AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN NEWS COVERAGE OF THE DILi MASSACRE

( A Content Analysis of Australian and Indonesian Newspapers from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992)

'

Yuventius Agustinus Nunung Prajarto

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES SYDNEY - AUSTRALIA 1994 iv

AUSTRALIAlf ARD IImOHBSIAN IIEWS COVERAGE OP TBB DILI IIASSACRB

(A content Analysis of Australian and Indonesian Newspapers

frOII 1 July 1991 to 31 Karch 1992)

SCHOOL OP POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OP AR'l' ARD SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE UNIVERSITY OP REif SOUTH WALES 1994 V

AUSTRALIAN AIID IRDONBSIAN NEWS COVERAGE OF TIIB DILI MASSACRE

(A Content Analysis of Australian and Indonesian Newspapers

fr0111 July 1991 to 31 Karch 1992)

Yuventius Agustinus Hunung Prajarto

Thesis POLITICAL SCIENCE 1994 STATEMENT

Name : Yuventius Agustinus Nunung Prajarto student No.: 2114322 School of Political science Faculty of Arts and social Sciences University of New south Wales

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgement is made in the text.

Date : 8 Febr~y 1994 Signatu ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people whom I can thank by name. I am particularly grateful to Rodney Smith, my supervisor. His help was invaluable in guiding the process of this research till its finishing touch. Without his highly meticulous and diligent checking, my report of this study would have lacked much of its substance. I would also like to thank the following for supporting to my study: Mami and Papi, Lez, Ad, Joel, Ninna D, Zheitta Vazza Devi, Toety Azis, Ma+Pa Bo, Ma+Pa Yo, Ashadi Siregar, Hatman M. Siahaan, Tjahjo Purnomo w., Ratih Hardjono, Lizard and Swara swara swaraph. In addition, I received help 0 from: Mick, Libya Charle­ son, Tedjomurti, Sugarbo, Ichlasul Amal, Ibu Mimik, Christine H, LPJY, Surabaya Post, FISIPOL-UGM, Didik, Clare, Jane Shields, caterin, David, and Juliana. But I owe my greatest debt to the countless friends and "my special rabbit" who added "everything". I cannot name them but their help was indispensable.

•sparrows flock together, but an eagle always flies alone• viii

CONTENTS

Diagrams, Figures and Tables ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ix Glossary ...... xi CHAPTER I STUDYING AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN MEDIA COVERAGE: conceptualisation and Methodology...... 1 A. Introduction...... 1 B. Research Framework...... 3 1. Bias ...... 4 2. Newsmaking ...•...... 10 3. The Australian and Indonesian media 20 4. New World Information Order •••••••• 36 c. Conceptual Framework And Hypotheses •••••• 44 D. Methodology • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 7 CHAPTER II EAST TIMOR BETWEEN 1970 AND 1991: A Political Conflict ...... 58 A. East Timor in the 1970s •••••••••••••••••• 59 B. From Integration to the "Dili Massacre" •• 67

CHAPTER III EAST TIMOR IN AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN PRESS: 1991-1992 ...... 71 A. 28 October 1991 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 72 B. Around 12 November 1991 •••••••••••••••••• 77 c. Lusitania Expresso .•••••••••••••••••••••• 126 CHAPTER IV NEWS PATTERNS OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN NEWSPAPERSIN REPORTING THE EAST TIMOR INCIDENT •• 138 A. News Attention and Time of Coverage •••••• 141 B. "5W+H" Formula and News Values ••••••••••• 163 c. News' Tendencies, covering-step, News Sources and Kinds of News contents ••••••• 174 1. News' tendency ••••••••••••••••••••• 175 2. covering-step •••••••••••••••••••••• 184 3. News sources ••••••••••••••••••••••• 189 4. Kinds of news contents ••••••••••••• 201 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 211 Bibliography ...... 235 Appendix A: Diagram of Units of Analysis and categories 240 B: Operational Definitions of the content Analysis ...... 241 c: Coding Sheet ...... 244

***** ix DIAGRAMS, FIGURES AND TABLES

Diagraas Diagram 1 Process of Newsmaking ...... 11 Diagram 2 Units of Analysis and Categories •••••••••• 240

Figures Figure 1 The Lusitania Expresso's Position on Wednesday, 10 February 1992 at 13.11 WIB ••• 131 Figure 2 Number of News Item Based on Newspaper's Name • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 142 Figure 3 Number of News Item Based on country of Newspapers • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 144 Figure 4 Number of News Item Based on Month and country of Newspapers ••••••••••••••••••••• 147

. Tables Table 1 News Coverage Based on Group of Editions and Country of Newspapers ••••••••••••••••• 151 Table 2 News Coverage Based on Group of Editions and Newspaper's Name •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 153

Table 3 Number of News Item Based on Page ...... 161 Table 4 Number of News Item Based on News Format •• 162 Table 5 Number of News Item Based on News Lead •••• 163 Table 6 Number of News Item Based on the Use of the "5W+H" Formula •••••••••••••••••••••••• 164 Table 7 Level of Completeness Among the Six Newspapers •••..•.....•.•.•.•.••••.•..•.... 166 Table 8 Level of Completeness Based on Country of Newspapers •••••••••••••..•.••••••••••••••• 168 Table 9 Implementation of News Values Based on Newspaper's Name •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 171 Table 10 Implementation of News Values Based on Country of Newspapers •••••••.•.••••..•.••• 172 Table 11 Number of News Item Based on News' Tendency 176 Table 12 Tendency of News Based on Newspaper's Name 178 Table 13 Tendency of News Based on Country of Newspapers •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 181 Table 14 Types of coverage Based on country of Newspapers •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.. 186 Table 15 Types of Coverage by Each Newspapers ...... 187 Table 16 Number of News Item Based on the Use of News Sources •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 190 Table 17 Number of News Item Based on Newspaper's Name and News Sources ••••••••••••••••••••• 192 Table 18 Distribution of News Item Based on country of Newspapers and News sources •••••••••••• 195 Table 19 Tendency of News Based on News sources •••• 199 Table 20 Number of New~ Item Based on Kinds of News contents ...... 2 o 3 Table 21 Kinds of News Contents Based on Country of Newspapers •••.•.••••••••••••••••.•••••••.• 204 Table 22 Kinds of News Contents by Each Newspapers 205 Table 23 Tendency of News Based on Kinds of News Contents •••••••.••••••••••••••.•••.••••••• 208

***** xi

GLQSSAR:X:

AAP = Australian Associated Press ABC = Australian Broadcasting Corporation ABRI = Indonesian Armed Forces ACET = Australian coalition for East Timor AFP = Agence France Presse AJA = Australian Journalist's Association AMF = Armed Movement Forces AP = Associated Press APC = Australian Press Council APEC = Asia-Pasific Economic co-operation APODETI = Associacao Popular Deaocratica Tiaorense ARIC = Australian Routine Information Channel ASD'r = Associacao social Democratica de Timor ASEAH = Association of south East Asia Nations BBC = British Broadcasting corporation CAA = Community Aid Abroad DEPDAGRI = Indonesian Home Department DKH = Military Honour Council FR· = First-hand Reports FRETILIN = Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente H&WT = The Herald and Weekly Time I = Informal IA = Revs Sources wbicb involve tbe Australian Routine Intonation Channel II = llews Sources wbicb-·involve the Indonesian Routine -Intonation Cbannel IIA = 1M Sources which involve tbe Australian and Indonesian Routine Intonation 0lannel IGGI = International Government's Group for Indonesia IRIC = Indonesian Routine Information Channel IT = levs Sources wbicb involve first-band reports, inforul and other sources KPN = National Investigation commission MRAC = Anti-communist Revolutionary Movement NC = Not Clear NIIO = New International Information Order NPC = National Press Club NWIO = New World Information Order 0 = Opinion OS = Other Sources IWI = Indonesian Journalist's Association SIC = Permit to Print SIT = Permit to Publish SIUPP = Press Publication Enterprise Permit UD'r = Uniao Deaocratica Timorense UNETIH = National Union of Timorese students UPI = United Press International WIB = Western Indonesia Time 5W + H = What, Who, Where, When, Why and How CIIAPl'ERI

STUDYIRG AUSTRALIAR ARD IRDOIIESIAR MEDIA COVERAGE: Conceptualisation and Methodology

A. Introduction on November 12, 1991, the world was shocked by a riot that happened in Dili, East Timor, formerly Portuguese Timor. The chaos, later known as the "Dili Massacre" or "East Timor Incident", killed and injured people. While Indonesia claimed that the political conflict was its own internal affair, other countries alleged that this event contravened human rights. This research will attempt to explore how the Austra­ lian and Indonesian newspapers viewed the Dili massacre, and it will examine news patterns of the Australian and Indone­ sian press coverage of this event. Briefly, there are three events which led East Timor to become international news in 1991 and 1992. Prior to the Dili massacre on November 12, firstly, a small-scale riot around the "Mutail" church took place on October 28. The deaths of two victims, identified as Alfonso and Sebastio Gomes, were caused by a conflict which involved East Timorese who pro integration and anti integration to Indonesia. This conflict occurred in relation to a plan for the Portuguese parliamen­ tary and UN delegations to visit East Timor and the clandes­ tine FRETILIN movement. The rampage on October 28 was followed by another event on November 12, when a mass of people marched from the Mutail

1 Church to Santa Cruz cemetery. The Timorese were involved in a conflict against the Indonesian army and this spectacle caused a number of deaths and wounded victims. The actual number of victims became a controversial issue. The Indone­ sian authorities at first stated that 19 people were killed and 97 injured. Other countries argued against the Indonesian government's statement and demanded that the Indonesian government tell the "truth". They claimed, as reported by some print and broadcast media, the number of victims was more than the Indonesian government's deposition. Responding to such claims, the Indonesian government promised an inquiry into the massacre by organizing Komisi Penyelidik Nasional (A National Investigation Commission), headed.by Justice Djaela- ni. Besides the two events which occurred on October 28 and November 12, the trip of the Lusitania Expresso from Portugal to the East Timor Sea during the first three months in 1992 also invited international coverage. This ship's passengers were prepared to go to Dili for an activity called a "flower scattering ceremony", and claimed their voyage was a peace cruise. In contrast, the Indonesian authorities viewed this cruise as a provocative effort in order to again attract world attention. These three events, which were interrelated, were re­ ported by the world mass media, including the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. News, as well as opinion articles about the Dili massacre, filled newspaper pages in the two

2 countries. It can be stated that East Timor issues dominated the Australian and Indonesian press content, especially in the last two months in 1991. The main problems here centre on how the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the East Timor incident. Were there differences between the Australian and Indonesian newspapers' reporting of the carnage? Was there a different pattern of newsmaking between the two countries? Does the concept of a New World Information Order1 help to explain their press coverage of this bloodshed?

B. Research Fruaework There are four main reasons for questioning how the Australian and Indonesian media faced the Dili massacre in 1991. First of all, the media cannot be free from bias. This bias may result from reporters and editors who handle facts or events and the "various interests" of the media in such events. The question is then to what extent did the bias influence the Australian and Indonesian media in reporting the massacre? Secondly, it is commonly accepted that such aspects as news values and news worthiness guide any process of newsmak­ ing. Each media organisation applies these criteria in dif­ ferent ways. Thus, how the Australian and Indonesian media

1.John c. Merrill, "The Global Perspective", in John c. Merrill (ed.), Global Journalism: A survey of the World's Hass Media, Longman, New York, 1983, p. 37.

3 implemented these criteria to report the Dili massacre will also be reviewed. Thirdly, although both Australia and Indonesia adhere to a concept of social responsibility for their press, there are some cultural differences between the Australian and Indone­ sian media. The dissimilar operation of the concept sometimes creates complaints and tensions. Regarding this matter, how the Australian and Indonesian media actually operated in reporting the massacre needs to be examined. Fourth, there is a different position between Australia and Indonesia identified in the concept of the New World Information Order. On the one hand the Australian media are a part of the Western media, and on the other hand the Indone­ sian media are assumed to be a part of the Third World media. The question of whether their dissimilar positions in the New World Information Order affect their newspapers' reportage of

the Dili massacre will thus also be examined. These four reasons will now be outlined in more detail.

1. Bias That the media cannot be free from bias, according to Arno, can be observed through two major points exhibited by media organizations when they are involved in reporting a conflict.1 The first is that media organisations will become

1.Andrew Arno, "Communication, Conflict, and storylines: The News Media as Actors in A Cultural Context", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International ConLlict, Westview Press,

4 storytellers who must work within given technological stipu­ lations and cultural proprieties. The technological limita­ tions of the print media, for instance, do not allow newspa­ pers to report a conflict between two groups of football supporters in the same way that TV networks can broadcast the tension. A newspaper needs a longer time to transmit the story of the conflict to its readers, while a television network is able to beam the riot at the very moment it oc­ curs. The technological superiorities of the electronic media allow television to become a storyteller which works faster than newspapers. The two media therefore focus on different aspects of the story. Another example which shows that the media organisations work within cultural conventions can be observed through content differences of magazines in relation to the launch of Madonna's sex book. Controversies regarding Madonna's appearances in her book have been differently reported by magazines in Australia and Indonesia. Using Australian cultural values, the Australian magazines feature some pages of Sex which show Madonna's naked and semi-naked photographs. Conversely, since Indonesian culture does not tolerate naked pictures, the Indonesian magazines are unable to use such photographs in their content. It is evident, therefore, that technological limitations and cultural con­ ventions may lead the media to be biased. The second is that the media will formulate their role

••• Continued ••• London, 1984, pp. 3-14.

5 as a third party, or an intensifier or diminisher of a con­ flict. A newspaper which does not affiliate with a political party, for example, tends to be the third party when report­ ing an election campaign. During the "peace revolution" leading up to the collapse of Marcos regime, the internation­ al media tended to play their role as intensifiers of the conflict in order to establish democracy in Philippine. on the other hand, the tendency of some newspapers not to pub­ lish widely a conflict shows that they formulate their role as diminishers rather than to be the third parties or inten­ sifiers. Between the two points, Arno adds, an issue of the independence of the news medium appears. The levels of press autonomy are influenced by the structural character of the conflict th~t has occurred and by the numerous ideologies of news which are proclaimed by particular communities.1 At this point, Arno believes that the news media catt operate as effective third parties. 2 He explains that news organizations have to be strong in order to be free from the pressures of special interests. Arno adds that acting as a third party demands that the news media act fairly and with­ out bias. Georgette Wang, who studied the "People's Daily" newspa-

1.Ibid., p. 14. 2.Andrew Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gaudet", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International ConLlict, West­ view Press, London, 1984, p. 233.

6 per in China, points out some factors which influence the press's function in a process of conflict.1 These factors among others are "the nature of the conflict, the size and ownership of the paper, the news freedom allowed in the country, and the structure of the mass communication sys­ tem".2 The press, she says, is able to offer a foundation for negotiation and compromise to the parties involved in such conflict by evaluating the situation, making different view­ points public and accommodating information on the matter. She also argues that antagonism or conflict is a crucial component in one step of the newsmaking process, called "newsworthiness". Donohue, Tichenor and Olien argue against Arno's posi­ tion regarding the capability of the news media to act as effective third parties. 3 Some studies, they note, have shown that media coverage is usually in favor of the estab­ lished group. The media content normally represents the attitudes of the strongest group in the social system. On the other hand, they add, the superior group will also favour

!.Georgette Wang, "The People's Daily and Nixon's visit to China", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International Conflict, west­ view Press, London, 1984, pp. 133-45. 2.Ibid., p. 133. 3.George A. Donohue, Phillip J. Tichenor and Clarice N. Olien, "Media Evaluations and Group Power", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International Conflict, Westview Press, London, 1984, p. 204.

7 media coverage which support its collective goals. 1

It would appear then that although media is able to formulate its role as the third party, or an intensifier or diminisher of the conflict, the media is rarely fully able to act as the third party. The influence of the most powerful groups in the system will prevent the media from bei'ng a third party. Furthermore, the dominant group's influence leads the media to favour the group's interests and to sup­ press information which is detrimental to the group.

As.stated earlier, bias may result from the actions of reporters and editors. Bias which comes from reporters will appear during the process of exploring and newsmaking. Edi­ tors, in addition, cause bias when managing news which comes from reporters. All of these are related to the use of news sources and the type of coverage. The use of news sources and the type of news coverage which are imbalance in reporting a conflict will produce a biased news.

Regarding news sources, Tiffen notes three categories:

routine information channels, first-hand reports and informal

sources. 2 He explains that the first category consists of,

among others, statements by government and political leaders,

television and radio broadcasts and press releases. The

1.Ibid., p. 207. Read also David H. Weaver, "Setting Political Priori­ ties: What Role for the Press?", Political Communication and Persuasion, 1990, vol. 7, p. 204.

2.Rodney Tiffen, The News from Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1978, p. 163.

8 second category includes eyewitness accounts of events, interviews with participants and direct observations. Infor­ mal sources, the third category, include leaks by government officials. A slightly different categorization is used by Sigal who divides information channels into routine, informal and enterprise. 1 Tiffen adds that "reliance on routine chan­ nels gives government and officials great scope to influence the content and focus of news 11 • 2 Thus, the use of first-hand reports and informal channels is needed in order to produce news fairly or at least to ensure a greater number of per­ spectives. The criteria which are used for measuring the fairness or lack of bias in the news media are the extent to which the media cover one or both sides of a story. Fairness· can be established from the symmetry or asymmetry of the news cont­ ent in relation to a conflict. Symmetrical news content covers two or more sides of news sources, while an asymmetri­ cal news content only conceals one side of those involved in a conflict. Arno reminds us that "freedom from the bias ••• , is an ideal, but generally the real question is simply at what level the bias will surface ••• , with sufficiently power­ ful countervailing forces 11 • 3

1.Sigal, quoted by Tiffen, Ibid. 2.Tiffen, Op. Cit., p. 163. 3.Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gau­ det," Op. Cit., p. 232.

9 This discussion of bias in the media leads to considera­ tion of the units of analysis which will be used to examine how the Australian and Indonesian media reported the Dili massacre. Three units of analysis will· be applied in this study to observe the biased news: fairness, news tendency and news sources. To discuss how the Australian and Indonesian media faced the Dili massacre, aspects of the news making process will also be observed. The following section will discuss these facets.

2. News making As a social institution, the press should operate within ethical and professional standards. An awareness of these ethical and professional standards is needed in getting and transmitting news. It should be realized that when the press collects and transfers news, it not only faces up to the events, but also copes with people (news sources and readers) or groups --even races or nations-- who are related to the events. Len Granato states, " news is a journalist report, ••• that will impact on people and society111 so that what the press presents will have an impact on the readers. The reality that the press cannot be separated from the audience and its environment, and that journalists and other people who are involved in the news work must be aware of l.Len Granato, Reporting and Writing News, Prentice Hall, New York, 1991, p. 29.

10 ethical and professional standards, is not only covered by journalists' code of ethics and press council's principles. A more immediately important factor is the whole process of newsmaking. All aspects of the process of newsmaking, accord­ ing to Ashadi Siregar, can be identified in a model as fol­ lows:1

Diagra11 of Rewsll&king Process

Press council Principles r:::::7 I Environaent I ...._ __coc1e__ of_Ethi_'cs ___ ~ I I V V 5W+B Fonula Diaensions r:::7 r::::7 BPress ---> 8Events -> Hews Values -> Angles ->~->~ lews Worthiness Pegs I\

Ideal Aspiration Business Aspiration

1.Ashadi Siregar presented this model in a discussion at the Yogyakarta Institution for Research, Education and Pub­ lishing (LP3Y), March 1991. He is a Director of Education at the LP3Y, a lecturer at the University of Gadjah Mada and an Indonesian novelist.

11 Besides incorporating the code of ethics and the press coun­ cil principles, this model indicates that the press, as a social institution, is related to its aspirations, environ­ ment and readers. All of these factors will colour the pro­ cess of newsmaking. Although the owners of the press are often assumed to be the main factor in defining news, Siregar argues that the main consideration for the press in publishing news is the readers. Readers here means consumers in general, including the advertisers. Because the tasks of the press are to report and sell the news to their consumers, considerations which are based on the consumers' needs are crucial. In detail, these considerations are indicated by the consumers' geo­ graphic, sociographic and psychographic backgrounds.1 In modern capitalist countries, the development of the press has made reporting an industrial activity, influenced by economic principles. 2 The press will seek to increase its circulation in order to reach as many advertisers as possi­ ble, while the advertisers will place their advertisements if the press can obtain a large circulation. Considering this, two points can be made. Firstly, the readers are crucial. If the press can fulfil the readers' needs which are appropriate

l.Also read F. Fraser Bond, An Introduction to Journalism, MacMillan, New York, 1961, pp. 62-3. 2.Merrill, Op. Cit., p. 37.

12 to the consumers' geographic, sociographic and psychographic backgrounds, press circulation will be larger, which will in turn attract advertisers the press. That the press has a strong desire to reach a number of subscribers and advertisers, secondly, means that the press has to decide its business aspiration. Simply, this business aspiration can be observed through the number of targets of the readers and advertisers. Business aspirations mean compe­ tition between the various papers. Tiffen notes two kinds of competition: "the direct commercial competition and the general competitive ethos which pervades journalism11 • 1 The first kind is linked to the commercial aspiration, while the other is related to other aspects in the process of newsmak­ ing. Besides being influenced by business aspirations, the dynamics of the press are affected by what might be called an ideal aspiration. This ideal aspiration usually is decided by the founders of each newspaper, who will lead the press toward its own purposes in society, such as "to improve and to establish democracy". This ideal aspiration reflects the expected roles of each press in its society when the press was built, al though this also changes over time, as new generations of journalists, editors and managers emerge. It should be noted that there is sometimes a contra­ diction between these ideal and business aspirations. The l.Rodney Tiffen, News and Power, Allen & unwin, Wellington, 1989, p. 52.

13 business aspiration must be to try to ~ultivate financial success, while the ideal aspiration might not allow this. Tabloid newspapers in a country which forbids pornography can be used as an example. The ideal aspiration of this tabloid is to give "healthy" entertainment to the society. The ta­ bloid, in agreement with Government guidelines, will not publish pornographic pictures and information.1 However, a tabloid such as this usually does not attract the readers, so that it reaches low circulation and will be abandoned by advertisers. It seems that if the tabloid maintains its ideal aspiration, it will collapse commercially. Conversely, if the tabloid tries to be a financial success, it has to be able to impress the readers and the advertisers. This diamet­ ric situation is solved through tabloids, for instance, taking advantage of the imperfect definition of pornography. The tabloid publishes photographic material in an obscured form so that it cannot strictly be identified as pornograph­ ic, but which attracts and impres,es the readers. In order to present the best media appearance, the ethical standards, which come from the press council's prin­ ciples, the code of ethics, and the ideal and business aspi­ rations, have to run parallel with professional journalism standards. The professional standards basically require the

!.Although pornography itself has not been defined precise­ ly, pornography in some countries, such as Muslim coun­ tries, is assumed to be disgusting or "unhealthy" enter­ tainment. This sometimes creates debate about which level of pictures or information can be classified as pornogra­ phy.

14 news workers' abilities to understand and apply what are frequently called news values and news worthiness. Although in practice the ethical standards sometimes conflict with the journalists' professionalism, the ethical standards, theo­ retically, have to guide journalists in using their profes­ sional skills. The news workers have to apply professional standards in all aspects of their work, from gathering and exploring facts to presenting news. Exploring news based on an event is the job of a journalist. Although there is a convention by which journal­ ists should explore and present their news under the "5W+H" formula --which is simply applied by asking who was involved, what happened and where, when, why and how it happened, 1-­ this procedure is not sufficient to produce news. In report­ ing news, other criteria such as news values and news worthi­ ness, must be considered. 2 These two criteria are applied differently by each newspaper, depending on its own editorial policy. The kinds of news values which are often chosen include timeliness, importance, prominence, proximity, magnitude and human interest. 3 These kinds reflect answers to questions ------1.Granato, Op. Cit., p. 30. 2.Granato notes that, basically, news worthiness is ful­ filled by the use of "5W+H" formula and news values. Granato, Op. Cit., p. 31. 3.Yogyakarta Institution for Research, Education and Publi­ cation (LP3Y) uses the six kinds of news values to measure the use of news values in news items.

15 such as is the information to be presented by the media news (timeliness), will the information have significant effects on the readers (importance) , are some parts of the news content --names of places and institutions, for example-- and news sources that appear well known by audiences (prominence), do the events that happened and are reported have geographical and psychographical closeness to the read­ ers (proximity), does the event involve a great number of people, or other measures such as money (magnitude), and does the information have human aspects (human interest). Corrup­ tion in the Government is a good example of these values. It

might, for example, be reported that an independent commis­ sion unraveled a corruption case yesterday (timeliness). The corruption involved 13 ministers who received 20 billion dollars illegally (magnitude). These ministers, among others, are the Minister of Trade, Minister of Transportation and Communication and the Defence Minister (prominence). Three of the wives of ministers involved in this case suicided because they felt so embarrassed (human interest). Being people involved in the Government, this event has significant ef­ fects to the society and, ·indeed, to the readers (importance), and has both geographical and psychograpical closeness to the readers (proximity). Using the other terms, Bond notes four similar news values: timeliness, proximity, size and importance.1 Granato

1.size has a similar meaning with magnitude. Bond, Op. Cit., pp. 80-1.

16 states eight: conflict, disasters, impact, prominence, time­ liness, proximity, novelty and human interest.1 Tiffen iden­ tifies speed, name, and interest as news values. 2 Other news values which are often used are uniqueness, controversy and suspense. 3 A wider consideration which is close to news values, is newsworthiness, which involves two aspects: the depth and the completeness of news. Granato argues that, basically, news worthiness is fulfilled by the use of the "5W+H" formula and news values. 4 Nevertheless, Siregar claims that news worthi­ ness is deeper and wider than the operation of the "5W+H" formula and news values. 5 News worthiness requires something likes investigation in more detail so that information which will be published goes beyond the "5W+H" formula and basic news values. The achievement of news worthiness thus depends on the ability of journalists to investigate the event accu-

l.Granato, Op. Cit., pp. 31-5 •. 2.Tiffen, The News from Southeast Asia, op. Cit., pp. 89- 119. 3.The identification of news values above is applied differ­ ently by different newspapers, depending on their view. Some newspapers go into detail on the six news values so that they produce different kinds of news values. The essential meaning of this discussion is that the six news values are assumed to be quite sufficient for reporting an event. 4.Granato, Op. Cit., p. 31. 5.Siregar discussed this matter at the Yogyakarta Institu­ tion for Research, Education and·Publication (LP3Y), March 1991.

17 rately, deeply and fairly. 1 From these points, it would appear that news worthiness is another aspect of the newsmaking process. The levels of the use of the "5W+H" formula, news values and news worthi­ ness will determine the appearance of news as a whole. The understanding of the "5W+H" formula, news values and news worthiness, therefore, guides journalists to colour their kinds of news content. This content regularly comprises the fact or event itself, comments on the event or support and counter to the comment, and background information. What in fact happens, as was previously stated, is that the ethical standards sometimes conflict with professional standards. An event which has been observed and meets the requirements of the "5W+H" formula, news values and news worthiness, sometimes cannot be published due to the fact that the ethical standards restrict or, at least, have not allowed yet, for some reasons. Racial tension, for example, is a big event, which on the one hand will be a "great" news and impress the readers, but it may also be very "sensitive" since it could threaten the unity and stability of a nation

!.Schultz, in her research, uses eight objective and five subjective categories of errors to measure the accuracy of the Australian newspapers. These categories are wrong time: wrong address: misidentification: wrong name or title: wrong numbers: wrong descriptions: wrong explana­ tions: wrong fact, spelling, grammar and others (objec­ tive errors), and omissions, overemphasis, underempha­ sis, misquotation, and other subjective error. Ju­ lianne Schultz, Accuracy in Australian Newspapers, Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, Working Paper No. 1., University of Technology, Sydney, (October) 1990, p. 13.

18 by encouraging further racial friction. Based on their pro­ fessional standards, the media may publish such matter. However, media may also refrain from publishing the event because of their ethical standards. The news work in dealing with the event itself, the use of the "SW+H" formula, news values and news worthiness, is handled by reporters. However, the wider responsibilities are conducted by editors. These editors manage their reporters and what the reporters should be doing on the one side, and determine the news dimension, angles and pegs on the other. Siregar states that the news is usually divided into politi­ cal, economic, social and cultural dimensions from which the . news to be covered will be chosen. News angles are specific details which are based ·on the news dimensions. Though the events covered by different newspapers are basically the same, the use of news angles will shape the news and make the news in certain newspapers different to others. News pegs are events in the past which are used for explaining actual news, so that the readers can understand the context of the new event. Based on this description of aspects of the newsmaking process, the parameters needed to examine how the Australian and Indonesian media report the Dili massacre can be stated as follows. Three units of analysis which will be used in this study are the kinds of news content, the completeness of the news and news values. The kinds of news content are categorized into the event, comment on the event, supporting

19 or countering views on the comment, and background informa­ tion. Completeness will be observed through the use of the "5W+H" formula. This unit of analysis is not divided into the six specific elements of .the "5W+H" formula, but is divided into good, medium and bad, based on the number of such elements which are used in a story. News values will also not be divided into different kinds, but will be cate­ gorized into maximum and minimum, based on the number of such news values which are presented. Besides-being based on the implementation of general news aspects in the newsmaking process, the place of the Australian and Indonesian media in their political and cul­ tural systems may influence the reportage of East Timar. This will be discussed in the following section.

3. The Australian and Indonesian aedia cultural differences between the Australian and Indone­ sian media sometimes create complaints and tensions •1 Al­ though both Australia and Indonesia adhere to a concept of social responsibility for their press, the interpretation and the implementation of this concept are not identical in each country. The adoption and the operation of the concept by the two countries can be described as follows. Australia's print media is guided by Australian Press Council (APC) principles and the Australian Journalists'

1."Diploaasi dari Tetangga Selatan (Diplomacy from South Neighbour)", in Tempo, 25 April 1992, No. 8 (XXII), p. 23.

20 Association (AJA) Code of Ethics. Both the Australian Press Council's principles and the Australian Journalists' Associa­ tion Code of Ethics are the rules which guide the ethical and professional standards of Australian journalists. According to Schultz, the Australian Press Council supports the principle that newspapers in Australia can manage themselves.1 The Australian Press Council has laid down two principles of the freedom of the press in Australia, which are guided by eleven general propositions. In other words, freedom of the press in Australia is established and then the press regulate themselves. In doing so, they should have an awareness of their responsibility as social institu­ tions. Such a principle is consistent with the social respon­ sibility theory of the press, which is rooted in the idea of social responsibility. This idea, according to Peterson, was based on the document "A Free and Responsible Press" produced by the Commission on Freedom of the Press as a whole, and "Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Principle" by William E. Hocking. 2 Peterson lists six tasks or functions of the press under this theory: 3

------l.Schultz, Op. cit., p, 74. 2.Theodore Peterson, "The Social Responsibility Theory of the Press", in Fred s. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm (eds.), Four Theories of the Press, Uni- varsity of Illinois, Urbana, 1963, p. 75. 3.Ibid., p. 74.

21 1. Servicing the political system by providing informa­ tion, discussion and debate on public affairs; 2. Enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government; 3. Safeguarding the rights of the individual by serving as a watch-dog against government; 4. Servicing the economic system, primarily by bringing together to the buyers and sellers of goods and services through the medium of advertising; s. Providing entertainment; 6. Maintaining its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be free the pressures of special interests.

The social responsibility theory is also adopted by Indonesia for its press system. Indonesia named its press system a press "Pancasila".1 The Indonesian Press Council in 1984 formulated this system as follows. 2 First of all, a national press is a press Pancasila, which means that the orientation of the press's activities are based on the values of Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. Second­ ly, press Pancasila is a development press which means it practices Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution to develop aspects of the lives of society, nation and country, includ­ ing in developing the press itself. Lastly, the essence of press Pancasila is a "healthy" press; that is, a press which free but responsible. The "heal thy" press is required to encourage a climate of faith between people to produce an open society which is democratic through positive interaction ------1.Pancasila is an Indonesian National Ideology. It consists of five principles: belief in God, humanitarianism, na­ tional unity, the people's sovereignty, and social jus­ tice. 2.See F. Rachmadi, Perbandingan Sistea Pers, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1990, pp. 197-8.

22 between the government, press and society. According to Rodgers, the press "Pancasila" operates neither in a "free western fashion" nor in a "totally authoritarian environment" •1 The Indonesian press floats somewhere between these two styles. The adoption of the concept of social responsibility in the Indonesian press system is reflected in the formula of "free but responsi­ ble•.2 This means that the Indonesian press have a freedom to publish, including the "right not to publish", but that this freedom should promise responsible conduct. A general principle of the formula, as described by Rodgers, is that the Indonesian press must not support the "cause of communism, atheism, sadism or pornography". 3 This formula comprises a taboo on Indone·sian press coverage on cases which may generate ethnic, religious, racial or inter­ .group indignation or tensions.4 Three guidelines for publica­ tion have also been given in 1979 by Ali Murtopo, the Indone- l.Peter Rodgers, The Doaestic and Foreign Press in Indone­ sia: 'Free But Responsible'?, Research Paper No. 18, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1980, p. 3. 2.Ibid., p. 6. 3 • Ibid. , p. 8 • Communism is a restricted ideology followed the failed coup by the Indonesian Communism Party on September 30, 1965. Atheism, sadism and pornography are also prohibited in Indonesia. 4.There is a view that such issues of ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup frictions or tensions, known as "SARA" (an acronym for s = suku or ethnic, A= aga.ma or religion, R = ras or racial and A = antargolongan or intergroup) will disturb the Indonesian stability and unity.

23 sian Minister for Information: "moral considerations, nation­ al interest, and whether it was appropriate for the news to be published".1 Under the formula of "free but responsible", in short, the Indonesian press activities are not supposed to disturb the stability and unity of the nation. As stated earlier, the interpretation and the implemen­ tation of the social responsibility principles are not iden­ tical in Australia and Indonesia. The dissimilar operation of the principles is influenced by the countries'political, economic, social and cultural backgrounds. If Australia fully guarantees the operation of its media by which the Australian media is free to express opinions and to argue critically, 2 Indonesia sometimes restricts its media due to the operation of the "free but responsible" formula. The Indonesian author­ ities butt not only into the Indonesian media operation, but also into media content. A regulation which gives the Government control over Indonesian media operation was passed in 1982. The Indone­ sian 1982 Act, among other things, states that a newspaper company has to have a SIUPP (a Press Publication Enterprise Permit) • The Act implies that the Indonesian Government will not restrict newspaper publication because of the substance of a newspaper's content, but it may withdraw the SIUPP on the basis of a press company's suitability. Hill

1. Ibid. , p. 7 • 2."Diplomasi Dari Tetangga Selatan" (Diplomacy from South Neighbour), Op. Cit., p. 23.

24 notes that this keeps Indonesian publications under Indonesian government regulation. 1 How the SIUPP becomes a "monster" for Indonesian publi­ cations can be understood in the case of the tabloid Monitor, for example. A mistake made by this tabloid led to the with­ drawal of the Monitor's SIUPP by the Department of Informa­ tion of Indonesia. 2 This was done without a legal trial process, with the exception of a hearing between the Depart­ ment of Information and the Indonesian Press Council. Arswen­ do Atmowiloto, the Monitor's editor in chief, has been im­ prisoned for several years, following the judge's verdict. From this point, it seems that the Indonesian media can be banned not only because of a press company's suitability, as the regulation of the SIUPP states, but also due to the government's control in the name of the Indonesian stability and unity. The case of Monitor is only one example that shows the Indonesian media cannot operate fully free from the Indone------1.David T. Hill, The Press in 'New Order' Indonesia: Enter­ ing the 1990's, Working Paper No. 1, National Library of Australia, 1991, p. 4. 2.Honitor was the first publication in Indonesia which exceeded 700,000. In the 15 October 1990 edition, Monitor published a result of a 'popularity poll. The result listed the Prophet Muhammad at 11th place. This was as­ sumed to be an unforgivable insult and angered the Indone­ sian Muslims. The Indonesian Government viewed that this disturbed the Indonesian stability and unity. See Hill, Op. Ci t • , p • 9 • Later, the publisher of Senang magazine returned its SIUPP as a self-awareness of having a mistake. Senang illustrated a draft of the Prophet Muhammad, something which is strictly restricted by Islam.

25 sian Government's action. Other incidents have occurred since the Indonesian 1982 Act was declared.1 Two Indonesian dailies (Sinar Barapan and Prioritas), a journal (Jurnal Bkuin) and a fortnightly news magazine (Expo) were killed off after pre­ senting commentaries on economic policies. Other publica­ tions, such as Topik, and Peli ta have also been banned, although only as a temporary sanction. Prior to 1982, the Indonesian Government imposed a 1966 Act on the press which consisted of, among others, two decla­ rations: no censorship or bridling would be applied to the Indonesian national press and no publication permit wQuld be needed. In fact, as Hill noted, two permits had to be ob­ tained by newspaper publications: the Permit to Publish (SIT) from the Department of Information and the Permit to Print {SIC) from the military security authority, KOPKAHTIB. Be­ sides this, he added, 12 publications were banned within a few weeks in relation to the reportage of a public demonstra­ tion that occurred in January 1974. 2 Since 1990, a "climate of openness" has been developing in Indonesia. The Indonesian media have an opportunity to encourage this endeavour. Al though the existence of the Indonesian 1982 Act still limits the scope of the Indonesian ------1.For further information read Hill, Op. Cit., pp. 5-6. 2 • Ibid, p. 4 • The regulation of SIT and SIC were replaced by the SIUPP in September 1982. This ran parallel with the substitution of the Indonesian's 1966 Act by the Indone­ sian's 1982 Act.

26 media's activities, the ideal expressed in the 1982 Act is that Indonesian news workers can present their reports with­ out worrying about censorship or government interference. This ideal becomes apparent in the way that the Act views the position of the Indonesian media in the context of tripartite relationship between the government, media and society. The form of the relationship is reflected in a statement made by President Suharto of Indonesia, who said that the press is one of the Government's partners at work. 1 The Indonesian government also wants the press to carry out a dual function: as a government communication channel and as a social communication channel. This broadens the understanding of the way in which the interaction among the government, press and society is based on principles of harmony, accor­ dance and equality.2 According to Rachmadi, such a relationship does not mean that the Indonesian press is solely a Government microphone. The press must operate in the way it has to work and should not merely propagate the government's interest. The govern­ ment only hopes that the press will not disrupt government programs and wider Indonesian development programs. 3 Looking into the Sinar Harapan and Prioritas cases, however, it seems that newspapers which fail to act as the

l.Rachmadi, Op. Cit., p.· 186. 2.Ibid., p. 202. 3.Ibid., p. 187.

27 government microphone and which criticise the Government are got rid of. It is thus still questionable whether the Indone­ sian media is free from censorship or Government interfer­ ence. Telephone calls to newspaper editors from "hidden" sources, who ask the editors not to publish news of an event as a whole or not to present some parts of this event, are often discussed among Indonesian media practicioners. This means that media content is sometimes published under the instructions of these "hidden" sources. Furthermore, the notion that Indonesian publications are government microphones can be seen in their similar content, which extends to using the same words and sentences in their news. This frequently appears in news which comes from Gov­ ernment institutions. A study by the Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerbitan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Institution for Research, Education and Publication) illustrates that media content mostly represents the state's interests rather than the wider interests within society. Using around 4,000 news items from nine Indonesia's dailies as its sample, this study indicates that 47.4% of the news items studied publish news subjects of state, higher than the proportion of wider social interests (37.8%). This means that the state's activi­ ties and statements more often appear in the Indonesian newspapers than the society's interests. Besides this, this study reveals that the Indonesian newspapers tend to use the government officers rather than the civilian as their news

28 sources.1 The appearance of such news is not solely an accident; nor is it caused only by the Government. Some media workers are also involved. The laziness of reporters who fail to dig facts in detail means they are ultimately satisfied with press releases from Government institutions. These press releases are published without any changes. Media conditions differ in Australia. It seems that the Australian Government thinks comparatively highly of the rights of citizens and groups, including the media, to ex­ press and criticise ideas. The Australian media, using self­ censorship, operates without direct censorship and interfer­ ence from the Government. It can be stated that newspaper operations and news content reflect the newspaper's own "spirits". It does not matter if they publish news which opposes the ruling Government. The Australian media, as stressed by Warren, plays essential political and cultural roles. 2 It seems that media has an independent influence over Australia's political and cultural life. This is a phenomenon which runs parallel with

1.The study was conducted in 1992. The full report of this study is being renewed by the LP3Y. The description above is based on an opinion article in Kompas. See Akhmad Zaini Abar, "Posisi Pers Sebagai 'Kekuatan Strategis"', in Koapas, 8 February 1993, p. 4. 2.Christopher warren, "Closures, Sackings - the Limits of Media Diversity", in Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Hedia, University of Technology Sydney, (September) 1991, p. 14.

