Justice Ignited: the Dynamics of Backfire Brian Martin (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007)

Home , Allan Nairn, Most of All, Rodney King, Torture Memos, Unlawful combatant

Justice ignited: the dynamics of backfire Brian Martin (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007)

This is the text as submitted to the publisher. It differs from the published text due to copyediting changes, different pagination and omission of the index.

Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Sharpeville 7 3. Dili 16 4. Dharasana 24 5. The beating of Rodney King 30 6. Target: whistleblowers 46 7. The dismissal of Ted Steele 55 8. Environmental disasters 69 by Hannah Lendon and Brian Martin 9. The invasion of Iraq 79 10. Abu Ghraib 90 by Truda Gray and Brian Martin 11. Countershock: challenging pushbutton torture 99 by Brian Martin and Steve Wright 12. Terrorism as predictable backfire 109 13. Theory and backfire 118 14. Conclusion 144 Appendix: Methods of inhibiting and amplifying outrage from injustice 154

Acknowledgements

Working on the backfire model and this book has been an exciting process because so many people have been involved in exchanging ideas. First of all I thank my collaborators on studies of backfire: Sharon Callaghan, Susan Engel, Truda Gray, David Hess, Sue Curry Jansen, Hannah Lendon, Iain Murray, Samantha Reis, Will Rifkin, Greg Scott, Kylie Smith, and Steve Wright. In my class “Media, war, and peace,” many students used the backfire model on original cases; their investigations helped confirm the value of the model. At seminars and workshops, I’ve received many valuable comments on backfire, including how to extend and refine the model. In preparing this book, David Hess and Steve Wright offered many insightful comments on structure and content. Truda Gray and Greg Scott went through drafts with fine toothcombs, picking up all sorts of points and pushing my understanding. Jeff Ross read many chapters with his acute editorial eye. Several others, including Philip Kitley, Joe Nevins, and Tom Weber, saved me from errors. Kevin Wehr, as external reviewer for Rowman & Littlefield, made many valuable suggestions and generously waived anonymity, allowing me to follow up specific points. Iain Murray showed how backfire analysis can help in campaigning against an injustice. I give specific acknowledgments in footnotes and at the ends of chapters. To all of you, my greatest appreciation. The project that led to this book was supported by the Australian Research Council. I thank Matt Hammon, Alan McClare, and Alex Masulis at Rowman & Littlefield, who have shepherded the book to publication. Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 1 (author’s prepublication version)

1 Introduction

What do these four events have in common? • Corporations frequently take reprisals against critics, especially their own em- • General Motors spied on Ralph Nader in ployees, without much publicity. In con- 1965. trast, General Motors’ investigation into

• Los Angeles police beat motorist Rodney Nader was exposed and led to widespread media coverage. King in 1991.

• Indonesian troops shot and killed protesters • Los Angeles police previously had beaten in Dili, East Timor in 1991. lots of other people, but few of these cases received much attention. King’s beating • U.S. military forces invaded Iraq in 2003. was different: it was captured on videotape by observer George Holliday and broadcast First, each event involved an injustice, at least on television nationally and internationally. in the eyes of quite a few observers. • Although Indonesian troops occupying East • For General Motors, a giant corporation, to Timor had committed many massacres in spy on and seek to discredit Nader seemed the 15 years before 1991, they received a devious and dishonorable response to limited attention due to censorship. The Dili what Nader had done, namely writing the massacre, unlike earlier killings, was wit- book Unsafe at Any Speed that alerted the nessed by western journalists and recorded public to shortcomings in auto safety. in photos and video, and later broadcast internationally. • For four Los Angeles police — with many more present at the scene — to strike • Some earlier U.S. invasions, such as in Rodney King dozens of times, while he was Panama, Grenada, and Haiti, were initiated apparently lying on the ground posing no quickly and completed before protest could threat, seemed to many to be a clear case of build momentum. The 2003 invasion of abuse. Iraq, in contrast, was publicly planned months in advance and subject to sustained • For Indonesian troops to shoot peaceful public debate. protesters appeared to most observers to be an obvious atrocity. Finally, each of the four events backfired

• For the world’s leading military power to against those held responsible. launch an unprovoked attack on another state — one already weakened by a decade • General Motors’ secret investigation of of international sanctions — seemed to Nader, once exposed, turned public opinion many people to be unfair. It was also said to against auto manufacturers and dramati- be a violation of international law. cally raised Nader’s profile, giving him the clout to instigate more effective challenges to the companies. Another feature of these four events is that they received extensive publicity. Unlike some • The beating of Rodney King led to highly earlier cases, lots of people became aware of adverse publicity for the four police officers these instances. involved in the beating and for the Los

2 Justice Ignited

Angeles police force generally. The four with less power. In each case, two factors — a officers were taken to court and two of perception of injustice and awareness of the them sent to prison. events by significant audiences — were crucial

• The Dili massacre, rather than discouraging in making the action counterproductive. This opposition to Indonesian rule over East is the particular type of backfire I examine in Timor, instead triggered a massive expan- this book. sion in international support for East Backfire can refer to an outcome or a Timor’s independence. process. A backfire, as an outcome, occurs when an action is counterproductive for the • The U.S.-led attack on Iraq reduced the perpetrator. Backfire, as a process, is the standing of the U.S. government, as meas- struggle over the meaning and consequences ured in public opinion polls, throughout of an action. My main attention is on backfire most of the world. Furthermore, rather than as a process, in other words on the dynamics reducing terrorist threats to U.S. citizens, it of backfire. may have increased the risk. The word “boomerang” can be used as an alternative to “backfire.” A related concept is In short, these four events are examples of a “blowback,” a term used to describe unfore- phenomenon that can be called backfire: an seen adverse consequences of government action that recoils against its originators. In a policies, especially covert operations. Backfire backfire, the outcome is not just worse than is a more general concept: it applies to many anticipated — it is negative, namely worse areas outside the government level and deals than having done nothing. with tactics as well as outcomes. (See chapter All sorts of things can backfire, especially 13 for more on blowback.) when someone takes on those with more To refer to the emotional response to at- power. Children who steal from their parents tacks, injustice, or norm violations, I mostly might be chastised, denied privileges, or use the term “outrage,” in the sense of fierce worse. An employee who openly insults the anger or indignation. I use “outrage” as a boss could be punished by being denied a surrogate for a wide array of emotional promotion, being transferred, or even fired. A responses captured by terms such as anger, murderer who is caught is likely to end up in shock, indignation, revulsion, disgust, antago- prison. Because openly challenging those with nism, and concern. The basic idea is that a more power is so predictably counterproduc- person is upset by something and feels action tive, most people avoid it most of the time. should be taken about it. If this sort of emo- Breaking the rules is risky if you get caught. tional response is expressed, verbally and But there’s an exception: if you’re power- through actions, by sufficient numbers of ful, often you can get away with it. Abusive people, it can lead to backfire as an outcome. bosses insult employees without much come- back. Powerful corporations threaten legal Inhibiting Outrage action against small businesses, most of which acquiesce. Repressive regimes commit human Backfires against powerful attackers are un- rights abuses against opponents; often few usual, so it’s worth asking, what do attackers people know about this and even fewer try to do that prevents or inhibits backfire? There are oppose it. Those with power can make the five important methods for inhibiting the rules but then enforce them only against outrage that can lead to backfire. others. The four cases of backfire — against 1 Cover-up: information about the event is General Motors, the Los Angeles police, the prevented from reaching receptive audi- Indonesian military, and the U.S. government ences. — are unusual, because the backfires were against those with more power attacking those Introduction 3

2 Devaluation of the target: the moral worth may be denied. A perpetrator can deny an act of an individual or group suffering injustice occurred, deny knowledge of the act, deny the is reduced. action meant what others think it does, and

3 Reinterpretation: the event or situation is deny any intention to cause the act. Authorities claimed not to be what it seems. may start by denying that anyone was killed at a protest. When the evidence becomes over- 4 Official channels: the issue is dealt with whelming, they may accept that someone died through formal procedures — such as but deny having known anything about it. Or courts or inquiries — or pronouncements they may agree that protesters died, but say it by authorities or experts, giving an appear- was the protesters’ fault and that police were ance of providing justice. protecting themselves and were following

5 Intimidation and bribery: those who might proper procedures. Finally, the authorities may act on the basis of outrage are subjected to deny any official intention to attack protesters, threats or attacks, or offered incentives not blaming a few rogue officers for abuses. to act. The types and styles of reinterpretation are legion. With the expansion of public relations The five methods of inhibiting outrage are and spin-doctoring, reinterpretation has been most vividly revealed through examples, as we turned into a routine and yet sophisticated art. will see in chapters 2 to 12. But it is possible By the same token, audiences have become to make some preliminary observations. increasingly skilled in seeing through self- Cover-up is an obvious tactic for perpetra- interested justifications. tors to avoid being blamed. The first instinct of Official channels give the appearance of most criminals is to not leave any incriminat- justice and thus are a potent method of inhib- ing evidence and then get away and not be iting outrage. If an action is endorsed by a caught. The Nazis carried out their extermina- scientific authority, an expert panel, a court, or tions in secret. Today, torture is carried out in a commission of inquiry, then many people dozens of countries, but not a single govern- will think all is well. Yet, contrary to appear- ment admits it. There are many techniques for ances, official channels often give a spurious cover-up, including operating in secrecy, legitimacy to injustice: experts might be influ- hiding evidence, destroying evidence, censor- enced by their employer or source of grants; ship, using proxies (such as hired killers), and courts might look only at legal technicalities, refusing to collect evidence. Cover-up is a way not moral justice; watchdog agencies might be to prevent communication to receptive audi- given insufficient resources; commissions ences, one of the two essential conditions for might be set up with restricted terms of refer- backfire. ence and hand-picked staff to give the answer Devaluation lowers people’s opinion about desired by the government. an individual or group, with the result that Some official channels are extremely slow. attacking that individual or group may not Cases can take months or years to get through seem so bad — indeed, it might seem to be a the courts. By the time there is a court verdict good thing. Devaluation has a long history. All or a report from a commission, agitation about sorts of groups have been and are devalued, the original injustice often has died down. including women, ethnic minorities, gays and Sometimes reports are released at times when Lesbians, people with disabilities, the poor, the they are least likely to be noticed. Finally, in homeless, and criminals. Occasionally, such as many cases governments simply ignore during revolutions, aristocrats or the wealthy recommendations from official inquiries. may be denigrated and attacked. In wartime, Intimidation and bribery constitute the fifth enemies are devalued. method of inhibition: people may know Reinterpretation is a staple of unjust attack. exactly what has occurred and think it is Some of the facts may be accepted, but said to unfair, but be unwilling to do anything about it mean something entirely different, or the facts due to the consequences, either negative or

4 Justice Ignited positive. Intimidation can be used against convenience. Depending on the case, it might targets, against witnesses, against campaign- make sense to list several types of reinterpre- ers, and against wavering members of the tation, to combine intimidation and cover-up, attacker group. Intimidation is often linked to to omit official channels, to separate intimida- cover-up, as when observers are too frightened tion and bribery, and so forth. There is no right to reveal what they saw. Bribery has a similar or wrong way to classify these methods. I have range of application. Often it is difficult to settled on five methods because they seem to obtain evidence about intimidation and even capture much of what goes on in a wide range more so about bribery, because these processes of cases, and because they are at a convenient are frequently hidden and sometimes subtle. level of generality. Figure 1.1 illustrates how To say there are five main methods of the five methods fit into a pattern. inhibiting outrage over injustice is a matter of

event Perception of injustice reaction target — attacked — unjustly

cover-up intimidation/bribery

devaluation official channels

reinterpretation

Figure 1.1. Five methods of inhibiting outrage and how they relate to an event, perceptions of it, and reactions to it

This diagram may give the misleading impression that the methods of inhibition operate in a sequence, beginning with cover- up and concluding with intimidation. Actually, each of the methods can operate independently, or in tandem with others, in virtually any order. So perhaps a better picture is Figure 1.2.

Introduction 5

cover-up

devaluation event reinterpretation reaction

official channels

intimidation/bribery

Figure 1.2. Five methods of inhibiting outrage and how they relate to an event, perceptions of it, and reactions to it

Promoting Outrage Overview

A key value of looking at methods of inhibit- Chapters 2, 3 and 4 describe three classic cases ing outrage over injustice is developing of backfire from violent assaults against “counter-methods,” namely ways of promoting peaceful protesters: the 1960 Sharpeville or amplifying outrage or, to put it another way, massacre in South Africa; the Dili massacre; of allowing appropriate outrage to be ex- and the 1930 salt march in India. Each case pressed. If, in confronting injustice, you can was a turning point in a long-running struggle expect to confront most or all of these five against injustice. methods, then it makes sense to be prepared to But backfire processes occur much more counter them. There are many possible ways to widely than violent attacks on peaceful pro- counter each of the methods of inhibition. testers. Chapter 5 deals with the King beating, Some of the most obvious are: a case that starkly reveals backfire dynamics even though Rodney King was not a protester • Exposing information about the injustice. and certainly not committed to nonviolence.

• Validating the targets. Chapter 6 deals with whistleblowing, and thus moves right away from violent attacks as the • Interpreting the event or situation as unjust. source of perceived injustice. Reprisals against

• Mobilizing public support and either avoid- whistleblowers are seen as unfair and hence ing or discrediting official channels. can backfire. The usual range of methods for inhibiting outrage can be seen. • Refusing to be intimidated or bribed, and Chapter 7 is about the dismissal of biologist exposing intimidation and bribery. Ted Steele from the University of Wollon- gong. I give a close look at the events. The If attackers had complete control, they new complexity shown by this case is multiple might be able to inhibit adverse responses to backfire processes: not only can an action by a injustice, but often there are participants or university administration backfire, but so can observers who act to encourage this response. actions by a dissident.

6 Justice Ignited

Chapter 8 deals with two environmental perceived injustice is involved. Just as impor- disasters, the Chernobyl nuclear accident and tant as understanding is practical action. the Exxon Valdez oil spill. No one intended Analyzing backfire dynamics offers insight — these accidents to occur, yet they had adverse especially for the less powerful — for building consequences for the Soviet government and better strategies against injustice. The most Exxon, respectively. So backfire can occur important test of the model is whether it can even when there is no intent on the part of do this. those held responsible. Chapter 9 analyzes the 2003 invasion of Iraq, showing backfire processes at work. In a conflict with violence on both sides, the capacity of a single action to generate outrage is reduced. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence of efforts by the U.S. government to inhibit outrage. Chapter 10 examines torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. This case shows how a local backfire can occur within a wider one, namely the invasion of Iraq. Chapter 11 is about torture technology, in particular electroshock weapons. It takes a step back from incidents of torture, such as at Abu Ghraib, to the struggle over the production and sale of the tools of torture. Chapter 12 examines the peculiar case of terrorism, which seems designed to produce outrage and thus is nearly always counterproductive. Hence, there must be other explanations for much terrorism. Chapters 2 through 12 deal with case studies using somewhat different styles. Chapters 2 to 4 tell stories of backfires, only commenting at the end on how tactics fit within the five methods of inhibiting outrage. Chapters 5, 8, 9, and 10 are organized around the five methods, telling stories within that framework. Chapter 7, on an academic dismissal, tells the story and then gives four backfire perspectives. Chapters 6, 11, and 12 use a variety of examples to illustrate a backfire perspective on a particular topic. I use these different approaches to provide different perspectives and insights. In chapter 13, I examine theory associated with backfire, including political jiu-jitsu, injustice, social movements, social problems, and communication. Finally, chapter 14 gives a summary of the backfire model and sums up insights from the case studies. The backfire model offers a way to better understand social dynamics, especially where Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 2 (author’s prepublication version)

2 Sharpeville

On 21 March 1960, white police in the town of Bureau, the signature of his employer Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire on a each month, and other particulars … the large crowd of peaceful black protesters, reference book must be shown on killing perhaps a hundred of them and injuring demand to any policeman or any of the many more. This massacre dramatically publi- fifteen different classes of officials who cized the protesters’ cause internationally.1 require to see it. Failure to produce it on This case starkly illustrates how violent demand constitutes an offence.2 attacks on peaceful protesters can be counterproductive. I tell the Sharpeville story with Pass offences often led to fines or imprison- special attention to tactics that might increase ment, with a thousand people charged every or decrease the scale of backfire. In the day. For the black population, the pass laws conclusion, I note how these tactics relate to were a potent symbol of their oppression. The the five main methods of inhibiting or ex- rally in Sharpeville was a protest against these pressing outrage. laws. In 1960, whites ruled South Africa. In the Sharpeville was set up by the South African system called apartheid, blacks, who government as a model community, with row composed most of the population, could not upon row of housing for blacks who would vote and were given only the worst jobs at low travel to work in nearby cities. Residents of pay, so their standard of living was far below the nearby black town of Topville — seen by that of whites. Blacks had separate, inferior the government as too close to white suburbs education. Their movement was restricted: to — were encouraged to relocate to Sharpeville. travel, male blacks had to possess a “pass,” Filled with many recently arrived families analogous to an internal passport. By 1960, seeking a better life, Sharpeville did not have a pass documents were held in a “reference strong local economy or traditions. There were book” that contained about 35,000 residents, of whom some 20,000 were children. It was like a large anonymous the holder’s name, his tax receipt, his suburb, stable and without a militant repu- permit to be in an urban area and to seek tation. work there, permits from the Labour Nevertheless, Sharpeville residents were affected by the unrest sweeping the country. For many decades, white rule in South Africa 1. Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: had been met by resistance, including mass Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven, opposition to pass laws from the early decades CT: Yale University Press, 2001) is the of the twentieth century. The African National definitive treatment of the Sharpeville mas- Congress was the primary vehicle for black sacre. The account here, except for material opposition to apartheid. Through the 1950s, about the international reaction, is drawn the ANC was totally committed to nonvio- largely from this source. For the purposes of a backfire analysis, heavy reliance on Frankel’s book is not problematic because Frankel did 2. Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville: not structure his study using a backfire The Agony of South Africa (London: Victor framework. Gollancz, 1960), 51.

8 Justice Ignited lence. For example, in 1959 the ANC called seriously harmed over the weekend, the for a one-month boycott of potatoes, which clashes and shots made them apprehensive, were a suitable boycott target for both fearing an impending bloodbath.5 Of course, economic and symbolic reasons. Thousands of residents subject to police assaults might well blacks, jailed for pass law violations, were put have been even more apprehensive. But it is under the supervision of farmers and made to important to be aware of the state of mind of pick potatoes with their bare hands. Though the police in order to understand what was to potatoes were a diet staple, the boycott was come. taken up eagerly and continued for three On Monday morning, 21 March, only a few months before the ANC called it to a close.3 residents left Sharpeville to go to work. In the late 1950s, the ANC was increasingly Instead, most of the town’s population challenged by the Pan Africanist Congress gradually joined the rally outside the police (PAC), which took a more militant stance. In station. The crowd eventually numbered March 1960, the PAC organized protests 18,000 to 25,000, including many children. against the pass laws, with 21 March set as the The organizers of the rally had no well- date for rallies around the country. developed plan of action, nor any system for Being an anti-apartheid organizer was a crowd control. A few crowd members had risky business. The South African Police were weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerries, club- well in control, with paid informers providing like weapons made from saplings with roots information about activities of both the ANC on their ends. There was some antagonism and PAC. Through their informers, police toward the police, but at the same time there were aware major protests were being planned were elements of a carnival, “happy-go-lucky” around the country, but were misled about the atmosphere. There was no plan to attack the date. PAC activists discovered the police police station. The few weapons carried in the agents and fed them false information.4 crowd served to boost morale rather than to aid In terms of black protest, Sharpeville was an attack.6 quiescent compared to other areas. Neverthe- In the Sharpeville police station, facing the less, PAC activists were able to mobilize crowd, were some 400 police, half with support from a large proportion of the town firearms, plus Saracen tanks with machine population. Over the weekend prior to the guns. This was ample firepower to quell any rally, PAC activists went door to door telling disturbance. Nevertheless, the police perceived residents about the protest scheduled for a threat from the large crowd as it pressed Monday. During the nights that weekend, against a thin wire barrier in front of the there were numerous spontaneous demonstra- station. tions and clashes with police. Protesters The police were poorly informed and seri- chanted and came armed with sticks; the ously stressed. The white police lived outside police attacked with whips and batons. In one Sharpeville, had few personal links with the incident, numerous objects were thrown at residents and had no sense of what animated police, who attacked with batons. But the them. The police believed the crowd “lusted crowd did not retreat or disperse and the police for white blood,” seeing “cultural weapons” fired 42 rounds, killing at least two residents. such as knobkerries as tools for attack. This Someone in a nearby house fired two shots, was a serious misreading of the situation.7 missing police. The police, as well as being misinformed Despite the police’s greater arsenal and and stressed from the weekend’s events, were killing power, and the fact that no police were

3. Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (London: 5. Ibid., 78–82, 86. Collins, 1962), 217–19. 6. Ibid., 100. 4. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 64. 7. Ibid., 100, 99. Sharpeville 9 not well commanded. Police leaders were who were injured, removed by family or unaware of the full weaponry held by the friends and who later died. It seems reasonable police. (There were both white and black to say perhaps a hundred died.9 Many more police present, but only white police had were injured. firearms.) Just as important as the number of deaths Poor organization and poor information on was the manner by which they occurred. Most both sides set the stage for disaster. On the of the victims were shot in the back as they police side, there was poor coordination of fled from the police. The firing continued long forces and a false belief that the crowd was enough for some police to reload their intent on attack. As hours went by and the weapons and continue. Some police used soft- protest continued, the tired and stressed police nosed bullets that cause horrific exit wounds. remained on duty. Meanwhile, most partici- These antipersonnel bullets, commonly called pants in the rally were treating the event much dumdums, had been banned by the 1899 more lightly. At one point, an aircraft buzzed Hague Declaration; any force that used them the crowd, for unknown reasons. Far from would look very bad in world opinion.10 being intimidated, crowd members treated this In 1960, South Africa was a respected as part of the festivities. member of the international community. It had At 1.30pm, a drunk in the crowd named a long established, well functioning system of Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A representative government, though crucially friend tried to stop him and two shots were limited to whites. It had a prosperous economy fired into the air. At the same time, a key — again mainly benefiting whites — and was police official named Spengler stumbled. seen as a valuable trading partner. It had many Some in the crowd leaned forward. A consta- supporters internationally. At the same time, ble helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles there was considerable opposition to the were thrown from the crowd and one hit the apartheid system, most obviously among the constable. The constable heard “shot” or black South Africans but also among segments “short” and fired. Spengler deflected the of the white population (especially the constable’s shot, but it was too late: the English-speaking segment) and in many other constable’s shot triggered the police to fire countries. Among opponents, apartheid was 4000 rounds into the crowd, killing dozens of seen as a system of racist oppression. people and wounding many more. But only some perceived apartheid as There are many views about these events, abominable. It had a fairly bland exterior. with police claiming they were defending Apartheid was a system of oppression and against the threatening crowd and PAC exploitation but not one of brutal violence supporters believing the police intended mass conspicuous to outsiders. To be sure, the South killing. My account here follows the detailed African police and military were essential to historical reconstruction by Philip Frankel in implementation of government policies such his authoritative book on the Sharpeville as the pass laws, but they mostly appeared as massacre titled An Ordinary Atrocity. agents of an administrative, routine law- According to Frankel, the massacre was not enforcing process, not as outrageous jack- premeditated. It was a mistake but, once firing booted thugs. started, it continued, having unleashed deep- To many people worldwide, apartheid was seated anxieties among the police.8 abhorrent in itself as a system of racial oppres- The official figure for the number of people sion, irrespective of the legalities by which killed by the police was 69. Frankel notes that this is certainly too low, as there were 24 or so victims removed by the police, plus others 9. Ibid., 150–52. 10. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing A Military and Political History of Antiper- 8. Ibid., 116–18. sonnel Weapons (London: Zed, 1995).

