DOCSLIB.ORG

UNSW Mphil Thesis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UNSW Mphil Thesis Pritchett’s prediction: Australian foreign policy toward Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, 1974-1999. Miranda Alice Booth A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences CANBERRA 2017 Table of Contents CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 4 1.1 Introduction 4 1.2 Argument of the thesis 10 1.3 Materials and methodology 13 1.4 Literature review 15 1.5 Structure of the thesis 18 CHAPTER 2: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1974-1983 20 2.1 The Whitlam Government and Indonesia’s incorporation of Timor, 1974- 75 20 2.2 Pritchett’s challenge 32 2.3 The Balibo Five 37 2.4 The Fraser Government and Indonesia’s invasion of Timor, December 1975-April 1976 41 2.5 Australian foreign policy and public opinion, April 1976 – April 1979 47 2.6 Australia’s recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in Timor 51 CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1983 – 1996 58 3.1 The 1983 cabinet decision 58 3.2 The Parliamentary Delegation to Timor 61 3.3 Recognising Indonesian sovereignty in Timor 64 3.4 The Santa Cruz massacre 66 3.5 The Keating Government’s foreign policy after Santa Cruz 72 3.6 Australian solidarity after Santa Cruz 77 3.7 Australian foreign policy and public opinion after Santa Cruz 78 CHAPTER 4: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1996 – 1999 83 4.1 The Howard Government’s first term, 1996 – 1998 84 4.2 Jakarta’s ‘foreign ally’ 87 4.3 Australian foreign policy and public opinion, 1998 - 1999 88 4.4 Containing international pressure 97 2 4.5 ‘Scorched Earth’ 100 4.6 The solidarity movement in action 100 4.7 InterFET 104 4.8 Fulfilling Pritchett’s prediction: Australia-Indonesia relations after InterFET 105 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 110 APPENDIX & BIBLIOGRAPHY 115 6.1 List of Abbreviations 115 6.2 Bibliography 117 6.3 Newspapers and periodicals cited 131 6.4 Unpublished records, Australian Government, National Archives of Australia, Canberra 132 3 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction Indonesia is a territory of enduring strategic importance to Australia.1 The territory is composed of 17, 000 islands that extend 5, 1000 kms between the Indian Ocean in the West and the Pacific Ocean in the East. 2 Indonesia sits astride Australia’s northern offshore oil and natural gas installations, and spans major sea lines of communication and air routes in the Asia-Pacific.3 Indonesia’s size and geography has dictated Australia’s permanent interest in good relations.4 In 1971, the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, a guidance document prepared by the Department of Defence (DOD), warned that an unstable and hostile Indonesia would directly threaten Australia’s security: “Because of its geography, it is the country from or through which a conventional military threat to the security of Australian territory could most easily be posed.” 5 Geography also dictated that a united, stable and friendly Indonesia could deter or impede a conventional assault against Australia. The assessment continued: “A stable, cohesive and economically developing Indonesia, with which Australia enjoyed relations of close confidence, would provide depth to our defence and add considerably to our security.” 6 Assessments that are more recent also recognise the importance of good relations with Indonesia to Australia. The 2016 Defence White Paper simply noted: 1 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy – 1971, dated March 1971. NAA: A5619, C470, Part 2. 2 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, Parliament of Australia, Near Neighbours, Good Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with Indonesia (2004), 2; Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East Timor (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2004), 4. 3 “Document 21. Attachment: Defence Significance of Portuguese Timor. Memorandum to Rogers, Canberra, 15 August 1974,” in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974 – 1976, ed. Wendy Way (Carlton South, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 81. 4 Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, “Indonesia in Australian Defence Planning,” Security Challenges 3, no. 4 (2007): 67. https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol3no4DibbandBrabinSmith.pdf 5 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy – 1971, dated March 1971. NAA: A5619, C470, Part 2. 6 Ibid. 4 “A strong and productive relationship with Indonesia is critical to Australia’s national security.” 7 A friendly and co-operative relationship with Indonesia has therefore been an enduring priority of Australia’s strategic policy. In 1973, Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia, Robert Furlonger, emphasised the importance of good relations with President Soeharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia to Australia: “Australia’s main interest is an Indonesia experiencing reasonable economic growth and a benign and stable government and pursuing policies of good relations with its neighbours. The Suharto government fulfils these criteria.” 8 Australian Governments co-operated with Soeharto’s New Order Regime, to encourage Indonesia’s economic growth, political stability and friendliness toward Australia, and secure Australia’s defence interest. For these reasons, Australian Governments also supported Indonesia’s annexation and incorporation of East Timor between 1974 and 1999. East Timor, a territory with a land area of 14, 974 square kilometres, occupies one-half of the island of Timor.9 East Timor (Timor) is located between Indonesia’s southern archipelago and approximately 700kms northwest of Darwin, Australia, in the oil and gas rich Timor Sea. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), led by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, was in power when a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, created the opportunity for an independent Timor in 1975. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia invaded Timor to prevent the success of the independence movement.10 In July 1976, President Soeharto signed a bill to incorporate Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia.11 Despite overwhelming Indonesian military force, Timorese armed and peaceful resistance against Indonesian occupation continued for 24 years. The Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan 7 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), 125. 8 “Dispatch from Furlonger, Jakarta, 19 January 1973,” in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 43. 9 Peter Chalk, Australian Foreign and Defence Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publications, 2001), 30. 10 Part 3. “The History of the Conflict,” in Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), Chega! The Final Report of the Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (Jakarta: KPG in co-operation with STP-CAVR, 2013), 1:206, http://chegareport.net/Chega%20All%20Volumes.pdf 11 Part 3. “The History of the Conflict,” in CAVR, Chega! The Final Report, 1: 213. 5 Bersenjata Republik Indonesia; ABRI) carried out frequent, large-scale military operations to eliminate the independence movement in Timor. Deliberate and indiscriminate violations of human rights accompanied Indonesia’s military campaigns. One widely accepted figure suggest that 30% of the population, or at least 200, 000 Timorese, died due to causes directly or indirectly related to Indonesia’s military occupation.12 On 30 August 1999, the Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia in a decisive referendum. ABRI immediately implemented a terror campaign of widespread violence, forced displacement and destruction to prevent Timor’s transition to independence.13 A pro-Jakarta lobby dominated Australia’s foreign policy toward Indonesia’s incorporation of Timor. Senior policymakers established personal relations with Jakarta’s political and military elite, furthered bilateral economic and military co-operation, and neutralised Australian public criticism of Indonesia. Sections of the media, academia and business defended the official policy and set the “correct” interpretation of Australia’s relations with Indonesia in the public sphere. 14 In 1974, the lobby comprised of key policymakers including Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Furlonger, the Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) Gordon Jockel, the head of the South Asia Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Graham Feakes, and his First Assistant Secretary Richard Woolcott.15 The lobby argued that an independent Timor would be a ‘non-viable state’ that would threaten regional security, and encouraged Indonesia’s incorporation of Timor. Furlonger wrote, “The thought of a poor, uneducated, probably unstable, independent Eastern Timor on our doorstep and susceptible to subversion and exploitation by other Powers, should be no more attractive to us than Indonesia.” 16 Indonesia shared Australia’s anxiety about an independent Timor and resolved to incorporate the territory; first, via a propaganda and political campaign, and later, by military force. Woolcott argued that Australia should support Indonesia’s incorporation of Timor: 12 Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 47. 13 Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 189-190. 14 Geoffrey C. Gunn and Jefferson Lee, A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor (Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994), 13-16.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA Mestrado Em Ciências Da Terra, Da
    UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA ESCOLA DE CIÊNCIAS E TECNOLOGIA Mestrado em Ciências da Terra, da Atmosfera e do Espaço Especialização em Processos Geológicos Dissertação Caracterização dos movimentos de massa no distrito de Baucau (Zona Oeste) Autor Félix Januário Guterres Jones Orientador: Pedro Miguel Nogueira Co-Orientador: Domingos Manuel Rodrigues Dezembro de 2011 AGRADECIMENTOS Este trabalho foi elaborado no âmbito da dissertação de mestrado para obtenção do grau de mestre em geologia, numa cooperação entre a Secertado de Estado de Recurso Naturais Universidade de Èvora e o, a estas direção o meu agradecimento. Desejo expressar também os meus agradecimentos a algumas pessoas sem as quais não seria possível a realização deste trabalho. · Orientador Professor Doutor Pedro Nogueira pela orientação, sugestões e apoio dado na resolução de dúvidas que foram surgiram ao longo da realização deste trabalho; · Ao meu co-orientador Doutor Domingos Rodrigues (Universidade de Madeira), pelo apoio e orientação que me deu durante a realização do mesmo, pela sua objectividade, pelas sugestões dadas e indicação de caminhos no sentido de resolver os problemas e questões que urgiram; Aos meus colegas Apolinario Euzebio Alver agradeço pela ajuda no trabalho de campo. Agradece Professor Doutor Rui Dias Agradece Professor Doutor Alexander Araujo Agradece Professor Doutor Luis Lopes Agradece Professor Paula Faria pela ajuda prática labotorio Agradece Sr. Antonio Soares diração Meteórologia pela suporta dados de precipitação e diração Algis no Minesterio de Agricultura e Pescas Agradece Sr. Antonio Aparicio Guterres Administrador de Baucau, Policia distrito de Baucau, Sub-Distrito Agradece tambam Administrador Sub-Distrito Baucau, Venilale, Vemasse Agradece Chefi de Suco e Chefi de Aldeia na zona de trabalho Agradece nossa Guia pela ajudamos na zona de pesquisa Agradece Sr.
