Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 3 (author’s prepublication version)

3 Dili

On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops colonies — such as and Mozambique gunned down hundreds of peaceful protesters — to gain independence. in Dili, the capital of . This act was In East Timor, ’s most remote intended to intimidate opponents of Indonesian colony, with a population of nearly 700,000, rule. But instead, the killings triggered a huge rival political forces struggled for supremacy increase in international support for East in the transition from Portuguese rule, with the Timor’s independence. In order to understand liberation movement Fretilin having most the Dili massacre and how it backfired, I popular support. In December 1975, Indone- review its background and aftermath, giving sian military forces invaded and occupied East special attention to the five methods attackers Timor. According to some commentators, the use to inhibit outrage. Indonesian government had obtained agree- Most of the archipelago today called ment for the operation from the Australian and was previously a colony of the U.S. governments.2 Fretilin fought the inva- Netherlands. Indonesia obtained its independ- sion but soon retreated to the mountains where ence in 1949. The new government, led by it maintained a guerrilla resistance to the Sukarno, fostered a strong sense of national- Indonesian occupiers. ism. In 1965, there was a military coup, The invasion and occupation were bloody, accompanied by a massive anticommunist with many fighters and civilians killed. purge, with hundreds of thousands of people Indonesian forces perpetrated serious human killed.1 The new regime, led by General rights violations, including torture, rape, and Suharto, was ideologically procapitalist, but it killing of civilians; Fretilin did the same, retained its predecessor’s strong nationalism. though on a much smaller scale and mainly in One of the islands in the archipelago, the first few years after 1975. The Indonesian Timor, had been colonized by Portugal in the occupation led to famine among East Timorese 1500s, and later by the Netherlands. Portugal living on the land, leading to the death of up to eventually ended up controlling just the 180,000 people.3 On a proportional basis, this eastern half of the island. In 1974, a military was one of the most lethal conquests in the coup in Lisbon toppled the Portuguese dicta- century. torship, opening the path for representative For several years, the United Nations government. This also enabled Portugal’s passed resolutions condemning the Indonesian takeover, but none of these was backed up

1. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 2. Joseph Nevins, A Not-so-Distant Horror: 1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast Mass Violence in East Timor (Ithaca, NY: Asian Studies, , 1990). On Cornell University Press, 2005), 51–52, 62– the lack of backfire from this bloodbath, see 63. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian 3. Commission for Reception, Truth, and Vickers, “Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Reconciliation Timor-Leste, Chega! (East Repression: Studying Lower-profile Nonvio- Timor: Commission for Reception, Truth, and lent Resistance,” Pacifica Review 13 (2001): Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005). I thank Joe 143–56. Nevins for referring me to this source.

Dili 17 with action. Most governments and corpora- reduced criticism from other governments. The tions preferred to keep on good terms with the governor of East Timor asked for easing of Indonesian regime, which ruled one of the restrictions on travel to, from, and within East world’s most populous countries. However, in Timor, in order to foster investment, to which the following decades, only the Australian President Suharto agreed. From 1989, tourists government formally recognized the incorpo- and western journalists — but not human ration of East Timor into Indonesia. Within rights observers — were allowed into East several countries, notably Australia, Japan, and Timor. Britain, there were active solidarity move- Fretilin, with declining numbers of fighters ments supporting the East Timorese liberation in the late 1980s, changed its strategic orienta- struggle.4 tion, also taking into account the increased The Indonesian occupiers kept tight control access by visitors. Rather than seeking over communications in and out of East liberation primarily through armed struggle Timor. After the 1975 invasion, supporters in with a guerrilla army based in the countryside, northern Australia for some years maintained the new approach emphasized civilian resis- short-wave contact with Fretilin in the face of tance in urban areas. Fretilin retained its Australian government efforts to shut down weapons but decided to use them only for the radio link.5 The restriction on information defense, not to launch attacks. The aims of this flow helped to reduce outrage over atrocities new orientation were to foster East Timorese carried out by Indonesian troops. Often the unity in the struggle and to gain greater only word of these came via individuals who support for independence both within Indone- were able to leave East Timor. Their testimony sia and internationally. Fretilin gave special often lacked credibility because there was no attention to mobilizing protests to coincide independent verification or endorsement by with visits by foreign dignitaries.6 western sources. A delegation of Portuguese parliamentari- The Indonesian occupiers in the late 1980s ans planned to visit East Timor in late 1991. faced reduced pressure from Fretilin and Independence supporters organized a major demonstration; at the same time, the Indone- sian military prepared for a crackdown. The 4. On the East Timorese liberation struggle, Portuguese visit was called off at the last see for example Carmel Budiardjo and Liem minute following a procedural disagreement Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor between the Indonesian and Portuguese (London: Zed Books, 1984); Jill Jolliffe, East governments. Tensions were predictably high. Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (Bris- On the night of 28 October, there was a bane: University of Queensland Press, 1978); fight between pro-independence and pro- Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Indonesian Timorese in the Church of Saint Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor Anthony of Motael in Dili. Many young (London: TAPOL, 1979); John Pilger, Distant people had sought refuge in the building prior Voices (London: Vintage, 1994), 231–323; to the cancelled visit; the church was sur- Constâncio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East rounded by Indonesian troops, who tried to Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the make the East Timorese leave. Two people Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End were killed, one of them a Timorese working Press, 1997); John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s for the Indonesians and the other an 18-year- Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East old supporter of independence named Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991). 5. Rob Wesley Smith, “Radio Maubere and Links to East Timor,” in Free East Timor: 6. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resis- Genocide, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random tance Movement’s Strategy for Engagement,” House, 1998), 83–102. Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000), 17–31.