10 Justice Ignited this was achieved. But in 1960 this view was actions were taken before medical help was shared by only a minority of western govern- sought. If news of the shootings had been ments. Colonialism was alive and well. Some contained entirely or had only leaked out by countries had gained independence from their word of mouth in dribs and drabs, without an colonial rulers, such as India and Pakistan in authoritative account, this would have reduced 1947 and, in Africa, Ghana in 1957, but many the adverse consequences for the attackers. others remained colonies, including most of But the police efforts to control information black Africa. In Algeria, nationalists were were too little and too late. Not only were fighting a bloody war for independence from there numerous witnesses among Sharpeville France. In Vietnam, a liberation struggle was residents, but some journalists had come to under way against a regime propped up by the Sharpeville for the protest and took photo- U.S. military. Overshadowing the numerous graphs before, during, and after the massa- wars around the world was the cold war cre.12 This sort of photojournalism was much confrontation between the two superpowers, less common in 1960 than it is today: the Soviet Union and the United States, with nuclear arsenals poised to launch devastating It so happened that a reporter, using the strikes. In the late 1950s, a powerful peace resourcefulness which is the stock-in- movement had sprung into existence to oppose trade of the journalist’s profession, was atmospheric nuclear testing and the nuclear able to get — and to get away with — arms race. some photographs of the Sharpeville In this context, South Africa seemed a pillar affray. The chance availability of this of stability in Africa, where independence dramatic record may have persuaded movements were agitating for liberation from editors here and there to give the accom- colonial shackles. The shootings in Sharpeville panying news story a prominent place on threatened to undermine international support their front pages, and these pictures were for South Africa, by providing a stimulus for seen by millions.13 action by those already opposed to apartheid and by weakening the moral position of the Although the police could not contain news South African government’s traditional allies. about the massacre, their efforts at “informa- The shootings, because they were readily tion management” are revealing. Crowd interpreted as a brutal attack by white police members wanted to help the wounded but against the black population, certainly had the were kept away by police, to reduce people’s potential to be counterproductive for the South knowledge of what had happened, to prevent African government, for the South African new protests developing, and to reduce Police as an organizational entity, and for the adverse publicity.14 individual police involved. One goal of the police was to eliminate After the shooting, the immediate reaction information about the use of dumdums. They of the police was to protect themselves from removed the dead bodies of a couple of dozen repercussions from their actions. Some of victims of these bullets. Some had survived them threw stones into the police station in and been taken to hospital. Doctors reported order to give the impression that the threat that most of the wounds were mid-body and from the crowd was greater than it had been: from the rear. Police went to the hospital and the larger the threat, the more easily the shootings could be justified. The police immediately cordoned off the 12. Reeves’ book reproduces 30 photographs. town and took control of communication. Journalists were kept out of the area, being 13. Peter Calvocoressi, South Africa and told the situation was too dangerous.11 These World Opinion (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 2. 11. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 134–35. 14. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 140–41. Sharpeville 11 took away some of the wounded, especially according to Saul Moise, an unfortunate those with injuries indicating use of dumdums. who fell foul of the patrols, was beaten (This was justified on the grounds that these senseless for no apparent reason, thrown individuals were security threats.) The police into prison and then released three weeks conveniently “lost” evidence about use of later without charges.17 dumdums, “misplaced” evidence on the ammunition rounds issued, used and not used. Adding to the repression, armed groups of Later, at the inquiry into the events, no experts white citizens ran patrols in black areas. The on dumdums were called. All in all, cover-up police did not try to monitor these extra-legal of the use of dumdums was quite effective.15 initiatives. From the point of view of most of the The international reaction to the massacre world, the Sharpeville events involved was powerful and extensive. Peter Calvo- massive use of force against an unarmed and coressi, in his book South Africa and World nonthreatening crowd. The police’s heavy use Opinion, said that, “First emotions were of firearms was seen as totally unjustified. everywhere much the same — horror, indig- That some in the crowd had sticks and nation, disgust.”18 Governments condemned knobkerries, and that some of them threw the massacre. Anti-apartheid activists were stones, did little to challenge the perception galvanized, obtaining much more support than that the police had used massive lethal force previously. Supporters of the regime were put inappropriately. Albert Luthuli, leader of the on the defensive. For example: ANC, commented that In Norway flags were flown at half-mast The guns of Sharpeville echoed across on public buildings on the day of the the world, and nowhere except among funeral of the Sharpeville victims. … the totalitarians was there any doubt about Brazilian government banned a football the true nature of what had occurred. match in Rio de Janeiro against a South The Government had placed beyond African team; it also recalled its ambas- question the implacable, wanton brutal- sador from Pretoria. At a conference in ity of their régime.16 New Zealand the Prime Minister, Mr. Walter Nash, asked his audience to stand From the police point of view, though, the in silent memory of the dead and the real threat came from the black population, Indian House of Representatives also especially from the organizers of the rally. paid this tribute …19 This perception persisted after the shootings. Police went through Sharpeville making many By comparison, the reaction inside South arrests, including the supposed leaders of the Africa was muted. In the face of a government “disturbances” as well as many others. The clampdown on activists and all dissent, the police beat many of those arrested as well as black population was demoralized rather than others who were not arrested. According to Frankel,

In the initial hours after the massacre most of the police simply combed the 17. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 156–57. streets and vented their anger on often Frankel’s original quotation includes the hapless people who were treated ‘as if bracketed clarifier “[the SAP]” which I have they [the police] were the victims,’ changed to “[the police].” 18. Calvocoressi, South Africa and World 15. Ibid., 147–48, 154–56. Opinion, 34. 16. Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222. 19. Ibid., 3–4.

12 Justice Ignited energized by the events. Within Sharpeville killings did not generate widespread abhor- itself, apathy was more typical than outrage.20 rence. The victims were perceived as The difference between international out- unworthy. Consequently, South African whites rage and the subdued response within South “were staggered by the unanimity of the Africa can be explained by several factors. world’s reaction to Sharpeville,” reacting with Black South Africans were already aware of “dazed incomprehension or truculent self- the iron fist of the apartheid state, through day- justification.”21 to-day encounters with violence and humilia- In contrast, in many foreign countries white tion. For many, the massacre only confirmed racism was neither so virulent nor so wide- what they already knew and so did not cause spread. To be sure, white racism was potent an explosion of resentment and further action. internationally, but it had to confront an Some critics of apartheid saw the massacre increasingly powerful worldwide movement as an expression of the true nature of the South for racial equality, which was supported by African state and immediately assumed the ringing endorsements from the United Nations Sharpeville events had been consciously and other bodies. The extermination policies orchestrated by the police as an exercise of of Nazi Germany had discredited white racism premeditated killing for the purposes of in the eyes of many, making it much harder to intimidation and brutality. Frankel, whose overtly endorse racist policies, though much views I have followed here, rejects both this overt and de facto racism persisted. Speaking interpretation and the opposite one, promoted generally, many more people outside South by the police and government, that put the Africa saw the Sharpeville victims as equal blame on the demonstrators. members of the human community, in other Unlike South African blacks, few interna- words as victims worthy of respect and tional observers were aware of the day-to-day empathy. brutality of apartheid, given the carefully A third factor affecting the South African managed image of legality and order conveyed and foreign responses was the potential for by the South African government and the intimidation. Within South Africa, police ar- willingness of foreign governments and corpo- rested activists as the government strengthened rations to ignore evidence that might disturb its capacity for repression, declaring a state of their political and trading relationships with emergency. This seems to have discouraged a South Africa. The Sharpeville killings broke larger mobilization of resistance. Had the through this conventional image, nurtured by ANC and PAC and other opponents of ignorance and convenience, with a picture of apartheid been better organized, the massacre unmistakable and unconscionable violence. might have triggered an expansion of resis- “Sharpeville,” a word which became synony- tance, but, as noted, demoralization was more mous with the massacre, served as an icon of common. Outside the country, on the other everything wrong with apartheid. hand, the South African police and state had A second factor distinguishing South virtually no capacity for threatening or re- African and foreign responses to the massacre pressing dissent. The risks of opposing was racism. Within white South Africa, blacks apartheid were far less, making possible a were commonly considered inherently inferior. rapid and very public expansion of opposition. Apartheid was a system of institutionalized Peer pressure also played a role. Among oppression — with political, economic, legal, white South Africans, open support for black social, and psychological dimensions — that equality was not easy. L. F. Beyers Naudé, a both reflected and enhanced perceptions of South African minister and supporter of white white racial superiority and justified privilege. The black population was so devalued that the 21. Colin Legum and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the West (London: Pall Mall 20. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 160–61. Press, 1964), 75. Sharpeville 13 supremacy, began to reconsider his views after responses as a natural, if over-reactive, the Sharpeville killings. In 1963 he resigned case of self defence could connect very from the ministry “to become a director of a positively with the prevailing persecu- multi-racial Christian Institute.” As a result of tion mentality among white South this challenge to apartheid, he and his family Africans in the aftermath of the massacre suffered “the fate of every dissenter of — including many who would not, other prominence in the Church: social ostracism, than in these exceptional circumstances, reinforced by public attack.”22 Ambrose lend their support to the Nationalist Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, who wrote a government … Ultimately, a sympa- powerful book about the massacre, was thetic commission — indeed any com- deported from the country. mission — was essential to smoothing In summary, there were three factors that the panic and fears of a vast array of helped the massacre trigger a much larger international interests with stakes in a reaction outside South Africa than inside: less post-Sharpeville South Africa.23 familiarity outside the country with the brutality of apartheid; a lower level of institu- The Wessels Commission did pretty much as tionalized racism; and less vulnerability to the government had hoped: it whitewashed the reprisals from the South African state. massacre. It did not go into the details of Immediately after the massacre, the South police’s shooting or use of ammunition; the African government decided to hold an inquiry issue of dumdums was hardly pursued. into the events. Internally, the government Potential black witnesses to the commission wanted to show the white population it was in came under strong pressures. Because of control of the situation. Externally, it wanted police intimidation, few of them were willing to demonstrate that South Africa was not an to testify, for fear of reprisals. They also came authoritarian state, to prevent damage to the under pressure from the PAC to follow a country’s reputation in diplomatic and trading “party line” that blamed the police for circles. So the Wessels Commission was set premeditated murder and did not acknowledge up. the role of fear and poor leadership among the In setting up this commission, there was a police. Finally, police simply lied to the dilemma for the government. If the commis- commission, having no fear of any punish- sion was too independent, it might come up ment. Police also destroyed, hid, and fabri- with strong conclusions damning the police cated evidence. and government, thus adding to the bad According to Frankel, the government publicity from the massacre. On the other wanted the commission to move quickly, both hand, if the commission was too subservient to to reassure the international community about the government — if, for example, it the government’s concern and to catch the completely exonerated the police and put all victims while they were still in a state of shock the blame on the protesters — then it would and therefore less able to testify effectively. have reduced its own credibility and done The commission seems to have lived up to nothing to placate international opinion. most of the government’s expectations, at least According to Frankel, the government’s in relation to its marginalization of the preference for the commission was towards the victims’ voices. Concerning the commission’s subservient end of the spectrum: report, Frankel comments that:

A pliant (or partially pliant) commission its overall findings, read four decades which confirmed the vicious intent of the later, are so densely unintelligible, so Sharpeville mob and presented police ridden with double-talk, qualifications,

22. Ibid., 31. 23. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 188.

14 Justice Ignited

and refutable logic as to defy both legal Finally, intimidation transforms both the reasoning and ordinary comprehension.24 willingness of participants to contribute to a struggle over meaning, as well as intervening The commission’s report was both obscure on one side in the struggle. and relatively favorable to the police. My account here mentions only a small part Sometimes it seems events are so obvious of the copious detail provided in Frankel’s that they “speak for themselves.” The Sharpe- book An Ordinary Atrocity. I’ve given special ville massacre became such a symbol of the attention to material relevant to backfire. One brutal reality of apartheid that it is easy to thing is clear: the massacre did indeed backfire assume its meaning was transparent to all but on the South African government in the the most prejudiced of observers. Yet a closer international arena, energizing apartheid’s look reveals complexities. What “actually opponents and putting its supporters on the happened” was quickly obscured by the back foot. Had the government and the police divergent agendas of black activists and the anticipated events in Sharpeville, there is little police, each of whom adopted simplistic, self- doubt they would have done everything serving accounts. It is fair to say there was a possible to avoid the unprovoked and uncon- struggle over the interpretation of events. Of trolled shooting at an unarmed crowd that course, more nuanced treatments such as appeared unconscionable to most neutral Frankel’s are not faultless; history is always observers, and turned “Sharpeville” into a open to rewriting on the basis of new evidence symbol of the brutality of apartheid. and ways of thinking. But in the aftermath of the massacre, the struggle over interpretation Conclusion was a matter of dire urgency for both supporters and opponents of apartheid, with carica- The Sharpeville massacre was a disaster for tures serving as tools in a struggle for the South African government, particularly allegiance. because it damaged its international reputation. But the struggle was more than a matter of The shooting of protesters, though intimidat- interpretation of an event. Also involved were ing to them, had the wider long-term effect of cover-ups and attempted cover-ups. A totally weakening the position of the white police and effective cover-up makes an event invisible to government in ruling a majority black popula- outsiders and makes interpretation irrelevant to tion. So it is reasonable to say the shooting them (though still relevant to those in the backfired: it was worse for the government know); a partially effective cover-up, such as than if it had not happened. concerning the use of dumdums, slants the The police and government took a range of basis for making interpretations. Devaluation steps to reduce outrage from the shooting. of the victims profoundly affects the meaning These can be readily classified into the five of the events. Similarly, an official investiga- categories presented in chapter 1, as follows. tion such as the Wessels Commission trans- Cover-up. South African police cordoned forms meanings by giving the stamp of Sharpeville and tried to control communica- approval to a particular interpretation.25 tion out of the town. This effort largely failed, with information and photographs about the massacre made available to the world. 24. Ibid., 192. The police removed evidence of the use of dumdum bullets. Dead bodies with evidence of 25. Austin T. Turk, Political Criminality: The dumdums were removed from the protest site, Defiance and Defense of Authority (Beverly surviving victims of dumdums were taken Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 146, says “The Republic of South Africa may well have the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.” Wessels Commission. I thank Jeff Ross for This is compatible with the role played by the this reference. Sharpeville 15 from the hospital, and evidence of the issue beating and arresting residents. The govern- and firing of dumdum rounds was removed or ment soon declared a state of emergency, destroyed. This cover-up was fairly successful: giving legal backing for the increased repres- the issue of dumdums did not play a signifi- sion that was already occurring. Arrests and cant role in the outrage over the massacre. threats also reduced the ability and willingness Devaluation. South African blacks were to report on the use of dumdums. However, devalued in the eyes of most South African intimidation had little effect on international whites due to overt and institutionalized opinion. racism. International observers, though, were Intimidation was effective in limiting testi- much less likely to have such a low opinion of mony to the Wessels Commission, helping South African blacks. Indeed, the fact that the turn its report into a whitewash. Likewise, massacre was carried out by white police cover-up reduced the commission’s access to against black protesters made it a potent information. symbol of racist brutality. White South African racism thus muted outrage within the Although the police and government used all country, whereas international anti-racism five methods of inhibiting outrage, in the end magnified it. they were mostly unsuccessful: the massacre Reinterpretation. The police perceived the turned out to be counterproductive for them. Sharpeville crowd as physically menacing and Shooting protesters in cold blood was widely the product of a deeper anti-white threat. Thus perceived as a gross injustice; once informa- it was easy for the authorities to endorse the tion and images about the shooting were view that the primary responsibility for the communicated internationally, the efforts of events was held by the crowd and its organiz- the government to blame the protesters and ers, dubbed “agitators.” give a semblance of justice through the The Sharpeville protest was part of the Wessels Commission were too little and too wider mobilization organized by PAC activ- late to undo the damage. ists. Again, this was perceived as a serious threat to law-abiding citizens. However, this Acknowledgements picture of the crowd as the aggressor and the I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Jeff Ross, police as victims who inadvertently used too Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for valuable much firepower did not sell well in other comments on drafts of this chapter. countries. On the other hand, PAC activists and other black sympathizers portrayed the Sharpeville events as premeditated murder. This interpretation resonated with those inclined to believe the worst about apartheid. Official channels. After the massacre, the government quickly established the Wessels Commission to serve as a symbol of the government’s commitment to justice, due process, and the search for truth. In order to reduce outrage without disturbing the status quo, the commission had to be seen to be fair and independent yet in reality produce a whitewash. This seems to be pretty much what happened, though it is unclear how much effect the commission had on opinion inside and outside the country. Intimidation. Immediately after the massacre, the police went through Sharpeville

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 3 (author’s prepublication version)

3 Dili

On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops colonies — such as Angola and Mozambique gunned down hundreds of peaceful protesters — to gain independence. in Dili, the capital of East Timor. This act was In East Timor, Portugal’s most remote intended to intimidate opponents of Indonesian colony, with a population of nearly 700,000, rule. But instead, the killings triggered a huge rival political forces struggled for supremacy increase in international support for East in the transition from Portuguese rule, with the Timor’s independence. In order to understand liberation movement Fretilin having most the Dili massacre and how it backfired, I popular support. In December 1975, Indone- review its background and aftermath, giving sian military forces invaded and occupied East special attention to the five methods attackers Timor. According to some commentators, the use to inhibit outrage. Indonesian government had obtained agree- Most of the archipelago today called ment for the operation from the Australian and Indonesia was previously a colony of the U.S. governments.2 Fretilin fought the inva- Netherlands. Indonesia obtained its independ- sion but soon retreated to the mountains where ence in 1949. The new government, led by it maintained a guerrilla resistance to the Sukarno, fostered a strong sense of national- Indonesian occupiers. ism. In 1965, there was a military coup, The invasion and occupation were bloody, accompanied by a massive anticommunist with many fighters and civilians killed. purge, with hundreds of thousands of people Indonesian forces perpetrated serious human killed.1 The new regime, led by General rights violations, including torture, rape, and Suharto, was ideologically procapitalist, but it killing of civilians; Fretilin did the same, retained its predecessor’s strong nationalism. though on a much smaller scale and mainly in One of the islands in the archipelago, the first few years after 1975. The Indonesian Timor, had been colonized by Portugal in the occupation led to famine among East Timorese 1500s, and later by the Netherlands. Portugal living on the land, leading to the death of up to eventually ended up controlling just the 180,000 people.3 On a proportional basis, this eastern half of the island. In 1974, a military was one of the most lethal conquests in the coup in Lisbon toppled the Portuguese dicta- century. torship, opening the path for representative For several years, the United Nations government. This also enabled Portugal’s passed resolutions condemning the Indonesian takeover, but none of these was backed up

1. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 2. Joseph Nevins, A Not-so-Distant Horror: 1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast Mass Violence in East Timor (Ithaca, NY: Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). On Cornell University Press, 2005), 51–52, 62– the lack of backfire from this bloodbath, see 63. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian 3. Commission for Reception, Truth, and Vickers, “Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Reconciliation Timor-Leste, Chega! (East Repression: Studying Lower-profile Nonvio- Timor: Commission for Reception, Truth, and lent Resistance,” Pacifica Review 13 (2001): Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005). I thank Joe 143–56. Nevins for referring me to this source.

Dili 17 with action. Most governments and corpora- reduced criticism from other governments. The tions preferred to keep on good terms with the governor of East Timor asked for easing of Indonesian regime, which ruled one of the restrictions on travel to, from, and within East world’s most populous countries. However, in Timor, in order to foster investment, to which the following decades, only the Australian President Suharto agreed. From 1989, tourists government formally recognized the incorpo- and western journalists — but not human ration of East Timor into Indonesia. Within rights observers — were allowed into East several countries, notably Australia, Japan, and Timor. Britain, there were active solidarity move- Fretilin, with declining numbers of fighters ments supporting the East Timorese liberation in the late 1980s, changed its strategic orienta- struggle.4 tion, also taking into account the increased The Indonesian occupiers kept tight control access by visitors. Rather than seeking over communications in and out of East liberation primarily through armed struggle Timor. After the 1975 invasion, supporters in with a guerrilla army based in the countryside, northern Australia for some years maintained the new approach emphasized civilian resis- short-wave contact with Fretilin in the face of tance in urban areas. Fretilin retained its Australian government efforts to shut down weapons but decided to use them only for the radio link.5 The restriction on information defense, not to launch attacks. The aims of this flow helped to reduce outrage over atrocities new orientation were to foster East Timorese carried out by Indonesian troops. Often the unity in the struggle and to gain greater only word of these came via individuals who support for independence both within Indone- were able to leave East Timor. Their testimony sia and internationally. Fretilin gave special often lacked credibility because there was no attention to mobilizing protests to coincide independent verification or endorsement by with visits by foreign dignitaries.6 western sources. A delegation of Portuguese parliamentari- The Indonesian occupiers in the late 1980s ans planned to visit East Timor in late 1991. faced reduced pressure from Fretilin and Independence supporters organized a major demonstration; at the same time, the Indone- sian military prepared for a crackdown. The 4. On the East Timorese liberation struggle, Portuguese visit was called off at the last see for example Carmel Budiardjo and Liem minute following a procedural disagreement Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor between the Indonesian and Portuguese (London: Zed Books, 1984); Jill Jolliffe, East governments. Tensions were predictably high. Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (Bris- On the night of 28 October, there was a bane: University of Queensland Press, 1978); fight between pro-independence and pro- Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Indonesian Timorese in the Church of Saint Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor Anthony of Motael in Dili. Many young (London: TAPOL, 1979); John Pilger, Distant people had sought refuge in the building prior Voices (London: Vintage, 1994), 231–323; to the cancelled visit; the church was sur- Constâncio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East rounded by Indonesian troops, who tried to Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the make the East Timorese leave. Two people Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End were killed, one of them a Timorese working Press, 1997); John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s for the Indonesians and the other an 18-year- Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East old supporter of independence named Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991). 5. Rob Wesley Smith, “Radio Maubere and Links to East Timor,” in Free East Timor: 6. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resis- Genocide, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random tance Movement’s Strategy for Engagement,” House, 1998), 83–102. Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000), 17–31.

18 Justice Ignited

Sebastião Gomes. Bishop Carlos Belo — the several minutes — no one could be sure leading Catholic Church figure in a largely how long.9 Catholic country — went to the scene. The Indonesians tried to claim Gomes had been This event might have become just one more killed with a knife, but Belo saw the bullet instance of an alleged atrocity, without holes in his body. In a funeral mass for authoritative documentation. The difference Gomes, the bishop fiercely criticized the this time was that western journalists were Indonesian occupiers, saying they had ultimate present at Santa Cruz cemetery, witnessing the responsibility for the deaths.7 massacre, among them Alan Nairn of the New The resistance movement decided to go Yorker, Amy Goodman of Pacifica Radio, and ahead with the protest it had planned for the Steve Cox, a British photographer, each of Portuguese visit, but to make it part of a whom was severely beaten. Their eyewitness memorial procession and service at Santa Cruz accounts provided vivid, credible evidence of cemetery for Gomes, scheduled for 12 what had happened.10 November. Indonesian troops surrounded the Most powerful of all was video footage shot mourners along its route. While expressing by British filmmaker Max Stahl, from political sentiments, the large procession was Yorkshire Television. Stahl hid his videotapes almost entirely peaceful, except for one in the cemetery and picked them up later. The incident. next day, Dutch reporter Saskia Kouwenberg smuggled the tapes out of East Timor and then Suddenly there was a brief scuffle as an out of Indonesia. This video footage was Indonesian major waded into the crowd screened initially in the Netherlands, then in with a group of soldiers bearing fixed Britain and other countries, and totally bayonets. The major threw a young discredited Indonesian government denials that woman to the ground as he tried to grab an atrocity had occurred.11 a nationalist flag she was carrying. Some The Dili massacre severely backfired on the accounts say the major was then stabbed Indonesian occupiers. International outrage led by the boyfriend of the young woman. to a huge increase in support for the East The stabbing, later cited by Indonesian Timorese solidarity movement in many authorities as the reason for the tragedy countries. Movement groups continued with that day, was hardly noticed at the time, their activities, raising awareness of the and to this day it is not clear what injustice and brutality of the occupation and happened.8 putting pressure on western governments and corporations over their overt or tacit support The march proceeded without hindrance until for the Indonesian government. The outrage its arrival at the cemetery. over the massacre boosted these efforts. Journalists and editors were more willing to Indonesian troops arrived and opened run stories about East Timor. Politicians, many fire on the crowd at point-blank range, of whom saw Stahl’s footage, were more without warning or provocation. It had willing to support legislation penalizing all the appearance of a planned, disciplined operation. The fusillade lasted 9. Ibid. 10. Also present was Australian journalist 7. Arnold S. Kohen, From the Place of the Russell Anderson, who tells his story in “The Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of Massacre of 12 November 1991,” in Aubrey, East Timor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Free East Timor, 145–52. I thank Joe Nevins 1999), 154–58. for this point. 8. Ibid., 162. 11. Kohen, From the Place of the Dead, 167. Dili 19

Indonesia. Speakers about the occupation, two prominent East Timorese figures, Bishop especially those from East Timor, were in Belo and José Ramos-Horta, head diplomat of much greater demand. the resistance. The award significantly lifted Commenting on western media coverage on the profile of the independence cause. East Timor, journalist Hugh O’Shaughnessy The global context in the 1990s also helped stated: supporters of East Timor independence. Following the end of the Cold War, commu- Whether the Indonesian authorities nism no longer served as such an effective recognized it at the time or not, Stahl’s pretext for oppression; governments were film was the death knell for the contin- more prone to use the rhetoric of human rights. ued dominance of Indonesia in East A number of small states gained independ- Timor. It put the territory on the world ence, including the Baltic states and parts of political agenda in a way that no other former Yugoslavia, giving greater plausibility document had done, inspiring people to demands for East Timor to have the same around the globe with the desire to help opportunity.14 to put an end to the occupation. Stahl’s The mobilizing effect of the Dili massacre film inspired print, radio and television did not derive solely from the scale of the journalists worldwide to continue the killings, because there had been many coverage of East Timor. John Pilger and previous massacres in East Timor, some of David Munro, for instance, used footage them worse than the one in Santa Cruz from Max Stahl and others as an indis- cemetery. For example, in 1981 a party of pensable part of a long television Fretilin guerrillas surrendered along with their documentary, Death of a Nation (1994), women and children. Aside from a few which was screened widely and updated women, they were all shot and their bodies and re-screened in 1999.12 burned, with some 400 killed. In August 1983, following a Fretilin attack that killed more In the United States, the testimony of than a dozen Indonesian troops, journalists Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, plus photos and videotape, led to media First some 200 Timorese were burnt coverage and to the creation of the East Timor alive in their homes, while another 500 Action Network, a grassroots movement. were killed at the Be Tuku River. … Some members of Congress were outraged by According to Mario Carrascalão, provin- the massacre and initiated legislative moves cial governor of the time who personally banning U.S. provision of military training and investigated the atrocity, more than 1000 weapons to Indonesia.13 Timorese of all ages were massacred. The increased visibility of the East Timor Yet there was no international response, issue was almost certainly a factor in the let alone pressure on the Suharto awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 to government to stop the killing. A statement by an Australian cabinet minister to the effect that Falintil [Fretilin troops] 12. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, “Reporting East should stop provoking the Indonesian Timor: Western Media Coverage of the military was the best that Canberra could Conflict,” in The East Timor Question: The come up with!15 Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, ed. Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 31–40, at 36. 13. Charles Scheiner, “The United States: 14. James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Pas- From Complicity to Ambiguity,” in Hains- sage to Independence, 3d ed. (Sydney: worth and McCloskey, East Timor Question, Longueville Books, 2003), 333. 117–32. 15. Ibid., 292–93.

