4Th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 1

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4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 1

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Alfred Wünnenberg Dates: * 20. July 1891, Saarburg ( Lothringen) - † 30. Decem- ber 1967, Krefeld / NRW An SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS und Polizei and the commander of the 4th SS Polizei Panzer Gre- nadier Division during World War II who was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oakleaves.

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The origins of the SS lie right back at the genesis of the Nazi movement in Germany in 1923. These were turbulent times, and few then would have been willing to bet on the outcome of the struggle for domination of Germany between the Nazis and the Communists. The two sides often battled violently in the streets, and injuries and deaths were far from uncom- mon. It was clear that some form of bodyguard element was required to protect those who spoke at Nazi outdoor meet- ings. The SA Stormtroopers, the Sturmabteilung, or "Brown- shirts', were little more than an unruly rabble, most of them unemployed :hugs with no real loyalty to Hitler, but useful for meeting the opposing Communists head on in countless violent street fights while, in the main, being by no means trustworthy or disciplined enough to :: rovide reliable bodyguards for the Party leadership.

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The Waffen-SS, as with the Heer, possessed a great variety of divisional structures. The complexities of this variety were further complicated by a more or less continuous evolution of authorized division structures throughout the war. For example, the first Waffen-SS divisions were organized as motorized infantry ones, with little armor. Four of the earliest divisions (SS-LAH, SS-Das Reich, SS-Totenkopf, and SS-Wik- ing'] were then reformed as Panzer (armored)- divisions, and three new-armored divisions joined them (SS-Hohenstaufen, &S-Frundsberg, and SS-Hitlerjugend). Four additional divisions were raised as Panzer-Grenadier (armored infantry) (SS-Nordland, SS-Reichsführer-SS, SS-Gotz von Berlichin- gen, and SS-Horst Wessel). The motorized SS-Combat Group Nord evolved into SS- Nord, which set the standard for the establishment of an SS mountain division. This was used as the intended structure for SS-Prinz Eugen, SS-Handschar, SS-Skanderbeg, and SS- Kama, though the last two didn't complete formation. Simi- larly, the SS-Cavalry Brigade developed into SS-Florian Geyer, which had a structure copied for SS-Maria Theresia (though not for SS-Liitzow, which had a structure similar to an infantry division).

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Alfred Wünnenberg ...... 13 Preface...... 15 4th Panzergrenadier Division Polizei ...... 32 SS Polizei Division ...... 34 SS Polizei Infantry Division...... 36 4th SS Polizei-Panzergrenadier Division...... 45 Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch ...... 53 Arthur Mülverstadt...... 56 Walter Krüger ...... 58 Fritz Freitag ...... 61 Friedrich-Wilhelm Bock ...... 64 Brigadeführer Jürgen Wagner...... 66 Herbert-Ernst Vahl...... 69 Helmut Dörner...... 71 Walter Harzer ...... 75 4th SS Polizei Army Group North in Russia...... 79 Demyansk Pocket...... 111 Battle of Krasny Bor...... 116 Annexes...... 128 Annexe 5 Ranks in German Army ...... 128 Ranks in Waffen S.S...... 136 Allgemeine S.S ...... 139 SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz ...... 147 S.S Verfugungstruppe ...... 151 SS-Totenkopfverbände ...... 154 The Art of Blitzkrieg...... 166 Panzer Tactics ...... 202 Campaing in France...... 241 Operation Barbarossa ...... 244 Last cauldron: Army and SS in Hungary, 1945 ...... 246 Germany in Defeat...... 250 Germany in Defeat 1945 ...... 251 Bibliography...... 252 Index ...... 259

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World War I Alfred Wünnenberg was born on 20 July 1891 at Saarburg/ Sarrebourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Germany. In February 1913 he joined the army and served in the 56th Infantry Regiment and was soon promoted to Unteroffizier. Alfred Wünnenberg was a company commander in Infantry Regiment 255 and later flyer observers during the First World War. After the war he fought for border protection "East" in Upper Silesia before he went to the police. In Ja- nuary 1940 he was appointed lieutenant colonel commander of the Police Rifle Regiment 3. On 1 February 1940, he was promoted to colonel and took part in the western campaign. As of June 1941, he took part in the Russian campaign. For breaking through the Luga position, the storming of Luga and Krasnovardeisk he received on 15 November 1941 as Standartenführer and Colonel Bobby awarded the Knight's Cross. He was then promoted to SS Brigade Commander on 15 December 1941 and commander of the SS Police Division. For the success of the Division in the fighting on the Volkhov him the Oak Leaves was awarded on July 1, 1942. As of June 11, 1943, he was responsible for the preparation of IV. SS Pan- zer Corps and promoted on July 1, 1943, SS-Obergruppenfüh- rer and General of Police. In August 1943, he took over the business of the Chief of the Order Police.

World War II On 2 October 1939 he became the commander of the 3rd Poli- zei Schützen Regiment with the rank of Standartenführer and given the SS service number 405 898. With this regiment, he

13/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 14 took on the Battle of France and the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Operation Barbarossa when on 15 November 1941 he was awarded the Knight's Cross. In December 1941 he took over the command of the 4th SS Polizei Division from Walter Krüger. In recognition of the heavy fighting the unit was involved in on 23 April 1942 he was promoted to SS-Bri- gadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei and awarded the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross. On 10 June 1943, he was moved to command the IV SS Pan- zer Corps, where he remained until 31 August. Afterwards he became chief of the Ordnungspolizei. This post he held up to the end of the war. Alfred Wünnenberg died on 30 December 1963 in Krefeld.

Awards and decorations Iron Cross (1914) 2nd Class (10 February 1915) 1st Class (9 September 1915) Wound Badge (1918) in Gold Clasp to the Iron Cross (1939) 2nd Class (18 June 1940) 1st Class (21 August 1941) Eastern Front Medal Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves Knight's Cross on 15 November 1941 as SS-Standartenführer and Oberst of the Schupo, and commander of SS-Polizei- Schützen-Regiment 3 91st Oak Leaves on 23 April 1942 as SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of the Police, and commander of SS-Polizei-Di- vision Sword of honour of the Reichsführer-SS SS Honour Ring ("Totenkopfring")

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Preface The German army had a number of special forces, most of which are best described by the French term hors de ligne, that is "outside of the regular army." Foreign troops have always fallen into this category in every army and the Germans certainly ended up with a tremendous force of foreign soldiers fighting in their uniforms. However, the Germans had three other non-traditional forces in their army. The first, the Waffen SS, sprang from Hitler's personal bodyguard and much like many other Guard forces in the world's long military history, developed into a completely independent army all unto itself. Though not intentionally, it most as- suredly falls into a category quite similar to that held by Na- poleon's Imperial Guard, whose roots also are found in a dic- tator's personal bodyguard. Unlike the Imperial Guard, which was Napoleon's favored children, the SS belonged not to Adolf Hitler, but to Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfuhrer der SS. It was not only a field force, but a tool in the internal political struggle between Hitler's cronies. The SS also, like Napoleon's Imperial Guard, contained large numbers of foreign troops. In contrast to Napoleon's Imperi- al Guard, however, the SS went on a massive recruiting effort among foreign nationals in an effort to make it as large as possible. And, also unlike Napoleon's Imperial Guard, the German portions of the SS were subjected to an ideological mania for racial purity that was frequently swept aside when it was convenient. Large portions of the SS contained non- Germanic troops. Much of the SS fought with a steadfastness that was found in Napoleon's Old Guard, while some parts formed with foreign nationals had very poor reputations that included mass desertions, mutiny, and atrocity. The second portion of forces hors de ligne in the German army was the Luftwaffe ground troops. The German division of operations between the army, navy, and air force was con- torted by personalities and the political power base on which the Reich was formed. Hermann Goring claimed and was given anything that had any involvement with flying. As a result,

15/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 16 the German paratroopers or fallschirmjagers, were part of the Luftwaffe. Operationally they were handled by the Army, but they were Goring's toys to play with as he wished. Like the SS, however, they also developed a ferocious reputation as fanatical fighters and were greatly feared and respected by their enemies. Unlike the fallschirmjägers, the Luftwaffe also produced a number of Luftwaffe Field Divisions. These units were a second line formation at best, though they frequently ended up in the front lines and invariably took a terrible pounding for their troubles. They were underequipped and undertrained for frontline duties, though eventually they developed reason- able combat skills. They were produced as Hermann Goring attempted to garner favor from Hitler by producing a series of divisions to block the advance of the Russian armies in the winter of 1941/2. The third force hors de ligne was a small number of naval divisions that were raised very late in the war. The surface navy had been so torn up by the Allies that it had very little use. Those ships that were operational continued to retain full use of their crews, but those crews whose ships were gone, those support people who were suddenly without function, found themselves swept up and rifles shoved in their hands in an effort to stem the flow of the Russian hordes westward into the Fatherland. The last force is the traditional forces hors de ligne and those are the multitude of completely foreign 'forces that fought alongside the Germans. The largest single group of foreigners in the German army were former citizens of the Soviet Union. They started out as small numbers of volunteers that simply joined up with the Wehrmacht as it pushed through Russia. They were deserters from the Soviet army and they were enthusiastic citizens who came forward and wanted to fight against their communist oppressors. It is believed that fully 25 percent of the German army at the end of the war were former citizens of the Soviet Union. Germany also obtained a large number of foreign troops from the various puppet states that it established. The largest force

16/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 17 was probably the Italians. After the Allies invaded, Italian so- ciety tore itself in half. The diehard fascists remained true to Mussolini and the Germans, forming a number of divisions and a large number of support units that fought until the end of the war. Germany also established a puppet state in Slovakia, which provided three infantry divisions, a mechanized division, and a security division, all of which fought on the Russian front. Then there is the puppet state of Croatia, which was as much an endlessly bleeding ulcer to the Nazis as was Spain to Na- poleon. In order to deal with this, and perhaps following Frederick the Great's opinion that the entire Balkans was "not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier," Hitler encouraged Croatia to form an army that would be entirely committed to fighting the Serbian and communist partisans in Yugoslavia. There is an amazing spectrum of performance and quality to be seen as one examines the combat record of these forces. Most of the SS and Fallschirmjâgers were surely the most ag- gressive and hardest fighting units in the German army. The SS was frequently used as the fire brigade rushing from one emergency to another, plugging the line and beating back Russian, American or British breakthroughs. The Fallschirm- jâgers more often found themselves put into the critical positions in the line and simply refused to be pushed out of them. The Luftwaffe Field and Naval Divisions were stopgap measures of varying military prowess that were never used to lead any assault. The foreign troops, like the SS, ran the spectrum of quality from extremely good to most often of modest value. They are also one of the most interesting and saddest portions of the history of World War II. They were frequently motivated by nationalism and the desire to liberate themselves from one oppressor, only to find themselves oppressed by yet another.

