D'Estaing, and Prince de Broglie. When we see that the Independents, until 1962 the second largest party in France after the UNR, who tended to be the least opposed to an "Algerian Algeria" were those with the closest rela­ tions with the business world, we are tempted to conclude that big business was ready for withdrawal from Algeria. This conclusion warrants strong consideration, and a recent spate of books seems to support it.^^ These concluding remarks, suggesting the tremendous power of a new "technocracy" in France in both the economic and political fields, would require much more study if they are to be definitely confirmed. Whereas there is strong reason to believe that the technocrats forced a settlement

^ S e e Smith, op . cit. ^^E.g., Coston, op.cit.; Beau de Lomenie, op.cit.: and Claude, op.cit. It should be remembered, however, that most of these works are written by violent anti-Gaullists. On the other hand, responsible scholars have mentioned this possibility. See, for example, Furniss, De Gaulle and the French Army, p.!84n; and Meisel, op.cit. p.256. 215 . of the Algerian question in a particular way, there is much less reason for confidence when speaking of economic policy. For example, economic concentrations were quite pronounced during the Fourth Republic; Jean Monnet was not the creation of the Fifth Republic! Moreover, Pinay's withdrawal from the Debre government was not so much because of disagreement over economic policy as because of the Gaullist military 44 program. The relationship between the new elite and specific economic policies will require much more study before a definite linkage should be concluded. A comparison of Gaullists over time does not reveal much that we do not already know. For example, if we look at the Social Republicans, who remained faithful to the General throughout the General's voluntary exile, we find that in a sample of slightly more than half (40) of them relatively few changes have taken place. Then, as now, the Gaullist elite was closely connected socially with the middle and upper middle classes. Some 85 per cent of them were professionals and AIT's, whereas a smaller portion than at present derived from independent business backgrounds. The lack of apparent small business support may have resulted from the relatively greater power that the Moderates had at that time. It was much more likely that small business could have expected more from the latter than from the

Annee Politique . 1960 . pp.4-6. 216 . Gaullists: Soustelle and Duchet might have agreed about the Algerian problem, but social questions were quite another matter. On the other hand, the AIT group had a higher per­ centage (40 per cent) of the total Social Republican dele­ gation in the Chamber of Deputies than does the present UNR. Actually, most of these men today are leaders of the UNR and are among the closest advisers to the General; it seems that the base of social support for the Gaullists has expanded as it has become a majority party. Moreover, several of these men were big businessmen who ordinarily would have found themselves more at home with the Moderates, but tteir resistance backgrounds probably prevented them from joining a group tainted with Vichy despite the fact that de Gaulle himself had withdrawn from politics and renounced the old RPF. Indeed, this finding may point up what has been argued all along; that the core of Gaullists who re­ fused to withdraw from the political ward during the hope­ less days of the fifties was technocratic in origin. VI

THE UNR ELECTORATE

The sudden rise into prominence of the UNR was not unexceptional in so far as Gaullist parties have been con­ cerned. The earlier RPF had exploded upon the political scene in 1947 only to be dealt a subsequent setback in the election of 1951. Pinay's ascension to the premiership in 1952 which led 34 Gaullist deputies to desert the parlia­ mentary group and de Gaulle's repudiation a few months later of the Party left the RPF with only a handful of isolated deputies. There were differences, of course, between the situation faced by the RPF on the one hand and by the UNR. For example, the former was trying to return de Gaulle to power whereas the latter was formed only after the May 13 Revolution made him Premier. Moreover, whereas de Gaulle himself had taken the leadership of the RPF, he kept the newly formed UNR at arm's length, steadfastly refusing to allow it even to use his name.

-217- 218 . Nevertheless, there Is an. apparent similarity in the two cases — and an object of fascination to the political scientist, it might be added — which pertains to the future prospects of Gaullism. Can the UNR survive as a viable entity of French political life or is it likely to disappear as did the RPF? This question continues to arise whenever men discuss politics in France. It is almost like asking what are the prospects for one of the two major American parties. Obviously one cannot predict the future with certainty; however, it is hoped that through a study of the present UNR electorate some clues as to the prospects of Gaullism in the future might be offered. There are various interpretations of the UNR electorate in existence. Some interpreters of the French scene see in the rise both of nationalism and the Right an explanation for the successes of the UNR. Thus, soon after the election of 1958 the astute Rene Remond argued that the victory of the UNR reflected a general trend to the right in French politics. He noted that since the war the share of the vote for the Gaullists, Moderates, and Catholic groups had increased relative to that of the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals.^ Eugen Weber has professed to find a major cause for the comeback of the French Right in general as deriving from international frustrations which have been

^Rene Remond, "Le Nouveau Regime et les Forces Politiques," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. March 1959, pp.167-87. 219 . 2 exploited by right-wing politicians. On the other hand, many proponents of electoral sociology have concluded that Gaullism is essentially a refurbished traditional Right. These scholars in particular point to the strength of the UNR in the Eastern and Western bastions of France, areas 3 where the Right has always found much support. Similarly, it has been noted that the Party has found much support in 4 the wealthier areas of France. Somewhat differently, Jacques Fauvet recently has suggested that voting patterns in France have tended to reflect an enduring left-right division within the country. In certain departements the party vote has tended to reflect support for the parlia­ mentary traditions of the French left. In other departements. in general those in the North, there seems to be an execu­ tive-oriented vote which usually views with favor the parties of the Right.^ Again, Nicholas Wahl has claimed that Gaullism is the revolt of Frenchmen who perceive a ______j______2 Weber, op.cit.; also, see his "Un Demi-Sifecle de Glissement 2t Droite,” International Review of Social History. Vol.V, 1960, pp.165-201; and "New Wine in Old Bottles: Les Families Spirituelles en France," French Historical Studies, 1959, pp.200-24. It should be emphasized,however, that Weber does not confine the nationalist "virus" to the Right alone. Indeed, a point he makes is that the Left has been infected also to a great extent. E.g., see Franqois Goguel, "Analyse des Resultats," in Goguel (Ed.), op.cit.. pp.320ff., 336-37. ^E.g., see Edward Whiting Fox, "Appearance and Reality in French Elections," Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring 1963, pp. 172-86. ^See, e.g., Jacques Fauvet in Le Monde. December 30, 1965 - January 5, 1966, Weekly Edition. 220. profound difference in the relatively low political status of France and her relatively high rate of economic develop­ ment. Presumably the coincidence of the economic rebirth in the 1950's and the growth of nationalist sentiment were primarily responsible for the success of the UNR in 1958.^ In a more sophisticated vein, Eugen Weber argued recently that the strength of nationalist parties on the Right — as the UNR is said to be — as well as an increas­ ingly nationalist and assertive vocabulary employed even by certain groups on the left has resulted to a great extent from fundamental changes in the class structure of Western societies. In the past, parties were composed of certain well-defined classes or social groups which lent a certain stability to the political order. Today, however, we are in the midst of marked degrees of social mobility. The consequence has been an erosion of the traditional class base of politics. Hence, parties in the past, as representa­ tives of certain class interests, evolved appropriate ideologies to rationalize their claims on the polity. These ideologies, though, have little relevance to men and women who are upwardly and downwardly mobile. If they are moving from the working class they deem their interests are no longer properly accounted for, whereas if they have moved into a lower social status position, they nevertheless

6Wahl, The Fifth Republic, pp.15-23, 61-66. 221.

still resent the party proponents of their newly acquired

status. The result has been that since the traditional

symbols have little meaning, voters have found that highly nationalist parties with charismatic "leaders" such as the

UNR meet their needs to a greater extent than the older

class parties. More specifically, it is argued, the rise of

the UNR, a party with a nationalist vocabulary but wedded to

social change, meets these new demands in a day when "left"

and "right" are fast losing their meaning. Thus, the vocabulary of the nationalist Right is adopted by the UNR while it argues at the same time for the social reforms ex­

pressed by much of the Left. It is concluded, then, that

the success of Gaullism fundamentally results from recent

changes in the French class structure.^

The examples cited above go far in demonstrating the

elusive nature of Gaullism. The fact that so many writers

can come to different conclusions or emphasize different

facets of the problem regarding the Gaullist phenomenon is

eloquent testimony to the difficulties encountered in

studying its true nature. Thus, those writers who content

themselves with picturing the UNR as a rightist group fail

to point to the not insignificant number of ballots coming

from the Left (Communist, Socialist, Radical). In fact, it

shall presently become quite clear that the UNR has received

^See the works of Weber, op.cit. 222 . significant aid from all social categories. We may certainly agree, moreover, that Gaullism is strongly represented in the North as well as in urban areas, but one can equally point to strong UNR representation in certain rural and Southern strongholds. Whereas the areas of high industrial­ ization do tend to be Gaullist, the fact remains that so are many less industrialized departement s. It is true that the UNR has contained strong representation in departements with relatively high birthrates, but it also has been well represented in areas where the birthrate has remained rela- 8 tively constant. The fact is that the Gaullist voter is very difficult to isolate. Lacking any apparent firm social or economic base makes him an elusive target for the scholar; and since political observers no less than ordinary men quite naturally tend to follow their past habits, they often rely on models which may distort reality. Hence, the tendency for the Gaullist vote to appear as unstructured may lead observers to force the available data to fit their conceptual schemes. To take an example, some of the outstanding work in French politics has been carried out by such electoral geographers Q as the late Andre Siegfried and Francois Goguel. Political