29 the concept of the media's social responsibility, by which the Australian media acts as a watch-dog, carries out its social function of informing and interpreting events for the readers, and encourages social cohesion. The problems in the Australian media, according to Brenchley, are mostly caused by the existence of a tendency to market domination rather than a need for content regula­ tion.1 Such a problem has developed among Australian publica­ tions. The collapse of some publications, caused by their inability to compete indicates the tendency towards market domination. Between 1987 and 1989, as Smith notes, the West­ ern Hail (Perth), Telegraph, Daily Sun and Sunday Sun (Bris­ bane), Sun and The Times on Sunday (Sydney) ended their operations because of lack of financial support. 2 On the other hand, the acquisition and mergers of some publication enterprises resulted in market dominance. 3 Smith adds that the dispersion of The Herald and Weekly Times (H&WT), caused by market pressure from Holmes a Court, Packer and Murdoch from November 1986 to February 1987, strengthened Murdoch's

l.Fred Brenchley, "Creating a Responsive Regulatory Environ­ ment", in Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, Competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Hedia, Seminar Papers No. 2, University of Technology Sydney, (September) 1991, p. 28. 2.Rodney smith, "The News Media", in Rodney Smith and Lex Watson (eds.), Politics in Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989, p. 255. 3.Brenchley, Op. Cit., p. 28.

30 domination to 74% of the metropolitan newspaper market. 1 Government involvement to ensure the survival of newspa­ pers is a controversial issue in Australia. Devine firmly states that allow any government control over the media is a fatal mistake. 2 As Brenchley notes, the Government stands between strong demands to keep its hands off the press and pressure to set up super government agencies, to increase regulation, and to give subsidies for media regulation. 3 This controversy in itself may prevent action by the Australian government to manage the continuation of small news enter­ prises and to promote news diversity. This underlines the notion that the Australian media tends to work outside Government control. on the one hand, this condition leads the Australian media to be free from the Government. The advantages are the media's self-management and its freedom to express opinion and argument critically. On the other hand, lack of Government protection against market domination causes some media enteprises and newspapers

------l.Smith, Op. Cit., p. 255. 2.Frank Devine, "Keeping the Press Free - Why the Government Should Not Regulate the Media", in Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, Competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Hedia, Seminar Papers No. 2, University of Technology Sydney, (September) 1991, p. 24. 3.Brenchley, op. Cit., p. 32.

31 to collapse.1 The Indonesian Government's attention to the existence of small media, conversely, gives these media the opportunity to endure within a context of commercial media competition. The Government's decision not to allow teleprint operations by print media, especially by national and "strong" newspa­ pers, allows local and small companies in the Indonesian regions to maintain ~heir life. 2 Another Government policy which supports the existence of the local or regional newspa­ pers is that national newspaper publishers are not permitted to use the first daily flight to spread their newspapers. This allows the local newspapers to reach their readers before the arrival of national newspapers. 3 In some cases, it seems that the Government's involve­ ment in media regulation is needed. The ideal balance is that the Government does not intervene in the media's appearance, but it oversees the broad economic operation of the media. This would bring advantages for the media. The media could ------1.Two aspects of this situation since 1986-87 that has caused particular public debate has been the foreign proprietorship of the Australian media and the centraliza­ tion of ownership within Australia. Warren, Op. Cit., pp. 13-5. 2."Conglomeration of the press" in Indonesia, in fact, creates problems to other newspaper enterprises which excludes to the group. 3.The decision, however, does not work to the fullest advan­ tage. By using land vehicles, some newspapers spread the earlier editions to the regions before local newspapers are dropped off. In the case that there is only one flight to the some regions, it is also becomes a problem.

32 manage themselves and develop their own social responsibili­ ty, while their survival would not be disrupted by investment forces. Apart from differences in government controls, dispari­ ties between the Australian and Indonesian media lie in the cultural backgrounds between Australians and Indonesians. Having a culture of debate, as Ratih Hardjono notes, Austra­ lians bring this culture to all areas of their life.1 This culture is found in the system of debate in the Australian media. The media becomes a "space" for debate, 2 and the media itself sometimes creates debate by launching a particular presentation. 3 Besides the importance of debate, Hardjono stresses that the freedom to express opinions that are listened to by the national leaders is a crucial element which colours Austra­ lian culture. 4 For the Australian media, this provides the cultural background in which they can act as a "watch-dog" --whether through criticism or support-- on the Government.

l.Ratih, with tongue in cheek, predicts that this culture has been inherited from Ireland and that the Irish are well known as stubborn but romantic-people. See Ratih Hardjono, White Tribe of Asia, Monash Asia Institute­ Monash University and Hyland House, 1993, pp. 187-90.

2.Televisi ABC and 2'V Channel 9 performed debates between Prime Minister Paul Keating and the Opposition Leader DR. John Hewson in 1993 Federal Election Campaign. 3."Sex", a program of TV Channel 9, for example, caused controversy in 1992 over the necessity of such program to be broadcasted. 4.Hardjono, Op. Cit., p, 1989.

33 It should not need to be argued that the media also helps Australians by transmiting their ideas and opinions to the political leadership. Based on this cultural background, however, the Austra­ lian media is also aggresive, enjoys conflict and sensation,1 and draws conclusions rapidly but, probably, inaccurately. Its aggression is frequently related to events which contain . - conflict and sensation. Reporters will aggressively interview and pursue news sources. It is not surprising then, if in the case of a conflict, the media embarasses one side by present­ ing negative views. 2 "Trial by the press", in an indirect way, leads to inaccurate conclusions. The media's role in supervising the Government is often directed to other countries. The Australian media tend to "put on trial" other countries, especially other ruling Governments, as they do the Australian Government. This usually angers the other Governments and they demand that the Australian media take into consideration values and tradi­ tions held by those countries. 3 The different cultures in Australia and Indonesia thus lead to different media cultures. The Indonesians are regard­ ed as very sensitive about criticism. They usually assume l.This may encourages the readers' emotion. 2.For example, this problem was apparent in the case of Nick Greiner, the former NSW Premier. 3.Ratih Hardjono assumes that what the Australian media criticised have no subsequent changes in other countries. Hardjono, op. Cit., p. 189.

34 that critics deserve to get the blame. The Indonesian people cannot receive criticism openly. Ngono yo ngono, ning ojo ngono is an often stated phrase used by Indonesians in order to confine criticism. 1 Apart from this, Indonesians hold a value that people have to obey their elders and their lead­ ers. If they do not, they will be evaluated as impolite, even uncivilized people. Such values are brought into the Indonesian media cul­ ture. This helps to explain why the media is not so critical of the Government as the Australian media. At least, if the Indonesian media try to criticize something, they will do so in a "smooth" way, adopted and agreed to by the Indonesian people in general. 2 The tendency to act carefully in expressing criticism can also be found in the way the Indonesian media publish developments in the situations of other countries. This usually occurs if a crisis happens in other countries which has historical and psychological proximities to Indonesia, such as Malaysia and Thailand. Furthermore, careful consider­ ation about publishing critical events that happen in other countries is based on whether this will complicate Indonesian stability and unity. Racial tensions in Los Angeles in 1992, ------l.This phrase means: people can say that they do not agree, but they should do so in a "smooth" way that is not vul­ gar. 2.However, it can be argued whether the media criticise smoothly because of adopting the culture of obeying their elders and their leaders, or resulting from what might be called intimidation, using "legal" forces.

35 for example, were not widely broadcast by TVRI. The reason was that such news could potentially create the same problem in Indonesia, due to its multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and multi-lingual population. The description above illustrates the disparate frame­ works of the Australian and Indonesian media. This also underlines the point that reportage over the Dili massacre needs to be examined on the basis of an understanding of the similarities and disparities between the Australian and Indonesian media.

4. Mew World Inforaation order Some of the differences previously described between the Australian and Indonesian media, relate to the dissimilar positions of Australia and Indonesia in the New World Infor­ mation Order. The idea of the New Information Order essen­ tially runs parallel with the concept of the New World Eco­ nomic Order, which distinguishes the existence of the devel­ oped and the developing countries. The enhancement of the world's economic map entering the 1980s led to the identifi­ cation of three economic power categories: developed, devel­ oping and undeveloped countries. Australia, as an advanced or developed country, is categorized as a part of the modern western countries. on the other hand, Indonesia is one of the Third World countries. since the New World Economic Order has been recognised, the developing countries have also demanded recognition of

36 the World Information Order. John c. Merrill states that the concept of the New World Information Order indicates the developing nation's requirements in joining "the global information-sharing picture as partners rather than as help­ less consumers 11 • 1 The reasons that spurred the idea of the New World Information Order, according to John A. Lent, were that the "free flow of information" led to a "one-way" flow communication and that the developing countries tended to be receivers of inequitable, inadequate and distorted informa­ tion. 2 As Merrill states, there were different views among the Third World and the Western countries in picturing the global free flow of information. 3 The concept of free flow of information, in the Western view, emphasizes media freedom, interpreted as minimizing government controls. In contrast, the Third Worlders place the emphasis in this concept on the issue of balanced and unbiased information, whether it goes to or from Third World countries. Merrill argues against the idea that the free flow of information represents "Western communication imperialism". That the Western news agencies, l.Merrill, Op. Cit., p. 51. 2.John A. Lent, "Mass Communication in the Third World: Some Ethical considerations", in John A. Lent (Guest Editor), Third World Hass Hedia: Issues, Theory and Research, College of William and Mary, Virginia, 1979, p. 5. 3.John c. Merrill, "'The Free Flow of News' an~ 'Western communication Imperialism': Divergent Views on Ethical Issues", in John A. Lent (Guest Editor), Third World Hass Hedia: Issues, Theory and Research, College of William and Mary, Virginia, 1979, pp. 40-1.

37 such as United Press International and Associated Press, and communication enterprises dominated the acquisition of news messages, he said, did not represent imperialism. This is because the Western news agencies do not force the Third World media managers to buy the Western supplied information. He likens this phenomenon to the situation in which Western countries need oil and buy it, while the Third World coun­ tries with oil do not oppress them by selling it.1 Therefore Western-Third World media relationships tend to be a mutually beneficial symbiosis. Since the free flow of information has been symbolized in an "adversarial dialectic" with "Western communication imperialism", Merrill also criticizes the Third Worlders who always view the concept of free flow of information as "coming from the Western capitalist nations and never from the Communist world". 2 Although the controversy about the free flow of information mostly focuses on the relationship between the Western and the developing countries, such an antagonism also occured until recently between the Western and Communist Worlds and between the Communist and the Third World countries. A slightly different version of the concept of the New World Information Order (NWIO) or New International Informa­ tion Order (NIIO) among the Communist or Socialist world, the ------l.Ibid., p. 37. 2.Ibid., p. 35.

38 Western nations and the Third World countries which are joined to the Non-Aligned Movement, is put by Nordenstreng and Hannikainen. 1 At the fourth meeting of the Inter-Govern­ mental Coordinating Council for Information on Non-Aligned countries in Baghdad in June 1980, the Non-Aligned Movement nations, as the promoters of concept of the New World Infor­ mation Order, stated that this concept was based on: 2

The right of every nation to develop its own inde­ pendent information system and to protect its national sovereignty and cultural identity, in particular by regulating the activities of the transnational corpora­ tions, .•• , the right of every nation to use its means of information to make known worldwide its interests, its aspirations and its political, moral and cultural values, •.. , the fight against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism including Zionism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination and interference, ••• , the promotion of human rights through intensified efforts to consolidate so­ cial, economic and cultural development and combat hunger, disease, illiteracy and unemployment.

They added: 3

Comparing the Non-Aligned and Soviet versions of NIIO, it is evident _that by and large coincide, even to the extent of using mostly identical terminology. There is only one notable difference: the Soviet concept does not give priority to the New International Economic Order. Also the emphasis given to the notion of contents of communication, as well as to the objective of interna­ tional peace and detente, is obviously greater in the

l.Nordenstreng and Hannikainen use the New International Information Order to term the New World Information Order. Kaarle Nordenstreng and Lauri Hannikainen, The Hass Media Declaration of UNESCO, Ablex Publishing Corporation, New Jersey, 1984.

2.Ibid, p. 70.

3.Ibid., pp. 71-2.

39 soviet concept than in the Non-Aligned version of it. The Non-Aligned concept, for its part, is more specific in terms of spelling out the principles and objectives of NIIO.

In the Western (U.S.) version, they stressed, NIIO consisted of the strong conviction that the international flow of information "should not be restricted by governmental ac­ tions". Besides this, the Western countries also understood that they faced desires by many developing countries for aid in strengthening their own capabilities for handling news messages in order to "reduce their dependence on western organizations and technology. 111 Concerning the different views between the Western na­ tions and the developing countries in portraying the free flow of information, Nordenstreng and Hannikainen argue that the New world Information Order fits not only the require­ ments of the developing and socialist countries, but is "ultimately a matter of universal interest". 2 They cite osolnik, who writes from the Non-Aligned point of view, and who said that the new international order has to embrace the democratization of the news and information functions, since this is mandatory "for the realization of human rights and democratic social development in every country and for the participation of all in peaceful international cooperation11 •3

1.Ibid., p. 74.

2.Ibid., p. 76. 3.0solnik, quoted by Nordenstreng and Hannikainen, Log. Cit.

40 According to Third World critics, as has been mentioned, the concept of the New World Information Order which rejected biased, inadequate and distorted information might solve the problem that the international information flow tended to be a one-way flow. It is commonly accepted that the ordering of global communication is divided into two blocks --the North­ west block and the South block. International information finds its way from the North-West to the south block. Merrill describes the distribution of the two blocks as an order which tends to run "mainly along transatlantic lines": the North-West block contains some nations in North America, Europe, the former USSR, Japan and Australia, while the South block features nations in South America, Africa and Asia (minus Japan). 1 The idea of the New World Information Order assumes that, in the past, the Western media were too dominating and powerful, so that the Third World nations could not find news and information which was acceptable to their aspira­ tions. Lent describes the Third World complaint against the domination of the Western media as follows. 2 First of all, four international news agencies which are all concentrated in the West --united Press International (UPI), Associated

Press (AP), Agence France Presse (AFP) and Reuters-- monopo­ lize the international stream of news. The developing coun------1.Merrill, "The Global Perpective", Op. Cit., p. 51. 2.Lent, Op. Cit., p. 6.

41 tries view this as ideological aggression from the Western nations. Secondly, the Third World radio transmitters are defeated by stronger equipment such as that of Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting corporation (BBC), Radio France and Deutche Welle. Thirdly, there is a domination of the Western television programs because the Third World countries have not been able to produce enough of their own material. High technology such as satellites, lastly, is largely controlled by the Western superpowers. The Third World governments do not accept the "luxury of western style freedom" for their own media because of the problem of stability. 1 The Third World leaders argue, as Lent notes, that the Third World nations are recently emergent, require time to formulate their institutions, should keep stability and unity, must minimize critics, and have to construct public faith in governmental institutions and policies. 2 He adds that the media must cooperate with the Government by emphasizing positive, development-inspired news, by omitting negative societal or oppositionist types and by supporting national ideologies and purposes. Informa­ tion which results from biased, inadequate and distorted realities, negative images and the disruption of the "flow" of news is likely to disturb this stability. Thus, a problem develops when information always comes from the developed ------1.Ibid., p. 9.

2 • Ibid. , p. 8 .

42 countries, since such information may not be appropriate to the requirements of the developing countries. In other words, the developing countries demand a "balance" in the informa­ tion flow. Enrique Gonzalez-Manet describes three forms of inequi­ librium in the polarization between the developed and devel­ oping countries, particularly in Asia: 1 1. The growing inequality between the power of the large communications transnationals and virtually nonexist­ ent national information systems. 2. The communications isolation and inertia created in countries of the region by the hegemony of foreign information and telecommunications agencies. 3. The decline in the importance of domestic public opinion in the information sphere, as it becomes increasingly subordinated to foreign influence.

If information is accepted as a power, he adds, it should be balanced and shared in order to assure "peace and progress, improvement in the quality of life and access to education

and culture11 • 2 The media coverage of the Timor bloodbath in November 1991, an event which happened in Asia, can be used to examine the concept of the Hew World Information Order promoted by the Third World countries. Exploring news and articles in the Australian and Indonesian newspapers can lead us to under­ stand where these newspapers stand in relation to the New World Information Order and what functions they serve · in ------1.Enrique Gonzalez-Manet, The Hidden War of Information, Ablex Publishing corporations, New Jersey, 1988, p. 16. 2.Ibid., p. 67.

43 conflicts between the needs of the North-West and South blocks. It would be expected that the Australian media would accommodate the free flow of information, while the Indone­ sian media would complain about biased, inadequate and dis­ torted information.

c. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Bearing in mind the discussion above, some parameters for the present content analysis study of the press can be outlined. Three Australian newspapers and three Indonesian newspapers will be observed in this study. The newspapers are The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The Courier-Hail, Kompas, Jawa Pos and Surya. The time at which events take place is related to the patterns of news media in reporting these events. Holsti uses time, which corresponds to "the development of events within crisis", in his research on the 1914 crisis leading up the Great War in Europe. 1 With regard to the aims of this study, time will thus be considered as an important factor in rela­ tion to the news attention of the Dili case. The six newspa­ pers will be observed through their reportage of East Timor from the editions of 1 July 1991 (prior to the Dili massacre) to 31 March 1992. The Australian and Indonesian press, in reporting the ------l.Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case", in John E. Mueller (Ed.), Approaches to Heasurement in International Relations, Appleton Century-crofts, New York, 1969, p. 229.

44 East Timor incident, will be explored through several units of analysis and categories, including news sources and news aspects, which are illustrated in Appendix A and discussed in Appendix B. These units of analysis and categories will be used for examining the hypotheses of this study which can be described as follows. As soon as the Dili massacre occurred on November 12, 1991, the event was seen as very important by the media. Newspapers, as well as other mass media, reported the event, and later developments once the event became a controversy between Indonesia and other countries. Media attention on East Timor increased dramatically, compared to that prior to the incident. Furthermore, following the Komisi Penyelidik Nasional's report after investigating the killing fields, media coverage of East Timor decreased considerably. It is also obvious that although the media was able to formulate its role as a third party, or as an intensifier or diminisher of the conflict over East Timor, the media was not fully able to act as a third party. Likewise, following Donohue, Tichenor and Olien's arguments, which state that the news media is usually in favour of the established group, 1 the Australian and Indonesian media in reporting the Dili massacre would also tend not to act as third parties. On the one hand, the Australian newspapers would become increasingly concerned with favouring Australia and incrementally con------1.Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, Op. Cit. p. 204.

45 cerned with attacking or criticising Indonesia. on the other hand, the Indonesian newspapers would become increasingly concerned with favouring Indonesia and incrementally con­ cerned with attacking or criticising Australia. Furthermore, as concerns attacking or criticising anoth­ er country and favouring their own country, the newspapers

would be more likely to call upon news sources who come from their own country rather than those who come from other

country. This would be expected to lead to the appearance of news published by the six newspapers which has a one-sided rather than two-sided perspective. Because the Australian and Indonesian newspapers have reported the Dili bloodshed, it is evident that the massacre was newsworthy and contained news values. Although each newspaper applies news worthiness and news values in a dif­ ferent way, news values and news worthiness would be likely to be maximised in the news items presented by the six news­ papers. Similarly, the newspapers would be likely to maximise the use of the "5W+H" formula. These hypotheses can be summarised as follows.

(1) As the East Timor incident happened: - the Australian newspapers will become increasingly concerned with attacking or criticising rather than favouring Indonesia; - the Indonesian newspapers will become increasingly concerned with favouring rather than attacking or criticising Indonesia. (2) In reporting the East Timor incident, the six newspapers: - will tend to maximise the use of news values; - will tend to maximise the use of the "5W + H" formula.

46 (3) As concerns attacking or criticising Indonesia, the Australian newspapers: - will be more likely to use the Australian Routine Information Channels, first-hand reports, informal and other sources than the Indonesian Routine Information Channels; - will more contain controversies in the form of com­ ments than the event itself; - will be more likely to cover this incident from one­ side than both-sides. (4) As concerns favouring Indonesia, the Indonesian news­ papers: - will be more likely to use the Indonesian Routine Information Channels than other sources; - will be more likely to cover this incident from one­ side than both-sides.

D. Methodology

Research method: Bearing in mind the fact that the media cannot be free from bias, as well as the dissimilar process of newsmaking in Australia and Indonesia, the similarities and differences between the Australian and Indonesia media, and the contro­ versy regarding the existence of the New World Information Order, the question of how the Australian and Indonesian media faced the Dili massacre will be examined through the content analysis method. This method, according to Krippen­ dorf, is very commonly used for looking into the mass media, in which " ••• , it seeks to understand data not as a collec­ tive of physical events but as symbolic phenomena and to approach their analysis unobtrusively11 • 1

1.Klaus Krippendorf, Content Analysis, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980, p. 7_.

47 Following sociology-anthropology and general communica­ tion studies, political science studies have used content analysis for various purposes. During World war II, content analysis was used for observing the enemy's propaganda before launching counter propaganda as a tactic of persuasion. 1 Another purpose of the use of content analysis has been to observe freedom and equality as indicator of political chang­ es, as shown by Block's study in Sweden. 2 Besides this, Gunnel Rikardson has used content analysis to compare newspa­ per opinion and public opinion. 3 content analysis also came into use for observing mass media content before, during and after an election campaign, as presented by Fibiger, Carlsson et. al., Siune and Rawson. 4 Presenting a systematic and objective description of the documentary materials is an aim of content analysis research. l.Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propagan­ da, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 1992, pp. 201-6. 2.Eva Block, "Freedom and Equality: Indicators of Political Changes in Sweden 1945-1975", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 241-50. 3.Gunnel Rikardson, "Newspaper Opinion and Public Opinion", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analy­ sis, sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 215-26. 4.Bo Fibiger "Danish Election Campaigns in the Seventies", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analy­ sis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 159-76; Gosta Carlsson et. al., "Mass Media content, Political Opinions, and social Change: Sweden 1967-1974", Ibid., pp. 227-40; Karen Siune, "Broadcast Election campaigns in a Multiparty System: Denmark as a Test Case", Ibid., pp. 177-96; and D.W. Rawson, Australia Votes, Melbourne Uni­ versity Press, Melbourne, 1961, pp. 102-24.

48 To obtain this goal, the investigators who use content analy­ sis will face some problems which concern systematic inquiry. Ole R. Holsti states that there are three problems which are commonly faced by the researchers: sampling, reliability and validity.1 Sampling problems, as indicated by Berelson, are largely confined to problems of sampling on titles, issues or content, 2 while problems of reliability and validity, accord­ ing to Budd, et. al., have to be dealt with at every step in design, sampling, counting, analysing and interpreting. 3 Weber states that in collecting data for content analy­ sis, three steps for sampling can be implemented: sampling in communication sources, documents and text within documents. 4 Dealing with the election of communication sources is the premier step of sampling. Newspapers, magazines, television, radio, films, and documentary or other printed materials such as files, books and pamphlets are a number of the possible communication sources. The next steps of sampling are sam­ pling documents and sampling text within documents. Choosing titles from newspapers, magazines and films, and retrieving names of programs of radio and television can be classified ------1.0le R. Holsti, Content Analysis xor the Social Sciences and Humanities, Addison-Wesley Publishing company, Philip­ pines, 1969, pp. 127-49. 2.Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in communication Re­ search, Hafner Press, New York, 1952, pp. 176-7. 3.Richard w. Budd, et. al., Content Analysis ox Communica­ tions, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, p. 66. 4.Robert P. Weber, Basic Content Analysis, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1985, p. 42.

49 as sampling frames. Looking into some parts of the titles and names of the communication sources which are related to the aim of a study is sampling texts within docUDlents. Problems of sampling in content analysis may result from three factors. First of all, sampling always introduces chance differences between the sample and the population,1 an uncertainty element which is called sampling error.2 A repre­ sentative sample may have to be obtained before using this sample to generalise the population. This is close to the adequacy of sample which is drawn or, in other words, the adjustment of this sample to its population or universe. Listing the universe of class which have been defined to be the research objects precisely and accurately would help the investigators to avoid sampling error. Secondly, the acquisition of materials which will be identified in sampling sometimes obstructs the researcher's ability to obtain an adequate sample. Unless all materials have been prepared, the investigators will meet this problem. Contrasting with other areas of social research which do not explore recorded data and are concerned with respondents' answers, this problem is a serious pitfall of content analy­ sis. However, the consistency and the objectivity of the used materials in content analysis are more guaranteed, while the answers and opinions which are given in questionnaires and

1.0.A. de vaus, surveys in Social Research, Allen & Unwin, London, 1991, p. 61. 2.Holsti, Op. Cit., p. 132.

50 interviews may be influenced by the subjectivity of the respondents. Thirdly, sampling which is only based on the title of news on newspapers sometimes causes the investigators to collect the wrong materials. This problem commonly appears, especially when dealing with small newspapers which have not applied good journalistic standards. such newspapers use titles which do not adequately reveal the news story.1 In order to obtain the right materials, therefore, sampling should not only be based on the titles of news on newspapers, but also on the content of stories. Problems of reliability, as indicated earlier, have to be accounted for in every step of content analysis studies. Errors may happen in the study at any stage: design making, sampling, counting, analysing and interpreting. Krippendorf distinguishes three aspects of reliability: stability, repro­ ducibility and accuracy. 2 Hellevik suggests two types: stability and equivalency which then can be developed into object-constancy and intrasubjectivity for stability, and instrument congruency and intersubjectivity for equivalency. 3

1.A study by Yogyakarta Institution for Research, Education and Publication (LP3Y) in 1991 indicates this problem. 2.Krippendorf, quoted by Gunnar Andren, "Reliability and Content Analysis", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 48-9. 3.Hellevik, quoted by Tom Bryder, "Actor Reliability, Some Methodological Problems", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, p. 74.

51 Holsti introduces two terms: individual reliability and category reliability.1 All of these suggest that determining reliability allows a series of criteria, although, essential­ ly, they have the same meaning. Some points can be made about the various terms above. Firstly, the sources or reliability problems in content analysis are individual (coder) and category. Problems which come from coders are linked to the level of agreement among judges. In this case, well-trained coders are assumed to solve the problem. Kaplan and Goldsen affirm that several studies point out that training before coding significantly increases the level of agreement among coders. 2 Problems which come from categories can be overcome through pretesting categories. The test will produce certain categories which can be assumed as clear enough and others which have to be clarified further. Secondly, stability, reproducibility, accuracy and whatever the names of these have to be occurred in increasing reliability. Test-retest, equivalent forms and split-halves methods, according to Budd et. al., can be applied to test

1.Holsti, Op. Cit., pp. 135-6. 2.A. Kaplan and J.M. Goldsen, "The Reliability of Content Analysis categories", in H.D. Laswell et. al., The Lan­ guage of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George Stewart, New York, 1949, pp. 83-112.

52 the standard of reliability •1 From these, a decision to increase reliability can be made. Problems of validity are clearly linked to the discus­ sion of reliability. Good validity in content analysis would appear, if there was a high level of reliability. In general, validity is defined as "the extent to which an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure". 2 Janis affirms that a criterion for validity is laid down in the standard of

l.Budd et. al., Op. Cit., p. 67. The standard of reliability testing has been formu­ lated as a co-efficient of reliability as follows, where M is the number of agreements which are taken by two judges, and Nl and N2 are the number of codings which are made by judges land 2 {See Holsti, Op. Cit., p. 140):

2 M C.R.=------Nl + N2 However, this formula is criticised by Bernett, Alpert and Goldstein who show that this formula does not heed the extent of intercoder agreement which may produced from chance. Scott, as cited by Holsti, introduces an index of reliability {pi) which is computed as follows: % observed agreement - % expected agreement pi=------. l - % expected agreement Holsti formulates a composite reliability co-effi­ cient as: N {average inter-judge agreement) Composite Rel. = ------1 + [(N - l) {average inter-judge agreement)] Log. Cit. 2.Berelson (1952), Holsti {1969) and Janis {1965), quoted by Gunnar Andren, op. Cit., p. 50.

53 productivity. 1 The standard, Berelson suggests, means the extent the categories can establish the empirical results. If the standard of productivity can be reached, a study will be valid. 2 Meanwhile, Holsti states that the careful planning of the research design is useful to make valid inferences, which is the goal of all inquiry. 3 The valid inference, he adds, can be obtained during the choice of categories and content units and is interrelated with sampling procedures and reli­ ability. Validity, therefore, is closely related to all aspects of the research. The meaning of validity has undergone development. As cited by Holsti, the American Psychological Association Committee on Psychological Tests introduces four types of validity, in which each type has its own use: content validi­ ty, predictive validity, concurrent validity and construct validity. 4 Besides the four types, Krippendorf, as Andren notes, divides validity into five kinds: semantical validity, sampling.validity, correlational validity, predictive validi­ ty and construct validity. 5 It is apparent that between the American Psychological Association Committee on Psychological Tests and Krippendorf, there are only two similar types:

l.Janis, quoted by Berelson, op. Cit., p. 170. 2.Berelson, Ibid., pp. 110-1. 3.Holsti, Op. Cit., PP· 142-3. 4.Ibid., p. 143. 5.Krippendorf, quoted by Gunnar Andren, Op. Cit., pp. 51-3.

54 predictive validity and construct validity. These types can be outlined as follows. Content validity is usually used for a study which is purely descriptive. If the investigators work on descriptive research, content validity has met the requirements. Predictive validity is commonly implemented to the study by which the investigators can predict both past and the future events. This means that predictive validity is assumed as a guarantee to the ability of the research instruments in predicting the past and the future events. However, as Pratkanis and Aronson state, a study of Nazi propaganda, for example, cannot be separated from the investigator's passions and emotion •1 Thus the validity of the propaganda study, especially when dealing with Nazi propaganda, will be limited. Like predictive validity, concurrent validity is also concerned with the ability of research instruments in pre­ dicting other phenomena. In other words, an external criteri­ on can be used for comparing content data to establish con­ current validity. construct validity reflects a certain level which assures the establishments of both the measurement and the theory which underlies this measurement. Semantical validity, one of three other types identified by Krippendorf, is a level of the sensitivity of a method to the semantical differences in the materials which are observed. Sampling validity, another one, is linked to the extent to which ------l.Pratkanis and Aronson, Op. Cit., p. 258.

55 sample can reflect its universe. Lastly, correlational valid­ ity reflects the degree of result which is produced by one method correlate with another result from another method.

Research Objects: This study focuses on all items of news, including editorials and opinion articles in The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The Courier-Hail, KOHPAS, Jawa Pos and Surya, from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992, which contain reference to East Timor incident issues. These newspapers are chosen because of the following considerations. The Australian, including The Weekend Australian, is a national newspaper. The Sydney Horning Herald, including The sun-Herald, stands for a metropolitan daily in a large city and The courier-Hail while also metropolitan daily, covers a smaller city and is closer to East Timor than The Sydney Horning Herald. KOHPAS including Kompas Hinggu, is an Indonesian national newspaper, published in Jakarta. Jawa Pos claims itself as "a national newspaper which is published from the East". This newspaper originates in Surabaya, the second largest city of Indonesia. surya is for a metropolitan daily which is published in Surabaya. The total editions which will be observed are 275 days (minus holidays).

56 Reliability: The reliability of this research will be measured through the coefficient of reliability formula as follows: 1

2 M CR=------Nl + lf2

where Mis the number of coding decisions which have been agreed by two judges, and Nl and N2 are the number of coding decisions which are made by two judges. Content analysis is thus an appropriate method to inves­ tigate questions of how Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the Dili massacre. By looking at every news item related to the 12 November case in the Australian and Indone­ sian newspapers from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992, this method leads the study to examine the similarities and the distinctiv~s of the six newspapers in focusing their atten­ tion, in applying news aspects, in producing unbiased and balanced news, and in following the goals of the New World Information Order. The results of the use of this method in this study will be discussed in Chapter IV and Chapter V, after this study has described the political conflicts in East Timor between 1970 and 1992 in Chapters II and III.

*****

l.Holsti, Op. Cit., p. 140.

57 CIIAPl'BR II EAST TIIIOR BBTIIBBR 1970 AND 1991: A Political conflict

At least two big sets of events concerning East Timer have been reported by the world's press, especially by Australian and Indonesian newspapers, since the 1970s. The first set focused on the decolonization of East Timer and its annexa­ tion by Indonesia, which started in 1974 and continued until 1976. The second centred on the "Dili Massacre" which oc­ curred on November 12, 1991, followed by coverage of the trip of the "Lusitania Expresso" from Portugal to the East Timor Sea from January to March 1992. It may seem that the news coverage of the first event has no relationship with that of the second, primarily be­ cause of the long time between the two events. Yet there are two strong indications that the involvement of the Australian and Indonesian media in the first event possibly influenced the reportage of the second event. Firstly, the death of five Australian journalists in the Timer battlefield in 1975, which reflected the intense involvement of the Australian media in reporting the political conflict in East Timer, seemingly created an "Australian newsworkers' solidarity" against Indonesia. This incident influenced the later "ups and downs" of the Australia-Indonesia relationship and the Australian media strongly accused Indonesia in the case. Secondly, Indonesia's annexation of East Timer in 1975,

58 followed by the integration of East Timar into Indonesia in 1976, were likely to influence Indonesian media coverage over East Timar. on this issue, the Indonesian media seemed to publish reports which favoured Indonesia. 1 These two factors might influence the Australian and Indonesian media's reports of the second set of events in 1991. This chapter will deal briefly with the political con­ flict in East Timar, particularly in the 1970s. The descrip­ tion in this chapter will provide a basis for understanding in the next chapter how the Australian and Indonesian newspa­ pers coped with the "Dili Massacre" at the end of 1991.

A. Bast TiJ10r in the 1970s Australian news attention to East Timar, according to Tiffen, dramatically increased during the civil war which broke out about 18 August and continued till December 1975.2 In this period, he writes, news sources mostly came in the form of first-hand reports from the battlefield. One possible explanation of the high involvement of the Australian press at the time was the deaths of five Australian journalists. They were in Timar island observing events and conditions which developed when civil war happened. Prior to this time, which Tiffen terms the 'coalition ------1.Regarding the integration of East Timar into Indonesia, most reports of the Indonesian newspapers at the time reflected positive responses to this integration. 2.Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 162.

59 and decolonization' period from November 1974 to July 1975, a great number of Australian journalists, reporters and observ­ ers, had gone to Timor.1 The number of Australian journalists who went to Timor escalated. This increase was contrary to the Portuguese colonial government's banning of foreign journalists' visits following critical articles by Australian journalists who visited Timor in the early 1960s. 2 This restriction continued until the 25 April coup in Lisbon. However, as is suggested by Tiffen, the attention of Austra­ lian news media to East Timor during the 'coalition and decolonization' period was "still relatively slight". 3 The relevant political developments in East Timor (Portuguese Timor) started in April 1974. Although it was not obvious that these developments resulted from the prior coup in Lisbon (Portugal), there was a general opinion that the Armed Forces Movement (AMF) coup in April 1974 influenced East Timorese thinking, especially among people who opposed the Portuguese. 4 Immediately, groups among the Timorese organised five political parties. First of all, the Uniao Democratica Timor­ ense, known as the UDT, was formed on 11 May 1974. This party, according to Hoadley, had an aspiration to continue l.Ibid, p. 161. 2.Helen Hill, The Timor Story, Timor Information Service, Fitzroy, 1975, p. 3. 3.Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 161. 4.Hill, Op. Cit., p. 4.

60 Timer's link with Portugal •1 several days later, a party which asserted the right to independence, namely the ASDT (Asscociacao Social Democratica de Timor), was organised. It found support among civil servants, students, teachers and rural migrants. This party, which changed its name to FRETI­ LIN ( an acronym for Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) on 12 September 1974, was prominent in the secondary schools in Dili. It led to the creation of the UNETIM (the National Union of Timorese students). 2 Osorio Soares formed the Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense (renamed from Associacao Integraciao Timor Indonesia) at the end of May 1974. His party, known as APODETI, tended to support Timer's integration into Indonesia. 3 Two other Ti­ morese parties which emerged in late 1974 were the Associacao Popular Monarquica (Monarchist Party), which wanted to create a constitutional monarchy in Timar, and the Associacao Tra­ balhadores (Labor Party) which was formed around general demands for independence, democracy and social justice. During these political developments, which Tiffen called 'internal stirrings', the Australian press paid little cover­ age to East Timor. 4 Greater attention was given by the Aus­ tralian press to the Whitlam-Soeharto talks in September 1974 l.J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor, Insti- tute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1975, p. 3. 2.Hill, Op. Cit., p. 4-7. 3.Hoadley, Op. Cit., p. s. 4.Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 161.

61 in Yogyakarta. This meeting issued some statements about the future of East Timor. 1 Hastings, in The Sydney Horning Herald 16 September 1974, quoted a statement from a Foreign Affairs official who reiterated Whitlam's statement that although the independence of Timor would be a potential threat to Austra­ lia, the East Timorese should have the right to decide their own future. 2 The formation of a coalition government by UDT and FRETILIN was declared on January 21, 1975. As Hill noted, this coalition issued a statement saying that the integration into Indonesia was rejected, but both parties agreed to create good relations with Indonesia after independence. 3 UDT and FRETILIN also assumed, Hill added, that the Chinese in Timor would become a problem for them, especially because many Chinese had sent donations to UDT, and FRETILIN as well as to APODETI. These donations were based on the Chinese's own interests in the future of the region. UDT and FRETILIN's similarities in political views were not matched by their views in economic terms. UDT favoured the flow of foreign investments in tourism and mineral exploration, while FRETI­ LIN tended to want to control foreign investments strictly. 4

l.Hill, Op. Cit., pp. 5-6. Also Hoadley, Op. Cit., p. 22. 2.Peter Hastings, quoted by Hill, Op. Cit., p. 5. 3.Hill, Op. Cit., p. 7. 4.Ibid., pp. 7-8.

62 A 'leak' appeared in The Sydney Horning Herald ( 21 February) and The Age ( 22 February 1975), reporting that Indonesia was planning to take over East Timor militarily.1 The newspapers stated that this leak came from Australian intelligence reports, which were based on Indonesian military exercises in South Sumatra and Indonesian radio propaganda to East Timor. Accordingly, these reports received responses from both the Australian and Indonesian Governments. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta reminded the media that this release would damage Indonesia-Australia negotiations. The Indonesian Government was so angered by this r_eportage that Indonesia protested to Australia. At the same time, the Parliamentary debate in Canberra concluded that the existence of East Timor in future should be defined by self-determina­ tion, which could be accepted internationally. 2 civil war in East Timor broke out on 18 August 1975, following the UDT leaders' visit to Indonesia on August 2, and the UDT's attempts to dominate East Timor. The UDT had changed its strategy and orientation to ones of creating a corporation with Indonesia. However, this "UDT coup" failed and FRETILIN took control over East Timor in mid-September 1975. The UDT and APODETI forces were defeated by FRETILIN. 3 ------l.Tiffen, The News From southeast Asia, op. Cit., p. 166. Also read Hill, Op. Cit., p. 8. 2.Parliamentary Debates-House of Representatives, quoted by Hill, Op. Cit., p. 8. 3.United Nations-Department of Political Affairs, quoted by Tiffen, Op. Cit., p. 162.

