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Chapter VI the Strategic Stalemate from End of August to Mid-October 1812
Chapter VI The Strategic Stalemate from End of August to mid-October 1812 “The Daily Life” ollowing wounds received on For his part, Wittgenstein was August 17th, Oudinot was also forced to inaction because of the F evacuated to Vilna and it was weakness of its Corps. It can be Gouvion St. Cyr who took command estimated that the Russian general the next day and won the battle. For had under his command, on the his victory on the 18th, he was evening of August 18, barely 12,000 appointed Marshal of the Empire by infantrymen, 2,200 horsemen and decree of August 27th, 1812. General 1,400 artillerymen. Because of the Maison, will be appointed general de weakness of his battalions, he will division on August 21st and will take have to reorganize them. For example, the head of the 8th infantry division. on August 25th, the six depot After the relatively shallow battalions of Grenadiers were merged attempt to pursue the Russians and into three battalions (Leib and the fighting of August 23rd, where the Arakseiev together, St Petersburg and Bavarian general Siebein was mortally Tauride, Pavlov and Ekaterinoslav). wounded, St. Cyr will remain quite The forces of Wittgenstein will inactive, concentrating his two corps increase quite regularly until the of army on Polotsk and its vicinity. His beginning of October: thanks to the forces declining steadily, he will return of the wounded, first; the strengthen (but with delay) his arrival of men from the depot of the positions by building some redoubts, regiments belonging to the 1st Corps, trying to form a sort of entrenched afterwards; and also because of the camp in front of the walls of Polotsk. -
THE ARIZONA ROUGH RIDERS by Harlan C. Herner a Thesis
The Arizona rough riders Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Herner, Charles Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 04/10/2021 02:07:43 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/551769 THE ARIZONA ROUGH RIDERS b y Harlan C. Herner A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1965 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of require ments for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of this material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED: MsA* J'73^, APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below: G > Harwood P. -
The Forgotten Fronts the First World War Battlefield Guide: World War Battlefield First the the Forgotten Fronts Forgotten The
Ed 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov Ed The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The Forgotten Fronts The First Battlefield War World Guide: The Forgotten Fronts Creative Media Design ADR005472 Edition 1 November 2016 THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | i The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The British Army Campaign Guide to the Forgotten Fronts of the First World War 1st Edition November 2016 Acknowledgement The publisher wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following organisations in providing text, images, multimedia links and sketch maps for this volume: Defence Geographic Centre, Imperial War Museum, Army Historical Branch, Air Historical Branch, Army Records Society,National Portrait Gallery, Tank Museum, National Army Museum, Royal Green Jackets Museum,Shepard Trust, Royal Australian Navy, Australian Defence, Royal Artillery Historical Trust, National Archive, Canadian War Museum, National Archives of Canada, The Times, RAF Museum, Wikimedia Commons, USAF, US Library of Congress. The Cover Images Front Cover: (1) Wounded soldier of the 10th Battalion, Black Watch being carried out of a communication trench on the ‘Birdcage’ Line near Salonika, February 1916 © IWM; (2) The advance through Palestine and the Battle of Megiddo: A sergeant directs orders whilst standing on one of the wooden saddles of the Camel Transport Corps © IWM (3) Soldiers of the Royal Army Service Corps outside a Field Ambulance Station. © IWM Inside Front Cover: Helles Memorial, Gallipoli © Barbara Taylor Back Cover: ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ at the Tower of London © Julia Gavin ii | THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | iii ISBN: 978-1-874346-46-3 First published in November 2016 by Creative Media Designs, Army Headquarters, Andover. -
La Bataille De Leipzig Scénarios