20 Justice Ignited

In the past, cover-up and a highly regulated tors have to be shot and we will shoot media had been effective means for minimiz- them.”17 ing awareness of the brutalities of the occupation, but this time information from credible As well as denigrating the victims, Indone- independent observers reached the rest of the sian officials attempted to undermine the world. Indonesian officials, though, did what credibility of East Timorese leaders by misrep- they could to prevent publicity about the Santa resenting what they said and wrote. After East Cruz killings. Immediately after the massacre, Timorese leader Xanana Gusmão was captured phone services to the outside world were cut in 1992, a military-controlled newspaper off. The Australian government, with strong accused him of rape and murder, among other economic and security ties to Indonesia, slurs.18 attempted to assist in preventing information A usual method by which the occupiers about the massacre reaching a wider public, attempted to reduce backlash from atrocities was to misrepresent what had happened.19 For by ordering its immigration officials in example, Lieutenant Colonel A. Tampodang Darwin to conduct a rigorous search of claimed the Dili events were due to the the belongings of both Stahl and presence of “more than 100 clandestine [photographer Steve] Cox when they separatists, armed with Portuguese-made G-3 flew out through Northern Australia in rifles and hand grenades.” Indonesian Foreign late November (fortunately, both had Minister Ali Alatas claimed protesters had had the presence of mind to entrust their thrown grenades at the troops, who had to film to reliable couriers, one of whom defend themselves against the threatening exited Timor by another route).16 crowd.20 Lies did not convince the local East Indonesian officials denigrated the victims. Timorese population, but usually were effec- For example, General Try Sutrisno, com- tive with the population of Indonesia and the mander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed wider world. The Indonesian media were forces (and later vice-president of Indonesia), regulated and monitored by the government, shortly after the massacre, so only the official line was covered. In other countries, Indonesian government views were defended the action, telling a graduation usually reported. Standard western media ceremony at the National Defence practice gives priority to statements by Institute, Lemhanas, that dissent must be government officials — especially when the quashed by “exterminating anyone who government in question is allied to the west — disrupts stability … They are people and gives government opponents little or no who must be crushed. This scum must be voice. Because the East Timorese resistance eliminated … ill-bred people who have had little access to the western media, partly to be shot … come what may, they cannot ignore ABRI [Indonesian armed forces] … ABRI is determined to 17. Andrew McMillan, Death in Dili (Sydney: eliminate anyone who creates distur- Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), 162. Ellipses in bances … Delinquents like these agita- the original. 18. Estêvão Cabral, “The Indonesian Propa- ganda War against East Timor,” in Hainsworth and McCloskey, East Timor Question, 69–84, at 75–76.

16. Steve Cox and Peter Carey, Generations of 19. Cabral describes many of the techniques of Resistance: East Timor (London: Cassell, misrepresentation. 1995), 52. 20. McMillan, Death in Dili, 161–62. Dili 21 due to Indonesian censorship and partly to Many independent observers — including an cultural, language, and logistic barriers, it was official UN delegation — concluded, to the difficult to offer a credible challenge to the contrary, that the attack was indeed premedi- official Indonesian government line. The Santa tated. Cruz events were quite different: the testimony In response to the international outcry, the of experienced western journalists, plus video Indonesian government set up an official footage, provided a powerful counter to inquiry into the massacre. The inquiry report Indonesian government lies. was released on December 26, 1991. Indonesian officials initially stated 19 peo- Compared to testimony by East Timorese ple had died at Santa Cruz cemetery. They witnesses and western observers, the inquiry later raised this to 50. A separate, non- reported a very low number of deaths. But the government assessment gave a figure of 271, very existence of an inquiry was an indication with many hundreds more injured. of the seriousness of the backlash against the A publication by the Indonesian Depart- Indonesian occupation. Following the investi- ment of Foreign Affairs in 1992 gives the gation, two generals were removed. According following account of the Santa Cruz “inci- to Kohen, dent”: One prominent expert on the Indonesian The tragic outcome of the demonstration military, who said that Suharto saw the that occurred in Dili, East Timor, on the Santa Cruz events as a major blunder, 12th of November 1991 was deeply noted that it was the first time that any regrettable, as was immediately and Indonesian army officer of that rank repeatedly expressed by the Indonesian “had ever been so publicly humiliated” Government at the highest levels. Most during the Suharto era.22 unfortunately, the demonstration was not entirely peaceful and indeed displayed The massacre led to other official re- premeditated provocation and belliger- sponses. The army conducted its own inquiry, ence. It triggered a spontaneous reaction which may have led to changes in the by some security personnel, acting command structure. As well, outside the control or command of senior officers, and resulted in a deplorable loss Amid the international outcry, ten of lives and a number of wounded members of the Indonesian security people. It was a tragic incident and forces were tried for disciplinary of- clearly not an act ordered by or reflect- fenses in connection with the Santa Cruz ing the policy of the Government or the massacre. All received sentences of Armed Forces.21 between eight and eighteen months, mainly served under house arrest, and were reportedly released well before serving their full sentences. In stark 21. Republic of Indonesia, East Timor: Build- contrast, East Timorese accused of ing for the Future (Jakarta: Department of organizing the demonstration at Santa Foreign Affairs, July 1992), vi–vii. The Cruz on November 12, 1991, and a language in this document is much more subsequent demonstration in the Indone- subdued than Sutrisno’s speech, reflecting the sian capital of Jakarta received sentences different audiences for their accounts. Sutrisno ranging from five years to life.23 was addressing an Indonesian military audience whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs document, written in English, was expected to be available to foreign officials 22. Kohen, From the Place of the Dead, 170. and others. I thank Philip Kitley for this point. 23. Ibid., 171.

22 Justice Ignited

Although the official inquiries led to more curse of their total and relentless serious consequences for members of the isolation in their struggle.26 Indonesian military than any previous atrocities, which usually were perpetrated with The outrage from the Dili massacre laid the complete impunity, from the point of view of foundations for East Timorese independence. many outsiders, the official responses were Indonesia was badly affected by the 1997 window-dressing: economic collapse in East Asia. In 1998, following a campaign that used familiar Some observers believed that the methods of nonviolent action, Suharto re- removal of the two generals and court signed and parliamentary democracy was martials of lower ranking officers had introduced. A referendum was held in East little concrete impact but were the very Timor in 1999, with a vote of nearly 80% for least the Suharto regime could do to independence. Indonesian troops, police, and appease an outpouring of international militias organized and directed by the Indone- protest, and public disquiet in some sian military then went on a campaign of quarters of Indonesia itself.24 killing and destruction, leading to UN intervention and then independence for East Timor. The shootings in Santa Cruz cemetery were But that is another story.27 only the beginning of the Dili massacre. Indonesian troops then went among the Conclusion wounded, beating them. Some of the wounded were taken, days later, to a nearby river and The Dili massacre was a crucial turning point executed. According to Mario Carrascalão, — a transformative event — in East Timor’s former governor of East Timor, between 20 struggle for independence, most importantly and 50 East Timorese were killed on this by greatly increasing international support.28 occasion.25 The continuing assaults, torture, Ironically, this event appeared on the surface and killing, plus the arrest, trial, and lengthy to be a major defeat for the East Timorese: a imprisonment of leaders of the protest, were massacre in which hundreds died. But the very powerful means of intimidation. Despite this, brutality and excessiveness of the massacre Max Stahl reported that made it a prime candidate to backfire on the Indonesian occupiers. on the morning after the massacre there The one additional essential ingredient was were smiles on the faces of many communication to outside audiences, provided Timorese. This was because the foreign- by visiting Western journalists. The vital role ers had been there and filmed the event, of communication is highlighted by a and the foreigners, for once, were also beaten up and this, they believe, will be noticed. This, they believe, may lift a 26. Max Stahl, “Massacre among the Graves,” little the curse which is worse than The Independent (London), 17 November oppression and death for Timorese, the 1991, 19. 27. Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliv- erance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002); Nevins, Not-so-Distant Horror. 28. Analysis of the Dili massacre as a transfor- 24. Ibid., 172. mative event is given in David Hess and Brian 25. Lindsay Murdoch, “Dili Deaths ‘Just the Martin, “Backfire, Repression, and the Theory Start’,” The Age (Melbourne), 18 November of Transformative Events,” Mobilization 11 1998, 1. (June 2006): 249–267. Dili 23 comparison with previous massacres: the struggle was seen as a war, with violence on Indonesian military was successful in inhibit- both sides. Fretilin’s military weakness was ing outrage primarily through cover-up and less important, for wider perceptions, than the intimidation. But with the Dili massacre, these fact that both sides were using violence. This were inadequate, so the Indonesian govern- greatly reduced the likelihood that Indonesian ment eventually used all five methods to violence, including atrocities against civilians, inhibit outrage. To summarize: would backfire. Cover-up. Indonesian officials attempted to After Fretilin changed tactics, downplaying prevent information about the massacre getting armed struggle and emphasizing peaceful outside East Timor, for example cutting off all protest in the cities, it was far more successful telephone services. But attempts at censorship in building support within East Timor and, were only partly successful. Western journal- after Dili, internationally. The Dili massacre ists gave their eyewitness reports to world reveals how being the victim of attack can, in media, and Max Stahl’s videotape was the right circumstances, be far more effective smuggled out. Indonesian army commanders than fighting. could have decided to increase the cover-up by killing the Western observers, but this could Acknowledgements have backfired even more in the long run, I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Joe Nevins, because the presence of the observers in East Jeff Ross, Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for Timor was well known. valuable comments on drafts of this chapter. Devaluation. Indonesian leaders denigrated the East Timorese and tried to discredit their leaders. But this had little influence outside Indonesia. Reinterpretation. The military and government blamed the events on actions by protesters, or attributed them to an unfortunate loss of discipline. Officials gave low figures for the number injured and killed. These views had little credibility outside Indonesia. Official channels. The government established an inquiry into the massacre, which largely exonerated the military. This, and a military inquiry, had low credibility outside Indonesia. Intimidation. Troops arrested, beat, and killed independence activists in the wake of the massacre. This brutality did not discourage international supporters of East Timorese independence, but rather added to their outrage.

The international reaction to the Dili massacre shows the power of peaceful protest, in a repressive situation, for generating outside support. Fretilin’s armed struggle against Indonesian troops from 1975 to the mid 1980s was courageous but disastrous in human terms. Furthermore, it did little to increase international support, because the independence

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 4 (author’s prepublication version)

4 Dharasana

For peaceful protesters to willingly walk nonviolent action. Gandhi believed one’s forward and be cruelly beaten might seem, on methods should reflect one’s goals and there- the surface, to be masochistic and futile. Yet fore violence should be avoided. He developed this is exactly what happened at Dharasana, an approach based on personal purification, India, in 1930. But far from being futile, the dialogue with opponents, and principled use of beating of the protesters reverberated around nonviolent action. He held that a conscientious the world, turning public opinion against search for the truth — strongly linked to Britain’s rule over India. The events at justice — was the proper way to promote Dharasana are a perfect example of how change. But for Gandhi, satyagraha was not violence against nonviolent protesters can just a technique, but rather a way of life, backfire on the attackers. But the main way reflecting a long-term goal of community-level this process operated was not the way Gandhi self-reliance built around self-governing thought it did. villages. In this chapter, I tell the story of the famous Returning to India in 1915, Gandhi soon 1930 salt march, focusing on the Dharasana became a leader of the nationalist movement. events. Along the way, I highlight the methods His challenge was immense. On the one hand used by the British to minimize outrage and there were the “moderates,” including land- tell why these methods failed. owners and industrialists, who prospered British forces conquered India in the 1700s under British rule and who favored independ- and turned it into a profitable colony. As ence so long as their positions were not Britain’s industrial economy boomed, India’s threatened. On the other hand there were declined through forced dependency. Consid- Marxists and other radicals who favored armed ering the vast size and population of India, struggle. It was also difficult to bridge the split British rule did not require very many troops, between Hindus and Muslims. because so many natives were willing to work The pinnacle of Gandhi’s campaigning was for their colonial masters. The problem for the 1930 salt march. Salt was a British Indian nationalists was that the country was monopoly, subject to taxation, and it was split along so many lines, including caste, illegal for Indians to manufacture it. Therefore religion, class, ethnicity, and gender. These salt, a basic necessity, was a potent symbol of divisions were exploited by British overlords British oppression. Gandhi conceived a plan of to keep the country in bondage. From the mass civil disobedience by making salt. To 1920s on, the struggle for independence build support for this action, he led a 24-day followed a distinctive path, led by Mohandas march over more than 200 miles, giving talks Gandhi. along the way. The march was widely publi- Gandhi, born in 1869, had a conventional cized across the country, leading to increasing upper-caste upbringing and then moved from support as the challenge to the British gained India to South Africa to further his legal momentum. At the conclusion of the march, career. He became involved in the struggle near the village of Dandi on the coast, Gandhi against apartheid, was radicalized, and devel- and his followers walked into the sea and oped his own approach to social change. scooped out handfuls of salty mud. This Central to this approach was satyagraha, often symbolic act of defiance put the British rulers translated as truth-force or more generally as in a quandary.

Dharasana 25

The dilemma for the British was whether to I am anxious to avoid arresting Gandhi if tolerate a brazen challenge and thus be seen as I can do so without letting a “Gandhi weak or whether to crack down hard with the Legend” establish itself that we are risk of creating even more opposition. The afraid to lay hands on him. This we dilemma can be seen in letters from Lord clearly cannot afford. But at present Edward Irwin, the Viceroy, during this period. there are no signs of that idea gaining Prior to the march, Gandhi wrote an open currency. Apart from this, there is the letter to Irwin requesting his “assistance” by undoubted fact that he is generally removing the salt monopoly, which would regarded as a great religious leader then make it unnecessary for Gandhi to rather than a politician and that his proceed with his plan to march and make salt, arrest, while it will certainly not make which he explained in full detail. Gandhi the world fall in half, would yet offend always began with direct dialogue, seeking to the sentiment of many who disagree with win over his adversaries by appeals to justice, him and his policy …2 before mounting campaigns. Gandhi, a deeply spiritual person who drew on several religious Irwin’s ambivalence was shared by others in traditions for inspiration, wrote in a way that the British government, such as Wedgwood resonated with Irwin, a devout Christian. Irwin Benn, Secretary of State for India, who wrote respected Gandhi for his principled views. to Irwin from London that, “if Gandhi is Irwin could have ordered Gandhi’s arrest at arrested and disorder followed, it would the outset, but this would have inflamed public become merged in the terrorist organization opinion in India and abroad. Yet as the march and thereby strengthen it.” Gandhi’s use of proceeded, generating tremendous enthusiasm nonviolent methods caused special difficulty across the country, the difficulties became for the British. Benn noted that in the face of even greater for Irwin. A nationalist newspa- terrorism, “it will be a straight fight with the per expressed the dilemma: revolver people [violent opponents], which is a much simpler and much more satisfactory job To arrest Gandhi is to set fire to the to undertake.” In other words, the British had whole of India. Not to arrest him is to no hesitation in using ruthless force against allow him to set the prairie on fire. To terrorists.3 arrest Gandhi is to court a war. Not to The difficulty of suitably responding to arrest him is to confess defeat before the Gandhi’s methods was also expressed by a war is begun … In either case, Govern- British police officer, John Court Curry, who ment stands to lose, and Gandhi stands encountered Gandhi in both 1919 and 1930. to gain. … That is because Gandhi’s cause is righteous and the Government’s From the beginning I had strongly dis- is not.1 liked the necessity of dispersing these non-violent crowds and although the Irwin sought advice from provincial gover- injuries inflicted on the law-breakers nors. Some of them recommended arresting were almost invariably very slight the Gandhi immediately whereas others advised a idea of using force against such men was more cautious wait-and-see approach on the very different from the more cogent need grounds that arrest would only make matters for using it against violent rioters who worse. Irwin’s ambivalence is apparent in a were endangering other men’s lives. At letter to his father: the same time I realized that the law- breakers could not be allowed to continue

1. Quoted in Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action (New 2. Quoted in ibid., 130. York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 112. 3. Quoted in ibid., 132.

26 Justice Ignited

their deliberate misbehavior without any the stockade. A picked column advanced action by the police.4 from the crowd, waded the ditches, and approached the barbed-wire stockade, So great was Curry’s tension that he felt which the Surat police surrounded, “severe physical nausea” throughout the holding their clubs at the ready. Police period. officials ordered the Marchers to dis- After breaking the salt law at Dandi on 6 perse under a recently imposed regula- April 1930, Gandhi continued to promote the tion which prohibited gatherings of more “salt satyagraha.” He began a speaking tour; than five persons in any one place. The actions were undertaken across the country. column silently ignored the warning and The next major stage of the campaign was slowly walked forward. I stayed with the raids on the salt works at Dharasana. Gandhi main body about a hundred yards from drafted a letter to Lord Irwin telling of his the stockade. intentions. Gandhi was arrested that very Suddenly, at a word of command, scores night, on 5 May, leading to demonstrations of native police rushed upon the ad- across the country. Gandhi had counseled vancing marchers and rained blows on against violence in the wake of his arrest, an their heads with their steel-shod lathis admonition that was largely followed. [batons]. Not one of the marchers even Gandhi’s followers proceeded with plans raised an arm to fend off the blows. for salt raids. At Dharasana, salt was produced They went down like ten-pins. From and stored under the British monopoly. The where I stood I heard the sickening raiders proposed to “liberate” this salt that, whacks of the clubs on unprotected they argued, was legitimately owned by the skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers Indian people. The raids were to take place groaned and sucked in their breaths in under strict nonviolent discipline. Due to the sympathetic pain at every blow. arrest of Gandhi and some of the other key salt Those struck down fell sprawling, un- marchers, the leadership of the Dharasana conscious or writhing in pain with raids fell to Sarojini Naidu. fractured skulls or broken shoulders. In Initial raids were mild affairs, for example two or three minutes the ground was with individuals strolling near the salt works, quilted with bodies. Great patches of then rushing across the ditch around the salt blood widened on their white clothes. pans to gather some salt in small sacks, The survivors without breaking ranks followed by their arrest and transport to jail. silently and doggedly marched on until Naidu and the other leaders decided to adopt a struck down. When every one of the first more confrontational approach. They called column had been knocked down for volunteers to approach the salt works in stretcher bearers rushed up unmolested groups of 50 in attempts to get through the by the police and carried off the injured wire fence. This mass action would force the to a thatched hut which had been government to take stronger action. This plan arranged as a temporary hospital. led to a confrontation later dramatized in the Then another column formed while the 1982 film Gandhi. At the time, the drama was leaders pleaded with them to retain their captured by U.S. press correspondent Webb self-control. They marched slowly Miller. Here is a section of his report from 21 towards the police. Although every one May. knew that within a few minutes he would be beaten down, perhaps killed, I In complete silence the Gandhi men could detect no signs of wavering or drew up and halted a hundred yards from fear. They marched steadily with heads up, without the encouragement of music or cheering or any possibility that they 4. Quoted in ibid., 133. might escape serious injury or death. Dharasana 27

The police rushed out and methodically themselves. Maintaining nonviolent discipline and mechanically beat down the second was a top priority among the protesters; there column. There was no fight, no struggle: were occasional lapses as salt raids occurred in the marchers simply walked forward different parts of the country. until struck down. There were no For those who were not directly involved, outcries, only groans after they fell. the brutal beatings of nonresisting raiders had There were not enough stretcher-bearers the potential to cause enormous outrage. to carry off the wounded; I saw eighteen Therefore it is not surprising the government injured being carried off simultaneously, attempted to minimize the political damage in while forty-two still lay bleeding on the various ways. One was to prevent correct ground awaiting stretcher-bearers. The information about the encounter reaching blankets used as stretchers were sodden wider audiences. Thomas Weber, author of the with blood. definitive study of the salt march, says that At times the spectacle of unresisting men after the raids on 31 May, “Red Cross workers being methodically bashed into a bloody were denied access to the wounded and pulp sickened me so much that I had to according to nationalist sources ‘even press turn away. The Western mind finds it reporters were chased away’ in order to difficult to grasp the idea of non- prevent bad publicity.”6 On this day more than resistance. I felt an indefinable sense of a hundred raiders received serious injuries. helpless rage and loathing, almost as The government provided its own account much against the men who were submit- of what happened, claiming no brutality was ting unresistingly to being beaten as involved and that stories about hospitals filled against the police wielding the clubs, with wounded satyagrahis were false. A and this despite the fact that when I government communiqué about the events of came to India I sympathised with the 31 May stated that, Gandhi cause.5 Some half a dozen of the attackers got This drama continued over a number of days, into the salt pans where they were easily until the raids were called off. Hundreds of caught, but the remainder, on seeing the satyagrahis were hospitalized, and four died. horses [ridden by police], turned tail and As well as the beatings, the confrontation fled with the horses after them. The included arrests and police clearing or de- whole affair was over in a few minutes struction of camps established by the raiders. and no casualties whatever resulted as Most of the police who engaged in the the mounted men did not come into beatings did not seem deterred by the lack of contact with the volunteers nor had they resistance by their opponents. Indeed, some of any sticks or weapons in their hands.7 the police became enraged, kicking the men in their stomachs and testicles after they had The police also alleged that raiders were fallen, sticking lathis up their anuses, and feigning their injuries. throwing them into ditches. Another method used by the government On the other side of the confrontation, some was ridicule. One communiqué described witnesses among the camp of the raiders were some protesters requesting a “tap or two on the nearly driven to distraction by the brutality and back of the legs” so they could obtain meal had to be restrained from using violence tickets and return home.8

5. Webb Miller, quoted in Thomas Weber, On 6. Weber, On the Salt March, 450. the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi’s March to Dandi (New Delhi: 7. Quoted in ibid., 451. HarperCollins, 1997), 444–45. 8. Weber, On the Salt March, 453.

