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The French Left Long-Run Trends CLAUDE BOURDET

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The French Left Long-Run Trends CLAUDE BOURDET Universities & Left Review Spring 1957 Vol.1 No 1 The French Left Long-run trends CLAUDE BOURDET From the social, internationalist period following the Liberation. 1947 following its opposition to the and anti-colonial ideals of the Re- Moreover, frightened as always by war in Indo China. Its disbandment sistance, seemingly all-powerful in the greater militancy and vigour increased the Party's tendency to August, 1944, to the repeated post- of the French Communists, the have an ageing membership. war relapses into right-wing reaction S.F.I.O. leaders moved ever closer Further, with many disillusioned or immobilisme—such has been the to the third party of the post-war radicals leaving the Party, the lead- dismal course of French politics. administrations, the M.R.P. This ership relied increasingly on people This has not been due to the polit- led to increasing involvement with who joined the Party for reasons of ical capacity of the French ruling the M.R.P.'s colonial interests and, personal ambition and status con- class—for seldom has a ruling class ultimately, to socialist support for siderations—for example the higher been so blind not only to the the Indo-Chinese War and refusal ranges of municipal employees, national interests but even to its of the repeated Viet Minh offers of teachers, civil servants. It was upon own, as that which squandered peace negotiation. Afraid of "going these people—to whom socialism French men and resources in Viet it alone" with the Communists, they meant little more than political sup- Nam. No, the dismal condition of rejoiced when, in May 1947, the port or safeguard for their careers current French political life is due Communists (unable to continue —that the Party leaders leaned in above all to the wrong orientation support for the government's policy crushing the genuinely socialist and stupendous errors of the two in Indo-China, and moving to the opposition within the Party. major left-wing parties—the Social- rhythm of the tougher line now set ists and the Communists. Explana- by the Kremlin) left the government. tion is therefore in large measure a With the creation of the Marshall The Socialist sell-out critical examination of their records Plan, and later the building of the In opposition between 1951 and since 1944. Atlantic Alliance, this hostility to 1952—except for the Mendes- Despite its tremendous character, the) Communists became, as it were, France period—the Socialists gained the Resistance movement was un- a permanent system. American aid a certain amount of prestige through able to crystallise a new left-wing was conditional upon the permanent the failure of successive Right Wing Party. The Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.) exclusion of the Communists from governments. But the Party leader- was the only alternative open to Western governments. The Socialists ship, dominated by the fear of those politically active Resistance knew that to use even the threat of moving nearer to the Communists, fighters who would join neither the the Communist alliance against the failed to offer an alternative policy Communists nor the Christian French Right would mean to re- for France. Instead, Guy Mollet Democrats (M.R.P.). Consequently, nounce that American aid which tried to make positive internal although the S.F.I.O. leadership had they believed was indispensable. The French reform attendant upon not been very active in the Resist- French Right—which had not re- "European Unity"—that is the con- ance, the Party was nevertheless placed the C.P. in all government struction of a "little Europe", con- able to emerge as one of the three coalitions—was thus armed with a sisting of France, West Germany, major parties in post-Liberation permanent instrument of blackmail Italy and the Benelux countries—a France. The leadership, however, against the Socialist Party. The policy which, by binding them still did not renew itself from the ranks policies of the S.F.I.O. between closer to the M.R.P. and by its of those members who had been 1947 and 1951—their support for implicit and inherent support for active in the Resistance—with only the Indo Chinese war, for reaction- German rearmament, still further a few exceptions the pre-war leaders ary policies in France and in North alienated the Party's supporters. remained in charge between 1944 Africa, their continual submission Significantly it was Mendes-France, and 1947. As his successor as Party to American pressure, finally the a Radical, and not a Socialist who leader and as the first Socialist support for German rearmament— carried through the necessary re- Prime Minister, Leon Blum sup- were the inevitable outcome of this versal of French South East Asian ported Felix Gouin, a Marseillais, weak and exposed position. policy when it had