From CK Glantz Vol III Book 2 +Index.Indd

Contents

List of Maps, Tables, and Illustrations ix Preface xv Selected Abbreviations xxi

Part I. Defeating German Relief Attempts, 1–19 December 1942 1. Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 3 Context 3 Hitler, Manstein, and Paulus 4 The Stavka, Vasilevsky, and Vatutin 20 2. The Southwestern Front’s Battles along the Krivia and Chir Rivers, 1–15 December 39 Context: German Relief Plans 39 Soviet Plans and Preliminary Operations, 1–6 December 40 The Chir (Tormosin) Offensive, 7–15 December 46 3. The Stalingrad Front’s Defense against Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Tempest), 1–19 December 86 The Kotel’nikovo Axis and Preparations for Wintergewitter, 1–12 December 86 Operation Wintergewitter and the Battle for Verkhne-Kumskii, 12–19 December 107 4. The Don and Stalingrad Fronts’ Battle for the Stalingrad Pocket, 1–15 December 159 The Offensive, 1–5 December 159 Preparing the Way for 2nd Guards Army, 6–15 December 185 Conclusions 206

Part II. The Expanding Soviet Offensive, 16–31 December 1942 5. Operation Little Saturn and the Tormosin Offensive, 16–31 December 223 Context 223 Operation Little Saturn, 16–31 December 227 5th Tank, 5th Shock, and 2nd Guards Armies’ Tormosin Offensive, 16–31 December 245 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. viii Contents

6. The End of Wintergewitter and Donnerschlag (Thunder Clap) and the Stalingrad Front’s Kotel’nikovo Offensive, 16–31 December 1943 286 Wintergewitter and Donnerschlag, 16–23 December 286 The Climax of Wintergewitter, 19–24 December 297 The Stalingrad Front’s Kotel’nikovo Offensive, 24–27 December 317 The Consequences of German Defeat 327 7. The Stalingrad Pocket, 16–31 December 333 Sixth Army’s Situation on 16 December 333 Combat Operations, 16–23 December 342 After Donnerschlag, 24–31 December 351 Conclusions 376

Part III. Operation Ring: The Destruction of Sixth Army, 1 January–2 February 1943 8. Sixth Army’s Situation, Preliminaries, and the Don Front’s Plan, 1–9 January 395 The Expanding Soviet Offensive 395 Sixth Army’s Situation 398 Preliminary Operations 407 Preparing Operation Ring [Kol’tso] 419 9. Destruction: The First Stage, 10–17 January 433 The Ultimatum 433 The Soviet Advance to the Rossoshka River, 10–14 January 435 From the Rossoshka River to Pitomnik, 15–17 January 481 10. Destruction: The Second Stage, 18–25 January 495 The Lull, 18–21 January 495 The Soviet Advance, 22–25 January 510 11. Destruction: The Finale, 26 January–2 February 529 Rokossovsky’s Plan 529 The Soviet Advance and Liquidation of Sixth Army’s Southern Pocket, 26–30 January 530 Paulus’s Surrender and the Soviet Liquidation of Sixth Army’s Northern Pocket, 31 January–2 February 559 The Aftermath 571 Conclusions 578 12. Context, Conclusions, and Summary Judgments 585

Maps,Tables, and Illustrations

Maps 1. Army Group Don’s plan Wintergewitter [Winter Tempest], 1 December 1942 12 2. 5th Tank Army’s battle along the Chir River: situation, 2 December 1942 43 3. Situation along the Chir River, 6 December 1942 45 4. Situation along the Chir River, 7 December 1942 50 5. Situation along the Chir River, 8 December 1942 57 6. Situation along the Chir River, 9 December 1942 61 7. Situation along the Chir River, 11 December 1942 66 8. Situation along the Chir River, 13 December 1942 72 9. Situation along the Chir River, 15 December 1942 82 10. Fourth Panzer Army’s situation at 2200 hours, 10 December 1942 99 11. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 11 December 1942 105 12. Stalingrad Front’s Kotel’nikovo defense, 12–23 December 1942 108 13. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 12 December 1942 109 14. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 13 December 1942 116 15. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 14 December 1942 122 16. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 15 December 1942 126 17. 4th Mechanized Corps’ fight for Verkhne-Kumskii, 14–15 December 1942 127 18. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 16 December 1942 132 19. 4th Mechanized Corps’ fight for Verkhne-Kumskii, 16–17 December 1942 133 20. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 17 December 1942 138 21. 1378th Rifle Regiment’s defense at Verkhne-Kumskii, 16–18 December 1942 139 22. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 18 December 1942 144 23. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 19 December 1942 149 24. 3rd Guards (4th) Mechanized Corps’ withdrawal to the Myshkova River, 19 December 1942 150 25. Stalingrad pocket, 1 December 1942 162 26. Sixth Army’s Western Front, 1 December 1942 163 27. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 4–5 December 1942 171 28. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 6–7 December 1942 186 29. Stalingrad pocket, 8–10 December 1942 191 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. x Illustrations

30. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 7–10 December 1942 193 31. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 11–14 December 1942 203 32. Operation Little Saturn: opposing force, 16 December 1942 229 33. Operational plan for Little Saturn 231 34. Soviet Little Saturn and Kotel’nikovo offensives, 16–31 December 1942 234 35. Situation along the Chir River, 16 December 1942 246 36. Situation along the Chir River, 18 December 1942 249 37. Situation along the Chir River, 19–20 December 1942 251 38. Situation along the Chir River, 22–24 December 1942 257 39. Plan for the Tormosin offensive: situation on 23–24 December 1942 260 40. 5th Tank Army’s advance on Chernyshkovskii: situation on 25–26 December 1942 263 41. 5th Tank Army’s advance: situation on 27 December 1942 266 42. 5th Tank Army’s advance: situation on 28 December 1942 268 43. 5th Tank Army’s advance: situation on 29 December 1942 269 44. 5th Tank Army’s advance: situation on 30–31 December 1942 270 45. Tormosin offensive: situation on 29 December 1942 274 46. Tormosin offensive: situation on 30 December 1942 278 47. Tormosin offensive: situation on 31 December 1942 282 48. Donnerschlag (Thunderclap): Sixth Army’s breakout plan, 17 December 1942 288 49. Wintergewitter and Donnerschlag, 19–23 December 1942 289 50. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 20 December 1942 299 51. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 21 December 1942 303 52. LVII Panzer Corps’ advance, 22 December 1942 310 53. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 23 December 1942 312 54. Kotel’nikovo offensive: Stalingrad Front’s plan 319 55. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation on 24 and 25 December 1942 322 56. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation on 26 and 27 December 1942 325 57. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 29 December 1942 328 58. Kotel’nikovo axis: situation at 2200 hours, 30 December 1942 329 59. Stalingrad pocket, 20 December 1942 345 60. Sixth Army’s revised plan for Donnerschlag (Thunderclap), 26 December 1942 362 61. Initial plan for Operation Kol’tso (Ring), 27 December 1942 373 62. Final plan for the first stage of Operation Kol’tso (Ring), with Stavka corrections 375 63. Stavka’s offensive plans, 13 December 1942–20 January 1943 396 64. Stavka’s offensive plans, 20–26 January 1943 397 65. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 2 January 1943 402 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Illustrations xi

66. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 5 January 1943 410 67. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 6 January 1943 412 68. Stalingrad pocket’s Western Front, 8 January 1943 414 69. Don Front’s Operation Kol’tso (Ring), 10 January–2 February 1943 420 70. Opposing forces in the Stalingrad region, 10 January 1943 430 71. Operation Ring, 10–13 January 1943 436 72. 62nd Army’s attack plan, 9 January 1943 445 73. Operation Ring, 13–17 January 1943 478 74. Operation Ring, 17–25 January 1943 499 75. Operation Ring, 25–31 January 1943 533 76. 284th Rifle Division’s positions, 26–28 January 1943 535 77. Destruction of Sixth Army’s Southern Pocket, 28–31 January 1943 544 78. Destruction of Sixth Army’s Northern Pocket, 28 January– 2 February 1943 545

Tables 1. Assembly and concentration of forces designated to participate in Operation Wintergewitter 41 2. Combat strength of selected 62nd Army formations fighting in Stalingrad city, 1–3 December 1942 168 3. Dispositions of the Stalingrad Front’s 2nd Guards and 51st Armies at dawn on 22 December 1942 (from right to left or west to east) 307 4. Combat rating and mobility of infantry, panzer-grenadier, and pioneer battalions subordinate to Sixth Army’s divisions, 16 November and 15 December 1942 335 5. Comparison of the combat strength of Sixth Army’s combat battalions (grenadier [infantry], panzer-grenadier, and pioneer), 16 November and 15 December 1942 338 6. Approximate locations of opposing forces in and around Sixth Army’s Stalingrad pocket, 16 December 1942 340 7. Combat rating and mobility of infantry, panzer-grenadier, and pioneer battalions subordinate to Sixth Army’s divisions, 15 and 21 December 1942 352 8. Comparison of the combat strength of Sixth Army’s combat battalions (grenadier [infantry], panzer-grenadier, and pioneer), 15 and 21 December 1942 354 9. Combat rating and mobility of infantry, panzer-grenadier, and pioneer battalions subordinate to Sixth Army’s divisions, 21 and 28 December 1942 367 10. Comparison of the combat strength of Sixth Army’s combat battalions (grenadier [infantry], panzer-grenadier, and pioneer), 21 and 28 December 1942 369 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. xii Illustrations

11. Operational formations of the Don Front and its subordinate armies in Operation Ring [Kol’tso], 10 January 1943 424 12. Strength of the Don Front and its subordinate armies, 10 January 1943 431 13. Correlation of the Don Front’s and German Sixth Army’s forces, 10 January 1943 431 14. Correlation of forces in the Don Front’s main attack sector, 9 January 1943 432

Photographs (following p. 32) Lieutenant General Dmitrii Danilovich Leliushenko, commander of 3rd Guards Army Lieutenant General Fedor Mikhailovich Kharitonov, commander of 6th Army Lieutenant General Ivan Timofeevich Shlemin, commander of 5th Tank Army Major General of Tank Forces Mikhail Vasil’evich Volkov, commander of 5th Mechanized Corps Major General Ivan Nikitich Russianov, commander of 1st Guards Mechanized Corps Major General of Tank Forces Pavel Pavlovich Poluboiarov, commander of 17th Tank Corps Major General of Tank Forces Boris Sergeevich Bakharov, commander of 18th Tank Corps Major General of Tank Forces Vasilii Mikhailovich Badanov, commander of 24th (later 2nd Guards) Tank Corps. Badanov became Lieutenant General on 26 December 1942 Major General of Tank Forces Petr Petrovich Pavlov, commander of 25th Tank Corps Lieutenant General Ivan Vasil’evich Galanin, commander of 24th Army Lieutenant General Markian Mikhailovich Popov, deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front and commander of 5th Shock Army and, later, 5th Tank Army Colonel General Viacheslav Dmitrievich Tsvetaev, commander of 5th Shock Army starting 26 December 1942 Lieutenant General Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovsky, commander of 2nd Guards Army Major General of Tank Forces Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov, commander of 7th (later 3rd Guards) Tank Corps. Rotmistrov became Lieutenant General on 29 December 1942 Major General Karp Vasil’evich Sviridov, commander of 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Illustrations xiii

Major General of Tank Forces Semen Il’ich Bogdanov, commander of 6th Mechanized Corps From left to right, Colonels General of Aviation K. A. Vershinin, S. A. Krasovsky, and S. I. Rudenko, commanders of the North Caucasus Front’s VVS and 17th and 16th Air Armies, respectively Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander-in-chief of Army Group Don General of Infantry Karl Hollidt (right), commander of Army Group [Detachment] Hollidt, with General Walther Model, commander of Ninth Army Lieutenant General Erhard Raus, commander of 6th Panzer Division

