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A War of Reputation and Pride
A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….………………. -
Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East
Kiev 1941 In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three-quarters of a million men. This was the battle of Kiev – one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. For the first time, David Stahel charts the battle’s dramatic course and after- math, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany’s ‘panzer groups’ despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany’s war in the east. David Stahel is an independent researcher based in Berlin. His previous publications include Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009). Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Kiev 1941 Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East David Stahel Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao˜ Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107014596 c David Stahel 2012 This publication is in copyright. -
German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in Western and Russian Accounts of June-December 1941
University of Wollongong Research Online University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 2017+ University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 2018 German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in Western and Russian Accounts of June-December 1941 David Sutton University of Wollongong Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1 University of Wollongong Copyright Warning You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any copyright material contained on this site. You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Wollongong. Recommended Citation Sutton, David, German Defeat/Red Victory: Change and Continuity in Western and Russian Accounts of June-December 1941, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, 2018. -
Dispatches BAKERSFIELD CA PERMIT NO 66 from Decision Games #39 FALL 2020
PRESRT STD US POSTAGE PAID DISPATCHES BAKERSFIELD CA PERMIT NO 66 FROM DECISION GAMES #39 FALL 2020 (661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax | P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390 | DECISIONGAMES.COM Excerpt from Strategy & Tactics #50 The Last Strategies By Stephen B. Patrick Germany By December, 1944, the Axis existed only in Hitler’s mind. Accordingly, all strategies were Hitler’s. Germany was fighting on four fronts by this time: the west, Italy, Poland and the Balkans. The last two were nominally one front, but, because the two Soviet drives were basically independent, they had to be treated separately. Hitler’s strategy, such as it was, was one of desperation and wishful thinking. He was convinced that the Anglo-American alliance with the Soviets could not endure. Subsequent events proved him right. What he failed to recognize was that the mutual hatred they bore for Nazism was sufficient to hold the alliance together for the duration of the war. Hitler seemed to have few illusions about Germany’s chances to win the war. He now wanted to settle for destroying Communism. Hitler convinced himself that he could work out an alliance with the Anglo- Americans and the three would then crush the Bolshevik menace. To “encourage” the British and American governments to see things his way, Hitler felt he needed a major victory in the west. He may not have seriously believed he could root the western Allies, but he did expect to deliver a blow that would seriously upset the western timetable. He also hoped to so upset morale at home in the western alliance that the German Panzer V Panther on the Eastern Front, 1944. -
Soviet Tank Development During the Second World War Jeremy Paugh Concordia University - Portland, [email protected]
Concordia University - Portland CU Commons Undergraduate Theses Spring 2019 Steel Monsters: Soviet Tank Development during the Second World War Jeremy Paugh Concordia University - Portland, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.cu-portland.edu/theses Part of the History Commons CU Commons Citation Paugh, Jeremy, "Steel Monsters: Soviet Tank Development during the Second World War" (2019). Undergraduate Theses. 185. https://commons.cu-portland.edu/theses/185 This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by CU Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HST 493- Steel Monsters: Soviet Armor Development During World War 2 A senior thesis submitted to The Department of History College of Arts & Sciences In partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Bachelor of Arts degree in History By: Jeremy Paugh Faculty Supervisor ______________________________________________ _____________ Dr. Joel Davis Date Department Chair _______________________________________________ _____________ Kimberly Knutsen Date Dean, College of Arts & Sciences ________________________________________________ _____________ Dr. Michael Thomas Date Provost _______________________________________________________ _____________ Michelle Cowing Date Concordia University Portland, Oregon May, 2018 1 Abstract: This thesis aims to explore the far-reaching effects of armored warfare and tank -
David Stahel. Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 1941