produced its deeply implicated in the corrupt greatest catastrophe, Dien Bien Phu. management of the city, whose only Since the 1956 elections the So- "act" in the Resistance . had been Defeat of the left cialist-led government has betrayed to board the plane which carried Of the many painful effects this the hopes which inspired the left him away from France to Algeria. had upon the Party, perhaps the swing in the electorate and has It was for reasons such as these most permanent was the change in pursued policies which show that that the Socialists failed to gain the nature of the Party itself. The the leadership, at least, has learnt support of the great majority of Socialist Youth movement, a power- nothing from the sad record but- democratic-minded people which ful and radical sub-organisation lined above. Mollet's government might well have been theirs in the within the Party, was crushed in has submitted to Right Wing pres- 13 Claude Bourdet sures in precisely the manner of in every case. Many Socialists have As in all Communist Parties the its predecessors in 1947. The in consequence left the Party, the balance of power between the diff- motives, too, have been similar. In latest being Andre Vienot with the erent groups teetered to the see- fact to secure "Peace in Algeria"— entire Party Federation in the Ar- sawing of Kremlin policies. For one of the slogans which helped to dennes Department. The opposition example, with Zhdanovism triumph- pull French voters to the Left— within the Party still fights bravely, ing in Moscow, Andre Marty, al- meant accepting a coalition with the with people like Marceau Pivert, though disliked by many Party lead- Mendesistes, the Communists and Andre Philipp, Oreste Rosenfeld and ers for the independent quality of a few splinter groups of the centre others. But Mollet refuses them his extremism, was put in charge of political groupings. It meant a de- space in the Party press, forbids the wave of violent strikes which cisive break with the other political them to publish in the non-Party swept France: Benoit Frachon, the groups in the Assembly. Many press. One of the Left Socialist regular leader of the C.G.T. and a people—I was among them—urged leaders, Lucien Weitz, was expelled moderate, was dropped. An inde- the Socialists to act with the utmost from the Party because of his criti- pendent Coxnmunist Party would vigour in this direction. We believed cisms of Mollet's policy published have held a wide discussion of these that this policy was not only essen- in the Bevanite Tribune. The pros- differing political estimations and tial to French national interests, pects for the internal opposition to would have adopted one or other it was also the best one upon which Mollet do not, at present, look of the political "lines" put forward the S.F.I.O. could recapture its lost bright. for discussion,. But independent mass support. The Communists, so thinking had ceased in the leader- we argued, isolated as they were, ship, and since the Kremlin could would have to follow this policy The Communist dilemma not make up its mind about which without making any demands for After the Liberation the French line should be adopted, the French themselves (as a matter of fact the Communist Party hesitated between C.P. had no definite policy: trying Communists, in supporting the pro- three different policies. A small left to keep all avenues open, it suc- posal for this coalition, did not ask wing group, of which Marty and, to ceeded in closing them all. Already for participation in the government). a certain extent Tillon, were the immediately following the Libera- But Mollet and his affinity could most prominent figures, believed, tion distrust of the C.P. had spread not endure the idea of being sup- that regardless of the possible inter- through the French Left with ru- ported, even though indirectly, by national consequences a revolution mours that a Communist "coup" the C.P., of being called in conse- was possible in France. Although was being prepared. Although not quence, a "traitor" by ruling class the majority of the Party, or at least in fact making such preparations politicians and organs of opinion. of the leadership, believed this the leaders were unwilling to ack- The attitude of the Mollet group policy to be madness, the majority nowledge to its own membership the was summed up by Max Lejeune, group was itself divided into two impossibility of making a Revolu- Defence Secretary in the Mollet groups. One believed that war be- tion, and so when Maurice Thorez government, at last year's S.F.I.O. tween Russia and the West was ordered the Communist militia to Congress where he said: "If my more or less imminent, and that hand over the arms accumulated in socialist and my patriotic principles therefore the Party should be kept the Resistance other left wingers come into conflict with each other, under quasi-military control: no were not reassured.
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