63 In the end of September 1975, UDT and APODETI, together with some small parties, formed the Anti-communist Revolutionary Movement (MRAC) •1 Propaganda was launched in East Timor saying that FRETILIN tended towards communism. At that time, the world's journalists concentrated their reporting in Darwin, where refugees from East Timor arrived • . Their activities, according to Hill, were obstructed by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs which ordered jour­ nalists not to publish what was going on in East Timor. 2 Aircraft which carried journalists were prohibited from taking off from Darwin. In fact, some journalists went to East Timor by boat. Meanwhile, Indonesia at the time also barred foreign journalists who wanted to go to East Timor. This meant Indonesia would able to establish a monopoly on information from Timor. During this civil war, to which the Australian press paid much greater attention, five Australian journalists were killed around October 1975. 3 They were Greg Shackleton, Gary Cunningham, Tony Stewart (all from Channel 7) Malcolm Rennie and Brian Peters ( from Channel 9) • Many statements were released over their deaths. Lopez de Cruz, a representative of the UDT-APODETI coalition, stated that they were killed in the war between the UDT-APODETI forces and FRET I LIN. ------l.Hill, Op. Cit., p. 13. 2.Ibid., p. 11. 3.Ibid., p. 14.

64 Meanwhile, FRETILIN claimed that they were imprisoned by UDT­ APODETI or were killed by the Indonesian troops. The Austra­ lian Journalists' Association (AJA), together with other Australian organisations, demanded an inquiry into the deaths.1 On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN declared Timor's indepen­ dence, in a 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence'. 2 This was signalled by changing the flag from Portugal's to that of Democratic Republic of East Timor (red, black and gold). Fransisco Xavier do Amaral was chosen as the first president of this new republic and he formed his cabinet on 1 December. Anti-FRETILIN groups rejected FRETILIN's declaration and stated that East Timor was the 27th province of Indonesia. Indonesian invasion and incorporation started on Decem­ ber 7, 1975. 3 Roger East, the one Australian journalist still remaining in Dili, who had refused the Australian Gover­ nment's offer of evacuation, reported that around 18, ooo Timorese had moved to the hills and suggested that Indonesia had attacked East Timor militarily. 4 By this time, according to Tiffen, the Australian press divided its attention between East Timor and the November 1975 Federal election campaign in

1.Log. Cit. 2.Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 162. J.Log. Cit. 4.Hill, Op. Cit., p. 17.

65 Australia •1 Australian news attention continued not only until the integration of East Timor, which was conducted by the Indonesian authorities and completed on 17 July 1976, but also until the later diplomatic activities over the East Timor case in the annual meetings of the united Nations. Australian media activities in reporting the East Timor case in the 1970s, according to Tiffen, called upon three types of news sources: routine information channels, first­ hand reports and leaks. 2 Routine channels included statements from the Indonesian, Australian and Portuguese Governments, and the East Timorese leaders. Besides this, the Australian news also _gained their material from press releases, commu­ niques, and statements from other political leaders and quoted some reports from radio broadcasts and news agencies such as Antara, AAP and Reuters. secondly, first-hand reports appeared in the form of eyewitness' statements, interviews with participants and direct observations in East Timor. Tiffen writes that the reporters and observers who covered and focused on East Timor from both inside and outside the battlefield were Peter Munckton, Michael Richardson, Gerald stone, John Hamilton, John Edwards, Hamish McDonald, Bruce Wilson, Colin McIntyre, Jill Jolliffe, Helen Hill, Grant Evans, Jim Dunn, Dan Coggin,

l.Tiffen, The News From Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 162. 2.See Tiffen, Ibid., pp. 162-7.

66 Raymond Yao and Robin Osborne. 1 Leaks, a third news source, shaped and coloured the news's appearance in the Australian press. Four leaks came from Australian sources which were published by the Austra­ lian press. As stated before, there was a leak indicating that Indonesia wanted to takeover East Timor militarily, although the Indonesian invasion did not happen at the time. This leak was published in February 1975. Another leak ap­ peared in The Canberra Times on 16 January 1976. Besides this, there were two leaks which were published in April and in May 1976. The last three leaks were cables from the Aus­ tralian Ambassador in Jakarta, Richard Woolcott, to the Australian Government. 2

B. Fro• Integration 'l'o The •oili Massacre• After 17 July 1976, the world's news attention to East Timor continued, although quantitatively it decreased. several small scale events and some statements from the Timorese leaders and the Indonesian, Australian, Portuguese Governments, as well as other governments around the exist­ ence of East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia, ap­ peared in the world media. Recently, coverage again grew when the "Dili Massacre" took place in November 1991.

------~ l.Ibid., pp. 164-5. 2.Ibid., pp. 166-7.

67 Following the East Timar event in the 1970s, the rela­ tionship between Indonesia and Australia from 1976 to 1991 seemed to be an 'uncertain thing', especially as regards their press relations. Tempo, a weekly Indonesian magazine, described the difficult developments in the press relations between the countries by citing four events.1 In 1980, War­ wick Beutler was expelled from Indonesia. His visa was not renewed by the Indonesian authority from 15 July 1980. Indo­ nesia claimed that some reports from the Australian Broad­ casting Commission (ABC), which Beutler served, had discred­ ited Indonesia. This case ended the ABC' s operations in Indonesia, which had existed since the 1960s. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, Andrew Peacock, protested to Indonesia. Another event, which worsened the relationship between Indonesia and Australia, occurred in 1981 when three branches of the Australian Journalist' Association (New south Wales, Victoria and South Australia) opposed an invitation from the AJA to the Indonesian Journalist's Association (.EWI). These three branches demanded that Indonesia clarify the causes of five Australian journalist's deaths in Balibo (East Timar) on 16 October 1975, before giving the green light to this invi­ tation. Beside this, Indonesia was angered by David Jenkins'

reportage of President soeharto' s affairs in The Sydney ------1."Ketika Hala11UUJ Pers Hitaa (When the Press Page was Black)", in Tempo, 25 April 1992, 8 (XXII), p. 24.

68 Horning Herald on 10 April 1986. Indonesia viewed this news as an insult to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and his family. The Indonesian Ambassador August Marpaung retaliated by rejecting visas for nine Australian journalists who wanted to cover US President Reagan's visit to Bali at the end of April 1986. He also rejected visa requests for two Australian journalists to attend the "Thomas cup" badminton championship. one year later, however, Indonesia was satisfied by a Peter Hastings article. He wrote about the success of East Timor's development, under the heading "East Timor's War in Facts and Figures", in The Sydney Horning Herald at the end of April 1987.1 Beside this, the Australian and Indonesian authorities' positive approaches led to the improvement of the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. The crea­ tion of "sister-city relationships" between Semarang and Brisbane, as well as between Surabaya and Perth and between Ujung Pandang and Darwin indicated this improvement. 2 The above description of the political conflict in East Timor in the 1970s and the relationship between Indonesia and Australia until 1987 increases understanding of how these two matters coloured the Australian and Indonesian newspapers' attention to East Timor prior to 1991. Firstly, it was obvi­ ous that the Australian and Indonesian media were concerned ------l.Log. Cit. 2.Robyn Bromby, "Sister-state Relationship a Powerful Two­ Way weapon", in The AUstralian, 24 September 1993, p. 11.

69 very much with the development of political conflicts in East Timor prior to 1991. This meant that events in East Timor were important and news worthy. Secondly, the death of five Australian journalists led the Australian media to be more sensitive to events in East Timor. Timor' s psychological proximity, therefore, was crystalized for Australian journal­ ists by this event. It complemented the geographical proximi­ ty that already existed. The two kinds of proximities between Australia and East Timor were reinforced by the fact that many East Timorese refugees came to Darwin. Thirdly, the integration of East Timor to Indonesia created a new proximi­ ty for the Indonesians and the Indonesian media. The Indone­ sian media after 1976 reported events in East Timor as they did those in other Indonesia provinces. EVents in East Timor were in their attention. These three points help to explain the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the Dili massacre in November 1991.

*****

70 CHAPTER III EAST TIMOR IN AUSTRALIAN AND INDONESIAN PRESS:

1991-1992

It is a fact that the "Dili Massacre" occurred on November 12, 1991 and people were killed and injured. This bloodbath had relationships with the previous event which occurred on 28 October and can not be separated from the trip of the Lusitania Expresso in the first three months of 1992. Simi­ larities and dissimilarities appeared in the contents of Australian and Indonesian newspapers reportage of these three East Timorese events. This chapter will analyse both similar­ ities and differences in the news content of these newspa­ pers. It will examine them through news items published by The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Courier-Mail,

Kompas, Jawa Pos and Surya from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992. The three events will be described separately in this chapt­ er, in order to simplify interpretation of the six newspa­ pers' coverage of East Timor. 1 In reporting the Dili massacre, the Australian and Indonesian newspapers started to publish news of the event on November 13. The Australian, for example, reported it on page 7 under the title of "Timorese Mourners Massacred". This ------l.The following description of the "Dili Massacre" is based on Australian and Indonesian newspapers, especially The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Courier-Mail, Kompas, Jawa Pos and surya.

71 reportage was written by Jonathan Thatcher, combined with some information from AAP, AFP and Reuters. 1 Kompas and Jawa Pos placed the event under the titles of "Situasi di Kata Dili Teratasi" and "Kerusuhan Dili Dapat Diatasi". 2 on the following day, this event had became headline news in several Australia's newspapers. The Australian led with "Punish Timar Killers, Hawke Urges Suharto", and The Sydney Horning Herald ran "Massacre on Our Doorstep" as its headline, while The Courier-Hail on page 5 published the story "Sydney Student Feared Dead in Timor Massacre". 3 similarly, the Indonesian newspapers also reported the development of the massacre in their headlines. Kompas, for example, led with "Kerusuhan di Dili Disesalkan dan A/can Diusut Sampai Tuntas". 4 These news items were complemented by other forms of news, including interviews with eye-witnesses as well as editorials.

A. 28 October 1991 Prior to the time when the massacre happened, another event had occurred in which two people, Alfonso and Sebastiao ------l.Jonathan Thatcher, "Timorese Mourners Massacred", in The Australian, 13 November 1991, p. 7. 2."Situasi di Kota Dili Teratasi", in Kompas, and "Kerusuhan Dili Dapat Diatasi", in Jawa Pos, 13 November 1991, p. 1. These titles mean that the situation in Dili had been handled well. 3.See The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald 14 Novem­ ber 1991 on page 1 and The Courier-Mail on page 5.

4."Kerusuhan di Dili Disesalkan dan A/can Diusut SaJIJpai Tuntas (Riot in Dili is Regreted and will be Observed Till Clear), in Kompas, 14 November 1991, p. 1.

72 Gomez, were killed in East Timor. These victims, who were identified by Amnesty International as Alfonso Henriques (29 years old) and Sabastio Rangel (18 years old), were killed near the Mutail Roman Catholic church in Dili on 28 October 1991 about 1. 30 am. 1 This event led to statements by the Indonesian government and others. The Australian quoted an Indonesian armed forces headquarters spokesperson who said that this event was a provocative action by a small number of people against integration. 2 However, a spokesman for Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo stated that the deaths followed the Indonesian army's attacks. 3 Three Australian film makers who were half a block from the church also said that there was no evidence of a riot. Lois Randall, Gina Roncoli and Fransisco Vidinha said that the event began with ringing of bells and that they watched as hundreds of people were pushed towards the church. 4 Ac­ cording to other witnesses, gunshots were heard and after the Indonesian army left this area, two bodies were found. 5 The 28 October incident seemingly had relationship with the deadlock in Indonesia-Portugal talks over East Timor. It ------l.Antonio Sampaio, "Indonesia Admits Part in Shootings", in The Australian, 30 October 1991, p. 10. 2.Log. Cit. 3.Log. Cit. 4.James Morrison, "Australians Dispute Timor Riot Claims", in The weekend Australian, 2-3 November 1991, p. 17. s.sampaio, op. cit., p. 10.

73 was well-known that a Portuguese parliamentary delegation had prepared to visit East Timor in the beginning of November 1991. The delegation, which would consist of 13 Portuguese Parliamentarians, a number of representatives of the UN Secretary-General who had not been specified, 10 Portuguese journalists, 10 Indonesian journalists and 6 international journalists, was scheduled to make a 12-day visit.1 However, this plan could not, for several reasons, be carried out. Indonesia had objected to the inclusion of Jill Jolliffe as one of the six international journalists to accompany the delegation. 2 Portugal accused Indonesia of limiting its freedom to determine the delegation's members. This statement came from both the President of Portugal's National Assembly Vi tor Crespo and Lisbon's Ambassador in Australia, Jose Louis Gomes. 3 on the other hand, Jakarta claimed, through Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, that Jolliffe was not a journalist but a l.According to Jawa Pos, the six international journalists were Alex Thompson and Michael Bores (Channel IV, United Kingdom), Jill Jolliffe (Sunday Times), Melinda Liu (Newsweek), Pascal Mallet (AFP news agency) and Peter Weiss (The Washington Post). See "Portugal Ngotot Sertakan Wartawan yang Ditolak RI", in Jawa Pos, 26 October 1991, p. 1. 2.According to The Sydney Horning Herald, Jill Jolliffe is a Lisbon-based Australian freelance journalist and would have represented The Herald and The Age during the planned visit. see Tom Hyland, "Timor Visit Scuttled by Ban, Says Portugal", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 October 1991, p. 4. 3."Timor Visit Stalled by Media Ban", in The Courier-Hail 28 October 1991, p. 13. Also read Hyland, Op. Cit., p. 4.

74 "crusader for the FRETILIN". 1 Alatas added that, based on the Indonesia-Portugal agreement, the six international journal­ ists had to be agreed to by both Indonesia and Portugal. If one party did not agree, the international journalists could be changed. 2 It was clear that the deadlock was caused by the Portugal-Indonesia failure to agree on the international journalists included in the delegation. As a result, Portugal cancelled its plans on 26 October 1991. This became the second scheduled visit halted by Portu­ gal.3 In front of journalists, President of Portugal's Na­ tional Assembly Vitor Crespo stated that the visit would not be carried out if Indonesia's veto, which influenced a spe­ cific journalist, still existed. Indonesia, through General Director of Politics of the Foreign Affairs Department Wirjo­ no Sastrohandojo, accused Portugal of one-sided action in its decision not to visit East Timor. He said that Indonesia did not want to prevent Portugal's visit and demanded that Portu­ gal obey the agreement between Indonesia and Portugal made in New York. 4 This statement ran parallel with Alatas's comment saying that Indonesia had not acted unreasonably in this

1."UN to Rule on E Timor Visit Row", in The Australian, 29 October 1991, p. 9. 2."Portugal Ngotot Sertakan Wartawan yang Ditolak RI", in Jawa Pos, Op. Cit., p. 1. 3.The first visit was scheduled in April 1987. 4."Sudah Dua Kali Ini, Rencana Kunjungan Portugal Tertunda", in Jaw-a Pos, 29 October 1991, p. 1.

75 case.1 Foreign Minister Ali Alatas requested the UN Secretary­ General Javier Perez de Cuellar to solve the problem of the cancellation of Portugal's visit to East Timor. 2 A diplomatic source in the United Nations then announced that the UN's officers wished that Portugal could visit East Timor in the

next year (1992) and that the UN would mediate between Indo­ nesia and Portugal in determining the composition of the journalists covering the visit. 3 As well as the event in which Gomez and Alfonso were killed on 28 October, some reports from a spokesman of the Catholic Bishop of East Timor to The Australian described the life of East Timorese as one of fear and terror. These re­ ports were given 24 hours after the shooting deaths of the two victims. 4 The Australian also published a document which was leaked by a military source in East Timor to the East Timor news agency on 31 October 1991, stating that the Indo­ nesian army had initiated a clean up to deter FRETILIN guer­ rillas before the Portuguese visit. 5 This was the only leak ------1."Portugal llenunda Kunjungan ke Indonesia", in Kompas, 28 October 1991, p. 1. 2."Henlu Alatas Minta Sekjen PBB Bantu Bereskan Soal RI­ Portugal", in Kompas, 7 November 1991, p. 1. 3."PBB Harap Delegasi Portugal Kunjungi Timtim Tahun Depan", in Kompas, 9 November 1991, p. 11. 4."Military 'Ordered Purge of FRETILIN'", in The Australian, 31 October 1991, p. 9. 5.There is no further information about the existence of the news agency in East Timor.

76 which occurred around the 28 October incident. Another source in Dili added that the Indonesian military had created teams set up to destroy pro-independence groups. The Indonesian Ambassador in Australia, Sabam Siagian, denied these reports, saying that this information was a lie.1 A separate item was published by The Sydney Horning Herald, also on 31 October 1991, stating that an Australian had been expelled from Jakarta on Monday 28 october.2 Michael Tardiff, who took photos and had been talking to the demon­ strators when a 200-strong student demonstration occurred in Bogor, had been interrogated by Immigration officials and police, and was requested to leave Indonesia. However, it should be noted that this event had no relationship with the incident in East Timor in the end of October.

B. Around 12 Rovellber 1991 "A Dismal Day for Indonesia", David Jenkins wrote in his article to describe what had happened in East Timor on 12 November and what its impact on Indonesia would be. 3 His article evaluated this event as the worst day for Indonesia, especially in human rights terms. He noted that more than 100,000 people had died in East Timor since the Indonesian

1.Log. Cit. 2.Greg Austin, "Jakarta Expels Australian Who Took Photos," in The Sydney Horning Herald, 31 October 1991, p. 5. 3.David Jenkins, "A Dismal Day for Indonesia", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 1.

77 invasion in 1975.1 More obviously important, he believed, was that the event would worsen Indonesia's position in the views of the United States and European Community. The major event itself began when thousands of Timorese demonstrators ( around 3,500) , who gathered for memorial service for the two dead victims of 28 october, marched from Mutail church to Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. The Indonesian troops opened fire on them and killed and injured a number of demonstrators. As confirmed by some newspapers, there were two American journalists (Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman), an Australian Community Aid Abroad officer (Bob MUntz), a stud­ ent of the University of New south Wales --a New Zealander of Malaysian descent-- (Kamahl Amed Bamadhaj), and probably two _other Community Aid Abroad workers, who stayed and watched the incident. 2 Bamadhaj was finally confirmed to be dead, while the others were alive and left East Timor. Besides them, a later report which appeared in The Australian on 11 November 1992, suggested that a Dutch journalist, Saskia Kouwenberg, and her husband, Russell Anderson, were also in East Timor at the time. 3 ------l.A background story entitled "Bloody History of Timor Occupation", showed that Australia had officially accepted the Indonesian take over in 1978. 2."Massacre on our Doorstep" (The Sydney Horning Herald), "Punish Timor Killers, Hawke Urges Suharto" (The Austra­ lian), and "Sydney Student Feared Dead in Timor Massacre" (The Courier-Hail) published on 14 October. 3.David Nason, "Dili Tape Courier Used Blood to Escape Search", in The Australian, 11 November 1992, p. 5.

78 controversy regarding the number of victims and the causes of this event became the focus of Australian and Indonesian newspapers' attention. The chief of Indonesia's Armed Forces General Try sutrisno, as quoted by The courier­ Hail stated that 50 people died and 20 were injured, and no foreigners were among the victims.1 However, his statement was disputed by the other parties. Tony Parkinson, a foreign affairs writer for The Australian, stated that up to 115 people were killed. 2 This was supported by witnesses who watched the incident, such as Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman. 3 These journalists claimed that East Timorese had told them that the victims numbered more than the Indonesian army chief claimed. Another report also suggested that the student, Bamadhaj, was killed in this incident. 4 At the time, the exact number of civilians who were shot was still uncon­ firmed, but some human rights groups reported that the number of victims was more than 100. Alfredo Ferriera, an East Timar resistance spokesman, stated that more than 100 people were killed and injured in this incident. He also added that the ------l.The same number of victims which was claimed also appeared in The Sydney Horning Herald edition 14 November 1992. 2.Tony Parkinson, "Punish Timar Killers, Hawke Urges Suhar­ to", in The Australian, 14 November 1991, p. 1. 3.Stephen Hutcheon, "They Simply Walked Up and Gunned Them Down", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 1. 4.Sigrid Kirk and Deborah Cornwall, "Student from NZ Report­ ed Killed", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 13.

79 Indonesian military patrolled around Dili and conducted searches from house to house after the shootings.1 General Try sutrisno explained that the Indonesian security forces had tried (but failed) to order the demon­ strators to leave the area through 'sympathetic and persua­ sive' actions. The situation, he claimed, had become chaotic and the Indonesian soldiers had to use their weapons in defending themselves from the protesters' attacks. 2 He also did not agree with a foreign news agency's report which stated that the Indonesian army opened fire on the demonstra­ tors. 3 Nevertheless, his claim was dismissed by the two American journalists, who claimed that the military simply walked up and gunned the demonstrators down without saying anything. 4 They added that the massacre occurred 15 minutes after the East Timorese's march had ended. The Indonesian army started to open fire with their automatic weapons against unarmed demonstrators. Immediately, Australia protested to Indonesia and de­ manded an inquiry into the deaths. Prime Minister Bob Hawke urged the Indonesian authorities to punish the troops in­ volved in this incident. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and ------1.Parkinson, Op. cit., p. 1. 2.Greg Austin, "Massacre on our Doorstep", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 1. 3."Kerusuhan di Dili Disesalkan dan akan Diusut Salll.pai TUntas", in Kom.pas, Op. Cit., p. 1. 4.Hutcheon, Op. Cit., p. 1.

80 Trade, senator Gareth Evans, discussed this massacre with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Ali Alatas, in Seoul, when they were in South Korea for the Asia - Pacific Economic co-operation (APEC) meeting. The Foreign Affairs Department in Canberra also called in the Indonesian Ambas­ sador, Sabam siagian, to convey the Australian Government's position regarding this incident. Indonesia, on the other hand, tried to clarify its view of this incident. General Try sutrisno stated that the Indo­ nesian soldiers had to use their weapons to defend them­ selves. He also suggested that the number of victims was not as many as the other parties claimed. A formal statement from the Indonesian authorities was revealed by Sudomo, senior Minister responsible for Security Affairs, on 14 November 1991.1 He said that in the Dili incident 19 people were killed, including one New zealander, and 91 people were wounded, including two Americans. One Indonesian army offic­ er, Major Gerhan Lantara, was injured and treated in a Jakar­ ta hospital. Ali Alatas, as was confirmed by Senator Evans, stated that Indonesia held a "very deep concern" about this incident and agreed to the necessity of a full inquiry to make the cause and extent of the shootings clear. The other reactions came from countries such as Portugal and Canada, as well as from a FRETILIN resistance spokesman. Portugal's President Mario Soares, through his press spokes------1."Korban 'l!ewas GPK 19 orang", in Jawa Pos, and "'l!imtim 'l!etap 'l!erbuka" in Kompas, 15 November 1991, p. 1.

81 man, stated that he had asked the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de CUellar, to stop "atrocities" in East Timor.1 Portugal also attempted to persuade the United States' Gov­ ernment, leading to a change in the OS's views on East Timor. This country demanded a diplomatic meeting, which involved representatives of Portugal, East Timor and Indonesia. Jose Ramos Horta, in addition, said in Portugal that "only con­ vening the Security council can dissuade the Indonesians from pursuing these actions.n2 There are four points which should be noted about the first days after the massacre. The incident, first of all, re-opened the 'old wound' of Australian press relations with Indonesia, especially memories of the deaths of five Austra­ lian journalists in 1975. Indeed, the Dili massacre became a trigger for the Australian press to again report what was going on in East Timor and what the effects were after Indonesia declared East Timor as its 27th province. This incident led the Australian media to concentrate again their reports on this area. The Australian news attention, secondly, initially tended to 'trap' Indonesia by giving a greater proportion to statements which opposed Indonesia's claims.3 Statements from ------1.Jill Jolliffe, "Lisbon Tells UH to Halt 'Atrocities'", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 13. 2.Thatcher, Op. Cit., p. 7. 3.This will be further examined in the next chapter. It should be noted, however, that this second point applies only to one or two days after the shootings.

82 the Indonesian authorities were placed in news stories as excuses which formed unbalanced replies, both quantitatively and qualitatively,1 to earlier statements fr~m other parties. In this case, the Australian media quoted more sources who disagreed with Indonesia, or at least, who assumed that Indonesia solely was responsible for the massacre. Thirdly, controversy regarding the number of victims became the most attractive focus for media at the moment. The Australian newspapers paid most attention to 'magnitude' or 'size' in their news values. 2 Although the other news values were explored, such as 'importance' and 'proximity' and later 'human interest', magnitude seemed to be the favoured aspect of newsmaking at work. Fourthly, the Indonesian newspapers, on the other hand, tended to give a greater proportion to some statements which came from the Indonesian news sources. As published by Kompas and Jawa Pos, statements made by General Try sutrisno, For­ eign Minister Ali Alatas and senior Minister responsible for security Affair Sudomo dominated the Indonesian media's news content. Besides this, the Indonesian newspapers paid most ,' attention to Indonesia's claim in handling the massacre and the causes of the bloodshed. 'Prominence' and 'proximity' seemed to be the Indonesian newspapers' top news values. ------l.A simple example can be judged from the use of chosen words such as 'massacre' and 'bloodbath' rather than 'incident'. 2.Six news values are detailed in Chapter I and will be further examined in the next chapter.

83 Despite the fact that the Australian news media coverage over the incident tended to blame Indonesia, there was one article which argued that the mistake was not only Indone­ sia's responsibility. 1 Warren Osmond in The Sydney Horning Herald suggested that Portugal should take on its responsi­ bilities as well. 2 In his comments, Osmond reminded readers that "Portugal's indirect role also deserves secondary analy­ sis". This was based on the fact that Portugal had canceled its delegation's plan to visit East Timer in the end of october 1991.3 During the first week after the massacre, the Australian newspapers attempted to complete their reportage by quoting new statements and presenting developments around the incid­ ent. Most of them again focused on the international outrage, including comments from the East Timer's governor Mario Vegas Carrascalao and Bishop Monsignor Carlos Ximenes Belo, and also the strong statement from Prime Minister Bob Hawke. The Australian, for example, quoted Hawke's statement which said that the massacre had shown the failure of Indonesia's policy

1.During the time, the Australia's news coverage appeared in many kinds of news format. 2.Warren Osmond, "Portuguese cancellation Must Shoulder Some Blame", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 13. 3.Read also Tony Parkinson, "Timer's Bloodbath a New Blot on Relations with Indonesia", in The Australian, 14 November 1991, p. 11; Garrie Gibson, "Time for Action to Stop Brutality on East Timer", in The Courier-Hail, 14 November 1991, p. 8; and an editorial "Timer Could Use a Peace Plan Too," in The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991, p. 16.

84 of controlling the province by military force. 1 At the time, Hawke said that, "Whatever provocation may have occurred, if any, the response by the Indonesian military has been tragi­ cally excessive". 2 overall, the international reaction con­ demned Indonesia's use of military forces in handling the demonstrators.

An Australian Community Aid Abroad officer, Bob Muntz, who witnessed the incident, moreover, suggested that the demonstrators did not provoke or attack the Indonesian troops. 3 He also refuted Indonesia's claim that the first shot came from the crowd. Quoting a story from a Timorese nurse who treated his arm injury, Muntz also stated that the Indonesian military had announced that 84 people died at the cemetery and other 13 people died when they were brought to the hospital. Such comments again were denied by the Indonesian au­ thorities. By the first week after the massacre, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in Seoul stressed that Indonesian sol­ diers had no alternative to avoid the use of weapons on rioting crowds, when they clashed with the protesters and after an Indonesian military chief was wounded by a protester l.This also implied that Australia still viewed East Timor as an Indonesian province. See Tony Parkinson and Matthew Franklin, "Massacre Indictment of Military Rule: PM", in The Australian, 15 November 1991, p. 1. 2.Ibid., column 5. 3.Mark Skulley, "Attack on Mourners Unprovoked, Says Wit­ ness", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 16 November 1991, p. 15.

85 using a machete.1 In Jakarta, JDOreover, Alatas admitted that the Dili massacre would influence Indonesia's efforts to take the East Timar conflict off the UN's agenda. 2 He also stated that foreign media gave negative reportage to Indonesia around the bloodbath. East Timar Governor carrascalao argued against claims such as this by saying that the reportage of the foreign press could not be denied due to the fact that hundreds of witnesses had watched the massacre. The foreign press tended to believe the witnesses. 3 But, he refused to speculate about the number of victims and suggested that people wait until the formal number was announced. The Indonesian newspapers also reported that the senior Minister responsible for Security Affair Sudomo had met Mrs. Todd, Kamel's mother, and gave her a letter which introduced her to East Timor's Pangkolakops Brigader-General Rudolf s. Warouw. 4 Besides this, Indonesia's press release read by the Indonesian representative to the UN in New York on 14 Novem­ ber 1991, suggested that the situation in Dili was normal and there was no emergency curfew. 5 A regional military commander ----~------1.Ibid., column 4. 2."Alatas: Berita di Luar Hemojokkan", in Jawa Pos, 16 November 1991, p. 1. 3."Laporan Pers Asing Belum Bisa Dibantah", in Surya, 18 November 1991, p. 1. 4."Ibu Kaael Ahmad Tellllli Pak DoJ1JO", in Jawa Pos, 16 November 1991, p. 1.

5."Dili Normal, Tidak Ada Jam Halam", in surya, 16 November 1991, p. 1.

86 Major General Sintong Panjaitan renewed the debate over the number of victims by saying that 19 civilians were killed and about 20 to 91 people injured. This claim was similar to Indonesia's previous formal statement announced by Sudomo on 14 November. In the meantime, the Australian newspapers had launched speculation regarding the Indonesian troops' actions. The Sydney Horning Herald, which quoted Australian Associated Press (AAP) and Reuters, published a statement that the Indonesian soldiers had misinterpreted orders from Jakarta. This was based on Panjaitan's statement to journalists, saying that, "Soldiers thought they heard the order 'fire', when the order was 'don't fire". Panjaitan added that after the riot ended, the Indonesian troops found rifles, grenades, pistols and knives among the protesters.1 While some demonstrations to protest the massacre oc­ curred and the us planned to send a diplomatic team to inves­ tigate the massacre, a report which appeared in The Austra­ lian showed that responses from the ASEAN countries reflected ASEAN sensitivities. This report was based on Western diplo­ mat's opinion in Kuala Lumpur, and an evaluation to the ASEAN newspapers' coverage around the incident. The ASEAN media view, as presented in the report, was that "Australia held down a key role in leading international condemnation of the

------1."Soldiers Misheard 'Don't Fire' Order - Jakarta", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 15 November 1991, p. 9.

87 massacre.n1 The Chairman of the Indonesian Journalists Association

(PWI), M. Soegeng Widjaja, on 16 November 1991 stated in Yogyakarta that the Indonesian national press could report field findings, outside government statements. But he remind­ ed journalists to consider whether their reportage was bene­ ficial to the nation. He added that the Indonesian news reportage was crucial to compensate for news from the foreign media which tended to be negative towards Indonesia. Indone­ sia's Minister of Information Harmoko also attacked foreign journalists who worked in the '007 journalism style' without applying check and recheck procedures. 2 His statement was directed most against journalists who used tourism visas. Although non-Indonesian journalists tended to write negative­ ly about Indonesia in handling the 12 November case, as he confirmed, the Indonesian authorities had not seen it as necessity to ban the operation of foreign journalists. In facing up to the international outrage, the Indone­ sian authorities promised a full investigation to clarify the incident. An important instruction was issued by President Soeharto of Indonesia and announced by the Indonesian State­ Secretary Moerdiono on 17 November 1991. Soeharto ordered that the investigation of the massacre had to be conducted ------1."Muted Reaction Reflects ASEAN Sensitivity", in The Aus­ tralian, 15 November 1991, p. 8. 2."Koaisi Penyelidik Akan Bertemu Uslcup Belo", in SUrya, 22 November 1991, p. 14.

88 accurately and be well coordinated.1 In doing so, Indonesia would organize an independent coDlllittee which would comprise "representatives from Home, Foreign and Justice Ministries, the Armed Forces headquarters and the House of Representa­ tivesn.2 This Committee, Murdiono added, would be given a full and free mandate to observe the event and had no dead­ line to complete its report. commitment was shown by promis­ ing that Indonesia would bring the guilty parties to justice. By 18 November 1991, President Soeharto of Indonesia officially named a national team to investigate the massacre by Keppres No11JOr 53 Tahun 1991. This team, called the Na­ tional Investigation Commission (Komisi Penyelidik Nasional or KPN) comprised seven members, with supreme Judge Jaelani as the chairman. The other six members were Beng Mang Reng Say, Clementino dos Reis Amaral, Hari Sugiman, Hadi Wayarabi, Anton suyata and Sumitro. 3 President soeharto announced the creation of the Commission in Jakarta, where previously 70 East Timorese students had taken to the streets, protesting the massacre and demanding that the UN press Jakarta for self-determination for East Timor. ------1."Penanganan Dilakukan dengan Ceraat dan Dikoordinasikan Sebaik-baiknya", in Koapas, "Pak Barto Bentuk Tim 'Kasus Dili'", in Jawa Pos, and "Presiden Bentuk Komisi Penyeli­ dik", in Surya, 18 November 1991, p. 1. 2."Suharto Promises Justice", in The Australian, 18 November 1991, p. 1. J."Suharto Names Team for Inquiry", in The Australian, 20 November 1991, p. 9, and "Hakim Agung H. Djaelani Pimpin Komsi Penyelidik", in Kompas, 19 November 1991, p. 1.

89 Responding to the establishment of the investigation commission, Justice Djaelani suggested that his team had been given full and free rights to observe all matters, including· to meet everybody related to the incident.1 This was s~ated after the first meeting of the KPN in the supreme Justice building. In the KPN's agenda, the team would meet, among others, Dili Bishop Monsignor Carlos Ximenes Belo, East Timor Governor Mario Viegas carasscalao, East Timor's Army Comman­ der, eyewitnesses and wounded victims, as well as their families. Prior to this, the State-secretary Moerdiono gave assurances that the commission would work freely, accurately, fairly and thoroughly. 2 The East Timor Governor supported the existence of the commission and stressed that the Commis­ sion'.s report should be objective. 3 He also confirmed, as quoted by Indonesia's Home Minister Rudini, that the Dili situation was normal and that there were no further problems. 4 The State Department of the USA, meanwhile, confirmed that between 75 and 100 people were killed when the massacre happened. This confirmation was made in Washington after a three-day visit to the East Timor province by us ------1."Djaelani: 'l'ia Bisa Periksa Siapa Saja", in Jawa Pos, 22 November 1991, p.l. · 2."Koaisi Penyelidik Nasional Akan Bekerja Car.mat, Bebas", in Kompas, 20 November 1991, p. 1. 3.Log. Cit.

4."Rudini: 'l'unggu Basil Kerja Komisi Penyelidik Nasional", in Koapas, 22 November 1991, p. 1.

90 officials •1 An Australian official also suggested that more than 50 people died on 12 November and an Amnesty official claimed that up to 200 people were killed. In contrast, the Indonesian authorities maintained their opinion, estimating that only 19 people were dead shot in the 12 November case. Besides this, other massacres were denied by the Indo­ nesian army in response to new speculation. 2 FRETILIN claimed that Indonesia had carried out four :massacres during November 1991, although it only gave details regarding three. The first alleged massacre, on 12 November, caused many people to be killed and injured. The second one occurred on 15 November, with the number of victims reaching 70 people. 3 FRETILIN claimed that a fresh massacre had happened on 18 November, resulting in seven people dying, including a one­ year-old baby. This fresh news was announced by FRETILIN's representative in Australia, Alfredo Ferreira, who received reports from clandestine sources. 4 Regarding these matters, an Indonesian military spokesman said that, "There is no

l."US Confirms Dili Toll of 10011 , in The Australian, 21 November 1991, p. 2. Also "US Claims up to 100 Killed in Dili", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 21 November 1991, p. 11. 2."Laporan Itu Bohong Besar", in Surya, 19 November 1991, p. 1. 3.Greg Austin, "New Massacre Alleged in East Timor," in The Sydney Horning Herald, 19 November 1991, p. 10. 4.Clandestine is an organisation under FRETILIN. Read Chips Mackinolty, "Seven Death in Fourth Massacre, Fretilin Says", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 25 November 1991, p. 1.

91 truth to the reports" and that the Indonesian Government was waiting a formal conclusion from the Comnission.1 Indonesia also rejected the suggestion that the UN should send an investigating mission to East Timer. 2 The Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that Indone­ sia's comnission should be given an opportunity to finish its work. His statement appeared after the UH secretary-General Javier Perez de CUellar told reporters in Madrid that the UH would like to send a totally independent and impartial mis­ sion to present a report for the international comnunity on what had happened in East Timer in November 1991.3 During November 1991, protests broke out in many places. In Australia, demonstrations ~ccurred in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, and Darwin as well as in other cities. The actions were conducted to protest the involvement of Indonesia's troops in the massacre. Most of them took place in front of the Indonesian Embassy or consulates.4 Protests also appeared from both sides in Indonesia. About so anti-Indonesia demon­ strators began their actions at the UN's repesentative offic-

1."Army Denies Further Killings•, in The Sydney Horning Herald, 26 November 1991, p. 9. 2."Indonesia Rejects UN Dili Probe", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 30 November 1991, p. 16. 3.Tony Parkinson, "UN Investigators to Probe Dili Massacre", in The Australian, 29 November 1991, p. 3. 4.It was reported that the demonstrators had damaged the Indonesian consulate's facilities in Darwin. Read Greg Austin, "Jakarta Threatens Aust Links", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 27 November 1991, p. 1.

92 es in M.H. Thamrin Street and moved to the foreign embassies in Jakarta, including the Japanese and Australian Embassies.1 Pro-Indonesia groups focused their actions in front of Aus­ tralia's Embassy. 2 The pro-Indonesia demonstrators attacked the hostility of some Australians' attitudes towards Indone­ sia and the burning of Indonesia's flag in front of the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney. 3 At the diplomatic level, Australia seemed to cancel official plans to visit Indonesia. -The Federal Industry Minister, senator Button, said he would probably call off his proposed visit to Indonesia which had been arranged to start on December 11, in a protest against the massacre. 4 Austra­ lia, in addition, might also back the UN role in East Timor due to the failure of Indonesia in handling its 27th prov­ ince.5 On the other hand, Indonesia threatened to recall its

------1."Komisi Penyelidik Nasional Akan Bekerja Cermat, Bebas", in Kompas, Op. Cit., p. 1. 2.A photograph had been republished by an Indonesian maga­ zine, Tempo, describing pro-Indonesia demonstrators who brought a pamphlet, read 'Look at your face in the mirror, Australia. What about the Aborigines?'. Look at Tempo, 25 April 1992, No. 8 (XXII), p. 23. 3."Hengalir, Protas ke Kedubes Australia", in Jawa Pos, 22 November 1991, p.1. 4.Read "Visit may be called off in Timor Protest", in The Courier-Hail, 26 November 1991, p. 6. 5.Tony Parkinson, "Australia may Back UN Role in Timor", in The Australian, 21 November 1991, p. 5.

93 Ambassador and all its diplomatic staff.1 This threat was launched by a senior Minister responsible for Security Af­ fairs, Sudomo, in relation to the violent demonstrations against Indonesia's Embassy and consulates. He also deplored Australia's responses which were described as "premature", coming before the Indonesian Co1DD1ission on the massacre had completed its reports.2 However, sudomo's statement was denied by the Indonesian Defence Minister and acting Foreign Minister, General L.B. Moerdani, one day later. He stated that Indonesia was not considering a diplomatic withdrawal. 3 He assured Australia's Alllbassador Phillip Floods, that Indo­ nesia would not recall its diplomats. 4 In the meantime, Prime Minister Bob Hawke stated that Australia would review its relationship with Indonesia if the Collllllission's reports were biased. 5 From 23 to 30 November 1991, the Indonesian newspapers reported eleven important events. First, General Try Sutrisno suggested that East Timor was an open area for the Interna­ tional Committee of the Red cross's visit. He pointed out that the Committee were not constrained from visiting the ------1.Tony Parkinson, "Indonesia Threatens to Recall Envoy", in The Australian, 27 November 1991, p. 1. 2.Greg Austin, "Jakarta Threatens Aust Links", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 27 November 1991, p. 1. 3.Ibid, columns 4-5. 4.Mike Seccombe, "Indonesian Ties Depend on Inquiry", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 November 1991, p. 10. 5.Log. Cit.