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 16, ISSUE 3 (2015) Studies David Stahel. Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 1941. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Youssef Aboul-Enein and Basil Aboul-Enein. The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2015 ISSN : 1488-559X VOLUME 16, ISSUE 3 (2015) Alexander Howlett These two fascinating texts are important, and timely, contributions to the strategic and operational history of the Second World War. Both books seek to provide historical context to situate military and political developments in their respective regions. There are a number of points of comparison between the texts, such as the subjects of propaganda, logistics, operations as well as foreign policy, in particular, as they relate to the Axis and Allied powers. Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN, is a lecturer for the National Intelligence University, and is Chair of Islamic Studies at the National Defense University. Aboul-Enein has published several books on the subject of the Middle East in 20th century affairs. His 2010 book Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat addressed that topic from an ideological perspective. The Secret War for the Middle East, written with his brother Captain (retired) Basil Aboul-Enein, USAF, examines Allied and Axis intervention in the region in the lead up to and during the Second World War. David Stahel, lecturer at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, has written a series of books on the Wehrmacht’s campaigns against the Red Army in 1941. -
Leningrader Blockade (Russ.: Блокада Ленинграда) Teil
Leningrader Blockade (russ.: блокада Ленинграда) Teil von: Zweiter Weltkrieg, Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941–1945 Die Ostfront zu Beginn der Belagerung von Leningrad Datum 8. September 1941–27. Januar 1944 Ort Leningrad, Sowjetunion Ausgang Sieg der Sowjetunion Konfliktparteien Achsenmächte Sowjetunion Befehlshaber Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb Kliment Woroschilow Georg von Küchler Georgi Schukow Truppenstärke 725.000 Soldaten 930.000 Soldaten Verluste unbekannt 16.470 Zivilisten durch Bombenangriffe und ca. 1.000.000 Zivilisten durch Unterernährung Bedeutende Militäroperationen während des Deutsch-Sowjetischen Krieges 1941: Białystok-Minsk – Dubno-Luzk- Riwne – Smolensk – Uman – Kiew – Odessa – Leningrader Blockade – Rostow – Wjasma-Brjansk – Moskau 1942: Charkow – Operation Blau – Operation Braunschweig – Operation Edelweiß – Stalingrad – Operation Mars 1943: Woronesch-Charkow – Operation Iskra – Nordkaukasus – Charkow – Unternehmen Zitadelle – Smolensk – Dnepr 1944: Dnepr-Karpaten-Operation – Leningrad-Nowgorod – Krim – Wyborg– Petrosawodsk – Weißrussland – Lwiw- Sandomierz – Iaşi–Chişinău – Belgrad – Petsamo-Kirkenes – Baltikum – Karpaten – Budapest 1945: Weichsel-Oder – Ostpreußen – Westkarpaten – Ostpommern – Plattensee – Oberschlesien – Wien – Berlin – Prag Als Leningrader Blockade (russisch: блокада Ленинграда) bezeichnet man die Belagerung Leningrads durch die deutsche Heeresgruppe Nord und finnische Truppen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Sie dauerte vom 8. September 1941 bis zum 27. Januar 1944. Schätzungen gehen von etwa 1,1 -
The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945 Volume I Organization and History
The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945 Volume I Organization and History Leo W.G. Niehorster 2 The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945 The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 – 1945 by Leo W.G. Niehorster Copyright © 1998 and 2010 by Leo W.G. Niehorster All rights reserved. Except for use in a review, no portion of this book may be reproduced in any form without the express written permission of the pub- lisher. Neither the author nor the publisher assumes any responsibility for the use or misuse of information contained in this book. The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 - 1945 3 CONTENTS Page Foreword .................................................................................................................................. 4 Hungarian Military Organizational Symbols................................................................................ 5 A Short Review of Hungarian History up to 1920 ....................................................................... 6 Part I The Royal Hungarian Army 1920 – 1941 Chapter 1 Hungary Between the Wars ................................................................................... 16 Chapter 2 Military Organization and the Armed Forces ........................................................ 21 Chapter 3 The Ground Forces to 1941 ................................................................................... 38 Chapter 4 The Air Force to 1941............................................................................................ 54 Chapter 5 The River Forces to 1941 ..................................................................................... -
Why I Started Making Scale Models