18 Justice Ignited

Sebastião Gomes. Bishop Carlos Belo — the several minutes — no one could be sure leading Catholic Church figure in a largely how long.9 Catholic country — went to the scene. The Indonesians tried to claim Gomes had been This event might have become just one more killed with a knife, but Belo saw the bullet instance of an alleged atrocity, without holes in his body. In a funeral mass for authoritative documentation. The difference Gomes, the bishop fiercely criticized the this time was that western journalists were Indonesian occupiers, saying they had ultimate present at Santa Cruz cemetery, witnessing the responsibility for the deaths.7 massacre, among them Alan Nairn of the New The resistance movement decided to go Yorker, Amy Goodman of Pacifica Radio, and ahead with the protest it had planned for the Steve Cox, a British photographer, each of Portuguese visit, but to make it part of a whom was severely beaten. Their eyewitness memorial procession and service at Santa Cruz accounts provided vivid, credible evidence of cemetery for Gomes, scheduled for 12 what had happened.10 November. Indonesian troops surrounded the Most powerful of all was video footage shot mourners along its route. While expressing by British filmmaker Max Stahl, from political sentiments, the large procession was Yorkshire Television. Stahl hid his videotapes almost entirely peaceful, except for one in the cemetery and picked them up later. The incident. next day, Dutch reporter Saskia Kouwenberg smuggled the tapes out of East Timor and then Suddenly there was a brief scuffle as an out of Indonesia. This video footage was Indonesian major waded into the crowd screened initially in the Netherlands, then in with a group of soldiers bearing fixed Britain and other countries, and totally bayonets. The major threw a young discredited Indonesian government denials that woman to the ground as he tried to grab an atrocity had occurred.11 a nationalist flag she was carrying. Some The Dili massacre severely backfired on the accounts say the major was then stabbed Indonesian occupiers. International outrage led by the boyfriend of the young woman. to a huge increase in support for the East The stabbing, later cited by Indonesian Timorese solidarity movement in many authorities as the reason for the tragedy countries. Movement groups continued with that day, was hardly noticed at the time, their activities, raising awareness of the and to this day it is not clear what injustice and brutality of the occupation and happened.8 putting pressure on western governments and corporations over their overt or tacit support The march proceeded without hindrance until for the Indonesian government. The outrage its arrival at the cemetery. over the massacre boosted these efforts. Journalists and editors were more willing to Indonesian troops arrived and opened run stories about East Timor. Politicians, many fire on the crowd at point-blank range, of whom saw Stahl’s footage, were more without warning or provocation. It had willing to support legislation penalizing all the appearance of a planned, disci- plined operation. The fusillade lasted 9. Ibid. 10. Also present was Australian journalist 7. Arnold S. Kohen, From the Place of the Russell Anderson, who tells his story in “The Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of Massacre of 12 November 1991,” in Aubrey, East Timor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Free East Timor, 145–52. I thank Joe Nevins 1999), 154–58. for this point. 8. Ibid., 162. 11. Kohen, From the Place of the Dead, 167. Dili 19