Origins The origins of the SS lie right back at the genesis of the Nazi movement in Germany in 1923. These were turbulent times,

17/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 18 and few then would have been willing to bet on the outcome of the struggle for domination of Germany between the Nazis and the Communists. The two sides often battled violently in the streets, and injuries and deaths were far from uncom- mon. It was clear that some form of bodyguard element was required to protect those who spoke at Nazi outdoor meet- ings. The SA Stormtroopers, the Sturmabteilung, or "Brown- shirts', were little more than an unruly rabble, most of them unemployed hugs with no real loyalty to Hitler, but useful for meeting the opposing Communists head on in countless violent street fights while, in the main, being by no means trustworthy or disciplined enough to provide reliable bodyguards for the Party leadership. Hitler, however, had been impressed by the performance of at least some of his Fallschirmjâgers', and in March 1923 he decided to form an elite, dedicated bodyguard unit from a number of such dependable comrades. The task of forming this trusted band was delegated to his faithful chauffeur, Ju- lius Schreck, and another trusted follower, Josef Berchtold. To begin with, this group was simply a small detachment within the SA, and was known as the Stabswache, or Head- quarter Guard. Within a few weeks it had been expanded and took on the name Stosstrupp Adolf Hitler. This so-called 'Shock Troop' took part in the abortive Munich Putsch of 9 November 1923, providing personal protection for Hitler. On Hitler's release from Landsberg Prison following the abortive Putsch, he decided to reform his bodyguard, and once again turned to Julius Schreck to create this new unit. Initially, it consisted of just eight chosen men, and thanks to Hermann Goring was given the title of Schutz Staffel, or 'Protection Squad'. This was a reference to Goring's highly successful career as a fighter pilot during the First World War, when this title was used for aircraft allocated to flying escort duties. It was intended that the Schutz Staffel, which rapidly became known by its abbreviated form 'SS', would not exceed ten men plus one officer in each district, the exception to this being the Reich's capital city, Berlin, where the SS detachment was to be double the normal size.

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The elite status of the SS was enhanced by the extremely high standards of physical fitness and general appearance of those recruited to its ranks, but most importantly, by the fact that its owed its allegiance, not to the Party, but to the person of Adolf Hitler himself. 1

1 An SS of the S.S Totenkopf Standarte Oberbayern

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In April 1926, Schreck relinquished command of the SS to another of Hitler's most loyal followers, Josef Berchtold, who had by this time recovered from wounds he had received marching by Hitler's side during the Munich Putsch. The general ranks of the brownshirt army, the SA, were highly suspi- cious and resentful of this new elite unit which appeared in their midst, the SS still at this time being subordinate to the SA. This resentment grew when Hitler entrusted the care of the so-called 'Blutfahne', a Nazi flag splattered with the blood of those marchers killed or wounded during the Putsch, and which had, to the Nazis, acquired the status almost of a holy relic, to the SS. The SA had previously cared for the Blut- fahne. The situation was far from ideal, with the SA's resentment matched by the SS's rancour by reason of its subordination to the SA. SS units in any area were eventually restricted to a maximum of 10 per cent of the size of the SA contingent, and this only when the SA unit to which it was subordinated ac- tually reached its full, allocated strength. The SA therefore found it easy to manipulate the size of SS units over which it had control, many SA units also taking great delight in allo- cating the most menial task to their SS contingents. Resentful of the restrictions placed on the development of the SS, Berchtold resigned, command passing to his deputy, Er- hardt Heiden. Heiden, unfortunately, had no more success than Berchtold in circumventing the spiteful machinations of the SA, and he too lasted for only a short time as commander of the SS before he resigned. The SA no doubt took great pleasure in this, and anticipated just as easily manipulating his successor. In this they were to be greatly mistaken. Hei- den's successor was another veteran of the Munich Putsch, one Heinrich Himmler. Though his appearance was far from impressive, with his pince-nez spectacles and rather weedy turnout, Himmler was a superb organiser and was fired with enthusiasm for, and dedication to, the success of the SS. In 1928 he was appointed Reichsführer-SS. By 1929 Himmler had persuaded Hitler to approve a recruit- ment plan for the SS, and within a year it had grown in

20/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 100 the earliest possible date. Important though the latter task was, these orders must once again have led to the two corps becoming widely dispersed, as a result of which each was liable to be deprived of the necessary striking power. The danger was increased by the fact that much of the country to be crossed this side of Leningrad was marshy or wooded and hardly suitable for large armoured formations. A particularly regrettable step was the removal from 56 Pan- zer Corps of the SS Death's Head Division, which had meanwhile been relieved in the Zebesh-Opochka area by 290 In- fantry Division. The SS Division was now retained south of Ostrov as the Panzer Group reserve. Thus, as had previously happened when we set off from the German frontier, the Pan- zer Group's main effort was again placed on its left wing- 41 Panzer Corps. 56 Panzer Corps was dispatched on its wide sweep round to Chudovo with only one armoured and one infantry division, thereby being denied the essential protection of its open south flank by the SS division following along in echelon on the right. It was a particularly risky move when one considered that even though the enemy forces engaged by the corps to date had been outfought, they were far from annihilated. Be that as it may, we were still convinced that the corps would continue to find its safety in speed of movement. 3rd Motorized Division, which only came back under command at Ostrov, had already taken Porkhov on loth July after a hard struggle and was put on a minor road leading north. 8th Panzer Division was to drive through Zoltsy to seize the vital crossing point where the Mshaga ran into Lake Ilmen. In a series of battles, most of them fierce ones, the advance was kept going for the next few days. Except for one attack on the corps command post on the north bank of the Shelon riv- er in the early hours of 14th July — apparently carried out by enemy reconnaissance forces — the enemy had so far not made his presence felt on our open flank in the south. That same day, at my insistence, 8th Panzer Division, which had taken Zoltsy after a battle against an enemy well equipped

100/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 101 with artillery and armour, pushed on to the Mshaga sector. It found the bridge already blown. Meanwhile Panzer Group H.Q. had transferred the main effort of its advance even further west of the Luga, road. It had moved 41 Panzer Corps' three mechanized formations northwards to bar the way to the enemy forces retiring through Narva, north of Lake Peipus, before Eighteenth Army. Only one infantry division of the corps (the 269th) had been left on the road to Luga. Thus 56 Panzer Corps suddenly found itself even more isolated than before in its wide swing towards Chudovo. Accord- ingly we got on to Panzer Corps H.Q. to point out that if we were to carry out the Chudovo assignment our corps must have the immediate support both of the SS Death's Head Di- vision and also of Sixteenth Army's i Corps, which was relatively close behind. Before this appeal could be answered, however, 56 Panzer Corps was already in trouble. Early on 15th July we received a number of most unpleasant reports at the corps command post on the Shelon, west of Zoltsy. The enemy had launched a powerful attack from the north into the flank of 8 Panzer Di- vision, now strung out to the Mshaga, and simultaneously driven up from the south over the Shelon. This meant that the bulk of 8th Panzer Division's fighting troops, who were located between Zoltsy and the Mshaga, were cut off from the division's rear echelons, in whose area corps H.Q. was located. But that was not all. The enemy had closed the trap behind ourselves, too, by pushing up strong forces from the south to straddle our supply route. At the same time 3rd Mo- torized Division, advancing further northwards, found itself being attacked by superior enemy forces from the north and north-east at Maly Utogorsh. It was obviously the enemy's intention to encircle 56 Panzer Corps while it was isolated. The failure to echelon the SS Death's Head Division along our rear right flank had enabled him to attack across the Shelon with those of his forces which lay south of us. At the same time the removal of 41 Panzer Corps from the Luga road had released the strong enemy

101/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 102 forces there, and these were now attacking our northern flank. Our corps' position at that moment was hardly an enviable one, and we could not help wondering whether we had taken rather too great a risk this time. Had we been carried away by our previous successes to the extent of paying insufficient heed to the enemy on our southern flank? Yet what other chance should we had have of carrying out our mission? As matters stood, the only course open to us was to pull 8th Pan- zer Division back through Zoltsy to escape the encirclement that now threatened. 3rd Motorized Division had to be disen- gaged at the same time to give the corps back its freedom of movement. The next few days proved critical, with the enemy straining every nerve to keep up his encirclement and throw- ing in, besides his rifle divisions, two armoured divisions enjoying strong artillery and air support. 8 Panzer Division nevertheless managed to break through Zoltsy to the west and re-group, despite having to be temporarily supplied from the air. Before completing its own disengagement, 3rd Motor- ized Division had to beat off seventeen successive attacks. In the meantime, after Panzer Group H.Q. had put the SS Death's Head Division under our command, it was possible for us to clear the corps supply route. By 18th July the crisis was as good as over, the corps being by then firmly established around Dno on a front facing roughly east by northeast. The earlier danger on our open flank in the south was removed by the proximity of Sixteenth Army's 1st Corps, which was now drawing near Dno. One consolation was afforded us by the capture from a cou- rier aircraft of a letter bearing the signature of Marshal Vor- oshilov, whom I had met in Moscow in 1931 and who now commanded the 'front' opposite us. This not only confirmed that very substantial elements of the Soviet armies had been wiped out, but in the same connexion referred specifically to the battles around Zoltsy.

