Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 3 (author’s prepublication version) 3 Dili On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops colonies — such as Angola and Mozambique gunned down hundreds of peaceful protesters — to gain independence. in Dili, the capital of East Timor. This act was In East Timor, Portugal’s most remote intended to intimidate opponents of Indonesian colony, with a population of nearly 700,000, rule. But instead, the killings triggered a huge rival political forces struggled for supremacy increase in international support for East in the transition from Portuguese rule, with the Timor’s independence. In order to understand liberation movement Fretilin having most the Dili massacre and how it backfired, I popular support. In December 1975, Indone- review its background and aftermath, giving sian military forces invaded and occupied East special attention to the five methods attackers Timor. According to some commentators, the use to inhibit outrage. Indonesian government had obtained agree- Most of the archipelago today called ment for the operation from the Australian and Indonesia was previously a colony of the U.S. governments.2 Fretilin fought the inva- Netherlands. Indonesia obtained its independ- sion but soon retreated to the mountains where ence in 1949. The new government, led by it maintained a guerrilla resistance to the Sukarno, fostered a strong sense of national- Indonesian occupiers. ism. In 1965, there was a military coup, The invasion and occupation were bloody, accompanied by a massive anticommunist with many fighters and civilians killed. purge, with hundreds of thousands of people Indonesian forces perpetrated serious human killed.1 The new regime, led by General rights violations, including torture, rape, and Suharto, was ideologically procapitalist, but it killing of civilians; Fretilin did the same, retained its predecessor’s strong nationalism. though on a much smaller scale and mainly in One of the islands in the archipelago, the first few years after 1975. The Indonesian Timor, had been colonized by Portugal in the occupation led to famine among East Timorese 1500s, and later by the Netherlands. Portugal living on the land, leading to the death of up to eventually ended up controlling just the 180,000 people.3 On a proportional basis, this eastern half of the island. In 1974, a military was one of the most lethal conquests in the coup in Lisbon toppled the Portuguese dicta- century. torship, opening the path for representative For several years, the United Nations government. This also enabled Portugal’s passed resolutions condemning the Indonesian takeover, but none of these was backed up 1. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 2. Joseph Nevins, A Not-so-Distant Horror: 1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast Mass Violence in East Timor (Ithaca, NY: Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). On Cornell University Press, 2005), 51–52, 62– the lack of backfire from this bloodbath, see 63. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian 3. Commission for Reception, Truth, and Vickers, “Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Reconciliation Timor-Leste, Chega! (East Repression: Studying Lower-profile Nonvio- Timor: Commission for Reception, Truth, and lent Resistance,” Pacifica Review 13 (2001): Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005). I thank Joe 143–56. Nevins for referring me to this source. Dili 17 with action. Most governments and corpora- reduced criticism from other governments. The tions preferred to keep on good terms with the governor of East Timor asked for easing of Indonesian regime, which ruled one of the restrictions on travel to, from, and within East world’s most populous countries. However, in Timor, in order to foster investment, to which the following decades, only the Australian President Suharto agreed. From 1989, tourists government formally recognized the incorpo- and western journalists — but not human ration of East Timor into Indonesia. Within rights observers — were allowed into East several countries, notably Australia, Japan, and Timor. Britain, there were active solidarity move- Fretilin, with declining numbers of fighters ments supporting the East Timorese liberation in the late 1980s, changed its strategic orienta- struggle.4 tion, also taking into account the increased The Indonesian occupiers kept tight control access by visitors. Rather than seeking over communications in and out of East liberation primarily through armed struggle Timor. After the 1975 invasion, supporters in with a guerrilla army based in the countryside, northern Australia for some years maintained the new approach emphasized civilian resis- short-wave contact with Fretilin in the face of tance in urban areas. Fretilin retained its Australian government efforts to shut down weapons but decided to use them only for the radio link.5 The restriction on information defense, not to launch attacks. The aims of this flow helped to reduce outrage over atrocities new orientation were to foster East Timorese carried out by Indonesian troops. Often the unity in the struggle and to gain greater only word of these came via