28 Justice Ignited

Probably the biggest impact of the raids the serious injuries were converted; indeed, was outside India. Press correspondent Webb some of them became incensed by the Miller’s moving account, part of which was satyagrahis’ lack of resistance and redoubled quoted earlier, had an enormous influence in their brutality. Nor, apparently, were many shaping opinion. The government knew that government officials converted. The greatest free flow of information was damaging to its impacts were on the Indian masses, who were rule and so had imposed press censorship. informed of the events through the nationalist Miller, as a foreign correspondent, was not media, and on foreign public opinion, in covered by this censorship law, but his Britain, the United States, and elsewhere, via attempts to cable his story from Bombay to the reports by Miller and others. Using violence United Press office in London were initially against disciplined nonviolent protesters thus blocked. generated outrage most importantly through indirect means — through written accounts of An apparent Gandhi sympathiser in- the Dharasana raids — rather than, or as well formed him by way of an unsigned note, as, directly on the participants. that his message was not sent. On The salt march and the salt raids did not inquiring, at first he could get no lead to a breach in the government’s salt information about his message at all. monopoly, but it did transform consciousness Later, at Government headquarters of the in India. According to Weber, Bombay Presidency he was reassured that as there was no censorship his Talking with those old enough to telegram must have gone. After further remember the heady days of 1930, the protests and a statement of his intention consistent response is that the event to fly to Persia if necessary to get his transformed the feeling in the country scoop to the world, it was admitted that from one of pessimism to revolution, his message was stopped by the censor. that nothing which could now be said After further arguments most of his about those times could possibly capture message was transmitted.9 the intense sense of drama and wonder that surrounded the event, that the Miller’s story, circulated by United Press, movement changed the face of India’s appeared in 1,350 newspapers, was read out in history, that the country of before and the U.S. Congress, and was reproduced by after the Dandi March was not the Gandhi supporters in the United States with same.12 more than 250,000 copies. Gandhi believed nonviolent action worked Beyond its impact on India, the events of 1930 by conversion of opponents, through “melting introduced to the world the idea of nonviolent their hearts” by the voluntary suffering of action — including civil disobedience and satyagrahis.10 Thomas Weber argues that the disciplined mass protest — as a strategic Dharasana raids showed Gandhi’s view to be method of social action. wrong.11 Few if any of the police who inflicted Conclusion

9. Ibid., 403. The beatings at Dharasana were a transformative event in the struggle for India’s independ- 10. Gandhi’s views on nonviolence are discussed at greater length in chapter 13. 11. Thomas Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Walked Forward until Struck Down’: Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion,” Peace & Change 18 (July 1993): 267–89. 12. Weber, On the Salt March, 479. Dharasana 29 ence.13 The British used all five methods of confrontation, which was fully anticipated: inhibiting outrage, yet without much success. participants knew what was in store for them. Cover-up. British authorities imposed press At Sharpeville and Dili, in contrast, the censorship within India and attempted to protesters did not expect an assault, nor had prevent Webb Miller’s reports getting to his there been training in nonviolent discipline. Of editors. the three events, the number killed was far less Devaluation. Indians were devalued in the at Dharasana, yet the emotional impact of the eyes of many British whites. In some accounts, violence was enormous. This suggests that their resistance was trivialized. when protesters are highly principled in their Reinterpretation. The government said nonviolent methods, and design their cam- there was no police brutality and that victims paign carefully, then even a relatively low were faking their injuries. level of violence against them will seem Official channels. Gandhi and other mem- shocking. At Sharpeville and Dili, there was bers of the independence movement were less planning and little anticipation of vio- arrested; the courts served as agents for lence, but the scale of the killing was so great dispensing “justice.” that it shocked audiences worldwide. The key Intimidation. The predictability of being to the impact in all three events thus appears to beaten and the possibility of arrest discouraged be that authorities used violence seen as many potential participants. grossly excessive in relation to the actions of the protesters. Gandhi believed nonviolence worked by con- These three cases are vivid testimony that verting opponents, but actually at Dharasana brutal attacks on peaceful protesters can the police, who so ruthlessly beat the protest- backfire. But what about other sorts of attacks? ers, were not won over at all. Instead, the most Can they backfire too? In the following powerful impact was on third parties, namely chapters, I examine a range of other attacks, those not directly involved in the confronta- from unfair dismissal to illegal invasion. In tion: Indians in the rest of the country and every one, the perpetrators try to inhibit members of the public in Britain, the United outrage using the same five methods; when States, and other foreign countries.14 these methods fail, the attacks backfire. The events at Sharpeville, Dili, and Dharasana have several similarities. In each Acknowledgements case, violence was used against protesters who I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Jeff Ross, were peaceful, or nearly so. In each case, the Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for valuable attack rebounded against the attackers, leading comments on drafts of this chapter. to a dramatic increase in support for the cause espoused by the target group. Because this effect was so strong, these can be called classic backfires. There are some important differences among the three events. At Dharasana, protesters carefully planned and prepared for the

13. Analysis of the salt march as a transformative event is given in David Hess and Brian Martin, “Backfire, Repression, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” Mobilization 11 (June 2006): 249–67. 14. This process is analyzed in more detail in chapter 13.

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 5 (author’s prepublication version)

5 The beating of Rodney King

Shortly after midnight on 3 March 1991, context of racism and social control,1 an Rodney King was beaten by officers of the examination of the practices of professionals, Los Angeles Police Department. King was hit namely the police,2 an analysis of media by two tasers — electroshock weapons using narratives about the beating,3 and a study of two darts connected by wires to a high-voltage the effects of the beating on public opinion source — and then struck dozens of times by about racial discrimination.4 metal batons, as well as being kicked, over a If the beating is thought of as an attack on period of several minutes. Four officers King, then it is reasonable to say the attack participated in the arrest and more than 20 backfired: it recoiled adversely on the attack- police were present during the beating, which ers. That the beating ended up being damaging was illuminated by floodlights from a police to the police has been attested by observers of helicopter hovering overhead. diverse persuasions5 and confirmed by re- This event probably would have become search.6 just another arrest statistic except that a portion of the incident was captured on 1. Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., Reading videotape by an observer, George Holliday, Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising (New who heard the commotion from his apartment York: Routledge, 1993). nearby. After the video was screened on television, the “Rodney King beating” became 2. Charles Goodwin, “Professional Vision,” the most well known case of police use of American Anthropologist 96 (1994): 606–33. force in history, with serious adverse effects 3. Ronald N. Jacobs, “Civil Society and Crisis: for the police. The reputation of the LAPD Culture, Discourse, and the Rodney King took a battering, as the force was widely Beating,” American Journal of Sociology 101 perceived to be tolerant of brutality. There (1996):1238–72; Ronald N. Jacobs, Race, were vociferous calls for LAPD Chief Daryl Media, and the Crisis of Civil Society: From Gates to resign. The four officers directly Watts to Rodney King (Cambridge: Cambridge involved in the beating were charged with University Press, 2000). assault and brought to trial. Media attention was intense over the following months, with 4. Lee Sigelman, Susan Welch, Timothy thousands of newspaper articles published as Bledsoe, and Michael Combs. “Police Brutal- well as extensive coverage by electronic ity and Public Perceptions of Racial Discrimi- media. Morale in the LAPD was seriously nation: A Tale of Two Beatings,” Political damaged. Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 777–91. The King beating is an ideal case study for 5. Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How social analysis given the great amount of Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los documentation of the incident and the subse- Angeles and the LAPD (Boulder, CO: quent media coverage, trials, and riots. Among Westview, 1999), 228; Jerome H. Skolnick the studies undertaken are assessments of the and James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force (New York: Free Press, 1993), 10. 6. J. R. Lasley, “The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes toward

The beating of Rodney King 31

Several factors contributed to the backfire. precisely parallels the reaction to violent George Holliday’s video was an essential attacks on peaceful protesters. element, enabling a vivid visual exposure of I will look more closely at the King beating the events. Television stations repeatedly by examining in some detail each of the five screened a portion of the video, taking it to a methods of inhibiting outrage: cover-up; huge audience.7 The timing was advantageous devaluation; reinterpretation; use of official for obtaining media attention. The first Gulf channels; intimidation and bribery. I present war had ended just recently, leaving the news evidence, especially from valuable partisan agenda open to other issues. If the video had books about the beating, that is especially come to attention on the day the Gulf war useful in illustrating features of the struggle began, for example, it undoubtedly would over reactions to the beating.8 have had far less impact. This is not an attempt to tell “the story” of Also crucial was the symbolism of a police the King beating, much less to determine beating. Police are supposed to be protectors “what really happened.” Despite the existence against injustice. Though many people are of the videotape, the meaning of the events aware of discrepancies between the ideal and remains contested. My aim here is to show the reality of policing, nevertheless dramatic how attackers and their supporters used a evidence of police abuse can strike a chord variety of methods that inhibited outrage and through its challenge to the dominant belief how critics of the beating countered these system about policing and justice. Further- methods. more, it was important that Rodney King, a black man, was beaten by white policemen Key Figures (though a few of the police observing the • Rodney King, a black man beaten in the arrest were black). The graphic image of course of being arrested on March 3, 1991. whites attacking a black man resonated with • Stacey Koon, the police sergeant in charge of the U.S. history of racist violence against King’s arrest. blacks. • Lawrence Powell, Timothy Wind, and Although there were quite a number of Theodore Briseno, police officers directly citizens and groups concerned about police involved in King’s arrest. misconduct, there was not a powerful social • George Holliday, a witness to the beating movement to boost concern about the beating. who recorded it on his videocamera. Existing groups did not have a high public • Daryl Gates, Los Angeles police chief at the profile, nor was King associated with them in time of the events. any way. • Tom Bradley, Los Angeles mayor at the As in the cases of Sharpeville, Dili, and time. Dharasana, the King beating involved a violent assault by authorities. But there is also a big difference: King was neither a protester nor — Cover-up as described later — particularly peaceful, and certainly not a practitioner of nonviolent The defining feature of the King beating is the action. Yet the public reaction to his beating availability of a videotape recording the event. As noted by numerous commentators, without Police,” Policing and Society 3 (1994): 245– the videotape, the beating would have been 55. 7. Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel, 8. For a vivid film documentary, see The Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in an Age of Rodney King Incident, video. Directed by Media Frenzy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Michael Pack. Chevy Chase, MD: Manifold 2001), 33–35. I thank Kevin Wehr for Productions, 1998. I thank Jeff Ross for recommending this book. recommending this treatment.

32 Justice Ignited unlikely to come to public attention.9 There- Some of the reported cases of police brutality fore, cover-up, as a means to inhibit popular are far more serious than the King beating and anger, failed spectacularly in this case. seem to have less justification. They include Nevertheless, evidence of cover-ups can be beatings without pretext, torture, and killings, found in the King saga. But first it is worth some apparently premeditated.12 In these noting the usual scenario for cases of police cases, cover-up is central to reducing a brutality and other misconduct: no publicity backlash. The basic means of cover-up is and little or no negative consequences for police lying about what happened: “Far too police.10 An investigation into police miscon- many officers lie with impunity about the duct in the United States, stimulated by the conduct of a defendant, about what they were King beating, stated: able to observe, and about whether proper procedures were followed.”13 Many cases of police misconduct take Other police often know their colleagues place out of the public eye. Often, there are lying but decline or refuse to speak out are no witnesses to the incident other against them. This so-called “code of silence” than police officers and the victim of the is a form of police loyalty that inadvertently misconduct, and thus no one to corrobo- can sanction abuse. As described by the rate the complainant’s account. Repre- Christopher Commission, set up in response to sentatives of community organizations the King beating, the code of silence “consists and legal agencies described the diffi- of one simple rule: an officer does not provide culty of pursuing complaints against the adverse information against a fellow officer.”14 police, particularly in the absence of Long-time Minneapolis police officer Michael witnesses. Both police and civilians W. Quinn wrote a book about code of silence. agreed that, if it comes down to a He says when he joined the force, he had no citizen’s word against an officer’s story, idea about the extent of corruption, including the police version controls. In the vast lying, burglary, and beating prisoners. These majority of cases involving one civilian activities often were tolerated. But — and one officer the complaint is not sustained.11 There was only one thing you never did. You never snitched on another cop. 9. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Mary Prosser, Abbe The Code of Silence was the only rule Smith, and William Talley, Jr.; Criminal you had to obey above all other. Cops Justice Institute at Harvard Law School for the didn’t tell on other cops. Not for any 15 National Association for the Advancement of reason. Ever! Colored People, Beyond the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police Misconduct 12. Ogletree, et al., Beyond the Rodney King in Minority Communities (Boston: Northeast- ern University Press, 1995), 6; Michael Omi Story; Skolnick and Fyfe, Above the Law. and Howard Winant, “The Los Angeles ‘Race 13. Ogletree, et al., Beyond the Rodney King Riot’ and Contemporary U.S. Politics,” in Story, 57. Gooding-Williams, Reading Rodney King, 97– 14. Warren Christopher, et al., Report of the 114, at 97; Skolnick and Fife, Above the Law, Independent Commission on the Los Angeles 3, 190. Police Department (Los Angeles: Independent 10. Jeffrey Ian Ross, Making News of Police Commission on the Los Angeles Police Violence: A Comparative Study of Toronto Department, 1991), 168. and New York City (Westport, CT: Praeger, 15. Michael W. Quinn, Walking with the 2000), 199. Devil: The Police Code of Silence (Minnea- 11. Ogletree, et al., Beyond the Rodney King polis: Quinn and Associates, 2005), 33. Story, 60–61. Emphasis in the original. The beating of Rodney King 33

The code of silence is part of the culture of Though the King beating is the most many police departments, including the dramatic exception to the usual pattern of LAPD. It is enforced by reprisals against those cover-up, nonetheless there are some instances who speak out, as described later in the section of attempted cover-up in its story. George on intimidation. Holliday, who made the video of the beating, Of crucial importance in the cover-up or rang the local police station saying he had exposure of police misconduct is the role of witnessed a police beating, intending to offer the media. In the conventional social science the video. However, the desk officer expressed view of the news, called the “official domi- no interest in what Holliday had to say, nor did nance model,” officials are the primary defin- the officer record a complaint. Given this ers of events. Consequently, most police use- official unconcern, Holliday offered the tape to of-force incidents are never mentioned in the KTLA, a television station in Los Angeles.19 news, and even those covered typically receive In retrospect, it is possible to say that had the only cursory treatment, with the official officer taken Holliday’s call seriously and versions of events predominating.16 In most obtained the videotape, then destroyed it and cases journalists do not even find out about claimed to have lost it, the scale of the backfire police use-of-force incidents, and many such might have been dramatically reduced if not incidents do not conform to news values of eliminated. Paul King, Rodney King’s brother, prominence, proximity, and so forth. One attempted to make a complaint, but was given consequence is that most police shootings in the brush-off. Indeed, Paul King was inappro- the United States are not reported.17 priately asked whether he himself “had ever The interaction of official lying, the police been in trouble.”20 code of silence, police public relations tech- During the arrest of King, more than 20 niques, and the orientation of most news to police officers were present in addition to the official sources operates to minimize attention four immediately involved in subduing King. to most cases of alleged police brutality. These None of the observing officers made any processes serve, in effect, as means of cover- attempt to report inappropriate behavior. This up. could be because they believed the arrest had Regina Lawrence in her book The Politics been carried out according to proper proce- of Force, a highly sophisticated analysis of dures or can be attributed to the code of media treatment of police use of force, argues silence. In the latter case it is possible to speak that a few exceptional events break through of a cover-up. The effect of the code of silence the usual elite-oriented framing of news. The is more obvious in the first trial of the four King beating is the most prominent example of officers directly involved. The prosecution this alternative, event-driven media treatment approached police use-of-force experts to of police use of force. She argues that three testify at the trial, but they were unwilling.21 factors combined to make the beating into an agenda-setting event: the video, a dramatic political struggle between LAPD Chief Daryl Gates and Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, 19. Christopher, et al., Report of the Independ- 18 and public reaction. ent Commission, 11; Tom Owens with Rod Browning, Lying Eyes: The Truth behind the Corruption and Brutality of the LAPD and the 16. Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Beating of Rodney King (New York: Force: Media and the Construction of Police Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994), 56. Brutality (Berkeley: University of California 20. Christopher, et al., Report of the Independ- Press, 2000), 28–29. ent Commission, 10; Owens, Lying Eyes, 39. 17. Ibid., 29. 21. Cannon, Official Negligence, 242; Owens, 18. Ibid., 62–85. Lying Eyes, 266.

34 Justice Ignited

These few instances illustrate that cover-up through these techniques of cover-up. It did played a role in the King beating. The code of not abide by the police code of silence; it was silence, police lack of interest in recording a a graphic testimonial offered to the public eye complaint, their lack of interest in searching despite police failure to report the events or out additional witnesses of alleged brutality collect evidence; and it broke through the (there were numerous civilian eyewitnesses to routine relations between police and the the beating), and media acceptance of official media. interpretations, might well have relegated the beating to a non-event so far as citizen concern Devaluing the Target was concerned — except for the videotape. It is also worth mentioning what can be When police use violence, they commonly called a backfire within a backfire, related to blame suspects who are painted as deviant and apparent cover-up. Holliday’s video was violent.24 The beating of King was more likely edited at KTLA before being broadcast, to cause indignation if King was perceived as removing the first few seconds because the innocent, indeed a model citizen, not only image was blurry and hence not good for during his encounter with the Los Angeles television. This edited version, which showed police on March 3, 1991, but also before and a lengthy beating of an apparently nonresisting after. In many news reports, King was de- man, was the one shown by CNN and other scribed as a “black motorist,” with the networks; very few people saw the full tape.22 implication that he had been doing nothing At the first trial, the jury was shown the full wrong.25 Others, though, emphasized King’s tape, in which the early seconds showed King shortcomings and transgressions, thereby apparently charging at officer Lawrence devaluing him as a person and reducing some Powell, who initially struck King in self- people’s disgust over the beating. defense. This made jurors think they hadn’t The officer in charge of King’s arrest was been told the full story, suggesting a cover-up Sergeant Stacey Koon, who with the support of evidence supporting the police.23 of journalist Robert Deitz wrote a book about In summary, three key techniques were the affair, published in 1992.26 A few years involved in cover-up in this case. First is the later, Deitz wrote his own book, again police code of silence, which essentially focusing on Koon’s role.27 Tom Owens, in means lying — often by omission, namely not contrast, was a former LAPD officer who speaking up — about what happened or didn’t became an investigator for prosecutions of happen. Second is failure to receive or collect police for misconduct. He was hired as evidence, as when complaints about the investigator for King’s initial legal team. His beating were not even recorded. Third is the book, titled Lying Eyes, gives a very different routine interplay between police and the media perspective.28 Each of these authors pays whereby most police use of force is not seen as attention to the characters of both King and newsworthy by journalists or editors. Police public relations helps in this process, but the 24. Lawrence, Politics of Force, 14, 37, 179. crucial thing is the routine cooperation between police and journalists. 25. Cannon, Official Negligence, 82. These techniques are quite effective in 26. Stacey C. Koon with Robert Deitz, limiting exposure of most police abuses, so Presumed Guilty: The Tragedy of the Rodney usually only the victims and their immediate King Affair (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1992). acquaintances may know anything about them. But in the case of King, the Holliday video cut 27. Robert Deitz, Willful Injustice: A Post-O.J. Look at Rodney King, American Justice, and Trial by Race (Washington, DC: Regnery, 22. Cannon Official Negligence, 23–24. 1996). 23. Ibid., 195. 28. Owens, Lying Eyes. The beating of Rodney King 35

Koon, as well as the other indicted police by the police and courts because he was so officers. As might be expected, Koon’s and well known through the video.31 Deitz’s books are far more derogatory of King. Owens gives an entirely different perspec- Koon was proud of the arrest; he considered tive. He describes various attempts to smear it a model arrest and, when initially hearing it King by associating him with crimes or by had been videotaped, was pleased, as he framing him. On March 28, 1991, Los Angeles assumed it would show the high quality of his media reported that King was being investi- performance. (This was before he knew about gated for two robberies early in the year, with the public reaction.) In subsequent trials he the victims being shown photos of King by justified every blow to King as appropriate and officers from the Foothills Division, in which carried out according to official procedures. key police involved in the beating had He is also forthright in mentioning a critical worked.32 Owens collected evidence clearing perspective on King. King and concluded that the episode was a “set up by the LAPD meant to [damage] King’s The force we used was well within the image, detract from his credibility and guidelines of the Los Angeles Police integrity, make the four cops look good by Department; I’d made sure of that. And I making King look bad.”33 was proud of my officers, proud of the On May 26, 1991, LAPD vice officers professionalism they’d shown in subdu- arrested King for consorting with a transvestite ing a really monster guy, a felony evader and attempting to run down officers, and the seen committing numerous serious media immediately had the story. Owens again traffic violations. And subduing this guy sprang into action, finding witnesses and without the deadly force that all too collecting evidence; King did not have his often accompanies the arrest of a PCP- parole revoked as a result of the arrest. Owens dusted felony suspect.29 “was convinced the arrest of Rodney King was a staged event.”34 This was only the first of a (Koon assumed King had taken the drug PCP, series of LAPD arrests of King. Owens was which is said to endow the user with extraor- proud of collecting evidence that cleared King dinary strength.) Koon also referred to King’s on four occasions.35 criminal record: Owens also spends some time in his book telling of his personal interactions with King. Rodney King’s biography wasn’t happy- While Owens certainly does not idolize King face reading. Not only did he have a — he tells of King’s crimes and impulsive and troublesome criminal record before dangerous behavior — he does describe good March 3, 1991, his conduct afterwards sides to King, for example King spontaneously had been less than exemplary. It in- spending time with a group of kids, encour- cluded an arrest for picking up a trans- aging them to get an education and buying vestite prostitute and then trying to run them ice creams.36 Owens concludes that King over two LAPD vice squad cops.30 is neither a hardened criminal nor a saint, but

Deitz in his book wrote about “matters of character,” lauding Koon’s sterling record, giving extensive attention to King’s failings, 31. Deitz, Willful Injustice, 31–60. and claiming King was treated with kid gloves 32. Owens, Lying Eyes, 103. 33. Ibid., 105. 34. Ibid., 114. 29. Koon, Presumed Guilty, 21. 35. Ibid., 222. 30. Ibid., 134. 36. Ibid., 151.