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As long as we had been surrounded, our only links with the rear had been at best by wireless or aircraft.6 The very moment our lines of communication were restored, however, the usual plethora of paper descended on us. One item deserving special mention was an ominous inquiry telegraphed through from the Supreme Command. Moscow radio, in somewhat premature celebration of our corps' encirclement, had reported the capture of certain top-secret data on our multiple rocket-launcher. The Soviets had obviously taken an intense dislike to this new weapon, with which we were able to fire missiles of flaming oil. Already the Soviet Army facing us had wirelessed a warning en clair that if we did not stop using it they would retaliate with gas - an empty threat, of course, in

6 Map Encirclement of 56 Panzer Corps at Zoltsy (15th-18th July 1941).

103/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 104 view of the complete inadequacy of their own chemical warfare defences. In these circumstances it was understandable that they should make such a song and dance about the capture of this information. Now we were being called upon to explain how a top-secret document could possibly fall into enemy hands. Obviously it had not been taken from the fighting troops, but from a transport column intercepted by the Soviets when they cut our supply route. This sort of thing was liable to happen to any armoured formation operating far ahead of its own army front. In response to the Supreme Command's inquiry we duly reported the facts of the case, adding that to avoid any further censure we would henceforth refrain from cruising around on our own some 60 miles behind the enemy lines. On 19th July we had been informed by Panzer Group H.Q. that it I now planned to send 56 Panzer Corps through Luga to Leningrad. 269 Infantry Division, which was assembled on the Luga road, had already been placed under our command. We still had no success with our proposal that the forces of the Panzer Group be at long last concentrated for concerted action - preferably up north with 41 Panzer Corps east of Nar- va (where there were four serviceable roads to Leningrad) rather than along the Luga axis, which ran through extensive woodlands. For the rest, we were first to launch an attack eastwards with 1st Corps against the Mshaga sector, which we had already reached once before. Apparently the Supreme Command was still sticking to its plan for a wide outflanking movement and was even prepared to go round to the east of Lake Ilmen. For the time being, therefore, we and i Corps were involved in fresh battles, in the course of which the enemy was thrown back across the Mshaga. On 26th July we had a visit from the Oberquartiermeister I of O.K.H., General Paulus. I put him in the picture about the battles we had fought to date and pointed out how run-down our Panzer Corps had become in country which was most unsuitable for the use of armoured troops. I also drew his attention to the disadvantages of scattering the Panzer Group's re-

104/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 105 sources. The losses of our corps' three mobile divisions already amounted to 6.000 men, and both the troops and equipment were being subjected to excessive strain, even though 8 Panzer Division had been able, during a few days' rest, to bring the number of its serviceable tanks back from eighty up to the 150 mark. I told Paulus that in my opinion the best thing to do would be to withdraw the entire Panzer Group from an area where a rapid advance was almost out of the question and to use it against Moscow. If, on the other hand, the idea of driving on Leningrad and executing a wide encircling movement through Chudovo were to be maintained, it was essential that infantry be made available. Once the wooded zone had been cleared, our own corps must be saved for the final thrust on the city, otherwise the mobile divisions would reach Lenin- grad in no fit state for fighting. In any case, I pointed out, such an operation would take time. If we wanted to gain swift possession of Leningrad and the coastline, the only thing to do was to concentrate the whole Panzer Group up north in the area east of Narva, whence it could drive straight for the city. General Paulus entirely agreed with my views. Initially, however, things turned out quite differently. While Sixteenth Army, consisting of 1st Corps and another corps which had just arrived, took over the Mshaga front west of Lake Ilmen, it was decided, after all, that 56 Panzer Corps should now carry out the thrust on Leningrad up the route through Luga. For this purpose we were allotted 3 Motorized Infantry Divi- sion, 269 Infantry Division and the newly-arrived SS Police Division. This had the effect of dispersing the Panzer Group's mechanized forces further than ever. The SS Death's Head Division remained with Sixteenth Army by Lake Ilmen, and 8th Pan- zer Division was taken into reserve by the Panzer Group to be initially employed on clearing the communications zone of partisans - a role for which it was not only far too valuable but also quite unsuitable. The corps now had only one mobile division (3rd Motorized) in the Luga area, while 41 Panzer

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Corps' own three were in action east of Narva. The maxim established by Colonel-General Guderian on the use of armour was 'klotzen, nicht kleckern — 'Don't spatter: Boot'em!' Incur own case the very opposite course seemed to have been taken. All our efforts to retain the three mobile divisions irre- spective of which way our corps was sent proved unsuccess- ful. Experience has long shown that when forces run short, only very few commanders manage to maintain a tidy order of battle and avoid splitting their formations. It would take up too much space here if I were to describe the battles around Luga. They proved very tough indeed. While the enemy had had only a very modest number of troops available in this area a few weeks previously, he had now brought his strength up to a full corps of three divisions sup- ported by strong artillery and armour. To cap this, the country around Luga was a Russian training area with which, of course, the enemy was intimately acquainted, and in addition, he had had time to dig himself in properly. While these battles were still in progress, our corps was given a new task. At long last it was to join up with 41 Panzer Corps in the north for the assault on Leningrad. Even now, however, only Corps H.Q. and 3 Motorized Division were involved: 8 Panzer and the SS Death's Head Division were to continue in their present role. On 15th August we handed over at Luga to H.Q. 50 Corps under General Lindemann, an old friend of mine from World War I days, and began moving north. The route to our new command post on Lake Samro, 25 miles south-west of Narva, was so bad that we took eight hours to travel a distance of 125 miles. We had hardly reached Lake Samro late that evening when a telephone call was received from Panzer Group H.Q. ordering us to halt 3rd Motorized Division, which was com- ing up behind us, and to drive straight down south again next morning to report to H.Q. Sixteenth Army in Dno. We, together with 3rd Motorized Division and the SS Death's Head Division, which was being pulled over from Lake Ilmen, were now to join that formation. No one will pretend that we were particularly pleased at these peregrinations. The one admir-

106/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 107 able exception was our quartermaster, Major Kleinschmidt, whose cheerful equanimity was quite undaunted by the news that he would have to swing his supply and transport ar- rangements round through an angle of 180 degrees. So, on 16th August, we moved back to Dno along the same dreadful route we had covered the day before. This time the distance was 160 miles, and we took thirteen hours to do it. Luckily, 3 Motorized had not come too far north and could be turned round in good time, but what the troops thought of it all I do not care to imagine. 7

The ultimate reason for the change was probably that our sum total of forces was inadequate and that the whole area between Leningrad, Pskov and Lake Ilmen was thoroughly unsuitable as tank country. The picture we were given on our arrival at H.Q. Sixteenth Army was the following: 10 Corps, fighting on the right wing of the army south of Lake Ilmen,

7 Map 56 Panzer Corps' Drive into Flank of Thirty-Eighth Soviet Army on 19th August 1941-

107/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 108 had been attacked and pushed back by far superior enemy forces (Thirty-Eighth Soviet Army, comprising eight divisions and cavalry formations). It was now fighting a difficult defensive battle south of Lake Ilmen on a front facing south, with the enemy obviously trying to outflank it in the west. 56 Pan- zer Corps was to provide the urgently needed relief. What our corps had to do - if possible without attracting the attention of the enemy - was to introduce its two mechanized divisions into his western flank east of Dno in order to roll up the front while he was busy attacking our own 10 Corps in the north. The task confronting us was a pretty one, and it was gratifying to see how pleased the SS were to come back under our command. It was only a pity that we could not get 8 Pan- zer Division released for such a worth-while operation. By 18th August the carefully concealed move of the two divisions into camouflaged assembly areas in the enemy's western flank had been successfully completed, and when the corps unleashed its attack early next day the enemy was obviously taken completely by surprise. Our plan to roll up the enemy front from the flank proved entirely successful, and in the engagements that followed we and 10 Corps, which had now returned to the attack, jointly succeeded in roundly defeating Thirty- Eighth Soviet Army. By 22nd August we had reached the Lov- at south-east of Staraya Russa, despite the fact that in that sandy terrain, with its almost complete absence of roads, the infantry of the two motorized divisions had had to advance most of the way on foot. During those few days 56 Panzer Corps alone captured 12,000 prisoners, 141 tanks, 246 guns and several hundred automatic weapons and motor vehicles. The booty included two extremely interesting items. One was a brand-new 8.8cm. anti-aircraft battery of German manu- facture from the year 1941. The other was the very first Soviet salvo gun to fall into German hands. As I was most anxious to have the latter evacuated, I was all the more indignant to find that it could not be moved because somebody had helped himself to the tyres! The offender proved to be none other than my second assistant, Major Niemann, who had discov-

108/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 109 ered that these tyres fitted our own command wagon. He looked somewhat crestfallen when told to hand them back for reassembly. While the fighting troops, who once again had to exert themselves to the utmost, were enjoying a brief rest on the Lovat, there was talk of withdrawing 56 Panzer Corps for employment elsewhere, but then Sixteenth Army's eastward advance south of Lake Ilmen was resumed, after all. At the end of Au- gust, however, the first rains of that summer set in, turning every road into such a quagmire that for a while both motorized divisions were completely stuck. At the same time the enemy moved up new forces. In lieu of his beaten Thirty-Eighth Army three new armies appeared along the Kholm-Ilmen front opposite our own Sixteenth Army - the Twenty-Sev- enth, Thirty-Fourth and Eleventh. Fresh battles ensued, but to describe these in detail would take up too much space. 56 Panzer Corps forced a crossing over the Pola and pushed on to a point just short of Demyansk. Quite apart from die fact that enemy resistance was stiffening, the painful effort of advancing along roads several feet deep in mud imposed a particular strain on both men and equipment. During this period the whole of my time was spent out with my divisions, but even my sturdy Kubelwagen often had to be towed by a trac- tor to make any headway on those so-called roads. During this period even we came to feel the divergence between the aims pursued by Hitler (Leningrad) and O.K.H. (Moscow). The commander of Sixteenth Army, Colonel-Gen- eral Busch, told me he intended to push east as far as the Val- dai Heights so that he could later advance in the direction Ka- linin-Moscow. It seemed that H.Q. Northern Army Group did not agree - principally because it was worried by the prospect of baring the army's eastern flank. While at the beginning of September, 57 Panzer Corps intervened in our operations from the area of Central Army Group in the south, we ourselves were told on izth September that we would shortly be moved south with 3 Motorized Division to come under command of Ninth Army in Central Army Group. Even as a corps commander one could make neither head nor tail of all this