(following p. 207) A Soviet commander briefing his troops prior to Operation Little Saturn in mid-December 1942 Soviet infantry attacking in Operation Little Saturn Soviet tanks advancing in Operation Little Saturn Soviet infantry assaulting the town of Chertkovo in Operation Little Saturn German self-propelled guns attacking during Operation Wintergewitter Troops of 166th Rifle Regiment of 2nd Guards Army’s 98th Rifle Division defending along the Myshkova River in December 1942 Soviet antitank guns defending along the Kotel’nikovo axis in December 1942 The Southwestern Front’s troops advancing into the eastern Donbas region in early January 1943 Soviet antiaircraft fire in December 1942 The Soviet artillery preparation during Operation Ring, January 1943 Soviet antiaircraft fire downing a Junkers aircraft in early January 1943 Troops and tanks from the Don Front’s 5th Separate Tank Regiment assaulting German positions along the Rossoshka River in January 1943 62nd Army’s troops assaulting a German strong point in Stalingrad in January 1943 Troops of 21st and 62nd Armies linking up in Stalingrad on 26 January 1943 Field Marshal von Paulus at 64th Army’s headquarters on 31 January 1943 Generals Rokossovsky and Voronov (first and second from the left) debriefing Field Marshal von Paulus after his capture German prisoners on the streets of Stalingrad, 4 February 1943 The graves of Sixth Army’s dead in the Stalingrad region, January 1943 Captured German equipment in February 1943 Field Marshal von Paulus being led into captivity The Red Flag flying over Stalingrad’s center city General Gur’ev, commander of 39th Guards Rifle Division, inspects the captured Krasnyi Oktiabr’ Factory in early February 1943 Soviet soldiers marching through re-captured Stalingrad, 4 February 1943 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. xiv Illustrations

The ruins of Stalingrad’s center city in early February 1943 A German Ju-52 aircraft landing at Pitomnik airfield in January 1943

(following p. 379) The Soviet ultimatum demanding Sixth Army’s surrender, 8 January 1943 Colonel General K. K. Rokossovsky, Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, and Lieutenants General F. I. Tolbukhin and M. S. Gromadin receiving awards in the Kremlin on 5 February 1943 A Soviet leaflet urging Germans to surrender The “Kessel Madonna of Stalingrad” drawn by a German physician/ theologian during the siege German poster—with the slogan, “Stalingrad: The Fuhrer orders, we follow!” German poster—with the slogan, “Stalingrad—The immortal model of German warriors” German newspaper announcing Sixth Army’s surrender General of Panzer Troops Otto von Knobelsdorff, commander of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps Lieutenant General Erhard Raus, commander of 6th Panzer Division The village of Maslov (Masloff) on the Bystraia River 16 kilometers northwest of Tatsinskaia The headquarters of 6th Panzer Division in the village of Maslov during early January 1943 Colonel Walther von Hünersdorff, commander of 6th Panzer Division’s 11th Panzer Regiment 6th Panzer Division’s panzer-grenadiers on APCs in the Bystraia River valley A tank attack by 6th Panzer Division’s 11th Panzer Regiment toward the “Rabbit” [Kanichen] Farm, 2 kilometers northwest of the village of Maslov A tank attack by 6th Panzer Division toward Nadezhdovka, in the Bystraia valley 10 kilometers north of the village of Maslov 6th Panzer Division on the attack in the Bystraia River valley Unknown village in the Bystraia River valley A Soviet T-34/76 tank destroyed by 6th Panzer Division in fighting in the Bystraia River valley Troops of 6th Panzer Division clearing snow from dirt roads in the eastern Donbas region during early January 1943 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Preface

The Battle of Stalingrad, the epic World War II struggle pitting the Wehr- macht of Adolf Hitler’s Third German Reich and the armies of his Axis allies against the Red Army of Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union, culminated in Novem- ber 1942 when Soviet forces struck back against their Axis tormentors. About six months had passed since Axis armies first lunged eastward across the southern Soviet Union. During this time, the Axis invaders wrought havoc on the defending Soviets, inflicting more than 1 million casualties on the Red Army and advancing over 600 kilometers (372 miles) to reach the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains and Stalin’s namesake city on the Volga River. Despite debilitating defeats and repeated futile attempts to contain and strike back at the invaders, the Red Army succeeded in halting Axis forces in the rubble-filled streets of Stalingrad in October 1942. With his and the Wehrmacht’s reputation at stake, Germany’s Führer ordered his coun- try’s most famous army—General Friedrich Paulus’s Sixth—to capture Sta- lingrad at all costs. The grisly fighting that ensued bled Sixth Army white, leaving the frustrated Hitler no choice but to commit the forces of his Axis allies to front-line positions. As they had done the year before, Stalin and his Stavka (High Com- mand) skillfully exploited Hitler’s unbridled ambition, which pushed the Wehrmacht well beyond the limits of its capabilities. After failing repeatedly to identify and exploit weaknesses in Axis defenses during the summer and fall of 1942, the Stavka finally did so in mid-November 1942 by orchestrating Operation Uranus, the most important of a galaxy of counteroffensives designed to defeat the Axis enemy and seize the strategic initiative in what the Soviets now termed the Great Patriotic War. In its Uranus counteroffensive, the Red Army’s three attacking fronts defeated and largely destroyed the bulk of two Romanian armies and encircled German Sixth Army and half of German Fourth Panzer Army in the Stalingrad pocket, literally turning Ger- many’s world upside down. Within the next ten weeks, the Red Army par- ried and then defeated two German attempts to rescue Sixth Army, crushed Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies, severely damaged German Fourth Panzer and Second Armies, and destroyed German Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad. With well over half a million soldiers rudely torn from its order of battle in the East, Hitler’s Axis watched in horror as its status © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. xvi Preface abruptly changed from victor to vanquished. In short, the Axis defeat at Stal- ingrad was a turning point in this war because it was a catastrophe from which Germany and its Wehrmacht could never fully recover. The first two volumes in this trilogy describe the antecedents to this catastrophe: first, the Germans’ deceptively triumphal march east into the Caucasus and to Stalingrad, and second, the vicious battle of attrition in Sta- lingrad proper, which proved to be as pivotal in that campaign as the battle would become in the war as a whole. Both volumes exploit copious amounts of recently released archival materials to identify, document, and dispel those myths about the campaign that have prevailed since war’s end. The mythology associated with the Stalingrad campaign is a natural by- product of the sources on which previous histories were based. The destruction of German Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad has fascinated historians and the general public for seventy years. Despite this fascination and the innumerable books on the subject, many of the causes and events of this tragedy have eluded posterity. As the first two volumes in this study have demonstrated, the fighting in Stalingrad can be understood only within the context of a German campaign that originally had almost no interest in capturing the city. The invaders came within a few miles of their true goal, the oil fields of the Caucasus, only to fail. The broad causes of that failure were almost identical to those that had frustrated Germany in 1941: logistical overstretch, the inability to focus on a single objective, and the increasingly sophisticated organization and conduct of the Wehrmacht’s opponent, the Red Army. A second reason for our collective ignorance about this campaign is that participants on both sides wrote their accounts based on their memories, with little access to official records. Throughout the Cold War, many of the German records appeared to be irretrievably lost, and Soviet participants such as Vasilii Chuikov and Georgii Zhukov were also restricted to their own recollections. A third and related reason for misunderstanding Stalingrad is the wide- spread acceptance, at least in the West, of the German mythology concerning the entire conflict. It is human nature to seek excuses for one’s failures and even to rearrange one’s memories in a way that provides a logical if over- simplified explanation of what is often a complex and disjointed process. Thus, most German survivors of the “Eastern Front” offered as literal truth what was, in fact, their own (perhaps unconscious) alibi for defeat. In this version, the German survivors remembered advancing easily, almost without opposition, until they became entangled in the bombed-out streets of Stalingrad. Then and only then, in the German collective memory, was their fanatical but clumsy enemy able to bleed them to death in a hundred combat actions. Once the German forces were depleted, the Romanian and Italian © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Preface xvii units on their flanks crumbled in the face of overwhelming Soviet attacks that were able to encircle and strangle Sixth Army. Even then, the collective alibi argues, the Wehrmacht might have escaped were it not for the criminal interference of the amateur Hitler and the incredible passivity of Paulus. If nothing else, this final volume should demonstrate that Hitler was not alone in his mistakes and that the Red Army had become so effective and Sixth Army so weak that there was little chance of Paulus breaking out to join hands with the scratch German forces sent to his rescue. We will leave it to the reader to discover the other causes of German failure and Soviet success, many of which are detailed in these pages and in the two previous volumes. Suffice it to say, despite incredible gallantry and suf- fering on both sides, the Red Army ultimately won out, beginning the long process of redeeming Soviet territory from the Axis. Like its predecessor tomes, this third volume tests controversial questions and prevailing myths on the basis of fresh documentary evidence. The principal difference between this and the previous volumes is the sheer quantity of questions and myths associated with this period of the fighting. In short, this period is replete with controversy and unanswered questions, the most notable of which include the following:

• Who was responsible for developing the concept for Operation Uranus? • Why did the Uranus offensive succeed? • Could Sixth Army have escaped encirclement or been rescued? • Why did the German relief attempts fail? • Who was most responsible for Sixth Army’s defeat?

In addition to a wide variety of traditional sources, this volume exploits two major categories of documentary materials that were hitherto unavail- able to researchers. The first consists of extensive records from the combat journal of German Sixth Army, which had been largely missing since the war’s end; large portions of this journal have now been rediscovered and published. The second is a vast amount of newly released Soviet (Russian) archival materials, including excerpts from the Red Army General Staff’s daily operational summaries; a wide variety of Stavka, People’s Commissar- iat of Defense (NKO), and Red Army General Staff orders and directives; and the daily records of Soviet 62nd Army and its subordinate divisions and brigades for most of the time fighting was under way in Stalingrad proper. Because of the persistent controversy and mythology characterizing this period, we believe it is necessary and prudent to include in this volume ver- batim English translations of the many documents on which we based our judgments and conclusions. These, along with other detailed evidence in the form of charts and tables, are the substance of the Companion. This © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. xviii Preface supplement to volume 3 offers concrete evidence necessary to accept, re- ject, or simply qualify our conclusions. Thus, like the first two volumes, this one offers unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations of the later stages of the Stalingrad campaign. Since the Red Army’s offensive operations south and west of the Stal- ingrad region during the second half of December 1942 and January 1943 were so vast in scale, this volume concentrates on German and Soviet planning and the conduct of combat operations in the immediate vicinity of Stalingrad during this period. Specifically, it focuses on the struggle in and around Sixth Army’s encirclement pocket, including the launch and defeat of German relief attempts; the Red Army’s efforts to expand its outer encirclement fronts to and beyond the Chir, Don, and Aksai Rivers; and the operations conducted by the Soviet Don and Stalingrad Fronts to reduce Sixth Army’s Stalingrad pocket. As such, it describes in brief the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts’ planning and conduct of the Little Saturn offensive and the Stalingrad (later Southern) Front’s conduct of its Kotel’nikovo and Tormosin offensives. A supplemental Book Three of this third volume will examine military operations tangential to those at Stalingrad but that had a major effect on the ultimate fate of German Sixth Army. Thus, it will include unprecedented details about the offensive operations the Red Army conducted south and west of Stalingrad during the second half of December 1942 and all of January 1943, specifically:

• The Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts’ Operation Little Saturn against Italian Eighth Army • The Stalingrad (Southern) Front’s Kotel’nikovo and Rostov offensives against German Fourth Panzer, Romanian Fourth, and, later, German First Panzer Armies • The Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts’ Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh’ offensive operation against Hungarian Second Army • Most of the Briansk and Voronezh Front’s Voronezh-Kastornoe offensive operation against German Second Army • The Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts’ offensive in the eastern Don- bas region against Army Abteilung Fretter-Pico and Army Group Hollidt • The Trans-Caucasus Front’s offensive in the northern Caucasus region against German First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies

A research effort of this magnitude would not be possible without the support of numerous individuals and agencies. In this regard, we must again thank Jason Mark, both for his generous personal assistance and for the groundbreaking tactical accounts of Stalingrad published by Leaping Horse- man Books in Pymble, Australia. Likewise, William T. McCroden, who has © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Preface xix spent a lifetime compiling detailed and definitive orders of battle for Ger- man forces during the war, shared with us the numerous draft volumes produced by his research. Most important for this volume, we are indebted to two individuals whose keen knowledge of the war and the German language proved indispensable. The accomplished German military historian Dr. Romedio Graf von Thun- Hohenstein generously and selflessly volunteered to critique the manuscript for this volume. He spent countless hours reading it and commenting on all aspects of it, pointing out errors in fact and interpretation, identifying necessary sources, and correcting our frequent mutilations of the German language. Dr. Lothar Zeidler, a veteran of the war who served for more than two years in the Wehrmacht’s 168th Infantry Division and was twice wounded, translated many pages of German documents and shared with us his copious notes and other memorabilia from the war. Both generously provided their assistance driven by the desire to make this volume as accurate and objective as possible. We deeply appreciate their help. As with our previous efforts, we gratefully acknowledge the crucial role Mary Ann Glantz played in editing and proofreading the manuscript.

