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Massacre Timorese Timor link, no. 22, February 1992 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1992) Timor link, no. 22, February 1992. Timor link (22). pp. 1-8. The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/25957/ Number 22 February 1992 Massacre highlights Timorese plight East Timor became world news in November when Indonesian troops fired on a funeral procession at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dill, the territory's capital, killing up to 200 people. The incident tragically highlighted an injustice long ignored by much of the international community. The massacre followed a period of mounting tension in the former Portuguese colony, illegally occupied by Indonesia since 1975, with reports pointing to an escalating campaign of York radio station WBAI were in East Timor 'I turned around - tremendous amount Indonesian repression in the run-up to to report on alleged human rights abuses, of gun fire -- and there were dozens of a planned delegation of Portuguese and were badly beaten by troops while the people lying in the streets. ' parliamentarians in November. The shooting was going on. Bob Muntz, South East Asia project officer delegation was called off on 24 October According to Nairn: 'It was ... a planned with Australia's Community Aid Abroad, after Portuguese concern at Indonesia's and systematic massacre .... This was not a was also present and managed to escape. attempts to control and manipulate the situation where you had some hothead who On return to Melbourne he told a press visit. ran amok .... ' As the people saw the troops, conference: 'It was a case of sustained This issue of Timor Link looks at the he said, 'they tried to shrink back. There automatic weapon fire from many, many varying accounts of the Santa Cruz was a small collective gasp in the crowd. guns for a full two minutes into a crowded massacre and the background to it, As the soldiers turned the corner they raised street that had almost a thousand people in focusing on its international their M16s and began all at once firing into it with no possibility of cover ... repercussions. the crowd .... 'For all the time I was at the rally ... I 'Amy and I went out and stood between observed an orderly crowd of people The Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November the soldiers and the crowd because if they enthusiastically chanting their slogans, came after a memorial mass for Sebastiao saw foreigners there with cameras with tape displaying their banners, but doing nothing Gomes, a youth shot dead by troops in an recorders they wouldn't shoot. That didn't that could be described as provocative incident at Motael Church on 28 October. work.' towards the Indonesians .. As the mourners approached the Santa Cruz Amy Goodman added: 'There was 'There was no doubt that the attack was cemetery to place flowers on his grave, absolutely no warning .... I couldn't believe premeditated, unprovoked and well soldiers appeared and opened fire on the they would fire on this crowd - kids who planned .. .. I can say categorically that the procession. Among those killed was New were five years old .. .. These were truly claims of the Indonesian forces are nothing Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj. defenceless people. They had nothing but but lies designed to cover up the most The tragedy has caused international some banners ... and the commemorative appalling atrocity that has been perpetrated outrage, the more so as it was witnessed by cloth that they had for this young man, on the people of Timor for many years'. several foreign visitors who have been able Sebastiao, and they just kept shooting. British cameraman Max Stahl, of to publicise their testimonies. Below we 'With us they beat us into a corner and, Yorkshire Television, whose film revealed contrast their eye-witness accounts with the sitting on the ground, the only thing we the truth of the massacre, wrote a graphic official claims of the Indonesian military. could say was "Please, we're from account of the event in the Independent on America. ".. I kept thinking that the guns Sunday on 17 November. Like the other Foreign accounts pointed on us.. were also from America eye-witnesses, he emphasised the peaceful US journalists Allan Nairn of the New Yorker because the United States provides weapons nature of the march and the brutality of the magazine and Amy Goodman of the New for the Indonesian army. military's assault: '. .. there was no riot. There - 1 INSIDE THIS • Portuguese suspend v1s1t - p.3 • Outrage sweeps Australia - p.6 • Foreign bishops rally - p.7 ISSUE • International reactions - p.4-5 • Church under pressure - p.7 • Life of fear - p.8 , NEWS was a procession. a demonstration of Institute) graduates. that 'these despicable Referring to 'soldiers without any exceptionalh· good order. e\·en good people [pro-independence