94 Timorese victims. Besides this, he also stressed that the Dili massacre was an internal affair.1 second, the regional Police commander in East Timor, Colonel Ishak Kodijat, an­ nounced on 21 November that 49 lawbreakers had been captured. Eight of them were later liberated, due to the fact that their involvement was only as followers of clandestine groups. 2 Third, East Timor's Pangkolakops Brigader-General Rudolf Samuel Warouw instructed his armies to shoot at mem­ bers of a masked group who had disturbed Dili civilians. He admitted that he had not met the masked group and concluded that its existence was just a rumor. 3 Fourth, East Timor's Bishop Belo criticised the use of his church for political activities. His pastoral notes comprised nine points, written in Portuguese and Tetun --an indigenous language in East Timor-- and were spread to East Timorese Christians. 4 Fifth, Pastor Alberto Ricardo da Silva stated that his church ("Mutail") was not involved in the riot on 12 November. He also denied that there were posters, FRETILIN's flags, stones and scimitars in the church. These things, according to him,

------1."Siap Berbicara 24 Ja111. Tentang Nasib Timtim", in Surya, 22 November 1991, p. 1. 2."Hasih 41 Tersangka Ditahan di Dili", in surya, 22 Novem­ ber 1991, p. 1. 3."Tembak Di Tempat Pasukan Bertopeng", in Kompas, 24 Novem­ ber 1991, p. 1. 4."Belo Keluarkan Nota Pernyataan", in Jawa Pos, 25 November 1991, p. 1.

95 were found outside the church.1 Sixth, the Indonesian Defence Minister General L.B. Moerdani was invited to meet the National Investigation Commission (KPN) on 25 November 1991. Moerdani was the first Indonesian official who met the Commission. He gave informa­ tion to the KPN for about 150 minutes. Asked by the journal­ ists what he said to the Commission, Moerdani said that his meeting with the commission was not for press's consumption. He also reminded them that the commission was very independ­ ent. 2 seventh, Presiden~ soeharto of Indonesia, visiting Caracas, Venezuela, criticised some countries which said they would stop their aid to Indonesia. 3 The Netherlands govern­ ment, for example, had suggested it would delay any new aid to Indonesia. Soeharto was supported by Ali Alatas4 and L.B. Moerdani, 5 who said that the decision to stop the aid should not be taken before the commission finished its work. L.B. Moerdani, however, did not deny that such a decision was the donor's own. 6 ------1."Pastor Hotael: Gereja Saya Tak Tersangkut", in Jawa Pos, 26 November 1991, p. 1. 2."HenhankaJII: Saya Diundang KPN Untuk Berikan Hasukan", in Kompas, and "L.B. Hoerdani Beri Hasukan 150 Henit, in Jawa Pos, 26 November 1991, p. 1. 3."Presiden Soeharto Sesalkan Negara Yang PUtuskan Bantuan", in Surya, 27 November 1991, p. 1. 4.Log. Cit. S."Henhankaa Sayangkan Negara Yang Alcan Hentikan Bantuan", in Kompas, 27 November 1991, p. 1. 6.Log. Cit.

96 Eighth, by 26 November, surya reported that the Indone­ sian Consulate in Darwin could not operate due to protesters' attacks. Acting Consul Rachmat Murni stated to surya that the

Indonesian Consulate had been blocked by protesters since 18 November. As a result, the consulate could not work normally. Forty visas requested by Australian businessm~n, for example, could not be processed by the Consulate's staff. 1 This, according to Murni, complicated their business activities and led them to draft a petition to the Australian government. Ninth, prior to this, one of the KPN's member, Hadi Wayarabi,

attacked Portugal as the "country behind the 12 November case", which had caused people to die and be wounded. Portu­ gal, as Antara news agency quoted Wayarabi, tried to discred­ it Indonesia and created the incident. 2 Wayarabi's statement was made on 23 November 1991. This statement was slightly contradictory to that of General Try sutrisno, who said that the East Timor incident was initiated by FRETILIN. 3 sutrisno also described the involvement of foreigners in the slaughter by showing photographs. The photographs illustrated that foreigners had stayed in the Mutail church, while the East Timorese had not been there before the massacre occured. Tenth, in front of the House of Representatives' mem------l."40 Pengusaha Australia Akan Hengajukan Petisi", in surya, 26 November 1991, p. 1. 2."Portugal Dalangi Kerusuhan di Dili", in surya, 24 Novem­ ber 1991, p. 1. 3."Batalyon 303 Ditarik Dari Dili", in Jawa Pos, 28 November 1991, p. 1.

97 bars, General Try Sutrisno on 27 November again stressed that the Indonesian armies had to defend themselves. This had led them to shoot the protesters who tried to take the army's weapons. He also restated the Indonesian government's concern about the victims and their faailies, restating that the 12 November incident had caused 19 deaths and injured 91 people. The Regional CoDlander IX/Udayana Major-General Sintong Pandjaitan added that Battalion 303, which was responsible for the incident and consisted of 544 soldiers, would be withdrawn from the area~ 1 Eleventh, the National Investigation commission started its observation in Bast Timor on 28 November. The Commission conducted the first meeting in Dili with the Bast Timor's Governor carrascalao, two hours after the Commission checked in to the "Mahkota" hotel. 2 Before the meeting, carrascalao had prepared a 100 page report which was discussed with the Commission members. 3 on the following day, the commission met

1."ABRI Perpaksa Henel8bak Sebagai Upaya Bela Diri", in Koapas, 28 November 1991, p. 1. 2."Piba di Tiatia Langsung Kerja", in Jawa Pos, 28 November 1991, p •. 1, "Uskup Belo Siap Beri Keterangan", in Jawa Pos, 29 November 1991, p. 1, "Taklcan Goyah Dengan Pernya­ taan Begati~", in Koapas, 29 November 1991, p. 1 and "Pim· KPN Disaabut Dingin Warga Dili", in surya, 29 November 1991, p. 1. 3."Carrascalao Siapkan Laporan 100 Halaaan", in Surya, 29 November 1991, p. 1.

98 Bishop Belo for around three hours •1 After the meeting, Justice Djaelani stated that the meeting ran well, while Bishop Belo did not make any comment. 2 The Commission also interviewed Pastor Alberto Ricardo da Silva before checking the route of 12 November protesters on 30 November 1991. In the beginning of December, a special UN ·envoy was reported go to Jakarta to negotiate the possibility of fact­ finding mission to investigate the Dili massacre with the Indonesian authorities. According to the UN Secretary­ General, quoted by The Australian, the UN envoy was a chair­ man of a UN commission, Amos Waco, from Kenya. 3 However, The Australian added that the UN's plan had been opposed by the Governor of Bast Timor, carrascalao, who was afraid that the sending of the UN team would spark another riot. Foreign Minister Alatas also argued against the sending of the UN envoy.4 In the same day, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke said that he might cancel his planned visit to Indonesia ------1. "3 JUJ Uslcup Belo Ungkap Insiden Dili Kepada KPN, in Surya, 30 November 1991, p. 1, "KPN BerteJIU Dengan Uslcup Ximenes Belo", in Kompas, 30 November 1991, p. 1 and "Belo Terima Tim di Kediamannya", in Jawa Pos, 30 November 1991, p. 1. 2. "KPN BerteJDU Dengan Uslcup Xiaenes Belo", in Koapas, Op. Cit., p. 1. According to Pastor Alberto Ricardo da Silva, Bishop Ximenes Belo did not like the Indonesian journal­ ists because they tended to write which was not based on facts. See "Uslcup Belo Tak Bentikan Kegeaarannya Bersiul", in surya, 29 November 1991, p. 1. 3."UN Seeks Go-ahead for Timor Mission", in The Australian, 2 December 1991, p. 8. 4."Alatas Bantah PBB Akan Hengiria Ti• ke Dili", in surya, 1 December 1991, p. 1.

99 --scheduled for February 1992-- if the Indonesian Government had not completed its inquiry.1 Hawke's statement was made on the Nine Network's 'Sunday' program. 2 In December, although the Indonesian newspapers focused their reportage on the KPN's tasks, there was the other news from Indonesia which dealt with the massacre and was also reported by both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Firstly, as reported by The Courier-Mail (from AFP), six East Timorese students who studied in Udayana University, Bali, were arrested, following a raid on a house. 3 They had several anti-Indonesia pamphlets, three flags of East Ti­ morese pro-independence groups, and two south Korean-made hand grenades. There was also news from Dili, saying that pro-Indonesia East Timorese in Dili had criticised the burn­ ing of the Indonesian flag in Australia. Besides this, it was reported that Jose da Costa Pintho, a student of Dili Polite-

------1.sally Hopman, "PM.Says Dili Visit could Prove Hard", in The AUstralian, 2 December 1991, p. 2. Also read Stephen Sealey, "Hawke May Cancel Visit to Indonesia", in The courier-Mail, 2 December 1991, p. 3. 2.By 27 November, Prime Minister Bob Hawke stated that Australia would review its relationship with Indonesia, if Indonesia covered the real facts in investigating the massacre. "Australia Akan Meninjau Ulang Hubungannya Dengan Indonesia", in Jawa Pos, 28 November 1991, p. 1. 3."Timorese students Held in Tourist Isle", in The courier­ Mail", 3 December 1991, p. 15.

100 knik, and his friends were missing.1 Indonesia's news agency Antara, secondly, stated that there was the possibility that the Australian Community Aid Abroad (CAA) was involved in leading the East Timorese' s movement on November 12. 2 Such news was similar to Kamal Bamadhaj's account of the incident, which was rewritten by

Mrs. Helen Todd and published in The Asian Wa.ll street Jour­ nal (AWJ) letters of 25 November. 3 In her letter, Mrs. Todd admitted that her son knew much not only about the Dili case but also of FRETILIN's activities. Therefore, Mrs. Todd's letter in the AWJ added to the controversy of the activities of external parties (Portugal, FRETILIN and the Australian community Aid Abroad) leading up to the Dili massacre. Re­ garding this matter, Australian community Aid Abroad denied Indonesia's accusation through its spokesman Jeremy Hobbs. 4 Other news came from Dennis Shultz, who had returned from Dili. He claimed that he personally observed and found a covered pit at an Indonesian army camp at Tibar, 20 kilome-

---·------l.Around one year after the massacre, The Sydney Horning Herald reported that Pintho arrived in Portugal by using spurious passport through Jakarta. His route to go to Portugal was Dili, Kupang, Jakarta, Macao and Lisbon. Such news was not reported by the Indonesian newspapers. 2."Aust Group Behind Dili Plot: Jakarta", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 3 December 1991, p. 11. J."LSH AUstralia Dalangi Kerusuhan 12 November", in Surya, 2 December 1991, p. 1. 4."LSH AUstralia Bantah Terlibat Insiden Dili", in surya, 3 December 1991, p. 1.

101 ters outside Dili.1 He suggested that the covered pit was a mass grave of the victims. The Australian Ambassador in Indonesia, Phillip Flood, after visiting East Timor, made a statement which said that there was no evidence · that the massacre on November 12 was ordered by Jakarta. This state­ ment was used to reject speculation that the Indonesian Government was involved in the massacre. As quoted by The courier-Hail, Flood added t~at the Governor of East Timor carrascalao and Bishop Roman Catholic Belo had told him that they believed more than 100 people had been killed. 2 Meanwhile, a controversy regarding the possibility of a UN envoy appeared in Jakarta. General Moerdani suggested that there was no need to allow the Dili mission and claimed that the incident was entirely an internal affair. 3 He also argued against the ·necessity of peacekeeping force in East Timor because there was no war in the province. Brigader-General Nurhadi supported his senior officer's comment by saying that

Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) would not accept the UN

1.Tony Parkinson, "Mass Grave Found on Army Base", in The Australian, 3 December 1991, p. 7. 2."No Jakarta Massacre Link: Envoy", in The courier-Hail, 9 December 1991, p. 5. Also read George Megalogenis, "Envoy Says Dili Death Toll may Top 10011 , in The Australian, 9 December 1991, p. 4 and "Dili Death Toll may Exceed 100: Envoy", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 9 December 1991, p. 10. 3.Dennis Sanahan and Terry-Friel, "No Need for Dili Mission: Murdani", in The Australian, 6 December 1991, p. 2. Also "Jakarta Rejects UN Massacre Probe", in The Australian, 5 December 1991, p. 8.

102 envoy.1 Director of Foreign Information sutedja said that the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs had not received a formal information about the sending of a UN envoy from UN secretary-General Perez de cuel lar. 2 In contrast, others believed that Indonesia should let a UN envoy go to East Timor. The rejection of any UH mission, confirmed by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the former Indonesian F~reign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and the prominent Indonesian Muslim leader Abdulrachman Wahid, would worsen Indonesia's position in international affairs. 3 The other issues regarding East Timor which appeared in the Australian newspapers till mid-December involved five points. Firstly, there was a claim from Manuel Carrascalao, a senior member of the East Timor legislature, saying that he saw 50 dead bodies: 35 were in an army truck and the others lay on the road. 4 His statement contradicted Indonesia's claim that 19 people were killed and about 90 people injured. Secondly, 26 East Timorese were arrested by the Indonesian security forces. Eight of them would be tried for subversion,

1."ABRI Takkan Teriaa Utusan PBB", in Kompas, 4 December 1991, p. 1. 2."Deplu Belua Teriaa I~oraasi Hengenai utusan Sekjen PBB", in Kompas, 3 December 1991, p. 1. 3.Sanahan and Friel, Op. Cit., p. 2. Also read "Sebaiknya Teriaa Dulu Utusan dari Sekjen PBB", in Koapas, 5 December 1991, p. 1. 4.Ali Kontarumalos, "I Saw 50 Bodies, says East Timor MP", in The Weekend Australian, 7-8 December 1991, p. 13 and "Local MP Claims 50 Died at Dili", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 7 December 1991, p. 16.

103 which under Indonesia's anti-subversion laws meant they could be given the death penalty. The others would face the general criminal law.1 Thirdly, an Australia internal debate on Timar devel­ oped, involving the former Labor PM Gough Whitlam and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator Gareth Evans. As pub­ lished by Australian newspapers, Whitlam accused Hawke of lacking interest in Indonesia. This had prevented Australia from making "a prompt and effective approach" to President soeharto of Indonesia over the massacre. 2 on the other hand, Evans attacked Whitlam, saying that Whitlam was wrong on Timar. Evans tended to support Hawke by claiming that although Whitlam had established a close personal relation­ ship with soeharto, this had produced only limited results in many respects. 3 Senator Button told journalists that trade sanctions could not be imposed on Indonesia quickly, because of the benefit of relations between Australia and Indonesia. His l."Dili Detainess Face Subversion Charge", in The Courier­ Hail, 11 December 1991, p. 17 and read also "26 Likely to Face Charges over Dili", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 11 December 1991, p. 12 and "Jakarta Accuses Eight of Subver­ sion", in The Australian, 11 December 1991, p.a. 2.Peter Bowars, "Hawke Blundered on Timar, Says Whitlam", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 10 December 1991, p. 1. Also read Tony Parkinson, "Whitlam Blasts Hawke on Timar", in The Australian, 10 December 1991, p. 1. 3.Tony Parkinson, "Evans Attacks Whitlam over Indonesia Row", in The Australian, 11 December 1991, p. 4, and Berhard Lagan, "Whitlam Wrong on Timar: PM, Evans", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 11 December 1991, p. 7.

104 statement, according to The Australian, came after a four-day trip to Malaysia. 1 This newspaper quoted Button as stating that, 11 ••• , we have to be a little more sensitive and cau­ tious about our relationship with Indonesia11 • 2 Lastly, President Soeharto of Indonesia announced that Indonesia would refuse aid which was linked to action on the Dili massacre. 3 In a televised news conference, President Soeharto said that, "We (Indonesia) are not going to accept it at all if there are political preconditions". 4 His state­ ment was given after returning from a 23-day working trip to Latin America and Africa, in response to Canada and the Netherlands, which had threatened to cancel their aid. on 19 December 1991, seven days before the Indonesian ColDDlission completed its report, Australia's Foreign Minister senator Evans arrived in Indonesia. As stated by him, his arrival in Indonesia was not to lecture Indonesia and he did not want to interfere in domestic matters. However, he added,

1.George Megalogenis, "Fast Bans on Indonesia Too Risky: Button", in The AUstralian, 12 December 1991, p. 2. 2.Log. Cit. 3."We'll Refuse Aid if Indonesia is Linked to Massacre: Suharto", in The courier-Hail, 13 December 1991, p. 11. Also read "Timer Massacre Puts Pressure on Suharto", in The courier-Hail, 14 December 1991, p. 18, "Bantuan LN yang Dilcaitlcan Politilc DN Talclcan Diteriaa", in Koapas, 12 December 1991, p. 1, "Pale Barto Talc Hau Kaitlcan Soal Dili Dengan Bantuan LN", in Jawa Pos, 12 December 1991, p. 1, "Indonesia Talc Alcan Lepaslcan Timtim", in Surya, 12 Decem­ ber, p. 1. 4."Suharto Rejects Aid With Link to Action on Timer", in The AUstralian, 13 December 1991, p. 10.

105 Indonesia's inquiry over the 12 November incident should be "fair, just and acted upon promptly".1 In his visit to Indo­ nesia, Evans met Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, but he could not meet President Soeharto, General Benny Murdani and General Try sutrisno. 2 Evans' visit was coloured by Indonesia's rejection of a visa to Lindsay Murdoch, who was to cover Evans' visit for The Age and The Sydney Horning Herald. 3 Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said that East Timor might be closed to the foreigners. 4 Indonesia also rejected a request from Australia to set up a consulate in Dili, as requested by Evans during his three-day visit. In the meantime, Australian political developments ------1. 11Massacre Inquiry Must Be Fair: Evans", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 20 December 1991, p. 4. 2.Read Terry Friel, "Dili Response to Decide Jakarta's Fate, Says Evans", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 21 December 1991, p. 3. Also "Suharto Snubs Evans Protest", in The sun Herald, 22 December 1991, p. s., "Massacre Inquiry Must Be Fair: Evans", in The sydney Horning Herald, 20 December 1991, p. 4, and Bernhard Lagan, "Hosts Unlikely to Agree to Requests", in The Sydney Horning Herald, · 19 December 1991, p. 9. Read also Tony Parkinson, "Evans Faces Hardline Stance on Dili Massacre", in The Australian, 19 December 1991, p. 1, Greg Sheridan, "Jakarta's Future TUrns on Report: Evans", in The Weekend Australian, 21-22 December 1991, p. 11, Greg Sheridan, "Jakarta Snubs Evans - Polite­ ly", in The Australian, 23 December 1991, p. 3., and "Evans in Jakarta over Dili Deaths", in The Courier-Hail, 20 December 1991, p. 11. 3."Dili Protest: Eight Face Death", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 19 December 1991, p. 1. and "Massacre Inquiry Must Be Fair: Evans", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 20 December 1991, p. 4. 4.Lindsay Murdoch, "East Timor May Be Closed to Foreigners", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 23 December 1991, p. 1.

106 seemed to give 'fresh air' to Indonesia. The election by the ALP of new Prime Minister Paul Keating was assumed by Indone­ sia to reduce Australia's pressure on Indonesia over the massacre. Keating's triumph in Caucus became a media hit in Indonesia and was viewed as benefitting Indonesia.1 In Indonesia, the national investigation conducted by the KPN tended to dominate newspaper content in the last month of 1991. As previously stated, Kompas, Jawa Pos and Surya all reported that the Commision started its observation in the end of November by holding meetings with the Defence Minister and acting Foreign Minister, the Indonesian Home Minister, the Indonesian Army Commander in Jakarta and with

carrascalao (5 times), as well as Bishop Belo and Pastor Ricardo da Silva in East Timor. The commission's investiga­ tion in December was completed with some meetings between the KPN and the East Timor's Pangkolakops Brigader-General warouw

(5 times), 2 Pangkolakops's staff, local police in East Timor, the Local Commander of the Indonesian Army Brigader-General Sintong Pandjaitan (in Denpasar), Pastor Albrecht Kareem, Pastor Markus Wanandi, Pastor Locatelli, Pastor Jose Car­ bonell, Pastor Jose Antonio da Costa, the inmates who had

1."Diplomasi dari Tetangga Selatan (Diplomacy from south Neighbour)", in Tempo, 25 April 1992, No 8 (XXII), p. 23, and two reports from Greg Sheridan, "News Hits Front Page in Jakarta" and "Indonesia Keen to Meet New Leader: Evans", in The Weekend Australian, 21-22 December 1991, p. 8. 2."Brigjen Warouw Ungkap Insiden Dili 9 Jam Lebih", in surya, 3 December 1991, p. 1.

107 been involved in the Dili incident, 1 other formal leaders from the Regional and Local Houses of Representatives, East Timorese informal local leaders, mass and political organisa­ tions, the victim's families, the participants in the massa­ cre and 132 witnesses. Besides this, the Commission re-walked the route of the protesters' march, re-dug some areas of cemeteries and other areas which were suspected to be graves of the victims, rechecked the missing civilians and viewed a reconstruction of the Santa Cruz incident. 2 As Kompas noted, the Commission dug up one victim's grave in the public ce­ metery "Hera". The Commission found that the grave contained only one corpse and that the corpse was buried appropriately in a Christian manner. 3 In general, however, the contents and the results of the meetings could not be reported by the Indonesian press. Justice Djaelani, in this case, always ordered the journalists to wait until the Commission finished its work. 4 The commission finished its investigation in East

1."KJRI Dapat Bocoran Rencana 7 Desember", in Jawa Pos, 5 December 1991, p. 1.

2."Amaral Cs. Lakukan wawancara Rahasia", in Jawa Pos, 4 December 1991, p. 1 and "KPN Saksikan Rekonstruksi Insiden Santa Cruz", in Kompas, 11 December 1991, p. 1. Read also "Korban Insiden Dili Sekitar so Orang Tewas", in Kompas, 27 December 1991, p. 1. 3."Korban Insiden Dili Sekitar 50 Orang Tewas", in Kompas, Op. Cit., p. 11. 4."Hasil Temuan KPN Hulai Dievaluasi Senin Besok", in surya, 15 December 1991, p. 1.

108 Timor on December 14.1 The Governor of East Timor carrascalao, after he met and

handed over his 100 page report2 to the KPN in the end of November, gave some information to the Indonesian and foreign journalists. The information included, among other things, the fact that from the beginning of Portugal's plan to visit East Timor, carrascalao had not agreed with this plan. The plan, carrascalao suggested, would create great conflicts. Besides this, he believed that the Commission should produce objective reports and he rejected the involvement of foreign investigators. He did not at that stage believe the number of victims claimed by some parties and wanted to wait till the Commission reported. He hoped that whoever made mistakes leading to the massacre would be punished. Carrascalao also believed that the KPN had worked seriously.3 He reminded the Commission, however, that if it did not work objectively, he would investigate the massacre in his own way. 4 The East Timor inquiry concluded with the Indonesian commission's report announced on 26 December 1991. The find------1. 11 utusan Paus di .Ruaah Belo", in Jawa Pos, 14 December 1991, p. 1, "Basil TeJDUan KPN Hulai Dievaluasi Senin Besok", in SUrya, Op. Cit., p. 1 and "Kollisi Penyelidik Nasional Akhiri Penyelidikannya di Dili", in Kompas, 15 December 1991, p. 1. 2.His report was a summary of East Timor from 1989 to 1991. 3."Carrascalao Beri Keterangan Pada Wartawan Dalam dan Luar Negeri", in surya, 1 December 1991, p. 1. 4."Bila KPN Tak Obyektif Dibongkar Sendiri", in Jawa Pos, 1 December 1991, p. 1.

109 ings of the report into the shootings, which were given to journalists by the Commission leader, Justice Djaelani, after he met President Suharto, stated that about 50 people had been killed in the massacre.1 The report also accused sol­ diers of overacting to the demonstrators, which led to the massacre. A formal statement by Justice Djaelani said that, "The Commission had enough strong reasons to believe that the number of victims who died were around 50 people and the

injured more than 91 people11 • 2 Besides this, the report also stated that around 90 people were missing and that a number of these probably died. 3 Although the Commission's report of the number of deaths was lower than the international estimates, this was a much more credible official figure than before. Well-known wit­ nesses claimed that 115 people had been killed and independ­ ent human rights groups stated around 100 people were dead shot. on the other hand, as late as 17 December, the Indone­ sian army again suggested that only 19 people died when the

------l.Greg Sheridan, "Jakarta Revises Toll to 50 Dead", in The Australian, 27 December 1991, p. 1. Also read Terry Friel, "Dili Killings: Repot Rejects Army's Toll", in The couri­ er-Hail, 27 December 1991, p. 1 and "Jakarta Admits 50 Died at Dili", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 27 December 1991, p. 1, "Korban Insiden Dili Sekitar 50 orang Tewas", in Koapas, Op. Cit., 1991, p. 1, "KPN: Yang Tewas Sekitar 50 Orang", in Jawa Pos, 27 December 1991, p. 1, "Pak Barto Henyampaikan Belasungkawa Yang Dalam", in Surya, 27 Decem­ ber 1991, p. 1. 2."Jakarta Admits 50 Died at Dili", Op. Cit., p. 1. 3.Sheridan, Op. Cit. p. 1.

110 shootings occurred •1 Western diplomats welcomed the report, saying that it was more plausible than the Indonesian army's account of the incident. The East Timer's governor carrasca­ lao also saluted the Commission's report by saying that although the KPN could not prove the number of the victims by the dead bodies, the KPN had predicted well through witness­ es' accounts. 2 Moreover, General Try sutrisno said that ABRI would obey and support the report made by the commission. 3 A response from Australia to the report was given by Senator Evans on 29 December 1991. Evans said that this report was a positive matter. He said, as quoted by The Sydney Horning Herald, that, "From the limited reports we've seen so far, the Indonesian Government's reaction appears to

be positive and helpful 11 • 4 A slightly more negative comment came from David Jenkins in his article antitled "Jakarta saves Face, and $4bn", although some days after this he wrote ------l."Dili Inquiry Backs Army: Only 19 Died", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 18 December 1991, p. 1. 2."Carrascalao: sudah Tepat Itu", in Jawa Pos, 27 December 1991, p. 1 and "Carrascalao Tanggapi Laporan Tim KPN", in surya, 27 December 1991, p. 1. 3."Laporan KPN Selamatkan Bantuan Luar Negeri", in Surya, 28 December 1991, p. 1. 4.Angela Leary, "Dili Kill Report OK: Evans", in The Couri­ er-Hail, 28 December 1991, p. 14. Also read Anne Connolly and Natasha Bita, "E Timer Massacre Sackings Welcomed", in The Australian, 30 December 1991, p. 2, Malcolm Brown and Chips Mackinolty, "OUtrage Greets Evans's Reaction to Inquiry Report", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 December 1991, p. 10, and "Indonesia's Response is Positive, says Evans", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 30 December 1991, p. 5.

111 that, "The move was not only timely and welcome but an act of consummate political skill by a man, ••• , [it] will help restore Indonesia's tattered international reputation, •••• 111 Jenkins's co1DJ1ent was similar to an unnamed Western diplo­ mat's remarks that the KPN's report saved foreign aid for Indonesia. 2 The later comments appeared after Indonesia took further steps after the Commission gave its report. As stated by Nurhadi PUrwosaputro, an armed forces spokesman, the Indone­ sian soldiers who were involved in the massacre would be tried under the relevant laws. 3 Besides this, President Suharto of Indonesia on 28 December sacked Brigadier-General Rudolf Samuel warouw, the East Timor military operational commander, and Major-General Sintong Panjaitan, the military commander of Eastern Indonesia. Brigadier-General Warouw was replaced by Brigadier-General Theo syafei and Major-General

------l.David Jenkins, "Jakarta Saves Face, and $4bn," in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 December 1991, p. 1. Read also Jenkins, "Army Sackings Take the Heat Off Indonesia", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 30 December 1991, p. 1. 2."Laporan KPN Sela11atkan Bantuan LUar Negeri", in Surya, Op. Cit. , p. 1. 3.His statement was announced on 27 December. Read Terry Friel, "Soldiers Will Be Tried over Dili Massacre", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 December 1991, p. 10. Also read Anne Connolly, "Military to Charge Soldiers over Dili", in The Weekend Australian, 28-29 December 1991, p. 1.

112 Mantiri replaced Major-General Sintong Panjaitan.1 Based on the Indonesian Commission's report, President Soeharto of Indonesia issued a formal political statement expressing his condolences to the families of the victims. President soeharto also ordered the publication of the re­ port, which by then was widely spread through television, radio and newspapers. 2 When General Try sutrisno attended a Christmas Day celebration, he also expressed the same condo­ lences to the East Timorese. 3 It should be noted, however, that the FRETILIN resistance group, Amnesty International and overseas aid groups still disputed the accuracy of the Commission's report. 4 Entering 1992, in an end of year address, President Soeharto of Indonesia promised more autonomy for Indonesia's various regions, including Timer. This would be supported by ------1."Soeharto Sacks East Timer Army Chiefs", in The sun Her­ ald, 29 December 1991, p. 8, "New Timer Chief", in The courier-Hail, 31 December 1991, p. 11, "Indonesia ·Names New East Timer Generals", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 31 December 1991, p. 5, •sutrisno Replaces Generals", in The Australian, 31 December 1991, p. 8, "Hayjen Sintong Pan­ jaitan dan Brigjen warouw Diganti", in surya, 29 December 1991, p. 1, "Pangti ABRI llengganti Pangdllll Udayana dan Pangkolakops Tiati•", in Kompas, 29 December 1991, p. 1 and "Sintong-Warouw Segera Diganti", in Jawa Pos, 29 December 1991, p. 1. 2."Document Given Full Publicity", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 December 1991, p. 10, Anne Connolly, "Military to Charge Soldiers over Dili", in The Weekend Australian, 28-29 December 1991, p. 1, "Korban Insiden Dili Sekitar so Orang Tewas", in Koapas, Op. Cit., p. 1. 3."Pangab Nyatakan Rasa Dukacitanya", in Jawa Pos, 28 Decem­ ber 1991, p. 1. 4.Connoly, Op. Cit., p. 1.

113 decentralisation and deregulation in some fields. The devel­ opment of East Timor, moreover, should be the focus of atten­ tion of Indonesia. The President also repeated his condolenc­ es to families of the victims of massacre on November 12.1 These decisions, basically, followed the report of the Indo­ nesian Commission inquiry. Australian officials welcomed this promise, saying that it was "a positive signal in the after­

math of the Dili massacre11 • 2 Another statement came from the Indonesian armed forces commander, General Try Sutrisno,. who said that Indonesia '-s military would launch a search for the remaining victims of the shootings. This statement was given to journalists in Jakarta on the last day of the 1991. General sutrisno added that the search would begin as soon as changes in the army command were ordered by President Soeharto. 3 on 2 January 1992, Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (KSADJ General Edi Sudrajat formed a Military Honour Council (Dewan

Kehor.matan Hili ter = DKH) headed by Ma jar-General Feisal ------l."Suharto Pledges More Autonomy", in The Australian, 1 January 1991, p. 7. Also read "Soeharto Pledges Better Deal for Dili", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 2 January p. 7, "Cegah Hunculnya Fanatis.me Golongan Dala.m Pe.milu 1992", in Kompas, 2 January 1992, p. 1, "Pembangunan di Timar Timur Barus Jadi PUsat Perhatian", in surya, 2 January 1992, p. 1. 2.Tony Parkinson, "Suharto Pledges Social Reform" in The Australian, 2 January 1992, p. 2. 3."Jakarta to Search for Dili Victims", in The Sydney Horn­ ing Herald, 1 January 1991, p. 5. Read also, "Indonesia to Search for More Bodies", in The courier-Hail, 1 January 1992, p. 10.

114 Tanjung and consisted of Setiana, Toni Hartono, sutopo, Suparman Ahmad, Surjadi Sudirdja, Soewardi and Soetedjo.1 The DKII oriC1inated from the orders of the Highest Commander (Panglima Tertinggi) of Indonesia's Armed Forces President Soeharto on 28 December. The council was ordered to observe in more detail the decisions and the steps of the Security Operational Command (Kodam IXft]dayana) and the Security Operation of Command's Execution (Kolakops) in East Timor in handling the 12 November case. According to Brigader-General B. Hartadi, the aims of the DKII differ from those of the KPN. The DKII was constituted for guidance and education, while the KPN was established to seek the facts about the number of

victims. 2 The Military Honour Council arrived in Dili on 4 January and stayed there till 11 January 1992.3 Besides the KPN and the DKII, Indonesia constructed a Depdagri (Indonesia's Home Department) team comprised of eight members and headed by Rapiudin Hamarung. The Depdagri team officially was formed by the Minister of Internal Af­ fairs Rudin!, as instructed by President soeharto. The team ------1.KSAD equal to Indonesia's Army CoDIDl&nder. Later in the new formation of Indonesia's Cabinet 1993-1998, General Edi Sudrajat becomes Defence Minister and Major-General Faisal Tanjung holds position as Indonesia's Armed Forces Comman­ der. 2."KSAD Bentuk DKII, lleneliti Langkah Komando di Timtim", in Kompas, 3 January 1992, p. 1, "Hayjen Faisal Tanjung Pimpin DKII", in Jawa Pos, 3 January 1992, p. 1 and "llayjen Faisal Tanjung Ketua Dewan Kehormatan lliliter", in surya, 3 January 1992, p. 1. 3."DKII Tiba di Dili", in Kompas, 6 January 1992, p. 1.

115 was ordered to observe the Dili incident, especially in the context of the Home Department, and started its investigation on 2 January. 1 The aims of the team were to observe the involvement of the local officers in the Dili massacre and to gain control over the operation of the Home Department in East Timor after the 12 November case. on 12 January, Matsuo Weda, a Japanese citizen, was deported from Indonesia. He was expelled from East Timor for misusing a tourist visa. According to Jawa Pos, Weda spied on Indonesia's military installations and activities, inter­ viewed people claimed by Indonesia to be members of clandes­ tine organisation and re-marched many times from the Mutail church to Santa Cruz cemetery. one week before this, Indone­ sia had also expelled Raimundo Delgade, an American born in Portugal, for the same reasons. 2 Antara news agency, moreo­ ver, reported that four Marocconese, identified as Mohamad, Arnali Idris, Mustafa and Aziz, were arrested in Ambon. Besides the fact that their visas had expired, Indonesia claimed that they were involved in the Dili massacre. 3 Although the Dili case, as stated by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, was a step back for Indonesia's international

------l."KSAD Bentuk DKH, Henel1t1 Langlcah Koaando di Tiatia", in Koapas, Op. Cit., p. 14. 2."Warga Asing 'llisterius' D1deportas1", in Jawa Pos, 13 January ~992, p. 1. J."Jeraan Puji Cara RI Tangani Insiden Dili", in surya, 12 January 1992, p. 1.

116 diplomacy, 1 Indonesia received some tributes from Germany, Australia and the United states for the way it handled the subsequent inquiry. 2 In a closed meeting between President George Bush and Prime Minister Paul Keating, according to one Australia officer, the two leaders agreed that the KPN's report was encouraging. They welcomed President Soeharto's opinion about the commission!s report and said they would support Soeharto's actions in attempting to unravel the massacre. Prime Minister Keating also stressed to President Bush that the Australia-Indonesia relationship was very important and would not change. He added that the relation­ ship between the two countries would become a prototype for the relationship between Australia and other ASEAN countries. 3 In Canberra, meanwhile, the Indonesian Embassy staff got involved in tensions with protesters. As reported by Austra------1."Kasus Dili Kemunduran Diplomasi RI", in Jawa Pos, 4 January 1992, p. 16. 2."Presiden Bush dan PH Keating Puas Terhadap Basil-Basil KPN", in Kompas, 4 January 1992, p. 1, "Jerman Hemuji Presiden Soeharto Dalam Henyelesaikan Insiden Dili", in Kompas, 12 January 1992, p. 1 and "Jerman Puji Cara RI Tangani Insiden Dili", in surya, Op. Cit., p. 1. 3."Presiden Bush dan PH Keating Puas Terhadap Basil-Basil KPN", in Koapas, op. Cit., p. 1. Read also "Basil Kerja KPN Dipuji Pihak Luar", in Surya, 10 January 1992, p. 1. PM Keating, in his visit to Ireland in September 1993, stated that there is no use to argue continuously the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. He also criticised Portugal saying that Portugal was a hypocrite, Portugal as a colonial government was the worst and Portu­ gal bequeathed nothing to the East Timorese. See· Yuli Ismartono, "Pelobi Yang Henyenangkan", in Teapo, No. 30 (XXIII), 25 September 1993, p. 32.

117 lian newspapers, East Timorese protesters blocked the Indone­ sian Embassy in Canberra and built an Australian Coalition for East Timor (ACET) "embassy". The protesters erected hundreds of crosses in front of the Embassy and raised pro­ independence flags. The tension between the Indonesian Embas­ sy and East Timor protesters was heightened by the pelting of bricks, stones and bottles by the protesters which caused

some damage to Indonesia's property. On the other hand, Embassy staff threw missiles back at the demonstrators and injured a boy.1 As a result, the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra, as well as the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in Jakarta, protested to the Australian Government and demanded a guaran­ tee of the diplomatic staff's safety. Based on the Vienna Convention· of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, the host State had an obligation "to prevent any impairment of the dignity of a foreign embassy". 2 Indonesia stated_that the protesters' actions had insulted Indonesia's representatives in Austra­ lia. Australia responded to this protest by asking the pro­ testers to move their demountable East Timor "embassy", 124 ------1.Katherine Glascott, "Embassy Staff Threw Bricks at Pro­ testers", in The Weekend AUstralian, 4-5 January 1992, p. 3, Bina Brown, "Indonesians Complain", in The sun Herald, 5 January, p. 2, "East Timorese Protesters to Keep Embas­ sy", in The Courier-Hail, 6 January 1992, p. 15, Cindy Wockner, "Embassy Staffer 'Provoked' Man", in The Courier­ Hail, 4 January 1992, p. 11, "Pemrotes Anti-RI Nekat Bertahan", in Kompas, 8 January 1992, p. 1. 2.Greg Austin, "Way Open for Dili Crosses to be Moved", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 25 January 1992, p. 6, and Tempo magazine, 25 April 1992, No. 8 (XXII), p. 22.