109/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 110 chopping and changing, though I did form the impression that it was all ultimately due to the tug-of-war evidently going on between Hitler and O.K.H. over whether the strategic aim should be Moscow or Leningrad. At all events, the battles which Sixteenth Army fought in those weeks with 56 Panzer Corps taking part were continuously successful, and on i6th September O.K.W. was able to announce the defeat of substantial elements of the Eleventh, Twenty-Seventh and Thirty-Fourth Soviet Armies. Nine enemy divisions were considered to have been destroyed and" nine more badly battered. We still failed to find any real satisfaction in these achieve- ments, however, for no one was clear any longer what the actual aim of our strategy was or what higher purpose all these battles were supposed to serve. Whatever else might happen, the period of sensational advances of the kind we had made on Dvinsk was at an end. My days at the head of 56 Panzer Corps were now numbered. On the evening of 12th September, under a steady downpour of rain, I was sitting in my tent with one or two officers of my staff. Ever since it had begun to get dark early we had taken to playing bridge to while away the time until the evening situation reports came in. Suddenly the telephone rang at my el- bow and I was asked to take a call from my friend Busch, the army commander. A telephone message at this late hour did not usually bode anything pleasant, but on this occasion Busch read me out an order that had come over the tele- printer from O.K.H.: 'General of the Infantry v. Manstein will leave forthwith for Southern Army Group to assume command of Eleventh Army.' Every soldier will sense how proud and happy I felt at the prospect of leading a whole army from now on. To me, at the time, this seemed the peak of my military career. Early next morning I took leave — only by telephone, unfortunately - of the divisions under my command and then bade farewell to my own staff. In doing so I had grateful memories of all that 56 Panzer Corps and its staff had achieved in the

110/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 111 past months, when the headquarters and divisions had grown into a thoroughly integrated unit. Joyful though I was in taking over this new and bigger task, I was nevertheless fully aware that probably the most satisfy- ing phase of my life as a soldier was now over. For three whole months I had lived close to the fighting troops, sharing not only their trials and tribulations, but also the pride of their successes. Time and again I had been able to derive fresh energy from the very fact of this common experience, from the cheerful devotion with which everyone went about his duty and from the intimacy of comradeship. From now on my position would prevent me from working among the troops to the extent I had done to date. It was unlikely that I should ever again live through anything Kampfgruppeparable to the impetuous dash of 56 Panzer Corps in the first days of the campaign - the fulfilment of all a tank-force commander's dreams. I thus found the leave-taking extremely hard — most of all from my experienced Chief- of-Staff, Colonel Baron v. Elverfeldt, a cool, high-minded and never-failing counsellor. The same applied to my high-spir- ited and talented Chief of Operations, Major DetlefTsen, the head of my Intelligence branch, Guido v. Kessel, and that in- defatigable quartermaster, Major Kleinschmidt. Another of those I had to leave behind me was the head of my adjutant- general's branch, Major v. d. Marwitz, who had joined us only a few weeks previously and with whom I had close ties of friendship dating back to the days we had spent together in Pomerania and at the military academy. When I left on the morning of 13th September to take formal leave of my friend Busch, the only people I could take with me were my A.D.C., Specht, and my two drivers, Nagel and Schumann. Not one of them is alive today.

Demyansk Pocket The Demyansk Pocket was the name given to the pocket of German troops encircled by the Red Army around Demyansk (Demjansk), south of Leningrad, during World War II on the Eastern Front. The pocket existed mainly from 8 February-21

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April 1942. A much smaller pocket was simultaneously surrounded in Kholm, about 100 km (62 mi) to the southwest. These both resulted from the German retreat following their defeat during the Battle of Moscow. The successful defence of Demyansk, achieved through the use of an airbridge, was a significant development in modern warfare. The pocket demanded an inordinate response on the part of the Soviets, stalling offensive actions elsewhere. Its success was a major contributor to the decision to try the same tactic during the Battle of Stalingrad. 8

Encirclement The encirclement began as the Demyansk Offensive Opera- tion, the first phase being carried out from 7 January-20 May 1942 on the initiative of General Lieutenant Pavel Kurochkin, commander of Northwestern Front. The intention was to se- ver the link between the German Demyansk positions, and the Staraya Russa railway that formed the lines of communication of the German 16. Armee. However, owing to the very difficult wooded and swampy terrain, and heavy snow cover, the initial advance by the Front was very modest against stub-

8 Offensive of the Red Army south of Lake Ilmen 7 January–21 Fe- bruary 1942.

112/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 113 born opposition. On 8 January, a new offensive called the Rzhev-Vyazma Stra- tegic Offensive Operation started. This incorporated the previous Front's planning into the Toropets-Kholm Offensive Operation between 9 January and 6 February 1942 which formed the southern pincer of the attack that, beginning the second phase of the northern pincer Demyansk Offensive Ope- ration between 7 January and 20 May, which encircled the German 16th Army's (Generaloberst Ernst Busch) IInd, and parts of the Xth Army Corps (General der Artillerie Christian Hansen) during winter 1941/1942. Trapped in the pocket were the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd and 290th infantry divisions, and the SS-Division Totenkopf, as well as RAD, Police, Todt organization and other auxiliary units, for a total of about 90,000 German troops and around 10,000 auxiliaries. Their commander was General der Infan- terie Walter Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, commander of the IInd Army Corps.

Northwestern Front offensives The intent of the Northwestern Front offensive was to encircle the entire northern flank of the 16th Army's forces, of which the 2nd Army Corps was only a small part, and the So- viet command was desperate to keep the Front moving even after this success. The first thrust was made by the 11th Army, 1st Shock Army and the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps released for the operation from Stavka reserve. A second thrust was executed on 12 February by the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies of the Kalinin Front, with the additional plan of directly attacking the encircled German forces by inserting two airborne brigades to support the advance of the 34th Army. The front soon settled as the Soviet offensive petered out due to difficult terrain and bad weather. After being assured that the pocket could be supplied with its daily requirement of 270 short tons (240 t) of supplies by Luftflotte 1, Hitler ordered that the surrounded divisions hold their positions until relieved. The pocket contained two fairly capable airfields at Demyansk and Peski. From the mid-

113/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 114 dle of February, the weather improved significantly, and while there was still considerable snow on the ground at this time, resupply operations were generally very successful due to weakness of the Red Air Forces in the area. However the operation did use up all of the Luftwaffe's transport capability, as well as elements of their bomber force. The Northwestern Front grew increasingly desperate to wipe out the pocket, and over the winter and spring, launched a number of assaults on the "Ramushevo corridor" that formed the tenuous link between Demyansk and Staraya Russa through the Ramushevo village that were repeatedly repul- sed. In total, five Soviet Armies composed of 18 rifle divisions and three brigades were tied up for four months. However, by the end of May, the Stavka reconsidered the overall situation and decided to shift its attention to the Moscow sector, where a new German offensive was expected in the summer.

Breakout On 21 March 1942, German forces under the command of Ge- neralleutnant Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach attempted to leave through the "Ramushevo corridor". Over the next several weeks, this corridor was widened. A battle group was able to break out of the siege on 21 April, but the fighting had taken a heavy toll. Out of the approximately 100,000 men trapped, there were 3,335 lost and over 10,000 wounded. Howe- ver, their strong resistance had tied up numerous Soviet units at a critical moment, units that could have been used elsewhere. Instrumental in the German breakout, was the first time use of the Mkb-42(H), which would later be re-designated the MP-43 and then finally the StG-44. Between the forming of the pocket in early February to the virtual abandonment of Demyansk in May, the two pockets (including Kholm) received 65,000 short tons (59,000 t) of supplies (both through ground and aerial delivery), 31,000 replacement troops, and 36,000 wounded were evacuated. However, the cost was significant. The Luftwaffe lost 265 aircraft, including 106 Junkers Ju 52, 17 Heinkel He 111 and two

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Junkers Ju 86 aircraft. In addition, 387 airmen were lost. The Soviet Air Forces lost 408 aircraft, including 243 fighters, in a bid to crush the pocket. Fighting in the area continued until 28 February 1943. The Soviets did not liberate Demyansk until 1 March 1943, with the retreat of the German troops. For his excellence in command and the particularly fierce fighting of his elite unit, 3. SS Division Totenkopf, SS-Obergruppenführer Theodor Ei- cke was the 88th person to be awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross on 20 May 1942. The success of the Luftwaffe convinced Reichsmarschall Her- mann Göring and Hitler that they could conduct effective air- lift operations on the Eastern front. Göring later proposed a similar "solution" to supply the 6. Armee when it was surrounded in Stalingrad. In theory, the outcome could be equally advantageous; with the 6. Armee trapped, but still in fighting condition, the Soviet army would have to use up much of its strength to keep the pocket contained. This could allow other German forces to re-group and mount a counterattack. However, the scale of the forces trapped in the two operations differed greatly. While a single corps (about ⅓ of an army) with about six divisions was encircled in Demyansk, in Stalingrad, an entire and greatly reinforced army was trapped. Whereas the Demyansk and Kholm pockets together needed around 265 t (292 short tons) of supplies per day, the 6. Armee required an estimated daily minimum of 800 t (880 short tons), delivered over a much-longer distance and faced by a much better organised Red Air Force. The air transport force had already suffered heavy losses, and was much further away from good infrastructure. The Luftwaffe simply did not have the resources needed to supply Stalin- grad.