®The importance of high birthrates and younger popula­ tions as important variables in Gaullist support may be found in Franqois Goguel, "L'Electorat Gaulliste," Nouvelle Front i&re, Janvier 1964, pp.25-31. ^For a study of the limitations of electoral geography, especially with regard to the French case, see Jean Stoetzel, "Voting Behaviour in France," The British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 6 , 1955, pp.104-22. ecology, however, assumes certain enduring regional voting patterns. Although the UNR vote conforms in part to the traditional regional variations, its general support through­ out the country makes one extremely hesitant about relying upon demographic factors alone. While we may discover much of interest from the study of the geographical voting pat­ terns as explanatory factors, especially over a long period of time, nevertheless there remain special intervening variables which may be of equal importance. For example, the significance of a particular event or, as was the case in France, the arrival of the charismatic leader upon the scene often produces short-run changes at any rate in ordinarily stable electoral attitudes. Indeed, the UNR has received strong support in areas where both the tra­ ditional right as well as the left have been strong. To assume, as the exponents of electoral geography tend to do, that strong patterns remain relatively stable is hardly to account for the rise of a "flash party" like the UNR! To explain such a phenomenon as the flash party would seem to require an intensive analysis of voting statistics at the micropolitical level. In other words, sample surveys may go far in explaining those sudden changes in voting patterns which periodically shake French life. Perhaps there are individual predispositions or events which lead the French electorate from time to time to refuse allegiance to any of the more traditional parties. Indeed, it will be 224. argued in the course of this chapter that the key variable may be the lack of strong party identification on the part of the average voter. In a Sondages poll taken midway between the elections of 1958 and 1962, it was found that a Gaullist would tend to exhibit the following characteristics. He was more likely to be a woman than a man. He was probably either a young man from, say, 25-44 years of age or over 65, and he was likely to be better educated than voters in other parties. Although he might be located in a city or village of any size, when compared with other parties, his greatest concen­ tration was in towns of less than 2,000 and more than 100,000 in population. In terms of his occupational back­ ground, the Gaullist was somewhat more likely to be favored by the merchant and professional classes. As a relatively new party in French political life, the UNR naturally has wooed electors from each of the traditional parties, but its major source of strength has been within Moderate and Catholic MRP ranks and, to a lesser extent, among electors 10 of Radical and Socialist persuasions. It is interesting to note that this "typical" voter — assuming that is even the correct term to employ — is very difficult to locate in well-defined social groupings. Indeed, he is characterized by his heterogeneity. He is

^bondages , No.4, 1960. 225. likely to be found in almost any class, occupation, or age group. It is true, however, that he is rather unlikely to be an industrial worker; nevertheless, the UNR in general receives wide support in all categories, as a pre-election Sondages poll taken in September and October of 1962 re­ veals so well (see following page). The appeal of the UNR for sizeable numbers of French­ men, then, may be something other than an exhortation to the perceived economic self-interest of the individual who votes in terms strictly of class or economic considerations. While it is undoubtedly true that middle class voters are predominant among its supporters, the fact remains that its appeal, unlike that of most other French groups, is not confined to narrow class or occupational elements. In a very real sense, the UNR, like its Anglo-American counter­ parts is an "aggregative" party. What reasons may we offer as explanations for such a large UNR vote? It will be argued in the next few pages that the major factor behind the UNR success has been its ability to identify with the aspirations of those voters who display a high degree of devotion to General de Gaulle. Those voters perceive in the UNR the party which corres­ ponds most closely with the views and inclinations of the French President.^ Furthermore, it will be argued that

^Ste, e.g., Converse and Dupeux, op.cit.; Dogan, "Le Personnel Politique et la Personallte Charismatique," op. cit. Max Weber says charisma "shall be understood to refer TABLE I 226

THE PARTY WITH WHICH VOTERS IDENTIFY MOST CLOSELY

September - October 1962

5 ■a $ g 10 e e I •H E=> W « 0. a a e I p C as M i I •8 e e e • O a* S3 sc a <9 £

%_ % %_ X %_ %_ %_ Total 1 0 3 16 16 8 15 25 100 Sex: Males ...... *...... 1 2 4 19 7 15 8 16 1 18 100 Females ...... 8 3 13 4 17 8 14 2 31 100

Age: 20 to 34 years ...... 13 5 15 4 16 8 12 2 25 100 35 to 49 years ...... * 11 3 1 6 4 15 8 16 2 25 100 50 to 64 years ...... 8 4 18 7 17 7 17 1 21 100 65 and over ...... 5 2 14 7 15 11 13 2 31 100

Profession of Family Head: Farmers ...... 4 3 12 8 11 13 25 2 22 100 Mgrs., Ind., Lib. prof. .... 6 8 13 8 12 7 25 3 18 100 Merchants ...... 2 1 15 10 18 9 22 1 22 100 White Collar Employees .... 8 5 19 4 21 7 12 2 22 100 Workers ...... •••• 20 4 20 5 13 6 9 1 22 100 No Profession ...... fi 2 15 4 17 9 13 2 30 1 0 0

Residence: Less than 2, 000 inhabitants 7 3 15 6 14 8 17 28 100 2 to 5 , 0 0 0 inhabitants ..... 9 — 19 6 15 9 18 24 100 5 to 20,000 inhabitants .... 13 4 18 4 16 9 11 2 23 100 20 to 100,000 inhabitants .. 13 4 16 4 20 8 13 1 21 100 More than 1 0 0,000 inhabitants 11 4 16 5 15 7 13 2 27 100

Regions: Paris Region 14 6 14 3 19 4 10 2 28 100 North-West .. 5 2 14 3 21 12 18 2 23 100 North-East .. 10 3 17 6 19 12 12 1 20 100 South-West .. 7 2 18 11 7 5 17 1 32 100 South-East .. 11 3 18 5 11 7 18 2 25 100

Education: Primary ...... 11 3 17 6 15 8 13 26 100 Upper Primary ...... 4 3 19 7 19 8 18 22 100 Technical & Commercial 15 4 16 2 23 9 11 2 18 100 Secondary ...... 3 4 12 4 1 8 14 20 3 22 100 University ...... 2 11 8 5 15 5 26 5 23 100

Income: Less than 400 francs.... . 2 1 6 6 10 9 1 6 1 31 100 410 to 6 0 0 francs...... 2 19 5 13 10 1 2 2 24 100 610 to 8 0 0 francs ...... < 3 19 7 17 8 12 1 20 100 8 1 0 to 1 ,2 0 0 francs...... 4 17 4 1 8 8 16 22 100 1 ,2 1 0 francs and over ....< 6 13 7 19 10 21 2 19 100 227 . the charismatic powers of General de Gaulle which have proved so helpful to the Party could achieve full impact in a western nation such as France mainly because of the lack of a strong party identification in the part of a sizeable portion of the electorate. Unlike the United States, prob­ ably two—thirds of France's citizens refuse to give a continuing endorsement to any party. 12 One major consequence of such voting habits presumably is the ability of "flash" parties to project themselves upon the political stage at various times in history. 13 Hence, it was much simpler for the UNR than for any Anglo-American party to "get off the ground." We can hardly imagine an American party coming into a legislative majority a few months after its founding, much less practically winning an absolute majority within four years. But that is precisely what the UNR did! Recent French history is replete with parties who burst onto the scene at one time merely to languish or disappear the next to an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed. 'Charismatic authority,' hence, shall refer to a rule over men, whether predominantly external or predominantly in­ ternal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person." See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: A Galaxy Book, 1958, p. 295. For an attempt to operationalize the concept of charisma, see James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign," The American Political Science Review, December 1954, pp. 1083- 1102. ^Converse and Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," op. cit.

13 Ibid. 228. moment. We need only point to the rise and decline since 1945 of such groups as the MRP, RPF, UFF, and, most recently, the CNIP. The twin factors of charisma and weak party identifi­ cation, therefore, should go far in explaining the nature of the UNR electorate: men and women who are not anchored in their party loyalties presumably are more open to blandish­ ments from newer and more volatile forces. What data that are available relating to this question are far from con­ clusive, however. In this regard, a study of charisma in the United States suggests that there is a rather low positive correlation between charisma and the lack of party identification. 14 On the other hand, when a polity has been characterized by a large number of weak party identifiers and by "flash" parties as well, we are led to suspect that there may just be a significant relationship 15 between the two variables. Unfortunately, firm data are lacking; hence, we shall be forced to infer a great deal from the available material. Whereas recent studies are fairly convincing regarding the effects of General de Gaulle’s personality and policies on subsequent voting behavior, no such confidence exists in our suggestion that weak party supporters have tended to vote the UNR ticket. It is our hope merely to locate such

■^Davies, op.cit. ^Converse and Dupeux, op.cit. 229. types of voters and to see if they do tend to favor the UNR. This is not to maintain that most of these electors do in fact vote Gaullist; it is merely to infer that they may well do so. Our problem, therefore, is to isolate those types which are known to be lacking in party identification and to see then if such voters are found in large numbers in the UNR ranks.