    [Show full text]
  • Myths, Facts and Solutions 1 Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
    MYTHS, FACTS AND SOLutions 1 ASYLUM SEEKER RESOURCE CENTRE WWW.ASRC.ORG.AU Asylum seekers and refugees myths FACTS + solutions 2 Myths, FACTS AND SOLUTIONS Asylum Seeker Resource Centre 12 Batman Street West Melbourne, Vic. 3003 Telephone +61 3 9326 6066 www.asrc.org.au Design zirka&wolf. www.zirkawolf.com MYTHS, FACTS AND SOLutions 3 MYTHS AND FACTS MYTH 1 Asylum seekers are ‘illegal immigrants’ .........................................................4 MYTH 2 People who arrive by boat are not ‘genuine refugees’. .5 MYTH 3 Asylum seekers have only themselves to blame for lengthy detention because they lodge endless appeals ....................................................................7 MYTH 4 When asylum seekers destroy their documentation they are cheating the system ..................8 MYTH 5 Boat arrivals might be terrorists or pose other security risks. .9 MYTH 6 Boat people are queue jumpers; they take the place of refugees patiently waiting in overseas camps .....................................................................11 MYTH 7 Asylum seekers don’t use the proper channels — they come via ‘the back door’ ...................13 MYTH 8 Asylum seekers are ‘country shoppers’; they could have stopped at safe places along the way. 15 MYTH 9 Asylum seekers are ‘cashed up’ and ‘choose’ to come here. .16 MYTH 10 People smugglers are ‘evil’ and the ‘vilest form of human life’. .17 MYTH 11 Australia is losing control over its borders ......................................................19 MYTH 12 If we are too ‘soft’ there will
    [Show full text]
  • Votes and Proceedings
    1990-91-92 1307 THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS No. 107 TUESDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1992 1 The House met, at 2 p.m., pursuant to adjournment. The Speaker (the Honourable Leo McLeay) took the Chair, and read Prayers. 2 MINISTERIAL CHANGES AND ARRANGEMENTS: Mr Keating (Prime Minister) informed the House that, on 20 December 1991, His Excellency the Governor-General had appointed him to the office of Prime Minister and had, on 27 December 1991, made a number of changes to other ministerial appointments. The Ministers and the offices they hold are as follows: Representation Ministerial office Minister in other Chamber *Prime Minister The Hon. P. J. Keating, MP Senator Button Parliamentary Secretary to the The Hon. Laurie Brereton, MP Prime Minister *Minister for Health, Housing The Hon. Brian Howe, MP, Senator Tate and Community Services, Deputy Prime Minister Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Social Justice, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Commonwealth- State Relations I Minister for Aged, Family and The Hon. Peter Staples, MP Senator Tate Health Services Minister for Veterans' Affairs The Hon. Ben Humphreys, Senator Tate MP Parliamentary Secretary to the The Hon. Gary Johns, MP Minister for Health, Housing and Community Services *Minister for Industry, Senator the Hon. John Button, Mr Free Technology and Commerce Leader of the Government in the Senate Minister for Science and The Hon. Ross Free, MP Senator Button Technology, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister Minister for Small Business, The Hon. David Beddall, MP Senator Button Construction and Customs *Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senator the Hon.