Indonesia. Speakers about the occupation, two prominent East Timorese figures, Bishop especially those from East Timor, were in Belo and José Ramos-Horta, head diplomat of much greater demand. the resistance. The award significantly lifted Commenting on western media coverage on the profile of the independence cause. East Timor, journalist Hugh O’Shaughnessy The global context in the 1990s also helped stated: supporters of East Timor independence. Following the end of the Cold War, commu- Whether the Indonesian authorities nism no longer served as such an effective recognized it at the time or not, Stahl’s pretext for oppression; governments were film was the death knell for the contin- more prone to use the rhetoric of human rights. ued dominance of Indonesia in East A number of small states gained independ- Timor. It put the territory on the world ence, including the Baltic states and parts of political agenda in a way that no other former Yugoslavia, giving greater plausibility document had done, inspiring people to demands for East Timor to have the same around the globe with the desire to help opportunity.14 to put an end to the occupation. Stahl’s The mobilizing effect of the Dili massacre film inspired print, radio and television did not derive solely from the scale of the journalists worldwide to continue the killings, because there had been many coverage of East Timor. John Pilger and previous massacres in East Timor, some of David Munro, for instance, used footage them worse than the one in Santa Cruz from Max Stahl and others as an indis- cemetery. For example, in 1981 a party of pensable part of a long television Fretilin guerrillas surrendered along with their documentary, Death of a Nation (1994), women and children. Aside from a few which was screened widely and updated women, they were all shot and their bodies and re-screened in 1999.12 burned, with some 400 killed. In August 1983, following a Fretilin attack that killed more In the United States, the testimony of than a dozen Indonesian troops, journalists Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, plus photos and videotape, led to media First some 200 Timorese were burnt coverage and to the creation of the East Timor alive in their homes, while another 500 Action Network, a grassroots movement. were killed at the Be Tuku River. … Some members of Congress were outraged by According to Mario Carrascalão, provin- the massacre and initiated legislative moves cial governor of the time who personally banning U.S. provision of military training and investigated the atrocity, more than 1000 weapons to Indonesia.13 Timorese of all ages were massacred. The increased visibility of the East Timor Yet there was no international response, issue was almost certainly a factor in the let alone pressure on the Suharto awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 to government to stop the killing. A state- ment by an Australian cabinet minister to the effect that Falintil [Fretilin troops] 12. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, “Reporting East should stop provoking the Indonesian Timor: Western Media Coverage of the military was the best that Canberra could Conflict,” in The East Timor Question: The come up with!15 Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, ed. Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 31–40, at 36. 13. Charles Scheiner, “The United States: 14. James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Pas- From Complicity to Ambiguity,” in Hains- sage to Independence, 3d ed. (Sydney: worth and McCloskey, East Timor Question, Longueville Books, 2003), 333. 117–32. 15. Ibid., 292–93.

20 Justice Ignited

In the past, cover-up and a highly regulated tors have to be shot and we will shoot media had been effective means for minimiz- them.”17 ing awareness of the brutalities of the occupa- tion, but this time information from credible As well as denigrating the victims, Indone- independent observers reached the rest of the sian officials attempted to undermine the world. Indonesian officials, though, did what credibility of East Timorese leaders by misrep- they could to prevent publicity about the Santa resenting what they said and wrote. After East Cruz killings. Immediately after the massacre, Timorese leader Xanana Gusmão was captured phone services to the outside world were cut in 1992, a military-controlled newspaper off. The Australian government, with strong accused him of rape and murder, among other economic and security ties to Indonesia, slurs.18 attempted to assist in preventing information A usual method by which the occupiers about the massacre reaching a wider public, attempted to reduce backlash from atrocities was to misrepresent what had happened.19 For by ordering its immigration officials in example, Lieutenant Colonel A. Tampodang Darwin to conduct a rigorous search of claimed the Dili events were due to the the belongings of both Stahl and presence of “more than 100 clandestine [photographer Steve] Cox when they separatists, armed with Portuguese-made G-3 flew out through Northern Australia in rifles and hand grenades.” Indonesian Foreign late November (fortunately, both had Minister Ali Alatas claimed protesters had had the presence of mind to entrust their thrown grenades at the troops, who had to film to reliable couriers, one of whom defend themselves against the threatening exited Timor by another route).16 crowd.20 Lies did not convince the local East Indonesian officials denigrated the victims. Timorese population, but usually were effec- For example, General Try Sutrisno, com- tive with the population of Indonesia and the mander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed wider world. The Indonesian media were forces (and later vice-president of Indonesia), regulated and monitored by the government, shortly after the massacre, so only the official line was covered. In other countries, Indonesian government views were defended the action, telling a graduation usually reported. Standard western media ceremony at the National Defence practice gives priority to statements by Institute, Lemhanas, that dissent must be government officials — especially when the quashed by “exterminating anyone who government in question is allied to the west — disrupts stability … They are people and gives government opponents little or no who must be crushed. This scum must be voice. Because the East Timorese resistance eliminated … ill-bred people who have had little access to the western media, partly to be shot … come what may, they cannot ignore ABRI [Indonesian armed forces] … ABRI is determined to 17. Andrew McMillan, Death in Dili (Sydney: eliminate anyone who creates distur- Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), 162. Ellipses in bances … Delinquents like these agita- the original. 18. Estêvão Cabral, “The Indonesian Propa- ganda War against East Timor,” in Hainsworth and McCloskey, East Timor Question, 69–84, at 75–76.