Charisma and the UNR Vote That the smashing UNR victory in the election of 1962 was made possible by the Party's success in attaching itself to the coattails of General de Gaulle clearly would seem to be supported by the data. Most critics seemed to agree that voters who cast their ballots for the UNR in reality were showing their support for the French President. 16 Indeed, Immediately prior to the first ballot of the November election of 1958 a very small number of Frenchmen perceived the UNR as the party closest to General de Gaulle. Such was not to be the case after the election was over. Whereas before the first round only 14 per cent of all voters perceived the UNR as the party closest to de Gaulle,

57 per cent did so after the second round*^ The influence of charisma on the UNR vote can be de­ termined by several means. One way is to try to understand

^Dogan, op . cit . ^Converse and Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," op.cit.. p.335. 230. the motives of UNR electors by enquiring why they voted the Gaullist ticket. Presumably if they explained their support in terms of a specified individual's qualities rather than for party reasons, we might conclude that the personal characteristics of the leader had assumed an unusually high salience. Significantly, when the Gaullist electors were asked why they thought so many Frenchmen had voted UNR, an overwhelming 93 per cent said that they wished to "support the actions of General de Gaulle." 18 Moreover, expectations concerning the durability of the UNR as a force in French life seem to be rather low. Normally, we might expect "indifferents" or "hostiles" rather than "supporters" to manifest low expectations re­ garding the future of the Movement. A public opinion poll of February 1959, however, found that fewer than one-half of the UNR electors believed that the party with the largest number of deputies in the National Assembly would become a 19 permanent fixture in French politics. To take a somewhat different type of sample, after the completion of the 1962 campaign, "satisfied" voters were asked what it was that made them happy about the results of the campaign. Only 5 per cent found in the "victory of the UNR" a source of satisfaction. 2 0

1 Q This figure was taken from an IFOP sample as pub­ lished in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. p. 159. ^ Sondages. No.2, 1959, pp. 46-52. ^^As published on Goguel (Ed.), op.cit., p.227. 231. Furthermore, in a Sondages survey of the electorate prior to the municipal elections of March 1965, 49 per cent of the potential UNR electors said that the attitudes of prospective candidates concerning the policies of General de Gaulle would make no difference to them. 21 Such views might go far in explaining the astounding lack of support the UNR has been able to generate in local elec- tions. 22 Its inability to penetrate local structures in 1965 was in striking contrast to its smashing victory of less than three years earlier. Evidently de Gaulle's actions are perceived as crucial for many people at the national level, whereas in local campaigns his towering figure is perceived to be of little importance for many voters. Hence, the UNR, it would appear, can achieve success only when it is able to tie itself to the General's star. In fact, it is amazing how little the Party seems to be important at all for voters! Gaullist electors apparently take little notice of its role in French life. It is a tribute to the UNR leadership that it was able to impress upon so many voters in so short a time its image as the "true" follower of the French President — without the latter's aid it might be added.

21Jeanne Piret, "L'Opinion Publique au Debut de l'Annee 1965," Revue Francaise de Science Polit iq ue. June 1965, pp.529-37. 2 2 For a good study in this regard, see Philip M. Williams, "Party, Presidency, and Parish Pump in France," Parliamentary Affairs. Summer 1965, pp.257-65. 232. De Gaulle's personal qualities as an Influence on the UNR electorate became even more salient when the relation­ ship between the two referenda which organized the consti­ tutional powers of the Fifth Republic and the vote of 1962 are considered. It will be remembered that the September 28, 1958 consultation asked the French people to approve the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, while the October 28, 1962 referendum requested the populace to alter the Constitution in such a way as to allow the President of the Republic to be elected by a direct majority. In each of these consultations the prestige and authority of General de Gaulle were at stake, since not only were his constitutional powers to be increased or decreased but he himself had come out forcefully for a "yes" vote. Indeed, he had threatened to resign if the electorate returned a less than enthusiastic verdict. There could be no doubt as to the importance of the decision for the French elector- a t. e. 23 Not surprisingly, there was, according to Georges Dupeux, a correlation between the two referenda, on the one hand, and the vote for the UNR. The man or woman who votes "oui" at each consultation is quite likely to have given his or her electoral support to the UNR in 1962. Where­ as the parties of the Right were more amenable to change,

2 1Georges Dupeux, "Le Comportement des Electeurs Franqais de 1958 3. 1962, d'Aprfes Une Enquete Par Sondage," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. February 1964, pp. 52-71. 233. even the Communist voter in this respect was vulnerable. Apparently, to commit oneself to de Gaulle's views about Presidential power led many voters to the conclusion that his programs could best be carried out if they supported the UNR. We have reprinted Dupeux's findings in an Appendix.^ Therefore, the "yes" voter of 1958 who cast a similar ballot on October 28, 1962 was more than likely going to have voted UNR in November 1962. When it is found in one sample that voters give as their major reason for support­ ing the UNR the wish to favor the "actions of General de Gaulle" and in another study that "yes" votes at the two major referenda were strongly associated with a ballot for the UNR in 1962, we are led to conclude at the very least that the Gaullist personality must have been a highly positive factor in that 1962 vote. Many Frenchmen, then, were led by the logic of their preferences in the referenda to vote for the party which they perceived as best able to translate those purposes into action. Put another way, their support for General de Gaulle led them to vote for the Gaullist Party, since de Gaulle had made the referenda and hence the election into support for or against himself. 2 5

24Ibid. 234. In particular, the charismatic impact of de Gaulle on the electorate was especially pronounced in the 1962 cam­ paign. In 1958, the major groups, with the exception of the Communists, vied with one another in paying homage to de Gaulle so the issue was not clearly drawn. Four years later, however, for the most part only Gaullists and a few Republican Independents faced the entire "political class," thereby making it simpler to perceive the effects of charis­ ma on the electorate. In a recent article Mattel Dogan has pointed to several factors which suggest that 1962 was indeed a personal triumph for the French President by pointing to several consequences of that consultation. He noted first in this regard that the political leader­ ship of the Fourth Republic, whether of the Right or Left, was all but obliterated: Motte, Reynaud, Leenhardt, Simmonet, Poujade, Mendls-France, Gazier, Anxionnay, and Jacquet to name only a few. All told, 166 new deputies entered the National Assembly. Moreover, the UNR candi­ dates who so often defeated well-known politicians were relative unknowns themselves. For example, in the Paris region alone, Frederic-Dupont's defeat by Mer, Taittinger's defeat by Lepeu, Legaret's setback by Krieg, and Debray's loss to Haute-Clocque might be seen in this light. In several instances, Gaullists who were strangers to particu­ lar constituencies were nevertheless "parachuted" into them to face entrenched incumbents (e.g., in Seine-et-Oise, 235. Alpes-Maritimes, and the Rhone). The opposition groups which attempted such tactics, however, were resoundingly defeated in most cases. Finally, in their respective cam­ paigns, UNR aspirants made little if any mention of their membership in the UNR. In fact, the name "UNR-UDT" was absent for the most part from campaign posters and speeches. Neither were personal references to the career, record, or platform of the prospective deputy given much attention. Rather, each candidate dwelled upon his close connections with de Gaulle, or his support for "oui" at the recent referendum. Therefore, the huge turnover in the National Assembly, election of newcomers at the expense of seasoned political pros, the ability of the UNR to elect deputies who previously had not resided in their districts, and the depersonnalisation of the candidates, all could be cited as evidence of the charismatic appeal of the President of the Republic who was able to make of the election and the referendum an endorsement of his policies. 2 6 There are still other ways in which the influence of charisma on the UNR vote might be supported. For instance, charismatic campaigns seem to be characterized by great shifts in electoral opinion. 2 7 Parties generally would be expected to reflect fairly stable electorates* If, however,

26Ibid. ^Davies, op.cit.; Dogan, also, emphasized this point. See ibid. 236 . sudden massive and diffuse opinion changes take place, we might expect the "charismatic phenomenon" to have played a certain part in the outcome. Since it is obvious that the UNR itself has no figure who could encourage such changes 28 and since, as we have seen, the Party apparently is given little prominence or is regarded with indifference by the French voter, then we might conclude that the insti­ gator of change has been General de Gaulle. Indeed, these massive alterations in voting behavior which took place both in 1958 and 1962 enabled the UNR to strengthen its position at the expense of Left and Right alike. This popularity of the UNR probably can be explained by the ability of General de Gaulle to detach many voters from their parties and by the persuasive powers of the UNR to convince people that it best represented the President's position. 2 0 Whereas it is true that the UNR won more electors from the rightist groups* the fact remains that its support

^®For a study of public's indifference and/or hostility to leading Gaullists other than the General, see Sondages. No.3, 1963, pp.29-66. 9 QConverse and Dupeux, op.cit.: Alain Girard and Jean Stoetzel, "Le Compartement Electoral et le Mecanisme de la Decision," in Touchard (Ed.), op«cit.. p.173; and Philip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp.180-81. 237. on the Left was far from insignificant. De Gaulle's Impact on the electorate demonstrates the inability of observers to explain French voting behavior in terms of left to right spatial models. 30 Thus, in 1958 traditional Socialists and Radicals alone contributed over 31 per cent of the total UNR vote. 31 In 1962, over 23 per cent of the shift to the UNR came from similarly oriented voters. 3 2 Finally, so far as the Right is concerned, the impact of the Gaullists on the more conservative voters was devas­ tating. As Rene Remond has pointed out, the losses suffered by the CNIP, the MRP, and the extreme Right would seem in themselves at a glance to explain the UNR gain. Thus, according to him, in 1962 the UNR received 31.9 per cent of the vote at the second round which was a gain of 14.4 per cent from 1958. Conversely, the moderates and other rightists had lost 11.6 per cent of their support while the MRP had lost 2.8 per cent of its electorate. If we add the losses of these parties we obtain the exact total by which the UNR electors increased, namely 14.4 per cent! 33 Of course all rightist voters did not leave

30 Converse and Dupeux, ibid.. pp.341-43; Converse in Jennings and Zeigler (Eds.), ibid. 31 This fig-ure was adapted from Converse in Jennings and Zeigler (Eds.), ibid.. p.180; and Georges Dupeux, "D'Une Consultation & L'Autre: Les Reactions du Corps Electoral," in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. p.146. O O Figures adapted from Dupeux, op.cit.. p.67. ^Rene Remond, "L'Enigma de L'UNR," op.cit. 238. their groups to join the Gaullists, but Remond* s figures suggested that a large number of them in fact did so.