36 Justice Ignited

“just a man.”37 In humanizing King, Owens needed because cover-up and intimidation are counters others’ denigration. In the first trial, sufficient to minimize the consequences for King did not testify, making it easier for the police. In the King case, the impact of the defense to demonize him; in the second trial, Holliday video seems to have stimulated some he did testify, making him more human to the police to take extra efforts to discredit the jury.38 victim. There is no doubt King is an easy target for denigration, given his limited literacy, his Reinterpreting the Event arrest and prison record, and his penchant for drinking and fast driving. In a 1992 article in If outrage can result from a perceived injus- Vanity Fair, King’s failings are recounted, tice, then an effective way to counter it is to along with criticisms of his lawyer and others convince people that what happened was not cashing in on the “Rodney King trade.”39 In an actually what it seemed. In the case of King, article about yet another arrest of King on most people perceived a brutal police beating August 27, 2003, more than a decade after the of an outnumbered and defenseless man. famous beating, David Horowitz defended the Although the video of the King beating has LAPD, criticized “liberals,” and denigrated often been assumed to be self-explanatory, in King, calling him “a self-destructive lout,” “a practice it must be interpreted.41 Police pathetic bum,” and “a reckless criminal.”40 countered it with a different story: King was a The struggle over the meaning of the beating, powerful and potentially dangerous threat to including the reputation of the target, thus the police. He had been speeding, tried to continues long after the event. escape when police signaled him to stop, and In summary, three main techniques of led police on a high-speed chase before he was devaluation were used against King by his forced to stop. Police then had followed detractors, notably the police. The first was to normal procedures in arresting him and thus find dirt on him, such as his criminal record were fully justified in their actions. and complaints against him. This wasn’t diffi- Stacey Koon, in charge of the arrest, said cult, because King’s past contained many LAPD policy had been followed throughout. damaging episodes. The second technique was The policy specifies a series of options, with to publicize the dirt, for example by police escalating use of force: presence; verbaliza- feeding information to the media. The third tion; commands; firm grips; pain compliance; technique was to manufacture dirt, as when impact techniques; and deadly force.42 On the King was apparently set up to be involved night of 3 March, police went through the with a transvestite prostitute, with media stages of presence, verbalization, and com- primed to be present and record the embar- mands, but King did not acquiesce. Koon rassing and discrediting interaction. For most ordered a “swarm”: four officers each grabbed cases of police brutality, these methods are not one of King’s arms or legs, but he threw them

37. Ibid., 152. 41. Judith Butler, “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia,” in 38. Cannon, Official Negligence, 427–28. Gooding-Williams, Reading Rodney King, 15– 39. Peter J. Boyer, “The Selling of Rodney 22, at 17; Robert Gooding-Williams, “‘Look, a King,” Vanity Fair (June 1992): 78–82, 158– Negro!’,” in Gooding-Williams, Reading 61. Rodney King, 157–77, at 165. That reality is 40. David Horowitz, “Rodney King: Once a socially constructed is argued by Peter L. Bum, Always a Bum,” FrontPageMaga- Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social zine.com (9 September 2003). http://www. Construction of Reality (Garden City, NY: frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?I Doubleday, 1966). D=9712 (accessed 29 June 2006). 42. Skolnick and Fyfe, Above the Law, 37–42. The beating of Rodney King 37 off. Then Koon used two tasers, whose high- The police thus blamed King for his own voltage shocks normally bring down the target, beating, whereas most viewers of the video but King, unlike most people hit with tasers, blamed the police. But “the police” has was not subdued; he made a charge at officer multiple meanings: it could mean the four Powell. Koon believed King had superhuman officers directly involved in the beating, the 20 strength due to being “dusted” with the drug or so other police at the scene who did not PCP. intervene, the Los Angeles police force gener- Next on the continuum of force options was ally, the LAPD as an organizational entity, or impact techniques. Koon instructed two LAPD top officials — especially chief Daryl officers to use their batons on King; policy Gates — who were formally responsible for insists there be occasional pauses between policies, training, and discipline. The popular strikes to observe whether the suspect is and political response to the beating opened complying, in which case a lower-force option some divisions between these groups. Gates can be adopted. But, said Koon, King did not referred to the beating as an “aberration,” adopt the fully prone position demanded by blaming the individual officers.47 The Christo- the police; the beating continued until he did. pher Commission took a more structural view, Koon said the arrest was undoubtedly brutal, examining police attitudes, complaint proce- but it followed procedure.43 dures, and official tolerance of brutality, Because the police adopt force options in concluding that “The problem of excessive response to the suspect’s behavior, the police force in the LAPD is fundamentally a problem attribute their own actions to the suspect. of supervision, management, and leader- Koon claimed that, “I had been in charge of ship.”48 Koon blamed not only King but also the officers, but Rodney King had been in LAPD managers, especially Gates, as self- charge of the situation.”44 This theme of King interested bureaucrats who protected them- being “in charge” was used by the defense selves at the expense of street cops.49 Some throughout the trials and nicely captures the commentators agreed: journalist Lou Cannon reinterpretation involved. Normally, “in noted that because there had been other events charge” implies having power or authority, equivalent to the King beating, the problem which the police certainly had during the was systemic.50 arrest. By portraying King as being “in Cannon said the beating was like the charge” — validly so, from the perspective of Japanese film Rashomon, which portrays police use-of-force options — the responsibil- dramatically different perspectives on the ity for the beating was attributed to King. same event, except that one particular More generally, the defense tried to make perspective received most of the attention: the King the focus of attention, instead of the version shown in the video.51 police.45 In the initial Simi Valley trial, the In summary, police used two principal jurors accepted the police framing of events, methods in reinterpreting the events aside finding the four officers on trial not guilty.46 from blaming King. First, they presented their own perspective that the arrest was done

43. Koon, Presumed Guilty, 25–52; see also 47. Daryl F. Gates with Diane K. Shah, Chief: My Life in the LAPD (New York: Bantam, Deitz, Willful Injustice, 61–91. 1992), 316. 44. Koon, Presumed Guilty, 45. 48. Christopher, et al., Report of the Independ- 45. Laurence H. Geller and Peter Hemenway, ent Commission, 32. Last Chance for Justice: The Juror’s Lonely 49. Koon, Presumed Guilty, 105–9. Quest (Dallas: NCDS Press, 1997), 186. 46. D. M. Osborne, “Reaching for Doubt,” 50. Cannon, Official Negligence, 107. American Lawyer (September 1992): 62. 51. Ibid., 21, 450.

38 Justice Ignited according to normal procedures. Second, when systemic problems, and on which of the the pressure was on, they blamed each other: “multiple publics” the person was a member.54 Gates blamed the arresting officers whereas Within days of the screening of the Koon blamed police managers, especially Holliday video, a grand jury was formed to Gates. look into the beating. This was followed by In the first trial, the jury was convinced by initiation of an FBI investigation and by the the police interpretation of what happened, indictment of four Los Angeles police officers. leading to acquittal. But for members of the These uses of formal procedures focused on public who saw the beating on television, the the police involved in the beating, but pressure police interpretation was abstract or nonexist- was intense for more sweeping reforms. Calls ent. Furthermore, when watching the video, it for chief Gates to resign reflected an assump- was easiest to blame the officers involved, tion that new policies would be implemented. simply because they were the ones visible. The At the end of March 1991, Gates formed a effectiveness of reinterpretation varies from commission to investigate the beating; at the person to person and depends on the circum- same time, mayor Tom Bradley also formed stances, including information, knowledge, one. By agreement of the two bodies, they and the response of respected others. combined to form the Christopher Commis- sion, which carried out a thorough investiga- Using Official Channels tion in a matter of months, reporting in early July. The commission did not examine the Given that one way to reduce the popular culpability of individual officers for the outcry from injustice is to refer the matter to beating, which was a matter for the courts, but official bodies or experts with a reputation for instead reported on systemic problems in the being independent and fair, it is to be expected LAPD: the use of excessive force; racism and that court hearings and commissions of inquiry bias; police culture; recruitment and training; would be commonplace after prominent complaint systems; and formal structures for incidents of police violence.52 For some control of the police department and its chief. people, the promise of justice through official The commission’s report was seen by many as channels — or through “champions of justice” a largely sound and far-sighted document such as honest politicians53 — provides a which, if its recommendations were substitute for taking action personally. implemented, would transform the police.55 (In The King beating was seen by many as a contrast, Gates was very critical of the blatant injustice, leading to demands and report.56) This was quite different from some expectations that justice be done, with a range official reports that essentially whitewash the of possibilities expressed, including penalties problems. After the report was released, for the police involved in the beating, resigna- pressure mounted on Gates to resign; eventu- tion of police chief Gates, reform of the police ally he announced he would step down in to reduce brutality and penalize its perpetra- 1992. tors, and new policies to redress the economic Attracting far more attention was the trial of and political disadvantage of poor minority the four police officers directly involved in the inner-city communities in Los Angeles and arrest. Nearly everyone — the public, journal- elsewhere. The meaning of justice in part ists, lawyers, and the defendants — expected a depended on whether a person saw the beating guilty verdict. Such an outcome would help as an isolated incident or as a symptom of

52. Ross, Making News of Police Violence, 6, 54. Jacobs, Race, Media, and the Crisis of Civil Society. 38–44. 53. F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit 55. Cannon, Official Negligence, 121–47. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 56. Gates, Chief, 347–51. The beating of Rodney King 39 satiate the popular demand for justice. In an can be subverted by racial power, like unusual development, the trial judge changed that embodied in the Simi Valley jury.58 the venue to Ventura County, so that most of the jurors were drawn from Simi Valley, a In short, the legal system promised to rectify population highly sympathetic to the police. At an injustice to King; when it failed, the result the trial itself, the defense effectively was rage, though this rage was not targeted in countered the evidence of the video by decon- any effective manner. Thane Rosenbaum in his structing it and encouraging the jury to see the book The Myth of Moral Justice comments on events through the eyes of the police — an the failure of the law to achieve moral justice: effective exercise in reinterpretation. The police code of silence ensured no convincing When the application of the law is use-of-force experts were willing to testify for perceived as senseless, it has a shattering the prosecution. The prosecutors were not too effect on the capacity of the parties and the worried, though, because they believed the community to reconcile and move on. … video spoke for itself. The jury, though, was Unjust verdicts and the deep mistrust of and convinced otherwise and, on 29 April 1992, moral disgust with the legal system brought down a verdict of not guilty for all sometimes cause riots in the streets.59 four officers. News of the verdict, accompanied by The LAPD was not prepared for the riots. repeated screenings of the original beating,57 Gates was a lame duck chief, with less than acted like a shock wave through the country full attention to the job; when the verdict was and especially through South Central Los announced, he was attending a function to Angeles, where a massive riot ensued in which oppose some of the Christopher Commission more than 50 people died, thousands were recommendations. treated for injuries, and 800 buildings were On the third day of the riots, President burned with more than $900 million in George Bush addressed the nation on televi- property damage. Undoubtedly many factors sion and “virtually promised federal prosecu- contributed to the scale of the five-day riot, tion of the acquitted police officers … the notably existing racial tensions. One of the president and the attorney general felt the factors, and certainly the immediate trigger, prosecutions were politically imperative.”60 was fury over justice denied or, in other According to Lou Cannon, in his mammoth words, to an extension of the original outrage account of the King beating and its aftermath over the King beating. titled Official Negligence, the government’s goal was preventing “far-reaching investiga- … the imagery of the “rule of law” tions into police conduct” and “defusing the suggests that the prohibition against concerns of civil rights activists.”61 Enormous racial discrimination is clear and government resources were poured into a determinate. It doesn’t depend on “subjective” evaluation. And from this frame, what’s so enraging about the 58. Kimberlé Crenshaw and Gary Peller, “Reel King verdict is that it seems to show that Time/Real Justice,” in Gooding-Williams, even such clear, objective prohibitions Reading Rodney King, 56–70, at 62. 59. Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 16, 107.

57. According to Fox and Van Sickel, Tabloid 60. Cannon, Official Negligence, 374; see also Justice, 35, the media’s screening of the video Deitz, Willful Injustice, 96–98. after the verdict contributed to public anger. 61. Cannon, Official Negligence, 375.

40 Justice Ignited second trial of the same four officers, this time pacify an inflamed public that had been a federal trial. In the new trial, with a different deceived by the media. venue and jury composition, plus enormous And what was the next step? It was pressures on the jurors to reach a guilty verdict predictable. As officials are inclined to to prevent further riots, the result was that two do, the city appointed a study commis- of the four officers — Stacey Koon and sion. The commission’s job was to patch Laurence Powell — were found guilty and the holes in the road.64 sent to prison. The system appeared to work and after the second verdict no riots or distur- As stated by Koon, court cases and bances occurred. commissions of inquiry are a predictable The two criminal prosecutions of the four response to public anger, because they give the officers received saturation media coverage; appearance that justice will be done by respon- far less media attention was given to system sible bodies. This is familiar from historical reform in the LAPD. In part this reflects news cases of backfire. The King saga reveals values that give priority to personalities and another important feature of such cases: in conflict. The net effect was to personalize the order to placate a horrified public, the official provision of justice and divert attention away channels need to be seen to work. Many from system reform. people who saw the Holliday video believed To point to the role of official channels in the police were guilty, so a guilty verdict was reducing outrage is not to reject official necessary to prevent anger turning into action. channels, especially when they can bring about A guilty verdict, even with relatively mild real change. The point here is that official penalties, might have been enough to mollify channels can be used, cynically or inadver- residents of South Central Los Angeles tently, to reduce anger resulting from a sufficiently to prevent a riot. perceived injustice. The media are offered “a It is useful to remember that from the point ritual of normalization in which problems are of view of system change — a revamp of the identified but then handed off to officials to Los Angeles police to eliminate racism and resolve.”62 brutality, and promote community-building Gates, who felt the officers involved in the instead of force — the four police officers beating had let down the LAPD, wanted brought to trial were scapegoats. The verdict official action targeted at them, telling Mayor of guilty in the second trial gave the appear- Bradley “we should isolate the Rodney King ance of justice without any promise of more incident, let the courts handle it” and let the systemic change. commissions do their work.63 Koon clearly recognized the way formal Intimidation and Bribery inquiries could be used to reduce outrage: Police abuses are often accompanied by In the turbulent wake of the Rodney intimidation: the victim may be threatened or King affair, Los Angeles city officials arrested. “Far too frequently, the citizen who scurried to repair the damage. Damage has just been subjected to police abuse is then control was the foremost consideration. arrested and charged with a variety of The first step was to make certain the crimes.”65 Sometimes witnesses are charged as officers in the Rodney King affair — the well. Many people are afraid to complain presumed guilty — were indicted … the about police abuses, fearing retaliation and presumed guilty had to be prosecuted to lack of response, hence complaints are made

64. Koon, Presumed Guilty, 219. 62. Lawrence, Politics of Force, 113. 65. Ogletree, et al., Beyond the Rodney King 63. Gates, Chief, 338. Story, 42. The beating of Rodney King 41 about only some incidents. Police discourage — was leaked to the media “from an complaints by resisting the filing of them, by informed source.” As quickly as the harassing the complainant, by making threats, smear was out, the doctor resigned from and by making arrests. For example, “In the team.68 Virginia Beach, an NAACP attorney was arrested and prosecuted for trespass when he Owens tracked down quite a number of went to the police station to file a complaint witnesses to the beating of King, most of about police misconduct toward an NAACP whom were reluctant to comment, much less observer at a major disturbance.”66 Police may testify, due to fear of reprisals.69 Freddie G, also sue citizens who they allege are making one of the two passengers in King’s car during false allegations about police misconduct, an the chase before the beating, was killed a few example of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public months later in a car crash. Owens spoke to Participations (SLAPPs).67 Most of this intimi- witnesses who said the car was run off the dation by police is made more effective by road.70 being behind the scenes: cover-up and intimi- Police and others who spoke out critically dation go hand in hand. about the LAPD and chief Gates suffered Bribery is another tool to limit outrage. threats and harassment.71 As previously noted, When citizens sue police over alleged miscon- police use-of-force experts were highly duct, the result is often a settlement in which reluctant to testify at the trials of the four the citizen receives a pay-out but in return officers: the police code of silence was backed signs a confidentiality agreement that bars up by reprisals, especially ostracism.72 Alan public comment on the case. Yochelson, one of the prosecuting attorneys in Evidence about intimidation and bribery the first trial, told Owens: can be hard to obtain, given the reluctance of targeted individuals to talk and the interest of … we talked to any number of other the police in keeping the issue quiet. In the force and policy experts, who told us the King case, the most extensive account of video showed excessive force. Clearly, intimidation is given by Tom Owens, the there was excessive force on that video, former LAPD officer who became an investi- but none of them would go on the gator for King’s legal team. record. They said it would end careers.73

It seemed every time someone on our According to Owens, most civilian witnesses side became publicly known, confiden- of the beating had moved due to threats and tial information about that person’s unwanted publicity. Many Simi Valley jurors background surfaced. Within two days also moved due to threats.74 After George of appearing at a press conference, a Holliday became widely known for his video- doctor who had initially scheduled tape, the Immigration and Naturalization various specialists to work with King became the target of a minor scandal. Confidential information about an alleged past problem of the doctor’s — 68. Owens, Lying Eyes, 32. an overbilling to an insurance company 69. Ibid., 93–94, 99–101, 112.

66. Ibid., 56. The NAACP is the National 70. Ibid., 119. Association for the Advancement of Colored 71. Ibid., 182–87, 249. People. 72. Ibid., 186–87. 67. George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out 73. Ibid., 266. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). 74. Ibid., 259.

42 Justice Ignited

Service began trying to deport him to South anticipatory censorship to prevent reprisals.81 America.75 Journalists reporting on the King beating seem Lou Cannon in his book Official not to have had the same problem, perhaps Negligence reports some of the same findings because the story so quickly obtained satura- as Owens. Cannon recounts how LAPD use- tion coverage. of-force experts refused to testify at the Simi The various arrests of King, described Valley trial. Fred Nichols, who had testified to earlier as means of devaluing him, can also be the grand jury about excessive force, did considered forms of intimidation. Further- everything possible to avoid testifying in more, two of the officers involved in the court, including resisting a subpoena by beating charged King with assault,82 though claiming to suffer stress.76 One of the four this might be better understood as a legal officers involved in the beating, Theodore gambit than as attempted intimidation of King. Briseno, testified against his fellow officers. As noted, intimidation is difficult to He was labeled “Benedict Briseno”; the LAPD document, but even more so is bribery. Were later instigated an investigation of Briseno for police who adhered to the code of silence and perjury.77 In the second, federal, trial, LAPD refused to testify against fellow officers use-of-force expert Mark Conta testified for rewarded with collegial support, better as- the prosecution; initially some officers were signments, or promotions? The processes angry at him, and Koon called him a involved are often unconscious, so producing “whore.”78 But, according to his wife, “most documentation is extremely difficult. Bribery officers respected him for telling the truth.”79 may be too strong a word to describe subtle It is also possible for intimidation to be ways of rewarding those who do not speak out used by the other side. Many of the police about an injustice. present at but not participating in the beating In summary, in cases of police brutality, resented the prosecutions. To prevent them intimidation can be directed at many targets, testifying for the defense — namely in support including the victim of the brutality, witnesses, of the four officers who were charged over the and journalists. However, evidence of intimi- beating — they were threatened with prosecu- dation is often hard to obtain. Without Tom tions for perjury; few of them testified.80 In Owens’ revealing book, there would be little this case, intimidation was used not to inhibit on the public record about intimidation in the outrage from the beating, but rather to prevent King story. Bribery is even harder to docu- a diminution of the outrage. ment. Often it operates so subtly it can only be Journalists who cover police brutality can inferred. come under attack. Lew Irwin, in a story in the Intimidation can be very effective, but Columbia Journalism Review, described two always has limits. Holliday’s video, once cases of reprisals against television journalists created and in the hands of television stations, who covered police abuses, as well as a case of was beyond the immediate influence of the police. After it was broadcast, too many people were shocked and infuriated for intimidation to make a significant dent in 75. Ibid., 258. public opinion. Intimidation often serves to 76. Cannon, Official Negligence, 237–38. ensure cover-up, and once cover-up failed, backfire was predictable. 77. Ibid., 598.

78. Ibid., 416–17. 81. Lew Irwin, “Cops and Cameras: Why TV 79. Kathy Conta, personal communication, 13 is Slow to Cover Police Brutality,” Columbia June 2006. Journalism Review 30 (September/October 80. Ibid., 436–37; Deitz, Willful Injustice, 1991): 15–17. 101–9 82. Owens, Lying Eyes, 132–33. The beating of Rodney King 43

Conclusion This model, consisting of the stages of media initiation, arousal, reaction, and outcomes, The King beating is a multifaceted and vivid describes what can happen after a public case case study showing how what is perceived as of police violence; backfire analysis draws an unjust attack can backfire. Reactions to the attention to tactics used by those who stand to King beating were part of a struggle over gain or lose from outrage over police violence. perceptions of reality and what to do in It is worth looking at each of the five response to those perceptions. George methods for ideas about how to promote Holliday’s video enabled this particular police outrage from police brutality. Given that beating to break through the media’s usual cover-up is such a potent technique for reporting of official interpretations of police inhibiting outrage, reformers and activists use of force, generate widespread revulsion, should devote attention to means of exposing and trigger a major political struggle and crisis abuses. Jerome Skolnick and James Fyfe in of legitimacy. As a result, the King beating their insightful book Above the Law: Police provides extensive case material for examina- and the Excessive Use of Force adopt tion, containing ample evidence of the five openness as a key principle of police reform, methods for inhibiting outrage. arguing that monitoring and documentation Although the video circumvented the usual systems should be set up to “routinely video- means by which police cover up misconduct, tape police conduct during those occasions nonetheless evidence from the King affair where propensity to excessive force are most shows attempts at cover-up both before and likely to occur: high-speed chases, interroga- after the release of the video. Denigration of tions, protests, and riots,”84 a recommendation King as a person was a conspicuous technique endorsed by Jeffrey Ian Ross.85 It is important used by defenders of the police. The video was to remember, though, that all videotapes are interpreted by most viewers as clear evidence open to manipulation and interpretation. of police brutality, but the police involved Other means of challenging cover-ups are offered a contrasting interpretation, namely to support investigative journalism and en- that they were following official procedures courage whistleblowers, something especially and that King controlled the situation. After challenging and important for police depart- the video was broadcast, political and popular ments where the code of silence reigns. The pressures led to the setting up of a commission human rights group Witness provides video and launching of two criminal cases against equipment and training to groups around the four police officers. In each case, these formal world where human rights violations are likely procedures gave the promise of dispensing to occur, as a means to document abuses, justice and thus reduced outrage. Many people increase popular concern, and ultimately help felt only a guilty verdict would provide justice, deter abuses in the first place.86 so when the jury in the first trial rendered a verdict of not guilty, public fury was reignited 84. Skolnick and Fyfe, Above the Law, 266. and a major riot erupted. Finally, there is evidence police intimidated witnesses and 85. Ross, Making News of Police Violence, others in order to reduce the adverse conse- 126. For a detailed study of the use of closed- quences of the beating for the Los Angeles circuit television in custody cells in a British Police Department. police station, and the trade-offs between The analysis here is compatible with, but privacy and protection of prisoners, see Tim different from, Jeffrey Ian Ross’s political Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, Policing, process model of police violence as presented Surveillance and Social Control: CCTV and in his book Making News of Police Violence.83 Police Monitoring of Suspects (Cullompton, Devon: Willan, 2002). 86. “Witness,” http://www.witness.org/ (ac- 83. Ross, Making News of Police Violence. cessed 29 June 2006).

44 Justice Ignited

Opposing devaluation is not easy. Those outrage, they are seldom studied. Police who are concerned about justice for all, brutality is often accompanied by threats and regardless of status or stigma, need to be arrests of the victims, a process strongly linked aware of techniques of devaluation, to be with cover-ups. More widely, many activists prepared to expose it, and to argue that and movements have been targeted for everyone deserves to be treated with dignity harassment and disruption, but there is and fairness. Humanizing targets, such as by relatively little written on how to deal with showing what they have in common with this.88 Preparation is crucial, as is refusal to be others, can be an effective way of countering intimidated and willingness to expose threats devaluation. and attacks. Interpretation struggles can persist long A study of the King beating offers several after apparently uncontestable documentation insights about the backfire process. First, such as the Holliday video. News stories and backfire can occur well outside the template of interpersonal communications — from back- violent attacks against nonviolent protesters yard conversations to chatrooms — are all part found in the classic cases of Sharpeville, Dili, of interpretation struggles, which can carry on and Dharasana. King was not a protester, but for months, years, or decades. For many instead a drunken and perhaps drugged man activists, participation in protests seems more who had sped to escape police. He was not a real and substantial than writing a letter to the principled practitioner of nonviolence, but editor; looking at backfires suggests that rather resisted arrest, though the extent of his interpretation struggles can be as crucial to the resistance is a matter of debate. He was not impact of social action as the immediate action part of a movement seeking an end to injus- itself. tice. Despite all this, the beating caused The commission and the court cases follow- tremendous shock and anger, backfiring ing the King beating were the key official against the police. Whatever King had done, channels involved. They served to dampen most viewers believed the police had done demands for radical change in police proce- something much worse. This excessiveness or dures and management. In particular, the disproportionality is the key to backfire, along criminal cases against the four police officers with communication to receptive audiences. served to direct attention and attribute blame A second insight from the King saga is the to individuals and divert attention away from importance of media practices in routine institutional reform. The implication for cover-up of police misconduct, as analyzed activists is that official channels should be brilliantly by Regina Lawrence in The Politics used with care, if at all. Certainly, before using of Force. The normal news routine makes a particular procedure, it is worth investigating journalists de facto collaborators with police what happened to others who used it by taking their perspective and adopting their previously. Someone studying the fate of priorities. But occasionally an incident breaks complaints against the police — nearly all of through this routine, and media coverage which exonerate the police of any wrongdoing becomes critical, at least for a while. The same — might conclude it would be far more thing can happen with other injustices, effective to write a letter to the newspaper, including massacres: only some types of circulate a leaflet, or call a meeting. As argued injustices by powerful groups are exposed in by Regina Lawrence, mobilization of popular the media, whereas others are routinely concern is a key reason why the King beating ignored, falling outside the mass media’s received such intense media coverage.87 Although intimidation and bribery can be potent tools for inhibiting the expression of 88. An excellent treatment is Brian Glick, War at Home: Covert Action against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do about It (Boston: South 87. Lawrence, Politics of Force. End Press, 1989). The beating of Rodney King 45 criteria for newsworthiness. Therefore, for those concerned about these low-profile injustices, it should be a priority to find ways to break through mass media indifference, or to use alternative media. A third insight from the King story is that those perceived as responsible can fall out with one another. Police Chief Daryl Gates blamed the arresting officers for the incident, whereas Stacey Koon, the officer in charge of the arrest, blamed Gates for not standing behind established procedures. Those who wanted to blame someone for police brutality in the King case had several possible targets: the arresting officers, the police chief, the city government, police culture, and police procedures. Police officers, the police chief, and the city government normally support each other, but in the face of public pressure it is understandable they tried to displace blame from themselves to others. Interestingly, blame was usually personalized: individuals such as Gates and Koon were blamed rather than arrest procedures or the bureaucratic processes of the police and government. Yet, it can be argued, getting a new chief or getting rid of a few officers would not do a lot to change the routines that led to the beating, a point recognized by the Christopher Commission. But one of the key features of backfires is that they are driven by perceptions, which may or may not correspond to a deeper analysis. The most common public perception was that responsibility should be placed on individuals. In response, some of these individuals blamed others. It is reasonable to expect to find a similar process in other types of cases.

