Revisiting the Viqueque Rebellion of 1959 Geoffrey C. Gunn Research on anti-colonial rebellions in Southeast Asia has not only contributed to our understanding of state-society relations, peasant modes of production, millennial protest, proto- nationalism, and a range of other themes, but has enriched social science theory building, This is demonstrated in an array of creative studies on, especially, Burma, Vietnam and Laos, touching, variously, on peasant rationality (Popkins), “moral economy” (Scott) and political economy (Gunn) approaches. It is striking that Portuguese Timor, renown for its history of anti-colonial rebellions, has been virtually neglected in this field. By far the most serious challenge to Portuguese authority in East Timor in the post-war period prior to the decolonization crisis of 1974-75 was the insurrection of 1959. Broadly known in Portuguese writing as the “movimento de 1959” and, in Indonesia, as the “Gerakan Viqueque 1959,” after the major locus of the revolt in the remote eastern part of the island, the conspiracy against the colonial government also included Timorese members of the administration in Dili. Information about the events of 1959 and the deportation of the ringleaders long languished under a strict censorship regime. Obviously this was an important event in modern East Timor history, not only because of the scope of the insurgency against Portuguese rule, but also the ferocity in which it was crushed leading to hundreds of deaths in some accounts. While the hand of Indonesia in this rebellion is well established, it is also worth considering whether or not the event was a showing of anti-colonial pro-independence sentiment some fifteen years prior to the emergence of modern political parties following the collapse of the Salazar- Caetano dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974? While tracing the rebellion to its origins and following the fate of its alleged leadership, deported to Angola and Portugal, this chapter seeks to profile the rebel leaders sociologically, at least as can be determined through a scrutiny of colonial police dossiers on the deportees (numbering in all 68 according to Indonesian sources). We are also concerned to anthropologize the rebellion that broke out in remote Viqueque province at a time when Portugal was seeking to better know and document the peoples of its far flung Oceanic colony. Still, we allow, this is only a preliminary investigation as, rare in the history of classic European colonialism, memory of the 1959 rebellion is still fresh and alternative narratives should, rightfully, comprise part of the inquiry. Preludes to the Rebellion Fatefully, in early 1958, a group of fourteen Indonesians, two of them military officers, entering the Oecusse enclave from across the Indonesian border in west Timor, demanded – and received – political asylum status. Their removal and resettlement to Baucau in the east was then facilitated. The “refugees” were awarded a stipend (7 patacas a day), although not always paid punctually obliging them to frequently take out credit with various shopkeepers (Barata 1998, 79). The question remains unanswered in Portuguese writings (cf. Barata 1998; Lima 2002) as to why in the first place the authorities in Dili, known to be entirely wary of Indonesian intentions from any quarter, actually went out of their way to offer refugee-status and virtual political exile to the hitherto unknown group? Was this a misplaced humanitarian gesture? Was this on instruction from Lisbon via the Portuguese Embassy in Jakarta out of sympathy for the eastern island rebellion, or was this to please the external backers of the outer island rebellion, the American CIA? According to Felipe Jose Freira Themudo Barata (1998), who arrived in Timor on 22 June 1958 to take up the governorship, his predecessor, Governor César Maria de Serpa Rosa (1950-58), was less attuned to “political subtleties” and, fitting the mold of a typical military officer, was given to “prudence and parsimony.” Serpa Rosa's term in office also coincided with the tenure in Timor of Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacob Sutan Indra. As observed, Consul Nazwar began to unfold a “discrete but active anti-Portuguese campaign” working with local employees of the Consulate as well as the small local Arab population, known to harbor pro-Indonesian sympathies. He also gained the confidence of a number of gullible Timorese individuals, albeit quickly identified by the Portuguese authorities. The Consul was also observed to be engaged in such “subversive” activities as photographing sensitive military sites. In late 1958, alarm mounted in Dili with the discovery of the robbery of sixteen rifles, all but three recovered. The authorities also remained concerned at the rising frequency in which Indonesian sailing prauh beached on the north coast of Timor. Between 19 and 30 May 1959 up to 50 Indonesian prauh made landings at Lautem, some of them armed. In some accounts Portuguese military units