Party Identification and the UNR Vote

Until this time it has been argued that the UNR has been perceived by many voters as the party most likely to support the actions of General de Gaulle. Hence, many of them deriving from the "old-line" parties who were particu­ larly predisposed to General de Gaulle were led to cast their ballots for the UNR. By quickly identifying itself as de Gaulle’s party in the minds of the electorate, the 34 UNR was able to capitalize on their "leader’s" image. Nevertheless, if we are to get at the essence of the problem of the UNR voter we must know more about him than that he simply tended to be composed of voters highly favorable to de Gaulle's charismatic personality. A more pertinent question is: Why was he so favorably disposed in the first place? It is our hypothesis that there is a strong link between lack of party identification and the UNR vote. In other words, the UNR electorate is composed to a large extent of weak party identifiers. Such a phen­ omenon could go far in explaining not only the periodic

^Converse and Dupeux, op.cit.; Converse in Jennings and Zeigler (Eds.), op.cit.: and Williams and Harrison in Butler (Ed.), op.cit. 239. rise of the "flash" party in France but more broadly the persistence of instability in the society Itself. Where voters persistently locate themselves in parties, as in the United States, the stability of the polity is not so likely to be endangered, although it is true that multi- partyism in itself need not lead to instability. On the other hand, where they have not been socialized into politi­ cal groupings, as in France, the result may well be insta­ bility.35 Actually, for some time political scientists have known that party identification in France was relatively weak. In fact, the evidence is quite strong in this regard. In a comparative study of the United States and France, Dupeux and Converse found that identification with a party was much weaker in France. Indeed, they estimated that about two-thirds of the electorate in the latter nation could be characterized as weak identifiers. 3 6 For example, they discovered that only 20 per cent of a French sample could recall to what political party their fathers belonged or whether the latter were "independent, shifting around, or nonvoting." On the other hand, 82 per cent of the Americans polled could give their father's political affilia* tion. The authors concluded that Frenchmen were weak

^Converse and Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," op.cit. 36Ibid. 240. identifiers mainly because of the failure of the families to transmit party preferences. Similarly, a recent compar­ ative study of the politization of Dutch, Belgian and French youths found the latter to rank lowest on the scale in party identification and, in addition, they showed a more marked 37 hostility for political parties in general. The studies of French communities point to the same conclusions. Wylie found that local parties were extremely fragile and that political opposition resulted in the main from personal animosities. 3 8 Bettelheim and FrSre suggest much the same thing in pointing to the importance of personalities rather than parties in their study of Auxerre. 3 9 Despite its relatively low level of party identification, voter partici­ pation itself has proved to be relatively high in France when compared with the United States.This conjunction of high participation and a lack of party identification coincides in France with another interesting phenomenon: a

See Frank A. Pinner, "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. September 1965, pp.58-70; also, see Rene Remond, "La Jeunesse et la Vie Politique en France," paper presented to the International Association of Political Science, September 21-25, 1964, pp.1-25. ^Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse: An Account of Life in a. French Village. New York: Harper Colophon, 1964, pp.207-29. ^Charles Bettelheim and Suzanne Frere, Auxerre en 19 50: Une Ville Francaise Movenne. Paris: A.Colin, 1950, pp. 223-39. ^Georges Dupeux, "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France," International Social Science Journal. No.l, 1960, pp. 40-52. 241. relatively high degree of inter-party change-over. In a poll taken in January of 1958, nearly a year before the first legislative election of the Fifth Republic, 65.5 per cent of the voters of 1956 said that they would change to another party when a new election was called!^ Interestingly enough, in the first election contested by the newly- created UNR, only 14 per cent of a post-election sample declared that they had voted for the same party as in 1956! 4 2 Indeed, samples of public opinion taken since World War II have consistently revealed a marked degree of voter infidelity to political parties. 43 Finally, the change between the elections of 1958 and 1962 were quite revealing in this respect: only 58.5 per cent of the 1958 electorate voted for the same party four years later. 44 If it is assumed that the weak identifiers are in part those voters who have changed parties both in 1958 and 1962 at the legislative elections, it would seem that the UNR has been the beneficiary of such ballots. Indeed, many

^Calculated from data supplied in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit., p.141. ^Calculated from data found in Dupeux, "D'Une Consultation & L'Autre," in Touchard (Ed.), ibid., p.146. ^^E.g., see ibid..; and Stoetzel, "Voting Behaviour in France," op.cit. ^Calculated from data supplied by Dupeux, "Le Compartement des Electeurs Franqais de 1958 il 1962," op.cit. , p .61. 242 . electors of 1958 appear to have switched their 1956 prefer­ ence to the U N R . ^

TABLE II Percentage of 1956 party supporters who voted UNR in 1958 Communists 6 Socialists 8 Mendes Radicals 20 Radicals, RGR 30 MRP 35 CNIP and Moderates 38 Poujadists 43

What is interesting about these data, besides the fact that all parties lost voters to the UNR, is that the greatest losers were the groups of the Right. In a poll of "floating" voters who switched parties in 1958, Girard and Stoetzel discovered that 75.6 per cent of them went over to parties of the Right. 51 per cent of these Frenchmen alone favored the UNR.^^ The further one moves to the left, the less

4 5Calculated from data presented by Girard and Stoetzel in Touchard (Ed.), op. cit. . pp. 162, 180. It should be pointed out that a sizeable portion of these data had to be discarded for various reasons. They should be accepted, therefore, with some reservation. ^^Ibid.. pp.166-68. It should be stated here that these samples Include only those voters who in fact admitted their party favorite in each election. Nonetheless, the strength of the UNR among "floating" voters is particularly significant when it is realized that the CNIP also increased its share of the vote by a strong margin. enthusiasm he finds for the UNR. A similar pattern emerges i in 1962 when we compare the changes from 1958.

TABLE III Percentage of 1958 party supporters who voted UNR in 1962 Communist s 2.4% Socialists 13 Radicals 19 MRP 41 CNIP 47

It will be noted that the CNIP and MRP shift to the UNR is quite pronounced. Even more so than was the case in 1958, the UNR is favored by the parties of the Right. True, its Socialist supporters have increased somewhat, but many of the remaining Radicals from 1958 now are even less enthus­ iastic about their party. In a word, the UNR had become the Party of the Right. The fact that the data above were based on the results of the first round is significant: it means that for large numbers of rightists the change in their party support had taken place before the run-off when they would not have been forced to choose between a UNR candidate and a candidate of the Left. Nonetheless, the

^These figures are based on a national sample con­ ducted by the Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques from December 15 to December 30 of 1962. See Dupeux, "Le Comportement des Electeurs Frangais de 1958 k 1962," op.cit.. pp.52-71. 244. favor with which the UNR was perceived by the voters of other parties goes deeper than a mere study of the first round results would suggest. These responses suggest that the electorate of the Right has little appreciation even for the parties it actually votes for. In response to the question "Which party do you feel closest to?" significant numbers of Independents and MRP first-round electors stated that they in fact felt "most close" to the UNR! They seemed to favor a relatively new party rather than their own traditional groupings; nevertheless, they cast their votes for their traditional albeit less favored, group. Little wonder that the UNR swamped the other parties in the second round. 48

TABLE IV Percentage of party voters who felt closest to the UNR Communist 1.5% Socialist (includes SFIO and PSU) 4.5 Radicals 7 MRP 26 Independents (Includes Independent Republicans) 33

Based on data taken from Guy Mlchelat, "Attitudes et Comportements Politiques H l'Automne 1962," in Goguel (Ed.), op.cit., p.219. Besides the usual caveats concern­ ing the rather large number of discarded responses, it should be remembered that most parties, unlike the UNR and PCF, did not blanket the nation with candidates. 245. What are the implications of this shift by the more rightist groups over to the UNR both in 1958 and 1962? We would suggest that such changes are in reality not sur­ prising in the least, although the magnitude of the shift to the Gaullists in 1962 probably surprised most observers* Indeed, it has been pointed out that the rise of "flash" parties certainly has been a characteristic of French political life in recent years. What has been most interest­ ing, however, is the fact that the growth and decline of such groups has been confined largely to the parties which generally are considered by observers to be on the right of the political spectrum; parties which historically have appealed to similar clienteles. The surge of opinion in favor of the UNR was hardly a new phenomenon in this respect: the MRP, the RFF, and the Poujadists are worthy antecedents. The fall of the CNIP in 1962 was only the most recent example of the fickleness of this electorate. Conversely, the two major leftist groups, the PCF and SF10, have weathered such storms. In fact, the factions which have refused to fallow Guy Mollet’s leadership hardly have made a dent in the total socialist electoral strength. For example, the UFD and later the PSU never really got off the ground in their bid for power. Splits among the elites have failed to produce major schisms at the mass level. 4 9

^E.g., see Girard and Stoetzel in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.. p.164. 246. We would conclude that the fickleness of the elector­ ate on the Right is a result of the weak party identifica­ tion which characterizes the French electorate as a whole. Certainly the fact that so much UNR support comes from a section of the electorate which historically has shifted its allegiance to power parties when it felt the necessity is significant in this regard.^ Moreover, as we have seen, its relatively low esteem in the eyes of its present sup­ porters is still another Indication that the Gaullist roots do not appear to run very deep. 51 In a word, the UNR has succeeded to a great extent in mobilizing the votes of those Frenchmen who refuse consistently to ally themselves with any political party. France, then, is a nation in which party loyalties are not firmly established, and the voters who generally favor rightist groups are apparently the most fickle of all. Significantly, the majority of the UNR voters derive from an electorate which traditionally has favored parties said to be "right-wing" in orientation. There is, however, additional evidence that weak party identification is a major characteristic of the Gaullist voter. One indicator has to do with the way in which electors make up their minds concerning how they will cast their