    [Show full text]
  • Australia and the Origins of ASEAN (1967–1975)
    1 Australia and the origins of ASEAN (1967–1975) The origins of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and of Australia’s relations with it are bound up in the period of the Cold War in East Asia from the late 1940s, and the serious internal and inter-state conflicts that developed in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and early 1960s. Vietnam and Laos were engulfed in internal wars with external involvement, and conflict ultimately spread to Cambodia. Further conflicts revolved around Indonesia’s unstable internal political order and its opposition to Britain’s efforts to secure the positions of its colonial territories in the region by fostering a federation that could include Malaya, Singapore and the states of North Borneo. The Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated in September 1963, but Singapore was forced to depart in August 1965 and became a separate state. ASEAN was established in August 1967 in an effort to ameliorate the serious tensions among the states that formed it, and to make a contribution towards a more stable regional environment. Australia was intensely interested in all these developments. To discuss these issues, this chapter covers in turn the background to the emergence of interest in regional cooperation in Southeast Asia after the Second World War, the period of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi of Malaysia, the formation of ASEAN and the inauguration of multilateral relations with ASEAN in 1974 by Gough Whitlam’s government, and Australia’s early interactions with ASEAN in the period 1974‒75. 7 ENGAGING THE NEIGHBOURS The Cold War era and early approaches towards regional cooperation The conception of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a distinct region in which states might wish to engage in regional cooperation emerged in an environment of international conflict and the end of the era of Western colonialism.1 Extensive communication and interactions developed in the pre-colonial era, but these were disrupted thoroughly by the arrival of Western powers.
    [Show full text]
  • Howard Government Retrospective II
    Howard Government Retrospective II “To the brink: 1997 - 2001” Articles by Professor Tom Frame 14 - 15 November 2017 Howard Government Retrospective II The First and Second Howard Governments Initial appraisals and assessments Professor Tom Frame Introduction I have reviewed two contemporaneous treatments Preamble of the first Howard Government. Unlike other Members of the Coalition parties frequently complain retrospectives, these two works focussed entirely on that academics and journalists write more books about the years 1996-1998. One was published in 1997 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) than about Liberal- and marked the first anniversary of the Coalition’s National governments and their leaders. For instance, election victory. The other was published in early three biographical studies had been written about Mark 2000 when the consequences of some first term Latham who was the Opposition leader for a mere decisions and policies were becoming a little clearer. fourteen months (December 2003 to February 2005) Both books are collections of essays that originated when only one book had appeared about John Howard in university faculties and concentrated on questions and he had been prime minister for nearly a decade. of public administration. The contributions to both Certainly, publishers believe that books about the Labor volumes are notable for the consistency of their tone Party (past and present) are usually more successful and tenor. They are not partisan works although there commercially than works on the Coalition parties. The is more than a hint of suspicion that the Coalition sales figures would seem to suggest that history and was tampering with the institutions that undergirded ideas mean more to some Labor followers than to public authority and democratic government in Coalition supporters or to Australian readers generally.
    [Show full text]
  • Development and Its Discontents: the Indonesian Government, Indonesian Opposition, and the Occupation of East Timor
    Development and its Discontents: The Indonesian Government, Indonesian Opposition, and the Occupation of East Timor M. Scott Selders Based on a section of M. Scott Selders, “Patterns of Violence: Narratives of Occupied East Timor from Invasion to Independence, 1975-1999” (MA thesis, Concordia University, 2008). IAGS 9th Biennial Conference, Buenos Aires, July 2011 In 1974, decolonization began in Portugal’s colony of East Timor.1 In December 1975, this process was curtailed by neighboring Indonesia’s invasion, after which President Suharto’s New Order regime imposed a brutal occupation lasting until 1999. Between 1974 and 1999, it is estimated that over 100,000, and possibly as many as 183,000, East Timorese perished.2 The Indonesian government justified the invasion by reminding its Western allies of the Suharto regime’s staunch anti-Communism and by arguing that East Timor’s small size, poverty, and underdevelopment meant it was not a viable independent country.3 Consequently, after 1975, one of Indonesia’s main justifications for the occupation was that it was balancing the neglect of the Portuguese colonial administration by modernizing East Timor and the Timorese. This paper examines a sample of this development rhetoric from the 1980s. It also shows that such rhetoric was not universally accepted, even within Indonesia, as evidenced by two Indonesian sources from the early 1990s that directly question and contradict the Indonesian government’s civilizing claims. The Indonesian provenance of these 1 Standard surveys include Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978); John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991); James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996); Arnold S.