Acknowledgements This chapter is revised and enlarged from “The Beating of Rodney King: The Dynamics of Backfire,” Critical Criminology 13 (2005): 307–26. I thank Don Eldridge, Truda Gray, Jeff Ross, Greg Scott, Barbara Sims, and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments on drafts.

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 6 (author’s prepublication version)

6 Target: whistleblowers

Ralph Nader’s book Unsafe at any Speed, asked Nader who was paying his expenses. published on 1 November 1965, was an But such attempts to smear Nader, who lived a indictment of auto safety.1 In December, spartan lifestyle, were unsuccessful. General Motors initiated surveillance of GM tried to pin blame on private investiga- Nader, including attempts to entrap him in tors, implying that GM had requested they discreditable activities.2 The entire operation only examine Nader’s value as an expert was kept secret, a classic example of cover-up. witness and, by delving into Nader’s private But when the surveillance was exposed, it affairs and sex life, they had exceeded their backfired in a major way, with Senate hearings brief. GM had tried to maintain distance from leading to media coverage that damaged GM the investigation by using an outside law firm and the entire auto industry. as the go-between. In November 1966, Nader After Nader became convinced he was sued GM and Vincent Gillen, a private inves- being spied on, he sought and obtained press tigator. GM then distanced itself from Gillen, coverage. Journalists asked auto manufacturers but this was a mistake: Gillen had secretly for their comments. The companies denied that taped conversations showing GM’s interest in Nader was being investigated. To explain why discrediting Nader. not, one industry source said, “Think what a GM did one thing right: it made a public blunder it would be if a company were caught apology. The president of GM, James M. at it.”3 Eventually, under pressure from the Roche, admitted the investigation to the Senate press, GM admitted to its investigation of committee. He later apologized on national Nader. This became big news. television. These acknowledgments were seen Discrediting Nader was difficult. GM ap- as statesmanlike, lessening the damage to GM. parently went through Unsafe at any Speed Nader launched several court cases against looking for anything that might be wrong. In GM in an attempt to discover and expose what the Senate auto safety hearings, Senator Carl had really happened. But these cases did not T. Curtis repeatedly interrupted Nader, im- generate very much additional public attention, plying he was in it for the money. At hearings because the cases were slow and complex and in Iowa on auto safety, Karl M. Richards, of the audience for the subsequent revelations the Automobile Manufacturers Association, was so much smaller than for the original exposé. Nader found that people working in the 1. Ralph Nader, Unsafe at any Speed: The auto industry were afraid to speak out. Nader Designed-in Dangers of the American himself, because he was not an employee, was Automobile (New York: Grossman, 1965). less vulnerable to intimidation, but the sur- 2. Thomas Whiteside, The Investigation of veillance and efforts to discredit him would Ralph Nader: General Motors vs. One have deterred many in his situation. Thomas Determined Man (New York: Arbor House, Whiteside, in his definitive account of the 1972). I thank Jamey Wetmore for referring investigation, rhetorically asked, “Under such me to this book. See also Justin Martin, an intimidating barrage, who but a Nader Nader: Crusader • Spoiler • Icon (New York: could have emerged without having had his Basic Books, 2002). personal integrity and critical reputation 3. Whiteside, Investigation of Ralph Nader, 42.

Target: whistleblowers 47 destroyed?”4 whistleblowers have done and what is done to Nader was a whistleblower, a person who them is so striking that there is a great poten- speaks out in the public interest.5 Like many tial for backfire. other whistleblowers, Nader came under at- This chapter follows a different format tack. He not only survived but made the attack from the previous four. After describing, in the backfire: the publicity about GM’s investiga- next section, what typically happens to whis- tion turned Unsafe at Any Speed into a best- tleblowers, I focus on the failure of official seller and launched Nader’s career as the channels, something that is counterintuitive to world’s most well-known and effective whistleblowers and observers. Then I look at consumer advocate.6 In this, his case is quite the other methods of inhibiting outrage and different from the stories of most whistleblow- conclude with an example of a whistleblower, ers, which read like tragedies. Andrew Wilkie, who did just about everything The previous chapters have dealt with right. forms of physical violence — massacres and police beatings — and how these can backfire Whistleblowing against the perpetrators. Attacks on whistleblowers seem to be something quite different. Whistleblowers can be thought of as part of Very seldom are whistleblowers physically society’s alarm and self-repair system, bring- assaulted. They might be spied upon, as ing attention to problems before they become occurred to Nader, or harassed, reprimanded, far more damaging.7 Whistleblowers have and fired, as happens to so many whistleblowers who are employees. The common feature in all these cases is a perceived injustice. 7. C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Violence against those who are peaceful, or in Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, NY: a position of relative weakness, is seen as Cornell University Press, 2001); Quentin unjust. Reprisals against a law-abiding citizen Dempster, Whistleblowers (Sydney: ABC are also seen as unjust. What makes these Books, 1997); David W. Ewing, Freedom reprisals especially upsetting is that whistle- Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil blowers set out to serve the public interest, by Liberties to the Workplace (New York: speaking out about corruption or dangers to Dutton, 1977); Myron Peretz Glazer and the public. The discrepancy between what Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); 4. Ibid., 176. Geoffrey Hunt, ed., Whistleblowing in the Health Service: Accountability, Law and 5. Nader was a whistleblower in this general Professional Practice (London: Edward sense, though not according to narrower Arnold, 1995); Geoffrey Hunt, ed., Whistle- definitions such as “the disclosure by organi- blowing in the Social Services: Public zation members (former or current) of illegal, Accountability and Professional Practice immoral or illegitimate practices under the (London: Edward Arnold, 1998); Nicholas control of their employers, to persons or Lampert, Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union: organizations that may be able to effect Complaints and Abuses under State Socialism action” as given by Janet P. Near and Marcia (London: Macmillan, 1985); Marcia P. Miceli P. Miceli, “Organizational Dissidence: The and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Case of Whistle-blowing,” Journal of Business Organizational and Legal Implications for Ethics 4 (1985): 1–16, at 4. Companies and Employees (New York: 6. Nader has taken an active interest in whis- Lexington Books, 1992); Terance D. Miethe, tleblowing. See Ralph Nader, Peter J. Petkas, Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in and Kate Blackwell, eds., Whistle Blowing: Exposing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job The Report of the Conference on Professional (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999); Charles Responsibility (New York: Grossman, 1972). Peters and Taylor Branch, Blowing the

48 Justice Ignited spoken out about police corruption, pedophilia Previously, in the state of Victoria, Toomer in the churches, corporate mismanagement, had refused bribes to ignore infestations of biased appointment procedures, environmen- ships. In the Fremantle case, Toomer was tally harmful practices, and a host of other overruled by his superior and before long was issues. fined, demoted, and transferred. In 1980, due Although whistleblowers are extremely to the pressure, he retired at age 45. In the past valuable to society, most of them suffer three decades, his case has been brought enormously for their efforts. Ostracism, har- before numerous politicians and agencies, assment, slander, reprimands, referral to including the Ombudsman, the Administrative psychiatrists, demotion, dismissal, and black- Appeals Tribunal, and the Merit Protection listing are common methods used to attack and Review Agency, with a number of them whistleblowers. Bosses are the usual attackers holding formal inquiries. Even today, with co-workers sometimes joining in. Toomer’s supporters continue to petition the Many whistleblowers are conscientious, Australian government for compensation and high-performing employees who believe the have gathered evidence that Toomer was set system works. That’s why they speak out. up in Fremantle for removal from ship They believe that by alerting others to a quarantine duties.8 problem, it will be dealt with. Many do not For one man to lose his career is bad think of themselves as whistleblowers at all — enough. For millions of dollars to be spent on they believe they are just doing their job. So inquiries is an added burden. But in some they are shaken to the core when the response ways worst of all is that focusing on the to their public-spirited efforts is to vilify them treatment of Toomer distracted attention from as disloyal, to question their work perform- the original issue of corruption in quarantine ance, to withdraw emotional support, and to inspections. mount attacks. As well as suffering financial Mick Skrijel was a crayfisherman in South losses and severe stress, whistleblowers are at Australia in 1978 when he reported to police increased risk of relationship breakdowns and and politicians what he thought were drug health problems. drops off the coast. Afterwards, his catches Even worse than this, though, and unlike were stolen, his boat was destroyed by fire, his Nader’s confrontation with the auto industry, house was partially burnt, and he was as- few whistleblowers seem to bring about any saulted. Moving to Victoria in the 1980s, his change in the problems they speak out about. allegations were passed to the newly created The treatment of whistleblowers is a double National Crime Authority. Skrijel leafleted disaster for society: capable and courageous and picketed NCA headquarters over its individuals are attacked and sometimes de- inaction — and then the NCA investigated stroyed, while the original problems are left to Skrijel himself, who went to prison for five fester. This is illustrated by two longstanding months after a raid found explosives and Australian cases. marijuana on his property. His conviction was Bill Toomer was the senior quarantine later quashed by the Victorian Supreme Court: inspector in the state of Western Australia the judges found the explosives and marijuana when, in 1973, he requested fumigation of a could have been planted. Investigating the ship in Fremantle because of the presence of matter at the request of the government, a mice and rats. Fumigation is costly and time- consuming and hence disliked by ship owners. 8. Tony Hewett, “The Whistle Blower,” Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest (New Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1993, p. 40; York: Praeger, 1972); Alan F. Westin, with Keith Potter, “Protection of Vested Shipping Henry I. Kurtz and Albert Robbins, eds., Interests and their Protectors: A Multi Million Whistle Blowing! Loyalty and Dissent in the Dollar 32 Year Cover up” (submission to government bodies), 14 February 2005. Corporation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). Target: whistleblowers 49 senior barrister, David Quick, recommended ers Australia was set up to provide information an inquiry, with powers to collect evidence and support to whistleblowers; most of the and compel testimony, into the possibility that group’s members are whistleblowers them- Skrijel was framed, but the government selves. Through my involvement, especially as declined.9 president 1996-1999, I heard from many more Vast efforts have been made by Skrijel and whistleblowers. his supporters to pursue justice over his case. Over the years I’ve listened to hundreds of Somewhere along the line, the original issue of whistleblowers tell their stories. These stories the South Australian drug trade dropped off are as predictable as they are heart-rending. As the main agenda. well as a litany of reprisals from employers, These are but sketches of cases that are the most striking feature of the stories is what incredibly complicated, as are most whistle- happens when whistleblowers take their blower stories. But after hearing such stories, complaints to outside bodies such as ombuds- there is a burning question that is easy to men, anti-corruption commissions, auditor- articulate: “How can whistleblowers do generals, and courts. So familiar is the refrain better?” that when a whistleblower mentions an agency, sometimes I jump in and say, “They Official Channels: The Continuing Disaster didn’t help, did they?” The whistleblower responds, “How did you know?” I was just Whistleblowing usually involves a twofold going by the odds — hardly anyone reports injustice. First is the problem — corruption, being helped. abuse, a hazard to the public — about which a Of course, whistleblowers who contact me person speaks out. Second is the treatment of may not be representative. After all, they the whistleblower. Both of these have the wouldn’t be contacting me if an agency had potential to backfire, if people recognize them resolved their complaint. But there’s solid as matters for concern and information about research to back up my impressions. In the them is communicated to receptive audiences. largest study of whistleblowers in Australia, Therefore it is predictable that perpetrators William De Maria found that they reported will use the five methods of inhibiting outrage. being helped by an official body in less than That is exactly what can be observed in case one out of ten approaches, and in many cases after case. they felt worse off.11 This is the best available I’m going to give special attention to offi- research on how whistleblowers feel about the cial channels, because they play such a performance of official channels. prominent role in whistleblower cases. In the Then there are whistleblower laws, often late 1970s, I became aware of several cases in which environmental researchers or teachers had come under attack, for example being Ecologist 11 (January-February 1981): 33–43; denied tenure, having publications blocked, or Brian Martin, C. M. Ann Baker, Clyde losing grants. I started writing about the issue Manwell, and Cedric Pugh, eds., Intellectual under the label “suppression of dissent,” and Suppression: Australian Case Histories, as a result people told me about more cases, Analysis and Responses (Sydney: Angus & and before long I became familiar with a wide Robertson, 1986). variety of cases outside the environmental 11. William De Maria, Deadly Disclosures: area.10 In 1991, the organization Whistleblow- Whistleblowing and the Ethical Meltdown of Australia (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 1999); 9. Hall Greenland, “Mick’s War,” The Bulletin William De Maria and Cyrelle Jan, “Behold the Shut-eyed Sentry! Whistleblower Perspec- 121 (17 June 2003): 32–37. 10. Brian Martin, “The Scientific Straight- tives on Government Failure to Correct jacket: The Power Structure of Science and the Wrongdoing,” Crime, Law & Social Change Suppression of Environmental Scholarship,” 24 (1996): 151–66.

50 Justice Ignited seen as the salvation for whistleblowers. But hand, Geoff Hunt, founder of the UK group the laws fall far short of their promise. Freedom to Care14 — a national support group Whistleblower laws are written in different for whistleblowers, made up primarily of ways, but they all have a fundamental whistleblowers, similar to Whistleblowers shortcoming: they only offer remedies after a Australia — says whistleblower has spoken out and suffered reprisals. Many of the laws have other flaws. The UK law is, in our opinion, very Often they require that a whistleblower report nearly useless. We are not alone in matters internally first before going to the thinking this and the law has had quite a media — in fact, contacting the media may bad press over the last two or three nullify protection. Such conditions seem years. Its greatest success, it seems to designed to minimize public concern. But even me, has been in simply using its very whistleblower laws that look good on paper existence (regardless of merits/demerits) may give only an illusion of protection.12 In to threaten ignorant employers.15 Australia, there are whistleblower laws in every state and territory but there is not a Hunt’s alternative is to base whistleblowing on single case in which an employer has been a human right: the right to freedom of speech prosecuted for reprisals against a whistle- in the workplace. blower. In South Australia, whistleblowers In Australia and Britain, governments have have pushed for years for the state’s whistle- passed whistleblower laws but retain draco- blower act to be applied, to no avail. nian defamation laws, which are frequently Even if the laws were implemented, they used to stifle free speech, and official secrets are almost always slow and procedural, acts that prevent government employees from dampening outrage. In many cases, it is speaking publicly about virtually any aspect of virtually impossible to collect adequate their work. This is compatible with the evidence of reprisals. For example, ostracism judgment that whistleblower laws are more is terribly debilitating but exceedingly difficult about symbolic politics — giving the appear- to prove. Likewise, subtle harassment, such as ance of government concern about an issue — not informing an employee about meetings, than making effective interventions on behalf denying routine privileges, or changing of those who speak out in the public interest.16 rosters, is hard to document. Therefore, the The United States is the country with the reality of the whistleblower’s experience longest experience with measures to protect seldom emerges in formal investigations. whistleblowers, starting in the 1970s. What Another problem is that whistleblower laws seems to happen is that laws are passed and focus on the treatment of the whistleblower, then found to be ineffective, so new laws are with neglect of the original issue complained about. There are some who give a more positive Democracy Advice Centre; London: Public assessment of whistleblower laws. In Britain, Concern at Work, 2004), 101–18. the group Public Concern at Work, which 14. Freedom to Care. http://www.freedomto worked towards the country’s 1999 whistle- care.org/ (accessed 29 June 2006). [Note 13 blower law, is supportive of it. On the other added 2010: Freedom to Care has closed down.] 12. Brian Martin, “Illusions of Whistleblower 15. Geoff Hunt, personal communication, 12 Protection,” UTS Law Review 5 (2003): 119– July 2004. 30. 13. Anna Myers, “Whistleblowing — The UK 16. For a general account of this process, see Experience,” in Whistleblowing around the Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: World: Law, Culture and Practice, ed. Richard Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Calland and Guy Dehn (Cape Town: Open Markham, 1971). Target: whistleblowers 51 passed and the cycle is repeated. There are which had been found guilty of fraud and paid now dozens of different laws offering whistle- large fines — campaigned in the 1990s to blower protection, but none provides an easy neuter the act. But even with the False Claims road for whistleblowers. Act, a whistleblower faces daunting hurdles. It Tom Devine of the Government Account- can be difficult to find a lawyer willing to ability Project is one of the country’s most cover the huge legal expenses in a case that highly experienced whistleblower advisers. He can easily last years. In the court case, is author of The Whistleblower’s Survival whistleblowers must eventually reveal their Guide, the most useful manual for U.S. identity, risking permanent exclusion from whistleblowers.17 In his Guide, Devine as- their field of work. During the Justice Depart- sesses a host of different routes for whistle- ment’s review of the case, which may last blowers, finding that even the most promising years, whistleblowers are legally prohibited ones are very far from ideal. For example, from speaking about the evidence to public most federal government agencies now have audiences. And there are various other pitfalls hotlines for reporting misconduct, but Devine along the way.19 says “for those whistleblowers who seek to In a more recent article, Devine reaches a make a difference while avoiding retaliation, similar conclusion: hotlines are in most cases worthless at best.” The Office of the Special Counsel, set up On balance, in practice U.S. statutory specifically to receive whistleblowing disclo- whistleblower laws have been Trojan sures from federal employees, has severe horses, creating more retaliation victims deficiencies in practice. For example, although than they helped achieve justice. … the the OSC can demand that government system has been rigged so that realisti- agencies adequately investigate charges made cally it routinely endorses retaliation by whistleblowers, it seldom exercises its …20 power: “The OSC’s annual report for fiscal 1995 reveals that out of 333 whistleblowing After the failure of whistleblower laws in the disclosures, the office forwarded only two for 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed a stronger agency investigation.” Devine says that “On law in 1989, and then bolstered it with balance, these flaws in the system mean that amendments in 1994. But, according to an OSC whistleblowing disclosure is likely to Devine, be unproductive or even counterproductive — unless it is part of a larger strategy involving … the pattern of futility persists. Be- other institutions.”18 tween passage of the 1994 amendments The False Claims Act is the most powerful and September 2002, whistleblowers lost tool against fraud in government contracts. 74 of 75 decisions on the merits at the Through the act, whistleblowers can initiate Federal Court of Appeals, which has a suits against government contractors; if the monopoly on judicial review of government decides to take over a case, administrative decisions.21 whistleblowers are guaranteed a share of any money recovered as a result of their disclo- This is because the law is filled with loopholes sures. Reflecting the effectiveness of the act, a group of government contractors — most of 19. Ibid., 76–82. 20. Tom Devine, “Whistleblowing in the 17. Tom Devine, The Whistleblower’s Survival United States: The Gap between Vision and Guide: Courage Without Martyrdom (Wash- Lessons Learned,” in Calland and Dehn, ington, DC: Fund for Constitutional Gov- Whistleblowing around the World, 74–100, at ernment, 1997). 83–84. 21. Ibid., 85. 18. Ibid., 51, 68, 69.

52 Justice Ignited and the court regularly interprets the law to often go wrong in pursuing them. The other favor government administrators. Devine con- methods of inhibiting outrage also play cludes that although whistleblower laws important roles in whistleblower cases. receive “popular acclaim,” in practice U.S. government whistleblowers are suffering “a Cover-up government secrecy campaign of unprece- Those who attack whistleblowers usually like dented severity since the McCarthy era in the to keep things quiet. Only foolish employers 1950s and legal rights little better than window announce to the world that they have fired a dressing for an empty house.”22 Note that prominent dissident. When whistleblowers go Devine refers to government whistleblowers. to court, employers often agree to a settlement In the private sector, there is not even a pre- under the condition that neither party speaks tense of legal protection. about the settlement itself. Acceptance of such Why don’t official channels work? Imagine a so-called gagging or silencing clause is often an independent agency that ruled solely on the a precondition for a settlement. facts, without regard to power structures, and Whistleblowers often want to keep things that could implement and enforce changes in quiet too. Many of them are embarrassed and accord with its rulings. A single employee humiliated by the allegations against them and who found solid evidence of corruption at the do not want others to be aware of their diffi- top of the organization would then be able to culties. Often they are making complaints to topple senior managers and bring about major official bodies and assume that publicity will changes in policies and practices. Given that hurt their case. In many cases, lawyers advise corruption is found in nearly every large keeping quiet. The upshot is that whistleblow- organization, whether in government or corpo- ers commonly cooperate with employers in rations, such an agency would be a mortal covering up information about what is hap- threat. So it’s no surprise that no such agency pening. The same applies to the original exists. Instead, the various oversight bodies problem they revealed. The result is that public are toothless tigers — underfunded, with indignation is minimized. restricted mandates, vulnerable to attack should they be effective — and thus give the Devaluation appearance of addressing problems without Devaluation is part of the standard treatment much substance. of whistleblowers: harassment, referral to Most employees who speak out do so psychiatrists, reprimands, and the like are without consulting with whistleblower groups potent means of discrediting a person in the and without any awareness of the evidence eyes of fellow workers. Spreading of vicious about the weaknesses of official channels. rumors is part of the package, including Many such employees believe justice is to be malicious comments about the whistleblower’s found somewhere in the system, so when they work performance, personal behavior, and suffer reprisals, they make a submission to an mental state. To counter this, whistleblowers agency, wait months or years and then, when need to behave impeccably — a difficult task the result is negative, go on to another agency. when under intense scrutiny and immense This is an ideal way to reduce public anger stress — and to document their good perform- from the injustice being done. ance and behavior. This can be done, but only if the whistleblower is able and willing to Other Ways for Whistleblowers to Go muster the information and make it available. Wrong Reinterpretation I’ve described shortcomings in official chan- Employers typically deny any wrongdoing and nels at some length, because whistleblowers so say treatment of the employee is completely justified and nothing to do with public interest disclosures. Whistleblowers need to challenge 22. Ibid., 92. Target: whistleblowers 53 the official line by providing solid documen- Andrew Wilkie tation for every one of their claims. Just a week before the U.S. government Intimidation and Bribery launched its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Whistleblowers are often intimidated by Andrew Wilkie, an analyst in the Office of threats and actual reprisals. Many whistle- National Assessments, one of Australia’s blowers are surprised and shocked by repri- government intelligence agencies, resigned sals. After all, they thought they were doing from his position and challenged the Austra- the right thing. Very few had any idea of what lian government’s reasons for joining the was in store for them. It is common to hear assault.25 Through good sense and good luck, them say, in retrospect, “I was naive.” Wilkie avoided every one of the traps that Furthermore, the way whistleblowers are snare most whistleblowers. treated serves as an object lesson to co- First, and most importantly, Wilkie spoke workers, most of whom avoid the whistle- out in public. He did not report his concerns blower for fear of becoming targets them- through official channels by writing a memo selves. Employees know their jobs are safer if or talking to his boss. Instead, he contacted they do not speak out; sometimes promotions veteran journalist Laurie Oakes, who made are in order if they join in a witch-hunt. Wilkie’s resignation and revelations into a top Whistleblowers often accept settlements in news story. Wilkie persisted with this legal actions because they cannot afford to approach, giving numerous interviews and continue the case or they are exhausted by talks in the following months. His approach years of procedural battles. As legal commen- was the antithesis of cover-up. tator Thane Rosenbaum comments, “A settle- Second, because of who he was and how he ment is tantamount to an entirely lawful, behaved, Wilkie resisted devaluation. His economically efficient bribe.”23 Settlements background was conservative. In public, he with gag orders essentially use bribery to wore a suit and tie and spoke calmly and enforce cover-up. factually, a terrific performance for someone under so much stress. His background, It is perhaps no surprise that all five methods demeanor, and principled stand undermined of inhibiting outrage are found in whistle- attempts to portray him as a traitor or a radical. blower cases. What is disturbing is that When government figures made personal whistleblowers so often collaborate in these aspersions against Wilkie in Parliament and methods, especially in cover-up and using claimed he was not an Iraq expert, this official channels. They can be highly reluctant backfired as journalists exposed their unscru- to focus on taking their message to the widest pulous behavior and double standards.26 possible audience. Yet this has proved time Third, Wilkie kept the focus on the main and again the most effective way to mobilize issue, the official reasons for the Australian support for addressing the matter raised by the government joining the attack on Iraq. He whistleblower and for providing personal consistently countered the government line protection from reprisals.24 and did not pursue issues outside his expertise. Fourth, Wilkie did not use official channels to make his protest. By resigning, he avoided 23. Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins, 25. Andrew Wilkie, Axis of Deceit (Mel- bourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2004). 2004), 96. 24. Devine, Whistleblower’s Survival Guide; 26. Mike Seccombe, “Howard’s Rottweilers Brian Martin, The Whistleblower’s Handbook: Still Biting at the Heels of Whistleblower,” How to Be an Effective Resister (Charlbury, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 2003, UK: Jon Carpenter, 1999). p. 7.