^Converse and Dupeux, o p . cit. ^E.g., see Sondages. No.2, 1959, pp.46, 51. 247. ballots. Studies of American voting behavior suggest that men and women who decide late In the campaign which party they will support tend to talk less about politics and to be less emotional and Involved. Moreover, they tend to be independents or, at the very least, they refuse to commit themselves strongly to either of the major parties, ideo­ logically or otherwise. They may be subject to cross­ pressures, and they are less likely to participate by voting. In a word, such people do not identify strongly with either the Democrats or Republicans. Presumably, they also would be more easily swayed by the personal attributes of the presidential candidates than would strong party supporters; therefore, they would be candidate- rather than party-oriented. 52 The French data, while fragmentary, display certain similarities to the American studies in this regard. For one thing, there is some evidence that UNR electors d£ tend to show less interest in political matters than do the electors of several of the other major groupings. Guy Michelat has established that in 1962 UNR voters showed significantly less interest in political matters than did Socialists and Communists but more interest than either Independents (excepting the Republican Independents) or

^E.g., See Bernard Berelson et al, Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954; and Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964, especially pp. 67ff. 248. Popular Republicans. Logically we might have expected higher levels of interest on the right given its elector­ ate's relatively higher occupational status and education­ al levels.^

On the other hand, in the earlier elections of 1958, UNR supporters at the time of the first round balloting seemed more interested in politics than did any of the other groups. 54

TABLE V Vote of Nov.23,1958 Interested Uninterested No response UNR 68% 30% 2% Communist 63 34 3 Socialist 67 33 0 MRP 61 39 0 Independent 56 43 1

Why the apparent discrepancy in Gaullist attitudes in each election? True, in one sense there is no discrepancy: the Left does seem to be more interested than does the Right. However, the significant number of "interested" voters in the UNR category is puzzling in that it appears contrary to the previous data. Perhaps the difference be­ tween 1958 and 1962 can be explained by the shift in

■^Michelat, op.cit.. pp.243-44, 270-71. -^Adapted from a sample found in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit., p.160. 249. sentiment in the intervening years away from the MRP and CNIP toward the UNR. In other words, the UNR may have drawn to its bosom many more "uninterested" voters from the Independent and Popular Republican ranks in 1962. Moreover, the first ballot of 1958 probably reflected the more strongly committed, thus interested, strength of the UNR. It will be remembered also that most voters failed even to perceive the UNR as the party of General de Gaulle; hence, it might be supposed that those who were characterized by a greater awareness were better represented in the earlier period. It has been observed in several studies that interest and participation are related: Interested people are more likely to vote and take part in political discussions and 55 activities than are uninterested ones. Hence, it might be expected that in moving from the right-wing groups to the UNR to the Left the levels of participation would tend to rise accordingly. In an article dealing with data from the election of 1958, Georges Dupeux found little, if any, difference between the major parties. If we group the parties into "tendencies," it is found that the differences are minimal.

^~*E.g., Berelson et al, op.cit. t Campbell et al, op.cit. ^Dupeux, "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France," op.cit. Dupeux*s participation index is related not only to the actual vote, but to whether or not the respondents (1) tried to persuade others to follow their lead; (2) attended meetings; or (3) read election posters. TABLE VI Vote Strong Participation Weak Participation Left 15.25% 9.5% Right 14.25 9.5 UNR 15.25 11 "Other" 22.3 18

The Right shows slightly fewer "strong participation" respondants than the Left, whereas the UNR has a slightly larger number of weak participants. These differences, however, hardly would appear to be significant. On the other hand, French scholars have noted for some time that some socio-economic groups participate less fre­ quently than do other types. In particular, they have noted that women, youths, elder citizens, the poorly educated, and large city dwellers on the whole seem to participate less frequently than men, middle-aged voters, the better educated, farmers, and people from small communities.^ It might be interesting to see to what extent such weak participants are found in the ranks of the UNR. If they compose a sig­ nificant portion of the Gaullist support in relation to the other categories, there would seem to be greater merit in our argument that interest and participation indeed

^Remond, op . ci t. ; Stoetzel, op . ci t. : also, see Jean Meynaud and Alain Lancelot, La Participation des Francais 1^ Politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. 251. are related. Let us see how well the UNR does among the groups which are said to participate weakly. 5 8

TABLE VII % Stated party preference of weak participators UNR Right Left Women 24. 6% 15.29% 15. 2% Young (20 to 34 years) 21.3 13. 3 18. 6 Old (over 65 years) 21.7 17.4 13. 7 City dwellers (over 100,000) 20. 5 13 . 7 18. 5 Primary education 20.2 14. 2 18. 9 Average 21. 7 14. 9 17

Strangely enough, the UNR support among social cate­ gories who are known as weak participants is fairly strong whereas the Right has relatively fewer supporters than has the Left. From what we have argued previously, we might have expected precisely the opposite. In other words, we presumably would have thought that the weak participant groups would have been most strongly represented on the Right with the Left being slightly less well represented than the UNR. In this regard, it might be mentioned that what have been presented above are gross figures which merely deal

^ Sondages, No.2, 1963, p.64; and Dupeux, o p .cit. Scores of the Left (PCF, SFIO, Radicals) and the Right (Independents, MRP) were determined simply by computing their respective averages. 252 . with large aggregates. As such it is hoped that at the very least partial explanations may be provided. To show that voters on the Right change parties more often or are less interested in politics than are voters on the Left does not mean that all rightist-inclined electors compose the UNR. We can only suggest that this type of voter is found in disproportionate numbers in Gaullist ranks. For this reason our findings should be accepted with some reservations. Indeed* it may well be the case that in France levels of interest and participation are simply negatively corre­ lated. This possibility should not be excluded. Dupeux* moreover* has suggested participation on the average is higher in France than in other western societies; hence* we should not necessarily expect to discover any signifi- cant relationship between interest and participation. 59 He also suggests the possibility that "as voting is regarded as a moral obligation and a civic duty" many respondants may admit a lack of interest but nevertheless refuse to say they do not intend to vote.^ Nonetheless* it does seem that the UNR Itself contains a relatively large number of voters who traditionally have been weak participants either in terms of actually voting

^Dupeux, ibid. 60Ibid. 253. or in taking an active part in politics. this suggests that the Gaullists may have recruited into their ranks a dispro­ portionate share of voters predisposed toward low partici­ pation. Since we know that most of their strength has derived from disgruntled CNIP and MRP elements — which, according to the data, demonstrate relatively low levels of interest — it may well be that the UNR has gained a disproportionate share of the less interested and weaker participants since 1958. Hence, the relatively lower sup­ port received by the Right in terms of the Left from the weakly participating groups may have resulted in part from a transfer of such votes from the former to the UNR. If such is the case, the Dupeux findings would not necessarily contradict our own results. Whatever the relationship, however, the fact that the Gaullists seem to be supported by weaker participant groups should make us hesitate before saying that the relationship between the two variables is insignificant in France. The American studies have suggested that party loyal­ ties tend to be relatively weaker among electors who delay their voting decisions until after the political campaigns have begun. It has been argued that such voters tend to be not only less interested but that in many cases they seem to be relatively more cross-pressured. When UNR voters were asked in 1958 at what time they had decided to vote for the Gaullist candidate, fully 73 per cent stated that the 254. decision was taken during the campaign whereas another 4 per cent said they had only decided to support the UNR on the day of the election. Only 23 per cent of them were resolved to cast their ballots for the UNR before the campaign got under w a y . ^ Many Gaullist voters, then, seem to have made up their minds as to how they would vote quite late in the campaign. We would suggest that many of these voters were weak identifiers. Indeed, this presumption would seem to be strengthened when we notice the difference between the parties of the Left and Right in this regard. 6 2

TABLE VIII When voting decision was taken Before the During the Day of Vote of Nov.23, 1958 Campaign Campaign the vote Parties of the Left 55.5% 36,7% 7.8% (Communists, Socialists) Parties of the Right 27.5 72.5 0 (MRP, CNIP, UNR)

Nearly three-fourths of the CNIP, MRP, and UNR voters, apparently, were uncommitted when the campaign began. In such an environment it is easy to perceive how a new party

^As published in Touchard (Ed.), op.cit.» p.158. 62 This table was reconstructed from ibid. Unfortunate­ ly, in this connection data are not available on the Radicals whose voters contributed much support to the UNR in 1958. 255 . like the UNR could get "off the ground" in its bid for votes — particularly when it could tie itself to the coat­ tails of General de Gaulle. Unlike the "typical" American voter, the Frenchman probably is more subject to change during the course of a campaign. 6 % In this connection it should be remembered that 75.6 per cent of the actual floating vote between 1956 and 1958 derived from rightist voters while the UNR share of the floating vote was 51 per 64 cent. Indeed, it would appear quite plausible that this lack of stable party loyalty could easily be exploited by a well-known political figure. Whether he could transfer that devotion to a particular political group is another question, although from what we have seen so far there tends to be a strong relationship between the vote for de Gaulle in both the election and referenda, on the one hand, and support for the UNR.^^ Voters on the Right, then, are far more likely to hesitate in making a decision as to which party they prefer. If it is true — as the American case suggests -- that weak party identification and voting indecision are positively

63por a study of the relatively small effects political propaganda supposedly has on voting behavior in particular campaigns, see Thomas W. Burnham, "Polling for a President­ ial Candidate," Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol.29, 1965, pp.185-99. ^Computed from data supplied by Girard and Stoetzel in Touchard (Ed*), op . cit.. p.166.