118 crosses, banners, and flags from the grass outside the Embas­ sy gates.1 If they did not do that, stated Foreign Minister Evans, police would be ordered to remove the protesters. 2 While a Portuguese 'peace ship' was on a cruise to go to Dili, other developments in relation to the massacre oc­ curred. 3 First of all, Indonesia disciplined six soldiers. This was announced by the Indonesian army chief-of-staff, General Edy Sudradjat, in Jakarta on February 27. Three of them were dismissed from the military, two were removed from active duty and one was temporarily taken off active duty. 4

l.Katherine Glascott and Sally Hopman, "Evans Threatens to Disperse Dili Picket", in The Australian, 17 January 1992, p. 3. Also read Glascott, "Timorese Win cross Injunction", in The Weekend Australian, 18-19 January 1992, p. 7, Paul Chamberlin, "Evans Orders Timor Protest site Cleared", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 15 January 1992, p. 3, "Protest Hut Leaves Indo Embassy Gate", in The courier-Hail, 7 January 1992, p. 10, Greg Austin, "Way Open for Dili Crosses to be Moved", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 25 January 1992, p. 6, "Australia Akan Tindak Tegas Demon­ stran KBRI di Canberra", in Koapas, 17 January 1992, p. 1, "Diplomat RI Ragukan Evans", in Jawa Pos, 16 January 1992, p. 1, "Segera Diusir, Pemrotes KBRI", in Jawa Pos, 15 January 1992, p. 1, "Sabam Tiba, Pemrotes Digusur", in Jawa Pos, 17 January 1992, p. 1. 2.Chamberlein, Op. Cit., p. 3. 3.The ship, Lusitania Expresso, sailed from Portugal on January 23 and arrived in Darwin to pick up 100 students and journalists who would share in that cruise, before continuing to sail to Dili and conducting a 'scattering flower' ceremony at the Santa Cruz cemetery, which would be held on February 27. 4.Prior to the time, Indonesia had changed its military command structure for Eastern Indonesia. Read Tony Parkin­ son, "Indonesia Disciplines Six Soldiers for Dili Massa­ cre", in The Australian, 28 February 1992, p. 1, "Army Punishes Dili Generals", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 February 1992, p. 1, "I'm Not That Patient, Warns Dili's New General", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 11 January

119 Australia, through its Foreign Minister Senator Evans, deliv­ ered Australia's formal response to the Indonesian army's statement.1 Secondly, there were two reports which claimed that East Timorese lived in 'fear' due to an Indonesian campaign of psychological and physical harrasment. This report was based on Labor MP warren Snowdon's statement on January 27 and a report from Jonathan Thatcher from Dili on 29 January. 2 These reports were not contested by collDlents from Indonesia. Thirdly, the Indonesian security forces claimed that they had captured a leader of a separatist group in East Timor. This announcement was given by East Timor's new mili­ tary commander Brigadier-General Theo Syafei on 27 January. He stated that Jose Da Costa, or known as Mauhudu, was caught in Bairo Pite, near Dili, and was suffering from malaria. 3

••• continued ••• 1992, p. 11, "Sacked Military Boss Sorry for Dili 'Misdeed'", in The Courier-Hail, 10 January 1992, p. 11, "East Timar General 'Not as Patient' as Predecessor", in The Weekend Australian, 11-12 January 1992, p. 13, "New CollDlander Takes over in East Indonesia", in The Austra­ lian, 14 January 1992, p. 7. 1.Tony Parkinson, "Jakarta Accepts Soldiers At Fault", in The Weekend Australian, February 29 and March 1, 1992, p. 3. 2.Jonathan Thatcher, "East Timorese Living in Fear", in The Australian, 30 January 1992, p. 10 and "East Timorese 'Live in Fear' of Military", in The Courier-Hail, 28 January 1992, p. 18. 3."Timor Rebel Leader Seized", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 January 1992, p. 9, "Fretilin Guerilla Chief captured", in The Courier-Hail, 28 January 1992, p. 11, "Fretilin Chief to Surrender", in The Courier-Hail, 1 February 1992, p. 19, and also Jonathan Thatcher, "Indonesia Captures 120 However, as reported by The Sydney Horning Herald one day later, Indonesia's claim was denied by FRETILIN's representa­ tive. Quoting a statement from a FRETILIN guerrilla represen­ tative in Australia, Borges Ferreira, The Sydney Horning Herald noted that the Indonesian army's claim was just propa­ ganda because it lacked confirmation.1 Three Indonesian writers were sacked by the Indonesian authorities for an article quoting witnesses of the massacre, published by the weekly magazine Jakarta Jakarta. The three writers were editorial staff in this magazine, known as executive editors (Seno Gumira Ajidarma and waskito Trisnoa­ di) and an editor for Indonesian affairs (Usep Hermawan). 2 Besides this, in anticipation of the Portuguese ship's arri­ val, the Indonesian Government stated that both local and foreign journalists would be barred from East Timor. 3 By 26 January 1992, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in Singapore again stressed that Indonesia agreed to engage in dialogue with Portugal. In doing so, Indonesia demanded that

------••• Continued ••• Fretilin Deputy", in The Australian, 28 January 1992, p. 6. Another leader, Xanana Gusmao, later was captured and jailed for a life long, followed judge's verdict. Presi­ dent Soeharto of Indonesia gave grasi to him and reduced Gusmao's punishment to 20 years in August 1993. l."Timor Guerillas Deny Capture· of Leader", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 29 January 1992, p. 7. 2."Writers Sacked over Dili Article", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 18 January 1992, p. 17. J."Journalists Barred from East Timar", in The Sydney Horn­ ing Herald, 27 February 1992, p. 6.

121 the UN should mediate between the two countries. He said that Indonesia was always ready to discuss East Timer with Portu­ gal, if the dialogue was conducted under UN supervision. Responding to news from Reuters which said that Portugal insisted on the involvement of the East Timorese in the dialogue, Alatas rejected this by arguing that the majority of the East Timorese supported Indonesia.1 In another address delivered in Washington, which took place in National Press Club (NPC), Alatas suggested that it was unreasonable to compare the Dili incident to the Tianan­ men tragedy in China. The Dili massacre, according to Alatas, did not reflect the Indonesian government and ABRI's deci­ sions while the Tiananmen tragedy was the execution of the Beijing government's wishes. He added that the Tiananmen massacre happened in front of "the government's eyes", while the Dili case did not. Alatas suggested that the Dili incid­ ent be compared with the Kent State University outbreak or 'Bloody Sunday' in North Ireland. He adDlitted, however, that comparing the Dili case with Kent State or 'Bloody Sunday' was not justified because the Indonesian government also regretted that the massacre occurred. 2 At the same time, ·Alatas criticised New Yorker journal­ ist Allan Nairn who had stayed in Dili when the massacre ------1."Ali Alatas: RI Bersedia Dialog Dengan Portugal di Bawah PBB", in Surya, 27 January 1992, p. 1. 2."'l'idak Wajar, Heabandingkan Insiden Dili Dengan 'l'ianan.men", in Koapas, 22 February 1992, p. 1.

122 occurred and who attended the press meeting in NPC. The minister challenged Nairn's claim that he was a witness who watched the silent procession from Mutail to Santa Cruz. It was impossible for Nairn, Alatas suggested, to accompany the demonstration everywhere. Did the protesters only walk and pray silently? Alatas also stated, as admitted by Nairn, that it unethical to conduct journalistic activities by using tourist visas. The other "sins" committed by Nairn, according to Alatas, were that Nairn was not an objective reporter because he was influenced by his emotions and political attitudes, that Nairn's articles mostly were incomplete and out of context and that Nairn had a problem in interpreting from Indonesian to English.1 During the trial in Dili, meanwhile, Alfonso Rangel surprisingly explained that Bishop Belo was involved in sending messages to Ramos Horta in Australia before passing these on to Portugal. Alfonso, together with Amaro de Araujo and Felismina Dos Cinacicaco, was accused by the Indonesian authority of leaking two secret state documents, an interview between TV Portugal and East Timor Governor Carrascalao and a plan for Portugal's visit. One leaked document was a state document "TR No. 35/VI/1991".2 On the next day of the trial, Alfonso admitted that he had made a mistake by involving

1.Log. Cit. 2."Gadis Binaan Sering Dapan 'Pesanan'", in Jawa Pos, 22 January 1992, p. 1 and "Pengiriman Su11111a FC ke Darwin Juga Dibocorkan", in Jawa Pos, 23 January 1992, p. 1.

123 Bishop Belo in his political activities.1 More reportage appeared in the Australian newspapers in the second week of January 1992, saying that Indonesia finally accepted an envoy from the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Gali. 2 The Indonesian government, as. con­ firmed by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, would welcome and give a guarantee to allow the UN emissary Amos Waco, Kenya's Attorney General, to go to any places that he desired, if the UN applied formally. Alatas reminded other countries, however, that if the UN sent a special rapporteur (investiga­ tor) to investigate the Dili incident, Indonesia would reject it. The UN envoy should go to Indonesia just to seek clarifi­ cation.3 Indonesia's Defence Minister and acting Foreign Minister General L.B. Moerdani and State-Secretary Moerdiono supported Alatas's statement and stressed that the UN envoy's visit was not an investigation. 4 The Indonesian authorities also confessed that the Dili massacre was a tragic event and

1."'Saya Sal.ah Libatkan Pak Uskup'", in Jawa Pos, 29 January 1992, p. 1.

2. 11 Indonesia Accepts Special Emissary", in The Australian, 10 January 1992, p. 6. Also read, "Jakarta Snubs UN Inves­ tigator", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 6 February 1992, p. 9. 3."Indonesia Takkan Terima Pelapor Khusus dari PBB", in Kompas, 15 January 1992, p. 1, "RI Sambut Utusan PBB Heninjau Insiden Dili", in surya, 15 January 1992, p. 1, "Utusan PBB Diijinkan Kunjungi Timor Timur", in Surya, 11 February 1992, p. 1. 4."Kunjungan Utusan Sekjen PBB Bukan Investigasi", in Kom­ pas, 6 February 1992, p. 1.

124 "must never be repeated11 • 1 In his visit to Indonesia, Amos Waco stressed that the UN Secretary-General sent him in order to clarify and not to investigate issues around the massacre. Waco, accompanied by 4 other UN officers, arrived in Jakarta on 9 February, visit­ ed East Timer from 12 to 13 February and met President Soe­ barto of Indonesia and the other Indonesian autborities. 2 After meeting with President Soebarto, Waco stated that be would write a comprehensive report which consisted of all the facts that be gathered during his visit, including his own view and recommendation. Nevertheless, be refused to explain this in detail to journalists in Jakarta. 3 A surprising comm.ent was made by Indonesia's President Soebarto on February 17 in Jakarta. According to Mohammad Isnaeni, President Soebarto suggested that Indonesia bad never wanted East Timer, the former Portuguese colony. 4 Indonesia's acceptance of control of East Timer was meant to help the Timorese achieve independence. Speaking in front of ------1.Greg Sheridan, "Indonesia Accepts Dili Killings were Tragic: Alatas", in The _Australian, 27 January 1992, p. 6. 2.Read "Envoy to Investigate Dili", in The Australian, 5 February 1992, p. 7, "UN Envoy to 'Clarify not to Inves­ tigate' Dili", in The Australian, 11 February 1992, p. 6, "UN Envoy in Dili to Clarify Issues", in The Sydney Horn­ ing Herald, 14 February 1992, p. 8, and "Dili Culprits to be Tried, Envoy Told", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 15 February 1992, p. 16. J."Saya Puas Dengan Kunjungan Ini", in Kompas, 15 February 1992, p. 1. 4.Terry Friel, "We Never Wanted Timer: Suharto", in The Australian, 18 February 1992, p. 8.

125 the executive members of an academic foundation, President soeharto stated that, "It's the East Timorese themselves who chose to be independent together with Indonesia, hence we could not reject their plea. 111 The Indonesian military commander in East Timor, in the meantime, was preparing a special taskforce which would be used for intercepting the Portuguese ship Lusitania Expresso. General Theo syafei said that Indonesia's force comprised soldiers, police and immigration officers, of who would lead the ship away from East Timor.

c. Lusit:ania E%presso unexpectedly, the trip of the Portuguese ship, Lusitania Expresso, which sailed from Portugal on January 26, received little attention from the Australian newspapers. Specific attention to it started in the beginning of March 1992, when the ship arrived in Darwin. It seemed that the Australian coverage of the ship's journey was an anti-climax in the whole coverage of the East Timor incident. This impression differed from that given in the Indonesian newspapers, which reported the trip on a day to day basis in the form of news, features, editorials, opinion articles and background sto­ ries. ------1.Log. Cit. Also read "Indonesia Tidak Pernah Klaim dan Jajah Timtim", in Surya, 16 February 1992, p. 1! "Sejak Dulu Indonesia Tidak Pernah Hengklaim Timtim", in Kompas, 16 February 1992, p. 1, "Rekaman Insiden Dili Direkayasa", in Jawa Pos, 16 February 1992, p. 1.

126 Senator Evans confirmed that the Federal Government had warned Australians participating in the journey, saying that they should be aware of the risks. Australia's Ambassador in Jakarta, Philip Flood, hoped that the voyage of the ship, which would dock in Darwin, would not create misunderstanding from Indonesia about the involvement of Australia. He ex­ plained that Darwin, which would dock the Lusitania Expresso, was an international port, so that all ships would be accept­ ed if they entered through controlled procedures. Flood stressed that whatever the name and the aim of the trip, the trip itself should not disturb the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. 1 Indonesia, which viewed the trip of the Lusitania Ex­ presso as a provocative act, meanwhile prepared its warships to stop the ship. 2 The Indonesian authorities also warned that the Lusitania Expresso should use formal procedures for

1."Lussitene Expresso Barus Lalui Aturan Untuk llasuk RI", in Kompas, 19 February 1992, p. 1. 2.There was a controversy regarding the number of warships which were prepared by the Indonesian forces. Indonesia, as reported by Antara news agency stated that Indonesia deployed six warships, including a freegat and a destroy­ er, while FRETILIN's representative in Australia claimed nine up to twelve Indonesia's warships. See Lenore Taylor, "Indonesian Warships Await Peace Boat", in The Australian, 10 March 1992, p. 1, Chips Mackinolty, "Warships Monitor Dili Peace Journey", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 9 March 1992, p. 2, "Indonesian Navy Blockades Dili", in The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 March 1992, p. 2 and "Peace Boat 'Buzzed' by Aust, Indonesian Planes", in The Courier-Hail, 11 March 1992, p. 3.

127 entering Indonesia.1 Former Indonesia Foreign Minister Moch­ tar Kusuma-Atmadja supported the Indonesian government's decision by saying that the government should prevent the arrival of the ship in East Timor. 2 General Try sutrisno added that the ship's passengers would be deported if they forced entry into Indonesian waters. 3 On 27 February, the Indonesian authorities, for the first time in three years, banned all foreign journalists, Indonesian journalists working for foreign media and local journalists who were not already based in East Timor, from working there. 4 It was also reported in Surya that around 600,000 Christians in East Timor, together with some Indone­ sia mass organisations and Timor Timur University students, opposed the arrival of the ship in Dili. 5 Further controversy regarding the Lusitania Bxpresso appeared in the last day of February. The chairman of the trip committee Rui Marques, as reported by AFP, stated that

1."Lussitene Expresso Barus Lalui Aturan Untuk Hasuk RI", in Kompas, Op. Cit., p. 1. 2."Sebaiknya Pemerintah cegah Kehadiran Lussitene Expresso", in Kompas, 26 February 1992, p. 1. 3."Penumpang Lusitania Expresso Akan Dideportasi Jika Bersi­ keras Hasuk", in Kompas, 6 March 1992, p. 1. 4.Friel, Op. Cit., p. 6 and Mackinolty, "Indonesian Navy Blockades Dili", Op. Cit., p. 2. 5."600.000 Umat Katolik di Tim'l'im tolak feri Portugal" and "KNPI Juga Henolak Kapal Portugal", in Surya, 24 February 1992, p. 1.

128 the trip would be cancelled.1 A few hours later, however, the committee suggested that the trip would continue. Reuters claimed that the continuation of the trip was made possible after an unknown donor gave money to the committee. 2 The Lusitania Bxpresso, as reported by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers, left Portugal on 23 January and docked in Darwin on March 8. Its arrival was welcomed by 300 to 500 supporters. It stayed in Darwin for 36 hours before leaving for East Timor carrying about 120 protesters. 3 Ac­ cording to Jawa Pos, 85 of the passengers flew from Sydney to Darwin by Ansett. Kompas reported that the ship would bring 132 passengers _and 40 journalists (most of them Australian and Portuguese). 4 The protesters planned to go to Dili to conduct a "flower scattering" ceremony at the Santa Cruz cemetery. The ship left Darwin on 9 March, at 7.20pm, with Luis ------1."Expresso Batal Berlayar ke Dili", in Jawa Pos, 1 March 1992, p. 1 and "Feri LUsitania Bxpresso Terancam Batal ke Dili", in Surya, 1 March 1992, p. 1. 2."Feri LUsitania Expresso Tetap Berlayar ke Dili, in surya, 2 March 1992, p. 1. 3.Read David Nason, "Indonesian Plane Tails Peace Ship", in The Australian, March 9, 1992, p. 3. Also read Tony Parkinson, "E Timor Protest Ship in Turmoil," in The AUstralian, 2 March 1992, p. 3, and Terry Friel, "Indone­ sian MPs Call for Sinking of Peace Ship", in The Sydney Horning Herald, 28 February 1992, p. 6, "Feri Lusitania Expresso Tanpa Sambutan di Darwin", in Surya, 9 March 1992, p. 1, and "Bxpresso Percepat Berlayar ke Timtim", in Jawa Pos, 9 March 1992, p. 1. 4."Lusitania Expresso Tinggalkan Darwin", in Kompas, 10 March 1992, p. 1 and "Penumpang Expresso Sudah Tiba di Darwin", in Jawa Pos, 6 March 1992, p. 1.

129 dos Santos as its captain. The ship, as reported by the Australian media, was shadowed by both Indonesian and Austra­ lian aircraft. These flew over the ship, which was nearing an Indonesian naval blockade. 1 Among the passengers were the former Portuguese President General Antonio Ramallio Earnes and Shirley Shackleton.2 Two Indonesians who were to join the trip, according to Jawa Pos, were left in Darwin. Jawa Pos also reported that there was a debate between Australian Immigration officers in Darwin and the trip organiser. The Australian Immigration officals explained that East Timor was one Indonesia's provinces and therefore refused to finish some passengers' immigration documents which stated East Timor as their target country. The passengers altered their documents after they were not permitted to leave Darwin. 3 By 10 March at 13.11 (Western Indonesia's Time= WIB), Indonesia's Patrol Nomad P-802 TNI-AL detected the arrival of l.Lenore Taylor, "Indonesia Plays D~wn Row over Leaked Paper", in The AUstralian, 11 March 1992, p. 2. This news particularly concerned to a document which was leaked to the Nine Network on Monday, 9 March 1992, comprising a record of a meeting which was held on october 14, 1988 over "The Australian-Indonesian Relationship in the Short Term". 2.Shirley Shackleton is Greg Shackleton's wife. Greg was killed during the civil war in 1975. There is various number of passengers reported by the Indonesian newspapers. Jawa Pos reported that the number of passengers was less than 100 while Koapas published that 132 passengers and 40 journalists accompanied the trip. Read "Penuapang Eicpresso Talc Capai 100 Orang", in Jawa Pos, 10 March 1992, p. 1 and "Lusitania Erpresso Tinggalkan Darwin", in Kompas, Op. Cit., p. 1. 3."Penu.mpang Eicpresso Talc Capai 100 Orang", in Jawa Pos, Op. Cit., p. 1.

130 the Lusitania Bxpresso which had reached 140 sea-miles from Eastern tip of Timar island. It had thus entered Indonesia's Exclusive Economic zone ( illustrated in Figure 1) •1 Indone­ sian authorities predicted that the ship would enter Indone­ sian waters at 06.00 WIB on 11 February. From Darwin, it was

reported that the ship's owner Carlos A.A. Rocha Cabecas suggested that his ship's captain would obey Indonesian rules. 2

Figure 1

Tbe Lusitania Expresso's Position on lfednesday 10 February 1992 at 13.11 (western Indonesia's Ti1e) when detected by Indonesia's loud P-802 m-AL (source: Koapas, 11 March 1992, p. 1). ------1."Bxpresso Sudah llemasuki ZBB", in Jawa Pos, 11 March 1992, p. 1. 2."Pagi Ini, Lusitania Bxpresso Hencapai Perairan Indonesia", in Kompas, 11 March 1992, p. 1 and "Pagi Ini, Kapal TNI-AL Cegat Lusitania Expresso", in Surya, 11 March 1992, p. 1.

131 Six Indonesian warships were prepared in order to expel the ~ortuguese ship. Quoting an Indonesian intelligence report, Antara news agency stated that KRI Ki Hajardewantara was the leading ship used to prevent the LUsitania Bxpresso entering Indonesian waters. The other five warships, KRI Yos Sudarso, KRI Teluk Banten, KRI Kerapu, KRI Sarong and KRI Ngurah Rai, were in supporting positions.1 By 05.07 WIB on 11 March 1992, the Lusitania Bxpresso turned back to Darwin after entering one mile of Indonesian water and being warned by KRI Yos Sudarso. The first contact between the KRI Yos Sudarso and the LUsitania Bxpresso start­ ed when the Portugal's ship sailed three miles from Indone­ sian water. At the time, the Indonesia's Frigate 353 KRI Yos Sudarso commander warned the LUsitania Bxpresso's captain not to enter Indonesian waters. The Portuguese ship continued to

sail until it was one mile into Indonesian waters. An Indone­ sian naval commander again warned the ship to go back to the international waters. This order was followed by the captain of the LUsitania Bxpresso, and the ship left the area, shad­ owed by the KRI Yos Sudarso and the KRI Ki Hadjardewantara. Forty two kilometers off the Timar coast, the ship had diffi­ culties in its engine cooling system. 2 --~------1. "Pagi Ini, Kapal TNI-AL Cegat Lusitania Bxpresso", in surya, 11 March 1992, p. 1. 2."LUsitania Taati Perintah Dan Kelllbali Ke Darwin", in Koapas, 12 March 1992, p. 1, "Drama Expresso Sudah Berak­ hir", in Jawa Pos, 12 March 1992, p. 1 and "Lusitania Expresso Dihalau Dan Kapok", in Surya, 12 March 1992, p. 1.

132 The Australian newspapers gave three different accounts of these events. At the time, the Australian newspapers named the trip of the Lusitania Expresso as a 'peace trip'.1 This was different from Indonesia's claim that the trip was a provocative exercise by Portugal. Quoting the Australian representative of the East Timer independence movement, Alfredo Ferreira, The courier-Hail stated that Indonesia prepared nine warships. 2 Regarding the use of Indonesian warships, The Australian reported that three of the six Indonesian warships, including a frigate and a destroyer, were used for shadowing the Lusitania Expresso when leaving Indonesian waters. 3 These frigates allowed the Lusitania Expresso to sail within 14 nautical miles of the East Timer coast before ordering it back to the international waters. 4 The Australian also reported that Australian defence forces which were involved in the K92 exercise in Northern Australia would monitor the voyage of the Lusitania Expresso. 5 The Lusitania Expresso docked again in Darwin on 12 March. Although some leaders of the trip claimed that their l.Lenore Taylor, "Indonesian Warships Await Peace Boat", in The Australian, 10 March 1992, p. 1. 2."Peace Boat 'Buzzed' by Aust, Indonesian Planes", in The Courier-Hail, 11 March 1992, p. 13. 3.According to Indonesian newspapers, only two warships which shadowed the Lusitania Expresso. 4.Tony Parkinson, "Indonesian Navy TUrns Back Dili Protest Ship", in The Australian, 12 March 1992, p. 1. 5.Log. Cit.

133 trip was successful, the arrival of the Lusitania Expresso, according to the Indonesian newspapers, was not welcomed by the hundreds of people the ship had attracted before going to East Timor. Jawa Pos reported that the ship was applauded by

around 40 people, while Koapas and Surya mentioned that only a few people in Darwin welcomed the ship. These newspapers also stated that the students and journalists had unenthu­ siastic faces and non-Portuguese passengers felt that they had been deceived by the trip committee.1 Other problems were also faced by the Lusitania Bxpresso. According to local newspapers in Darwin, as the Indonesian consulate confirmed, the Lusitania Expresso was not able to pay A$ 52,000 - 57,000 for Darwin Port services. Besides this, Eapresa National Elcano de La Harina Harkantie, a Spanish company, claimed that the rent for the ship had not been paid. 2 After the ship docked in Darwin, the Captain said that

he would lay an official complaint to the UH because of dangerous conduct by Indonesian warships. He stated that the Indonesian frigates came close to the Lusitania Expresso and that this worried its passengers. The Lisbon government also condemned the Indonesian naval activities, saying that they

l."Yang Non-Porto Herasa Tertipu", in Jawa Pos, 13 March 1992, p. 1, "Lusitania Hanya Disambut Segelintir Warga Darwin", in Kompas, 13 March 1992, p. 1 and "Lusitania Expresso Tidak Lagi Dielukan", in surya, 13 March 1992, p. 1.

2. "Bxpresso Tak Hampu Bayar Sewa Dermaga, in Jawa Pos, 14 March 1992, p. 1, "Expresso Digugat Empressa Spanyol", in Jawa Pos, 15 March 1992, p. 1 and "Lusitania Bxpresso Disandera Di Darwin", in Surya, 15 March 1992, p. 1.

134 were in breach of international maritime law. on the other hand, the Australian Government accepted the Indonesian decision to turn back the ship, saying that Indonesia had a sensible and appropriate response in handling the situation. Last but not least, three events were reported by the Indonesian newspapers. 1 First of all, there was a statement which said that the dissemination of information of the Dili case was produced by an Australian foreign correspondent in Jakarta. 2 News which was gathered by the Australian Associat­ ed Press (AAP) and the Australian Broadcasting corporation

(ABC) was re-published by media in the South Pacific region. The Sydney Horning Herald's correspondent for south Pacific, Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, stated that South Pacific society only received news about Indonesia that Australian journal­ ists considered to be newsworthy. She said that this was caused mostly by the fact that there was no South Pacific journalist who had direct access to information about Indone­ sia.3 These comments indicate the dominance of Australian news values throughout the Pacific in reports of Indonesian events like the Dili incident.

------1.There have been some more recent developments in the Dili case. However, these were not included in this study because they happened after 31 March 1992. The study centered on the events from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992. 2.such a statement did not identify the correspondent's name. 3."Penyebaran In:tormasi Kasus Dili Bersumberkan Wartawan Australia",. in Kompas, 4 March 1992, p. 1.

135 Second, East Timer's police-chief Colonel Ishak Kodijat freed 24 of the 32 people who were suspected of involvement in the Dili incident. The release was made under the self­ assurance of their lawyer, Ponce Atmono. However, the 24 people had to report to the local police routinely before their trials. 1 Third, Indonesia surprisingly asked the Netherlands to stop its aid to Indonesia. Three points were made to the Dutch government: (1) to stop the disbursement of all Netherlands' aid to Indonesia, (2) not to prepare new aid for Indonesia and (3) not to conduct further International Government's Group for Indonesia (IGGI) meetings. However, Indonesia's Ambassador for Netherland Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo stressed that Indonesia still would repay its debt to the Netherlands, including its interest, on time. Besides this,. he wished that a good relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia could continue. 2 The review above shows the general level and content of Australian and Indonesian newspapers' coverage of the con­ flict in East Timer in 1991 and 1992. It is obvious from this review that the reportage of East Timer between the Austra­ lian and Indonesian newspapers in general and among the six newspapers in particular during the time studied shows simi­ larities and differences of content. The similaraties focused

1."Sebanyak 24 tersangka Insiden Dili Dibebaskan", in Kom­ pas, 3 March 1992, p. 6. 2."Indonesia Heminta Belanda Hentikan Pencairan Bantuannya", in Kompas, 26 March 1992, p. 1.

136 on the reports of the massacre that it happened on 12 Novem­ ber and caused death and wounded people. The dissimilarities consisted of facts that were reported and each newspaper's style in publishing the development of the 12 November case. It is apparent that the reportage of East Timar by the six newspa~ers created different interpretations of the Oil± massacre for their Australian and Indonesian audiences. This discussion of the general content of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers gives a background for a more systemat­ ic content analysis of how the newspapers in the two coun­ tries approached the Dili massacre. This analysis is dis­ cussed in the following chapter.

*****

137 CIIAPl'BR IV NBlfS PATTBRlfS OF THE AUS'l'RALIAH AND INDONBSUJI NBlfSPAPERS Ilf RBPOR'l'IlfG THE BAST TDIOR IlfCIDBN'l'

When an event occurs, all the steps in the newsmaking process are basically undertaken by newspaper enterprises in the same way. Their reporters observe the event, compile facts, con­ duct interviews with witnesses and write reports of the event using journalistic standards. Their desk editars manage the report --sometimes combining it with other reports from other news sources-- before deciding that the report had newswor­ thiness and should be published. To anticipate the develop­ ment of the event, the newspaper enterprises deploy their newsworkers to centre them around potential events. News is the products of these steps which is reported by different newspapers, but the news of different newspapers is rarely alike. These dissimilarities can be observed through news contents and specific aspects of the news writ­ ing contained in this content. Some newspapers will use two or multi-sided coverage while others will not. some of them will report an event comprehensively, while the rest will publish it in a short report. Some follow the development of the event over days, the rest stop reporting it after one day. The Australian and Indonesian newspapers' attention to East Timor from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992 illustrates this well. It is apparent that the story of the Dili massacre as

138 told by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers described in Chapter III contained similarities and dissimilarities. The similarities of the story reported by each newspaper (The

Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The courier-Hail,

Kompas, Jawa Pos and surya) and by the Australian and Indone­ sian newspapers in general, for example, included that the event occurred on 12 November and that the event left people dead and wounded. on the other hand, differences emerged and centred on the controversy regarding the number of victims and statements made by several leading parties included in the events. These content dissimilarities arose especially before the Indonesian commission produced its reports. Apart from these broad similarities and dissimilarities of the news contents, as the previous chapter describes, there are four main questions which further identify the patterns of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in reporting the 12 November case. These four questions are (1) how do the Australian and Indonesian newspapers pay attention to the events in East Timor, (2) do the Indonesian newspapers apply the same news standards as the Australian newspapers, (3) can news that is neutral, balanced and unbiased be pre­ sented by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers, and (4) do the Australian and Indonesian newspapers follow the New World Information Order concept? This chapter will examine these first three questions by looking systematically at the patterns of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting of East Timar, especially

139 when they were dealing with the massacre.1 The first question will be observed through, among other things, the number of news item that the newspapers produced, the timing of their coverage and the prominence of newspaper pages which con­ tained news of the East Timor issue. The second question will be answered by examination of news values and elements of the "SW+H" formula. The answer to the third question will deal with the different newspapers' news tendencies, covering­ step, kinds of news contents and use of news sources. Data for this study were obtained from observation of The AUstralian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The Courier-Hail, Kompas, Jawa Pos, and surya newspapers. News items which dealt with East Timor in these six newspapers from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992 were recorded on coding sheets. On the basis of the information contained there, the news items relevant to the study2 were classified into prepared units of analysis. 3 The coefficient of reliability (CR) for this study, based on 30 cases (which produced agreement on 196 out of 240 coding decisions), is 0.81.

1.Based on the discussion of the first three questions in this chapter, the fourth question will specifically be discussed in Chapter v. 2.Besides 363 news items which dealt with East Timor, there were 72 news items in the three Australian newspapers which concerned only Indonesia. This study only focused on 363 news items, in which East Timor was the issue. The 363 items of news which were observed excluded some letters to the editor concerning East Timor.

3.The diagram of the units of analysis and categories can be read in Appendix A.

140 A. News Attention and 'l'i:ae of coverage Like a "sonic boom", the Dili massacre caused the world to tremble. The dead and wounded people caused by the massa­ cre, the infringement of human rights, and self-determination for the East Timorese were all in question. For the period that some countries demanded a full and free investigation of the massacre and assumed that Indonesian soldiers were in­ volved in the massacre, the world media paid attention to the case from day to day. During this time, most reportage came from Indonesia, Portugal's views and witnesses' accounts of the massacre. The six newspapers which were observed produced 1076 items of news on East Timor. The 1076 news items comprised 152 items (14.1%) from The Australian, 156 items (14.5%) from The Sydney Horning Herald, 55 items (5.1%) from The Courier­ Hail, 163 items (15.1%) from Kompas, 240 items (22.3%) from Jawa Pos and 310 items (22.8%) from surya (see Figure 2). The 152 news items in the first category were based on The Aus­ tralian and The Weekend Australian, while 156 items in the second category were from The Sydney Horning Herald and The sun-Herald. The Weekend Australian was considered to be The Australian's combination edition on Saturday and Sunday (published on Saturday). The sun-Herald, although different in style and layout, was combined with The Sydney Horning Herald to complete a 7-day edition of The Sydney Horning Herald. The three Indonesian newspapers come out every day of the week: although their Sunday editions have a different

141 appearance and content to editions throughout the rest of the week. Figure 2 Rmllber of Revs Itea Based on lfewspaper's Halle (N = 1076)

310 22.a% 300 240 22.3%

The Australian 200 . 163 · liml 152 156 ,s.,% The Sydney 14.5% Morni,,g' Herald ~ 14.t% The Courier - Mall [[[J 100 Kompas .§

Jawa Poa. 8 Surra. Ill

As Figure 2 reveals, The Courier-Hail has the lowest number of items on East Timor (55 items), The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and Kompas produce 152, 156 and 163 which are close to the average (179.33), and Jawa Pos and surya which achieve high numbers (240 and 310 items). Three points help to explain the large margin between The Courier­ Mail on one hand and Jawa Pos and Surya on the other hand. Firstly, although The Courier-Mail is a metropolitan newspa­ per, this newspaper operates in a city that is not big as Sydney, where The Sydney Morning Herald is published. The courier-Mail, being a parochial newspaper in a small metro­ politan centre, is aiso different to The Australian and Kompas as national newspapers. Thus al though Brisbane is

142 closer than Sydney to East Timor, The Courier-Hail staff apparently decided that the recent political conflict in East Timor would not interest its readers much. It seems that this newspaper's coverage did not reflect the "geographical proximity" between Brisbane and East Timor, but reflected the lack of "psychological proximity" of an Australian regional centre to overseas events. Secondly, although Jawa Pos itself claims that Jawa Pos is a national newspaper, it is published in Surabaya, a city from where Surya is also published. Each of the two newspa­ pers claim to be the best newspaper, especially for the eastern area of Indonesia and in reporting events that happen in Eastern Indonesia. In many respects, Jawa Pos and surya compete with each other to satisfy their readers. This may be the clearest reason why the two newspapers produce many more news items of East Timor than the other newspapers. Reportage of the recent political conflict in East Timor was probably used to prove which one was the best newspaper. The high number of news items, thirdly, is not only caused by the competition between Jawa Pos and Surya. The way the two newspapers presented their reportage also led Jawa Pos and Surya to produce more items than the other newspa­ pers. These two newspapers often published a number of news items about a single, while the other newspapers published news of the same event under a single item. When the Indone­ sian authorities changed the Indonesian military commanders in East Timor, for example, Jawa Pos and surya added to their

143 reportage of the event with other stories, such as personal biographies of the former and new commanders. It is apparent that the two newspapers exploited the use of these "news pegs" in a maximum way. 1 . Figure 3 below shows that if ·the six newspapers are recategorized by country of newspapers, 363 items (33.73%) came from the Australian newspapers and 713 items (66.27%) from the Indonesian newspapers. Figure 3 KUJllber of Revs Itea Based on country of :Newspapers (N = 1076)

800 7 1 3 I 66.27%1 0000 600 0000 0000

3 6 3 0000 I 33.73%1 0000 300 0000 0000 0000 0000 200 0000 0000 100 0000 0000 0000 0000

0 Australian Newspapers lndonesi·an Newspapers 0

1.This is similar to the way The Sydney Horning Herald reported the Dili massacre sooner after the incident happened. This newspaper published 9 news items on 14 November 1991, compared by The AUstralian, for example, which produced 4 news items in the same day. See The Sydney Horning Herald and The AUstralian, 14 November 1991.

144 The fact that the Indonesian newspapers tended to pub­ lish more news items than the Australian newspapers is ex­ plained by the following reasons. First of all, this was caused by the number of news items which were produced by particular newspapers. The high number of news items in the Indonesian newspapers were related to Jawa Pos and Suryawhich produced 240 and 310 news items. On the other hand, the low number of news items in the Australian newspapers was in­ fluenced by The Courier-Hail which published only 55 items. News items produced by Kompas (163), The Australian (152) and The Sydney Horning Herald (156), meanwhile, were close to the total average (179.33). Secondly, the "geographical and psychological proximi­ ties" between Indonesia and East Timor are much higher than those between Australia and East Timor. In spite of the fact that it has no international recognition, Indonesia has claimed that East Timor is its 27th province since the inte­ gration of East Timor to Indonesia. The Indonesian under­ standing is that East Timor belongs to Indonesia. As a re­ sult, Indonesia will view that events in East Timor as events in Indonesia. on the other hand, East Timor is an area which is located out of Australia, al though many East Timorese refugees are now living in Australia. This relates to the third reason, that is the fact that Indonesia is able to control information about East Timor, as was illustrated during the trip of the Lusitania Expresso. The Indonesian authorities banned foreign journalists, the Indonesian jour-

145 nalists who worked for foreign media and other journalists who had not been in East Timor from covering the arrival of the Portuguese ship in East Timor (see Chapter III). The reasons above explain how did Kompas, Jawa Pos, Surya and the Indonesian newspapers in general tend to pub­ lish more news items than the Australian newspapers. This raises the question of how did the Australian and Indonesian newspapers report the events in East Timor during the time studied in more detail. The 1076 news items published by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992 were distributed as follows. The Australian and Indonesian news attention to East Timor dramatically rose once the Dili bloodbath happened. The 1076 news items studied mostly came from the reportage made by the six newspapers after September 1991. As Figure 4 reveals, in July 1991 there were no items in the Australian newspapers, while 2 news items appeared in the Indonesian newspapers in relation to East Timor. In August 1991, there was no news item which dealt with East Timor in either the Australian or Indonesian newspapers. One news item in the Australian newspapers and 6 items in the Indonesian newspapers appeared in September 1991. This slightly increased in October 1991 to 11 news items (the Australian newspapers) and 14 (the Indonesian newspapers) before dramatically rising to 118 news items (the Australian newspapers) and 126 news items (the Indonesian newspapers) in November 1991. For the Australian newspapers, this number

146 dropped moderately from 118 items in November to 109 items in December 1991 before falling considerably to 48 items in January 1992 and 31 items in February 1992. For the three Indonesian newspapers, on the other hand, this number again dramatically increased from 126 items in November to 209 items in December 1991 before falling considerably to 121 items in January 1992 and 77 items in February 1992. In the following month there were 45 news items ( the Australian newspapers) and 158 news items (the Indonesian newspapers).

Figure 4 lfUllber of Revs Itea Based on Month and country of lfewspaper (N = 1076 and p < 0.000)

300

209 200

158 121

100

July Nov Dec Feb March 1992

• Australian Newspapers Indonesian Newspapers [I]

Considered in more detail, there were different patterns between the Indonesian and Australian newspapers in their

147 coverage. Australian newspapers' reportage of East Timor peaked in November 1991, while the culmination of the Indone­ sian newspapers' coverage occurred in December 1991. A second peak of coverage appeared in December 1991 for the Australian newspapers and in March 1992 for the Indonesian newspapers. Therefore, one of the clearest patterns in the Austra­ lian and Indonesian newspapers' activity reflected by Figure 4, was the increasing level of the six newspapers coverage to East Timor when the Dili massacre happened. For the Austra­ lian newspapers, two points help to explain this picture. First, the Australian media was concerned very much about East Timor because of the deaths of its five journalists in 1975 during civil war in this area. This led the Australian newspapers to heed East Timor and report what was (and is) going on there. Another reason is that East Timor geographi­ cally is close to Australia. This 'geographical proximity' is supported by 'psychological proximity', as many East Timorese refugees have stayed in Australia, particularly in Darwin, the Northern Territory's capital city, since their arrival in 1975.1 Thus, the two types of proximity cause the Australian media to pay greater attention to East Timor. These two reasons led the Australian press to cover East Timor exten­ sively again once new events in East Timor attracted the Australian press.

1.Gerald stone, quoted by Helen Hill, Op. Cit., p. 11.