54 Justice Ignited all the usual reprisals at work. He also avoided • consult widely before acting, including the exhausting and time-consuming appeals to with family, friends, and sympathetic co- various official bodies. workers; Fifth, Wilkie stood up to intimidation. He • build alliances with others willing to help might have been charged under one of the expose wrongdoing, including co-workers, government acts requiring government journalists, and public officials; employees to keep quiet, but by going public • be aware that official channels have sig- he made it difficult for the government to act nificant limitations; against him. By speaking out, he also resisted • be prepared for reprisals. the bribery implicit in keeping quiet to hold a job. These recommendations are entirely compati- Wilkie also had perfect timing. For ble with challenging each of the methods of maximum response, the message needs to get inhibiting outrage.28 to an audience when it is most receptive. Just Whistleblowers and their supporters have before the invasion of Iraq was the ideal time, much to gain by thinking strategically. If they when media attention was intense and debate put themselves in the shoes of the guilty over justifications was fierce. Wilkie punc- parties, they can imagine tactics that will keep tured the apparent unanimity of government the main issue off the public agenda. Cover- Iraq experts, and so made a tremendous impact up, attacks on the credibility of the whistle- on the debate. Wilkie’s timing was also ideal: blower, cover stories, and intimidation are mass protest against the Iraq invasion was at predictable, so preparations should be made to its height, so there was a large receptive counter them. Official channels also serve to audience for his message. keep issues out of the public eye by shifting According to the backfire model, Wilkie attention to the treatment of the whistleblower did just about everything right. But that does and treating the matter in-house. It is an not mean things were easy for him. After all, immense challenge for most whistleblowers to he sacrificed his career for the sake of speak- stop assuming justice can be obtained within ing out. But it is worthwhile remembering that the system and instead to seek support and large numbers of whistleblowers lose their vindication in the court of public opinion. careers, and years of their lives, in futile efforts to obtain justice within the system. Acknowledgements Seldom do they have any lasting effect on the This chapter draws on “Bucking the System: issue about which they raised the alarm. Andrew Wilkie and the Difficult Task of the Whistleblowers have much to learn about Whistleblower,” Overland 180 (2005): 45-48. being effective. Whether or not one agrees I thank Keith Potter and Will Rifkin for with Wilkie’s claims about Iraq, his method of helpful advice, Truda Gray and Greg Scott for speaking out is a model for others. comments on drafts, and members of Whistle- blowers Australia for continuing support and What to Do inspiration.

Whistleblower advice manuals27 make the following sorts of suggestions:

• document claims exhaustively before going public, in order to be able to counter denials and destruction of evidence; 28. Brian Martin with Will Rifkin, “The Dynamics of Employee Dissent: Whistleblow- 27. Devine, Whistleblower’s Survival Guide; ers and Organizational Jiu-jitsu,” Public Martin, Whistleblower’s Handbook. Organization Review 4 (2004): 221–38. Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 7 (author’s prepublication version)

7 The dismissal of Ted Steele

In 2001, Ted Steele, a biologist at the triggered a huge outcry.1 The Principal of the University of Wollongong — where I work — College, Wilfred Lockhart, later said in was summarily dismissed from his tenured interview that “if he had known what would position, resulting in an enormous outcry. This happen … he would have destroyed the letter became the most prominent Australian aca- or buried it at the back of a file drawer,”2 a demic dismissal case in half a century. good indication that he thought his actions had The Steele case was an important episode in backfired.3 the defense of academic freedom in Australia. The Steele case is especially useful for In addition, it offers a wealth of evidence on analyzing backfire dynamics because it is how a dismissal, perceived as an attack on recent, because there is much published academic freedom and free speech, can back- documentation and commentary, and because I fire on a university administration. In this have been able to observe the events from chapter, I examine backfire dynamics through close at hand. This chapter reads somewhat a close analysis of the Steele case. differently from the others because my access Like most of the whistleblower cases in the to information allows closer attention to detail previous chapter, there was no violence in a way that is seldom possible using secon- involved in this case: the source of outrage dary sources. I should mention that although I was a dismissal seen as unfair. Yet the matter have known Ted Steele for years, I have never is more complex than a simple backfire: the been a close friend of his. Since his dismissal, actions of dissidents — such as Steele — and we have not communicated aside from brief e- unions can also backfire. The Steele case mails, as discussed later. illustrates the existence of multiple backfire The Steele case can be categorized as dynamics. involving academic freedom, free speech, or The classic cases of backfire from violent both. The expressions “academic freedom” assaults on peaceful protesters are relatively and “free speech” are contested concepts, so it easy to analyze because the injustices were so is possible to find differing interpretations of widely recognized and the interaction so one- sided. In the King beating case and most whistleblower cases, the interactions are also 1. Michiel Horn, Academic Freedom in commonly seen as very one-sided, despite Canada: A History (Toronto: University of efforts to stigmatize King and whistleblowers. Toronto Press, 1999), 220–45. But Steele’s behavior, prior to his dismissal, was more problematic, as described later. 2. Ibid., 225. Some previous academic freedom cases 3. The dismissal of Herbert Richardson from seem to have involved backfire effects. For St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto example, the 1958 dismissal of Harry Crowe in 1994 also appears to fit the backfire model from United College, Canada, on the basis of quite well: Brian Martin, “The Richardson material in an intercepted private letter, Dismissal as an Academic Boomerang,” in Workplace Mobbing in Academe: Reports from Twenty Universities, ed. Kenneth Westhues (Queenston, Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), 317–30.

56 Justice Ignited their meaning. Academic freedom is com- the basis that there is no evidence of monly taken to cover both institutional upgrading. autonomy from governmental intervention and • 26 February 2001. Steele is dismissed. the autonomy of faculty to undertake teaching • After 26 February 2001. There is a and research without interference and — in massive backlash against the university some circumstances — to make public administration. The National Tertiary Educa- comment. The Steele case involved only this tion Union (NTEU), the national academics’ latter dimension of academic freedom, namely union, undertakes a publicity and lobbying making public comment. campaign. Free speech is the right to express opinions • May 2001. The NTEU launches a case in without penalty. It usually refers to expression the Federal Court that the university admini- in the public domain, and can be claimed by stration violated the enterprise agreement. corporations as well as individuals. Within • August 2001. A Federal Court judge rules most large organizations, though, there is in favor of the NTEU.4 seldom a presumption that employees have a • September 2001. The university admini- right to speak in public about organizational stration appeals. problems: those who do are called whistle- • March 2002. The full bench of Federal blowers and frequently suffer reprisals, as Court rules in favor of the NTEU.5 discussed in the previous chapter. Universities • April-July 2002. Negotiations occur are a partial exception in that the tradition of between the NTEU and the university admini- academic freedom sometimes offers protection stration. for those, like Steele, who go public about • 22 April 2002. Steele is reinstated but re- internal problems. mains off campus on study leave (sabbatical). In the next section I give the background to • 5 July 2002. A settlement is announced. the Steele dismissal, including a fair bit of Details are confidential but Steele does not information about Steele and his behavior. In return to his post. the following sections I examine backfire dynamics in relation to the university administration, the union, Steele, and the university’s The Steele Case Department of Biological Sciences. The extra information about Steele is useful for making The University of Wollongong is located in two points: that a dissident’s own actions can the city of Wollongong, which is just south of backfire, and that a dismissal can backfire — Sydney and has a population of about 250,000. when it is seen to be grossly unfair — even Originally an extension of the University of when the person dismissed has credibility New South Wales, it became a separate problems. The postscript reveals some of the university in 1975 and grew rapidly through responses to my writing about the Steele case. the 1980s to reach its present size of about 20,000 students. The university also grew sig- Key Events in the Steele Case nificantly in reputation during this time, • 1985. Steele is appointed to the University especially in research. of Wollongong. In 1985 Steele was appointed as a lecturer, • January 2001. Steele makes claims to the a tenurable position roughly the status of a media about students having their marks U.S. assistant professor. He advanced rapidly, “upgraded.” • January 2001. The Vice-Chancellor and members of Biological Sciences deny Steele’s 4. NTEIU v University of Wollongong (2001) Federal Court of Australia 1069 (8 August). claims. • 1 February 2001. The state Ombudsman 5. University of Wollongong v National Terti- declines to investigate Steele’s allegations on ary Education Industry Union (2002) Federal Court of Australia 360 (28 March). The dismissal of Ted Steele 57 being promoted to senior lecturer and then pass, pass conceded, and fail. Many students associate professor, a rank in Australia equal mainly receive passes and credits and this is in status to full professor in the United States. considered quite acceptable. Very high marks Steele was an iconoclastic biologist, having are unusual. It is common for only one to five proposed a mechanism for the inheritance of students in a class of 50 to receive a high acquired characteristics at a genetic level.6 distinction, or perhaps even none. For a Originally from Adelaide, he had worked student to receive all high distinctions in a overseas after his PhD but could not sustain a semester is exceptional. For example, at the career in Britain due to resistance to his ideas. University of Wollongong in the first semester Wollongong provided a reasonably supportive of 2001, fewer than one in a hundred under- platform for his research. graduate students taking three or four courses In dealing with his detractors and competi- received all high distinctions.7 Grade inflation tors in biology, Steele at times adopted a may be more significant at the bottom end of confrontational style. As well, he often the grade spectrum, given that there seem to be engaged in campus issues using a similar style. fewer vocal protests about massive failure With the introduction of a campus-wide e-mail rates in introductory courses. system in the 1990s, Steele soon became a Over a period of decades starting in the familiar commentator, noted especially for his 1960s, Australian higher education moved comments hostile to the university administra- from an elite to a mass system. This led to tion. One of his prime targets was what he concern about declining standards, as some called “Mickey Mouse professors.” A full academics complained they had to reduce the professor in the Australian system is an elite level of difficulty in their classes. Much more academic post, typically comprising no more contentious, though, has been the commer- than one out of seven faculty positions. Until cialization of higher education since the late recently at most universities, the rank of 1980s, including the massive increase in full- professor could not be obtained by promotion fee-paying foreign students. Australian stu- but only by appointment to an externally dents pay significant fees but are entitled to a advertised chair. Steele claimed such chairs zero-interest, inflation-adjusted loan that is were being given to people of marginal paid back gradually through an income tax scholarly achievement because of their surcharge payable when their taxable income connections with senior administrators. exceeds a specified threshold. Foreign stu- Steele’s dismissal was triggered by his dents, on the other hand, pay larger fees comments about “soft marking,” namely the (typically around A$12,000 per year, about awarding of undeservedly high grades to US$9000) and must pay them immediately. students. It is widely thought there has been Through such fees, higher education has some grade inflation in Australian universities, become a major Australian export industry. though nothing like that said to occur in some Foreign student fees have become a significant parts of the U.S. system such as Harvard. At component of many university budgets and Wollongong, like most Australian universities, some academics complain there is pressure, grades are high distinction, distinction, credit, open or subtle, to pass foreign students in order to maintain the income flow. Controver- sies over “soft marking,” raised periodically in 6. E. J. Steele, Somatic Selection and Adaptive the media, are largely about allegedly lower Evolution: On the Inheritance of Acquired standards for foreign students. Characters (Chicago: University of Chicago At the beginning of 2001, the Sydney Press, 1979); Edward J. Steele, Robyn A. Morning Herald — one of Australia’s Lindley, and Robert V. Blanden, Lamarck’s Signature: How Retrogenes are Changing Darwin’s Natural Selection Paradigm 7. I thank David Macpherson and Aden (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998). Steinke for figures on students’ marks.

58 Justice Ignited

“quality” daily newspapers — ran a series of dence of any impropriety in marking and stories about soft marking, drawing on an therefore no basis for a formal investigation.10 advance report of a survey of social scientists, On the basis of this assessment, plus informa- some of whom claimed the emphasis on fee- tion provided by Biological Sciences and the based courses was leading to lower standards.8 administration, Steele lost credibility in the However, very few academics were willing to eyes of many. speak publicly about this. Steele jumped into this ferment by making the dramatic allegation The University Administration and that two students in his own department, Backfire Biological Sciences, had had their marks boosted — indeed, that he had been instructed Then, on 26 February 2001, Steele was to raise their marks.9 summarily dismissed. The Vice-Chancellor Other members of the department denied stated in a media release that the dismissal Steele’s allegations, as did Gerard Sutton, the “was necessary in the light of Associate Vice-Chancellor (equivalent to a U.S. univer- Professor Steele’s knowingly false allegations sity president). Claims and counterclaims flew undermining the essential fabric of the about on the university e-mail system, with employment relationship and puts at serious some of the commentary leading to stories in risk the good name of the university.”11 the mass media. For the administration, the dismissal back- Steele, in one of his widely circulated e- fired in a dramatic fashion. Steele, previously mail missives detailing his allegations, sent a perceived by many as having little credibility, copy to the Ombudsman for the state of New was overnight transformed into a martyr. The South Wales, in which Wollongong is located. method of dismissal accentuated the image of He received a formal reply from the Deputy free speech muzzled. The dismissal notice was Ombudsman, who said the office had been delivered to Steele at his home at 5.15pm; at obliged to treat the e-mail as a formal submis- the same time, the locks on his university sion. In a careful analysis of the case, the office doors were changed. Deputy Ombudsman said there was no evi- Commentary in the media was overwhelmingly critical of the dismissal.12 Many Wollon-

8. Carole Kayrooz, Pamela Kinnear, and Paul Preston, Academic Freedom and Commer- cialisation of Australian Universities: Percep- 10. Lisa Sewell, “No Uni Grade Rorts Study: tions and Experiences of Social Scientists, Ombudsman Opts Out,” Illawarra Mercury, 3 Discussion Paper Number 37 (Canberra: February 2001, p. 3. The Illawarra Mercury is Australia Institute, March 2001). the sole daily newspaper in Wollongong. 9. Aban Contractor, “‘High School’ Classes 11. Aban Contractor and Gerard Noonan, for Fee-paying Uni Students,” Sydney “University Sacks Whistleblower in Grading Morning Herald, 9 January 2001, pp. 1, 4; Row,” Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February Aban Contractor, “Revealed: The Secret Paths 2001, p. 1. to Higher Education,” Sydney Morning 12. “Unis Can’t Dismiss Demand for Quality,” Herald, 12 January 2001, p. 1. Several years Australian, 28 February 2001, p. 12; Jim later, in May 2005, the Sydney Morning Jackson, “The Freedom of Academe is a Herald ran a major series of stories about Fragile Thing,” Sydney Morning Herald, 15 problems due to privatization of Australian March 2001, p. 10; Ian Lowe, “The Dissent of higher education, including soft marking. This Steele,” New Scientist 169 (17 March 2001): time, several academics were willing to speak 59; Padraic P. McGuinness, “Silenced for the out. See Debra Jopson and Kelly Burke, Sake of the Corporate University,” Sydney “Campus Critical,” Sydney Morning Herald, Morning Herald, 1 March 2001, p. 12. 7–8 May 2005, pp. 27, 32–33. McGuinness is a regular columnist who The dismissal of Ted Steele 59 gong academics and staff were dismayed; I In contrast, there was little prospect of heard many say they did not support Steele’s hiding Steele’s dismissal, especially since behavior but they opposed the way he had Steele had a penchant for going to the media. been dismissed. Indeed, many people unfa- Both the electronic and print media reported miliar with the details assumed Steele’s the story, using both the administration’s brief allegations about boosting of grades must be media release and commentary from Steele, correct — after all, why else would he be the union, and others. dismissed? When meeting academics from A variant of cover-up is to say very little, other universities, I — like many others from for example by refusing to comment to the Wollongong — was frequently quizzed about media. This is commonly called stonewalling. the affair. For a period, the university seemed This reduces the risk of getting caught in lies more known for the dismissal than for its or contradictions and reduces the attractive- undoubted achievements. ness of the story to journalists, who normally The attack on Steele backfired because it like to obtain comment from both sides. This seemed to compromise his freedom to speak was the approach adopted, for the most part, out on matters of academic and social signifi- by the administration. cance and because it was perceived as arbi- When Steele made his original allegations trary and disproportionate to anything Steele about soft marking — but before his dismissal had done. In short, it was seen as both contrary — all of his colleagues in the Department of to academic freedom and as unjust treatment. Biological Sciences disagreed, and stated so in Some administrators consciously take pre- a letter to a newspaper.13 However, unlike cautions to prevent or reduce backfire from Steele, they were not used to or comfortable their actions. Others have an intuitive grasp of with media campaigning and could not agree how to achieve this. However, it is not neces- on a common approach to it, so after the sary to probe motivations in order to observe dismissal they did not make formal public common methods used by administrators that comment — aside from rebutting Steele’s inhibit outrage: covering up actions, devaluing claims on the department’s website — leaving targets, disguising actions, following proce- media comment for the administration, which dures, and using intimidation and bribery. said very little. For the first year after the Hiding actions is perhaps the most effective dismissal, the same pattern prevailed, with means of inhibiting outrage. After all, if few Biological Sciences academics saying virtually people know about the issue, few will be nothing publicly and the administration pro- upset. In previous cases at the University of ducing only occasional brief formal state- Wollongong, academics had lost their jobs ments. with little or no publicity. For example, Devaluation of the target can be an effec- tenured Geosciences senior lecturer John tive means of inhibiting outrage, but using the Formby was dismissed in 1998 following an technique can be tricky because criticisms investigation into allegations about his behav- need to be credible. The dismissal itself would ior, even though an investigation committee have devalued Steele in the eyes of some, recommended against dismissal. Formby did especially those who believe we live in a just not seek publicity, instead making a legal world. But the administration, to its credit, did challenge to the decision, which he lost. Aside not launch an open attack on Steele’s perform- from gossip around campus, the dismissal was ance or character. Nor do I have any evidence only publicized in an e-mail from departing of covert efforts to discredit Steele. Undoubt- Geosciences lecturer Laurie Brown (29 August edly there was hostile gossip, but much of this 2001).

13. Rob Whelan, et al., “Look to Wollongong usually writes from a conservative position; for Best-practice Assessment” (letter), Lowe takes a more progressive line. Australian, 24 January 2001, p. 31.

60 Justice Ignited was stimulated by Steele’s own actions and stration relied on an inventive reading of a statements, as described later. particular clause in the enterprise agreement. Another common means for inhibiting Intimidation and bribery are potent tools in outrage is to describe the events in ways that the hands of any large organization. Many minimize concern. When academics are dis- academics are frightened by even the possibil- missed, administrators virtually never say “We ity of offending powerful figures in their are dismissing Professor X because she was a university, not to mention a misconduct vocal critic of the university president” or, charge, reprimand, demotion, or dismissal, so even less likely, “We are dismissing Professor it doesn’t take much to intimidate them. Steele X for exercising her academic freedom.” was made of tougher stuff, having confronted Instead, in almost every case, administrators the administration for years, but undoubtedly rhetorically endorse academic freedom while being dismissed was traumatic for him. The presenting some rationale for their actions: obverse of intimidation is bribery through shortage of money, necessary redeployments expectations of grants, reduced teaching, or reorganizations, procedural violations, or promotions, and the like. Again, for many poor performance. The Steele dismissal was academics it does not require much in the way unusual in that the administration explicitly of inducements to inspire conformity. stated the reason was Steele’s public com- In summary, the University of Wollongong ments about marking and standards. administration did little that mitigated outrage. Formal procedures, such as grievance Rather than hiding the dismissal, it was carried procedures or courts, give the appearance of out in a heavy-handed manner. Rather than providing justice. Following procedures there- disguising the reason for the dismissal, it was fore undercuts outrage even when the proce- openly stated. Rather than follow obvious dures themselves are unfair in practice, as in procedures, they were openly violated. The the case of court battles between an unem- administration did reduce backlash by limiting ployed individual and a large organization. comment to the media and by arguing that its Steele’s dismissal was, on the surface at actions could be justified under a particular least, a gross violation of procedure. A bit of clause in the enterprise agreement, but this had background is necessary to explain why. limited effect. As a result, the dismissal Australian academics are covered by a single backfired against the administration in a major trade union, the National Tertiary Education way. Union (NTEU). In the framework of Austra- lian industrial law at the time, each university The Union and Backfire was expected to come up with an “enterprise agreement” about wages and conditions, with Just as administrations dislike outrage, so management and the local NTEU branch defenders of academic freedom would like to negotiating to reach the agreement. At magnify it. If they are ready and able to Wollongong, the enterprise agreement nego- achieve this, then administrations will be far tiations in 1999 were exceptionally difficult. less likely to mount attacks in the first place. To push the process along, academics held a After Steele was dismissed, his defense was one-day strike, then a two-day strike, and largely undertaken by the NTEU, which finally a three-day strike. For Australian mounted a three-pronged strategy involving a academics, this was an exceptional level of legal challenge to the dismissal, publicity, and industrial action. Part of the enterprise lobbying. agreement reached after this struggle stated The first prong was a legal challenge. Out that dismissal of an academic could only occur of half a dozen legal options, the union after following a set of procedures, including decided to launch a case in the Federal Court laying of charges and setting up of an investi- that the enterprise agreement had been gation committee. None of this was done breached. In August 2001, the judge ruled in before Steele’s dismissal. Instead, the admini- favor of the union. After the university The dismissal of Ted Steele 61 administration appealed, in March 2002 the which union and administration officials full bench of the court affirmed the ruling. entered negotiations about Steele’s future. The second prong was a publicity cam- Nearly all this negotiation occurred behind paign, with media releases, circulation of closed doors, aside from some media flare-ups information, and an on-line petition eventually along the way. At a meeting of the Wollon- signed by nearly 5000 people, the majority of gong branch of the NTEU on 18 April 2002, whom were Australian academics. members of the Biological Sciences Depart- The third prong was lobbying Council, the ment presented a motion calling for a miscon- University of Wollongong’s governing body duct inquiry into Steele’s actions to be set up. (similar to a U.S. board of trustees). The two Carolyn Allport, national president of the elected academics on Council were union union, told the meeting the NTEU was negoti- members; informal approaches were made to ating with the administration to obtain a other members. Despite the NTEU position satisfactory outcome regarding Steele; the gaining a degree of support on Council, for the Biological Sciences members were persuaded most part Council went along with the Vice- to withdraw their motion. The subtext was Chancellor. “trust the union negotiators.” Whatever the I now look at each of these prongs in terms advantages of this approach, it did little to of whether it amplified or inhibited the promote debate about academic freedom at original feelings of outrage over the dismissal. Wollongong or elsewhere. Of course, outrage is not the only factor to be A settlement between Steele, the admini- considered, so the NTEU strategy should not stration, and the union was announced on 5 be judged on this criterion alone. But it is an July 2002, stating “All legal and disciplinary important factor and hence worth examining. procedures have been terminated as a result of The publicity campaign was highly effec- the settlement. The details of the settlement tive in increasing outrage. It emphasized the remain confidential and all three parties have unfairness and disproportionality of the agreed to make no further public comment.”14 dismissal and generated awareness and The tight confidentiality of the settlement concern throughout Australia and beyond. drastically reduced media coverage. There was Lobbying Council, in contrast, did little to little about the settlement in the Australian or increase outrage. It was a classic insider the Sydney Morning Herald, major newspa- approach, reinforcing the assumption that pers that had regularly covered the Steele Council is a genuine ruling body, when in case.15 Following the Vice-Chancellor’s e-mail practice most Australian university councils announcement about the settlement, not a routinely rubber-stamp decisions by their single other person commented on the univer- senior executives. sity’s e-mail system. The union’s legal and The court challenge to the administration negotiation strategy defused outrage. utilized a set of procedures — the legal system Soon after the dismissal, union branch — and thus tended to dampen outrage. During presidents in New South Wales were keen to the long periods between court judgments, campaign on the grounds of defending intel- media and wider academic interest dwindled. lectual freedom. However, they were ham- Only when the court ruled in the union’s favor pered by reluctance within the Wollongong did interest pick up, but then only briefly. branch to support Steele’s intellectual free- However, the court challenge was also used for publicity purposes. For example, a protest was held outside the Federal Court on 5 July 14. Lisa Sewell, “Steele and Uni Reach Hush- 2001, the day the initial hearings began, with hush Settlement,” Illawarra Mercury, 6 July many participants wearing academic gowns. 2002, p. 3. The dampening effect of formal procedures 15. Patrick Lawnham, “Scientist Quits after was most obvious following the union’s Settling Uni Score,” Australian, 8 July 2002, second court victory, in March 2002, after p. 3.