^E.g., see Dupeux, "Le Comportement des Electeurs Franqais de 1958 £ 1962," op.cit. 256. related, It Is difficult to avoid the conclusion that party identification Is very weak on the French Right in general and among Gaullists in particular. To a much greater ex­ tent than leftist voters, the Independent, Popular Republican, and Gaullist electorates are prone to vacillate in their behavior. Indecisiveness, inter-party changes, and low levels of interest on the Right certainly suggest that voter r loyalties are quite fragile. In conclusion, then, does the concept of the "cross­ pressured voter" apply to large sections of the UNR elector­ ate? In the absence of interviews over time we cannot be sure. It seems, however, that a large number of Gaullist electors do share common characteristics with what U.S. political scientists in particular have denoted as the "cross-pressured" individual. 6 6 UNR voters take longer periods of time in making up their minds as to how they will cast their ballots, arid they seem to compose a sizeable portion of the "floaters." Moreover, they appear to show little Interest in politics. The relatively strong support they receive from such groups as women, youths, elders, and large city voters, while not extremely disproportionate, does suggest that blocs of people who display little interest in politics and who have relatively low levels of partici­ pation do in fact favor Gaullism. Finally, weak party

^Berelson, op.cit. 257 . identifiers are more likely t o be subjected to cross­ pressures than are voters who anchor themselves firmly to political parties. For the s trong identifier, the party supposedly is able to give me aning to political events, to give order to political life, whereas for the individual lacking such roots the politi cal world is more amorphous and changing. The supposed e ffects of the charismatic figure on such voters also sh ould be seen in this light: the fact that party supporter s in 1958 tended to picture de Gaulle as closest to their own particular group and the greater tendency of the weak supporters to waver are sig- nificant findings in this reg

6 7Converse and Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," op.cit. VII

CONCLUSION

As this study was nearing completion, the National Assembly elections of March 1967 were taking place. While it is as yet too early to assess the implications of that electoral battle, at least a few brief preliminary remarks might be in order. From a perusal of the better newspapers and journals, it would seem that the election itself did little, if any­ thing, to refute the major conclusions of this work.'*' The UNR received somewhat of a setback in that it lost 47 of the 230 seats it controlled before Parliament was dissolved. Within the "Fifth Republic" coalition itself, the major UNR allies, the Independent Republicans, raised their total to 44 from 35 seats. From what we suggested in earlier chapters, this should not seem too surprising. The traditional Moderfe

^See the following: Le Monde, March 2-8, 1967, Weekly Edition; ibid., March 9-15, 1967; and L 1 Express. March 13-19, 1967; ibid., March 20-26, 1967; also, see Henry Tanner and John L. Hess in New York Times. March 19, 1967.

-258- 259. electorate, which swung so heavily to Gaullism in 1962, may be in the process of gradually returning to its more estab­ lished ways. For it is truly stretching the meaning of the word to include the Giscardians under the rubric of "Gaullism." Their traditions, history, and interests all militate against assuming that they will work closely with the "true" Gaullists, the UNR, in the future. Already, their post-election refusal to forge a single parliamentary group with the UNR is a significant omen for the years ahead. One thing, therefore, appears rather certain: the UNR will no longer have such an easy time of it in the third legislature as it did in the second legislature. It will require all the skills of President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Pompidou to keep their forces in line.

Moreover, the election meant the loss of several key

UNR figures. Such organizational and parliamentary elites as Ministers Charbonnel and Sanguinetti, Marcenet, Vallon,

Pasguini, Clerget, Riviere, and Karcher would no longer be

represented in Parliament. If the old UDT elements hoped

to increase their influence in the UNR-UDT, they were to be

doomed to disappointment. Not only Vallon, but Capitant,

Barberot, and Hamon received setbacks. True, such men as

Chalandon, Michelet, Richard, and Baumel could not help but

lend lustre to the parliamentary delegation. That three

Senators, an ex-Secretary-General, the present Secretary-

General, and a Gaullist leader who had never occupied a 260. public office should seek election suggests several facts of life in France today. In a larger sense, it suggests that many ambitious politicians perceive the National

Assembly rather than the Senate as the more important arena; or at least twenty-one senators did so at the recent elec­ tion. More concretely, that Baumel, Michelet, Richard, and Chalandon would seek election in the lower house is an

Indication that intra-party influence in the future will be exercised from the seat of the deputy even more so than in the past. The struggle for the UNR's soul in the first days of the Fifth Republic and the ultimate victory of uncon- ditionalism created this state of affairs. It appears that

some of the heroes who fought that great fight have now

concluded that past performance is not enough in itself.

Their decision to run at all was fraught with difficulty.

Over fifty UNR deputies were not re-nominated in order to

accommodate various individuals and coalition partners.

Demand certainly seems to have outrun supply! Hence,

Deputy Evrard's seat was given to Michelet in the

departement of Finitere, to the chagrin of the former.

There were others who likewise were dissatisfied.

De Gaulle's aloofness from the UNR during the campaign

was not so pronounced as in the past. Indeed, the General

found It necessary to broadcast an eleventh hour appeal to

^See Raymond Barrillon in Le Monde. December 29 , 1966 - January 4, 1967, Weekly Edition. 261. the voters to support "Fifth Republic" candidates. The plea, apparently, did not help very much. If the 1965 presidential election was a portent of things to come, it demonstrated that the electorate was no longer so apprehen­ sive about the President's withdrawal from political life. Our argument that Gaullist voters tend toward charismatic identification with de Gaulle and weak party loyalties may well be confirmed when the more thorough studies of this election begin to appear in print. Certainly, logic would have led us to expect a UNR retrenchment in the election. Charisma by its very nature is likely to be relatively short­ lived, and we need hardly comment about the fragility of the party vote. The charismatic aspects of Gaullist France, quite simply, are becoming routinized; but routinization was precisely what the UNR needed least if it were to re­ tain its hold on the nation. As more than one analyst con­ cluded the morning after the election, Gaullism had been accumulating resentments over the years. The resolution of the Algerian War found a grateful people ready to confirm de Gaulle in power in 1962. By 1967, however, grievances over income, welfare, housing, and education were sufficient­ ly intense to turn many a voter away. Moreover, after more than eight years of Gaullism, there was little difficulty in determining who " 1 es 11s11 were; and we can hardly be surprised at the reaction. After all, it is from the fickle Right that much of the UNR strength derives. The UNR base 262. of support, in a word, was slowly being chipped away. With or without de Gaulle it is unlikely that it can ever really recover. In all likelihood his sudden departure from the scene would merely accentuate already existing trends. If the 1967 election possibly revealed the beginnings of a trend away from Gaullism, the campaign Itself revealed a continuation of certain patterns of organizational be­ havior; patterns which have endured at least since the resolution of the great intra-party conflict in early 1961. ThiB, we noted recently that same hostility to the outside world which so often has led UNR leaders to suggest that their political opponents verged on treason; the revelling in the Gaullist mystique; and that belief in the Resistance and its traditions which bind as one all followers of the leader of Free France. Several observers commented upon this phenomenon during the electoral battle.^ Canadian correspondent Alan Harvey, who covered the campaign in the provinces, put it quite well when he said: "Gaullism, in fact, is not an alluring creed. It has an arbitrary style, a chip-on-the-shoulder aggressiveness, a secretive quality; opponents are kept in their place."^

^See Raymond Barrillon in Le Monde, December 29, 1966 - January 4, 1967, Weekly Edition. ^E.g., see Vlansson-Ponte, Le Monde, February 2-8, 1967, Weekly Edition. ^The Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 27, 1967. 263. As in the past, commentators this year again were predicting the disintegration of the UNR, if not now, then at least very soon.'* Individual conflicts in the Girone, Finistere, and elsewhere over who was to receive prospective party nominations probably had something to do with this g pessimism. Nevertheless, the Gaullists still remain united in Parliament despite all the dire predictions in recent years. From what we have said in the course of this study, however, their unity should not be so surprising. That community of sentiments which binds the UNR continues to be immune to centrifugal forces. Since unconditionalism won at Bordeaux in 1959, rumors have persisted that the parliamentary delegation was so divided that it simply would fragment. It did not. Indeed, a sample of the major roll call votes taken in the National Assembly since uncondition- alism triumphed would suggest that, with the exception of the Communist Party, the UNR has been the most monolithic group of French deputies in existence since World War 11.^

^E.g., see The New York Times, March 19 , 1967. ^Le Monde, December 29, 1966 - January 4, 1967, Weekly Edition. ^Interesting discussions of the issues involved, the debates themselves, and the resolution of the issues can be found in the yearly issues of L f Annee Politique. For a very good study of the cohesion of the parliamentary groups, see Waline, op.cit. 264. TABLE IX UNR deputies who voted against their majority and government po s it ions Issue Number Censure on Budget of 1961 (November 1959) 0 Censure on refusal to recall Parliament (May 1960) 0 Vote to alter Title XII of the Constitution (May 1960) 3 Vote on "Force de Frappe" (October 1960) 0 Vote on Tax Reform (July 1961) 7 For debate on Alcohol (July 1961) 11 Vote for lifting parliamentary immunity for Georges Bidault (July 1962) 0 Censure on Agricultural Policy (October 1964) 0 Vote on Budget of 1965 (November 1964) 0 Vote on Education Budget (October 1965) 3 Vote on French-Algeria oil tanker deal (October 1965) 4 Vote on Amendment to Military Service Act (May 1965) 0 Approval of Fifth Plan (November 1965) 0

The above are bills which, it has been said, aroused much controversy in the National Assembly. Yet it will be noted that in most cases Gaullist agreement was absolute: not a single deputy strayed from the fold. It is especially relating to issues in which the integrity of the Government was called into question, when Gaullist institutions are questioned, or when the implications of national grandeur are involved that deviations from the majority are completely g absent. It is true, of course, that recalcitrant deputies have been sanctioned by exclusion from the group on occasion, but it is hardly likely that prospective punishment alone could have explained such cohesion. For example, it has been