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Battle of Krasny Bor The Battle of Krasny Bor was part of the Soviet offensive Ope- ration Polyarnaya Zvezda. It called for a pincer attack near Leningrad, to build on the success of Operation Iskra and completely lift the Siege of Leningrad, encircling a substantial part of the German 18th Army. The offensive near Krasny Bor, Leningrad Oblast, formed the western arm of the pincer. The Soviet offensive began on Wednesday, 10 February 1943. It produced noticeable gains on the first day, but rapidly turned into a stalemate. The strong defense of the 250th (Spanish) Infantry Division led by General Emilio Este- ban and the 4th SS Police Division gave the German forces time to reinforce their positions. By February 13, the Soviet forces had stopped their offensive in this sector. In Spain, February 10 became known as "Black Wednesday", due to the heavy losses of the Spanish Division, which lost over 70% of the men engaged in the action. It was the most costly battle for the Spanish volunteers during their time on the Eastern Front. 9

9 Soviet plan for Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda in the context of the wider offensive in the northern and central parts of the front

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The Siege of Leningrad The Siege of Leningrad began in early autumn 1941. By Sep- tember 8, German and Finnish forces had surrounded the city, cutting off all supply routes to Leningrad and its su- burbs. However the original drive on the city failed and the city was subjected to a siege. During 1942 several attempts were made to breach the blockade, but they were all unsuc- cessful. The last such endeavour in 1942 was the Sinyavin Of- fensive. After the defeat of that effort, the front line returned to what it was previously and again 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) se- parated Leonid Govorov's Leningrad Front in the city and Ki- rill Meretskov's Volkhov Front. Despite the failures of earlier operations, lifting the siege of Leningrad was a very high priority, so new offensive preparations began in November 1942, only weeks after the last offensive failed. In December, the operational plan was appro- ved by the STAVKA (the Soviet High Command) and received the codename "Iskra" (Spark). By January 1943, the situation looked very good for the Soviet side. The German defeat at Stalingrad had weakened the German front. The Soviet forces were planning or conducting offensive operations across the entire front, especially in southern Russia. Amidst these conditions, "Iskra" was to become the first of several offensive operations aimed at inflicting a decisive defeat on Army Group North. Operation Iskra was a strategic victory for the Soviet forces and successfully opened a land corridor 8–10 km wide into the city. A railroad was swiftly built through it and allowed many more supplies to reach the city than the "Road of Life" (the truck route across the frozen Lake Lagoda), eliminating the possibility of the capture of the city and a German-Fin- nish linkup. At the same time, however, STAVKA knew that "Iskra" was incomplete as the corridor it had opened was narrow and was still in range of German artillery. Additionally, the important heights and strong point at Siniavino were still controlled by the Germans. This led Georgy Zhukov, the So- viet commander, to plan a much more ambitious offensive

117/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 118 operation named Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star).

Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda tried to build on the success of Operation Iskra and began only days later. Zhukov, who had overseen Iskra, was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union on January 18, the day the two Soviet Fronts linked up and broke the blockade. This foresaw a three-front attack by the Northwestern Front [roughly equivalent to an army group], under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko; the Volkhov Front under Colonel General Kirill Meretskov, and the Leningrad Front under Colonel General Leonid Govorov, of which the 55th Army was now a part. The Northwestern Front was to attack the Ramushevo Corridor, which connected the Dem- yansk Salient, held by the Germans to their main positions since 1942. The destruction of the bulk of the German 16th Army in the pocket would allow the Front to exploit the gap in the German lines. The Leningrad and Volkov Fronts were to capitalize on the fact that the German 18th Army was stret- ched very thin in the January fighting and attack the army's flanks, aiming to link up near Tosno. Again, this would create a gap in the German lines. Overall, the goal of the offensive was nothing short of decisively defeating Army Group North and advancing to Lake Chud The 55th Army's objective was to break open the vital Lenin- grad-Moscow Highway, starting from its jump-off position in Kolpino towards Tosno; it was to join-up with a northbound pincer attack of the 54th Army of the Volkhov Front, thereby encircling German formations in the Mga sector. The highway is an important road/railway connection linking Moscow and Leningrad. The pivot-point for this highway was Krasny Bor, situated between the highway and the railway line. 55th Army's attack would also hit sectors defended by other Ger- man formations which were established to secure flanks and draw them into battle. Once this attack had succeeded, the plan was for the second echelon forces to advance through the gap towards Tosno. The attack was planned for February 10, 1943 and was to jump off from Kolpino. The 55th Army

118/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 119 planned to attack with a force of approximately 40,000 men and 30 tanks in first echelon, to be followed by a mobile group consisting of the 122nd Tank Brigade and the 35th Ski Brigade. At the end of January 1943, Emilio Esteban Infantes, the general in command of the 250th [Spanish] Infantry Division (Blue Division) was aware of a build-up of Soviet forces (55th Army), which indicated that an attack was imminent. To de- flect it, he ordered his reserves, two cycle companies and the 9th and 11th Batteries of the 250th Artillery Regiment, into Krasny Bor on February 2. On the 9th he ordered that at least one-third of the men with all available automatic weapons were to withdraw 2,000 meters behind the main line of resistance; that the 269th Infantry Regiment should be ready to give up its 2nd Battalion as soon as that was requested; and that the 263rd Infantry Regiment had to provide one infantry company, two Fusilier companies and a machine gun company as reserves. Some additional minefields were laid, and minor improvements to firing positions were undertaken. The German command promised to send two anti-tank companies with 75 mm PAK 40 AT guns and 88 mm AT guns (although only one of these arrived in time for the battle) as well as an infantry regiment.

February 10 – Day 1 On Wednesday, February 10, 1943, a massive artillery bombardment of 1,000 Soviet guns and mortars descended on the Spanish lines at precisely 6:45. Shells, mortars and Katyusha rockets pounded the trenches, bunkers and dugouts which had been constructed to strengthen the eastern flank of Army Group North. At 8.45 hours, the bombardment shifted from the front line onto Krasny Bor itself, also striking the villages of Podolvo and Raikelevo (both located east and southeast of Krasny Bor, respectively), the latter being the location of In- fantes' forward command post. At approximately 8:40, the 45th and 63rd Guards and the 72nd Rifle Divisions, followed by some tanks, advanced towards Staraia Mgsa (east of Krasny Bor), Krasny Bor, Raike-

119/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 120 levo and Podolvo, with the 63rd Guards Rifle Division facing the 5,900 troops of the 250th Infantry Division, holding the eastern flank of the line. Pinned down by two hours of initial bombardment, Spanish formations were unable to retreat towards the town and in many cases fought to the death. The frontline was quickly overrun, and many Spanish formations were destroyed there. Inside Krasny Bor, a company of the 250th Infantry Division held the October Railway station, repulsing infantry charges and three tank assaults by advancing Soviet forces. By 11:00 the company was reduced to 40 combatants, yet these managed to hold the factory until 12:00, when they fell back into the town. From 9:00 to 10:40, isolated Spanish units fought off Soviet attacks but were cut off when the Soviets seized the October Railway. Now encircled, the units still holding the Leningrad-Moscow Highway decided to hold-on as long as possible and were destroyed in combat. The 55th Army, in the meantime, had advanced despite heavy casualties inflicted by the dug-in Spanish troops. The Soviets took Raikelevo, which cut off Podolvo from Krasny Bor. In Krasny Bor itself the Spanish artillery, engineers and other assorted stragglers came under attack from Soviet infantry and armour, and by 12:00, the 63rd Guards Rifle Divi- sion reported the capture of Krasny Bor, despite the fact that the southern half of the town was still controlled by the Spa- nish. Soviet tanks opened fire on a hospital and retreating ambulances but were eventually beaten off by Spanish troops armed with Molotov Cocktails and hand grenades. The after- noon brought belated support for the defenders in the form of a Luftwaffe fighter-bomber attack on the Soviet positions around the town of Kolpino, to the east of Krasny Bor, while the 45th Guards Rifle Division seized Mishkino. Sviridov decided to insert the mobile group into the battle late on the day, but they were stopped by a combination of fierce resistance and a sudden thaw that stopped the Ski Brigade from operating off road. The German command reinforced the Spanish defenses with battle groups. The 63rd Guards Rifle Division advanced as far as the cen-

120/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 200 system for conducting the kind of war which its designers en- visioned. The primacy of the blitzkrieg concept was built around an organization designed, trained, and equipped for a short campaign in central and Western Europe. The eventual failure of the blitzkrieg system cannot be attributed to one particular commander or event. Although many scholars argue that Hitler or the Russian Campaigns provided the expla- nation, the problem perhaps lies in what Dörner calls a Logic of Failure: What Moltke had in mind about strategic thinking in war ap- plies in general to manipulation of interdependent systems. Schematizations and the formulation of rules obscure the constant need to adapt action to context. A sensible and effective measure in one set of circumstances can become a dangerous course of action when conditions change. We must keep track of constantly changing conditions and never treat any image we form of a situation as permanent. Everything is in flux, and we must adapt accordingly. The need to adapt to particular circumstances however runs counter to our ten- dency to generalize and form abstract plans of action.85 The German Military simply failed to adjust their system as the war progressed. Axis forces did little either to alter the basic pattern of their military organization and operational practice or to reform and modernize the way they made war.86 There was no way that Hitler’s Germany could defeat the force preponderance of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. This had been as true in 1914 as it was in 1941.87 The combination of the United States industrial capability, the Lend Lease aid provided to the British and the Soviets, and perhaps, more significantly, the collapse of the always tenuous German political--military relationship under Hitler, contributed to the systems failure. The degradation of the political-military relationship within

85 Dörner, 98. 86 For a comprehensive analys is see Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), 318. 87 Mosier, 283.

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Germany was an inherent problem for blitzkrieg in that the link back to the strategic level was severed once protracted war began. By design, fighting short duration campaigns of annihilation rather than returning to the trenches was the military’s idea of a strategic solution. The German Army did not want or think about political involvement once the order came to initiate war. As Hitler began to lose strategic sense and control and after the military began to lose initiative, the system faltered. Front line leaders lost the ability to exploit success. Directives from Hitler became more prescriptive as the war progressed. For example, Directive 67, issued on 25 November 1944 ordered: Should a commander, left to his own resources, think that he must give up the struggle, he will first ask his officers, then his non-commissioned officers, and finally his troops, if one of them is ready to carry on the task and continue the fight. If one of them will, he will hand over command to that man regardless of his rank and himself fall in. The new leader will then assume the command, with all its rights and duties.88

Conclusion Blitzkrieg was a viable operational system designed and intended to fight short duration wars against similarly designed and equipped enemies. Blitzkrieg became ineffective when German military planners failed to adapt doctrine and strate- gies to meet their government’s ever-increasing demands for employing military forces without a sound overall strategic concept. The operational and conceptual components of blitzkrieg are apparent today just as they were in 1940. A good example of this involved the “Thunder-Runs” conducted by a company, and later a battalion, from the 3rd Infantry Di- vision during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These “Thunder- Runs” demonstrate the importance of intent-based directives given to a commander capable of exploiting battlefield success at the tactical level while supporting operational objecti-

88 Hugh Trevor Roper, Hitler’s War Directives 1939-1945 (Edin- burgh, U.K.: Berlin Limited, 2004), 288.

201/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 202 ves that accomplish the strategic end state. The blitzkrieg system failed as an operational means of conducting war only when it was employed in a manner inappropriate to its original purpose and intent. When the political-driven strategy sought all-embracing conquest and enemy attrition, blitzkrieg was forced to confront a level of protractedness not envi- sioned by its creators. In fact, the operational premise of blitzkrieg was to avoid protracted battles, massive troop movements, and other such difficulties encountered by the Ger- mans in World War I. Much of the value of this monograph lies with to those in leadership positions that interface with the political dimension of war. Utilized appropriately, blitzkrieg met operational objectives while allowing field commanders the flexibility to exploit local situations and circumstances. When employed in a way that did not match its intended role, the blitzkrieg system failed with unintended consequences. The lesson in this can and should be applied to contemporary systems by planners and leaders considering operational plans and their implementation. Blitzkrieg as an operational system provides insight into the value of flexible doctrine, military culture, and operational planning.