La Bataille de Leipzig Scénarios Pour le Règlement de l’An XXX et Le Règlement des Marie-Louise 2 La Bataille de Leipzig December 19, 2013 • French Victory: Hold all hexes of Güldengossa, the Auenhain Farm, Markkleeberg, Dölitz and Connewitz, one hex each of All rules herein take precedence over any rules in the series rules, Gross Pössna and Seifertshain, and place Meerveldt’s II Corps which they may contradict. on Morale Level Three by the end of the scenario. Rules marked with an eagle or are shaded with a gray • French Tactical Victory: Hold one hex of Güldengossa, the background apply only to players using the Règlements de Auenhain Farm, all hexes of Markkleeberg, Dölitz, and l’An XXX. Connewitz and place Klenau’s IV Corps and Meerveldt’s II Corps on Morale Level Two by the end of the scenario. NOTE: All references to Artillery Ammunition Wagons (AAWs), Ammunition Supply, Artillery Ricochet, Cavalry Skirmishers and • Draw: Any result that is not a victory for either side. Grand Charges apply only to players using the Règlements de l’An XXX. • Coalition Tactical Victory: Hold all hexes of Güldengossa, the Manor House at Dölitz and place Lauriston’s V Corps on Morale Level Two by the end of the scenario. 1.0 INTRODUCTION La Batallie de Leipzig is a game of one day, the 16th, of the battle • Coalition Victory: Hold all hexes of Markkleeberg, that took place from October 14-19. Güldengossa, the Auenhain Farm, Gross Pössna, the Manor House at Dölitz and Dölitz or Connewitz by the end of the scenario. -
Lincoln's Role in the Gettysburg Campaign
LINCOLN'S ROLE IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN By EDWIN B. CODDINGTON* MOST of you need not be reminded that the battle of Gettys- burg was fought on the first three days of July, 1863, just when Grant's siege of Vicksburg was coming to a successful con- clusion. On July 4. even as Lee's and Meade's men lay panting from their exertions on the slopes of Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, the defenders of the mighty fortress on the Mississippi were laying down their arms. Independence Day, 1863, was, for the Union, truly a Glorious Fourth. But the occurrence of these two great victories at almost the same time raised a question then which has persisted up to the present: If the triumph at Vicksburg was decisive, why was not the one at Gettysburg equally so? Lincoln maintained that it should have been, and this paper is concerned with the soundness of his supposition. The Gettysburg Campaign was the direct outcome of the battle of Chancellorsville, which took place the first week in May. There General Robert E. Lee won a victory which, according to the bookmaker's odds, should have belonged to Major General "Fight- ing Joe" Hooker, if only because Hooker's army outnumbered the Confederates two to one and was better equipped. The story of the Chancel'orsville Campaign is too long and complicated to be told here. It is enough to say that Hooker's initial moves sur- prised his opponent, General Lee, but when Lee refused to react to his strategy in the way he anticipated, Hooker lost his nerve and from then on did everything wrong. -
The Battle of Sailor's Creek
THE BATTLE OF SAILOR’S CREEK: A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP A Thesis by CLOYD ALLEN SMITH JR. Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS December 2005 Major Subject: History THE BATTLE OF SAILOR’S CREEK: A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP A Thesis by CLOYD ALLEN SMITH JR. Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved by: Chair of Committee, Joseph Dawson Committee Members, James Bradford Joseph Cerami Head of Department, Walter L. Buenger December 2005 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT The Battle of Sailor’s Creek: A Study in Leadership. (December 2005) Cloyd Allen Smith Jr., B.A., Slippery Rock University Chair: Dr. Joseph Dawson The Battle of Sailor’s Creek, 6 April 1865, has been overshadowed by Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House several days later, yet it is an example of the Union military war machine reaching its apex of war making ability during the Civil War. Through Ulysses S. Grant’s leadership and that of his subordinates, the Union armies, specifically that of the Army of the Potomac, had been transformed into a highly motivated, organized and responsive tool of war, led by confident leaders who understood their commander’s intent and were able to execute on that intent with audacious initiative in the absence of further orders. After Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia escaped from Petersburg and Richmond on 2 April 1865, Grant’s forces chased after Lee’s forces with the intent of destroying the mighty and once feared iv protector of the Confederate States in the hopes of bringing a swift end to the long war. -
BATTLE-SCARRED and DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP in the MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial
BATTLE-SCARRED AND DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Steven Thomas Barry Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin Dr. John L. Brooke Copyright by Steven T. Barry 2011 Abstract Throughout the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the battalion leadership exercised by United States regular army officers provided the essential component that contributed to battlefield success and combat effectiveness despite deficiencies in equipment, organization, mobilization, and inadequate operational leadership. Essentially, without the regular army battalion leaders, US units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. For both Operations TORCH and HUSKY, the US Army did not possess the leadership or staffs at the corps level to consistently coordinate combined arms maneuver with air and sea power. The battalion leadership brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality. Many US officers shared the same ―Old Army‖ skill sets in their early career. Across the Army in the 1930s, these officers developed familiarity with the systems and doctrine that would prove crucial in the combined arms operations of the Second World War. The battalion tactical leadership overcame lackluster operational and strategic guidance and other significant handicaps to execute the first Mediterranean Theater of Operations campaigns. Three sets of factors shaped this pivotal group of men. First, all of these officers were shaped by pre-war experiences. -
Batfle of NATIONS Napoleon in Amber , by Paul G
11 AFTER ACTION REPORT: BATfLE OF NATIONS Napoleon in Amber , by Paul G. Dangel Readers who Iw'ole Ihc Battlc of Nations Folio grew in increasing numbers as the untried Napoleon march back and forth between game may wish to brealc ;t out at Ihis point conscripts learned the ri gors of warfare. Blucher and Schwarzenberg, both of whom and follow along with Mr. Dangel's account Many of them had been drawn from retired alternatively attacked and retreated in of Ihc historical aCliOIl in terms of the game. veterans who were medically unfit, and response to Napolcon's moves. The French One thing that may become apparent by olhers were no more than children. These Emperor was constantly olf balance and doing so is the dIfficulty 0/ simulating the troops proved very reliable in battle, but they unable to generate any real offensh'e action hesitancy and lact of communicatiOn On the were not up to the long marches with few of his own. Finally. in September, he sent pur1 0/ th e various commanders and units. supplies. Fatigue also look a heavy toll on the Marshals Ney and Oudinot nonh to take Perhaps. if one took several smfters of French units. It was because of these factors Berlin and defeat Bernadotte's Army of the Napoleon brtmdy In/ore playing the gllme that Napoleon decided to accept the Allied Nonh. By September 6 the operatit)n was next 'ime... -RAS armSlice. bungled and Napoleon set out with the rest of the Grand Army to help. Leaving southern The armstice ended on August 12, after The four day battle of Leipzig was Saxony enabled the French to fight on a Austria and Sweden joined the Allied camp. -
Polish Battles and Campaigns in 13Th–19Th Centuries
POLISH BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016 POLISH BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016 Scientific editors: Ph. D. Grzegorz Jasiński, Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz Reviewers: Ph. D. hab. Marek Dutkiewicz, Ph. D. hab. Halina Łach Scientific Council: Prof. Piotr Matusak – chairman Prof. Tadeusz Panecki – vice-chairman Prof. Adam Dobroński Ph. D. Janusz Gmitruk Prof. Danuta Kisielewicz Prof. Antoni Komorowski Col. Prof. Dariusz S. Kozerawski Prof. Mirosław Nagielski Prof. Zbigniew Pilarczyk Ph. D. hab. Dariusz Radziwiłłowicz Prof. Waldemar Rezmer Ph. D. hab. Aleksandra Skrabacz Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz Prof. Lech Wyszczelski Sketch maps: Jan Rutkowski Design and layout: Janusz Świnarski Front cover: Battle against Theutonic Knights, XVI century drawing from Marcin Bielski’s Kronika Polski Translation: Summalinguæ © Copyright by Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita, 2016 © Copyright by Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości, 2016 ISBN 978-83-65409-12-6 Publisher: Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości Contents 7 Introduction Karol Olejnik 9 The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica Karol Olejnik 17 ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald Zbigniew Grabowski 29 The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 Marek Plewczyński 41 The -
Satin Army Corps System