8Waline, ibid. 265. argued that many UNR deputies were particularly upset over 9 the Government's agricultural policy in 1964. Neverthe­ less, it is significant that all of the deputies were to fall into line subsequently. The long-term prospects for Gaullism, then, may not be especially propitious. The nature of its electorate and so far the notable lack of any dynamic successor to de Gaulle do not augur well for the future. Nevertheless, the contri­ butions of the UNR to French political life seem to have been not insubstantial. The "manifest" functions of the UNR have been to confirm General de Gaulle in power by giving him a parliamentary majority. As we have seen, the UNR has carried out this function admirably. The intra-party strug­ gle, the definition of party role, and the persistent refusal to elaborate a doctrine are by-products in the performance of these functions. With the exception of the Soustellians, the UNR never left the least doubt that its chief intention was to retain a single individual as head of state. Thus, whereas a function of the British majority party might be the recruitment of government leadership, the UNR's aims have been much more modest in this respect. No better testimony

q L1Annee Politique, 1964. pp. 89ff. ^^In addition, the old argument might be raised that roll calls tend to reflect bargains which might have been struck between the various participants; hence, unity may have been achieved but at a price by the leadership. 266. to Its success in the performance of its functions could be given than by the numerous journalists, historians and social scientists who have chosen to ignore it. With the notable exceptions of de Gaulle's activities, and the Algerian struggle, the politics of the Fifth Republic have been rather dull, and interest has waned in the French political process. Because of its superiority as an organized force in parliamentary life, the UNR could perform certain "latent" functions for groups within French society and for the system itself. For the more nationalist and mostly rightist elements, the Gaullists possibly eased the shock of colonial retrenchment. Only a party given to the generous employment of nationalist symbols, which spoke in the name of the man who embodied the spirit of Free France, could have made such a graceful exit from North Africa. It was difficult to sustain the charge before the public that de Gaulle was a traitor. In all probability Gaullism alleviated the humilia­ tion administered to France by the loss of Algeria, De Gaulle, of course, was the initiator, but it requires some imagination to see how he could have avoided civil war had the UNR as part of the Right been united as a single force. Gaullism, with its emphasis on the French mission and grandeur, on national glory, has gone far in rectifying that loss of self-esteem so prevalent after World War II. 267 . Frenchmen appear to have more faith in the future as re­ flected in their higher birth rates, their greater propen­ sities to invest, and their changing consumption habits. Moreover, they seem much more willing to organize into meaningful economic relations, and their faith in the future seems much more pronounced to the outsider. Ideological arguments are said to be less pressing. Under de Gaulle France seems more intent than ever in asserting her independence, particularly her independence of the United States. In this endeavor, de Gaulle apparently retains a marked popularity with the electorate. In par­ ticular, he appears to echo the opinion not so much of the traditional Right -- although his support, as we have seen, is substantial in these circles — as of the French bour­ geoisie: the industrialists, managers, merchants, and the liberal professions. As Jacques Ellul has pointed out, the bourgeoisie is much more anti-American and more inclined toward neutralism in foreign affairs. De Gaulle seems to speak the language of these groups, who favor him not for economic reasons so much as for political ones. 12 In a

^E.g., see the articles by Wylie and Kindleberger in In Search of France; and Edvard Tannenbaum, The New France, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. ^Jacques Ellul, "Structures et Positions de la Droite," Evidences. March 1959, pp.5-13. Ellul says the Right should be distinguished not so much by interests as by ideology. Among other things, it is distinguished by its hostility to alien forces of any kind, its relatively small concern for the poor and its pessimism. 268. word, they do not rally to Gaullism because of economic resentments. Moreover, It Is these social groups which tend to represent "dynamic" as opposed to "static" France, and they are more likely to speak as opinion leaders in the France of today. It may be significant that in our own study we found that these elements contributed rather more strongly to the UNR than to other parties. In conclusion, a UNR parliamentary majority has insured the necessary political stability for France so that she might digest some of the great economic changes of recent years. After so many years of social and economic stagnation, many social groups were quite unprepared for the economic rebirth when it did take place. The growth of large mass-oriented firms and the elimination of many traditional family and farm enterprises upset existing patterns and made adjustment difficult for many small businessmen and farmers. And inflationary pressures struck particularly hard those groups whose incomes could not keep pace with rising prices. Foujadism was a national reaction of those who felt life was bypassing them. De Gaulle and his supporters provided that indispens­ able breathing space so that the nation might adjust to these momentous changes. The Rueff Plan reflected this attitude. Encouraging the continual growth of large-scale businesses through tax incentives, reducing or eliminating governmental 269. support for groups long accustomed to It, devaluing the franc, and balancing the budget all were designed to straight­ en out many of the Imbalances which had arisen In recent years. While It might be going too far, as some of the more optimistic commentators do, to say that France's social and political structures are rapidly in the process of being reconciled, it nevertheless could be argued that Gaullism has provided that domestic tranquility necessary for healing the old wounds. It is highly unlikely that the Fifth Republic can sur­ vive de Gaulle in its present form. The dual executive and the balance of political forces would seem to make it impos­ sible. President, government, and the majority compose similar interests at this juncture. In the future this may not be the case. However, if there are no major problems, France in all likelihood can stand the luxury of a return to the multi-party system. That luxury may have been brought about in no small way by the UNR in presiding over the consolidation of the social and economic gains as well as by the resolution of the Algerian war. True, in the formula­ tion of major policies, the UNR has played little if any part. 13 De Gaulle received the credit, but his supporters gave him the wherewithal to accomplish his purposes.

13 See Bernard E. Brown in James B. Christoph (Ed.), Cases In Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965, pp.129-205. APPENDIX

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D ia c r a m m e V. Eiectorct independent SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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-272- 273. Charnay, Jean-Paul. les Scrutins Politiques en France de 1815 1 1962. Paris: A. Colin, 1964. ______. Soclete Militaire et Suf£ rage Politique en France depuis 17 89. Paris: S .E.V .P.E.N., 1964. Christoph, James B., et al. Cases in Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. Claude, Henri. Gaullisme et Grand Capital. Paris; Editions Sociales, 1961. Coston, Henry. Les Re tour des 112 00 Families.11 Paris: La Librairie Franqaise, 1960. Cotteret, Jean-Marie, Emeri, Claude, and Lalunilre, Pierre. Lois Electorales et Inegalites de Representation en France 1936-19 60. Paris. Crozier, Michel. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. Dauer, Jacques and Rodet, Michel. Le 13 Mai Sans Complots . Paris: Le Pensee Moderne, 1959. . Les Orphelins du Gaullisme. Paris: Rene Julliard, 1962. Debre, Michel. Ces Princes Qui Nous Gouvernement. Paris: Plon, 1957. . Servir La Nation. Asnieres: Secretariat General du Conseil National de 1 *U.N.R.-U.D.T., 1963. DeTarr, Francis. The French Radical Party: From Heriot to MandSs-France. Oxford: University Press, 1961. Duverger, M. £a .Vf. Republique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris, 1963. Ehrmann, Henry W. Organized Business in France. Princeton: University Press, 1957. Fabre-Luce, Alfred. The Trial of Charles de Gaulle. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1962. Faucher, Jean-Andre. Le Cinqui^me Republique. Paris: Editions Galic, 1962. Fauvet, Jacques and Planchais, Jean. La Fronde des ggneraux. Paris: B. Arthaud, 1961. 274. Furniss, Edgar S.f Jr. De Gaulle and the French Army: A Crisis In Clvil-Mllltary Relations. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1964. . France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle * s Heritage and Prospects. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Goguel, Frangois (ed.). Le Referendum d 'Octobre et Les Elections de Novembre 19 62. Paris: A. Colin, 1965. ______and Grosser, Alfred. La Po 1 itique en France. Paris: A. Colin, 1964. Heriens, Ferdinand A. The Fifth Republic. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960. Hoffmann, Stanley, e£ _al. In Search of France. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963. Jennings, M. Kent and Zeigler, L. Harmon. The Electoral Process. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1966. Laponce, J.A. The Government of the Fifth Republic: French Political Parties and the Courts. Unlversityof California Press, 1961. Leites, Nathan. On the Game of Politics in France. Stanford: Stanford University Press* 1959. Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960. Macridis, Roy C. (ed.) De Gaulle: Implacable Ally. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. ____ and Brown, Bernard E. The de Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc . , 19 60. Marcus, John T. Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Meisel, James H. The Fall o f the Repub lie; Military Revolt in France. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962 . Meynaud, Jean. Nouvelles Etudes sur des Groupes des Pression en France. Paris: A. Colin, 1962. 275. ______and Lancelot, Alain. La Participation des Francais % la Politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. Michelet, Edmond. Le Gaullisme. Passionnante Aventure. Paris: A. Fayard, 1962. Passeron, Andre. D_e Gaulle Parle. Paris: Plon, 1962. Pickles, Dorothy. The Fifth Republic. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Remond, Rene. La Droite en France: De la Premiere Restauration la Ve Republique. Paris: Aubier, New Edition, 1963. Siegfried, Andre. Dje la lVe 5. la. Ve Republique. Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1958. Soustelle, Jacques. L * Esperance Trah ie (1958-61). Paris: Editions de l'Alma, 1962. ______. A New Road for France. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965* Sulzberger, C. L. The Test: De Gaulle and Algeria. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962. Tannenbaum, Edward R. The New France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Thomson, David. Democracy in France Since 187 0. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. Touchard, Jean (ed.). Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958. Paris: A. Colin, 1960. Vedel, Georges (ed.). .La Depolitisation; Mythe ou Realite? Paris: A. Colin, 1962. Viansson-Ponte, Pierre. The King and His Court. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965. . Risoues et Chances de la Veme Republique. Paris: Plon, 1959. Wahl, Nicholas. The Fifth Republic: France1s New Political System. New York: Random House, 1959. Werth, Alexander. De Gaulle. England: Penguin Books, 1965. 276 . Williams, Philip M. Crisis and Compromise. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966. ______and Harrison, Martin. De Gaulle's Republic. London: Longmans, 1961. Wylie, Laurence. Village in the Vaucluse. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1964.