    [Show full text]
  • Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives
    OVERT ACCEPTANCE: CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE IN COVERT OPERATIVES CHIP MICHAEL BUCKLEY A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE RIDGE SCHOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE MERCYHURST UNIVERSITY ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA JANUARY 2015 RIDGE SCHOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE MERCYHURST UNIVERSITY ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA OVERT ACCEPTANCE: CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE IN COVERT OPERATIVES A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE Submitted By: CHIP MICHAEL BUCKLEY Certificate of Approval: ___________________________________ Stephen Zidek, M.A. Assistant Professor The Ridge School of Intelligence Studies and Information Science ___________________________________ James G. Breckenridge, Ph.D. Associate Professor The Ridge School of Intelligence Studies and Information Science ___________________________________ Phillip J. Belfiore, Ph.D. Vice President Office of Academic Affairs January 2015 Copyright © 2015 by Chip Michael Buckley All rights reserved. iii DEDICATION To my father. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge a number of important individuals who have provided an extraordinary amount of support throughout this process. The faculty at Mercyhurst University, particularly Professor Stephen Zidek, provided invaluable guidance when researching and developing this thesis. My friends and classmates also volunteered important ideas and guidance throughout this time. Lastly, my family’s support, patience, and persistent inquiries regarding my progress cannot be overlooked. v ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives A Critical Examination By Chip Michael Buckley Master of Science in Applied Intelligence Mercyhurst University, 2014 Professor S.
    [Show full text]
  • Failed Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor Written by Katherine Green
    Failed Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor Written by Katherine Green This PDF is auto-generated for reference only. As such, it may contain some conversion errors and/or missing information. For all formal use please refer to the official version on the website, as linked below. Failed Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor https://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/06/failed-humanitarian-intervention-in-east-timor/ KATHERINE GREEN, APR 6 2012 Failed Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor: A Bottom-up Hypothesis The two decades since the end of the Cold War witnessed a new generation of warfare, which in turn gave rise to the parallel evolution of two diametric paradigms—ethnic conflict, and its consequential international response, humanitarian intervention. The hope for peace and prosperity in a post ideological war era met its rapid demise in the first half of the 1990s, in which ethnic conflicts in Africa and the Balkans galvanized some of the worst human rights abuses and atrocities. After a near decade of heavily criticized international peacekeeping, the United Nations—UN—set its sights on the conflict in the Malay Archipelago region. The UN response to the Indonesian- Timorese conflict provided a world stage for the vindication and reconciliation of humanitarian intervention. A strategic and logistical approach requiring a robust and substantive peacekeeping operation as administered by the international community had yet to come to fruition. Although East Timor eventually gained independence in 2002, it was the deplorable failure to mitigate escalating ethnic tensions in the summer of 1999 that ultimately demonstrated, yet again, the United Nations’ self-limiting culture—a failure that precipitated extreme violence against the East Timorese peoples.