David M. Glantz Jonathan M. House Carlisle, PA Leavenworth, KS © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Selected Abbreviations

German (Axis) Soviet Higher Commands Commands and Forces OKW (Oberkommando der A—army Wehrmacht)—Armed Forces High GA (Gds.A)—guards army Command TA—tank army OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres)— TC—tank corps Army High Command GTC (Gds.TC)—guards tank corps AG (H.Gr.) (Heeresgruppe)—army MC—mechanized corps group GMC (Gds.MC)—guards mechanized A (AOK) (Armeeoberkommando)— corps army RC—rifle corps PzA—panzer army GRC (Gds.RC)—guards rifle corps Harko (Hoherer Artilleriekommando)— CC—cavalry corps higher artillery command (army GCC (Gds.CC)—guards cavalry corps level) MAC—mixed aviation corps Arko (Artilleriekommando)—artillery RD—rifle division command RDNKVD—NKVD rifle division AC (A.K.)—army corps GRD (Gds.RD)—guards rifle division PzC (Pz.K.)—panzer corps CD—cavalry division D (Div.)—division GCD (Gds.CD)—guards cavalry ID (I.D.) (J.D.)—infantry division division PzD (Pz.D.)—panzer division AAD—assault aviation division ID (JD) (mot)—motorized division BAD—bomber aviation division MotD (Mot. D.)—motorized division NBAD—night bomber aviation division CavD (K.D.)—cavalry division FAD—fighter aviation division MtnD—mountain division MAD—mixed aviation division Sec.D—security division FR—fortified region LFD—Luftwaffe field division RB—rifle brigade Br.—brigade TB—tank brigade IB (Inf.B)—infantry brigade GTB (Gds.TB)—guards tank brigade MotB—motorized brigade MB—mechanized brigade PzB—panzer brigade MRB—motorized rifle brigade Rgt. (R)—regiment NRB—naval rifle brigade Sec.R—security regiment DB—destroyer brigade AR—artillery regiment RR—rifle regiment IR—infantry regiment GRR (Gds.RR)—guards rifle regiment PzR—panzer regiment TR—tank regiment © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. xxii Selected Abbreviations

German (Axis) (continued) Soviet (continued) PzGR (Pz.Gren.R)—panzer- GTR (Gds.TR)—guards tank regiment grenadier regiment AR—artillery regiment EngR—engineer regiment Gds.AR—guards artillery regiment MotR—motorized regiment ATR—antitank regiment MtrcR—motorcycle regiment TDR—tank destroyer (antitank) Bn (Btl.)—battalion artillery regiment PzBn—panzer battalion AAR—assault aviation regiment MotBn—motorized battalion BAR—bomber aviation regiment InfBn—infantry battalion MAR—mixed aviation regiment EngBn—engineer battalion RAR—reconnaissance aviation regiment MGBn—machine gun battalion CAR—corps artillery regiment Co. (kp.)—company GAR—gun artillery regiment Btry (battr.)—battery HAR—howitzer artillery regiment G-MR (Gds.-MR)—guards mortar Miscellaneous (multiple-rocket launcher or Abt. (abteilung)—detachment or Katiusha) regiment battalion MtrR—mortar regiment A.A.—reconnaissance abteilung MRR—motorized rifle regiment Pz. A.A.—panzer reconnaissance CR—cavalry regiment abteilung GCR (Gds.CR)—guards cavalry Abschnitt—section or sector regiment Aufkl. (Aufklarung)—reconnaissance RAS—reconnaissance aviation squadron Gp. (Gruppe)—group RBn—rifle battalion HKL—front lines (hauptkampflinie or TBn—tank battalion main combat line) AABn—antiaircraft artillery battalion Inf.— infantry ATBn—antitank battalion Kpfgp. (Kgr.)—kampfgruppe [combat MG-Arty Bn (MGArtyBn)—machine group] gun–artillery battalion mot.—motorized G-MBn (Gds.-MBn)—guards mortar Flak (fugabwehrkanone)—antiaircraft battalion guns Sep.ArmdCarBn—separate armored car Jg (Jäg) (Jäger)—light battalion i. G.—in the General Staff ArmdTrainBn—armored train battalion Pak (panzerabwehrkanone)—antitank Co—company gun Btry—battery Pi—Pioneer (engineer) Pkw (personenkraftwagon)—personnel Miscellaneous carrier AA—antiaircraft Pz.Jg. (panzerJäger)—antitank unit Arty—artillery St.G. (Stu.Gesch.) (stürmgeschutz)— AT—antitank assault gun Cav.—cavalry IG (infanteriegeschutz)—infantry gun CP—command post v.—von DAG—division artillery group z.b.V.—temporarily formed DD—long-range artillery group © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Selected Abbreviations xxiii

German (Axis) (continued) Soviet (continued) (R) (r. or ru.)—Romanian Det.—detachment (I)—Italian FD—forward detachment (H)—Hungarian G (Gds.) as a prefix with any (G)—German abbreviation—guards Gp.—group MTF—motor tractor factory MTS—motor tractor station OP—observation post PVO—antiaircraft defense RAG—regimental artillery group Res.—reserve RVGK—Reserve of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command Sep.—separate SF—state farm © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Part I Defeating German Relief Attempts, 1–19 December 1942 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Chapter One Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas

Context

If the first ten days of Operation Uranus stunned the Germans, they gen- erated conflicting emotions among theSoviets. In the wake of numerous Soviet offensive operations in September and October that had failed miser- ably, the Red Army’s offensive successes from 19 through 23 November were as unprecedented as they were shocking. In fact, the encirclement of Sixth Army paralyzed the Germans, temporarily masking the reality that the Sovi- ets had engaged and defeated Romanian rather than German forces and had prevented the Germans from organizing effective countermeasures to contain and defeat the Soviets’ deep armored thrust. As a result, the encirclement was a reality before the Germans could react, and they never regained their equilibrium. Despite careful planning and the heady missions assigned to their forces, the Soviets were surprised, if elated, by their initial success. Furthermore, as was the case with the Germans, this combination of elation and surprise masked difficulties that would plague Soviet commanders for many more weeks. These became apparent from 24 through 30 November, when scratch German forces halted the Soviet advance along the Krivaia and Chir Riv- ers, and Soviet forces utterly failed to even begin liquidating encircled Sixth Army as rapidly as they had hoped. In short, by 1 December 1942, harsh battlefield realities began to tem- per both Soviet euphoria and German shock. With the initial victories and defeats of the first ten days of Operation Uranus behind them, the Germans and Soviets alike faced genuine life-and-death dilemmas associated primarily with Sixth Army’s ultimate fate. For the Germans, the challenge was to reinforce or relieve General Paulus’s encircled army while stabilizing the front. For the Soviets, the challenge was to fulfill the promises and hopes of Opera- tion Uranus by destroying Sixth Army before the Germans could rescue it. The search for solutions to these dilemmas produced a deadly game of cat and mouse that would endure for the next three weeks. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

4 Chapter One

Hitler, Manstein, and Paulus To Relieve or Not to Relieve The exchange of messages among Hitler, Weichs, and Paulus from 22 through 24 November, during which the Führer forbade any retreat by Sixth Army, makes it easy to argue that Hitler was solely responsible for its loss. At the time, however, the situation was not so obvious. The Red Army’s offensives during the battle for Khar’kov in May 1942, at the Great Bend of the Don in July and August 1942, and in the Kotluban’ region in September and October 1942 had been so poorly prepared that the more agile German panzer forces and the stubbornly defending German infantry and motorized divisions had torn the attacking Soviets apart. As soon as Operation Ura- nus began, the OKH (Army High Command) had started shuffling reserves along the Eastern Front, and the brilliant Field Marshal von Manstein would be in charge of the forthcoming counterstroke. Indeed, on 24 November Manstein sent a message to the OKH indicating that he believed a relief effort could start in early December if the promised reinforcements arrived, although he insisted that the relief would be a near-run thing.1 At 1815 hours the same day, Army Group B sent a telegram to the headquarters of new Army Group Don announcing its composition, although Manstein would not assume full command until 0800 hours on 27 November. The telegram, numbered 419742 and classified “Top Secret,” stated, “Army Group ‘Hoth,’ Sixth Army, 3rd Romanian Army, and Army Group ‘Hollidt’ will be transferred to Army Group ‘Don’ (commander, Field Marshal von Manstein). The date will be reported additionally on 26 November.”2 En- tries in the War Diary [Kriegstagebuch (KTB)] of the OKW (German Armed Forces High Command) for 25 November exuded an air of optimism, despite the harsh reality that Sixth Army was indeed encircled:

The Situation in the East. In regard to the situation in Sixth Army, the Führer feels confident. The 294th and 62nd Infantry Divisions [Army Group Hollidt] came up quickly and linked up with 22nd Panzer Divi- sion. In addition, 336th Infantry Division is coming forward from the west. We remain hopeful that 6th and 11th Panzer Divisions will also come up quickly. Along the Chir River, the chief of staff of Romanian Third Army, Colo- nel [Walter] Wenck, from the German General Staff, is organizing the outfitting of a defensive front. The first reserves have come up to Fourth Panzer Army in the Kotel’nikovskii region. The chief of the German Military Mission in Romania, General Hauffe, contacted Marshal Antonescu with a request about providing fresh Ro- manian forces. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 5

Yesterday, Field Marshal von Manstein was appointed to command Army Group Don. The encircled Sixth Army is holding on to its positions, but its situation with supplies is critical. The unfavorable winter weather and the enemy’s superiority in fighter aircraft compels us to doubt whether we can throw in by air the requested daily norms of material, which include 700 tons of food, ammunition, fuel, etc. The Fourth Air Fleet possesses only 298 transport aircraft and requires about 500 aircraft. The commander of the VIII Air Corps operating at Stalingrad, Colonel-General Richthofen [this was an error: Richthofen commanded Fourth Air Fleet, and Lieutenant General Fiebig commanded VIII Air Corps], proposed the Führer begin withdrawing Sixth Army to the west, and then, once again, attack. How- ever, the Führer categorically rejected this proposal.3

Based on assessments like these, along with Manstein’s imminent presence on the scene and Göring’s comforting, if unrealistic, assurances about resup- plying Sixth Army, Hitler had some reason to believe that the Uranus encirclement could be defeated and that Sixth Army could survive for a brief period if it could be resupplied by air. A few shared Hitler’s optimism, a fact that has been obscured by the subsequent disaster. Captain Hans-Joachim Loser, a battalion commander in 76th Infantry Division at the northwestern corner of the newly formed pocket, recalled his initial reaction:

On 22 or 24 November [1942] the division informed its regiments: we are surrounded, and the Führer has ordered us to hold Fortress Stalingrad. . . . The younger officers identified the basic problem, that the Romanians had been unable to hold the open ground along the Don to the North in the way we had blocked [the attack]. Yet we did not see the situation in dramatic terms. Our division commander [General of Artillery Maximil- ian von Angelis] visited my strongpoint and described the sobering situation to me: “We have often lived through similar situations, you have yourself often seen it. We have a truly excellent location. Our Branden- burgers [the region from which 76th Division was recruited] will do well, I personally have no worries.” We believed him because we had been in analogous situations before, in smaller positions that were perhaps even more difficult [but we had extricated ourselves].4

However, virtually all the commanding generals, Weichs, Paulus, their chiefs of staff, Richthofen, and all the corps commanders in Sixth Army fully ap- preciated the necessity of an immediate breakout and denied any chance of supplying Sixth Army by air. The fact that Manstein broke up the united front among the generals concerning the peril facing Sixth Army indicates © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