T-34 STORY OR WHY I STARTED MAKING SCALE MODELS by Serge Kaznadiy 2016 I was born in Kirovohrad, Ukraine when it was part of the Soviet Union, or the USSR, for short. Being a country with centralized government-run economy, the USSR did not have too many fancy consumer goods. In fact, its goods were not fancy at all. Hobby groups were literally non-existent, as the government did not encourage any groups with any interests at all. The hobby scene was dull. Serge Kaznadiy 1971 KIROVOHRAD Hobby kits were almost non-existent as well, except for a few ideologically inspired ones, like 1:800 scale Battleship Potiomkin (left) and cruiser Aurora which occupied a prominent place in the history of Bolshevism. There were models of 1:35 KV tank (below) and a couple of self-propelled guns. Kits included only a bottle of glue but no decals or paints. The kits were sold in so-called Kulttovari (Cultural Items) stores. No paints, tools or lacquers were available. Luckily (or not) there was East Germany which retained its European traditions, including those in manufacturing consumer goods which were of far better quality that those made in the USSR. This applied to hobby model kits as well. The East German government created VEB Plasticart in 1958, a company which offered almost Tamiya-level 1:100 scale model kits in fancy semi-gloss boxes with attractive artwork. (Germany!) The only limitation was that Plasticart offered only plane and heli models (mostly Soviet ones) and a Soviet Vostok spaceship. No armor or ships kits Kits by Plasticart were only avaialble in Moscow, the capital city of the Soviet empire, and a few other large cities like Leningrad or Kiev. -
Here Can Be No Debate That Nazi Germany’S Drive on Moscow Was a Human Calamity with Few Precedents in History
INTRODUCTION The battle of Moscow involved 2.5 million men on both sides of the eastern front, making it one of the largest and, without question, one of the most important battles of the Second World War. According to Andrew Roberts, Hitler’s offensive towards the Soviet capital was noth- ing less than decisive: ‘It is no exaggeration to state that the outcome of 1 the Second World War hung in the balance during this massive attack’. For both sides, the battle for Moscow was an epic of endurance and sacrifice, while its sheer magnitude concentrated the world’s attention as never before. There can be no debate that Nazi Germany’s drive on Moscow was a human calamity with few precedents in history. The battle began at the start of October 1941 with Operation Typhoon and, with a two- week pause at the start of November, continued to the very gates of Moscow by early December 1941. As one German soldier wrote: ‘Burning villages, the bodies of dead Russian soldiers, the carcasses of dead horses, burned-out tanks, and abandoned equipment were the 2 signposts of our march.’ Magnifying this level of destruction across a front nearly 700 km wide, Army Group Centre, the German force charged with seizing the Soviet capital, left a torrent of devastation through central Russia. The offensive towards Moscow was only the latest in an unbro- ken series of battles that Army Group Centre had fought since June 1941. The trail of destruction began with a two-week battle at Minsk, followed by a two-month battle at Smolensk, and then a month of fighting down into Ukraine for the battle of Kiev. -
Prisoners! the Red Army and German Pows, 1941–1943*
Take (No) Prisoners! The Red Army and German POWs, 1941–1943* Mark Edele University of Western Australia The Problematic From the outset of the German-Soviet war (1941–45), Soviet soldiers, command- ers, political officers, and police agents killed captured Germans. Investigation into the reasons and extent, the perpetrators and dynamics of these war crimes was hampered from the start.1 One obstacle was that alleged Soviet atrocities were part of German propaganda well before the Wehrmacht’sattackonJune22, 1941. The “Commissar Order” of June 6, 1941, decreed the execution of Soviet political officers ( politruki, or commissars) should they be captured in battle or while organizing resistance. The order attempted to legitimize this open breach of * Research for this article was made possible, in part, by a University of Western Australia Research Development Award in 2010 and an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP130101215, 2013–16). It was also supported by very generous colleagues: I would especially like to thank Iva Glisic, Leonid Vaintraub, and Jonathan Waterlow for their help in various archives, and Jürgen Förster, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jochen Hellbeck, Matthew Lenoe, Lennart Samuelson, David Stahel, and Alex Statiev for their many valuable suggestions. The comments of the two readers for the JMH— particularly those of David Stone, who generously volunteered to reveal his identity— helped immensely in the task of polishing the final product. I am also grateful to Stewart Candlish for correcting my Teutonic English and to Debra -
Thesis (Complete)
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) From myths to memes Transnational memory and Ukrainian social media Makhortykh, M. Publication date 2017 Document Version Final published version License Other Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Makhortykh, M. (2017). From myths to memes: Transnational memory and Ukrainian social media. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:02 Oct 2021 1 FROM MYTHS TO MEMES: TRANSNATIONAL MEMORY AND UKRAINIAN SOCIAL MEDIA ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit op woensdag 27 september 2017, te 11.00 uur door Mykola Makhortykh geboren te Kiev, Oekraïne 2 Promotiecommissie Promotor: Prof.