16. Steve Cox and Peter Carey, Generations of 19. Cabral describes many of the techniques of Resistance: East Timor (London: Cassell, misrepresentation. 1995), 52. 20. McMillan, Death in Dili, 161–62. Dili 21 due to Indonesian censorship and partly to Many independent observers — including an cultural, language, and logistic barriers, it was official UN delegation — concluded, to the difficult to offer a credible challenge to the contrary, that the attack was indeed premedi- official Indonesian government line. The Santa tated. Cruz events were quite different: the testimony In response to the international outcry, the of experienced western journalists, plus video Indonesian government set up an official footage, provided a powerful counter to inquiry into the massacre. The inquiry report Indonesian government lies. was released on December 26, 1991. Indonesian officials initially stated 19 peo- Compared to testimony by East Timorese ple had died at Santa Cruz cemetery. They witnesses and western observers, the inquiry later raised this to 50. A separate, non- reported a very low number of deaths. But the government assessment gave a figure of 271, very existence of an inquiry was an indication with many hundreds more injured. of the seriousness of the backlash against the A publication by the Indonesian Depart- Indonesian occupation. Following the investi- ment of Foreign Affairs in 1992 gives the gation, two generals were removed. According following account of the Santa Cruz “inci- to Kohen, dent”: One prominent expert on the Indonesian The tragic outcome of the demonstration military, who said that Suharto saw the that occurred in Dili, East Timor, on the Santa Cruz events as a major blunder, 12th of November 1991 was deeply noted that it was the first time that any regrettable, as was immediately and Indonesian army officer of that rank repeatedly expressed by the Indonesian “had ever been so publicly humiliated” Government at the highest levels. Most during the Suharto era.22 unfortunately, the demonstration was not entirely peaceful and indeed displayed The massacre led to other official re- premeditated provocation and belliger- sponses. The army conducted its own inquiry, ence. It triggered a spontaneous reaction which may have led to changes in the by some security personnel, acting command structure. As well, outside the control or command of senior officers, and resulted in a deplorable loss Amid the international outcry, ten of lives and a number of wounded members of the Indonesian security people. It was a tragic incident and forces were tried for disciplinary of- clearly not an act ordered by or reflect- fenses in connection with the Santa Cruz ing the policy of the Government or the massacre. All received sentences of Armed Forces.21 between eight and eighteen months, mainly served under house arrest, and were reportedly released well before serving their full sentences. In stark 21. Republic of Indonesia, East Timor: Build- contrast, East Timorese accused of ing for the Future (Jakarta: Department of organizing the demonstration at Santa Foreign Affairs, July 1992), vi–vii. The Cruz on November 12, 1991, and a language in this document is much more subsequent demonstration in the Indone- subdued than Sutrisno’s speech, reflecting the sian capital of Jakarta received sentences different audiences for their accounts. Sutrisno ranging from five years to life.23 was addressing an Indonesian military audi- ence whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs document, written in English, was expected to be available to foreign officials 22. Kohen, From the Place of the Dead, 170. and others. I thank Philip Kitley for this point. 23. Ibid., 171.