demonstrato rs) command control' and 'exercising self­ humour, despite the fear of the panicipants. must be sho t'. defence', the report describes the All the provocation the military needed \\'as On 9 December, as an official Indonesian 'provocati ve savagery' of the demonstrators in the pro-independence h ;:mners and comm1ss1on of inquiry began its whom, it alleges, were forced to attend the slogans of the demonstrators. and in their investigati on of the events of 12 November, demonstration. It disowns the accounts of temerity in demonstrating at :.111' . Try was equally candid: 'Once the atrocities committed after the massacre. Arrested and detained by the police after investigation is accomplished, we will wipe Western governments appear to have burying his film in the graveyard, Stahl was out all separatist elements who have tainted generally welcomed the inquiry's findings. held for nine hours. '\\'hy, I asked had they the government's dignity.' The US State Department said that the carried out this barbarous killing. Why did commission 'appears to have taken a serious they need guns :.1t all when the and responsible approach', while the demonstrators had non6" Official inquiry Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, As Timar Link went to press, Indonesia agreed with its estimates of the death toll. Indonesia's claims released its preliminary report on the But Amnesty International has expressed Head of the Indonesian armed fo rces, massacre. It contradicted army claims that serious doubts about the credibility of the General Try Sutrisno, initiall y put the death only 19 people had died, upping the figure report and called for an independent United toll at about 50 with 20 wounded and denied to 50 dead and 90 disappeared. Nations inquiry. that any fo reigners were among the victims. Blaming separatists for the army shooting, the general claimed that 'hand grenades, guns and knives' had been seized and that the crowd which left Motael church had been 'yelling hysterically, pelting shops and a police post. ' 'The security forces,' he went on, 'tried hut failed to impose order through Chronology of events sympatheti c and persuasive means .... The mass was so brutal that it led to victims. The deputy commander of military sector 700, Major Gerhan Lantara, was stabbed and the 21 October: Bishop Belo, Apostolic 23-25 November: Reports from East situation became more chaotic. Preventative Administrator of Dili diocese, speaks on Timor tell of an atmosphere of terror acti ons were first taken ... unril finally the Portuguese radio of his fears for the worse than at any time since the 1975 situati on had to be restored .... ' safety of the Timorese as the date for the Indonesian invasion. Bishop Belo pleads Try accused the Catholic Church of Portuguese parliamentary delegation to for help. Virtually all phone links with instigating the protest, adding that the East Timor approaches. the outside world are cut off. church, as a place of sanctity, 'should not be misused to create disorder.· 25 October: Portuguese delegation The military mocks the threat of US According to Reuters, Majo r General ·suspended' after Indonesia vetoes an pressure, pointing to Washington's Sintong Panjaitan, the regional commander, Australian journalist, Jill Jol1iffe, chosen failure to follow up expressions of told the Indonesian media: 'The authorities by the parliamentarians as a member of concern at the 1989 Tiananmen Square will never he in any doubt about taking the foreign press team. Reports of rising massacre in China with concrete action. tough acti on against any kind of abuse of tension in Dili . It claims the massacre will soon be our persuasive approach. The only order is: 28 October: Motael church incident in forgotten and threatens to kill all East to kill or to be killed.' which a youth, Sebastiao Gomes is shot Timorese youth. On 14 November official Indonesian army dead. Alfonso Henrique, an informer of Widespread threats against the Catholic fi gures for the death toll were revised 1 the Intel secret police, is stabbed to Church throughout Indonesia. The downwards to 19 dead and 91 injured . death. Vatican maintains a cautious silence, General Try, while regretting the incident, Tension continues to rise in early worried at the position of the church in said that 'it must be realised that they November as repression continues. a predominantly Muslim country. [fighters against Indonesian rule] are brutal. ' He said an investigation would be held, but 12 November: Massacre at the Santa 27 November: Reports received from stated that the affair was a domestic Cruz Cemetery, Dili, where over 100 East Timar that Indonesia is killing concern. 'We hope that foreign countries mourners of Sebastiao Gomes are shot people every day. Hope expressed that will nor meddle in the internal affairs of dead by the Indonesian military.
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