6 Chapter One his personal responsibility for its ultimate fate. In Hitler’s eyes, at that time, Manstein was probably the army’s most influential voice concerning operational matters. Given the doubts in many quarters, the airlift issue was bound to resur- face in later conversations with Hitler. Again, Zeitzler, chief of the General Staff, was the primary instigator and the only witness to those conversations, so his account must be viewed with some skepticism. Using estimates from the OKH staff, Zeitzler argued that the encircled forces required an absolute minimum of 300 tons of supplies per day; given the poor weather, that meant the goal should be 500 tons on every day when flying was possible. Göring, trapped by his previous promises to Hitler, insisted that the Luft- waffe could deliver that tonnage. Hitler too was trapped: he had long argued that the Luftwaffe, the new high-technology air force of the Reich, was much more motivated and effective than the uncooperative German army. To re- ject Göring’s assurances would be to repudiate both the Luftwaffe and its chief in favor of the army generals who had so often thwarted the Führer’s will. The conversation ended with Hitler accepting Göring’s promise; the most that Zeitzler could salvage from the clash was permission to report the actual tonnage delivered each day.5 There is no doubt that Göring repeatedly promised to provide the necessary airlift, and there is no doubt that the conversation with Zeitzler occurred. Nonetheless, the timing of that conversation is subject to question. According to Zeitzler’s recollection, he argued with Hitler and Göring on 24 November, the day after Hitler’s return to Wehrwolf. Yet as Joel Hayward has argued, Göring left Berchtesgaden on 22 November and did not see Hitler again until arriving at Rastenburg on the 27th. By that time, Hitler had already committed Sixth Army to withstanding a siege. In the interim, General Richthofen repeatedly telephoned Weichs, Zeitzler, and Jeschonnek (chief of the Luftwaffe’s General Staff), seeking to reverse the airlift decision, but to no avail.6 The proposed retreat of Sixth Army remains one of the great “what if?” debates of World War II. With the benefit of hindsight, many have argued that General Paulus should have defied Hitler and broken out to the west, thereby saving his soldiers and depriving the Soviets of a great victory. This debate really involves two different issues—Paulus’s moral responsibility to disobey his Führer, and the practical possibility of actually accomplishing the withdrawal. Disobeying orders, especially in combat, is always a drastic step. Again, in retrospect, Hitler acted like a madman whose ego mattered more than his troops. Yet this characterization was not clear-cut in 1942, especially for an officer like Paulus, who had worked for the Führer in earlier campaigns. The confrontational, uncouth behavior of Hitler and his adherents undoubt- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 7 edly repelled the general, who was himself a model of civility. Nevertheless, Paulus had witnessed and personally benefited from the phenomenal success achieved by Hitler; to question that success now would have been an act of egotism comparable to that of the dictator himself. Moreover, Paulus undoubtedly believed that if he attempted to disobey at this stage, he would simply be replaced by another commander. Paulus reportedly remarked to Major General Arthur Schmidt, his chief of staff, that “he would willingly give his head for the Sixth Army, but that he felt it was useless to do so.”7 Indeed, Hitler’s negative reaction to General Seydlitz’s decision to withdraw 94th Infantry Division back to the Orlovka region and the ensuing debacle, and the Führer’s subsequent appointment of Seydlitz to command Sixth Army’s northern front, was a clear message that Hitler was prepared to relieve Pau- lus at the first sign of withdrawal. Even Seydlitz seconded Paulus’s decision to accept Hitler’s decision, remarking, “There’s nothing left but to obey.”8 Therefore, having made the strongest possible argument about the danger to his forces, Paulus felt compelled to acquiesce and to hope that his superiors had some solution that was not evident to him. By the time Sixth Army’s commander realized that no such solution existed, it was too late to change his stance. There is also the question of whether a withdrawal was practical. Cer- tainly the last ten days of November, when the Soviet encirclement had not yet solidified, represented the best opportunity for a German escape. How- ever, Sixth Army was not postured for such a breakout. For example, when Weichs ordered XIV Panzer Corps out of Stalingrad to defend against the northern pincer of the Soviet offensive, it took 16th Panzer Division almost two days to disengage from the fighting in the city. Thereafter, this redeploy- ment placed the army off balance, with too many of its mobile forces committed to defending the northwest and west and too few ready to defend or break out to the southwest. Then there was the matter of fuel shortages, which began to hamper Sixth Army’s forces even before the encirclement was complete. In addition, prior to the Uranus offensive, Sixth Army had evacuated many of its horses to protect them for the winter, anticipating that it would not leave Stalingrad until the following spring. Without these draft animals, the infantry divisions could not move their guns or supplies.9 The “mobility factor,” which already plagued Sixth Army’s ability to maneuver before the Soviet counteroffensive, became a major impediment to a successful breakout by mid-December, largely due to Sixth Army’s severe losses in transport during the encirclement battle. A comparison of the mobility factor in Paulus’s Sixth Army before and after the encirclement battle illustrates the problems the army would have faced had it tried to organize a breakout from the Stalingrad pocket (see appendixes 8A and 8B in the Companion). Before the Soviet counteroffensive, © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

8 Chapter One

67 percent of Sixth Army’s combat battalions and 44 percent of its artillery batteries were more than 75 percent mobile, and 94 percent of its combat battalions and 69 percent of its artillery batteries were more than 50 percent mobile. However, by 15 December, only 27 percent of Sixth Army’s combat battalions and 17 percent of its artillery batteries were more than 75 percent mobile, while only 42 percent of its combat battalions and 38 percent of its artillery batteries were more than 50 percent mobile. Expressed in different terms, on 16 November, Sixth Army had 30 combat battalions (28 percent) and 21 artillery batteries (12 percent) that were 90 to 100 percent mobile, but on 15 December, it had only 23 combat battalions (17 percent) and 16 artillery batteries (10 percent) that were 90 to 100 percent mobile. Most of Sixth Army’s losses took place during the weeklong encirclement fight and during the first two weeks of the Soviets’ attempt to reduce the Stalingrad pocket. In addition, if Sixth Army had chosen to conduct a breakout during the critical 24–30 November period, its shock group likely would have consisted of elements of 14th, 16th, and 24th Panzer Divisions and 3rd, 29th, and 60th Motorized Divisions (see appendix 8C in the Companion for the combat rat- ings and tank strength of Sixth Army’s mobile divisions). Among them, these divisions fielded 29 panzer-grenadier or motorized infantry battalions at varying strengths and approximately 121 Pz-II and Pz-IV tanks—equivalent to one full-strength panzer division. However, only 7 of these 29 battalions were rated strong or medium strong, 11 were average, 8 were weak, and 3 were already exhausted. And since the bulk of these 121 tanks were perform- ing the vital role of infantry support, fewer than half could be assembled on short notice without placing other sectors of the front in extreme jeopardy. Therefore, Sixth Army might have escaped Stalingrad, but only on foot and only if it left the bulk of its heavy equipment and supplies behind, as Paulus had reluctantly admitted in his 23 November message to Hitler. Such a withdrawal might have saved as many as half its personnel, but it would have left Sixth Army incapable of further combat and in jeopardy of being destroyed in a subsequent Soviet offensive. As a prudent soldier, Paulus would have been reluctant to risk such a desperate act, which would have reduced his army to an ineffective mass of refugees in the snow. Furthermore, at first, there was no force outside the encirclement capable of assisting Sixth Army’s breakout. After the collapse of Romanian Third Army, the only forces standing between the Red Army and the German rear areas were the remains of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, plus some improvised battle groups. These ad hoc forces had been created by enterprising Ger- man officers who commandeered maintenance, engineer, and labor troops in the region. Paulus’s own adjutant, Colonel Wilhelm Adam, commanded one such battle group, defending the junction of the Don and Chir Rivers. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 9

The Genesis of Operation Wintergewitter

While the Stavka tried various means to maintain the strategic initiative and still contain Sixth Army, German commanders had to deal with the consequences of Hitler’s decision to remain in Stalingrad. These consequences included two related problems: how to reinforce or relieve the encirclement, and how to resupply Paulus until reinforcement or relief could occur. Dis- cussions of these matters began the moment Hitler flatly denied Paulus’s and Weichs’s pleas to withdraw the army. And the daunting task of organizing the relief fell to Army Group Don and its commander, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. On 26 November, just two days after Manstein sent Paulus his initial greeting and a promise of “help to get you out,” an obviously relieved Paulus provided his superior with a candid description of his situation (see appendix 8D in the Companion). The Sixth Army commander began his letter with a straightforward description of the nature of the Soviet offensive and the initial orders he had received. He then stated that the outcome of the struggle was “still uncertain,” that he had “received no orders or information” from a higher level for the past 36 hours, and that he had requested “freedom of action” from Hitler but had not received any positive response.10 In the ab- sence of any guidance from on high, and with his army’s situation deteriorating by the hour, Paulus asked Manstein to help to resolve these vital matters. Paulus ended his letter with a “P.S.” that unwittingly mirrored his situation, writing, “In the circumstances, I hope you will overlook the inadequacy of the paper and the fact that this letter is in longhand.” Although Manstein had tacitly endorsed Hitler’s stand-fast decision, he was most likely ignorant of the situation when he dispatched his 24 Novem- ber message to Paulus while en route to his army group’s headquarters.11 When the field marshal discussed Sixth Army’s situation at Weichs’s headquarters, he still had no idea of the encircled army’s predicament. He did not know how many soldiers had been encircled; nor did he have any real grasp of the Luftwaffe’s ability to supply the army by air. In any case, it was now up to Manstein to develop a plan to rescue Sixth Army and obtain the forces necessary to do so. On 24 November, the new commander of Army Group Don contacted the OKH to recommend that Sixth Army’s breakout be delayed, based on the twin assumptions that aerial resupply could sustain Sixth Army and that more forces were needed to guarantee a successful relief operation. As Manstein explained in his memoir:

The immediate question [on 24 November], however, was whether Sixth Army, having once missed its real opportunity to break out [on 21–22 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

10 Chapter One

November], should try to do so at this particular moment. As two days had passed since General Paulus’s request to Hitler, the attempt could not, according to Army Group B, begin before 29th and 30th November. By then the enemy would already have had more than a week in which to tighten his hold on the pocket.12

As a result, Manstein ultimately concluded, “The relief operation could be launched with the forces due to arrive at the beginning of December.”13 Manstein then discussed two options for Sixth Army’s escape and the associated relief effort: to break out westward toward the Don River crossing at Kalach and the upper Chir River, which he considered riskier because of the stronger Soviet forces along this axis, or to break out to the southwest through the remnants of Fourth Panzer Army, which was also risky because of the lack of German forces along this axis. His initial assessment of the forces available along these axes included the following:

• Headquarters, LVII Panzer Corps, with 23rd Panzer Division and strong army artillery, sent from Army Group A to Fourth Panzer Army to relieve Stalingrad from the south. • 6th Panzer Division (recently brought up to strength) sent from the West to Fourth Panzer Army to relieve Stalingrad from the south. • One headquarters corps (XVII or XXXXVIII Panzer) and four or five divisions sent to Third Romanian Army (left wing) to relieve Stalingrad by an advance eastward from the upper Chir River as Army Detachment Hollidt.14

This initial appreciation actually envisioned a rescue attempt from the Bokovskaia region along the upper Chir River, north of Chernyshevskaia, employing 62nd and 294th Infantry Divisions of Hollidt’s XVII Army Corps, the remnants of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, and whatever fresh infantry divisions could be sent from the West or other front sectors (such as 336th Infantry and, later, 304th and 306th Infantry Divisions). The OKW’s 25 No- vember KTB entry quoted earlier in this chapter provides an optimistic description of a relief operation within the context of other important consid- erations. In reality, the mini-offensive launched by Hollidt’s 62nd and 294th Infantry Divisions against the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards Army along the Krivaia River line on 25 November also reflected this concept. However, the stronger than expected Soviet resistance ultimately put paid to this idea, prompting Manstein to shift his attention from the upper to the lower Chir River and the Don, in particular, the Nizhne-Chirskaia and Rychkovskii regions. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 11

Based on recommendations Manstein submitted to the OKH on 24 No- vember, two days later the latter sent Army Group Don its assessment of what forces would be available to conduct the relief efforts:

(a) Within the framework of Fourth Panzer Army: 57 Panzer Corps under General Kirchner (to be moved over from Army Group A) with 6 and 23 Panzer Divisions and 15 Luftwaffe Field Division under command. These forces were scheduled to arrive in the Kotelnikovo area by 3rd December. (b) Deploying to the sector of Romanian Third Army: a new formation to be known as Army Detachment Hollidt, consisting of 62, 294 and 336 Infantry Divisions; 48 Panzer Corps (General v. Knobelsdorff) with 11 and 22 Panzer Divisions; 3 Mountain Division; and 7 and 8 Luftwaffe Field Divisions. This group was to be ready to become operational on the Upper Chir around 5th December.15

Field Marshal von Manstein altered his assessment of Sixth Army’s situation [Lageburteilung] on 28 November, the same day he sent a detailed appreciation of the situation to Hitler. In the wake of discussions with Richt- hofen and Pickert (commander of 9th Antiaircraft [Flak] Division), Man- stein now definitely ruled out any possibility of supplying Sixth Army by air. Furthermore, he concluded that, under the present circumstances, it would be possible to create only a narrow connection with Paulus’s army, and he concluded that keeping the army in the Stalingrad pocket was unacceptable. Since time was of the essence, he determined that LVII Panzer Corps should be prepared to begin its relief operation by 3 December; Army Group Hol- lidt’s operation, with XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, would begin six days later. However, he underscored that everything depended on the timely arrival of promised reinforcements—a reality that ultimately had a major impact on both relief efforts.16 After receiving Hitler’s approval, Army Group Don issued its order for the relief operation, Wintergewitter (Winter Tempest), on 1 December (see map 1). As originally described by Manstein, while Sixth Army continued “holding its existing positions in the pocket,” the army group would mount two relief thrusts to rescue the army:

On a date still to be fixed (but in any case not earlier than 8th Decem- ber), Fourth Panzer Army was to attack east of the Don with the bulk of its forces, moving off from the area of Kotelnikovo. Once it had thrust through the enemy’s covering forces, its task would be to attack and roll up the southern and/or western siege front encircling Stalingrad. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Map 1. Army Group Don’s plan Wintergewitter [Winter Tempest], 1 December 1942 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 13

A small force provided by Army Detachment Hollidt’s 48 Panzer Corps was to thrust from the Don-Chir bridgehead of Nizhne Chirskaya into the rear of the enemy’s covering forces. Should the enemy opposite Fourth Panzer Army north of Kotelnikovo be conspicuously reinforced prior to the attack, or should the situation of Fourth Romanian Army, whose job was to cover Fourth Panzer Army’s long eastern flank, take another critical turn, the following alternative plan would come into operation. The armoured divisions of Fourth Panzer Army would make a surprise move northwards along the west bank of the Don and launch the main thrust from the Nizhne Chirskaya bridgehead. It was also envisioned that a less powerful shock group should thrust up at Kalach from out of the Don- Chir bridgehead west of the Don in order to cut the enemy’s communications there and open up the Don bridge for Sixth Army. As regards Sixth Army, the orders laid down that on a date after Fourth Panzer Army’s attack still to be fixed by the Army Group it would initially breakthrough to the southwest in the direction of Donskaya Tsarytsa, its aim being to link up with Fourth Panzer Army and to take a hand in rolling up the southern and western siege fronts and capturing the Don crossing.17

Manstein assumed that Hitler would have no choice but to accept the fact that Sixth Army would have to abandon some of its positions. In his memoirs, Major General W. F. von Mellenthin, chief of staff of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, elaborated on his panzer corps’ role in the operation:

It was intended that the 48th Panzer Corps should take command of the 11th Panzer Division, the 336th Infantry Division, and a Luftwaffe field division, which on 4 December were still moving up to the front. When Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army moved on Stalingrad, the 48th Panzer Corps was to cross the Don and join hands with their left flank. Colonel Adam, a member of the staff of Sixth Army, was at Nizhna Chirskaya, with some scratch units he had assembled there.18

Significantly, both relief options planned by Manstein emphasized the importance of the German bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Don River opposite Rychkovskii and Nizhne-Chirskaia, near the junction of the Don and Chir Rivers. As a result, when implemented, Manstein’s plans provided the context for two major battles, both involving Soviet attempts to block the relief efforts. The first of these occurred along the Chir River when the Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army, followed a week later by the Stalingrad Front’s 5th Shock Army, conducted an offensive to seize © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

14 Chapter One

Rychkovskii and Nizhne-Chirskaia. In this instance, the Stavka’s intent was to block any relief operation attempted by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps from the lower Chir region east toward Stalingrad—that is, the northern prong of Op- eration Wintergewitter. Initially under the control of Romanian Third Army and then Army Group Hollidt, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was transferred to Fourth Panzer Army by 3 December. The second battle took place along the Kotel’nikovo axis after Fourth Panzer Army’s LVII Panzer Corps initi- ated the southern prong of Manstein’s relief plan—the advance to Stalingrad from the southwest. In this case, the Stavka organized a stubborn defense while assembling a large enough force to crush German LVII Panzer Corps. Both these battles, of two to three weeks’ duration, fundamentally altered the Stavka’s plan to expand Operation Uranus into Operation Saturn. Of course, independent of these battles, the essential question was: could Sixth Army survive long enough to be rescued? In large part, the answer depended on Göring’s Luftwaffe.

The Aerial Resupply of Sixth Army After the fact, several historians have calculated the true requirements for a successful airlift. Based on estimates by the Luftwaffe’s General Hans Je- schonnek, they concluded that Göring’s pilots would have to bring in 750 tons of supplies per day to fully supply Sixth Army. Although Paulus’s army could “get by” with 500 tons per day, the figure of 300 tons, which Zeitzler suggested to Hitler, was the absolute minimum necessary for subsistence and did not include all the materials necessary to maintain a fighting force. In terms of aircraft, 750 tons represented at least 375 Ju-52s, each fully laden with a 2-ton payload, landing inside the encirclement every 24 hours. In fact, considering the excessive distances to be flown, the practical load limit was probably closer to 1.5 tons per Ju-52. Given an operational readiness rate of only 30 to 35 percent for the overworked transport aircraft, this meant that the Luftwaffe needed at least 1,050 Ju-52s. Yet the entire Luftwaffe had only about 750 Ju-52s in November 1942, and only 47 of these aircraft were immediately available in the Stalingrad region. Ju-52s were in limited supply because, during the encirclement of Sta- lingrad, Hitler committed at least one-third of the German transport fleet to airlifting troops into Tunisia in response to the Allied landings in northwestern Africa.19 In addition to the strategic influence of the Anglo-American war effort in North Africa, the British and American bombing offensive against the German homeland tied down the bulk of Luftwaffe antiaircraft [Flak] units that could have wreaked havoc on Red Army tank forces if they had been deployed to Germany’s Eastern Front. Moreover, the Luftwaffe itself, like Army Group B, was operating at the end of a long supply line because of the poor Soviet road network and the © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 15 different railroad gauges in Germany and the Soviet Union. Consequently, not all Ju-52s could be dedicated to the actual airlift; others were needed to bring critical parts and time-sensitive supplies to the departure airfields of the lower Don. Thus, even before factoring in the weather and the Red Air Force, a sustained airlift was a logical impossibility. Still, Göring had promised Hitler, Jeschonnek had implied that aerial supply of Sixth Army might be possible, and no one in the Luftwaffe wanted to abandon the soldiers of Paulus’s army. On 23 November, the Luftwaffe staff began shifting transports eastward. The training command surrendered several hundred aircraft and skilled instructor pilots. These diversions, in combination with combat losses during the airlifts to Tunisia and Stalingrad, meant that the German air transport fleet never recovered from the crisis of late 1942. Even Lufthansa civil aircraft were pressed into service in the crisis. Yet moving these aircraft, many of them already in need of repair, a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers from Germany to southeastern Russia took time. Bomber aircraft, including the Ju-86, the He-111, and the newly fielded He-177, required additional time to convert to a transport role. On 2 December, when the siege was already a week old, Fourth Air Fleet could muster a total of only 200 transport aircraft, a figure that rose to 300 by 8 December. By that time, Richthofen controlled nine wings of Ju-52s, four wings plus two additional groups of He-111s, two wings of Ju-86s, a wing of He-177s, and even some FW-200 Condors and other long-range aircraft. Subsequent arrivals barely kept pace with the losses that occurred during the airlift.20 While the aircraft gathered, Lieutenant General Martin Fiebig, commander of VIII Air Corps [Fliegerkorps VIII] under Richthofen’s Fourth Air Fleet, began to organize the airlift effort. On 26 November, however, Richthofen conducted a radical reorganization to maximize the effort. Ma- jor General Victor Carganico became responsible for the overall airlift, under Fiebig’s supervision. Richthofen and Carganico segregated the aircraft, concentrating all transports of one type at a single airfield to simplify maintenance and loading. The main departure airfield at Tatsinskaia, 211 kilometers west of Pitomnik, was the base for all Ju-52s, as well as for the 14 Me-109 fighters that patrolled the air corridor. He-111 units operated out of Moro- zovskaia (Morozovsk), the most advanced base, 168 kilometers west of Pitom- nik; the long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft were located at Stalino, a full 440 kilometers away from the pocket. The airfields, especially the arrival field at Pitomnik, 28 kilometers west of Stalingrad, and the four smaller airstrips within the pocket soon became congested.21 In addition to Pitomnik, there was an airfield at Gumrak, 15 kilometers west of Stalingrad and northwest of Gumrak Station, but it was not fully developed because it was too near Sixth Army’s headquarters. There were also lesser airstrips not capable of receiving large aircraft at Karpovka, Basargino (8 kilometers south © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

16 Chapter One of Pitomnik), and Stalingradskii (5 kilometers south of Gorodishche), the last being closest to the front, several kilometers west of Mamaev Kurgan.22 The Germans’ great organizational undertaking had to deal with severe maintenance problems, adverse weather, and Soviet opposition. The Red Army Air Force had been badly outclassed in the summer and fall, but by the time of the airlift, it was able to mount a major effort to thwart Richt- hofen’s pilots. The air armies in the Stalingrad region totaled more than 1,350 aircraft by mid-November, compared with 732 German aircraft (not including the influx of air transports) in Fourth Air Fleet. Moreover, most of these Soviet aircraft were newer, more capable types than those used during the summer months. La-5 and Iak-7 fighters had replaced virtually all the obsolete LaGG-3s, while Pe-2 twin-engine bombers and Il-2 Shturmoviks (assault planes) gave the Soviets a much greater ground-attack capability. Particularly at lower altitudes, where most German transports flew, such aircraft could compete effectively with their German counterparts. The Soviets’ newer aircraft also tended to have higher maintenance readiness rates than the worn-out planes of Fourth Air Fleet. In addition, for the first time in the war, virtually all Soviet aircraft were equipped with radios, which facilitated the task of ground-controlled intercept.23 The German airlift surprised Soviet air commanders at first, but by early December, they had organized an effective air defense campaign. Over the German airfields, the Southwestern Front’s 17th Air Army and the Stalin- grad Front’s 8th Air Army bombed transports on the ground at night and interdicted them on takeoff in the daytime. Around Stalingrad, the Red Air Force’s commander, Colonel General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Novikov, organized three concentric zones. The outer zone, corresponding roughly to the area between the inner and outer fronts of the ground encirclement, was subdivided into five sectors. Here, the Don Front’s 16th Air Army and the Stalingrad Front’s 8th Air Army, reinforced with a division of national air defense fighters, assigned specific fighter units to particular sectors, allow- ing them to become familiar with their operational areas. Kotluban’ airfield served as the headquarters for a ground-intercept control network, vectoring fighters toward any transports it detected.24 The middle zone was an approximately 30-kilometer band where Soviet antiaircraft batteries put up dense barrages along the most likely axes of German flight. This was particularly significant on the western side of the pocket, where the transport pilots had to fly low to land at Pitomnik. Finally, over the German pocket itself, Soviet fighters tried to intercept the transports, while Soviet bombers attacked the arrival airfields.25 In addition to failing to meet Sixth Army’s minimum supply requirements, the airlift proved costly in terms of lost aircraft and lost lives of the aircrews flying them. The best count based on German sources is that 488 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 17 transport aircraft were lost—266 Ju-52s, 42 Ju-86s, 165 He-111s, 9 FW-200s, 5 He-177s, and 1 Ju-290—along with roughly 1,000 airmen. The number of Ju-52s lost amounted to more than one-third of Germany’s entire inventory. Of the 488 total, 166 German aircraft were destroyed, 108 were missing, and 214 were written off.26 By contrast, according to a Soviet estimate, 903 German transports and bombers, including 676 Ju-52s, were destroyed, together with an additional 162 fighter aircraft, for a total of 1,065 planes. Discrepancies of this type are common when computing aerial combat losses and do not necessarily represent intentional deception by either side. For example, the German figure may not include 47 transports destroyed on the ground when 24th Tank Corps overran Tatsinskaia airfield in late December.27 Yet even the most optimistic German accounting would acknowledge that the Red Air Force, winter weather, and prolonged operations gutted the Luftwaffe during the airlift. What did the Luftwaffe accomplish for this terrible price? By any mea- sure—whether the ideal of 750 tons per day or the minimum of 300 tons— the airlift failed. During the first five days (25–29 November), an average of 53.8 tons arrived each day in Stalingrad. The OKW’s daily reports often mentioned the number of flights arriving in the encirclement.For example, one of the earliest comments about aerial resupply was made in the KTB on 27 November. In light of subsequent events, its optimism turned out to be misplaced:

The Situation in the East. Army Group Don occupied its sector at 0800 hours today. The dispersal of enemy forces at Stalingrad presents itself as very favorable for the purposes of Sixth Army. The supply situation of the army is better than presumed up to this time. Only 27 Ju-52s flew today in the Stalingrad region. We have 298 Ju-52s which can bring to Stalin- grad up to about 700 tons daily. In the meantime, the daily requirement consists of 700 tons; and later, after the reserves have been used up, it will amount to 1,500 tons. . . . The consumption of fuel on the Eastern Front is not very great; it amounts to 3,100 cubic meters daily, in comparison with the daily expenditure of 3,500 cubic meters, which the Führer has allocated for Army Groups A and B.28