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY CORPS SYSTEM IN THE UNION ARMY Allan Satin, Cincinnati Civil War Round Table, [email protected] © Allan Satin & Cincinnati Civil War Round Table, 2010, www.cincinnaticwrt.org At the end of the American Civil War, the Union Army was organized into army corps each with its own unique number which remained with it even if the corps was transferred from one army to another. How did this system develop in the Union Army? The United States Regular Army had no field commands larger than a regiment when the Civil War broke out in April 1861. Regiments were assigned to geographical departments with no intervening level of command. With the expansion of the armies resulting from the recruitment of the volunteer forces, command levels between the regimental and departmental levels were clearly required. At first, those departments with large enough field forces organized their new regiments into brigades (e.g. May 28 in the Department of Washington). As the forces became larger, divisions were formed (June 11 in the Department of Pennsylvania). The first major campaign was fought with armies organized into divisions (First Bull Run). Military men in the United States were familiar with the corps d’armée system as it had existed in the armies of Napoleon, but conservative commanders such as George B. McClellan and Don Carlos Buell were reluctant to form army corps in the armies under their command. McClellan wanted to postpone the creation of army corps until he had tested his divisional commanders through active operations to see which of them would be capable of commanding at the army corps level. -
House of Representatives
1946 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE 9245 UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE spiritual ideals and principles. Fill us gentleman from Ohio [Mr. SMITH] to act APP-OINTMENTS IN THE REGULAR CORPS, with a dauntless faith in the wisdom and as a conferee in place o:f- the gentleman To be assistant sanitary engineers, effective power of Thy spirit, for Thou' alone canst from Michigan [Mr. CRAWFORD] and the date o/ oath of office touch to finer issues the creative and Senate will be notified of the action of John R. Thoman curative forces of our civilization. Thou the House. Richard J. Hammerstrom alone canst bring to fulfillment our deep· There was no objection. To be senior assistant sanitary engineers, est yearnings and highest hopes. EXTENSION OF REMARKS effective date of oath of office We humbly confess that · again and Richard S. Green Ralph C. Palange again our faith is eclipsed and shadowed · Mr. RIVERS asked and was given per Leonard B. Dworsky Graham Walton by doubt and we become disheartened mission to extend his remarks in the Francis B. Elder Howard W. Chapman and discouraged and feel that we have RECORD in tw(} instances, in one to in- Conrad P . Straub Gerald W. Ferguson been deceived by delusions. God forbid . elude an editorial from the Mobile Press· Elroy K. Day Richard S. Mark Register, and in the other an article by Charles T. Carnahan that we should ever be guilty of that pes simistic cynicism which believes that hu Mr. Frank A. Godchaux, president of the IN THE ARMY man nature is basically brutal and self Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. -
Official U. S. Bulletin
We liq/1;;sitilfi‘iinancewOuiriMen Who_Are Fighting in France PUBLISHED DAILY UNDER ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMJ’ITEE ON PUBLIC INFOBBIATION GEORGE CREEL CHAIRMAN ' Vol. 1. MONDAY, ..“4. 1917. N0. 189. \VASHINGTON, OCTOBER U. S. WOMEN lN ARGENTINA FAMILIES OF MEN WHO DEED 0R WERE DiSABLED GET $100,000 FOR RED CROSS WHEN U. S. TRANSPORT WAS SUNK BY U-BOAT WELL The Department of State authorizes the SHARE EN BENEFZTS OF NEW WAR lNgURAiNCE ACT following: A telegram from the American ambas Loss of Vessel, Says Treasury Department Statement, Furnishes Striking sador in Buenos Aires that a pa states Lesson in of and Automatic triotic society of American women, or Object Benefit Compensation insurance Pro ganized when the United States entered visions of the Law—Summary Covering Various Cases Prepared. the war, held a two days” fair in Buenos Aires and cleared $100,000 in gold which The Treasury Department authorizes to come in large measure from the sale of will be sent to the American Red Cross. bonds of the second Liberty loan. This result was largely due to the gener the following: In view of the importance of the new osity of Argentinians, who attended in The sinking of the American transport law to those in military and naval service large numbers. Many of them gave their Antilles by a German submarine, with the and their families and dependents, the fol own cattle for the benefit of the fund. loss of 70 lives, has furnished a striking ' lowing oflicial summary covering; various The minister for foreign affairs.