148 For the Indonesian newspapers, two motives explain their coverage of Timar. Firstly, similar to the Australian newspa­ pers' activity in the 1970s, the Indonesian newspapers were also very much concerned about East Timar. The integration of

East Timor to Indonesia as a 27th province led the Indonesian newspapers to pay attention to East Timar as they did to the other provinces of Indonesia. This shows that the "geographi­ cal and psychological proximities" also influence the Indone­ sian newspapers. Besides this, the controversy over the integration that influenced Indonesia's international diplom­ acy, attracted newspapers to follow the development of the East Timar case. As a result, when the Parliament of Portugal announced a delegation would visit to East Timor, this became a starting point for the Indonesian newspapers, as well as international newspapers, to pay greater attention to East Timar. This second reason shows that events in East Timar are considered by Indonesian newspapers to be important matters and to comprise news worthiness. These two reasons encouraged an Indonesian news coverage of East Timar that was 196.4% higher than the Australian newspapers. It probably can be accepted that the cancellation of the Portuguese Parliament and the UN's visit to East Timar in­ creased the reportage of the world media, and the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in particular, of East Timar. Statements made by Portugal that the revocation resulted from Indonesia's ban on Jill Jolliffe, an Australian journalist based in Lisbon, appeared in the Australian newspapers. on

149 the other hand, Indonesia's statements which argued against Portugal's statements and stated that the cancellation re­ flected an unfair attitude by Portugal, were published by the Indonesian newspapers.1 It also possibly can be argued that the cancellation led to the incident that happened in Dili on 12 November 1991. Although the massacre, according to Allan Nairn, followed the march of East Timorese from the church of "Mutail" to Santa Cruz cemetery to conduct prayers for Alfonso and Gomes, some believed that the march and some activities during the march were influenced by the disappointment among the East Timorese about the cancellation of the visit.2 As a result, the visit plan, the cancellation and the massacre became the focus of media attention at the time. These factors provide an understanding of the increasing level of Australian and Indonesian newspapers' reportage of East Timer during the time studied. They also indicate the different patterns shown by each newspaper and by the Austra­ lian and Indonesian newspapers in general in reporting the 12 November incident. A general finding that can be accepted is that either the Australian or Indonesian newspapers had paid much attention to the events in East Timer prior to the massacre.

1.see the previous description in Chapter III. It seems that the Indonesia's views, expressed by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, were not published by the Australian newspapers. 2.Described in Chapter III.

150 Besides the different patterns in the increasing level of their reportage, statistically significant effects were demonstrated by the crosstabulation between the groups of edition and the country of newspaper (p < 0.000). As Table 1 demonstrates, the 1076 news items were distributed into the three main time categories, those were July-September 1991 which produced only 9 news items, october-December 1991 which produced 587 news items and January-March 1992 which produced 480 cases. In more detail, the Australian news attention rose sharply from 1 in the first group of editions to 238 in the second group of editions before these dramatically decreased to 124 in the third group of editions. on the other hand, the Indonesian news attention increased considerably from 8 in July-September to 349 in October-December 1991 and rose slightly (by 7) to 356 in January-March 1992.

Table 1 News coverage Based on Group of Editions and Country of Newspapers r -======• •== = = Edition Row Country of July- October- January- Total Newspapers September December March

Australia------1 238 124 363 (0.31) (65.61) (34.21) (33.71) Indonesia 8 349 356 713 (1.11) (48.91) (49.91) (66.3%)

Column------9 587 480 1076 Total (0.8%) (54.6%) (44.6%) (100.0%) =rn==r======nn -=-======x2 with 2 d.f. = 27.644 p < 0.000

151 This table also reveals that the summit of the Austra­ lian news attention occurred in the last three months of 1991. The Australian newspapers thus focused their reportage of East Timor in the three months which became the center of this study. From this point, it seems that the Australian newspapers paid more attention to the events which took place at the time of the massacre rather than to the events which happened after that. On the other hand, the Indonesian news­ papers as a whole cantered their attention in the third group of editions (January-March 1992) more than those in the two previous groups. It was apparent that during the first three months of 1992, the Indonesian newspapers tended to report more events that happened in Indonesia, such as the change­ over of the Indonesian military commanders and Waco's visit, than the Australian newspapers. Besides this, the Indonesian newspapers also paid more attention to the trip of the Portu­ guese ship than the 'three Australian newspapers •1 These explain why the Indonesian newspapers reported East Timor in greater depth in the third group of editions. The patterns of coverage from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992 are also significantly different (p < 0.000) among the six newspapers studied. The clearest pattern, as Table 2 shows, was demonstrated by The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The Courier-Hail, and Jawa Pos on one hand and Kompas

1.The trip of the Lusitania Bxpresso was assumed to be the third major event which followed the "Mutail" church incident and the Dili massacre.

152 and surya on the other hand. The number of news items in Kompas and surya rose sharply from 4 and 3 in July, August and September to 68 and 147 in October, November and December 1991 before again rising to 91 and 160 in January, February and March 1992.

Table 2 News coverage Based on Group of Editions and Newspaper's H811e Edition Row Newspaper's July­ October­ January­ Total Name September December March Australian------91 61 152 (0.0%) (59.9%) (40.1%) (14.1%) Sydney Horning 1 108 47 156 Herald (0.6%) (69.2%) (30.1%) (14.5%) Courier-Hail 39 16 55 (0.0%) (70.9%) (29.1%) (5.1%) Kompas 4 68 91 163 (2.5%) (41.7%) (55.8%) (15.1%) Jawa Pos 1 134 105 240 (0.4%) (55.8%) (43.8%) (22.3%) surya 3 147 160 310 (1.0%) (47.4%) (51.6%) (28.8%) ------Column 9 587 480 1076 Total (0.8%) (54.6%) (44.6%) (100.0%)

x2 with 10 d.f. = 44.035 p < 0.000

On the other hand, the other newspapers increased from July, August and September to the last three months of 1991 before decreasing during the first three months of 1992. The Australian's news coverage, for example, increased dramatical­ ly by 91 in the last three months of 1991, from o to 91,

153 before its news coverage dropped to 61 in the following three months. The Sydney Horning Herald showed an increase from 1 to 108 in the two groups of editions in 1991 and a decline from 108 to 47 in the first three months of 1992. The courier­ Hail's news coverage also showed the same pattern; increasing from o in the first group of editions to 30 in the second group of editions before decreasing by 23 to 16 in the third group of editions. One Indonesian newspaper that showed the similar pattern to the Australian newspapers, Jawa Pos daily, raised its news coverage from 1 in the first group of edition to 134 in October, November and December 1991 before these declined by 29 to 105 in the first three months of 1992. Thus, with the exception of Ko,apas and Surya, the peak of reportage occurred during the three months which were consid­ ered to be the centre of this study (October, November and December 1991). These months contained the two major incidents (October 28 and November 12), the international condemnation of Indonesia, and the Indonesian Commission's activities. It should be noted, however, that in october itself, as Figure 4 previously shows, Australian and Indonesian news attention to East Timor was small. The rapid increment in coverage started at the end October, once the 'Mutail' church incident occurred on october 28. Besides this, Table 2 reveals that the coverage among the six newspapers may be grouped into three different patterns. Firstly, there was a similar pattern of coverage between The Sydney Horning Herald and The Courier-Hail. A second pattern

154 was illustrated by The Australian and Jawa Pos. Another pat­ tern was demonstrated by Kompas and Surya in their coverage of East Timor from 1 July 1991 to 31 March 1992. These patterns reflect the three roles --intensifiers, diminishers and third parties-- of newspaper when dealing with the conflict.1 What The Sydney Horning Herald and The Courier-Hail did seems to be the intensifiers of the conflict. This was reflected through their reportage which was high in the second group of editions ( during the months around the massacre) and dramatically dropped by 39.l and 41.81 to the following group of editions. From this point, it would be apparent that the two newspapers focused more on the massacre and the· international reactions sooner after the incident happened rather than the other events which occurred after that. Kompas and surya, on the other hand, seem to have been diminishers of the conflict. The two newspapers produced more items in the third group of edition than in the earlier group (around 4.2 and 14.11).2 It seems that these newspapers tended not to be so obsessed by the massacre and conflicts around it and produced more reportage of the denouement of the con­ flicts. The Australian and Jawa Pos, meanwhile, may be classi­ fied as third parties in the conflicts followed the Dili ------l.Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gau­ det", Op. Cit., p. 233. 2.Although Surya itself showed that its peak reportage occurred in December, the accumulation of its reportage based on the three groups of edition revealed that its reportage reached a peak from January to March 1992.

155 massacre on 12 November. Although their reportage from the last three months of 1991 to the first three months of 1992 declined by 19.81 and 12.01, the two newspapers paid a rela­ tively balanced attention during the last three months of 1991 and the first three months of 1992. This means that the two newspapers tried to report the developments of the Dili massa­ cre from day to day, especially from october 28. Based on the slight differences of their coverage between october to Decem­ ber 1991 and January to March 1992, it is apparent that The Australian and Jawa Pos tried to report any developments around this incident not only at the time when the massacre happened, but also in the succeeding period. The Australian itself, as an Australian national newspa­ per, has a foreign affairs focus. Its reportage of Indonesia was based from reports which came from Tony Parkinson, its correspondent in Jakarta. These were combined with the other reports which came from other sources, such as a foreign correspondent in Dili, both Indonesian and non-Indonesian routine information channels, releases from the Australian, Indonesian, Portuguese Governments and the Timorese represen­ tatives, and also a leaked document which was obtained by The Australian concerning Indonesian military activities to deter the FRETILIN guerrillas. As a metropolitan newspaper, The Sydney Horning Herald produced the reportage of the massacre through its foreign affairs correspondent Greg Austin and its journalist based in Lisbon Jill Jolliffe. This newspaper also published comments

156 and analysis of the massacre by David Jenkins, who often writes about Indonesia. These were combined with reports which came from other sources, such as releases from the Indonesian, Australian, Portuguese Governments and the Timorese represen­ tatives, including from other news agencies such as AAP, AFP, AP, Reuter and Antara. The Courier-Hail, another Australian metropolitan newspa­ per, published the reportage of the massacre mostly based on Cindy Wockner's reports (from Canberra), combined with other reports from AP, AAP, AFP and Reuter news agencies. This newspaper also published Peter Charlton's comments about the events that occurred on 12 November 1991 in East Timor. The two Indonesian national newspapers, Kompas and Jawa Pos, based their reports mostly on their reporters in Jakarta and Dili. These newspapers also placed their foreign corre­ spondents in Australia. The events which related to the massa­ cre and came from Australia were reported by Kompas through Ratih Hardjono's reports, while Jawa Pos reported the events based on Dhiman Abror's reports. Both Ratih Hardjono and Dhiman Abror were Indonesia's foreign correspondents based in Sydney. The two newspapers also used other reports which came from Indonesia's news agency, Antara, and non-Indonesian news agencies, such as AP, AFP and Reuter. surya, an Indonesian metropolitan newspaper, placed its foreign correspondent in Australia at the time surrounding the massacre. This newspaper also often gathered its reports from the acting Indonesian Consul in Darwin through direct interna-

157 tional dials from Surabaya. As well as other Indonesian news­ papers, this newspaper combined its reports with other reports from Antara, AP, AFP and Reuter news agencies. Al though the Indonesian authorities had stated that Indonesia would ban foreign correspondents, Indonesia's jour­ nalists who worked for foreign media and other news workers who had not been in East Timor when the Portuguese ship went to East Timor, the three Indonesian newspapers were able to send reporters to the area. These additional reporters joined the Indonesian navy and reported events from the Indonesian warship. It is apparent that The courier-Hail, which produced only 55 news items, used fewer resources than the other newspapers. Using much more resources, in contrast, the other newspapers tended to produce the high number of news items. This thus shows that the use of the resources influences the different news coverage shown by each newspaper. Two points can be made from the discussion of the Austra­ lian and Indonesian news attention and the time of coverage. First of all, in compliance with the developments of the time and the events, each newspaper also showed its own pattern in paying attention to the events. This was reflected through the increasing level of reportage made by each newspaper. Some newspapers, such as Jawa Pos and Surya, viewed the recent political conflict in East Timor was a great moment. This view led them to report the massacre in high number of items. The others, such as The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald and

158 Koapas, meanwhile looked at the case as a more normal event and reported on it using fewer items. The courier-Hail seemed to assume that the event would not attract their readers too much and reported it using a very low number of items. Secondly, the variation between national and metropolitan newspapers are reflected in the dissimilar patterns which were shown between The Australian and the other Australian newspa­ pers on the one hand, and between Jawa Pos and the other Indonesian newspapers on the other hand. 1 Besides this, the dissimilar patterns are also demonstrated by The Australian and Koapas as national newspapers in their own countries. 2 As stated earlier, the two Australian metropolitan newspapers (The Sydney Horning Herald and The Courier-Hail) were consid­ ered to be intensifiers of the conflict, The Australian and Jawa Pos ( both national newspapers) were seen to be third

parties of the conflict. Koapas (a national newspaper) and surya (a metropolitan newspaper) meanwhile were considered to

be diminishers· of the conflict.

However, it should be noted that the fixed formulation of these roles in the Dili case can not only be determined by the

number of news items which were reported. This should also be evaluated from, for example, the tendency of the news, the

------1.Jawa Pos by its own claim, was considered to be a national newspaper. 2.Kompas which has the largest circulation is accepted as a national newspapers in Indonesia.

159 types of coverage and the choice of news sources.1 The other data concerning to the Australian and Indone­ sian newspapers' coverage showed an important finding regard­ ing the prominence of the pages in which the 1076 news items were reported. overall, the 1076 news items were published between page 1 to page 40. Due to the fact that at the time surrounding the massacre the Indonesian newspapers never contained more than 16 pages, news items which appeared bet­ ween page 17 to page 40 automatically belong to the Australian newspapers. 2

1.These will be analysed in the following section. 2.The page number coding was based on the place of the title of news. If a news item began in page 1 and continued to page 13, for instance, this was categorised as news in page number 1.

160 Table 3 lfUllber of Hews Itell Based on Page 1111-mnn=:a: ... w •== -- =•= ii - cc === No. Page Frequency Percentage

------1. 1 564 52.41 2. 2 27 2.51 3. 3 26 2.41 4. 4 54 5.01 5. 5 17 1.61 6. 6 49 4.61 7. 7 24 2.21 8. 8 36 3.31 9. 9 34 3.21 10. 10 46 4.31 11. 11 25 2.31 12. 12 62 5.81 13. 13 16 1.51 14. 14 25 2.31 15. 15 15 1.41 16. 16 28 2.61 ------TOT AL 1048 97.41 ------Notes: Pages rhat comprised less than 10 cases were 28 (2.61).

As Table 3 reveals, 564 news items (52.41) were pub­ lished in page 1. This indicated that the issue of East Timor was important and news worthy at the time. The reason is clear enough. The decision to publish news on page 1, usual­ ly, was based on the consideration of "to what extent this news, compared to the other events (news), would impress the readers". The fact that most of the events in East Timor were published on page 1, such that the issue of East Timor became headline news, also showed how great the Australian and Indo- l.No item appeared in page number 24, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. Each of page number 19, 20, 22, 25, 28, 31, 32 and 40 consisted of one case. Page number 18, 26 and 27 comprised 2 cases. Page number 23 contained 3 cases. Five cases appeared on page number 17 and 6 cases were published on page number 21.

161 nesian news attention was over the events in East Timor. The Australian and Indonesian news attention divided according to news format ( see Table 4) , showed that most cases appeared in the form of hard news (888 cases or 82.5%). Due to the fact that hard news is the reportage of the "newest" and "important" facts or events, b8:sed on facts rather than analysis, and written with the aim to inform rather than to entertain, means that the newspapers reportage of East Timor was frequently based on the "events" rather than "comments" or "background stories" which usually ap­ peared in the other categories of news items.

Table 4 NUllber of News Itea Based on News Poraat No. News Format Frequency Percentage

------1. Hard news 888 82.5% 2. Soft news 4 0.4% 3. Editorial 62 5.8% 4. Opinion article 59 5.5% 5. Features 44 4.1% 6. Background 19 1.8% ------TOT AL 1076 100.0% == I I - JI P¥

Table 5 below demonstrates that the six newspapers tended to publish news items which implemented "who" and "what" leads rather than the other kinds of news leads.1 This

1.News lead is assumed to be the most important part of news item and guides the readers to understand the summary of the news report. The discussion of the types of new leads focuses on the news lead itself, while the discussion of the "5W+H" formula spans on the whole story of the news.

162 means that the six newspapers mostly started their reportage through the news lead stating 'who said' and 'what happened' rather than 'where, when, why and how it happened'. Tables 4 to 6 are used here to provide background information about the news attention paid to East Timar by the six newspapers during the time studied.

Table 5 lf1Dlber of lfews Item Based on lfews Lead =-=-==-======-====·=••=•=•===---·----======•=•-==-=•======-==-=== No. News Lead ,---=·---·Frequency Percentage ------1. Who 507 47.1% 2. What 468 43.5% 3. Where 10 0.9% 4. When 70 6.5% 5. Wh.y 2 0.2% 6. How 18 1.7% 7. Other 1 0.1% TOT AL 1076 100.0% -==-=== a -=:::rawcmm ,--uuwww- -

The discussion of the Australian and Indonesian news attention to the 12 November case leads to the conclusion that there are some differences between the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in producing their news reportage during the time studied. This leads to the examination of the use of news aspects, such as news values and the "5W+H" formula applied by the six newspapers.

B. •sw+e• Ponmla and lfews Values Two important aspects of the newsmaking process studied are the use of the "5W+H" formula which relates to the com­ pleteness of news and news values which colour news perfor-

163 mance. As stated earlier, the "5W+H" formula is a basic procedure that has to be understood by reporters in gathering news or in exploring events. This formula comprises six questions: what happened, who were involved, and where, when, why and how it happened. News reports published by the news­ papers, ideally, should contain the answers to all these questions in order to give complete reports to their readers. Unless all answers were reported, readers will miss important information. Levels of the use of the "5W + H" formula to measure the standard of the completeness were trichotomised in this study into High, Medium and Low.

Table 6 KUllber of News Itea Based on the Use of the •sw+e• Ponmla No. Completeness Frequency Percentage 1. High 966 89.8% 2. Medium 107 9.9% 3. Low 3 0.3% TOTAL 1076 100.0% :==•=· =-======z-==-=--11-=--:1==== •=• = = Ill I

The 966 news items (89.8 per cent) which comprehensive­ ly reported six answers to the questions of "who were in­ volved, what happened, and where, when, why and how it hap­ pened" were categorised as "High" news. The 107 news items (9.9 per cent) which reported four or five of the six an­ swers related to the same questions were classified as "Medium" news. The 3 news items (0.3 per cent) which reported

164 only three or less than three from six answers which related to the same questions were categorised as "Low" news. Table 6 clearly shows that in reporting the 12 November case, the six newspapers studied tended to publish much more news which contained a "High" level of completeness than the two other levels. This led to the understanding that the six newspapers generally had produced news items which fulfilled the requirements of completeness. Although these newspapers had not always comprehensively applied the "5W+H" formula, at least, the six newspapers had tried to maximise the implemen­ tation of the basic procedure in gathering or exploring events. This was supported by the fact that some of their reportage (9.91) could be classified into the "Medium" news. Besides this, it should be noted that the 3 "Low" cases occurred in the form of background stories in which it is difficult to present the six answers of the "5W+H" formula.

An example of this was a background story published by The Sydney Horning Herald which simply contained chronological events in East Timor. The implementation of the "5W+H" formula by each newspa­ per can be viewed in Table 7 below. The pattern of the use of the "5W+H" formula which reflect the level of completeness in each news item, as demonstrated in Tables, is significantly different among the six newspapers (p < 0.000).

165 Table 7 Level of Collpleteness Allong the Six Newspapers Newspaper's Level of Completeness Row Name High Medium Low Total Australian------127 25 152 (83.61) (16.41) (0.01) (14.1%) Sydney Horning 133 20 3 156 Herald (85.31) ( 12. 81) . (1.91) (14.5%) Courier-Hail 41 14 55 (74.51) (25.51) (0.01) (5.11) Kompas 149 14 163 (91.41) (8.61) (0.0%) (15.11) Jawa Pos 221 19 240 (92.1%) (7.91) (0.01) (22.3%) Surya 295 15 310 (95.2%) (4.81) (0.01) (28.8%)

------Column 966 107 3 1076 Total (89.81) (9.91) (0.31) (100.0I) -= -=- :======-======----=-======------==-- x2 with 10 d.f. = 51.804 p < 0.000

Surya seems to publish news which is slightly more complete in using the "5W+H" formula (95.21) than Jawa Pos (92.1%), Kompas (91.41) and The Sydney Horning Herald (85.31), The Australian (83.61) and The Courier-Hail (74.5%). This leads to the understanding that Surya published the highest proportion of "High" news items, followed by Jawa Pos, Kompas, The Sydney Horning Herald, The Australian and The courier-Hail. One reason that helps to explain why The courier-Hail produced the lowest percentage of the "High" level of comple­ teness is that its news items sometimes appear in the form of

166 short news. This influenced the completeness aspect of its news items which usually excluded the explanation of how and/or why it happened. 1 This by no means to define that among the six newspapers studied, The Courier-Hail is the worst. As recorded in Table 7, The courier-Hail tends to publish more news which has "Medium" level of completeness (25.51) than the other newspapers. In this case, the other two Australian newspapers score "Medium" levels 16.41 and 12. 81 of the time, while the three Indonesian newspapers score less than 101. Therefore, the performance of The Courier-Hail at least reaches the level "Medium" news (25.51 or 14 cases).

Table 7 above also clearly reveals that only The Sydney Horning Herald published news items with a "Low" level of completeness (1.91). As stated earlier, these items appeared in the background stories in which it is difficult to fulfill the requirements of the "5W+H" formula completely. Observing the level of completeness in news published by the six newspapers on the basis of country of newspapers gives the result recorded in Table 8. This table shows that statistically significant effect is demonstrated by the crosstabulation between the level of completeness and the countries in which the six newspapers are published ( p <

O. 000) • The Indonesian newspapers seem to publish more news

1.Hews items which only consisted of 4 or five elements of the "5W+H" formula were categorised into the "Medium" level.

167 items which have a "High" level of completeness (93.3%) than the Australian newspapers (82.91). Conversely, the Australian newspapers tend to produce more news items which are categor­ ised as "Mediwa" ( 16. 31) than the Indonesian newspapers (6.71). Table 8 Level of COllpleteness Based on country of llewspapers Country of Level of Completeness Row Newspapers High Mediwa Low Total

Australia------301 59 3 363 (82.9%} (16.31} (0~81) (33.7%) Indonesia 665 48 713 (93.31) (6.71) (0.0%} (66.3%}

Column------966 107 3 1076 Total (89.81) · (9.9%} (0.31) (100.0%} ======x2 with 2 d.f. • 30.689 p < 0.000

An explanation that can be made from the table above is that the Indonesian newspapers in general tended to produce more "High" news items than the Australian newspapers. The top three newspapers which publish the "High" news items are Surya, Jawa Pos and Kompas. On the other hand, the Australian newspapers seem to produce more "Mediwa" news items than the Indonesian newspapers. However, such findings cannot erase the fact that both the Indonesian and Australian newspapers, basically, have tried to maximise implementation of elements of the "5W+H" formula in their news items. The six newspapers in the two countries all mainly produced news items which can

be categorised as "High" news.

168 Another news aspect examined in this study is the use of news values. As Tiffen notes, the implementation of news values helps reporters to reduce the role of individual attitudes in producing news. 1 He states that news values allow the solution of the difficult decisions faced by the newsworkers. This means that consideration of news values will lead the newsworkers to think highly of the readers' requirements to the news. Considering the issue of "impor­ tance", for example, will guide the reporters to decide whether the event they explore has significant effects on the readers or whether it is just important for the newsworkers themselves. If the event was only significant for the news­

workers, the news value of "importance" could not be accept­

ed, and it would be better for the newsworkers to leave the event unreported. This study dichotomises the level of implementation of news values into "Maximum" and "Minimum" categories, on the basis of the number of kinds of news values --timeliness (=new, actual, freshness), importance, magnitude (=size, number), prominence (=name, famous), proximity (both geo­ graphically and psychologically) and human interests. News items which contain four to six kinds are categorised as "Maximum", while news items which consist one to three kinds are classified as "Minimum".

1 .Rodney Tiffen, News and Power, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989, p. 66-7.

169 on the basis of data contained there, most of the news items published by the six newspapers studied can be consid­ ered to have "Maximum• news values (1063 cases or 98.81). The news values which frequently appeared in news items under scrutiny were 'importance', 'timeliness', 'magnitude', 'proximity' and 'prominence', although 'human interest' also coloured the news. They appeared in combinations which varied from six to three kinds. The news value which rarely appears in the 1063 items is "human interest". This can be understood as follows. News coverage of the massacre as event is not as extensive as reportage of the developments after the massa­ cre. The clearest use of "human interest" aspect, for exam­ ple, was shown in a reportage which contained witnesses' acounts of the massacre, especially when they were telling how the Indonesian army opened fire to them.1 In the follow­ ing days, news coverage mostly consisted of statements from different parties, the Indonesian Commission activities and the international reactions to the massacre. such events do not involve "human interest" as a news value. Although the implementation of news values by each newspaper, as presented in Table 9, is significantly differ­ ent ( p < o. 000) , the six newspapers published news items which almost always contained the maximum number of news values (more than 94. Ot). This table also shows that the three Indonesian newspapers published all news items contain-

1.See The Sydney Horning Herald, 14 November 1991.

170 ing the maximum level of news values (1001), while the three Australian newspapers published stories with the maximum level as often as 96.41 of the time. News items which consist of the minimum number of news values only appear in The Courier-Hail (5.51), The Australian (3.31) and The Sydney Horning Herald (3.21). It should be noted that although 96.4 to 1001 of news items studied can be categorised into the "Maximum" category, not all of these news items include 6 kinds of news values. This means that the news items may include 6, 5 or 4 kinds of news values.

Table 9 I•pleaentation of News Values Based on Newspaper's Nuae ====-======-====-===-======:=,======Newpapers' Categorisation of News Values Row Name Maximum Minimum Total Australian 147 5 152 (96.71) (3.3%) (14.1%) Sydney Horning 151 5 156 Herald (96.8%) (3.2%) (14.5%) courier-Hail 52 3 55 (94.5%) (5.5%) (5.1%) Kompas 163 163 (100.0%) (0.0%) (15.1%)

Jawa Pos 240 240 (100.0%) (0.0%) (22.3%) surya 310 310 (100.0%) (0.0%) (28.8%) ------Column 1063 13 1076 Total (98.8%) (1.2%) (100.0%)

x2 with 5 d.f. = 27.757 p < 0.000

171 On the basis of the country where the six newspapers are published, the application of the news values is also signif­ icantly different between Australia and Indonesia ( p < 0.000). As recorded in Table 10, the Indonesian newspapers seems to publish slightly more news items which comprised the maximum number of news values (100.0I) than the Australian newspapers ( 96. 41) • The three Australian newspapers produce

13 news items (3.61) which can be categorised as the "Mini­ mum" in applying news values.

Table 10 Iapleaentation of Revs Values Based on Country of Kevspapers m country of Categorisation of News Values Row Newspapers Maximum Minimum Total Australia------350 13 363 (96.41) (3.61) (33.71) Indonesia 713 713 (100.01) (0.01) (66.31) Column------1063 13 1076 Total (98.81) (1.21) (100.0I) x2 with 1 d.f. = 22.933 p < 0.000

The most important thing in discussing the use of news values is not in the distribution of data such as this, but the kinds of news values that often appear in the news items. While "importance", "timeliness" and "proximity" were most often used by the six newspapers, "magnitude" and "promi­ nence" were the two top news values. When the number of victims of the massacre was being argued, "magnitude" often

172 came up in the items and seemed to be the top _news value, especially for the three Australian newspapers. The three newspapers tended to publish mainly the high number of victims stated by non-Indonesian news sources and placed Indonesia's claims on this matter in smaller spaces. The reports of the Australian newspapers are not infrequently one-sided. The Australian newspapers seemed to push the readers towards believing non-Indonesian news sources. News coverage such as this often appeared, especially before the Indonesian Commission produced its report. From this point of view, it appears that Ratih Hardjono's statement that the Australian media are aggressive, enjoy conflict and conduct a "supervisory" role over other government countries is true. 1 The Indonesian newspapers, on the other hand, tended to place "prominence" as the top news value. The reason possibly is clear: "name makes news". However, this can also be inter­ preted as the reflection of Indonesia's culture which con­ sists of, among other things, the obligation to obey the elder and the leader, since the prominent names that appear are Indonesian government officers. At the time, General Try Sutrisno, General L.B. Moerdani, and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas were the prominent Indonesian names in these stories. The discussion of news values above completes an under­ standing of the use of news aspects in the Australian and Indonesian newsmaking process. The different ways of imple-

l.Hardjono, White Tribe o~ Asia, op. Cit., p. 188-9.

173 men ting the "5W+H" formula and news values shown by the six newspapers studied probably reflect each newspapers' own editorial policies. This leads to the further findings and analysis of bias in the news of this study. c. Hews Tendencies, covering-Step, Revs sources and Kinds of Hews contents The reasons which led the Australian and Indonesian newspapers to pay attention to East Timor naturally had consequences for their coverage. Ideally, newspapers should not be biased in reporting events. This means, as Arno states, that newspapers should work as effective third parties in conflicts. 1 However, according to Barr, "the power of the press to influence public opinion" leads the press to bias. 2 Bias, he adds, is "inevitable in all news reports". In the East Timor case, the deaths of five Australian journalists in 1975, for which many Australian journalists felt Indonesia had a responsibility, and both the 'geographi­ cal and psychological proximity' of the Australians to the East Timorese, contained the possibility to bias their cover­ age against Indonesia. The Australian media probably would more attack or cr'iticise Indonesia, would more use one-sided

1.Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gau­ det", Op. Cit., p. 233. 2.Trevor Barr, Reflections of Reality: The Hedia in Austra­ lia, Rigby, Adelaide, 1977, p. 77.

174 coverage to discredited Indonesia, and would use news sources who did not belong to the Indonesian channels. Their editori­ als and opinion articles would probably also attack Indone­ sia. On the other hand, Indonesia's "proximity geographically and psychologically" and Indonesia's expectation of the international admission of East Timor as its province, also suggested the possibility of biased news which would favour Indonesia. The Indonesian news coverage of East Timor possi­ bly would favour Indonesia, would use one-sided coverage to support Indonesia, and would use news sources from Indonesian Routine Information Channels. Besides this, Indonesia's editorials and opinion articles would tend to favour Indone­ sia. Thus, the question is, did the Australian and Indonesian newspapers report the Dili massacre with bias? More particu­ larly, did their news tendencies tend to be positive or negative to their country's interests? Did the newspapers use one-sided coverage? Did the newspapers tend to use only news sources which supported one party?

1. Revs' tendency The tendencies of news items as a whole in reporting the East Timor incident were divided into 9 categories, as Table 11 illustrates.

175 Table 11 R11•ber of Revs :rtea Based on Hews' Tendency m ·- == No. News' Tendency Frequency Percentage ------1. Attacked Indonesia 70 items 6.5% 2. Attacked Australia 21 items 2.0% 3. Attacked Indonesia and Australia 8 items 0.7% 4. Favoured Indonesia 39 items 3.6% 5. Favoured Australia 5 items 0.5% 6. Favoured Indonesia and Australia 2 items 0.21 7. Crit. Indonesia & Fav. Australia 0.0% 8. Crit. Australia & Fav. Indonesia 9 items 0.81 9. Neutral 922 items 85.71 ------TOT AL 1076 items 100.0% ·= = ; --

Around 85.7% of the 1076 news items published by the six newspapers were neutral reports. These news items contained facts or events, comments and/or supports or counters to the comments, and background stories that presented the good and

the bad realities in balance. Thus, it would be apparent that more than four-fifths of the news coverage of East Timar was not biased to Australia or Indonesia. In other word, the six newspapers tried to produce news items which were neutral.

It should be noted that the very kinds of events which were covered by the press might suggest that the press criti­ cised or attacked Indonesia. However, the categorization above was based on the tendency of the news in reporting these events. News which reports that Prime Minister Bob Hawke urges President Suharto to clarify details of the

massacre, for example, might be seen as critical of Indone­ sia. But the way this news is presented, in fact, means it

should be classified into the ninth category if the report

176 itself is neutral. Conversely, a news item which published Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas's denial of FRETILIN's claim over the number of victims might be seen as favourable to Indonesia. However, the way this news is presented, in fact, means it could be categorised as a neutral news. Although the six newspapers tended to publish neutral reports rather than either attacking or favouring Indonesia and Aus~ralia, the pattern of coverage based on the tendency of news is significantly different among the six newspapers studied (p < 0.000), as Table 12 below indicates. The number of news items which contained neutral reports was 922 (85.71), higher than those which criticised Indonesia (70 items or 6.51), criticised Australia (21 items or 2.01), favoured Indonesia (39 items or 3.61), and those which com- bined critical and 'favourable stances to Australia and Indo- nesia. No newspaper criticised Indonesia and favoured Austra­ lia at once in an item of news. However, with the exception of The Australian, all newspapers published some news which contained tendencies to criticise Australia and to favour Indonesia simultaneously. This table also illustrates that The Sydney Horning Herald seems to have published more reports that are critical of Indonesia ( 25. 61) than The Australian ( 12. 51) or The Courier-Hail (16.41) and certainly more than Kompas (0.61), Surya (0.31) and Jawa Pos (0.0I). The Sydney Horning Herald also tended to report slightly more articles critical of Australia (4.51), than The Courier-Hail (3.61), The Austra-

177 lian (2.6%), Kompas (1.8%), SUrya (1.0%) and Jawa Pos (0.8%). Kompas presented the highest proportion of reports favourable to Indonesia ( 7. 4%) higher than Jawa Pos ( 3. 3%) , Surya (3.2%), The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald (2.6%) and The Courier-Hail (1.8%).

Table 12 Tendency of News Based on Newspaper's Nmae ==--===--= Newspaper's Tendency of News Row Name CI CA FI N Total Australian------19 4 4 115 152 12.5% 2.6% 2.6% 75.7% 14.1% Sydney Horning 40 7 4 99 156 Herald 25.6%. 4.5% 2.6% 63.5% 14.5% Courier-Hail 9 2 1 42 55 16.4% 3.6% 1.8% 76.4% 5.1% Kompas 1 3 12 143 163 0.6% 1.8% 7.4% 87.7% 15.1%

Jawa Pos 2 8 229 240 0.0% 0.8% 3.3% 95.4% 22.3% Surya 1 3 10 294 310 0.3% 1.0% 3.2% 94.8% 28.8% ------Column 70 21 39 922 1076 Total 6.5% 2.0% 3.6% 85.7% 100.0% :======:=-==== x2 with 35 d.f. = 243.198 p < 0.000 Notes: 1. c = Criticised or Attacked I= Indonesia F = Favoured A= Australia N = Neutral 2. Five categories are not presented in the table due to the small number of their cells. These categories are "criticised. Indonesia and Austra­ lia", "favoured Australia", "favoured Indonesia and Australia", "criticised Indonesia and favoured Australia" and "criticised Australia and favoured Indonesia".

178 Among the three Australian newspapers, The Australian is the most infrequent in producing news items which were criti­ cal either of Indonesia or Australia. But this newspaper has the highest number of news items which criticise Australia and Indonesia at the same time ( 3. 3%), while The Sydney Horning Herald is 1.9% and The Courier-Hail is nil on this score. The Australian also became the sole Australian newspa­ per which produced news items with the tendency to favour Australia.1 The same percentage was produced by The Austra­ lian and The Sydney Horning Herald in terms of news items which favoured Indonesia (2.6%), while The Courier-Hail had only 1.8% of stories in this category.

From these points, it will be apparent that The Austra­ lian, as an Australian newspaper, tends to publish more biased news which favours the two countries, with the excep­ tion of news items which favour Indonesia and Australia together. The Sydney Horning Herald and to some extent The Courier-Hail, on the other hand, tended to publish biased news which criticised the two countries. This is by no means to say that these newspapers do not sometimes produce the opposite tendencies. In addition, and without denying the fact that the three Australian newspapers also produced a high number of neutral reports, such realities probably can

1.News items which tend to criticise both Australia and Indonesia at the same time and those which tend to favour Australia are not presented in the table.

179 not be separated from their own roles. As previously dis­ cussed, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Courier-Mail are likely to be the i~tensifiers of conflict, while The Austra­ lian is classified as a third party in the conflict. This suggests that the role as intensifiers in conflicts exhibited by The Sydney Morning Herald and The courier-Hail was not only defined by their reportage --which focused on the events at the time surrounding the massacre rather than those in the succeeding periods-- but also by the fact of their higher numbers of critical reports. This was different to The Aus­ tralian's third party role, in which this newspaper reported the events relatively constantly along the periods and its news tendencies tended to favour Indonesia and Australia. The three Indonesian newspapers, on the other hand, tended not to produce as many news items with these tenden­ cies as the Australian newspapers. Nor did Jawa Pos and Surya show very different patterns in their tendency of news. Besides the fact that the three Indonesian newspapers had a tendency to favour Indonesia, one point that should be noted is that Kompas is the Indonesian newspaper which has the highest percentage in the five tendencies of biased news (criticise Indonesia, criticise Australia, favour Indonesia, favour Indonesia and Australia, and both criticise Australia and favour Indonesia). This seems to run parallel with the fact that Kompas is a leading newspaper in Indonesia which makes it possible to contact different resources with various information.

180 If the six newspapers were categorised by country of newspapers, the tendency of news over the Dili massacre reportage becomes as follows (see Table 13). A significant different pattern is demonstrated by the Australian and

Indonesian newspapers in their news' tendencies (p < 0.000).

Table 13 Tendency of News Based on country of Newspapers country of Tendency of News Row Newspapers CI CA CI&A FI N Total

Australia------68 13 8 9 256 363 18.71 3.61 2.21 2.51 70.51 33.71

Indonesia 2 8 0 30 666 713 0.31 1.11 0.01 4.21 93.41 66.31 Column------~------70 21 8 39 922 1076 Total 6.51 2.01 0.71 3.61 85.71 100.01 = I - m II 1- == ·-==== x2 with 7 d.f. = 175.801 p < 0.000 Notes: 1. c = Criticised or Attacked I = Indonesia F = Favoured A= Australia N = Neutral 2. Four categories are not presented in the table due to the small number of their cells. These categories are "favoured Australia", •favoured Indonesia and Australia", "criticised Indonesia and favoured Australia" and "criticised Australia and favoured Indonesia".

The Indonesian newspapers tend to produce more neutral reports (93.41) than the Australian newspapers (70.51). The Australian newspapers produced more reports which favoured or criticised Indonesia and/or Australia in some way. But it should not be denied that the high percentage shown be the Australian newspapers in producing neutral reports also

181 implies that what the Australian newspapers had done in reporting East Timor should be acceptable to Indonesia. No complaint could be made by Indonesia due to the high level of neutral reports in the Australian newspapers. The biased news, meanwhile, also differed between the two countries. The Australian newspapers published much more news which criticised Indonesia than the Indonesian newspa­ pers (18.7% to 0.3%). On the other hand, the Indonesian news seemed to produce slightly more news which favoured Indonesia than the Australian newspapers ( 4. 2% to 2. 5%). From this point, it would be obvious that the Australian newspapers tended to bias their reportage of East Timor against Indone­ sia. It probably can also be concluded that the ASEAN coun­ tries claim that the Australian newspapers were responsible for leading the international condemnation against Indonesia, as described in Chapter III, is close to fact. However, the other facts in Table 13 also indicate that the three Australian newspapers bias their coverage not only to discredited Indonesia, but also to criticise Australia or the Australian government. Their level of news ~hich showed a tendency to criticise Australia was higher than similar news in the Indonesian newspapers (3.6% to 1.1%). The fact that the Australian newspapers biased their coverage not merely to debunk Indonesia was also supported by another point which showed that they tended to condemn Australia and Indonesia together somewhat more often than the Indonesian newspapers did. This provides an understanding that the Australian

182 newspapers tend to implement their "watch-dog" roles to the Australian and Indonesian governments in the 12 November case. In spite of the East Timor coverage, however, Indonesia wished that the Australian media should produce more neutral reports so tha~ these could be more accepted. According to Broinowski, responses from Indonesia, and more recently Malaysia, to Australia's media have become stronger, because the Australian media's national identities became a sensitive issue.1 She adds that there are strong assertions in the Jakarta (and Kuala Lumpur) Government(s)' views against the Australian media's reports. Australia's media were described as moralistic, inaccurate, imbalanced and insensitive. This means that --despite the general neutrality found in this study-- the Indonesian Government still wanted the Australian media to provide reports which were more acceptable to it. Regarding reportage of East Timor, Indonesia demanded that the Australian media not attack it and not lead interna­ tional condemnation against Indonesia through their news. Indonesia wished that Australian news be based not only on non-Indonesian sources, but for balance also to use the Indonesian information channels. In other words, Indonesia demanded the Australian media to use sources proportionally in such conflicts.

l.Alison Broinowski, "How the World Sees Australian Journal­ ists", in the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism seminar on Trading with the Region, on 14-15 November 1992, at the University of Technology, Sydney.