Entries for subsequent days were as follows:

• 28 November: “In Army Group Don, yesterday, only 30 Ju-52s flew into Stalingrad. The German and Romanian forces encircled there number approximately 400,000 men [German editor: actually, there were about 250,000 men, up to 100 tanks, 1,800 guns, and 10,000 vehicles].”29 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

18 Chapter One

• 30 November: “The command of Sixth Army intends to pull its northwestern flank back even further. Yesterday, of the 38 Ju-52 aircraft that took off, only 12 reached Stalingrad.”30 • 1 December: “Yesterday, 30 Ju-52 and 35 He-111 flew into the Stalingrad region. Sixth Army has been provided with food up to 5 December, and large caliber ammunition is sufficient up to 12 December.”31 • 2 December: “Field Marshal Manstein intends to begin an offensive toward Stalingrad on 4 December. On 1 December only 15 Ju-52 and He- 111 aircraft flew into the Stalingrad region.”32 • 3 December: “The ration strength of those [soldiers] of encircled Sixth Army is not 400,000 [men] as previously assumed, but instead is 300,000 men. Yesterday, 73 aircraft (half of them bombers) delivered 115 tons of foodstuffs, ammunition, and fuel to the Stalingrad region.”33 • 4 December: “In the Stalingrad region, the Luftwaffe was unable to carry out re-supply because of the bad weather (fog and ice with a temperature of 0º).”34

The average number of daily supply sorties rose in early December, when the influx of transports brought the airlift to its height (see appendix 8E in the Companion). Nevertheless, there were only two days in which the airlift even approached the 300-ton mark. On 7 December, a total of 188 sorties moved 282 tons. Twelve days later, on 19 December, Fourth Air Fleet had its best day: 154 aircraft moved a total of 289 tons into Pitomnik while evacuating 1,000 wounded from the pocket. If Sixth Army’s own figures are correct, Luftwaffe aircraft transported an average of 118 tons per day to Sta- lingrad from 1 through 15 December. Other sources vary: one states that the supplies delivered to Sixth Army’s encirclement pocket from 1 through 12 December averaged 97.3 tons per day, a quantity that increased to 137.7 tons from 12 through 31 December.35 Whichever figure is correct, the tonnage was far below Sixth Army’s minimal requirement of 300 tons per day. Accordingly, Paulus’s army had to ration ammunition, fuel, and food almost from the beginning of its siege. Overall, during the 71-day airlift, the Luftwaffe transported 8,350.7 tons of food and supplies, or an average of 117.6 tons per day. Although the airlift failed to feed and supply Sixth Army, it did evacuate at least 24,900 wounded soldiers who otherwise would have died or become prisoners.36 Paradoxi- cally, however, the most severely wounded were often the least likely to escape, because one man on a litter occupied the same cabin space as three or more seats for the “walking wounded.” After 30 November, all German aerial resupply efforts in support of encircled Sixth Army were handled by Fourth Air Fleet’s VIII Air Corps, led © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 19 by Fiebig, the commander of Stalingrad air supply operations [Luftversor- gungdfuhrer Stalingrad]. The Luftwaffe employed three airfields as bases for the airlift:

• Tatsinskaia, 211 kilometers and 60 minutes of flying time from Pitomnik, with Ju-52 and Ju-86 transport aircraft under the command of Colonel Hans Förster • Morozovskaia (Morozovsk), 168 kilometers and 50 minutes of flying time, with He-111s and Ju-86 medium bombers belonging to VIII Air Corps’ 55th Bomber Wing, commanded by Colonel Bernhard Kühl • Stalino, 322 kilometers and 80 minutes of flying time, with long-range reconnaissance and bomber aircraft commanded by Major Willers

Fighter escort for the transports, when available and if the weather per- mitted, were provided by 3rd Fighter Wing, commanded by Major Wolf- Dietrich Wilcke.37 To understand the scale of food rationing in Stalingrad, consider that a minimum of 2,500 calories per day was considered necessary for a soldier to maintain his fighting capabilities in severe winter conditions. After the Soviet pincers closed around Stalingrad on 23 November, Sixth Army had only six days of full rations left. As a result of the failed aerial resupply, Sixth Army reduced each soldier’s intake to 1,500 calories on 26 November and 1,000 calories on 8 December.38 Representative of this process, each man’s bread ration amounted to 8 ounces (half the normal ration) per day by 23 November and decreased to 2 ounces per day by 26 December. This was accompanied by less than a quart of vegetable soup at midday and either tinned food or a second bowl of soup in the evening.39 Another source placed German rations at 200 grams (7 ounces) of bread per day by late December, supplemented by 200 grams of horse meat, 30 grams (1 ounce) of fat, and three cigarettes per day.40 For comparison’s sake, the inhabitants of Leningrad during the frightful siege in the winter of 1941–1942 subsisted on daily rations ranging from 7 to 12.2 ounces for workers and their dependents, while soldiers defending the city received 17.6 ounces of bread.41 The food situation in Stalingrad was confirmed by a veteran from 44th Infantry Division’s 2nd Battalion, 134th Regiment, who later wrote:

Again and again the ration had to be cut [in December 1942]. At first every man was issued one-third of a loaf of bread per day, then a quarter, and later a fifth. This monotonous diet was occasionally supplemented by a few slices of sausage and a meat broth obtained by boiling horse meat. Only the wounded were given half of a bar of chocolate and some brandy immediately after the evacuation to revive their spirits.42 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

20 Chapter One

Paulus addressed these problems in a message he sent to Army Group Don at 2030 hours on 11 December:

Up to now provisions remain well behind expectations. Since 23 Novem- ber, the daily arrivals have been 60 tons instead of the required 600 tons. The munitions situation is sinking dangerously; and the food supply will be sketchily available by 19 December. Unless a considerable increase in the provisioning by air is possible, there must be relief by 18 December at the latest for success.43

The day after Paulus sketched out the problem in no uncertain terms, Gen- eral Wolfgang Pickert, commander of 9th Flak Division, sent a message to Sixth Army entitled “Provisioning of the Army by the Luftwaffe,” which contained a list of the airlift’s shortcomings. First and foremost, Pickert pointed out that the actual amount of supplies sent to Stalingrad to date did not correspond with the practical carrying capacity of the aircraft. For example, although each Ju-52 could carry 2 to 2.5 tons and each He-111 could carry 1.8 to 2 tons, the total of 57 Ju-52s and 313 He-111s that reached Stalingrad from 23 November through 10 December averaged only 1.6 tons per aircraft.44 The message traffic from Paulus to Army Group Don and OKH regarding Sixth Army’s deteriorating supply situation would increase exponentially after 15 December, especially when the relief effort by Hoth’s LVII Panzer Corps began to falter. In short, by mid-December, it was clear to Paulus and his subordinates that unless something was done to improve the army’s provisioning or relieve it entirely, their soldiers would surely perish, if not at Russian hands then by starvation.

The Stavka, Vasilevsky, and Vatutin The Evolution of Operation Saturn, 1–8 December The crystallizing defenses of Axis forces along the Krivaia and Chir Rivers and in the Kotel’nikovo region at the end of November forced Stalin, the Stavka, Stavka representative Vasilevsky, and the three front commanders in the Stalingrad region to reassess their plans. In fact, by now, the Soviets were prisoners of their own success at Stalingrad. They had expected to trap perhaps 90,000 Germans but eventually estimated that up to 300,000 men were actually inside the encirclement. The Don and Stalingrad Fronts, therefore, had to devote most of their efforts to containing and reducing encircled Sixth Army, a process that ultimately took more than two months.45 The Stavka’s original strategy had been to follow a successful Opera- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 21 tion Uranus with the even more grandiose Operation Saturn, which was designed to push Axis forces out of the entire eastern Donbas region and trap and destroy Axis forces in the Caucasus (see map 35 in Book 1). Saturn required General Vatutin’s Southwestern Front, assisted by 6th Army of Gen- eral Golikov’s Voronezh Front, to expand the Uranus offensive by advancing southwestward from the Don, Krivaia, and Chir Rivers and capturing the city of Rostov-on-the-Don, 300 kilometers south of Verkhnyi Mamon on the Don and the same distance southwest of Nizhne-Chirskaia on the Chir. By capturing Rostov and other major communications centers along the lower Don River, Soviet forces would cut off the logistical support and withdrawal routes of German Army Group A, which was still heavily engaged deep in the Caucasus region. During the last few days of November, Stalin, Vasilevsky, and Vatutin ce- mented the final command arrangements for Saturn. They created two powerful shock groups on 1st Guards Army’s left and right wings, integrated the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army into the offensive plan, and appointed Lieuten- ant General Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovsky to command the newly formed and powerful 2nd Guards Army, Saturn’s premier exploitation force. As De- cember began, the participants in Operation Saturn anxiously awaited their final attack orders. However, the strategic situation had sharply changed, primarily because the Germans had begun to assemble forces to rescue their encircled Sixth Army. As a result, the Stavka now faced not one but three related tasks— reducing encircled Sixth Army; defeating the German forces gathering to rescue Sixth Army, especially along the Chir River; and launching Opera- tion Saturn. In a sense, Stalin and his lieutenants faced a problem similar to that which had plagued Hitler for the preceding four months—how to use inadequate forces to achieve simultaneous but geographically separate goals. Organizationally, the issue revolved around the use of Malinovsky’s 2nd Guards Army, which ultimately included more than 122,000 men, 2,325 guns and mortars, and 469 tanks. This made it almost twice as large as most So- viet armies in 1941–1942 and far closer in size and equipment to a German field army. It included 1st and 13th Guards Rifle Corps, each with three guards rifle divisions; a full complement of supporting artillery; and the new 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, with more than 200 tanks. Eventually, it would be reinforced by 7th Tank and 6th Mechanized Corps, increasing its armored strength to more than 450 vehicles. Leliushenko’s 1st Guards Army, which would end up spearheading Operation Saturn, was even larger than Malinovsky’s army, having more than 142,000 men and its own 1st Guards Mechanized Corps with 163 tanks.46 Throughout late November and into early December, Stalin hedged his bets, hoping that Malinovsky’s force would still be available for Operation © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

22 Chapter One

Saturn. Thus, 2nd Guards Army remained Saturn’s exploitation force as the Stavka and Vasilevsky refined the plan during the first week of December. On 9 December, however, the Stavka, frustrated over its inability to liquidate Sixth Army’s encirclement pocket, diverted Malinovsky’s army from Opera- tion Saturn to the task of reducing Sixth Army’s pocket. Only days later, however, the disturbing specter of a Fourth Panzer Army relief attempt emanat- ing from the Kotel’nikovo region compelled the Stavka to divert 2nd Guards Army again, this time to defeat the relief effort (see below). This decision was not an easy one. Elated by Uranus’s initial success, Sta- lin wanted to proceed with his strategic plan and crush the entire German force in the south. By this time, however, the Soviet attackers had expended much of their supplies and reserve forces. This, combined with the loss of surprise and the stiffening of German defenses along the Chir and in the Kotel’nikovo region, made further Soviet advances more difficult. Though preoccupied by his own failure in Operation Mars, Zhukov, in his capacity as deputy supreme commander, urged caution. On 29 November, he sent Stalin a long cable suggesting the creation of strong armored reserves to defeat the forthcoming counterstrokes near Nizhne-Chirskaia (XXXXVIII Panzer Corps) and Kotel’nikovo (LVII Panzer Corps). When some staff officers proposed diverting troops from the encirclement to continue the offensive operation, Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky objected vociferously, convinc- ing Stalin that major forces must focus on eliminating Sixth Army.47 All this ultimately led to the truncation of Saturn into the far less ambitious Little Saturn—a matrix of offensive operations aimed at defeating German relief attempts. However, it would take well over a week for this transformation to take place. In accordance with General Vasilevsky’s instructions, on 28 November, General Vatutin reorganized the forces on his Southwestern Front’s right wing so that they could conduct Operation Saturn (see appendix 7C in the Companion). He formed a large shock group in the Verkhnyi Mamon region along the Don River, on the right wing of Leliushenko’s 1st Guards Army, and assigned General Kuznetsov, his deputy, to command this group. Thus, when Operation Saturn began, Leliushenko was to control the shock group on the army’s left wing as well as the army as a whole, while Kuznetsov controlled the shock group on the right wing along the Don River. The Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army was to support Leliushenko’s group by attacking toward Tormosin and Morozovsk, and the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army was to support Kuznetsov by attacking toward Kantemirovka. With command and control issues settled, Vatutin issued the attack order for Operation Saturn on 2 December (see appendix 8F in the Compan- ion). The directive required the Southwestern Front to conduct an offensive with Leliushenko’s 1st Guards Army and encircle and destroy Italian Eighth © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 23