22 Justice Ignited

Although the official inquiries led to more curse of their total and relentless serious consequences for members of the isolation in their struggle.26 Indonesian military than any previous atroci- ties, which usually were perpetrated with The outrage from the Dili massacre laid the complete impunity, from the point of view of foundations for East Timorese independence. many outsiders, the official responses were Indonesia was badly affected by the 1997 window-dressing: economic collapse in East Asia. In 1998, following a campaign that used familiar Some observers believed that the methods of nonviolent action, Suharto re- removal of the two generals and court signed and parliamentary democracy was martials of lower ranking officers had introduced. A referendum was held in East little concrete impact but were the very Timor in 1999, with a vote of nearly 80% for least the Suharto regime could do to independence. Indonesian troops, police, and appease an outpouring of international militias organized and directed by the Indone- protest, and public disquiet in some sian military then went on a campaign of quarters of Indonesia itself.24 killing and destruction, leading to UN inter- vention and then independence for East Timor. The shootings in Santa Cruz cemetery were But that is another story.27 only the beginning of the Dili massacre. Indonesian troops then went among the Conclusion wounded, beating them. Some of the wounded were taken, days later, to a nearby river and The Dili massacre was a crucial turning point executed. According to Mario Carrascalão, — a transformative event — in East Timor’s former governor of East Timor, between 20 struggle for independence, most importantly and 50 East Timorese were killed on this by greatly increasing international support.28 occasion.25 The continuing assaults, torture, Ironically, this event appeared on the surface and killing, plus the arrest, trial, and lengthy to be a major defeat for the East Timorese: a imprisonment of leaders of the protest, were massacre in which hundreds died. But the very powerful means of intimidation. Despite this, brutality and excessiveness of the massacre Max Stahl reported that made it a prime candidate to backfire on the Indonesian occupiers. on the morning after the massacre there The one additional essential ingredient was were smiles on the faces of many communication to outside audiences, provided Timorese. This was because the foreign- by visiting Western journalists. The vital role ers had been there and filmed the event, of communication is highlighted by a and the foreigners, for once, were also beaten up and this, they believe, will be noticed. This, they believe, may lift a 26. Max Stahl, “Massacre among the Graves,” little the curse which is worse than The Independent (London), 17 November oppression and death for Timorese, the 1991, 19. 27. Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliv- erance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002); Nevins, Not-so-Distant Horror. 28. Analysis of the Dili massacre as a transfor- 24. Ibid., 172. mative event is given in David Hess and Brian 25. Lindsay Murdoch, “Dili Deaths ‘Just the Martin, “Backfire, Repression, and the Theory Start’,” The Age (Melbourne), 18 November of Transformative Events,” Mobilization 11 1998, 1. (June 2006): 249–267. Dili 23 comparison with previous massacres: the struggle was seen as a war, with violence on Indonesian military was successful in inhibit- both sides. Fretilin’s military weakness was ing outrage primarily through cover-up and less important, for wider perceptions, than the intimidation. But with the Dili massacre, these fact that both sides were using violence. This were inadequate, so the Indonesian govern- greatly reduced the likelihood that Indonesian ment eventually used all five methods to violence, including atrocities against civilians, inhibit outrage. To summarize: would backfire. Cover-up. Indonesian officials attempted to After Fretilin changed tactics, downplaying prevent information about the massacre getting armed struggle and emphasizing peaceful outside East Timor, for example cutting off all protest in the cities, it was far more successful telephone services. But attempts at censorship in building support within East Timor and, were only partly successful. Western journal- after Dili, internationally. The Dili massacre ists gave their eyewitness reports to world reveals how being the victim of attack can, in media, and Max Stahl’s videotape was the right circumstances, be far more effective smuggled out. Indonesian army commanders than fighting. could have decided to increase the cover-up by killing the Western observers, but this could Acknowledgements have backfired even more in the long run, I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Joe Nevins, because the presence of the observers in East Jeff Ross, Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for Timor was well known. valuable comments on drafts of this chapter. Devaluation. Indonesian leaders denigrated the East Timorese and tried to discredit their leaders. But this had little influence outside Indonesia. Reinterpretation. The military and govern- ment blamed the events on actions by protest- ers, or attributed them to an unfortunate loss of discipline. Officials gave low figures for the number injured and killed. These views had little credibility outside Indonesia. Official channels. The government estab- lished an inquiry into the massacre, which largely exonerated the military. This, and a military inquiry, had low credibility outside Indonesia. Intimidation. Troops arrested, beat, and killed independence activists in the wake of the massacre. This brutality did not discourage international supporters of East Timorese independence, but rather added to their outrage.

The international reaction to the Dili massacre shows the power of peaceful protest, in a repressive situation, for generating outside support. Fretilin’s armed struggle against Indonesian troops from 1975 to the mid 1980s was courageous but disastrous in human terms. Furthermore, it did little to increase interna- tional support, because the independence