individuals who support for independence both within Indone- were able to leave East Timor. Their testimony sia and internationally. Fretilin gave special often lacked credibility because there was no attention to mobilizing protests to coincide independent verification or endorsement by with visits by foreign dignitaries.6 western sources. A delegation of Portuguese parliamentari- The Indonesian occupiers in the late 1980s ans planned to visit East Timor in late 1991. faced reduced pressure from Fretilin and Independence supporters organized a major demonstration; at the same time, the Indone- sian military prepared for a crackdown. The 4. On the East Timorese liberation struggle, Portuguese visit was called off at the last see for example Carmel Budiardjo and Liem minute following a procedural disagreement Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor between the Indonesian and Portuguese (London: Zed Books, 1984); Jill Jolliffe, East governments. Tensions were predictably high. Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (Bris- On the night of 28 October, there was a bane: University of Queensland Press, 1978); fight between pro-independence and pro- Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Indonesian Timorese in the Church of Saint Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor Anthony of Motael in Dili. Many young (London: TAPOL, 1979); John Pilger, Distant people had sought refuge in the building prior Voices (London: Vintage, 1994), 231–323; to the cancelled visit; the church was sur- Constâncio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East rounded by Indonesian troops, who tried to Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the make the East Timorese leave. Two people Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End were killed, one of them a Timorese working Press, 1997); John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s for the Indonesians and the other an 18-year- Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East old supporter of independence named Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991). 5. Rob Wesley Smith, “Radio Maubere and Links to East Timor,” in Free East Timor: 6. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resis- Genocide, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random tance Movement’s Strategy for Engagement,” House, 1998), 83–102. Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000), 17–31. 18 Justice Ignited Sebastião Gomes. Bishop Carlos Belo — the several minutes — no one could be sure leading Catholic Church figure in a largely how long.9 Catholic country — went to the scene. The Indonesians tried to claim Gomes had been This event might have become just one more killed with a knife, but Belo saw the bullet instance of an alleged atrocity, without holes in his body. In a funeral mass for authoritative documentation. The difference Gomes, the bishop fiercely criticized the this time was that western journalists were Indonesian occupiers, saying they had ultimate present at Santa Cruz cemetery, witnessing the responsibility for the deaths.7 massacre, among them Alan Nairn of the New The resistance movement decided to go Yorker, Amy Goodman of Pacifica Radio, and ahead with the protest it had planned for the Steve Cox, a British photographer, each of Portuguese visit, but to make it part of a whom was severely beaten. Their eyewitness memorial procession and service at Santa Cruz accounts provided vivid, credible evidence of cemetery for Gomes, scheduled for 12 what had happened.10 November. Indonesian troops surrounded the Most powerful of all was video footage shot mourners along its route. While expressing by British filmmaker Max Stahl, from political sentiments, the large procession was Yorkshire Television. Stahl hid his videotapes almost entirely peaceful, except for one in the cemetery and picked them up later. The incident. next day, Dutch reporter Saskia Kouwenberg smuggled the tapes out of East Timor and then Suddenly there was a brief scuffle as an out of Indonesia. This video footage was Indonesian major waded into the crowd screened initially in the Netherlands, then in with a group of soldiers bearing fixed Britain and other countries, and totally bayonets. The major threw a young discredited Indonesian government denials that woman to the ground as he tried to grab an atrocity had occurred.11 a nationalist flag she was carrying. Some The Dili massacre severely backfired on the accounts say the major was then stabbed Indonesian occupiers. International outrage led by the boyfriend of the young woman. to a huge increase in support for the East The stabbing, later cited by Indonesian Timorese solidarity movement in many authorities as the reason for the tragedy countries. Movement groups continued with that day, was hardly noticed at the time, their activities, raising awareness of the and to this day it is not clear what injustice and brutality of the occupation and happened.8 putting pressure on western governments and corporations over their overt or tacit support The march proceeded without hindrance until for the Indonesian government. The outrage its arrival at the cemetery. over the massacre boosted these efforts.