Army’s main forces, the remnants of Romanian Third Army, and German operational reserves committed against the Southwestern Front from other axes—primarily, Army Group Hollidt. Simultaneously, on the Southwestern Front’s left wing, 5th Tank Army was to continue its offensive southward across the Chir, capture Tormosin, and then wheel westward along the Mo- rozovsk axis to destroy enemy forces operating there and reach the Northern Donets River. Overall, the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards and 5th Tank Armies, supported by the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army on their right, were to reach the Il’inka (60 kilometers northeast of Morozovsk), Kalitva River, and Northern Donets River front. Once they were concentrated for the offensive, 1st Guards Army’s forces included 1st Guards and 5th Mechanized Corps; 159th, 197th, 278th, 203rd, and 266th Rifle Divisions; 47th, 50th, and 14th Guards Rifle Divisions; 90th and 94th Rifle and 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigades; 3 tank regiments; 19 -ar tillery regiments; and 1st Mixed Aviation Corps. This force was to “penetrate the enemy’s defenses in the Astakhov and Sviridov sector and, by attacking along the Bokovskaia–Verkhne Chirskii, and Bokovskaia-Kashary axes, as well as toward Pervomaiskii and Bol’shinka [with five reinforced rifle divisions and two mechanized corps], link up with Lieutenant General Kuznetsov’s operational group, which was attacking [south] toward Boguchar and Kashary, to encircle and destroy the enemy defending along the southern bank of the Don River.”48 The directive then detailed specific missions to be achieved over the course of three days for both mobile and rifle forces, the movement of forces prior to the offensive, the combat formation to be employed along each axis, the nature of the artillery offensive, limits on ammunition expenditure, and details regarding air support. As was customary, the directive ended by specifying training tasks to be accomplished during preparations for the operation. As thorough as this plan was, the Stavka was still uneasy because it was unusual to conduct an offensive with two shock groups in a single army, much less along axes so far from each other. Therefore, the Stavka insisted that Vasilevsky ensure close cooperation between the attacking forces. On 3 December, Vasilevsky met personally with Lieutenant General Golikov, commander of the Voronezh Front; Major General Kharitonov, commander of 6th Army; and General Kuznetsov, commander of 1st Guards Army’s operational group, at 1st Guards Army’s headquarters in Verkhniaia Gnilusha. At this meeting, Vasilevsky required all parties to sign a formal “act” solidify- ing their relationship and their specific responsibilities during the offensive (see appendix 8G in the Companion). After several days of give-and-take on the question of future operations, late on 3 December, Stalin signed a Stavka directive approving Operation Saturn and dispatched it to Generals Vasilevsky, Vatutin, and Golikov. Sev- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

24 Chapter One eral hours later, however, the Soviet dictator sent a sharp rebuke to Vasi- levsky, criticizing his supposed poor management of military operations against the Stalingrad pocket. Despite this rebuke, Stalin retained Vasilevsky as Stavka coordinator for the Don and Stalingrad Fronts’ operations against Sixth Army’s pocket, but he tasked General of Artillery Voronov with responsibility for coordinating the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts in Opera- tion Saturn. Most important, Stalin mandated that Saturn would begin on 10 December:

1. The plan for operation “Saturn” of 2 December 1942 is approved. 2. Readiness for the operation, that is, the completion of preparations for the operation—the transport of ammunition and the bringing of the forces and aircraft to full combat readiness—is timed for 9 December. 3. The occupation of jumping-off positions—the night of 10 Decem- ber. The beginning of the operation is 10 December. 4. Lieutenant General Falaleev is entrusted with the supervision of the aviation of both fronts. 5. Colonel General of Artillery Comrade Voronov is entrusted with the coordination of the operations of both fronts during the preparation of the operation and its conduct.49

In addition to determining Voronov’s and Vasilevsky’s roles in the forthcoming offensives, the Stavka reshuffled its senior officer cadre conducting Op- eration Saturn. It appointed Major General S. S. Biriuzov, chief of staff of the Briansk Front’s 48th Army, as Malinovsky’s chief of staff in 2nd Guards Army, and it ordered Biriuzov to report to the army’s headquarters in the city of Tambov immediately.50 Stalin’s rebuke to Vasilevsky was contained in a Stavka order dispatched from the Kremlin at 0550 hours on 4 December. Ostensibly designed to improve the coordination of the Don and Stalingrad Fronts’ operations, it was characteristically short, to the point, and caustic:

Comrade Mikhailov [Vasilevsky]. Your mission is to unite the actions of Ivanov and Dontsov [Eremenko and Rokossovsky]. However, up to this time, you have had separation rather than unification. In spite of your orders, Ivanov attacked on the 2nd and 3rd, and Dontsov was in no condition to attack. The enemy was given an opportunity to maneuver. Dontsov will attack on the 4th, and Ivanov turns out to be in no condition to attack. The enemy will once again receive an opportunity to maneuver. Henceforth, I demand you permit no more mistakes. Before issuing an order about a combined offensive by Ivanov and Dontsov, you need to verify whether they are in a condition to attack. [signed] Vasil’ev [Stalin]51 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 25

With the start date of the Saturn offensive now only six days away, Vatutin worked closely with Leliushenko and Kuznetsov over the next 48 hours to ensure that every possible aspect of the operation was examined and every problem identified and corrected. In particular, they focused on two areas: the Verkhnyi Mamon region along the Don River, where Kuznetsov’s operational group was to attack from a small bridgehead on the southern bank, and the Novaia Kaltiva region to the west, where Kharitonov’s forces were to assault across the Don’s icy surface. In the wake of these discussions, Vatutin issued a new directive on 4 December specifying when the infantry and artillery of Kuznetsov’s operational group were to occupy their forward positions and instructing him how to perform certain critical functions, such as oc- cupying jumping-off positions for the attack, coordinating with neighboring units, and crossing the Don River. An addendum to this directive specified the operational formation Kuznetsov’s group was to employ and provided details about artillery and air support, air-ground recognition signals, diver- sionary operations, and necessary troop and command cadre training (see appendixes 8H and 8I in the Companion).52 These 48 hours of consultations over a host of vexing operational and tactical matters convinced Vatutin and Voronov that it would be sheer folly to have a single army headquarters controlling and coordinating two operational groups attacking roughly 150 kilometers apart—Kuznetsov’s group in the Verkhnyi Mamon region on 1st Guards Army’s right wing, and Leliu- shenko’s group in the Astakhov region on the army’s left wing. Therefore, in response to a request from Voronov and Vatutin, at 0420 hours on 5 De- cember, the Stavka split 1st Guards Army into two armies: 1st Guards Army under the command of Kuznetsov, and a new 3rd Guards Army commanded by Leliushenko (see appendix 8J in the Companion).53 Since the decision to subdivide 1st Guards Army was motivated solely by the desire to improve command and control, the two new armies were significantly smaller than their predecessor, even counting the reinforcements the Stavka dispatched to each. Nonetheless, the Stavka considered the two armies more than a match for their prospective opponents: 62nd and 294th Infantry Divisions of Army Group Hollidt’s XVII Army Corps, the weak divisions of Romanian I Army Corps, and the bulk of Italian Eighth Army. However, to ensure that the Saturn force was large enough to secure victory, the Stavka reinforced it with the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army, commanded by Major General Fedor Mikhailovich Kharitonov. The 6th Army had the important dual missions of reinforcing 1st Guards Army’s penetration operation in the Verkhnyi Mamon region and protecting the right flank of the entire Saturn force as it exploited south toward the Northern Donets River. Based on the Stavka’s instructions, General Golikov, the Voronezh Front’s commander, issued Kharitonov’s attack order on 5 December (see appendix 8K in the Companion). © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

26 Chapter One

Golikov’s order required 6th Army to launch a supporting attack on 1st Guards Army’s right with 127th, 172nd, 350th, 267th, and 160th Rifle Divi- sions and 17th and 25th Tank Corps, supported by 1 tank brigade and 2 tank regiments, 1 tank destroyer brigade, 15 artillery regiments from 8th Artillery Division, 3 regiments and 5 battalions of guards-mortars [Katiushas], and the entire 2nd Air Army. The army’s mission was to penetrate Italian defenses, reach the Kantemirovka region, and protect the right flank of the South- western Front’s attacking forces.54 Given the complexity and importance of Operation Saturn, the Stavka, Voronov, and Vatutin continued to adjust the offensive plan right up to the last minute. For example, on 6 December, Voronov and Vatutin dispatched yet another order to Golikov to ensure that Kharitonov’s 6th Army projected its tank corps as deeply as possible into the enemy’s rear and also created a defensive line to protect the right flank of the Southwestern Front’s shock group (see appendix 8L in the Companion).55 Despite all the careful and intricate planning for Operation Saturn, the military situation began to change drastically on 8 and 9 December for two fundamental reasons. First, the offensive by General Romanenko’s 5th Tank Army southward across the Chir River toward Nizhne-Chirskaia and Tormo- sin was faltering in the face of strong German resistance (see below). This reality left Voronov and Vasilevsky with no choice but to recommend that the Stavka form a new army to assist 5th Tank Army’s vital effort to block any German attempt to relieve Stalingrad from the west. Second, and more important, Stalin and Vasilevsky finally realized that the Don and Stalingrad Fronts lacked sufficient forces to liquidate Sixth Army’s Stalingrad pocket. This made it necessary to shift 2nd Guards Army away from Operation Sat- urn so that it could spearhead the offensive to crush Sixth Army. As a result, the Stavka could not conduct Operation Saturn in its present form. These changes in plan took place rapidly between 8 and 13 December. On 8 December, at Vasilevsky’s request, Stalin formed the new 5th Shock Army (see appendix 8M in the Companion). Commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov and subordinate to the Stalingrad Front, 5th Shock consisted of 4th Guards and 258th, 300th, 315th, and 87th Rifle Divisions; 4th Mechanized Corps; 7th and 23rd Tank Corps; and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Its missions were to “destroy the enemy’s Nizhne-Chirskaia and Tor- mosin groupings in cooperation with 5th Tank Army” and to “prevent, at all cost, an enemy penetration from the Tormosin and Nizhne-Chirskaia region to link up with the enemy grouping encircled in the Stalingrad region.” Sub- sequently, it was to prepare to attack west toward Ust’-Bystrianskaia north of the Don River.56 Popov’s shock army was to become fully operational overnight on 11–12 December, after it assumed control of 5th Tank Army’s 4th Guards and 258th Rifle Division and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Since the army’s initial re- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 27 sponsibility was to capture Rychkovskii and Nizhne-Chirskaia, this was evidence that Vatutin and the Stavka were displeased by Romanenko’s perfor- mance as commander of 5th Tank Army. The order also gave Popov, who had performed well as Eremenko’s deputy, the forces necessary to accomplish his missions—specifically, the full-strength 7th and 23rd Tank Corps, commanded by Major Generals of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov and E. G. Push- kin, respectively. However, while Rotmistrov’s tank corps actually reached 5th Shock from the Stavka Reserve, Pushkin’s corps remained subordinate to the Volga Military District until it was assigned to the Southwestern Front’s reserve in late December. Finally, so that 5th Shock could operate against Nizhne-Chirskaia from both north and south, the Stalingrad Front transferred 57th Army’s 4th Mechanized Corps and 300th and 315th Rifle Divi- sions to Popov’s army. As a result, in addition to attacking Rychkovskii on the Don’s western bank with at least one tank and one cavalry corps, 5th Shock now had a mechanized corps and two rifle divisions on the Don’s eastern bank, which it could use to liquidate the Germans’ bridgeheads opposite Rychkovskii and Nizhne-Chirskaia. In addition, on 9 December, Vatutin compensated 5th Tank Army for its loss of 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and two rifle divisions to 5th Shock Army. He sent 5th Mechanized Corps and 47th Guards Rifle Division, which 5th Tank had recently transferred to 3rd Guards Army for Operation Saturn, back to Romanenko. Of necessity, Vatutin instructed Leliushenko to make minor adjustments to his operational plan (see appendix 8N in the Compan- ion).57