Panzer Tactics A everyone knows, theory and practice do not ilways coin- cide. That is exacdy how it was with the German philosophy of the employment of armored formations in World War II, Although Germany was well ahead of all other armies in the fundamentals of commitment and in the art of operational command from the mid-thirties, within the Wehrmacht there were abundant violations of those fundamentals when it came to putting them into practice on the operational and tactical levels. Thus a study of German armored operations cannot have the goal of documenting the many violations of principle. Instead, I intend to make clear how the German fundamentals of employing armor formations differ from those of other nations even to the present day. Those tacti-

202/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 203 cally effective doctrines were one of the ultimate reasons for the success of German troops on a local level until the final weeks of the war. The technical literature includes countless Kampfgruppe- petent presentations at the level of operational/ strategic command (army and higher). That also holds true at the tactical/operational level of army corps and division. Totally underrepresented are factually correct descriptions of the level of command that bears the actual burden and rigor of the battle, that of the regiment—generally, the brigade in modern usage—and the battalion. With appropriate reinforcements for combat and employment, they generally form the heart of the operation in that they become the battle groups (Kampf- gruppen) or combat formations, frequently approaching divisional strength. The reasons for the gaps in the literature are manifold. The interested reader usually wants an overview of a battle or a military theater without getting lost in the details of individual fighting. Also, most of the war literature inevitably comes from generals, some of whom have no knowledge at all regarding situations so far under them. An additional aspect is that operational Kampfgruppemand in action at lower levels is, in part, more difficult than that of the larger formations, which an intelligent general staff officer can learn in a few years of ongoing training, regardless of what branch of service he belongs to. Command skills at the lower tactical level do not come from theoretical studies or sheer talent. One has to work long years at all levels to gain that experience. It was no accident that, by the end of the war, officers ranging from die level of divisional command to that of commanding general of an army corps were predominately men who had started the war as small-unit commanders and risen through command of small formations to command of large organizations. In the process, reserve officers were in the majority. By using the classical weapon employed at the point of main effort (Schwerpunktwaffe)—the armor formation—I will fa- miliarize the reader with the different types of operational

203/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 204 roles and other missions that exist during operations. Right at the beginning, an essential fundamental principle must be taken to heart: tanks achieve their success primarily and predominately through offensive action. That is true whether the tactical operational situation is offensive or defensive. As a commander of armies von Manstein masterfully demonstrated how German armor formations could achieve remarkable successes when they were committed in (counter-) attacks, even within the context of overall retreat. The tank, therefore, must constantly remain the sword in the hand of the tactical commander. He must use it offensively against the enemy, even in hopeless situations. If he forgoes this advantage by committing tanks to stationary positions or, even worse, digs them in and allows them to degenerate into a direct-support weapon for the infantry, then he is like a knight of old who has been reduced to the dubious protection of his shield. The initiative an armor leader instinctively seeks then passes over to the enemy. Misunderstandings regarding the combat value of tanks con- tinually arose when they were assigned roles beyond their capabilities or which they could only perform in quite limited fashion. These misunderstandings arose when the tank was considered as the sole ruler of the battlefield. Such high- flown expectations in turn assume that the tank can with- stand any threat, even though an abundance of such threats may be directed against it. In addition to direct-fire weapons of all calibers, there are indirect fire systems, mines, obstacles, close-quarters combat systems with hollow-charge or simple incendiary devices and an increasing number of missiles that can be used at minimal distances from cover by individual riflemen. There is always great disillusionment when the tank formation, stressed beyond its capabilities, suffers hair-raising losses. It is hardly surprising to hear in many circles that the tank has become obsolete as an effective combat weapon. Such conclusions fail to recognize that it is always necessary to employ the best weapon for the intended objective at the correct time and commit it in terrain that does not grant the

204/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 205 enemy an advantage before the operation even begins. The troop leader must continuously attend to the prerequisites for the operation, not only through choice of terrain and correct timing, but also through proper force ratios and effective combat support, particularly from the air. The main battle tank (Kampfpanzer) is limited by technical requirements and does not have unlimited capabilities (protection against all possible threats). It requires a precise balance between a practical level of protection, on the one hand, and, in the final analysis, the far more important capability to function against the enemy. That combination is the ability to dominate the battlefield. It comes from the sum of the tank's capabilities and not from over-emphasis on a single charac- teristic. Only when firepower, mobility, protection and command and control capability are combined in a balanced whole can a tank function effectively as a system and be more effective than a system which was not conceived according to these principles. Other aspects also contribute to effectiveness, such as good training of the crew, a high level of technical reliability, a large logistical operating range etc. It is, in the final analysis, futile to argue whether the Tiger or some other tank was the best armored fighting vehicle of the Second World War. The mass-produced M4 Sherman stood no chance in a direct engagement with a Tiger. Nevertheless, it was a successful model because it was technically reliable and was provided to the troops in inexhaustible numbers. The Soviet T-34 was rugged and did not require a high-tech- nology industrial base for its mass production. What advantage did the Tiger provide the Wehrmacht if the enemy manufactured 20 tanks to every Tiger that left the factory? It was "acceptable" for an American crew to "consume" half a dozen or more Shermans between landing in France and arriving at Germany's borders. A successful main battle tank thus depends on a series of fac- tors. It was quite clear that the chances for survival for a tank crew in a Panzerkampfwagen IV were significantly lower than in a Tiger. It would not have been advantageous to the Wehrmacht if, instead of a Tiger, three or four Panzer-

205/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 206 kampfwagen IV's had been manufactured. Even the best weapons system must finally bow to quantitative threats. Although produced at considerably more cost, the Panther and Tiger contributed to delaying the unavoidable end of the war. The comments, made in the following book are based on two things. First, the content of the regulations will be explained. The regulations, however, contain only the bare essentials and include only general statements about the practice— about the "how" of armored operations. By far the greatest portion of the text consists of the knowledge gained that was directly derived from actual experience in operations. That knowledge was collected through hours of discus- sion with former Panzer soldiers of all ranks, evaluation of combat reports and accounts of personal experiences along with, of course, the personal experience of the author as an armor officer and leader/commander in numerous combat exercises ranging from platoon leadership through command of tank and antitank (Panzerjäger) companies and, finally, an armor battalion. In the formation of the post-war German army—the Bundes- wehr—the majority of the principles of leadership and employment as practiced in the Wehrmacht were adopted wholesale. That was particularly the case with most of the officers in the 1950's, and even in the 1960's, many of whom had previously served in the Wehrmacht.

Development of german armor tactics Given the great success of German armor formations in World War II, it is surprising that the formation of armor units and the doctrine for their employment did not proceed in a directly linear and purposeful manner. Just as in other countries, the majority of officers did not recognize the prom- ising possibilities of motorization. In spite of isolated significant successes with tanks, they were viewed primarily as support weapons for infantry in France and Great Britain, Only hesitantly were other directions tried (British experimental

206/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 207 exercises in 1934 on Salisbury Plain and the formation of two armored divisions in France). In Germany, too, the theoreticians who thought progressively ran up against the massive opposition of traditionalists. Forced to make up with quality for lack of quantity, a more intensive start was already being made with the formation of so-called mobile troops (schnelle Truppen) as early as the formation of the Reichswehr. These mobile troops built on the experience of the cavalry. The first step was the use of motor vehicles for reconnaissance and transport functions rather than weapons carriers. This might seem strange, considering the unhappy German experience with Allied tanks on the Western Front in the First World War. However, many had a false picture of the capabilities of tanks. They were seen as ponderous, mechanically unreliable systems with an extremely limited radius of action that were all too easy to stop when committed against a massed defensive system. Such an evaluation was indeed limited and naive, but it was predomi- nant at the beginning of the Second World War and favored the initial success of the Germans. Although he was progressive in his thinking about many things, the Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, opposed the formation of a so-called motorized combat troop (Kraft- fahrkampftruppe). Most theoreticians traced their thinking back to the experience of the First World War. Based on the decrease in significance of cavalry, it was felt that airplanes and tanks could not in any way carry lead to the reintroduc- tion of mobile operational principles. In turning away from the basic principle of "movement," the conduct of operations focused exclusively on the factor of "fire" (effect). It is significant that as early as 1921 the Chief of the Army High Command (Chef der Heereslei-tung), General von Seeckt, stated in a memorandum, "Fundamental 'Considera- tions for the Rebuilding of Our Armed Forces" (Grundle- gende Gedanken fiir den Wiederaufbau unserer Wehrma- cht): ". . . that less than ever does the salvation of the weaker lie in rigid defenses, but rather in mobile attack." Paradoxi- cally, in a land that had been thoroughly demilitarized by the

207/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 208 victors and was scarcely capable of defending itself, the principles of free-reigning operations and the offensive employment of armor was increasingly being recognized. With this thought, possibilities increased for a numerically inferior but better equipped and mobile operating force. The dreams of the infantry- man, who had been pulverized by artillery in crushing positional warfare during the First War, also played a subliminal roll. It was important to seize the opportunity to penetrate the static elements of the operational thinking of the time! The manifold opposition and hindrances to the formation of such troops were finally overcome in the mid-thirties, when Reichskanzler Hitler personally took an obvious interest in thematter. He, himself, was marked by the trauma of positional warfare and was promulgating expansionist ideas. It was especially obvious to him that the armored branch of the service (Panzerwaffe) had the potential to offer an especially effective instrument with which one could wager the step across the borders. That also tipped the balance toward the establishment of armor formations with particular characteristics. In contrast to the armored battalions of other nations, the new armor battalions (Panzer-abteilungen) were seen from the start as capable of carrying out independent operations, rather than just as support for the infantry. Among other things, the essential step in the right direction came in 1935 from a great demonstration and experimental exercise in North Germany near Munster, that was, at times, attended by Hitler in person. The formation of the new Panzerwaffe matched Hitler's political interests. Laughably, a number of generals later attributed their opposition to the mechanization of the army to having recognized this at that time! It was important then for the few creators of the German Panzertruppe to set about forming an effective army with the few resources available and making Germany capable of defending itself. Certainly it cannot be their fault that false operational ideas were taken up in the neighboring countries! (France increasingly became the exception. It had effective tanks and, by the

208/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 209 end of the 1930's, had started organizing armored divisions on the German pattern.)