confiscated weapons believed to be destined for rebels. If the initial concern was contraband, the major concern turned to the political and security threat posed by these visitors, especially as it became apparent that the illicit landings were connected with anti-Jakarta rebel forces in Sulawesi. In order to clarify a swirl of rumors regarding these activities, two customs officials were dispatched to Lavai, located on the north coast between Baucau and Lautem, even though no decisive proof of any direct subversive activity was then uncovered (Barata 1998). While there was uncertainty in Portuguese thinking as to the nature of the threat or as to whether the Jakarta government was involved, according to one PIDE analyst, “In our opinion the actions of the leaders of the South Celebes (Darul Islam) group [actually] posed a major problem for the central authorities in Jakarta.”1 While subsequent research on the Permesta rebellion has revealed that the rebels upheld vague designs on west Timor, no evidence has come to light directly linking them with the rebellion in Portuguese Timor (cf. Kahin & Kahin 1995, 173). Nevertheless, their actions potentially threatened the status of Portuguese Timor as they were not bound by the good relations protocols developed between Jakarta and Lisbon. Putting all these facts together, the government believed that it had advance warning of a revolutionary movement in Timor. Notably. in early 1959 the Portuguese authorities gained wind of illicit meetings held in Dili at the instigation of the Indonesian consul. Reportedly, in December 1958, the consul made contact with the exiles in Baucau, and paid them off. On 21 December, five of the Indonesians departed Baucau for Viqueque. Two of them, Lambertus Laden and Gerson Pello, then embarked on tours of sucos (administrative sub-divisions) in, respectively, Baucau, Laga and Ossu, and Uoto-Lari and Uato-Carbau on the remote south coast of the island (Barata 1998, 63). According to Governor Barata (1998, 63), first news of rebellion brewing in Viqueque also came to the attention of the Administrator of Baucau, Artur Marques Ramos, derived from information supplied by the head of the Baguia military post in the early days of June. [Baguia was a strategic town athwart the road linking the north coast of the island with Uato Carabau in the south]. Two Indonesians had been identified as conspiring with native chiefs in Uato-Lari and Uato-Carabau to plan rebellion. Accordingly, the administrator prepared instructions to transport the two Indonesians to Dili. Ramos, also received information from Baucau in early June that Indonesian exiles residing in Viqueque were holding clandestine meetings in Luca and that “revolutionary” cells had been uncovered in Dili. Even so, Ramos claims not to have been aware of any suspicious activity by the Indonesians in Viqueque and appeared to be totally unprepared for the events.2 Chronology of a Rebellion A basic chronology of the rebellion in Viqueque and elsewhere follows drawn from a number of official and unofficial sources.3 — 30 May 1959, armed clash between crew of an Indonesian sailing boat and Portuguese military, 8 rifles confiscated. — 7 June (Sunday ) 1959, a cipaio (sepoy or native soldier) and a morador (resident) were killed in a nighttime attack by rebel elements on the administrative post of Uato-Lari. The rebels made off with 48 rifles and ammunition. The administrator, accompanied by his family, offered assistance to the cipaio by driving him to Ossu. The rebels also cut telephone lines connecting Viqueque with Baucau and, in a series of riots and sporadic attacks, burnt a number of houses. — 9 June, once Baucau had informed Dili by telegram, authorities in the capital mobilized to prepare military reinforcements with a view to taking control of telephone communications, and to arrest the Indonesians. Early the next morning a force of 50 troops were flown to Baucau in relays. Arms and ammunition was distributed. Captain Manuel João Farjado Barreiros was placed in charge of local operations. At the last moment it was decided to use four-wheel drive military Unimogs (Barata 1998, 66). — 9 June, after midday Administrator Ramos returned to Viqueque at the head of the party, comprising an official, a sergeant, and nine soldiers. — 9-11 June, meantime Lt. Braga was charged with reinforcing the Baguia post and the radio station in Baucau. Owing to lack of communications two days passed without information on the military column. — 11 June, a batida or shooting-party of arraias was assembled in Uatolari. — 11 June (11 AM), the rebels staged an assault on Baguia but were repelled. As Barata (1998, 66) writes with irony, “happily for our side the arms stolen by the rebels were of poor quality and many cartridges were duds.” — 12 June, arrests were made of a chefe de suco along with two others. — 13 June, the arraias reoccupied Uato-Carabau. — 13 June, the Indonesian Joubert was arrested along with five Timorese including a chefe de suco and a chefe de povocação.