University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 6-1-1964 An analysis of the effect of civil-military relations in the Third Reich on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940 John Ogden Shoemaker University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Shoemaker, John Ogden, "An analysis of the effect of civil-military relations in the Third Reich on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940" (1964). Student Work. 374. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/374 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE THIRD REICH ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST IN 1940 by John Ogden Shoemaker A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of History University of Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts June 1964 UMI Number: EP73012 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. DissertationPublishing UMI EP73012 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 PREFACE The author’s analysis of the effect of civil-military, relations on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940 is based upon three case studies. Chapter T provides the background for the civil-military, relations existing in the Third Reich in 1940 and intro­ duces the major personalities in the case studies which follow. Each of the next three chapters describes a separate military situation during the German campaign in the West in 1940 and the civil-military environment, in which,it developed. These three cases were selected because each has posed difficult and controversial problems of. inter­ pretation for historians. The fifth and .last chapter provides a cumu­ lative analysis of the three cases and briefly extends the Nazi debacle to its conclusion. Chapter II appeared in slightly different form in an article in the MarchT962 issue of Military. Review entitled "Sichelschnitt, Evolution of an Operation Plan. " That paper was first undertaken, as a research project in a .‘'Graduate Problems" course in History at the University of Omaha and was prepared for publication with per­ mission of the Department of History and the Graduate Council, the University of Omaha. The maps in Chapters II, III, and IV were prepared from sketches by. the author and.are based on research connected with this study. The author expresses his appreciation for the guidance and assistance provided him by Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, Professor and Chairman.of the Department of.History, University of Omaha. Without Dr. Trickett’s wise counsel and .encouragement this endeavor would not have been possible. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ..................... ii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................. vi INTRODUCTION ............................................... .1 Chapter I. HITLER REMOVES THE MILITARY OPPOSITION . 3 The 100, 000 man. Army - The S. A, - The Blood Purge - The Blomberg-Fritsch Affair - The Opposition of Ludwig Beck - The Haider Plot - The Eclipse of OKH II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN OPERATIONAL PLA N N IN G ...................................................................... 42 The Airplane Mishap - THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN - OPERATION ORDER YELLOW - Manstein’s Opposition - SICHELSCHNITT, the Manstein variant - Hitler Changes Plans HI. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MTfIE STOP ORDER” .......................................................................... 71 Closing, the Dunkirk Pocket - Hitler’s Stop Order - The Military. Situation om 2 4 May 1940 - Political Considerations - Military Considera­ tions - Historical Controversy - Rundstedt, von Brauchitsch, Goering, and Hitler - The Evacu­ ation of the B. E. F. iv Chapter Page IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FAILURE TO INVADE BRITAIN. ....... 98 The Defeat of France - No Plans for Invasion of BritainInvasion Possibilities - Disagree­ ment Among the Military - OPERATION PLAN SEA- LION - The Preparation - Political Con­ siderations - HitlerTs Indecision - Abandonment of the Plan - The Decision to Attack the Soviet Union V. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FAILURE OF GERMANY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN THE WEST IN 1940 ........................... 139 The Failure of Military. Leadership - The Failure of Political Leadership - The Significance of .. WESERUEBUNG,. the "Stop Order, " OPERATION SEA- LION, and BARBAROSSA - Civil-Military Responsibilities in Development of National Strategy - Responsibilityfor the German Tragedy BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................... 158 v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. OPERATION PLAN-YELLOW The Original OKH Plan of 19-29 October * 1939 . ..................... 2. SICHELSCHNITT The Manstein Variant as Modified by OKH and Published on 24 February: 19 40 ......................... 3. Battle Situation at the Time of German "Stop O rder" of 24 May 1940 ............................................ 4.' OPERATION PLAN SEA LION Army (OKH) - "wide front" <- Invasion Plan of M id-July 1940 .................................................... 5. OPERATION PLAN SEA LION Arm y (OKH) - "narrow fro n t" - ■ Invasion Plan of Mid-September .1940 . ... ... INTRODUCTION "We .live in an age in which military influence in both'foreign and domestic policy is marked and is growing, and there is little hope that this .tendency will be reversed in the foreseeable future. Germany, more than any. other modern nation, has had a wide variety •of problems.in its civil-military relationships. "No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other major power was in the end so completely prostituted."2 Each phase in the development of the German State had its corollary in civil-military, relations. During the Imperial period, the collaboration between Chancellor Bismarck,. War Minister Roon, and Field Marshal von Moltke illustrates the success that may be achieved through civilian control of national destinies when accom­ panied by competent military, advice. The political upheaval of the Re publican, period shows the difficulty, of maintaining civilian control during, periods of political turmoil. The virtual military dictatorship of the World War *1 period illustrates the chaotic results of purely military control of political decisions. The disintegration of the German Armed .Forces (Wehrmacht) during the Nazi era indicates the ^Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of The Prussian Army 1640- 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s ,. 1955), p. xix. ; ^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State-The Theory and .Politics of Civil-Military. Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 98. 1 2 equally catastrophic results to be expected when political-leaders ignore the warnings of professional soldiers. In.Nazi Germany, the absence of a civil-military equilibrium resulted in distortion of the perspective and judgment of soldiers and statesmen alike,, "leading.to a bellicosity in. peace and a weakness in war which contributed to their ultimate downfall. "3 The thesis that, follows concerns itself only with the Nazi period of German history--in particular, the German military cam­ paigns in France and Flanders in 1940. The civil-military.relation­ ships during this period reflect the complete lack of rapport between. Hitler and the General Staff. The resulting unclear division of responsibilities and conflicting, authority precipitated a host of inex­ cusable errors in military and political management. These factors, together with Hitler’s propensity.for directing local military actions far beyond his competence, contributed to the eventual defeat of the German Armed Forces by the Allied .Powers. 3Ib id .. p. 99. CHAPTER I HITLER REMOVES THE MILITARY OPPOSITION The story of civil-military relationships in .the Third Reich during the years 1933-1940 .is an account of one man’s conquest of a military organization. It describes the diabolical process by which Hitler, ’’the one time corporal, outmaneuvered the strongest General Staff and gained absolute control of the most formidable military machine that the world had ever seen. The General Staff with which'Hitler had to deal was the pro­ duct of the European development of the German State. The precepts and .traditions of the General Staff were admired and emulated by every military power. It was the model to which the United.States turned in 1898 to modernize its own armed forces. The General Staff developed by-the elder Moltke and von Roon subscribed to a policy of complete divorcement of military and politi­ cal affairs. Military plans were prepared without regard to their political implications. Although corporate anonymity