The first three Panzerdivisionen In spite of opposition from most quarters, the Kom-mando der Kraftfahrkampftruppen was given the assignment of organizing three large armored formations (Panzergrofiver- bande). This started in 1935 and was, to a certain extent, a large-scale experiment. The 2. Panzerdivision, then in Wiirz- burg, was turned over to (at that time) Oberst Guderian, one of the most ardent proponents of an operational Panzerwaffe. Many had the thought that, in this way, he himself would have to see the senselessness of such measures. The path to these organizational measures had already been laid over the course of years of secret activity in the Reich- swehr, part of which took place in the late 1920's in the Soviet Union (at the KAMA facility). On 1 November 1933 a training unit was formed at Zossen with the cover-name of "Kraft- fahrlehrkommando" (motor vehicle training command). Within a few months, additional company-sized formations were activated. Soon they were consolidated into battalions and regiments. In the rapid expansion after 1935, the accu- mulated experience paid off. The new German Panzertruppe could grow from within itself. It was imperative to avoid forming new units from untrained command personnel, as was done in other countries. In Germany that principle is called "Kalben" (calving). The decision to form separate armor formations was not in itself a guarantee of future success. (Many countries had armor formations, after all.) In this connection it is important to note that from the beginning in Germany these formations were capable of operations as combined arms teams. They did not need the external attachment of other formations to do that. Among them were integral motorized riflemen (Schützen) who were initially only transported on trucks. They soon developed into mechanized infantry (Panzerschiit- zen) and, in 1942, were given a special branch of service designation (Waffengattung) as "Panzergrenadiere." The Pan-

209/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 210 zerdivi-sion included correspondingly motorized artillery (later the Panzerartillerie), combat engineers (Panzerpio- niere) and signals troops (Panzer-nachrichtentruppen). Air defense against aircraft (Flak) was also soon motorized. The heart of the new Panzerdivision was the Panzer-brigade and the Schutzenbrigade. The Panzerbrigade originally included two Panzer-regimenter, each consisting of two Panzer- abteilun-gen (corresponding to an American armored battalion) containing one medium and three light tank companies. The Schutzenbrigade originally contained a motorized Schut- zenregiment, a battalion of Kradschutzen (riflemen on mo- torcycles) and a Panzer-Abwehr-Abteilung (antitank battalion). Divisional troops included a Panzeraufklarungs-abteilung (armored reconnaissance battalion), a motorized artillery battalion within the divisional artillery regiment, a Pio- nierbataillon and a Nachrichteuabteilung, as well as logistic formations. The inadequate production of tanks, especially the medium Panzer III's and IV's, prevented a uniform outfitting of the units. The concept of the Panzerdi-vision was not entirely proven, because three so-called "leichte Divisionen" (light divisions) were also formed. They only included a single Panzerabteilung and, in the Polish campaign, proved to have inadequate striking power. During the pre-war years, the tables of organization and equipment changed relatively often. It would pass beyond the intent of this book to go into the details. At the end of 1938 two additional Panz-erdivisionen and one more leichte Dhi- sion were created. In April of 1959 another two Panzerdivisio- nen and another leichte Division followed. Starting at that point in time, only a single Panzerregiment was authorized in a Panzer division. The start of the war came in the midst of these organizational measures so that the formation of the 6. through 9. Panzerdivisionen was post- poned and two Panzerabteilungen were assigned directly to army districts.

First experience in war In Poland and especially in France it became evident that the

210/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 211 brigade organization was too ponderous and the Panzerdivi- sion had to be pared down. The unarmored riflemen were also not powerful enough. The armor-weak Leichte Divisionen were reorganized into Panzerdivisionen immediately after the Polish campaign. Henceforth the Panzerdivisionen included only a single Panzerregiment. With the arrival of the first Schutzenpanzerwagen (SPW) (armored personnel carriers) the first rifle battalion of the Schutzenregiment was equipped with it and became the "gepanzertes Schützen-ba- taillon" (armored infantry battalion), renamed "Panzergre- nadier-battaillon" in 1942. The combat engineers were also given armored vehicles and the artillery and air defense forces received self-propelled mounts (Selbstfahrlafetten).

Armored battle groups As the war continued, antitank defenses increased and it became increasingly important to react more flexibly to devel- oping situations. Large maneuver elements were often not in a position to do that. Combat-ready tanks (at times without concern for what company they belonged to) were assembled into a "gepanzerte Gruppe" (armored group) and reinforced with SPW-Kompanien (armored-personnel carrier companies). These then formed so-called "Panzerkampfgruppen." Panzerpionier and artillery forces were generally assigned to support them. Depending on the situation, the Panzeraufk- larungsabteilung might also be involved. In this case, however, it was frequently employed more in the role of a (light) Panzergrenadierbataillon than for reconnaissance purposes. Divisions that had two Panzerabteilungen could also form two Kampfgrup-pen, though one of the battalions would have to work with a towed artillery battalion supporting it. This combination of armored forces proved to be the most successful organization of troops. Only the "purebred" combination that was the Panz-erkampfgruppe constituted a team of combined arms. It could work together in ideal fashion due to its armor and comparable operational and tactical mobility. None of the different branches had to exert undue concern for the other or employ it in a situation that endangered

211/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 212 it. The non-armored portion of the division served as the reserve, guarded areas or acted as normal positional troops in defense. That often caused logistical problems, since the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) usually had to be with the Panz-erkampfgruppe. Additional problems arose because no staff for the Kampfgruppe was permanently organized. In- stead, it had to be formed by arbitrarily taking people from the parent organization. It would have been more proficient to have a permanent personnel organized for it. Armored battalions were also not given the logistical capacity to operate separately. The organization and equipment of the Panzer-aufklarung- sabteilung also did not prove successful. Rather, it left the regiments and battalions lacking their own efficient reconnaissance elements. As for the Panzerjagerabteilung was concerned, it was increasingly proposed to integrate it by companies into the infantry regiments or even into the Panzer-grenadierbataillone, since the antitank battalion was only suitable for limited separate employment anyway. The Panzerkampfgruppe as an organization was not officially introduced during the war. Instead existing organizations were improved incrementally, such as by the formation of supply companies. Inadequate to the end were the numbers and the outfitting of the Panzergrenadiere, the latter due to the lack of adequate production of SPW's. Most were only motorized and, in fact, really only infantry, since they had to perform all assignments dismounted.

The panzerbrigade in 1944 The activation of separate Panzerbrigaden was a half-hearted attempt to form streamlined armored maneuver formations (thirteen were planned altogether) . Certainly the intent in forming them was to create organic Panzer-kampfgruppen. The main deficiency, however, was in the totally inadequate logistics elements. The result was that these formations were "out of gas" within a few days. They were insufficiently capa-

212/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 213 ble of sustaining themselves as a separate formation.

Reorganization after the second world war The new Bundeswehr was, it is true, primarily created by former Wehrmacht officers. However, wartime experiences were not always adopted in a consistent fashion. Of course, many aspects appeared again in the training. After a good beginning in 1956, however, much too large and ponderous divisions on the US pattern began to be formed. Introduced again was a situation where the lowest command level that was capable of combat with combined arms was at the level of the brigade, with similarly unwieldy Panzer- or Panzergre- nadier-bataillone. During the 1970's there were several reorganizations, such as the formation of a fourth Panzer-/Panzergrenadierbataillon in the brigade. Nevertheless, the brigade was increasingly deprived of its logistical independence so that it was increasingly dependant upon the division or even the corps for command and control of combined arms operations. The main reason for that, of course, was primarily the fact that the primary mission at the operational level—given the strategic framework at the time—was the defense of the na- tional borders that were very close at hand. The Panzergrena- diere suffered a lot as a result. The unfortunate separation of the rifle squad from its armored personnel carriers and its commitment to digging into field fortifications was obliga- tory. Only the tanks were committed in mobile operations, but even they were often cooped up in the context of small battle positions in a stationary role. They assumed the role of mobile bunkers. The primary objective was not the defeat of the enemy but to hold onto terrain. Entire generations of officers matured in that erroneous thought pattern. After the decline of the direct East-West confrontation, it required significant efforts to bring the setting of operational objectives back to Panzer-type basics. There again, as in the 1920's and 1930's, the followers of the "pure theory" were confronted with the narrow-mindedness and provinciality of

213/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 214 ignoramuses in operational theory. Nevertheless, in Germany today, as earlier, the tactical/operational fundamentals for the commitment of Panzertrup- pen are used in a manner similar to the way they crystallized during the Second World War, even if obviously influenced by the present-day technological setting, the essentially great- er significance of combat-support requirements and the increased effectiveness of all weapons against armor. After this short historical overview let us have a close look at the German principles of armor warfare. I would like to start with the main types of combat (Gefechtsarten): offensive operations, defensive operations and delaying actions.

