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Archived Content Information Archivée Dans Le Archived Content Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page. Information archivée dans le Web Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n’a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s’appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada. Conformément à la Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada, vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « Contactez-nous ». CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 29 / CCEM 29 MDS RESEARCH PROJECT / PROJET DE RECHERCE DE LA MED “NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE – NORWEGIAN CHALLENGES” By / par Maj / capc Tohmas Brevick - Norwegian Army This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au contains facts and opinions which the author cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and correct for que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, including nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un the Government of Canada and the Canadian organisme quelconque, y compris le Department of National Defence. This paper gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la may not be released, quoted or copied except Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de with the express permission of the Canadian diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude Department of National Defence. sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. Network Centric Warfare Chief of Defence Norway has decided that network centric warfare will be the basis for a study on the future development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The decision was made due to the development of NCW within major NATO Allies and Norwegian partners. The purpose of this paper is to provide substantiation that the Norwegian Forces can, with difficulty, transform themselves into a truly network centric force. It will illustrate how obstacles related to Norwegian ambitions, Command and Control, technological requirements, interoperability, and finally, just ability to lead and command, can be overcome. It shows that the greatest challenge to NCW for Norway will be the contemporary mindset among its senior military leaders, and that this obstacle can be overcome. Page 2 of 80 Network Centric Warfare TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Thesis Statement.................................................................................................................8 1.2 The Network Centric Concept............................................................................................8 1.3 The Domain Model ..........................................................................................................11 1.4 The NCW Components ....................................................................................................12 1.5 US Army and NCW .........................................................................................................13 1.6 What is a Network Centric Force.....................................................................................14 2 NORWEGIAN AMBITIONS................................................................................. 15 2.1 The Minister of Defence...................................................................................................15 2.2 Norwegian Defense Budget – Fiscal year 2003 ...............................................................16 2.3 The Chief of Defense .......................................................................................................17 2.4 Main Elements in Norwegian NCW Ambitions...............................................................18 2.5 The Norwegian Vision 2014+ ..........................................................................................19 2.6 A Summary of the Norwegian Ambitions........................................................................19 3 COMMAND CONCEPT IN A NETWORK CENTRIC FORCE ............................. 20 3.1 The Norwegian Command Concept in NCW...................................................................21 3.2 Leadership ........................................................................................................................22 3.3 The Command System .....................................................................................................22 3.4 Characteristics of a Command System.............................................................................24 3.4.1 Situational Awareness ..............................................................................................25 3.4.2 Decision Capability ..................................................................................................26 3.4.3 Tempo.......................................................................................................................27 3.4.4 Interoperability .........................................................................................................28 3.4.5 Resilience and endurance .........................................................................................29 3.4.6 Flexibility .................................................................................................................29 3.5 Information Management.................................................................................................30 3.6 The Command Structure ..................................................................................................31 3.7 Command Tools - Norwegian CCIS ................................................................................33 3.8 Ad Hoc Organizations – Task Forces...............................................................................34 3.9 Possible Changes to Command Structure ........................................................................35 3.10 Possible Changes in the Norwegian Command Structure and System ............................37 3.11 Willingness to Change......................................................................................................39 3.12 The Norwegian Command Concept - Summary and Conclusion ....................................42 4 ABILITY TO LEAD AND COMMAND IN NCW................................................... 45 4.1 Status current of the educational system ..........................................................................45 4.2 Status of the current selection system ..............................................................................47 4.3 Status of the current training system ................................................................................48 4.4 Experimentation - Future Simulation and Training .........................................................49 4.5 Ability to Lead and Command in NCW – Summary and Conclusion .............................50 5 TECHNOLOGY IN A NETWIORK CENTRIC FORCE ........................................ 52 5.1 Command Tools - Norwegian CCIS ................................................................................52 5.1.1 The Joint CCIS – NORCCIS II ................................................................................53 5.1.2 Army CCIS – NORTaC C2IS ..................................................................................57 5.1.3 Naval CCIS - SjøTas ................................................................................................59 Page 3 of 80 Network Centric Warfare 5.1.4 Air CCIS – NEC CCIS.............................................................................................59 5.2 Sensors..............................................................................................................................59 5.3 Communication ................................................................................................................61 5.4 Investments in NCW Capabilities ....................................................................................62 5.5 Technology – Summary and conclusion ..........................................................................63 6 INTEROPERABILITY.......................................................................................... 64 6.1 Interoperability in a Network Centric Force ....................................................................64 6.2 Current NATO Standards and Challenges .......................................................................65 6.3 Technological challenges .................................................................................................66 6.4 Doctrinal challenges.........................................................................................................67
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