183 The clearest picture from the discussion above, there­ fore, is that the news media cannot be completely free from bias. Although most news items produced by the six newspapers are the nutral reports, some others are the biased news, whatever their tendencies are. This supports Barr's statement saying that the media cannot be free from bias •1 Besides this, the reality that the media cannot be the effective third parties in a conflict, as Donohue, Tichenor and Olien state, 2 had also been demonstrated through the biased news that exists in general and through the news which favour a particular country. It seems that the Indonesian news cover­ age tended to represent the attitudes of the strongest group (the Indonesian government) in the Dili case. The Australian newspapers, on the other hand, cannot also be the effective third parties due to the fact that they, especially The Sydney Horning Herald and The courier-Hail, tend to be the intensifiers of the East Timor case.

2. covering-step Another element to provide Barr's argument about the existence of bias in the news, can be observed through the fairness aspect in the newsmaking process operated by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in reporting the 12 November case. The two types of coverage which reflect the

1.Barr, Op. Cit., p. 77. 2.Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, Op. Cit., p. 204.

184 fairness of news content are one-sided coverage and two or multi-sided coverage. It could be accepted that the last type of coverage usually would produce fairer news, while the first would not. The dichotomous division of the 1076 cases according to covering-step produces the result that 702 news items (65.2%) show one-sided coverage and 374 news items (34.8%) show two or multi-sided coverage. This means that one-sided coverage was more likely to be used by the six newspapers in reporting the bloodshed that happened in Dili on 12 November 1991. As long we are concerned with the assumption that two or multi-sided coverage tends to produce the fair news, the reality which will be accepted is that the six newspa~ers seem to produce more unfair news than the fair news. But, as the previous discussion of the fairness states, not all 1076 cases comprise news covering a crisis or conflict. The situa­ tion when the news was published probably reflected a con­ flict between several parties --for example, conflict that existed between Portugal and Indonesia-- but the news itself should not be classified as comprised of conflict, since the news only reported, for example, Australia's reaction. News which did not contained a conflict or crisis was categorised as belonging to the first category (one-sided coverage). From this point of view, it would be apparent that the one-sided reportage of East Timor made by the six newspapers did not always produce unfair news. Observing the covering-step, as Table 14 shows, it is

185 apparent that there is no statistically significant effect (p < 0.927) in the crosstabulation between the types of coverage and the country of newspapers.

Table 14 Types of coverage Based on country of Newspapers Country of Types of coverage Row Newspapers One-Sided Two or Multi-Sided Total Australia------238 125 363 (65.6%) {34.4%) {33.7%) Indonesia 464 249 713 (65.1%) {34.9%) {66.3%) Column------702 374 1076 Total (65.2%) (34.8%) {100.0%} ======:==-== x 2 with 1 d.f. = o.0083 p < o.927

All six newspapers tended to use one-sided coverage more often than two or multi-sided coverage. The explanation for this is as follows. Besides the fact that not all items of news comprised conflicts which involved two or more parties (Indonesia and others, and vice-versa), some of them reported events which did not contain different views. The other news items featured two or more statements which supported one another in a neutral way (no conflict emerged, so they belonged to one-sided coverage) • Thus , reports which are gathered by one-sided coverage in such matters, if there is no conflict, cannot be assumed to be biased news. It is a pity that this study did not cover how many news items which implemented one-sided coverage were unbiased in this way.

186 The crosstabulation between the types of coverage and the newspaper's name, however, shows the statistically dif­ ferent pattern among the six newspapers in applying the covering-step (p < 0.0001). The distribution of the two types of coverage applied by each newspaper is illustrated in Table 15 below.

Table 15 Types of coverage by Bach Newspapers ------=====-======-- Newspaper's Types of coverage Row Name One-Sided Two or Multi-Sided Total

Australian------88 64 152 (57.9%) (42.1%) (14.1%) Sydney Horning 109 47 156 Herald (69.9%) (30.1%) (14.5%) courier-Hail 41 14 55 (74.5%) (25.5%) (5.1%) Kompas 90 73 163 (55.2%) (44.8%) (15.1%)

Jawa Pos 181 59 240 (75.4%) (24.6%) (22.3%) surya 193 117 310 (62.3%) (37.7%) (28.8%) Column------702 374 1076 Total (65.2%) (34.8%) (100.0%)

x2 with 5 d.f. = 26.592 p < 0.0001

The most important point of this table is that most reports in all newspapers during the time studied are one­ sided. Besides this, The Australian and Kompas have quite similar patterns in implementing the types of coverage, as well as between Jawa Pos and The Courier-Hail, while The

187 Sydney Horning Herald is somewhat different either with Surya and the first four newspapers. The Australian and Kompas tended to use the two types of coverage in balance. On the other hand, Jawa Pos and The Courier-Hail seemed to apply one-sided coverage around three times more often than two­ sided coverage. The Sydney Horning Herald implemented one­ sided coverage as much as 69.9% of the time and two-sided coverage only 30.1% of the time, while surya more focused on one-sided coverage (62.3%) than two-sided coverage (37.7%). Such results are important, due to the each newspaper's position in Australia or Indonesia. The AUstralianand Kompas are the national newspapers in their own countries. This leads them to provide broader reports of national scope compared with the other newspapers. Their differences with Jawa Pos and surya were caused by their use of one story to report major news which comprised parties involved in the conflict. Conversely, Jawa Pos and Surya often divided their major news into smaller news items which each represented one party's view. The difference between The Australian and Kompas on the one hand and The Sydney Horning Herald and The Courier-Hail on the other hand is also caused by the each newspaper's position. As previously stated, the two last newspapers are the metropolitan newspapers, while the two first are the national newspapers. This means that the The AUstralian and Kompas should enlarge their use of the types of coverage because their reportage would be read by the national and international consummers, while the other news-

188 papers should not, due to their smaller scope of consumers (metropolitan city readers).

3. News sources This unit of analysis was examined through seven basic categories: Indonesian Routine Information Channels (IRIC), Australian Routine Information Channels (ARIC), First-hand Reports (FR), Informal (I), Other Sources (OS), Opinion (O) and Not Clear (NC). Because the 1076 news items studied used more than a single news source, the first five categories were combined into permutations. There were 33 new categories from these combinations. Table 16 below demonstrates that news sources which were often used by the six newspapers in their reportage of East Timor were IRIC (23.41), OS (10.01), IRIC + OS (20.41), IRIC + ARIC + OS (6.11) and Opinion (12.31). The other categories were used infrequently by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Some of these categories were never used by the six newspapers during the time studied. The important point from this table is that most of news items used Indonesian Routine Information Channels (IRIC) either as a single news source or combined with the Australian Routine Information Channels (ARIC) and the Other Sources (OS). Besides this, news items which were based on the writer's opinion were frequently published by the six newspapers.

189 Table 16 IIUllber of llews Itell Based on the use of llews sources == = = No. News Sources Frequencies Percentage ------1. IRIC 252 23.4% 2. IRIC + FR 15 1.4% 3. IRIC + OS 220 20.4% 4. IRIC + I 5. IRIC + FR + OS 36 3.3% 6. IRIC + FR + I 7. IRIC + OS+ I 1 0.1% 8. IRIC + FR + OS + I 2 0.2% 9. ARIC 34 3.2% 10. ARIC + FR 12 1.1% 11. ARIC + OS 40 3.7% 12. ARIC + I 13. ARIC + FR + OS 9 0.8% 14. ARIC + FR + I 15. ARIC + OS+ I 16. ARIC + FR + OS+ I 17. IRIC + ARIC 40 3.7% 18. IRIC + ARIC + FR 10 0.9% 19. IRIC + ARIC + OS 66 6.1% 20. IRIC + ARIC + I 1 0.1% 21. IRIC + ARIC + FR+ OS 19 1.8% 22. IRIC + ARIC + FR+ I 23. IRIC + ARIC + OS+ I 1 0.1% 24. IRIC + ARIC + FR + OS + I 1 0.1% 25. FR 39 3.6% 26. OS 108 10.0% 27. I 28. FR + OS 22 2.0% 29. FR + I 30. OS+ I 31. FR+ OS+ I 32. Opinion 132 12.3% 33. Not Clear 16 1.5% ------TOT AL 1076 100.0% ---= --

Nevertheless, the distribution of news items across the 33 categories of news sources, as Table 16 reveals, produced cells with high frequencies as well as empty cells. Thus, in order to strengthen the analysis of the use of news sources, some categories were re-classified. Thia..step •aintained the

190 five original categories and created four new categories, namely "II", "IA", "IIA" and "IT". The first new category (II) included categories number 1 to 8, "IA" consisted of categories number 9 to 16, "IIA" contained categories number 17 to 24, while "IT" was a combination of categories number 28 to 31 in the table. The five old categories were First­ hand Reports (FR), Other Sources (OS), Informal (I), Opinion (O) and Not Clear (NC). The new distribution of the 1076 news items based on the new categories and the newspaper's name are recorded in Table 17 below. This table shows that statistically significant effects were shown by the crosstabulation between the news sources and the newspaper's name (p < 0.000). The proportion of news sources involving Indonesian Routine Information Channels (either a single IRIC or its combination with other news sources excepts ARIC, e.g. "II"), used by Surya (71.9%), Kompas (60.7%) and Jawa Pos (54.6%) is much larger than those published by The Australian (23.0%), The courier­ Hail (21.8%) and The Sydney Horning Herald (16.7%). On the other hand, The courier-Hail (29.9%), The Australian (20.4%) and The Sydney Horning Herald (19.2%) seem to publish sub­ stantially more news items with news sources involving Aus­ tralian Routine Information Channels (either a single ARIC or its combination with the other categories excepts IRIC, e.g. "IA") than Kompas (4.3%), Jawa Pos (2.9%) and Surya (1.3%).

191 Table 17 lfllllber of News Itea Based on Newspaper's Naaa and News Sources I! H &EE- rm.a::¥.mffl&E ii •= " =•• ====----=• - - == Newpapers' News sources Row Name II IA IIA OS o Total ------Australian 35 31 37 13 22 152 23.01 20.41 24.31 8.61 14.51 14.11 Sydney Horning 26 30 40 21 26 156 Herald 16.71 19.21 25.61 13.5% 16.71 14.51

Courier-Hail 12 16 7 6 6 55 21.81 29.11· 12.71 10.91 10.91 5.11 Kompas 99 7 23 7 18 163 60.71 4.31 14.11 4.31 11.01 15.11 Jawa Pos 131 7 11 29 41 240 54.61 2.91 4.61 12.11 17.11 22.31 Surya 223 4 20 32 19 310 71.91 1.31 6.51 10.31 6.11 28.81 Column------526 95 138 108 132 1076 Total 48.91 8.81 12.81 10.01 12.31 100.01 =---- rmm•======--= -==- it x22 with 35 d.f. = 319.611 p < 0.000 Notes: 1. II= involving Indonesian Routine Infonation 0lannels (without ARIC) I1 = involving Australian Routine Intonation Oiannels (without IRIC) Ill• involving Indonesian and Australian Routine Infonation Olannels PR= First-band Reports (single) OS• other sources (single) I= Infonal (single) IT• involving First-band Reports, Infonal and other sources (without me and we) 0 = Opinion IC• lot Clear sources 2. Four categories tbat are not presented in tbis table are I, IT, PR and llC due to the slall nUlber of their cells.

Examining news sources which involve both the Australian and Indonesian Routine Information Channels, e.g. "IIA", furthermore, it seems that there are three kinds of similari­ ties between individual newspapers. The first pattern was shown by The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald, whose

192 use of "IIA" sources varied from 24. JI to 25. 61. This means that the two Australian newspapers tried to explore events in East Timer based on news sources which, at least, involved Australian and Indonesian Routine Information Channels and sometimes combined the two routine information channels with the other categories of news sources. The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald use of these sources higher than that by The Courier-Hail and Kompas ( 12. 7% and 14 .1%) , which formed the second pattern. The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald also implemented substantially higher the "IIA" category than Jawa Pos(4.6%) and Surya (6.5%), which reflected the third pattern. News items which contained conflicts, therefore, were better reported by The Australian and The Sydney Horning Herald than the other newspapers , particularly when they applied two-sided coverage either using the two routine information channels or a combination of these with the other categories of source.1 Another distinctive pattern is demonstrated by surya and Jawa Pos in publishing news items based on a writer's opin­ ion. Jawa Pos (17.11) seems to publish news items based on this news source much more often than surya (6.1%). Jawa Pos also tends to produce slightly more reports using this news source than The Sydney Horning Herald (16.7%) and The Austra­ lian (14.51). The courier-Hail (10.9%) and Kompas (11.01) are higher than Surya but it are lower than the three other l."IIA" is a new category of news source which contained categories number 17 - 24 in Table 18.

193 newspapers in publishing the writer's opinions. The important point of this table basically lies on the high nwnber of news items which used "II" compared with "IA", "IIA", "OS", "O" and the other categories of news sources which were not presented in Table 17. This means that news sources which involve Indonesian Routine Information Channels appear more often than the others. However, it is a mistake to conclude that news items reported by the six newspapers studied tended to use one-sided coverage or tended to favour Indonesia. Firstly, the use of news sources which included Indonesian Routine Information Channels did not always con­ tain Indonesian Routine Information Channel as a single news source. Some of them consisted of combinations between the Indonesian Routine Information Channels and others (FR, os, I) • The fact that the combination of I.RIC and OS appeared in 220 cases (20.4%), as Table 16 reveals, supports this argu­ ment. Secondly, most of news items produced by the six news­ papers in their reportage of East Timor during the time studied were neutral reports (see Table 11). Therefore, the use of news sources which involved the Indonesian Routine Information Channels did not always produce biased news favouring Indonesia. A statistically significant effect is also revealed by the crosstabulation of the news sources and the country in which the six newspapers are published (p < O.OOO).

194 Table 18 Distribution of Revs Itea Based on country of Newspapers and lfews SOUrces ----===--======-=-:--======•==z:z.;:=-======•====-======:-=rm=====••1m-=:r=1•=====z===: Country of News Sources Row Newspapers II IA IIA FR OS o Total Australia------73 77 84 17 40 54 363 20.1% 21.2% 23.1% 4.71 11.0% 14.9% 33.7% Indonesia 453 18 54 22 68 78 713 63.51 2.5% 7.6% 3.1% 9.5% 10.91 66.3% Colwnn------526 95 138 39 108 132 1076 48.9% 8.8% 12.8% 3.6% 10.01 12.3% 100.0% a =-, =••=== = I lE TIP ffl ____ JI - ===- x22 with 7 d.f. = 241.879 p < 0.000 Notes: 1. II = involving Indonesian Routine Infonation Cbannels (without WC) IA = involving Australian Routine Infonation Olannels (without WC) Ill= involving Indonesian and Australian Routine Infonation Qlannels FR = First-band Reports (single) os = otber sources (single) I = Infonal (single) IT = involving First-band Reports, Infonal and other Sources (without we and WC) o = Opinion IC = llot Clear Sources 2. Tbree categories of news sources are not presented in tbis table due to tbe Slall nlllber of their cells. These categories are I, IT and BC.

As Table 18 illustrates, the Indonesian newspapers seem to publish many more news items which use "II" (63.51) than the three Australian newspapers (20.11). on the other hand, the Australian newspapers tend to report more news items which comprise "IA" (21.2%) than the three Indonesian newspapers (2.5%). A similar difference also appears in news items which consists of "IIA" (23.1% to 7.6%). Besides this, the Austra­ lian newspapers seems to publish slightly more news items which based on opinion (14.91) than the Indonesian newspapers ( 10. 9%). The other categories present slight differences

195 between the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. These facts lead to the understanding that the use of diverse news sourc­ es by the Australian newspapers is more common than it is among the Indonesian newspapers. The "II", "IA" and "IIA" categories in Table 18 show big differences between The Australian and Indonesian newspapers. In this case, the Indonesian newspapers tend to use "II" more often: that is to use news sources which involve Indonesian Routine Information Channels. This indicates that the Indone­ sian newspapers view the Indonesian Routine Information Channels as the most important kind of news source for their publication. This news source was combined with "FR", "OS" and "I", if the events that occurred required the involvement of other kinds of news sources included in the "II" category. on the other hand, the Australian newspapers tend to produce more reports using "IA": that is, news sources which involve the Australian Routine Information Channels. These newspapers seem to assume the Australian Routine Information Channels are their most important kind of news source. Along with the Indonesian newspapers, the Australian newspapers also com­ bined their own routine information channels, if the events that occurred required the involvement of other kinds of news sources included in the "IA" category. Big differences were also demonstrated by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers when they produced news items which used the "IIA" category. The Australian newspapers tend to produce more reports based on "IIA": that is, news sources

196 which involve the Australian and Indonesian Routine Informa­ tion Channels together. This can be understood by the fact that under scrutiny the Dili massacre generally created much more news items which involved Indonesia than Australia. In the such cases, in which Australia gave its reaction to Indonesia's action, the Australian newspapers would exploit both the Australian and Indonesian Routine Information Chan­ nels. Conversely, the Indonesian newspapers would not always use the Australian Routine Information Channels, if they viewed that Australia's reaction as unnecessary for their publication. They probably viewed Australia's reaction as only for the Australian media's consumption. Besides this, Indonesia received reactions which not only came from Austra­ lia, but also from other countries. These led them to focus their reportage of East Timor using news sources under the "II" category rather than the "IIA" category. A big enough difference was also shown by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers when they published the writer's opinions. Although the number of case$ based on opinion of the Indonesian newspapers was higher than the Australian newspapers (78 to 54), as a whole, the Australian newspapers more often used the writer's opinions as their news sources than the Indonesian newspapers ( 14. 9 to 10. 91) • This can probably be explained by the idea that, firstly, the Austra­ lian writers are more responsive to the 12 November case and, secondly, the Australian newspapers counted on individual's opinions in their reportage of East Timor and gave the

197 writers chances to express their opinion critically. This by no means to say that the Indonesian newspapers did not count on individual's opinions and that there was no freedom to express such opinions at all in Indonesia. The most important point is that besides the Australian and Indonesian newspa­ pers reporting of developments in the Dili massacre, these newspapers also gave chances to the writers to express their opinions critically. The news sources which are used by each newspaper help to explain the tendencies of news described earlier in this section (see Table 12 and 13). The use of the "II" news sources in greater numbers may have influenced the Indones~an newspapers in producing biased news which had tendency to favour Indonesia than to criticise Indonesia. Similarly, the higher use of the "IA" news sources seems to have caused the Australian newspapers to publish more biased news which tend to criticise than to favour Indonesia. The following explanation from Table 19 may clarify how the use of news sources influences the emergence of biased news. The patterns between the tendency of news and the use of news sources is significantly different (p < 0.000).

198 Table 19 Tendency of lfevs Based on lfevs sources ~= & I News - Tendency of News Row sources CI CA CIA FI CAFI N Total ------II 4 4 1 12 3 501 526 o.81 0.81 0.21 2.31 0.61 95.21 48.9%

IA 16 3 2 5 4 64 95 16.8% 3.21 2.11 5.31 4.21 67.41 8.81 IIA 4 3 2 4 1 122 138 2.9% 2.21 1.41 2.9% 0.7% 88.41 12.81

FR 9 2 28 39 23.11 5.11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 71.8% 3.61

OS 17 6 1 3 81 108 15.7% 5.6% 0.9% 2.8% 0.01 75.0% 10.01 IT 3 2 1 16 22 13.6% 9.11 4.5% 0.01 0.01 72.7% 2.0%

0 16 1 1 15 1 95 132 12.1% 0.8% 0.8% 11.4% 0.81 72.0% 12.3%

Column------70 21 8 39 9 922 1076 Total 6.5% 2.01 0.7% 3.6% 0.8% 85.7% 100.0% ===-==== --=- ===-- x 22 with 49 d.f. = 199.231 p < 0.000 Notes:

1. II = involving Indonesian Routine Infonat1on Olannels (witbout WC) ll = involving Australian Routine Infonat1on Cbannels (without IRIC) Ill= involving Indonesian and Australian Routine Infonat1on Cbannels FR = First-band Reports (single) os = other sources (single) I = Infonal (single) IT = involving First-band Reports, Infonal and other sources (witbout IRIC and WC) o = Opinion IC = llot Clear sources CI = Criticised Indonesia Cl = Criticised Australia CU= Criticised Indonesia and Australia FI = Favoured Indonesia CAFI= Criticised Australia and Favoured Indonesia I = leutral 2. The FA and m colUIDS and tbe IC row are not presented in tbis table due to tbe sull nulber of tbeir cells.

199 Three points can be made from the distribution of data in Table 19 above. Firstly, a high percentage of the biased news which criticised Indonesia appeared highly in news items which used FR (23.1%), IA (16.8%), OS (15.7%), IT (13.6) and o (12.11). The two other news sources (II and IIA) produced news items which criticised Indonesia as little as o.e and 2.9% of the time. This means that news items which criticised Indonesia were rarely published, if the Indonesian Routine Information Channels (as a part of either II or IIA) were involved as news sources. Secondly, news items which tend to criticise Australia mostly used IT (9.1%), OS (5.6%) and FR (5.11) as their news sources. The other news sources did not show big differences in producing news items which criticised Australia. Thus, the biased news which tend to criticise Australia mostly came from news items which did not involve the Indonesian and Australian Routine Information Channels (whether as parts of II, IA or IIA). Thirdly, a big dif­ ference also shown by news items which tend to favour Indone­ sia. such items mostly came from opinion (11.4%). From this, it is apparent that opinion articles based on the writer's opinion are more likely to be biased toward Indonesia than other news gathered by the reporters from news sources. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to conclude, from the discussion of the news' tendency, the types of coverage and the news sources as a whole, that the Australian and Indone­ sian newspapers are very biased. If they are very biased, how

could most of their news be categorised as neutral reports?

200 Likewise, why are Indonesian Routine Information Channels utilized by the Australian newspapers and, in turn, why are news sources which involved the Australian Routine Informa­ tion Channels used by the three Indonesian newspapers? Similarly, why do first-hand reports and news which is based on sources other than the Indonesian and Australian news sources, also occur in neutral reports, despite the fact that these news sources also produce news items which favour Indonesia, criticise Indonesia, criticise Australia, or criticise both Australia and Indonesia at the same time? What the Australian and Indonesian newspapers generally did, then, was to give reports to Australians and Indone­ sians. This means that they were still giving the public a chance to form their views freely and critically. However, this is not to deny that the Australian and Indonesian news­ papers may also have influenced both public opinion and Australian and Indonesian social attitudes through the ap­ pearance of biased news, the sources they used and their level of coverage.

4. Kinds of News Contents The discussion of the news tendencies, types of coverage and news sources can be extended by looking at different kinds of news contents. Some problems emerged when this study analysed the kinds of news contents used in Australian and Indonesian newspapers, firstly because of the mixture of the two kinds of news contents (events and coJlllllents) which were

201 often published in one item and secondly due to the difficul­ ties of precisely defining these two kinds. Another kind of news content (background story) was easier to identify. This last kind usually was published under a separate and clear heading. "Trial and error" processes, as well as discussion with an Indonesian expert in communication science, led to way of classifying news content. The first problem was solved through examination of the proportion of events and comments contained in a news item. If the proportion of events in the news item was higher than comment, this item of news was classified as an event, and vice versa. The second problem, according to Siregar, could be unraveled by examining the person's position as a news source and the likely impact of the news. 1 The government officer's statement, for instance, was classified as an event because of the fact that his or her comment would have influence in the decision making process. In contrast, a civilian's statement was categorised in the second category (comment and/or supports or counter to the comment), since this would have had much less impact in the decision making process. Thus, the questions of who the person is and what his or her position is were very helpful in determining the categorisation of the kinds of news cont­ ents.

------!.Siregar suggested this solution in an informal interview at the University of Gadjah Mada, July 1992.

202 Besides this, events should be understood as not only the three major events which dealt with the shootings on October 28, November 12 and the trip of the LUsitan1a Expres­ so, but also as including other events which related to these three events. Senator Gareth Evans' statement in his visit to Indonesia, for instance, was classified into the first cate­ gory (as an event). The second category was always seen as comprising comments which were fully ·separated from the event. It should also be noted that editorials and opinion articles were classified into the second category. Although, in some cases, the content of these news formats might in­ fluence the decision making process, might contain two/multi­ sided coverage and might be were written by government offic­ ers, for example, these news formats are clearly based on personal comment or opinion and labelled as such. Hence, editorials and opinion articles were always seen as comments which were separate from events. on the basis of the subjects which made the news, the 1076 cases were trichotomised into:

Table 20 Jln•ber of Mews Itea Based on Kinds of Mews contents - == -= No. Kinds of News Contents Frequency Percentage

------~------1. An event 871 80.91 2. comment on the events and/or support or counter to the comment 186 17.3% 3. Background story 19 1.8% TOT AL 1076 100.0% -=-===·======-=-===--==--======-======

203 As Table 20 discloses, the 871 news items (80.9%) were classified into the first category (events), 186 cases ( 17. 31) belonged to the second category ( comment and/or support or counter to the comment) and 19 items of news (1.8%) were background stories. During the time studied, news of events were much higher than the two other kinds of news content. This· can be understood due to the fact that the main function of newspaper is to report events that occur rather than to publish comments or background stories. Observing the kinds of news contents based on the coun­ try of newspapers demonstrates that there is no statistically significant effect in the crosstabulation between the kinds of news contents and the country of newspapers (p < 0.547).

Table 21 Kinds of Revs contents Based on country of Rewspapers ======-=-======Country of Kinds of News contents Row Newsps Events Comments Backgrounds Total

Australia------300 58 5 363 (82.6%) (16.01) (1.41) (33.7%) Indonesia 571 128 14 713 (80.1%) (18.01) (2.01) (66.3%) Column------~------871 186 19 1076 Total (80.9%) (17.31) (1.8%) (100.0%) = ===-=---=-======- ======,-======-=====-=-=====-- x 2 with 2 d.f •· = 1.205 p < o.547

As Table 21 notifies, events were reported by the Aus­ tralian newspapers in 300 news items (82.6%) compared with the Indonesian newspapers which published 571 items (80.1%). Comments and/or supports or counters to the comments were

204 also published in similar proportions (16.0% to 18.01}, as were background stories (1.41 to 2.0%). This means that the Australian and Indonesian newspapers had similar patterns in production of different kinds of news contents, in which events around the ·oili massacre were primarily reported rather than being a matter of comment or background news. Both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers thus operated within the main functions of newspapers: to report events. Nevertheless the patterns of the kinds of news contents from 1 July 199~ to 31 March 1992 are significantly different

among the six newspapers studied (p < 0.0008). Table 22 Kinds of Hews Contents by Bach lfewspapers ---- ======--=====--======Newspaper's Kinds of News Contents Row Name Events Comments Backgrounds Total ------Australian 127 24 1 152 (83.6%} (15.81) (0.71) (14.1%) Sydney Horning 125 27 4 156 Herald (80.11) (17.31} (2.6%} (14.51}

Courier-Hail 48 7 55 (87.3%} (12.71) (0.01) (5.11) Kompas 134 28 1 163 (82.21) (17.21) (0.61) (15.11) Jawa Pos 170 65 5 240 (70.81) (27.11) (2.1%) (22.3%} surya 267 35 8 310 (86.11) (11.3%} (2.6%} (28.81) Column------871 186 19 1076 (80.9%} (17.31) (1.8%} (100.0I) ======-~ -======x2 with 10 d.f. = 30.257 p < 0.0008

205 As Table 22 reveals, The courier-Hail seems to publish slightly more events (87.31) than surya (86.11): both are somewhat higher than The Australian {83.61), Kompas (82.21) and The Sydney Horning Herald {80.11). Meanwhile, Jawa Pos, which published the lowest number of event~ {70.81), more often published comments and/or supports or counters to the comments (27.11) than the other newspapers which varied from 11.31 (Surya) to 17.31 (The Sydney Horning Herald). Although there was no big difference, background stories were mostly produced by The Sydney Horning Herald and surya (2.61), which were somewhat higher than Jawa Pos (2.11). Kompas (0.61) and The Australian ( o. 71). The courier-Hail did not publish background stories of the 12 November case during the time studied. Table 22 shows that Jawa Pos has the most distinctive pattern of news content among the six newspapers studied. Two points can be made from these findings. First of all, Jawa Pos more often published editorials and opinion articles in relation to the Dili case. Editorials and opinion articles basically were the written expressions from editors and writers to comment on particular events. Their views thus were classified to be comments and/or supports or counters to the comments. Secondly, Jawa Pos more often made contact with people who had no access in the decision making process in producing their reportage of East Timor. From this point of view, it seems that Jawa Pos lacks the views of prominent names and more often made contact with the civilian East

206 Timorese when gathering facts at the time of the massacre. News items which used these news sources were classified into comments rather than events. Although the different patterns of the kinds of news contents notified by Table 22 are statistically significant, The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald and Kompas basical­ ly showed similar patterns. Their reportage differs from those made by Jawa Pos on the one hand and those produced by Surya and The courier-Hail on the other hand. The last two newspapers much more often produced stories of events than The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, and Kompas. Statistically different patterns had also been demon­ strated by the crosstabulation between the kinds of news contents and the tendency of news (p < 0.001), as Table 23 records. The most important point of this table is that around 85.71 of the 1076 news items reported, whether in the kinds of event, comment or background story, were neutral reports. Apart from the background stories which were only published in 19 cases, observing the neutral reports on the basis of kind of news contents, however, leads to the follow­ ing points. Neutral reports among stories covering events ( 87. 5%) were higher than those of among comments and/or supports or counters to the comments (77.4%). This means that the comments reported by the six newspapers during the time studied had greater possibility to create bias. These biased comments are higher than the biased reports of events in the news items which favoured Indonesia. The same pattern has

207 also been shown in the news items which criticise Indonesia. Whether they are used to criticise or to favour one particu­ lar country, coJDJDents tend to lead to the creation of the biased news.

Table 23 Tendency of Revs Based on Kinds of Hews contents ttt::= Kinds of Tendency of News Row News Contents CI CA CIA FI FICA N Total An------event 49 20 7 22 7 762 871 5.6% 2.3% 0.8% 2.5% 0.8% 87.5% 80.9%

Comments 18 1 1 17 2 144 186 9.7% 0.5% 0.5% 9.1% 1.1% 77.4% 17.3% Background 3 16 19 Story 15.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 84.2% 1.8% ------Column Total 70 21 8 39 9 922 1976 6.5% 2.0% 0.7% 3.6% 0.8% 85.7% 100.0% ==- == rm.:.=-======x2 with 14 d.f. = 37.711 p < 0.001 Notes: 1. c = criticised I= Indonesia F = Favoured A= Australia 2. The FA, FIA and CIFA columns are not presented in this table due to the small number of their cells.

An explanation can be addressed to explain why the such coJDJDents tend to create the biased news. Editorials and opinion articles, as stated earlier, were directly classified into the second category of news contents (comments). Analy­ sis --to name the comments appeared in editorials and opinion articles-- ideally, should be neutral. However, the editor or writer's field of experience and frame of reference sometimes led them to bias their written expression. The relatively

208 "good" relationship between Australia and Indonesia under Whitlam and Soeharto's governments, for example, made Whitlam tend to favour Indonesia and accuse Australia's Prime Min­ ister Bob Hawke (at the time) in making comment on the Dili massacre. The Indonesian editors, to take another example, seemingly produced editorials which tend to favour Indonesia due to the "freedom of the media" in Indonesia. Thus, it is not too surprising that this kind of news contents (comments) frequently presented biased news, although the neutral com­ ments are still higher than the biased comments.

These discussions of the·news attention, news aspects in the newsmaking process, news tendencies, types of coverage, news sources and kinds of news contents of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers show that there are different patterns between the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in general and among the six newspapers studied in particular in produc­ ing reports of the Dili incident. Although these newspapers showed different patterns in reporting the 12 November case, it is obvious that they had paid much attention to events that occurred in East Timor and that they tried to maximise the use of news aspects (completeness and news values) in the newsmaking process. Besides this, these newspapers generally produced neutral reports rather than biased reports, imple­ mented much more one-sided coverage than two/multi-sided coverage, used many kinds of news sources and operated within the main functions of newspapers to report events rather than

209 comments or background news. This leads this study to eval­ uate where the Australian and Indonesian newspapers stand in relation to the concept of the New World Information Order. The question of whether the reportage of East Timor made by these newspapers followed the concept of the New World Infor­ mation Order will be presented in the following chapter, along with other conclusions of this study.

*****

210 CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

As soon as the Dili bloodbath occurred on 12 November 1991, the event was seen as very important by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. It was predicted earlier in this thesis that the reportage of East Timor would dramatically increase after this event and that there would be some dif­ ferences in the content and in the newsmaking process of the reportage, as well as in the formulation of the newspapers' roles and in the newspapers' position in relation to the concept of the New World Information Order. This chapter will present the conclusions of this study, in which it will become obvious that the hypotheses described in Chapter I are not fully applicable to Australian and Indonesian news coverage of East Timor during the time studied. This report is, of course, far from comprehensive. Some weaknesses may come from the methodology which was used, from the steps taken in gathering of data, or from acciden­ tally uncovered materials. Thus, this report would be en­ hanced by the other studies by using other methodologies such as questionnaires given to both Australians and Indonesians, or by recruiting some research staff and by checking and rechecking materials. Nonetheless, this study has tried to examine the Australian and Indonesian newspapers appropriate­ ly and has identified some clear patterns in their news coverage of East Timor.

211 Three Australian newspapers (The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Courier-Mail) and three Indonesian newspapers (Kompas, Jawa Pos and Surya) have been observed· in this study. These six newspapers published 1076 news items which related to the 12 November case between 1 July 1991 and 31 March 1992. The 1076 news items appeared as hard news, soft news, editorials, opinion articles, features and back­ ground stories. Every news item was examined and filled on to the coding sheets which consisted of the units of analysis and the categories.1 By using the SPSS-computer program, the frequency of each unit of analysis and each category was calculated and the units of analysis were crosstabulated. The study is conducted in compliance with the procedures of the content analysis method. As stated in Chapter IV, the coeffi­ cient of reliability for this study was 0.81. In general, examination of The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The courier-Hail, Kompas, Jawa Pos and surya showed that their coverage was based on appropriate journal­ istic standards. 2 Most of their_ reportage was neutral and fair, had applied "High" levels of the "SW+H" formula, had implemented the "Maximum" level of news values, and had tried l.The diagram of the units of analysis and the categories is presented in Appendix A. 2.Nevertheless, in spite of the Dili massacre, Mr Conrad Black, the deputy chairman of Fairfax Holdings, criticised the Australian journalists, saying that the journalists were "slavish dupes", "unprofessional" and "intolerable". See Dennis Shanahan and Errol Simper, "Black Scathing About 'Unprofessional' Journalists", in The Australian, 26 November 1992, p. 1.

212 to use news sources from different parties. The six newspa­ pers also showed tendencies in line with their main function of reporting events rather than making comments or providing background stories. In spite of some cases which reflected the media's different positions in the North-West and South blocs, the tendencies of the Australian and Indonesian news­ papers basically followed ·the New World Information Order concept. The general conclusion of this study can be expressed in eight points, as follows. Events that related to the 12 November case, first of all, were viewed as important and newsworthy by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in general and the six newspapers studied in particular. This can be observed through the intense reports made by these newspapers of the events. News coverage of East Timor domi­ nated newspaper pages in both countries at the time surround­ ing the massacre. Some reports of the Dili case also became headline news in these newspapers. From this point of view, it was obvious that the six newspapers became concerned with the "Mutail" church incident (28 October), the Dili massacre (12 November) and the trip of the Portuguese ship Lusitania Expresso in the first three months of 1992. The development of the three events, especially the Dili massacre, was reported by the six newspapers, which used many sources and the standard rules of the professional reportage. secondly, the six newspapers showed different patterns in their attention to East Timor. This was reflected through

213 the increasing level and the peak of reports during the time studied. The startling increment in the number of reports started at the end of October and increased considerably in the following months, although each newspaper showed differ­ ent tendencies in the first three months of 1992 (see Figures 2, 3, 4 and Tables 2 and 3). Analysis of the three monthly groups of editions and the country of newspapers shows that on the one hand, the peak of Australian newspapers' reports occurred in the second group of editions (October, November and December-1991): that is, the time which became the centre of this study. The Indonesian newspapers, on the other hand, reached their peak of reportage in the first three months of 1992 (the third group of months). Furthermore, different levels of reportage were demonstrated by each newspaper. The Courier-Hail and The Sydney Horning Herald showed the highest number of their reportage in November 1991. The Australian, Jawa Pos and Surya reached their peaks of reportage in Decem-. ber 1991, while Kompas focused its reportage of East Timor in March 1992. The different levels and peaks of reports over the Dili massacre during the time studied, therefore, showed the different patterns of news attention of East Timor bet­ ween the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in general and among the six newspapers in particular. The fact that the news media cannot be fully free from bias runs parallel with Donohue, Tichenor and Olien's argu­ ment against Arno's position regarding the capability of the news media to act as effective third parties in disputes or

214 conflicts •1 There were three patterns which defined the formulation of the newspaper's roles in the conflicts of the Dili massacre. 2 The Sydney Morning Herald and The courier­ Mail (both the metropolitan newspapers) tended to be intensi­ fiers of the conflict. This was reflected through their patterns of reportage: high in the second group of editions and lower in the third group of editions. It seems that they were more interested in the massacre and the international reactions soon after the incident than in the other events which showed the solution of the conflict. Kompas (the na­ tional Indonesian newspaper) and Surya (the metropolitan newspaper), on the other hand, seemed to be diminishers of the conflict. Their reportage was higher in the third group of editions than in the earlier group of editions. These newspapers were not obsessed by the massacre and conflicts around it and had the tendency to produce reportage which focused on the denouement of the conflict. Jawa Pos (which claims to be a national newspaper) and The Australian ( a national newspaper) might be properly classified as third parties. Although their reportage declined in the first three months of 1992, these newspapers maintained a relatively steady level of reportage across the second and third groups of editions. l.Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, Op. Cit., p. 204. 2.Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gau­ det, Op. Cit., p. 233.

215 Variation between national and metropolitan newspapers in this particular conflict were also reflected by the six newspapers studied. A national newspaper, ideally, tends to be the third party in any conflict due to the fact that it is able to broaden its scope when routinely reporting events by compiling facts on a wider range of stories than metropolitan newspapers. The limitations of the operational scope of metropolitan newspapers, on the other hand, tend to mean that they cannot be third parties. Kompas, for example, in fact became the diminisher rather than the third party of the conflict. Thus, the media's position within the country does not always indicate the formulation of media's role in the conflict. Thirdly, Barr's argument that media cannot be fully free from bias was reflected through news tendencies shown by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers' reportage of East Timor.1 It is a fact that around 85.71 of their reportage of East Timor comprised neutral reports (see Tables 12, 13, and 14) • However since controversies regarding the number of victims and the primary cause of the massacre were reported by the six newspapers, news which was biased toward particu­ lar parties was common. Australian newspapers increasingly attacked or criticised rather than favoured Indonesia, while the Indonesian newspapers tended to favour Indonesia rather than to criticise or attack Indonesia. This meant, (a) that

1.Barr, Op. Cit., p. 77.