Periodicals

Alan, Ray. "Can de Gaulle Check the Gaullists," Commentary. January 1959, pp. 9-16. Anderson, Malcolm. "The Myth of the 'Two Hundred Families'," Political Studies. June 1965, pp.163-78. Andrews, William G. "Evreux 1962: The Referendum and Election in a Norman Constituency," Political Studies. October 1963, pp. 308-26. Aron, Raymond. "La Republique Gaulliste Continue," Preuves. No.143, January 1963, pp.3-11. Baumel, Jacques. "Le Gaullisme et son Avenir," Nouvelle Frontifere. January 1964, pp. 36-38. Belloin, Gerard. "L'U.N.R., Parti du Grand Capital et du Pouvoir Personnel," Cahiers du Communism. V.38, 1962, pp. 16-42. Bloch-Michel, Jean. "Gaullism and the 'Machiavellian Left'," Dissent, Spring 1963, pp. 133-137. Blondel, Jean. "The French General Election of November 1958," Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 12, 1958-59, pp. 4 7-59. Burdeau, Georges. "La Crise de la Conscience Politique Franqaise," Critique. July 1965, pp. 658-73. 'Les Moyens et les Fins de la Politique en France," Critique. Vol. 20, 1964, pp. 786-803. Chariot, Jean. "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, February 1964, pp. 86-94. 277. ______. "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. Vol. XVII, February 1967, pp. 70-77. Converse, Philip E. and Dupeux, Georges. "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," The Pub lie Opinion Quarterly. Vol. XXVI, Spring 1962, pp. 1-24. D. M. P. "France After the General Election," The World Today. January 1959, pp. 8-16. Dogan, Mattel, "Le Personnel Politique et la Personnalite Charismatique," Revue Francaise de Sociologie. July-September 1965, pp. 305-24. ______. "Le Vote Ouvrier en France: Analyse Ecologique des Elections de 1962," Revue Francaise de Sociologie. October-December 1965, pp. 435-71. Domenach, Jean-Marie. "De Gaulle Contre Lui-mSme," Nouvelle Frontiere. January 1964, pp. 22-24. Dupeux, Georges. "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France," International Social Science Journal. No.3, 1960, pp. 40-52. ______, "Le Comportement des Electeurs Franqais de 1958 Si 1962, d'aprSs une Enquete par Sondage," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. Vol. XIV, February 1964, pp. 52-72. Duverger, Maurice. "M. Debre Existe-t-il?" La Nef, July 1959, pp. 3-8. ______. "L'Eternal Marais: Essai sur le Contrisme Franqais," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. February 1964, pp. 33-51. Ehrmann, Henry W. "Direct Democracy in France," American Political Science Review. December 1963, pp. 883-901. "French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests," Administrative Science Quarterly. March 1961, pp. 534-55. Ellul, Jacques. "Structures et Positions de la Droite," Evidences. March 1959, pp. 5-13. Emeri, Claude. "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. September 1963, pp. 728-39. 278. Fox, Edward Whitney. "Appearance and Reality in French Elections," Virginia Quarterlv Review, Spring 1963, pp. 172-86. Furet, Francois and Ozouf, Jacques. "La France A-t-elle Changee?" Preuves. February 1966, pp. 47-55. Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. "The Grand Design of Charles de Gaulle," Virginia Quart erly Review. No. 2, Spring 1964, pp. 161-181. Gabilly, Marcel. "L’U.N.R.s Un Parti Qui Reste & Faire," Revue de Paris. May 1959, pp. 127-36 . Goguel, Francois. "L'Electorat Gaulliste," Nouvelle Frontiere. January 1964, pp.25-31. . "Le Referendum du 28 Octobre et les Elections des 18-25 Novembre 1962," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, June 1963, pp. 289-314. Godley, David B. "The French Referendum and Election of 1962," Political Studies. October 1963, pp. 287-307. Gordey, Michel. "Changeless de Gaulle," The New Republic. December 18, 1965, pp - 16 — 19. Hamon, Leo. "Members of the French Parliament," Inter- national Social Scienc e Journal, No.4, 1961, pp.545-66. . "Voting Patterns in Gaullist France," The World Today, April 1963, pp - 146-55. Kitzinger, U. W. "The French General Election of 1958: 2 Constituencies," Politic al Studies . June 1959, pp. 147-73. Hayward, J. E. S. "Presidentialism and French Politics," Parliamentary Affairs , Winter 1964-65, pp. 23-39. Hoffmann, Stanley H. "The French Constitution of 1958: The Final Text and Its Prospects," American Political Science Review, June 1959, pp. 332-57. ______. "De Gaulle’s Memoirs: The Hero as History," World Politics. 1960— 61, pp. 140-55. Hughes, John Emmett. "Gaullism," Newsweek, November 30, 19 64. 279. Hurtig, Serge. "French Politics Before the Presidential Battle," The Wo rid Today. September 1965, pp. 368-74. Jabin, Andre. "L'U.N.R. A-t-elle Une Doctrine," La Revue So cialiste. July 1962, pp. 173-93. Lancelot, Alain. "Note sur le Second Tour des Elections de Novembre 1962," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. June 1963, pp. 315-24. Lavau, Georges. "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. June 1963, pp. 433- 43. . "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francais e de Science Politique. September 1963, pp . 689-905.

Lipset, Seymour M. "The Changing Class Structures and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus. Winter 1964, pp. 271-303. Marchand, Jean-Jose. "Structures et Positions de la Droite," Evidences. June-July 1959, pp. 11-15. Marette, Jacques, "L'U.N.R. et l'Electlon Legislatif Partielle du 9e Arrondissement," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. September 1961, pp. 819-40. Michelat, Guy. "Les Forces Politiques en France," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. June 1963, pp. 428- 32. Michelet, Edmond. "Telle qu'en elle-meme," Nouvelle Fronti^re, January 1964, pp. 32-35. Middleton, W. L. "Enter Pompidou." Contemporary Review. J une 1962, pp. 318-27. Middleton, W. L . "The French Elections," Contemporary Review, January 1959, pp. 4-7. Pflimlin, Pierre, et al. "Democratic et Technocratic," France-Forum. January 1961, pp. 4-13. Philip, Andre. "The Crisis of Democracy in France," Social Research. Spring 1963, pp. 23-37. Pinner, Frank A. "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1955, pp. 58-70. 280 . Piret, Jeanne. "L'Opinion Publlque au Debut de l'Annee 1965," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. June 1965, pp. 529-37. "Ou en est la Popularity du General de Gaulle," Reallte. January 1965, pp. 35-37.

Remond, Rene. "L'Enigme de l'U.N.R.," Esprit. February 1963, pp. 307-19. . "La Jeunesse et la Vie Politique en France," (Paper presented to the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Sept­ ember 1964, p. 25.) . "Le Nouveau Regime et les Forces Politiques," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. March 1959, pp. 167-87. Stibio, Andre. "Structure et Positions de la Droite," Evidences, March 1959, p. 14.

Stoetzel, Jean. "Conference of the British Sociological Association, 1955, II," British Journal of Sociology. June 1955, pp. 104-22. ______. "Les Sondages et l'Election Presidentielle de 1965," Revue Francaise de Sociologie. April-June 1966, pp. 147-57.

Taylor, Edmond. "De Gaulle Looks Left," The Reporter. June 3, 1965, pp. 13-14. ______. "The New Communist Propaganda Strategy," The Reporter, July, 1965, pp. 27-29. Thorburn, Hugh G. "The Realignment of Political Forces in France," International Affairs, Autumn 1964, pp. 486-95. Todd, Olivier. "De Gaulle's Gambit," New Statesman. October 22, 1965, p. 588. ______. "Heir to de Gaulle?" New Statesman. August 6 , 1965, p. 181. Tournoux, J. R. "Structures et Positions de la Droite," Evidences, April-May 1959, pp. 5-6. Viannson-Ponte, Pierre. "Aux Qui Ont I'Oreille du General," Realites, No. 232, May 1965, pp. 64-67. 281. Wahl, Nicholas. "The Fifth Republic: 1965," (Paper pre­ sented at the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-11, 1965.) Waline, Jean. "Les Groupes Parlementaires en France," Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique« 1961, pp. 1170-1237. Weber, Eugen. "The Right in France: A Working Hypothesis," American Historical Review. April 1960, pp. 554-68. ■ "New Wine in Old Bottles: Les Families Spirituelles en France.11 French Historical Studies. 1959, pp. 200-24. "Un Demi-Silcle de Glissement 3. Droite," Internat ional Review o f Social History, Vol. V, 1910, pp. 165-201. "La Fievre de la Raison: Nationalism and the French Right," Wo rid Politics. July 1958, pp. 560-78. Williams, Philip M. "Party, Presidency, and Parish Pump in France," Parliamentary Affairs. Summer 1965, pp. 257-65. ______and Harrison, Martin. "The French Referendum of April 1962," Parliamentary Affairs. Summer 1962, pp. 294-306.

Miscellaneous

L * Annee Politique (Paris), 1958-66. L 1 Express (Paris), 1962, 1964-67 . The Globe &. Mail (Toronto), 1965-67 Le Monde (Paris), 1958-67. La Nation (Paris), 1962-65. New York Times. 1958-66. Nouvelle FrontiSre (Paris), 1964-65 Paris-Match, 1958-67. 282. Realites (Paris), 1958-66. Bondages (Paris), 1958-66.