Why is the offense the main type of combat operations ? In predominantly static types of combat—security or defense—the tank force only has an advantage in the opening phase, if it blocks the enemy and opens fire by surprise. The longer the battle continues, the more possibilities accrue to the enemy. The tank gives away its position with the first shot, no matter how well it was concealed. Room for movement is primarily to the rear. The attacking enemy, on the other hand, takes the initiative. The enemy accrues all the possibilities that go to the active party, He chooses the location and the time to start the action and his array of forces. It follows from the above that stubborn control of a sector of terrain for tanks can only be a prerequisite for the subse- quent maneuver-oriented type of combat typical of armor. An enemy who has run into a defensive position often only loses a few leading tanks, rapidly pulls back beyond the range of dangerous fire and quickly gains a good understanding of the situation of the opposing positions. In this phase, the attacker can, without delay, commit the entire array of combat support available to him, including air support. While this may not destroy the enemy, it prevents a withdrawal of forces. At that point, the attacking forces can outflank the defender and deliver the decisive blow at another location. After the first shots, the initiative goes to the ag-

214/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 215 gressively operating attacker. An armor force that remains in a position stays in the role of the one who has to wait for the next blow. The main reason that a few tanks covering the withdrawal of the main forces were so frequently able to stop numerically superior attackers was the declining vigor of the pursuit and the attacker waiting for additional combat support—aircraft, high-angle fire, etc. Decision in battle almost always comes in the attack, the defensive is often only an essential preparation, seldom more than that. The commitment of tanks offensively whenever possible is re- flected in the German doctrine for command. In Heeres-Di- enstvorschrift (Army Regulation) 470/7, "Die mittlere Pan- zerkompanie" (The Medium Tank Company) - which was also applicable for the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger—there are no types of combat presented other than attack. In Heeres-Dien- stvorschrift 470/10 "Panzerregiment und Panzerabteilung" the ex-tremely brief section on "Verteidigung" (Defense) merely stresses that, after allowing the enemy to approach, it is necessary to immediately counterattack.

Forms of attack The various forms of attack are differentiated into a meeting engagement as advance guard (Vorhut), hasty attack (Sofor- tangriffe) or deliberate attack (Angriff nach Vorbereitung). An advance guard is committed to a meeting engagement in order to strike an enemy by surprise when he is not yet ready to defend or to take possession of terrain that will be decisive for further conduct of the battle without loss of time. The attack can be in the strength of a reinforced company but, if possible, with the entire battalion. An immediate attack—often done on the initiative of the battalion commander—occurs when the concentration of the follow-on forces cannot be awaited or in order to take advantage of a favorable situation. The result is that the enemy is rapidly engaged by surprise without splitting one's own forces. The attack formation can usually be accomplished with a

215/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 216 short halt in the march. If possible, it should be protected from enemy observation and effects of fire. It must take place rapidly in order to deny the enemy time for preparation of his antitank defenses. The higher the level of combat readiness while deploying, the shorter the time needed for the march halt. Surprise encounters with the enemy and conditions of terrain (for example, exiting a defile) can force the start of the attack out of a march column or a narrow combat formation. As soon as the attack by the leading tanks gains room for deployment of those that follow, and the enemy situation and terrain permit, combat formation must be established. The battalion most frequently conducts a hasty attack in the Breitkeil ("V"-formation or inverted wedge). During the attack, covering fire for the further advance of the company must be established. Additionally, the center company moves forward from sector to sector. The continuity between the first and the second elements must not be broken. A deliberate attack is usually directed against a strong, prepared defense. The battalion then has a separate mission or fights within the framework of a armored battle group (gepanzerte Kampfgruppe). Before moving into the assembly area, the approach routes and the area itself must be recon-noitered. They should provide cover against enemy ground and aerial observation. If possible, the assembly area should be able to be reached by wheeled vehicles. In the assembly area the formation organizes itself for the attack, to the extent that space and terrain permit. It makes itself ready for combat. All preparations required to execute the attack are carried out. They include: • Thorough reconnaissance of the terrain of the attack • Clearing of barriers and obstacles in front of the enemy battle lines. • Acquisition of all necessary data for carrying out the attack through combat reconnaissance • Establishing contact with the leaders of the combat-support branches supporting and accompanying the attack and

216/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 217

• Liaison with the leaders of infantry and rifle formations that are attacking ahead of the tanks The results of reconnaissance by all elements participating in and supporting the attack with regard to terrain, identified nests of enemy resistance—especially'antitank weapons and artillery— are evaluated. Personal briefing of the company commanders and as many subordinate leaders as possible should be carried out in the area of the attack as far possible without betraying the intended attack. Radio silence must be enforced in the assembly area to prevent the enemy from drawing conclusions about an impend- ing attack from radio traffic. It is desirable that the tanks depart the assembly area in combat formation. If the terrain does not permit that, a short halt during the march out will be required even during a deliberate attack.

Prerequisites for the attack There are many causes for the failure of an attack. Frequently the force ratio in itself is a critical disadvantage for the numerically weaker party. There is good reason why the attacker should have a twofold—if possible, threefold—numerical superiority. However, there are other means by which the attacker can make his assault effective. A numerical superiority of the defender can rapidly be neutralized if the attack against his position is closely coordinated with the available means of combat support as well as the operations of neighboring forces. On the one hand, that keeps the enemy down so that aimed fire is impossible and, on the other, prevents the enemy from massing fire. The essential objective in attack—besides the destruction of as many targets as possible—is to piecemeal the enemy, elimi- nate his combat support elements and minimize his command and control capability. Among other things, disruption of command and control results from maintaining constant pressure, multi-directional operations, concealment, disruption of communications links and use of smoke. It is so ad-

217/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 218 vantageous to the attacker to have the initiative on his own side that he must be concerned about maintaining that advantage. Many attacks fail terribly in the initial phase because decisive mistakes have been made. These can include: • Incorrect choice of terrain (and timing) • Inadequate knowledge of the enemy situation • Ineffective or inadequate coordination of the support elements and • Incorrect commitment of forces. Arrival in the assembly area must be as quiet as possible (low engine rpm). Camouflage against ground and aerial observation is especially important. Track patterns, as created by tracked vehicle turning movements, must be removed to con- ceal signs of the presence of tanks from aerial observation. Traces of movement must be concealed or intentionally point back out of the area. As a rule, the area is reconnoitered by the reconnaissance platoon, the route marked with signs and the places for individual tanks indicated with unit-prepared signs (for example, turret numbers or tables of numbers in different platoon colors). The tanks drive to their places and back in, if possible under trees. The turret is traversed to the side so the barrel does not stick out into the way and the driver and radio operator can conveniently climb out through their hatches. The track marks are removed and the tank concealed with natural vegetation or a net. Each tank immediately provides its own security. The platoon leader checks out his sector and coordinates the security measures. Anti-aircraft spotters are assigned. If the situation allows, individual machine guns are dismounted and used as anti-aircraft defense. The sentinels and air-defense lookouts give the alarm through calls and signals or, if need be, by opening fire or using flare-pistols. They should all be relieved every two hours; sooner if it is cold. All tank crews are to have their individual weapons on them and steel helmets available when they dis- mount in the event of a surprise artillery barrage. A series of logistical measures are conducted in the assembly

218/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 219 area and the required tactical orders are given. All vehicles are completely topped off and supplied with am- munition. To accomplish that, the supply vehicles drive to a central point for the platoon or company or unload the supplies for each tank (cans, barrels, boxes, etc.) at the side of the road. The supply vehicles then retrace their route and pick up the empty containers. Possible technical/mechanical deficiencies are corrected with the help of contact teams from the maintenance personnel. The maintenance status is checked. The crews conduct maintenanace prior to going into action. The assembly area should be far enough from the main line of battle (Hauptkampflinie = HKL) so as to be beyond the range of enemy artillery. Usually it is located in a, wooded area with a road network in it. The tanks are drawn up along both sides of the road network so they can move out again without delay. A few tanks reconnoiter alert positions on the edge of the woods so they can be occupied in the event the assembly area is attacked. The crews rest, either on the rear deck of the tank or in a foxhole under the vehicle. During the halt the leaders must reconnoiter the route to the main lines and coordinate with the troops holding the positions in the line. Link up with the supporting elements takes place in the assembly area. Their leaders also take part in all reconnaissance and issuing of orders. The routes to the line of departure (Ablau-flinie) must be reconnoitered and the precise march time to reach it noted.

The start of the attack In the initial phase of the attack the organization is still widely dispersed, allowing as many gun tubes as possible to engage the enemy at any given time. Combat reconnaissance has gone ahead and finds obstacles as well as the forward edge of the enemy lines, if that has not already been done by dismounted patrols earlier It is extremely important during this critical phase of the attack that the enemy is prevented from aimed fire of his weapons through indirect fire of friendly forces, either in the form

219/263 4th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division Polizei 220 of preparatory fires or on-call ones. Forward observers (Vor- geschobene Beobachter) in their SPW's should be positioned far enough forward in the organization tnat, driving from one observation point to the next, they can maintain continuous observation of the battlefield. If possible, each lead company should be directed to coordinate with a forward observer. The tactical leaders call for artillery support. The permission to fire is obtained from the commander of the formation (Ge- fechtsverband: e.g., battalion or regiment). In general, the foremost units have the mission of rapidly thrusting through the depth of the enemy main lines and de- stroying the enemy artillery. The follow-on tanks of the second echelon fight in close cooperation with their own infantry, overcome the enemy infantry and those heavy weapons that were not destroyed by the first echelon. In this fashion the kind of massing that prevents the attack from gaining ground is avoided. After successfully braking through, the assault is to be carried forward into the enemy rear area. That is the fastest and sur- est method of breaking enemy resistance. After the objectives of the attack have been attained, the commander must immediately reorganize the battalion as required for the next operation. The battalion must be continu- ally prepared to parry enemy counterattacks.

Course of the attack The attack must proceed strictly according to the most important fundamental of armor commitment: fire and movement (Feuer und Bewegung). If the attack rapidly gains ground, the tank platoons move as a unit and are covered by other platoons. Fire and movement is coordinated within the company by the company commander. The battalion commander does this on his level. The battalion commander, however, concentrates less on controlling the fire of his tanks and more on steering the maneuver of the companies and requesting the fire support of the artillery. The coordination of the movement within the company goes more deeply into detail than at battalion level and concerns

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