216 both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers had tried to produce news items which had no tendency either to attack or criticise the particular parties and (b) that bias in the news cannot fully be avoided. Despite the fact that the newspapers' coverage of the Dili massacre was not too biased, there were different rea­ sons which caused the biased news. The bias of the Australian newspapers seems to have been caused by the past experience in 1975, in which five Australian journalists were killed in Balibo. It was also influenced a little by Australian sym­ pathy for East Timor's independence, while Indonesia had declared East Timor as its province and the Australian Gov­ ernment had 'de facto and de jure' accepted it.1 On the other hand, the bias of the Indonesian newspapers probably was influenced by the hopes for broader international admission of East Timor as Indonesia's province and by the Indonesian media's obligation to maintain Indonesia's unity and stabili­ ty. Fourth, the types of coverage applied by the six newspa­ pers supported the understanding that their news items were not too biased. Although it was clear that the six newspapers produced more news items which contained one-sided coverage than those which had two/multi-sided coverage (see Tables 15 and 16), the items which had one-sided coverage did not

1.The main report of Tempo magazine on April 25, 1992 noted that Australia is the solely Western countries which accepted East Timor's integration to Indonesia. See Teapo, Op. Cit., p. 22.

217 always contain conflicts or crises. Sometimes, such items merely reported events which did not contain different views. The other news items featured two or more statements which balanced one another in a neutral way. Therefore, although there were different patterns in applying the types of cover­ age, and one-sided coverage was more often used by the six newspapers, these points did not mean that the reportage of East Timor was too biased, since the reportage mostly com­ prised neutral reports. Fifth, as concerns attacking or criticising another country and favouring their own country, it would also be apparent that the newspapers did not only call upon news sources from their own country rather than those from the other country. The six newspapers used news sources from both their own country and the other country, as well as from news sources in other categories (see Tables 18 and 19). Different patterns in exploiting news sources were demonstrated by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in general and by each newspaper in particular. These tendencies in the use of news sources might in­ fluence each newspaper in publishing biased news. The heavy use of news sources which involved the Indonesian Routine Information Channels (II) was likely to lead the Indonesian newspapers to publish news items which favoured Indonesia rather than the other tendencies of news bias. On the other hand, the implementation of news sources which involved the Australian Routine Information Channels seemed to influence

218 the Australian newspapers to produce biased news which criti­ cised Indonesia. However, it should be noted that the use of news sources from one particular party did not always create biased news, since such news sources did not bias reportage of facts or events. Thus the use of various news sources basically only coloured news content or at least ensured a greater or lesser number of perspectives. It seems to be contradictory that the Australian news was not generally biased (Table 14) but was seen as such by Indonesia. There are four reasons that help to explain why Indonesia took this view. Cultural background differences within the Australian and Indonesian media, firstly, led them to create different perceptions in understanding and imple­ menting the social responsibility of the press (see Chapter I). In some cases, Australian newspapers' reports that were critical of Indonesia were viewed as negative and biased reports by the Indonesian government. Secondly, as Ratih Hardjono states, Indonesia basically has a negative view of the Australian media. 1 Bad experiences of Australia-Indone­ sia's media relationships in the past (see Chapter II) tend to encourage the view that Australian newspapers' reportage would always be biased against Indonesia. Thirdly, Austra­ lia's media attitudes in reporting the massacre during the l.Ratih Hardjono made this statement at the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism and Australian Trade Commission seminar on "Trading with the Region", on November 14, at the University of Technology, Sydney. She is an Indonesian foreign correspond­ ent who was a presenter at the seminar. She represents the Asian media the Asian media's view of the Australian media.

219 first weeks influenced the Indonesian government to see this news as biased. At the time, as Chapter III describes, the Australian media seems to be aggressive against Indonesia, fond of sensation and conflict, and of jumping to conclusions seen as "premature" by Indonesia. The Australian newspapers' choice of reports and words at the time surrounding the massacre also angered Indonesia. Fourthly, it seemed that the reportage of the Dili massacre was something of a "shock therapy" against Indonesia, because Australian newspapers do not continuously report the daily developments of the politi­ cal events in Indonesia and then suddenly focused on the Dili massacre in ways that seemed critical of Indonesia. These four reasons apparently influenced Indonesia's view of the reportage of East Timer made by the Australian newspapers. The paradox will still exist in the future, if these four causes are not fixed by Australia and Indonesia. This also helps to explain the causes of the "ups and downs" of the Australia-Indonesia's media relationships in the past. The endeavours that should be made, therefore, are: ( 1) encouraging a better understanding between Australia and Indonesia in relation to their media relationship, (2) eras­ ing the latent negative Indonesian view towards the Austra­ lian media, (3) changing the view that the critical reports are always detrimental, (4) increasing the appreciation of the cultural backgrounds of Australia and Indonesia, thus (5) producing news reports which are more acceptable, and (6) the Australian and Indonesian media reporting continuously the

220 development of political events both in Australia and Indone­ sia and not only focusing on particular issues which are sensitive. Sixth, although the six newspapers apparently tried to implement a "High" level of the "SW+H" formula, the Indone­ sian newspapers had a tendency to produce more items which reached this level than the Australian newspapers (see Tables 7, 8 and 9). Nevertheless, the Australian newspapers provided news items which contained at least "Medium" levels of com­ pleteness. Similarly, al though the six newspapers studied tried to maximise the use of news values, all the Indonesian newspaper items fell into the "Maximum" category (see Tables 10 and 11), while the proportion of Australian newspapers items was slightly lower. However it is obvious that the news values and completeness aspects of the newsmaking process were implemented thoroughly by the six newspapers in covering the shootings. Therefore, good journalistic standards basi­ cally were implemented by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in general to achieve a required level of newswor­ thiness. seventh, the six newspapers tried to fulfill the main functions of newspapers by reporting more events than com­ ments and/or supports or counters to the comments and back­ ground stories (see Tables 21, 22 and 23). The fact that biased reports were produced by news items using comments rather than those reporting events supports the earlier conclusion that the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in

221 general were able to produce neutral reports. This also means that although the Australian media represents a picture of the Western media, Indonesia ( as well as the other Third World countries) should accept Australian newspapers' repor­ tage of East Timor, due to the fact that most of their reportage comprised neutral reports and that no news media can be fully free from bias. Therefore, it is a mistake to conclude from the discus­ sion of the seven points above, that the Australian newspa­ pers tended to report the incident unfairly, inadequately and biasedly. It is also not appropriate to assume that the Australian newspapers have damaged Indonesia too much through their reportage of East Timor. In spite of their lack of attention to the Indonesian Commission's report and the voyage of the Portuguese ship, the findings show that these newspapers seem to have "counted" Indonesia in their editori­ al policies. It is also a mistake to conclude that the three Indonesian newspapers tended to publish the Dili incident unfairly, inadequately and biasedly. It is obvious that the Indonesian newspapers basically are also able to produce neutral reports. In spite of possible Indonesian government influence on their contents, the findings of this study demonstrate that most of their reportage reveals good jour­ nalistic performance that is comparable with what the Austra­ lian newspapers produced. Nevertheless, as Conrad Black and Ratih Hardjono note in their serious concerns with the Australian news attention to

222 particular events, endeavours should be made by the Austra­ lian newspapers in particular and also by Indonesian newspa­ pers to improve their coverage •1 The Australian media's coverage will be more acceptable to Indonesia in particular and the Asian and developing countries generally, if they are able to be more sensitive in understanding the other coun­ tries' cultural values regarding criticism. The fact that they have become a "watch-dog", taking on what Hardjono sees as a "supervisory role" in Australian politics and society, does not mean they can simply apply this role to the politics and society of the other countries, due to the different cultural values held by these countries. On the other hand,

Indonesia should also be able to understand Australian polit­ ical and cultural backgrounds and the way that Australian newspapers operate. The sensitive attitudes shown by Indone­ sia tend to show that Indonesia has not fully understood the media freedom and the broader freedom of expressing arguments critically in Australia, as well as the Australian media's role as a "watch-dog" in Australian politics and society. Thus, appreciation of the Australian and Indonesian media's position will lead the Australians and Indonesians in general to understand each other's activities.

1.conrad Black was basically concerned with Peter Hartcher's affair of the wrong attribution of an opinion poll and not par­ ticularly concerned with the East Timer case. But this can also be used for the judgement in the Australian media coverage in the Dili massacre. See Shanahan and Simper, Op. Cit., p. 1. While Hardjono basically focused her opinion on the Australian media in general. See Ratih Hardjono, Op. Cit., pp. 188-191.

223 Eighth, although in many cases there were indications that showed the Australian and Indonesian newspapers to be part of the general controversy between the North-West and South blocs, it can still be argued that the Australian and Indonesian newspapers basically followed the concept of the New World Information Order. Bearing in mind the observation of news contents and news patterns discussed earlier, it seems that Merrill's argument about the conflict in the flow of information, in which, on one hand, the Western media is too dominant and powerful and, on the other hand, the Third World countries demand the establishment of a New World Information Order, is reflected in the Australian and Indone­ sian news coverage of East Timor. This information conflict is seen in Indonesia's dissatisfaction with the way the Australian press reported the massacre and, by contrast, the way in which the Australian press in reporting East Timor demanded and were guaranteed freedom of the press by the Australian Government.1 Indonesia accused the Australian media of exaggerating when they reported the massacre. The general view of the Indonesians to the Australian media, as stated earlier, was negative. The Indonesians assume that the Australian media

1.Prime Minister Paul Keating stated that freedom of the press was essential in Australia's political system and he supported the Australian media's rights to report and to comment freely and critically. This statement was given to three Indonesian journalists who interviewed him at the Parliament House. Read Tempo 25 April 1992, No. 8 (XXII), p. 26.

224 tend to publish reports which criticised and discredited Indonesia. Similarly, the ASEAN countries' media took the view that the Australian media played a great role in leading the international condemnation of Indonesia. This meant that the world opinion on the political conflict in East Timor was greatly influenced by the Australian media.1 With regard to the fact that East Timor (Timor island) belongs to the Asian continent, the Australian newspapers' reportage of East Timor probably portrays the Australian media reportage of Asia. seneviratne takes up this issue by questioning whether the Australian newspapers are still in the 19th century when reporting Asia. He critically states:2

Isn't it true that our (Australia) news agenda and news values are still influenced by a Euro-centric attitude which is more reflective of the world of the 19th cen­ tury rather than the "New World Order" which is taking us into the 21st century?

These comments and stances represented a dissatisfaction among the Third World countries about the North-West block that tended to drive the developing countries to a position l."Penyebaran InLormasi Kasus Dili Bersumberkan Wartawan Australia", in Kompas, 4 March 1992, p. 1 and "Muted Reaction Reflects ASEAN Sensitivity", in The Australian, 15 November 1991, p. 8. 2.Kalinga Seneviratne, "Reporting Asia: Are We Still in the 19th Century", paper at the Australian centre for Inde­ pendent Journalism (ACIJ) - the Australian Trade Commis­ sion (AUSTRADE) seminar, Trading With The Region, on November 14, 1992, at the University of Technology, Syd­ ney, p. 5.

225 of being either objects or helpless consumers in the distri­ bution of information. The domination of the Western media created a world opinion and a selection of information which, in the Third World's view, was detrimental to the developing countries. This study addresses Merrill's argument about the con­ flict in the flow of information, Seneviratne's concern about the way the Australian media report events in Asia continent and Ratih Hardjono' s statement about Indonesia's negative views to the Australian media. The principal findings of this study give some answers on issues of whether the Australian and Indonesian news attention refers to the concerns of the New World Information Order concept in reporting the 12 November case and its developments. In some cases, it would be apparent that the demands of balancing the flow of infor­ mation, producing unbiased news and treating the Third World­ ers as partners rather than as helpless consumers were not met by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers in their reportage of the Dili massacre. Three facts indicate this. Firstly, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that foreign (non-Indonesia) reportage of East Timor tended to corner Indonesia. This was supported by an unnamed Western diplomat's claim, secondly, who said that the ASEAN countries generally assumed that the Australian media had a great role in leading the internation­ al condemnation against Indonesia. The dip_lomat added that the reaction to the Dili case shown by the ASEAN countries,

226 basically, reflected the ASEAN countries' sensitivities. Thirdly, an Australian journalist stated in an Asia-Pacific conference, held in Ujung Pandang, that most of reportage of East Timor in the Pacific region came from the Australian news sources --primarily AAP-- due to the fact that the Pacific countries did not have direct news access to Indone­ sia.1 These three facts suggest support for the negative assumptions of the Third World countries about the Western media. First of all, the Western media seems to be too domi­ nating and powerful, so that the Third World riations can not find news and information that is acceptable to their aspira­ tions. 2 In this case, the Australian media dominated the dissemination of information of the Dili massacre in the Pacific region and their reportage sometimes angered Indone­ sia. Secondly, the Western media tended to produce inade­ quate, unfair and biased information when reporting some events in the developing countries and that information caused dissatisfaction to these countries. What the Austra­ lian media did in reporting East Timor was assumed to be biased, unfair, inadequate and again established the negative

l.These three facts in the developments of the 12 November case which have been described in Chapter III. 2.The details of the Third World's views about the domina­ tion and the power of the Western media can be read in Merrill, "The Global Perspective", Op. Cit., p. 51.

227 view of the Australian media among the Indonesians •1 one Indonesian Embassy's staff in Canberra has stated that the Australian newspapers sometimes cited an Amnesty Internation­ al member's claim about the massacre, for example. In fact, he claimed, this member had never gone to East Timer. The Embassy staff member asked, first, did the member really know about East Timer and what was going on in East Timer, and second, how could the Australian newspapers believe him?2 In short, this Embassy staff member viewed the Australian me­ dia's attitude negatively. From these points of view, it also seems that the way the Australian media in reporting the events in Asia regarded by Seneviratne as going back to the 19th century --or even further than that-- and thus moving far from the requirements of the 21st century, is close to the reality. In reporting some events in East Timer, the Australian newspapers tended to lead the international opinion in blaming Indonesia, as a reflection of Western domination. Controversy regarding the number of victims was reported aggresively in the Australian media, for example. They also jumped to conclusions about the victims that later proved inaccurate, at least compared with l.The negative view was the general assumption of the Indo­ nesian, as stated by Ratih Hardjono in the seminar of Trading with the Region, 14 November 1992, at the Univers­ ity of Technology, Sydney. 2.The staff member discussed this matter in informal inter­ view in the second day of the screening of an Indonesian movie, "Tjoet Nja' Dhien", in Canberra, in November 1992. For diplomatic reasons, the writer cannot name the staff member in this report.

228 the commission reports, which were largely ignored in the Australian press. on the other side, the attitudes of the Indonesian newspapers when reporting the Dili incident also indicated the conflict that exists between the developed and the devel­ oping countries. Two matters which were interrelated showed the attitudes of the Indonesian newspapers. Firstly, as was reflected by Bishop Belo's refusal to receive Indonesian journalists, the Indonesian newspapers sometimes published reports that were not based on the real facts. 1 This probably was caused by the Indonesian newspapers' obligation to main­ tain Indonesian unity and stability, since the political conflict in East Timor was vi~wed by the Indonesian govern­ ment as creating other conflicts in the other provinces and disturbing Indonesia's unity and stability. Inevitably, these obligations put pressure on Indonesian newspapers to wait for formal Indonesian government explanations before reporting the massacre. Thus, such attitudes "undermined" the indepen­ dence of the Indonesian newspapers to report the incident through their own initiatives. This is by no means to say that there is no freedom for the Indonesian newspapers at all, but it is to say that such freedom sometimes is limited due to Indonesia's wider interests. Apart from the fact that the Indonesian newspapers sometimes failed to produce news based on the facts and

1.After some time, Bishop Belo did meet Indonesian journal­ ists.

229 showed little initiative in digging for facts, their at­ titudes encouraged a dependency on the Indonesian government. The Indonesian newspapers used more news which came from Indonesian Routine Information Channels. As Tiffen argues, "reliance on routine channels gives government and official great scope to influence the content and focus of news 11 • 1 As was argued above, heavy use of governmental information channels would minimise freedom of information, which is related to media freedom. This is the essential problem pointed out by the developed countries, which state that media freedom is the core of the New World Information Order, rather than eradicating the one-way flow of information and the domination of the Western media. The discussion above leads to the conclusion that the issues of the New World Information Order did emerge strongly in the Australian and Indonesian news coverage of East Timor from July 1991 to March 1992. Australian newspapers showed their power and domination in the Pacific region, had a tendency to corner Indonesia in international opinion and created dissatisfaction within Indonesia in particular and in ASEAN countries in general. On the other hand, what the Indonesian newspapers had done in reporting East Timor re­ flected the low level of.the media freedom in Indonesia. The social responsibility of the Indonesian newspapers framed them in a narrower space of media freedom, due to the Indone-

1.Tiffen, The News from Southeast Asia, Op. Cit., p. 163.

230 sian government' suggestion that they help establish the unity and stability of Indonesia. The reportage of East Timor, hence, did seem to set the Australian and Indonesian newspapers into their own blocks in relation to the concept of the New World Information Order.1 Nonetheless, it is still questionable whether the repor­ tage of East Timor made by the Australian and Indonesian newspapers fits entirely into the framework suggested by the New World Information Order. Some findings of this study, at least, suggest a generally good performance by Australian and Indonesian newspapers in reporting the events in East Timor. Firstly, the responsive attitudes of the Australian and Indonesian newspapers to the Dili case were basically alike. While the Australian newspapers seem to lead the world's opinion --reflecting Western media domination--, the Indone­ sian newspapers indicated that they did not ignore the Dili case and showed a concern with the event that embraces human­ itarian problems. At various levels, both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers made an issue over human rights. If it is argued that they did not show the same level of concern with this issue, such a debate would be equal to "the search for the snake's armpit" (never ending). Hence, the first main -point is that the newspapers were responsive to the event. Secondly, both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers

1.The North-West and the South blocks were discussed ·by Merrill. See Merrill, "The Global Perspective", Op. Cit. p. 51.

231 did not show much bias in reporting the event. This focuses attention on the real problem of bias, as stated by Arno: that is, to what extent will the level of bias surface.1 The findings of this study indicate that biased news was rela­ tively small compared to the neutral reports that were pub­ lished. In other words, the Australian and Indonesian newspa­ pers tried to perform well in their reportage by producing the high number of neutral reports. Based on the facts that the media cannot be free from bias and that cam-plaints of bias often appear, the second main point of the necessity of the New World Information Order is how to minimise the biased news: how to minimise the bias of the Australian newspapers against Indonesia and, in turn, how to diminish the biased news made by Indonesian newspapers. This probably can be solved through compromising the view of the biased news on the basis of Australia and Indonesia's views. The way the Australian newspapers report events and news which is report­ ed should be acceptable to Indonesia and, on the other hand, media freedom in Indonesia needs encouraging by reducing the Indonesian government control. Bearing in mind the political and cultural backgrounds in Australia and Indonesia, lastly, the different patterns of their reportage basically can be understood. These political and cultural backgrounds, as stated earlier in Chapter I,

1.see Barr, Op. Cit., p. 77 and Arno, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Litigantibus Tertius Gaudet", Op. Cit., p. 232.

232 influence the adoption and the implementation of the social responsibility theory of the press. This means that the operation of the press will differ between Australia and Indonesia, and, t~us, will have impacts in the production of reports. These dissimilarities, ideally, should not create new conflicts in relation to the concept of the New World Information Order. The more important thing is how to make the ways of the Australian newspapers in reporting the event more understandable by Indonesia and how to make the Indone­ sian newspapers' reportage more understandable by Australia. Similarly, the Australian and Indonesian newspapers should be more appreciative in understanding the political and cultural backgrounds of other countries, so that their reportage is more acceptable. Therefore, an understanding of the political and cultural backgrounds is needed in both countries. The facts that the Australian media were powerful and dominating especially in the Pacific region, had a great role in leading international condemnation against Indonesia, and some of their reportage angered Indonesia, and that, on the other hand, media freedom in Indonesia did not fully exist, do not erase the point that the findings of this study did not suggest opposition between the media of the two blocs. The generally good performances in their news items and their good endeavours in implementing proper news aspects in the newsmaking process, reflected the fact that the Australian and Indonesian newspapers are not merely parts of one of two unequal information blocs.

233 overall, the study has shown the way the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the political conflict in East Timar. It has also examined the Australian and Indonesian news attention, Australia's and Indonesia's standing in the concept of the New World Information Order and some aspects of the process of newsmaking in The Australian, The Sydney Horning Herald, The courier-Hail, Kompas, Jawa Pos, and surya regarding their reportage of East Timar. In general, this study suggests that the Australian and Indonesian newspapers are now moving towards the goals of the New World Information Order.

*****

234 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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2. Arno, Andrew, 11 CoD11Dunication, Conflict, and Storylines: The News Media's Actors in a Cultural Context" , in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), The News Media in National and International Conflict, Westview Press, London, 1974, pp. 1 - 15. 3. ------, "The News Media as Third Parties in National and International Conflict: Duobus Li tigantibus Tertius Gaudet, in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), The News Media in National and International Conflict, Westview Press, London, 1974, pp. 229 - 38. 4. Barr, Trevor, Reflections of Reality: The Media in Austra­ lia, Rigby, Adelaide, 1977. 5. Berelson, Bernard, Content Analysis in Communication Research, Hafner Press, New York, 1952. 6. Block, Eva, "Freedom and Equality: Indicators of Polit­ ical Changes in Sweden 1945-1975", in Karl Erik Rosen­ gren (ed.), Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Publica­ tions, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 241 - 50. 7. Bond, Fraser, An Introduction to Journalism, MacMillan, New York, 1961. 8. Brenchley, Fred, "Creating a Responsive Regulatory Environ­ ment", in Australian Centre for Independent Journal­ ism, Competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Media, University of Technology, Sydney, (September) 1991, pp. 27 - 32.

9. Bryder, Tom, "Actor Reliability, Some Methodological Problems, in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 69 - 88. 10. Budd, Richard w., et. al., content Analysis of Communica­ tions, The Macmillan company, New-York, 1967. 11. Carlsson, Gosta, et al., "Mass Media content, Political Opinions, and social Change: Sweden 1967-1974", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed. ) , Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Pllblications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 227 - 40.

235 12. Donohue, George A., Phillip J. Tichenor and Clarine N. Olien, "Media Evaluations and Group Power", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International Conflict, Westview Press, London, 1984, pp. 203 - 15. 13. Devine, Frank, "Keeping the Press Free - Why the Govern­ ment Should Not Regulate the Media", in Australian centre for Independent Journalism, Competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Hedia, University of Technology, Sydney, (September) 1991, pp. 21 - 26. 14. Fibiger, .Bo, "Danish Election Campaign in the seven­ ties", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in cont­ ent Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 159 - 76. 15. Gonzalez-Manet, Enrique, The Hidden War of Information, Ablex Publishing Corporations, New Jersey, 1988. 16. Granato, Len, Reporting and Writing News, Prentice Hall, New York, 1991. 17. Hardjono, Ratih, White Tribe of Asia, Monash Asia Institute - Monash University and Hyland House, Mel­ bourne, 1993. 18. Hill, David T., The Press in 'New Order' Indonesia: Enter­ ing the 1990's, Working Paper No. 1, National Library of Australia, 1991. 19. Hill, Helen, The Timar Story, Timor Information Service, Fitzroy, 1975. 20. Hoadley, J. Stephen, The FUture of Portuguese Timar, Insti­ tute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1975. 21. Holsti, Ole R., "The 1914 Case", in John E. Mueller (ed.), Approaches to Heasurement in International Relations, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1969, pp. 226 - 47. 22. ------, content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Human­ ities, Addison-Wesley Publishing, Philippines, 1969. 23. Kaplan, A. and J.M. Goldsen, "The Reliability of Content Analysis categories", in H.D. Laswell, et. al., The Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semant­ ics, George Stewart, New York, 1949, pp. 83 - 112. 24. Krippendorf, Klaus, Content Analysis, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980.

236 25. Lent, John A., "Mass Communication in the Third World: Some Ethical Considerations", in John A. Lent (Guess Editor) , Third 'Nor ld Hass Hedia: Issues, Theory and Research, College of William and Mary, Virginia, 1979, pp. 1 -16. 26. Merrill, John c., "'The Free Flow of .News' and 'Western Communication Imperialism': Divergent Views on Ethical Issues", in John A. Lent (Guess Editor), Third World Hass Hedia: Issues, Theory and Research, College of William and Mary, Virginia, 1979, pp. 27 - 43. 27. ------, "The Global Perspective", in John c. Merrill (ed.), Global Journalism: A survey of the World's Has~ Media, Longman, New York, 1983. 28. Nordenstreng, Kaarle and Lauri Hannikainen, The Hass Hedia Declaration of UNESCO, Ablex Publishing Corporation, New Jersey, 1984. 29. Peterson, Theodore, "The social Responsibility Theory of the Press 11 , in Fred s. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm (eds. ) , Four Theories of the Press, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1963. 30. Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propagan­ da, W.R. Freeman and company, New York, 1992. 31. Rachmadi, F., Perbandingan Sistem Pers, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1980. 32. Rawson, D.W., Australia Votes, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1961. 33. Richardson, Gunnel, "Newspaper Opinion and Public Opin­ ion", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, 215 - 26. 34. Rodgers, Peter, The Domestic and Foreign Press in Indone­ sia: 'Free But Responsible'?, Research Paper No. 18, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1980. 35. Schultz., Julianne, Accuracy in Australian Newspapers, Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, Working Paper No. 1., University of Technology, Sydney, 1990. 36. Siune, Karen, "Broadcast Election Campaigns in a Multipar­ ty System: Denmark as a Test Case", in Karl Erik Rosengren (ed.), Advances in Content Analysis, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1981, pp. 177 - 96. 37. Smith, Rodney, "The News Media", in Rodney Smith and Lex Watson (Eds.), Politics in AUstralia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989, pp. 301 - 18.

237 38. Tiffen, Rodney, News and Power, Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1989. 39. ------, The News From Southeast Asia, Institute of South­ east Asian studies, Singapore, 1978. 40. Vaus, D.A. de, surveys in Social Research, Allen and Unwin, London, 1991. 41. Wang, Georgette, "The People's Daily and Nixon's Visit to China", in Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds.), The News Hedia in National and International Conclict, Westview Press, London, 1984, pp. 133-45. 42. Warren, Christopher, "Closures, Sackings - the Limits of Media Diversity", in Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, Competition and Diversity in Australia's Print Media, University of Technology, Sydney, (Septem­ ber) 1991, pp. 13 - 20. 43. weaver, David H, "Setting Political Priorities: What Role for the Press?", Political CoJ1111Junication and Persua­ sion, 7:201-11. 44. Weber, Robert P., Basic Content Analysis, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1985. 45. White, Sally A., Reporting in Australia, MacMillan, Mel­ bourne, 1991.

Unpublished Materials:

1. Broinowski, Alison, "How the World Sees Australian Journal­ ists", paper at the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism and the Australian Trade commission seminar Trading With The Region, at the University of Technolo­ gy, Sydney, 1992. 2. Seneviratne, Kalinga, "Reporting Asia: Are We Still in the 19th Century", paper at the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism and the Australian Trade Commis­ sion seminar Trading With The Region, at the University of Technology, Sydney, 1992.

238 Newspapers contain issues of the Dili case: 1. Jawa Pos, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992. 2. Kompas, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992. 3. Surya, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992. 4. The AUstralian, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992. 5. The courier-Hail, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992. 6. The Sydney Horning Herald, l July 1991 - 31 March 1992.

*****

239 APPENDIX A

Diagraa 2: Units of Analysis and Categories lo OBITS or AIALYSIS CATEGORIES

1 RWSPAPER'S 1 Tile Australian 2 The Sydney Morning Herald 3 Tile Courier-Mail l1NE 4 K

2 TIMI 1 July, August and septelber 1991 2 october, IOvelber and Decelber 1991 3 January, February and Narcb 1992 3 TEIDEICY OF 1 Attacked or criticized Indonesia ms 2 Attacked or criticized Australia 3 Attacked or criticized Indonesia and Australia 4 Favoured Indonesia 5 Favoured Australia 6 Favoured Indonesia and Australia 7 criticized Indonesia and favoured Australia 8 criticized Australia and favoured Indonesia 9 leutral

4 COMPLETE!m 1 High 2 Hedi111 3 Low

5 HEWS VALUES 1 Nad1111 2 llinil111

6 FAIRIF.SS 1 one-sided Covering 2 Both-sided Covering

7 IEWS SOURCES 1 Indonesian Routine Inforaation Cbannels (IRIC) 2 Australian Routine Inforaation Channels (ARIC) 3 First-band Reports (FR) 4 otber sources (OS) 5 Infonal (I) 6 me+ we 16 me+ ARIC + FR 26 IRIC +we+ FR+ OS 1 me+ FR 11 me+ we+ os 27 IRIC +we+ FR+ I 8 me+ os 18 me+ we+ I 28 me+ we+ os + I 9 me+ I 19 me+ FR+ os 29 IRIC +FR+ OS+ I 10 we+ FR 20 me+ FR+ I 30 ARIC +FR+ OS+ I 11 we+ os 21 me + os + I 31 IRIC +we+ FR+ OS+ I 12 we+ I 22 we+ FR+ os 32 Opinion 13 FR+ OS 23 we+ FR+ I 33 Rot Clear 14FR+I 24 we+ os + I 150S+I 25 FR+ OS+ I 8 mDS OF 1 Event ms C0ITEIT 2 Couent on tile Event and SUpport or Counter to tile Couents 3 Background

240 APPENDIX B

Operational Definitions of the Content Analysis

1. lellspaper's nue is a nue wbicb is used by tbe press to identify its publication. Six (3 fro1 Aus- tralia and 3 fro1 Indonesia) newspapers whicb will be observed are: a. the lllstralian b. • Sydney llorning Berald c. • courier-Nail d. DPAS e. Java Pos f. surya Eacb of these newspapers will be studied tbrougb tbe nUlber of itellS of East Tilor news they reported.

2. Tile is the period whicb is defined for the study of East Ti10r news in tbese three newspapers. The total period is 9 10nths (275 days linus holidays) fro1 l July 1991 to 31 Narcb 1992 and this is divid­ ed into three parts: a. l July to 30 sept8llber 1991 (92 days) b. 1 october to 31 Decelber 1991 (92 days) c. 1 January to 31 Nardi 1992 (91 days) This unit of analysis will be observed tbrougb tbe frequency of news in each part of tbe tiH.

3. Tendency of news is the Hans of news as a whole in reporting the East Ti10r incident. This unit of analysis will be exuined tbrougb nine categories: a. Attacked or criticised Indollesia. categorised as this if the news reflects negatively on Indone­ sia in handling tbe East Ti10r·incident. The news whicb contains both tbe bad and tbe good side in balance for Australia, but reflects negatively on Indonesia will also be classified in this cate­ gory. b. Attacked or criticised Australia. categorised as this if tbe news reflects negatively on Australia related to the East Ti10r incident. The news whicb contains both the bad and the good side in balance for Indonesia, but reflects negatively on Australia will also be classified in this cate­ gory. c. Attacked or criticised IadoDesia and Australia. categorised as this if the news reflects negatively on Indonesia and Australia in facing up the Dili ussacre. d. favoured Indonesia. categorised as this if the news contains 10re of the positive side of Indonesia in handling the ussacre. Tile news which contains both the bad and tbe good side in balance for Australia, but contains 10re the positive side of Indonesia will also be classified in this cate­ gory. e. Favoured Australia. categorised as this if the news contains 10re of the positive side of Australia in relation to the Dili ussacre. The news which contains both the bad and the good side in bal­ ance for Indonesia, but contains 10re the positive side of Australia will also be classified in this category. f. favoured Indonesia and Australia. categorised as this if tbe news contains 10re of the positive sides of Indonesia and Australia in handling the ussacre. g. criticised Indonesia and favoured Aastralia. categorised as this if the news reflects negatively on Indonesia and contains 10re of the positive side of Australia in relation to the East Ti10r incid­ ent. b. criticised Australia and favoured Indonesia. categorised as this if the news reflects negatively on Australian and contains 10re of the positive side of Australia in handling the Dill incident. i. leutral. This category will be used if the news contains both the bad and the good side in balance whether for Indonesia and Australia.

241 4. COlpleteness is a criteria which is linked to the use of the '51 + B' foraula in the news. Three categories are used for defining whether the Australian press rates bigbl.y in this coapleteness: a. Bigll, if all answers wbicb relates to the questions of 'who were involved, what happened, and where, when, why, and bow it happened' are reported coaprebensively. b. llediua, if four of five fro1 six answers wbicb relate to the questions of 'who were involved, what happened, and where, when, wby, and bow it happened' are reported. c. Low, if only three or less than three froa six answers which relate to the questions of 'who were involved, what happened, and where, when, why, and bow it happened' are reported.

5. kls vala are criteria which are used to support news so that this news is appropriate to be reported. Six news values wbicb are very conon used are tiaeliness (=actual, freshness) , iaportance, aagni tude (=size, D111ber), proainence (=fuous, nae), proxility geographically and psychologically, and bUlan interest. !bis unit of analysis will be observed through two categories: a. Nuilua, if four or aore news values appear in the news. b. Ninia, if only three or less news values appear.

6. rairness is a criteria when dealing with the covering-step. This unit of analysis is divided into two categories: a. one-sided coverage, if in a conflict or crisis only one speaker fro, a certain party is interviewed or quoted. b. Both-sided coverage, if in a conflict or crisis two or aore speakers frol both parties are inter­ viewed or quoted.

7. lews sources are people or institutions and activities which produce news. This unit of analysis is divided into 32 categories: a. Indonesian loatine Infonation ONumels (me), if the inforaation cow froa the Indonesian Goveruent and political leaders, press releases and conuniques, Indonesian radio broadcasts, Indonesian television networks or the Indonesian news agency. b. Australian Routine Infonation awmtls (me), if tbe inforaation cow fro, the Australian Goveruent and political leaders, press releases and conuniques, Australian radio broadcasts, Australian televisions networks or the Australian news agency. c. rirst-band reports (D) are the aatter of news which coaes fro, direct observation, interviews with participants and eyewitnesses wbo are involved in the event. d. other sources (m), if the inforaation is based on non-Indonesian and non-Australian Governaents and political leaders, non-Indonesian and non-Australian press releases and conuniques, non-Indone­ sian and non-Australian radio broadcasts, non-Indonesian and non-Australian television networks, and non-Indonesian and non-Australian news agencies. e. Inforaal, if the inforaation especially coaes fro, news sources which cannot be categorised into the four categories above, such as a leak. f. me + me, if the inforaation cow fro, both Indonesian and Australian Routine Inforaation OJan­ nels. g. me + n, if the inforaation coaes froa the Indonesian Routine Inforaation Cbannels and first-band reports. b. me+ m, if the inforaation coaes froa the Indonesian Routine Inforaation Channels and other sourc- es. i. me + I, if the inforaation coaes fro• tbe Indonesian Routine Inforaation Channels and inforaal sources. j. me + n, if the inforaation coaes froa the Australian Routine Inforaatlon Cbannels and first-band reports. k. me+ m, if the inforaation coaes fro1 the Australian Routine Inforaation Channels and other sourc- es. 1. me + I, if the inforaation coaes fro, the Australian Routine Inforaation Cbannels and inforaal sources. 1. n + m, if the inforaation coaes fro, first-band reports and other sources. n. n + I, if the inforaation coaes fro• first-band reports and inforaal sources.

242 o. m + I, if the intonation c:oteS fro1 intonal and other sources. p. me+ we+ PI, if the intonation coaes froa the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intonation Cbannels and first-band reports. q. me+ we+ m, if the intonation c:oteS fro1 the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intonation Channels and other sources. r. me+ we+ I, if the intonation coaes froa the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intonation Cbannels and intonal souces. s. me + PI + m, if the intonation coaes fro• the Indonesian Routine Intonation Cbannels, first­ band reports and other sources. t. me + PI + I, if the intonation coaes fro• the Indonesian Routine Intonation Channels, first­ band reports and intonal sources. u. me+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro1 the Indonesian Routine Intonation Channels, intonal and other sources. v. we + PI + m, if the intonation coaes froa the Australian Routine Intonation Channels, first­ band reports and other sources. w. we + n + I, if the intonation coaes froa the Australian Routine Intonation Channels, first­ band reports and intonal sources. x. we+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro• the Australian Routine Intonation Channels, intonal and other sources. y. PI+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro1 first-band reports, intonal and other sources. z. me+ we+ PI+ m, if the intonation coaes fro1 the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intonation Cbannels, first-band reports and other sources. aa. me+ we+ PI+ I, if the intonation coaes fro1 the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intonation Channels, first-band reports and intonal sources. bb. me+ we+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro1 the Indonesian and lustraliu Routine Intonation Cbannels, intonal and other sources. cc. me+ n +m +I, if the intonation coaes froa the Indonesian Routine Intonation Cbannels, first­ band reports, intonal and other sources. dd. we+ PI+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro• the Australian Routine Intonation Channels, first­ band reports, intonal and other sources. ee. me+ we+ PI+ m +I, if the intonation coaes fro1 the Indonesian and Australian Routine Intor­ aation Channels, first-band reports, intonal and other sources. ff. Opinion, especially appears in the fons of opinion article and editorial. gg. lot Clear. a. linds of DM contents are defined as the subjects wbich like the news ledia. This unit of analysis is categorised into three kinds: a. Event b. COllent on the event and support or counter to the couent d. Background Because the three kinds of news contents are soaetiaes COlbined, studying this unit of analysis will focus on wbicb kind of content is eapbasised. leis in newspapers will be categorised as an event if the news content describes an event wbicb takes place. Included in tbis category: the lain event, delonstration and action-reaction to tbis event. This will be aeasured tbrougb the nUlber of news iteas which refer to the event. coaent on the event and support or counter to the conent appear in the fora of stateaents, wbether fro• the governaent officers, political leaders, other leaders, or experts. SUpport or counter to the conent usually follows the coaent before. This category will be accounted througb the nUlber of iteas of news vbicb are in the fora statelent or couent and support or counter to the c:oaent. Background is a kind of news content wbicb gives a brief explanation and cbronological events.

243 'APPENDIX C

Coding Sheet

Ite1 No: ....•..•

NeNspaper's na1e: Edition ······························ Page(s) Colu1n(s) ------Title: ......

NeNs fonat 1.HardneNs 2.SoftneNs 3.Editorial 4.0pinion Article 5.features &.Background stories NeNs lead 1.Nho 2.Nhat 3.Nhere 4.Nhen 5.Nhy 6.HoN 7.0thers: ...•

======Tendency of neNs: 1.Attacked Indonesia 2.Attacked Australia 3.Attacked Indonesia I Australia 4.favoured Indonesia 5.favoured Australia &.favoured Indonesia I Australia 7.Attacked Indonesia I favoured Australia I.Attacked Australia I favoured Indonesia 9.Neutral

Co1pleteness 1.6ood 2.Nediu1 3.Bad

NeNs values 1.Naxi1u1 2.Nini1u1

fairness 1.0ne·sided covering 2.Both-sided covering

NeNs sources : 1.IRIC 2.ARIC 3.FR 4.0S 5.1 6.IRIC+ARIC 7.IRIC+FR 8.IRIC+OS 9.IRIC+I 10.ARIC+fR 11.ARIC+OS 12.ARIC+I 13.fR+OS 14.fR+ I 15.0S+1 16.IRIC+ARIC+FR 17.IRIC+ARIC+OS 18.IRIC+ARIC+I 19.IRIC+fR+OS 20.IRIC+FR+ I 21.IRIC+OS+I 22.ARIC+fR+OS 23.ARIC+fR+I 24.ARIC+OS+I 25.FR+OS+I 26.IRIC+ARIC+fR+OS 27.IRIC+ARIC+fR+I 28.IRIC+fR+OS+I 29.ARIC+fR+OS+I 30.IRIC+ARIC+fR+OS+I 31.0pinion 32.Not clear 33.IRIC+ARIC+OS+I

Kinds of neNs : 1.Event content 2.Co11ent on the event and support or counter to the co11ents 3.Background

======Coder: UNSN, ...•. / ..... /19 .. Sian : 244