From Operation Saturn to Operation Ring [Kol’tso], 9–13 December Later on 9 December, Vasilevsky finally “bit the bullet” and formally recommended that fundamental changes be made to his plans for Saturn and the liquidation of Sixth Army’s pocket. Dispatched to the Stavka at 1830 hours, this report, which had clearly been discussed with and authorized by Stalin beforehand, was a candid and sobering admission by Vasilevsky that his previous offensive plan had failed (see appendix 8O in the Companion). With customary directness, the Stavka representative said that, after consulting with Rokossovsky, he was seeking Stalin’s approval to employ Malinovsky’s 2nd Guards Army to crush Sixth Army’s pocket rather than reinforce Opera- tion Saturn. Noting that Malinovsky’s army was already en route to the Stalingrad region, Vasilevsky recommended that it, together with the Don Front’s 21st, 65th, and 24th Armies, conduct a three-stage offensive to destroy the encircled German grouping. He noted that the Don Front’s armies, in conjunction with the Stalingrad Front’s 64th and 62nd Armies, had already begun © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

28 Chapter One the first stage of this offensive on 8 December, with the goal of pinning down German forces and destroying those west of the Rossoshka River. During the second stage, the Don Front, reinforced by 2nd Guards Army and supported by the Stalingrad Front’s 64th Army, would advance to isolate and capture enemy forces along the southern face of Sixth Army’s pocket. Finally, in the third stage, the offensive would climax with attacks by all the Don and Sta- lingrad Fronts’ armies toward Gumrak and Stalingrad proper, crushing Sixth Army’s resistance once and for all. Vasilevsky then spelled out the specifics of his plan, stating that 2nd Guards Army, reinforced by 17 artillery regiments from 1st Artillery Division and 65th and 21st Armies, would join the offensive by attacking eastward along the Baburkin, Hill 135.6, Pitomnik, and Voroponovo axis. In conjunction with 24th and 65th Armies on its left and 21st Army on its right, Malinovsky’s army would dismember encircled Sixth Army, all the while preventing the Germans from breaking out of the pocket to the south or southwest. Finally, Vasilevsky recommended that the second stage of the offensive begin on 16 December, but if a delay was necessary, it should certainly begin no later than 17–18 December.58 Therefore, Vasilevsky acknowledged that his original plan had failed, and he candidly admitted that the Don and Stalingrad Fronts could not destroy Sixth Army without support from Malinovsky’s 2nd Guards Army. Furthermore, the transfer of 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front obviously eliminated any hope of conducting Operation Saturn in its original form. However, since an offensive against Italian Eighth Army was an essential element of the Stavka’s overall strategic concept, it had no choice but to di- rect Vasilevsky, Voronov, Vatutin, and Golikov to develop a truncated version of Saturn. At a minimum, this lesser version would have to be strong enough to smash Italian Eighth Army and also prevent any German relief operation toward Stalingrad from the west—that is, the Rychkovskii and Nizhne- Chirskaia regions. As Stalin and Vasilevsky developed their new plan for liquidating Sixth Army, the supreme commander sought the advice of his deputy, Zhukov, who was directing Operation Mars. Sent at 0120 hours on 10 December, Stalin’s message read:

I am transmitting Mikhailov’s [Vasilevsky’s] thoughts to you. Report your opinion to me. From Mikhailov’s telegram, 57th Army’s role in the general offensive to liquidate the encircled enemy was not clear. After a conversation with Mikhailov, it became clear that 57th Army will be operating from the Rakitino, Kravtsovo, and Tsybenko region in the general direction of Gornaia Poliana State Farm and Peschanaia Balka. I think we can approve Mikhailov’s plan. The time for beginning 2nd © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 29

Guards Army’s commitment into action is the 18th [of December]. The entire operation to liquidate the encircled enemy will be completed by 25–26 December. I await your answer. [signed] Vasil’ev [Stalin]59

After considering Zhukov’s advice, Stalin gave the go-ahead for an operation code-named “Ring” [Kol’tso] in a message he dispatched to Vasilevsky at 0020 hours on 11 December:

To Comrade Mikhailov [code name for Vasilevsky] Strictly Personal 1. Conduct Operation “Ring” [Kol’tso] in two stages. 2. First stage—reach the Basargino and Voroponovo region and liquidate the enemy’s western and southern groupings. 3. Second stage—a general assault by all of the armies of both fronts to liquidate the main body of enemy forces west and northwest of Sta- lingrad. 4. Begin the first stage of the operation no later than the day which has been determined during telephone conversations between Vasil’ev [Sta- lin] and Mikhailov [Vasilevsky]. 5. Complete the first stage of the operation no later than 23 Decem- ber.60

No sooner did the Stavka approve Vasilevsky’s new offensive plan than it began to learn of difficulties encountered in transporting 2nd Guards Army to its assembly area northwest of Stalingrad. These problems were reflected in a directive sent by General Bokov, deputy chief of the Red Army General Staff, to Malinovsky’s army at about midday on the 11th. The directive high- lighted a whole series of serious disruptions in rail troop movements associated with haphazard organization and poor logistical support (see appendix 8P in the Companion). Faced with these problems, Vasilevsky requested and received Stalin’s approval to delay the offensive’s start date to the 15th. Al- though the Stavka acquiesced to this delay, Stalin’s reluctance to do so reflected his genuine anxiety over the possibility of the Germans pulling some magic trick from their rucksack and rescuing Paulus’s beleaguered army.

From Operation Saturn to Operation Little Saturn, 14–15 December Although the debate about the transfer of 2nd Guards Army to Stalingrad had subsided by 12 December, on the same day, a new and far more serious crisis loomed for the Soviets—the horrifying possibility that Sixth Army would be relieved. The crisis began at dawn on 12 December, when Fourth Panzer Army unleashed General Kirchner’s LVII Panzer Corps on a concentrated drive toward Stalingrad to rescue Sixth Army. By evening, Kirch- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

30 Chapter One ner’s forces were more than halfway to the Aksai River. The next day, in the vanguard of the panzer corps, 6th Panzer Division pushed northward across the river, precipitating a four-day battle in the vicinity of the village of Verkhne-Kumskii. This German panzer thrust shattered the defenses of the Stalingrad Front’s 51st Army and propelled its tanks to within 75 kilometers of the southwestern front of Sixth Army’s Stalingrad pocket. Although Stavka representative Vasilevsky ordered Eremenko’s Stalingrad Front to reinforce 51st Army with two mechanized corps, by nightfall on 13 December, it was doubtful that Trufanov’s 51st could contain or even slow the German jug- gernaut. The unexpected and rapid German advance caused consternation within the Soviet commands. Recognizing the danger immediately, Vasilevsky tried but failed to reach Stalin in Moscow. Early in the evening on 12 Decem- ber, the Stavka representative traveled to the Don Front’s headquarters at Zavarygin, where he discussed the situation with front commander Rokos- sovsky and 2nd Guards Army commander Malinovsky, who happened to be at the headquarters. Based on these meetings, Vasilevsky took the initiative and directed Malinovsky to prepare to move his army southward to the Myshkova River. Since only 60 of the 165 trains transporting 2nd Guards Army had reached their disembarkation points northwest of Stalingrad by this time, the remainder could be diverted south fairly easily.61 Vasilevsky then contacted General Tolbukhin, commander of 57th Army, and arranged to have Malinovsky colocate his command post at Tolbukhin’s. He also told the latter to do everything in his power to facilitate the southward movement of Malinovsky’s army. Vasilevsky finally reestablished contact with Moscow later on the evening of the 12th. After briefing Stalin on the dire situation and explaining the steps he had already taken, he urged Stalin to approve those measures, particularly the decision to dispatch 2nd Guards Army to the Myshkova River line. At first reluctant to postpone the offensive to destroy Sixth Army, Sta- lin finally promised to discuss the matter with the State Defense Commit- tee (GKO) and get back to Vasilevsky later. The latter candidly admitted, “I awaited the Stavka decision with great anxiety.”62 Ultimately, at 0500 hours on 13 December, Stalin ordered Vasilevsky “to transfer the 2nd Guards Army from the Don to the Stalingrad Front on 15 December,” “take charge of the troops intended to wipe out the enemy groupings trying to reach Paulus,” and “present the Stavka with a plan for employing the 2nd Guards Army within the next few days.”63 This intense flurry of activity in Soviet command channels on 12 and 13 December resulted in two key decisions announced by Stavka directives issued late on 13 and 14 December—one pertaining to the reinforcement of the Stalingrad Front’s 51st Army by 2nd Guards Army, and the other truncat- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Competing German and Soviet Dilemmas 31 ing Operation Saturn into an offensive with more modest objectives. Since Stalin had already ordered 2nd Guards Army to transfer south to the Mysh- kova on the morning of the 13th, the Stavka issued the Saturn directive first and the 2nd Guards transfer second. The Stavka’s first directive, issued at 2210 hours on 13 December, was addressed to Vasilevsky, Vatutin, and Golikov. It explained to its representative and to the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts’ commanders precisely why it was necessary to truncate Operation Saturn, and it announced the birth of Saturn’s offspring, Operation Little Saturn (see appendix 8Q in the Companion).64 It began by asserting that the original situation giving rise to Saturn had been sound—that is, the lack of German operational reserves behind the Chir River and the availability of 2nd Guards Army to exploit the offensive had made it reasonable to establish Kamensk and Rostov as Sat- urn’s objectives. Now, however, German operational reserves had appeared (referring to XVII Army Corps and XXXXVIII and LVII Panzer Corps), and 2nd Guards Army was “working on another front.”65 Therefore, declared the directive, it was reasonable to alter the operation, with the new objectives being “the destruction of the enemy’s Bokovskaia-Morozovskii grouping” (meaning XVII Army and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps) and “the Italians” (Ital- ian Eighth Army).66 Otherwise, the directive, which set 16 December as the start date for the offensive, left much of the original penetration and maneuver scheme intact but transferred the new 6th Mechanized Corps from the Southwestern to the Stalingrad Front. Completing these frenetic amendments to the strategic plan, at 2300 hours on 14 December, the Stavka issued the second directive, which once again changed the destination of 2nd Guards Army—this time to the Kotel’nikovo axis (see appendix 8R in the Companion). Addressed to Vasi- levsky, the directive postponed Operation Ring and ordered 2nd Guards Army to move south by forced march and deploy “in the rear of the units that have been operating against the enemy’s Kotel’nikovo grouping.” In the meantime, Rokossovsky and Eremenko were to “continue systematically destroying the encircled enemy forces from the air and with ground forces, deny the enemy rest both day and night, compress the encirclement ring, and halt attempts to break out from encirclement at the outset.” Most important, it directed “our southern forces” (meaning 2nd Guards and 51st Armies) to “defeat the enemy’s Kotel’nikovo grouping, occupy Kotel’nikovo, and dig in there firmly with the forces of Trufanov [51st Army] and Iakovlev [Malinovsky].”67 Thus, during the six-day period from 9 to 14 December, operational realities forced the Stavka to twice alter its planned employment of 2nd Guards Army. First, on 9 December, it shifted Malinovsky’s army away from Op- eration Saturn for the sake of launching Operation Ring to destroy German © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

32 Chapter One

Sixth Army. Then, less than four days later, it postponed Operation Ring for the sake of blocking a German relief effort from the Kotel’nikovo region toward Stalingrad—a decision with which Rokossovsky, whose Don Front was earmarked to conduct Operation Ring, thoroughly disagreed. In addition to the determined resistance by Paulus’s Sixth Army in the Stalingrad pocket, the catalysts for these changes were the presence of German XVII Army Corps and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps behind the Krivaia and Chir Rivers and the threatening advance by Fourth Panzer Army’s LVII Panzer Corps from Kotel’nikovo toward Stalingrad. The common denominator in all these altered plans was Malinovsky’s 2nd Guards Army, whose presence the Stavka considered absolutely necessary for the Red Army to achieve victory along any axis. The immediate consequences of these changes were the truncation of Operation Saturn into Little Saturn, the postponement of Operation Ring, and the commencement of a crucial struggle along the Kotel’nikovo, Aksai, and Myshkova River axis leading toward Stalingrad from the southwest. All these changes made the second half of December a critical period indeed.

As the Germans and Soviets formulated their plans for what would become an eventful second half of December, equally critical developments were occurring in the lower Chir region during the first half of the month. At stake there was the fate of Manstein’s relief effort toward Stalingrad from the west. Although overshadowed by the subsequent dramatic developments along the Kotel’nikovo axis, the fighting along the lower Chir River region in early December proved far too important to pass over lightly. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press.

Lieutenant General Dmitrii Danilovich Leliushenko, commander of 3rd Guards Army

Lieutenant General Fedor Mikhailovich Kharitonov, commander of 6th Army

Lieutenant General Ivan Timofeevich Shlemin, commander of 5th Tank Army Major General of Tank Forces Mikhail Vasil’evich Volkov, commander of 5th Mechanized Corps