    [Show full text]
  • Project Safecom News and Updates Monday, 4 May 2015
    Project SafeCom News and Updates Monday, 4 May 2015 Subscribe and become a member here: http://www.safecom.org.au/ref-member.htm 1. Labour exploitation, slave-like conditions found on farms supplying biggest supermarkets 2. 'Prosecutions should stop': Auschwitz survivor angers co-plaintiffs 3. ASIO Act could conceal ‘torture, murder by agents’ 4. Tony Abbott's Indigenous 'lifestyle choices' remark smacks of racism, says UN rapporteur 5. Bruce Haigh: Bali Nine pair ‘victims’ of ‘flawed relationship’ with Indonesia 6. Bali 9: our selective compassion has come undone 7. Bali 9 executions: Abbott government backflipped on AFP death penalty directive 8. Chan and Sukumaran execution 'illegal', but Indonesia ignores Australia again 9. Australia expelling Iranian sheikh violated human rights, UN body finds 10. The Saturday Paper: Factions jockeying over key ALP policies 11. Right to freedom of speech cannot breach employment contract 12. Australia Blasted For 'Paying Cambodia To Take Refugees Off Its Hands' 13. Nauru opposition says Facebook shut down 14. Nauru's ban on Facebook angers opposition and refugee advocates 15. MEDIA RELEASE: Refugees say NO to Cambodia 16. MEDIA RELEASE: Immigration turns screws on Manus refugees to force transfers 17. Boy with autism who faces deportation hand-delivers letter to Peter Dutton 18. Townsville boy with autism writes to Immigration Minister asking not be deported 19. New bridging visa for autistic boy and mother, with deportation to be reviewed 20. Immigration, Customs and Border Protection staff move
    [Show full text]
  • Engaging the Neighbours AUSTRALIA and ASEAN SINCE 1974
    Engaging the neighbours AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN SINCE 1974 Engaging the neighbours AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN SINCE 1974 FRANK FROST Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Frost, Frank, 1947- author. Title: Engaging the neighbours : Australia and ASEAN since 1974 / Frank Frost. ISBN: 9781760460174 (paperback) 9781760460181 (ebook) Subjects: ASEAN. Australia--Foreign relations--Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia--Foreign relations--Australia. Dewey Number: 327.94059 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. This edition © 2016 ANU Press Contents Chronology . vii Preface . xi Abbreviations . xiii Introduction . 1 1 . Australia and the origins of ASEAN (1967–1975) . 7 2 . Economic disputes and the Third Indochina War (1976–1983) . 35 3 . Regional activism and the end of the Cold War (1983–1996) . 65 4 . The Asian financial crisis, multilateral relations and the East Asia Summit (1996–2007) . 107 5 . From the ‘Asia Pacific Community’ to the fortieth anniversary summit and beyond (2007‒2015) . .. 145 6 . Australia and ASEAN: Issues, themes and future prospects . 187 Bibliography . 205 Index . 241 Chronology 1945 Declaration of
    [Show full text]
  • Trade Mission to New Zealand and Australia
    1 106TH CONGRESS "!WMCP: 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 106±16 SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA MARCH 1999 Prepared for the use of Members of the Committee on Ways and Means by members of its staff. This document has not been officially approved by the Committee and may not reflect the views of its Members U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 68±478 CC WASHINGTON : 2001 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 VerDate 20-JUL-2000 11:57 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 K:\HEARINGS\68478.TXT WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3 COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York BILL THOMAS, California FORTNEY PETE STARK, California E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida ROBERT T. MATSUI, California NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania AMO HOUGHTON, New York SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan WALLY HERGER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM MCCRERY, Louisiana JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington DAVE CAMP, Michigan GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana MAC COLLINS, Georgia JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ROB PORTMAN, Ohio XAVIER BECERRA, California PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida WES WATKINS, Oklahoma LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona JERRY WELLER, Illinois KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri SCOTT MCINNIS, Colorado RON LEWIS, Kentucky MARK FOLEY, Florida A.L.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian False Flag Operations
    Center for Global & Strategic Studies Islamabad INDIAN FALSE FLAG OPERATIONS By Mr. Tauqir – Member Advisory Board CGSS Terminology and Genealogy The term false flag has been used symbolically and it denotes the purposeful misrepresentation of an actor’s objectives or associations. The lineage of this term is drawn from maritime affairs where ships raise a false flag to disguise themselves and hide their original identity and intent. In this milieu, the false flag was usually used by pirates to conceal themselves as civilian or merchant ships and to prevent their targets from escaping away or to stall them while preparing for a battle. In other cases, false flags of ships were raised to blame the attack on someone else. A false flag operation can be defined as follows: “A covert operation designed to deceive; the deception creates the appearance of a particular party, group, or nation being responsible for some activity, disguising the actual source of responsibility.” These operations are purposefully carried out to deceive public about the culprits and perpetrators. This phenomenon has become a normal practice in recent years as rulers often opt for this approach to justify their actions. It is also used for fabrication and fraudulently accuse or allege in order to rationalize the aggression. Similarly, it is a tool of coercion which is often used to provoke or justify a war against adversaries. In addition, false flag operations could be a single event or a series of deceptive incidents materializing a long-term strategy. A primary modern case of such operations was accusation on Iraqi President Saddam Hussain for possessing weapons of mass-destruction ‘WMD’, which were not found after NATO forces, waged a war on Iraq.
    [Show full text]