62 Justice Ignited dom. To obtain a unified campaign, the lowest and VC Sutton is so drunk with power, common denominator thus became defending that the place behaves (to those outside the enterprise agreement, with the conse- the “Wollongong Loop”) much like a quences described here. If, instead, the prefer- tin-pot South American dictatorship in a ence of the branch presidents to highlight state of academic degradation meta- intellectual freedom had won the day, then the phorically akin to contemporary Russia/ union’s campaign might well have promoted a Eastern Europe/Cuba. much more powerful sense of outrage. In the United States, free speech issues are Although some academics were sympa- often argued in terms of the First Amendment, thetic to both the content and style of such with legal conflict taking the place of direct contributions, others were repelled. Steele’s engagement with the issues. Australia, in rude and aggressive style alienated many who contrast, has no constitutional protection of agreed with some of his points. Sometimes free speech, so free speech is more frequently individuals sent Steele personal e-mails defended by collectively organizing to oppose commenting on some current issue and were attacks on it. (Interestingly, there is no obvious surprised and disgruntled to find their message difference between the two countries’ overall copied to the entire campus accompanied by a levels of free speech.) In the case of free commentary by Steele. This discourteous speech by Australian academics, though, en- behavior did not win him many friends. terprise agreements offer some formal Steele was not on good terms with union protection. By providing an avenue for legal officers. On one occasion he used the campus- action to replace direct action, these agree- wide e-mail to criticize the union for not ments, like the First Amendment in the United supporting him on some matter; the branch States, may encourage tactics that dampen president, Mike Morrissey, rebutted Steele’s outrage. claims in an equally vitriolic e-mail (2 December 1998). Steele was observed to drive Steele and Backfire through the picket line during strikes and, although a union member most of the time The actions of individuals, including academic since joining the university in 1985, he was dissidents, can backfire against themselves. not a member for a couple of years not long Steele had a long history of making allega- before his dismissal. tions, especially against the university admini- By the time he was dismissed, Steele had stration. According to Steele, his own become notorious on campus for his combat- “vigorous and vituperative interchanges on the ive personal style. It should be said, though, e-mail” covered a range of topics, including that Steele was often quite pleasant, especially “space allocations, library cuts, unethical on a personal level. In many years of knowing colleagial [sic] behaviour, promotional barri- Ted as an acquaintance, I never had anything ers, executive obstacles on overseas/confer- other than agreeable face-to-face engagements ence travel, funding cuts, parking fines, with him. At one point I published a short senseless executive edicts on the pasting of article on plagiarism issues that favorably student notices, etc.” (e-mail, 23 February reported his position.16 However, a few years 1995). To take another example, in one of his after this I was one of a number of targets in attacks on “Mickey Mouse professors,” sent in some of his “vituperative” e-mails. a 22 December 2000 e-mail to all staff, Steele Many of Steele’s colleagues in Biological commented that Sciences had had unpleasant encounters with

The “Professor” title is so associated with derision that it would make that 16. Brian Martin, “Academic Credit Where great humanist of good will Walt Disney It’s Due,” Campus Review 7 (4–10 June 1997), turn in his grave. It has become so bad, 11. The dismissal of Ted Steele 63 him over the years, but these were episodic. dispute, Steele threatened to sue them should What eventually united them in opposition to he be damaged by decisions made at the Steele were his claims at the beginning of meeting. They felt vindicated by the 2001 about soft marking. Steele alleged the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Steele’s claims as marks of two of his own students had been not even warranting investigation. “upgraded.” The students in question were However, free speech means little unless it doing “honors,” something with no exact also applies to those who are disagreeable and equivalent in the U.S. academic system. who make unsustainable claims. Academic Traditionally, honors is an optional year of freedom is valueless unless it includes the study at the end of a normal three-year under- freedom to make provocative statements and graduate degree, typically involving course- to be wrong. That is why the dissent of a work and a thesis. Those who achieve a high person like Steele should be defended against enough honors mark can proceed to a PhD, attack. (The question then arises of how to possibly with a scholarship, and no further respond to those who make incorrect, coursework or examination is required aside misleading, derogatory, or damaging claims. from the PhD thesis. (In some newer degrees, This is a complex issue. One thing is to ensure honors is built into a four-year degree. A thesis the opportunity for others to reply openly and is still part of it.) In Biological Sciences, in a timely fashion to such claims.) At the honors results were calculated as a straight same time as defending Steele’s right to average of coursework marks and the mark on dissent, it is possible to observe that his the thesis, itself an average of the marks of approach often backfired — leading to less three examiners, two from Biological Sciences support rather than more — especially when itself and one external. he was perceived as being abusive, making Steele had supervised the theses of the two claims without solid foundation, or refusing to honors students in question, one in 1997 and accept correction. the other in 2000. He was reported in the There are a number of ways dissidents can newspaper as claiming he had been instructed reduce the risk that their interventions will to raise their marks. This didn’t make much backfire. sense, because Steele himself was not a marker of the students’ work. Furthermore, he was 1. Being polite acting chair of the department meeting in 1997 2. Couching comments constructively that decided the final marks of honors and 3. Acknowledging inaccuracy or its other students, and made no objection at the possibility time. 4. Joining others. Steele had a different way of viewing the process. He claimed that the mark by the Being polite, constructive, and acknowledg- single external thesis examiner — whom he ing fallibility are quite compatible with dissent chose and with whom he agreed — should of the most radical sort. There is no guarantee have been definitive and that any other result that behaving this way will protect against amounted to “upgrading.” However, to support attack, but it is certainly more likely to win this position would have been to reject the allies than being abusive, negative, and obsti- department’s formal procedures, yet Steele had nate. Joining others provides safety in num- made no objection to the procedures when bers, with individuals less likely to be attacked they were reviewed in 1999-2000. than if they are ahead of or outside the crowd. Steele’s colleagues knew of these contra- Collective action, whether or not sanctioned dictions in Steele’s position and so were angry by a union or industrial agreement, is usually when he made allegations of upgrading to the safer than individual action. But individual media. They were further aggrieved when, dissent is sometimes a felt necessity when prior to a special departmental meeting (17 others are afraid or unwilling to act, or when January 2001) to address the matters in

64 Justice Ignited they do not have the information or resources priate field and, implicitly referring to to do so. Blanden, that “External examiners (especially Steele did not consistently adopt any of those in very narrow research fields in these methods, so it is not surprising that his research only institutions) sometimes misjudge actions seriously backfired. After he was the level at which an Honours student is dismissed, he used a different method: he kept learning.” quiet. This avoided annoying his supporters or Adjudication of these and other points of disturbing the union’s legal and negotiation dispute is not essential to examining outrage. I strategy. Being quiet avoids generating outrage have outlined some points raised in Blanden’s but is hardly a general prescription for being declaration in order to suggest the sort of an effective dissident. procedural detail that can loom large to It is not my aim here to tell Steele or participants in disputes. Concentrating on pro- anyone else how they should behave. But it is cedural detail, though, is a sure way to dis- possible to observe that some behaviors are courage outside interest in an issue and to more effective than others in achieving par- dampen any sense of outrage. ticular purposes. Studying backfire dynamics can give insight into what sorts of behaviors Biological Sciences and Backfire are likely to be counterproductive. Steele and some of his supporters put great Members of the Department of Biological store in a statutory declaration by Bob Blanden Sciences for the most part supported or of the Australian National University. tolerated Steele for years. Some of them had Blanden, a senior immunologist and collabo- personal confrontations with Steele on occa- rator with Steele, was the external examiner sion, but no formal complaints were pursued for both the students whose marks Steele by university officials to the level of a formal claimed were upgraded. On 17 May 2002, inquiry, which, given Steele’s willingness to Steele widely circulated Blanden’s declaration. go to the media, would have brought much There are obvious gulfs between the perspec- negative publicity to the university. tive of Blanden and Steele and that of the In 2001, Steele’s claims about upgrading Department of Biological Sciences. For were a direct attack on the department. example, Blanden said he awarded a grade of Initially, these backfired against Steele to Third Class Honors to the student in 2000 but some extent, though the department’s reputa- did not assign a mark; Steele saw this as proof tion remained damaged, especially among that procedures had been violated. According those who lacked awareness of rebuttals to to the Department, a mark in the Third Class Steele’s claims. Then came the dismissal, Honors range was selected in the knowledge which backfired against the university gener- that the final grade (Second Class Honors, ally and, in the eyes of many, turned Steele Division One) would have been the same into a martyr. The department, which was not whichever mark in the range was used. consulted about the dismissal, could do little to Blanden said the 1997 student “should never resuscitate its reputation. Though Steele’s have been admitted to a Tertiary Course.” attacks had united department members in Obviously the student was admitted, and opposition to Steele and his claims, they indeed graduated. Blanden’s claim raises the lacked the skills and confidence to mount a question of why Steele agreed to supervise media campaign. But even if they had been such a student. Blanden said it was inappropri- prepared to go to the media, they had little ate “that the marks of two non-immunologists leverage. The line that “assessment procedures should be averaged with the mark of an were properly followed” is not a great story external expert in immunology” (himself). angle compared to “procedures were violated” Rob Whelan, then head of the Department of or “dissident is dismissed.” In short, there Biological Sciences, said the internal examin- were few resources by which the department ers were experienced researchers in an appro- The dismissal of Ted Steele 65 could generate or redirect outrage to its own • To activate or magnify outrage, academics advantage. need to counter these administration tactics. The lesson here is that backfires are contin- Possibilities include exposing hidden or gencies that cannot be created at will. A lot of disguised actions by documentation and groundwork is required, the conditions have to mobilization of support, creating opportu- be right, and the opportunity has to be present. nities to expose actions, and avoiding Steele’s dismissal backfired against the procedures or using them to mobilize administration because a commitment to free support. speech had been nurtured by the visible and invisible efforts of untold thousands over the Documentation is the foundation of any years. Furthermore, the NTEU felt obliged to such effort. “Mobilization of support” means defend the enterprise agreement at the Univer- getting support from people, including through sity of Wollongong because otherwise enter- conversations, meetings, leaflets, e-mails, prise agreements across the country — in media coverage, and many other channels. particular their procedures against arbitrary It should be remembered that outrage is not dismissal — would have been undermined. an end in itself, nor is it the only way to But none of this worked to the particular defend academic freedom. The point here is advantage of Biological Sciences. that it can be a powerful tool in defending dissident academics. The better prepared Using Backfires academics are to counter administration tactics, the less likely administrations are to In academia, administrations have much attack academic freedom in the first place. greater formal power than any faculty Backfires are not just a risk for administra- member, yet for the administration to openly tions. Dissidents can generate backfires against exercise the power of dismissal is to risk themselves by seeming to go beyond norms of triggering a large hostile reaction. Hence it is accuracy and decency. not surprising that various techniques are used The better the documentation and the to mitigate the response to dismissals. greater a community’s commitment to schol- This suggests it can be worthwhile looking arly norms, the greater the chance participants at other academic freedom cases using the will share perceptions. But even in the sober- same framework. Like most organizational est of organizations, there are considerable struggles, the Steele case is quite complex, and levels of deception. It is well known that indeed only some of the complications have organizational elites use public relations, spin- been canvassed here. Nonetheless, it is possi- doctoring, and cover-ups as a matter of course, ble to generalize from the Steele case. Here is with “truth” regularly subordinated to organi- a tentative outline of points to look for. zational imperatives. A totally honest organization would never hide or disguise actions • An attack on an academic can backfire or stonewall, but these are standard practice in when it seems unfair, seems to violate numerous dismissals. To the extent that academic freedom, or appears to be dispro- careerism, commercialism, and managerialism portionate to anything the academic has infect higher education, pressures exist to done, and when information about this is misrepresent what is really going on. This is communicated to significant audiences. not likely to change soon.

• Academic administrators are often aware, consciously or intuitively, of the potential for backfire. They can inhibit outrage in various ways, including by hiding actions, stonewalling, disguising actions, or following procedures.

66 Justice Ignited

Postscript extremely damaging effect the dismissal had on him. At the beginning of 2002, while the Steele After this initial response, I received no case was still before the court, I wrote an further personal communication from Steele. I article analyzing strategies of the administra- did obtain, though, an e-mail he sent a few tion, Steele, the union, and the Department of days later addressed to the editors of Biological Sciences. On 27 January I sent a Australian Universities’ Review. In it, he draft of the article to all the key players, claimed “there is much misrepresentation in indicating that I would be submitting the the article and facts that are incorrect” but did revised version to Australian Universities’ not specify any of the alleged misrepresenta- Review and inviting comment. This led to tions or inaccuracies. He then said “In normal diverse responses. The Vice-Chancellor circumstances I would vigorously rebut or replied saying he declined to comment because correct in public much of what Martin intends the matter was the subject of legal proceed- to publish — as I am a great believer in free ings. Members of Biological Sciences were speech and academic freedom. At present more forthcoming. Six of them responded, these freedoms do not exist in Australia and ranging from those who saw my treatment as Martin’s article damages me at a time when I reasonably balanced to one who saw it as cannot defend myself. In these circumstances I grossly biased in favor of Steele. Their would appreciate that the NTEU does not comments on specific points led me to make publish the article.” various minor changes. This attempt at blocking publication has I opened the article by comparing Steele’s characteristic features of suppression of dismissal to the dismissal of Professor Sydney dissent,18 notably that Steele neither provided Orr from the University of Tasmania in 1956, evidence nor contacted the author (me) but the most famous such case in Australian instead intervened at a higher level (the academic history.17 Ted Steele responded by e- editors). In exerting pressure to thwart mail in a preliminary fashion, saying “I don’t criticism, Steele’s attempt to block publication believe my case has any resemblance whatso- was reminiscent of his threats against ever to the Sydney Sparkes Orr case in colleagues in Biological Sciences. Steele’s Tasmania 50 years ago. Indeed what has intervention can be taken as an example of a happened to me, and the damage it has caused wider phenomenon: dissidents are not neces- me personally and professionally, has no sarily tolerant of others, including other dissi- precedent as far as I can see in any advanced dents. Nevertheless, I believe it is still vital to western democracy.” Contrary to Steele’s defend dissent, even of intolerant dissidents. claim, there are many cases where the damage I also sent the draft to both University of to challengers has been far more serious, Wollongong elected NTEU branch officers including physical assault — a shot fired into and to paid officers in the state and national Orr’s house narrowly missed killing him — offices of the union. Less than two weeks later but his response certainly reflected the I submitted a revised version to Australian Universities’ Review which, it is important to note, is published by the union at a national 17. W. H. C. Eddy, Orr (Brisbane: Jacaranda level. Australian Universities’ Review thus Press, 1961), and John Polya and Robert could be said to be a union journal, though it Solomon, Dreyfus in Australia (Australia: The authors, 1996), are supportive of Orr. Cassandra Pybus, Gross Moral Turpitude: The 18. Brian Martin, C. M. Ann Baker, Clyde Orr Case Reconsidered (Melbourne: William Manwell, and Cedric Pugh, eds., Intellectual Heinemann Australia, 1993), is highly critical Suppression: Australian Case Histories, of Orr and supportive of the University of Analysis and Responses (Sydney: Angus & Tasmania administration. Robertson, 1986). The dismissal of Ted Steele 67 has an independent editorial board. I chose this article much earlier.21 Finally, concerning the journal because of its circulation to union worry about my analysis being in a union members nationally. journal, it would be a simple matter to include I received no response from any union a disclaimer that I was not speaking on behalf officers. I did hear from the chair of the of the union. (The published article included editorial board, David Burchell, who told me such a disclaimer.) most members of the board were keen to The response by certain senior union publish the article. However, there were two officers to my article has characteristic obstacles to publishing the article, both raised features of suppression of dissent, notably that by senior officers within the union. The first those objecting did not contact me but instead obstacle was a concern about defamation. intervened at a higher level, namely by putting Defamation law in Australia is harsh and leads pressure on the editorial board. This response to both censorship and self-censorship.19 is compatible with a generalization that Union figures were worried about Steele suing academic unions and staff associations are the union over my article. uncertain allies of free speech.22 Union offi- (When my article was eventually pub- cers were putting in enormous efforts to lished,20 the following sentences were omitted defend the enterprise agreement and, by exten- on the insistence of NTEU’s legal advisers: sion, academic freedom across the country, but “Indeed, because Steele so often made allega- at the same time attempting to block my tions without first checking the facts, and article. This can be explained by the priority because of his inflammatory style, he had lost they placed on the procedural route, namely credibility in the eyes of many on campus. defending the enterprise agreement through Within Biological Sciences, some colleagues the courts and negotiations, rather than the were outraged by his behaviour on a number mobilization route, namely building greater of issues, not all of which were known more support through participation and publicity. widely.”) Taking the procedural route implies that The second obstacle to publishing my anything that might potentially disturb the article was that certain senior officers (outside union’s legal and negotiation strategy was to Wollongong) thought it might be prejudicial to be brushed aside, including my article. The the union’s court case involving Steele, for irony is that my article highlighted the rhetori- example if some of my comments about Steele cal role of academic freedom. In seeking to were used against the union in the case. My block my article, these particular union offi- view, naturally enough, was different. I cers were in effect disagreeing with my thought publicity would be advantageous to analysis, instead asserting the primacy of using the union’s position. I also thought it would be formal channels. Using formal channels gives better to present Steele warts and all and then those with power and position more control to defend his academic freedom. The worry over the course of events but does little to about material in my article being used in the empower the rank and file. court case seemed artificial, since I had I am a long-time member and supporter of covered the same basic points in a newspaper the union, but that does not mean I have to keep quiet about what I see as inappropriate action. There are many dilemmas of defending dissent, not the least of which is knowing what 19. Robert Pullan, Guilty Secrets: Free Speech to do when erstwhile defenders of dissent — and Defamation in Australia (Sydney: Pascal Press, 1994). 20. Brian Martin, “Dilemmas of Defending 21. Brian Martin, “When Dollars Do All the Dissent: The Dismissal of Ted Steele from the Talking,” Australian, 18 April 2001, p. 35. University of Wollongong,” Australian Uni- 22. Martin et al., Intellectual Suppression, versities’ Review 45, no. 2 (2002): 7–17. 246–47.

68 Justice Ignited union officers in this case — attempt to suppress comment. Due to the settlement of the case, it was possible for my article to be published.23 But if the case had not been resolved in a timely fashion, I like to imagine the editorial board would have successfully stood up to censorship pressure from within the union.

Acknowledgements David Ayre, David Burchell, Josie Castle, Mike Donaldson, Don Eldridge, Truda Gray, Michiel Horn, Tony Hulbert, Sue Curry Jansen, Sharon Robinson, Paul Rodan, Wendy Russell, John Schuster, Greg Scott, Ted Steele, Mark Walker, Rob Whelan, and several anonymous reviewers, among others, have given me useful comments on my writings on the Steele case, though of course this does not imply they agree with my treatment of the issues. This chapter is adapted from an article published in Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005.

23. Martin, “Dilemmas of Defending Dissent.” Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 8 (author’s prepublication version)

8 Environmental disasters by Hannah Lendon and Brian Martin

Major nuclear reactor accidents and oil spills the result of rash copycat behavior by police in are disasters for both humans and the envi- a tense situation. Likewise, the police who ronment. With such disasters, attention usually beat Rodney King did so at the conclusion of a is focused on the environmental impacts. But furious police chase, known to pump up there is another sort of impact — on public adrenaline and increase the risk of abuses. opinion. Outrage is a common reaction. Some Generally speaking, only some assaults — people see accidents as due to blind fate, but such as torture — are coldly calculated; others others hold corporations or governments are partly inadvertent, occurring in circum- responsible, or even entire technological stances that make them possible or even likely. systems. “Environmental backfire” — when Environmental backfires can be seen in this outrage from environmental disasters is di- way: they are inadvertent, in that no one rected at industries, governments, or techno- intended them, but underlying conditions logical systems — offers an opportunity for make them possible or even likely. the promotion of environmental causes. To examine environmental backfire, we In the cases described in previous chapters, look at two famous accidents: the Chernobyl the targets attacked were humans, whether nuclear accident and the Exxon Valdez oil described as protesters, citizens, or employees. spill. Both show evidence of the common Environmental backfire is quite different: the methods of inhibiting outrage. We conclude by assault is on the environment, though humans noting some implications, both for environ- may be affected too. Another big difference is mentalists to prepare for and deter future that there seems to be no human intent behind disasters and for managers who feel their accidents: in other words, the environment was organizations have been unfairly blamed. not targeted for attack. Nevertheless, although Disasters can serve as catalysts for strength- an accident may be entirely inadvertent, if it ening environmental consciousness and lead- has serious environmental or other effects, it ing to greater protection for the environment. can have adverse consequences for whoever or whatever is perceived as responsible. Although Chernobyl accidents are not intentional, many of the preconditions for accidents — technological On 26 April 1986, a chemical explosion in a design, maintenance systems, work schedules, nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in the Soviet adherence to rules — are the direct result of Union dispersed radioactive pollution over a human decisions. So it is quite possible to vast area, exposing thousands of people to attribute blame. The result is that the dynamics dangerous levels of radiation. of environmental disasters fit the backfire A nuclear accident, like Chernobyl, can framework. harm the environment as well as the local On closer inspection, it is not so obvious population. An event such as this is likely to that assaults that backfired were always be perceived as unjust because both the intended. The Sharpeville shootings, according environment and the people are seen as to Frankel’s account as given in chapter 2, innocent victims. Therefore, the accident can were not a pre-planned massacre, but rather backfire against whoever or whatever is seen

70 Justice Ignited as responsible: the operators, the managers, the the radiation on the local population and designers, the industry, or the form of tech- ecology were not revealed. Local people were nology itself. not given realistic information about dangers, Chernobyl was the most prominent nuclear leading to rumors. Few statistics were kept accident in history, triggering a tremendous about health impacts and ecological damage. reaction against nuclear power. It is easy to Foreign scientists were not allowed entry to find evidence of major efforts to minimize this the region except under carefully controlled antagonism to nuclear power, because of the conditions.4 extensive documentation about this accident. For the purposes of devaluation, the There is plenty of evidence of cover-up. “target” included both the people and the Indeed, it was the most characteristic feature environment affected by radioactive pollution. of the Soviet nuclear enterprise, which was There is little evidence of official statements tightly controlled by the Soviet government. casting aspersions on the people or the envi- There had been dozens of serious accidents ronment, but the actions of the government within the Soviet Union prior to Chernobyl, reflected devaluation in practice. Some local yet the government had not permitted any communities were evacuated; others were not. public information about a single one.1 In Party officials and their families were evacu- 1957 there was a chain reaction in a military ated quickly, but school children were nuclear waste dump at Chelyabinsk, contami- removed from the special zone only later. nating a huge area with radioactivity and Rather than fully informing the population, the killing hundreds of people, but there was no government kept people ignorant and treated announcement. This event was also denied by them patronizingly, thus devaluing their good Western authorities.2 sense. Following the Chernobyl accident, the Large numbers of workers were used in government made no public statements; sealing the damaged reactor, in the process President Gorbachev’s new policy of glasnost receiving significant doses of radiation. They had not taken hold in the nuclear industry.3 By were hailed as heroes at the time. Later, when chance, winds blew radioactivity from many of them reported illnesses, these were Chernobyl towards Western Europe, where it dismissed as unrelated to radiation.5 Thus, was first registered in Sweden. Western both the health consequences and personal evidence and reports forced the Soviet gov- understanding of these workers were devalued. ernment to make its own announcement. This There were several ways to interpret the was followed by an apparent new-found responsibility for and significance of the openness about the causes of the accident. But Chernobyl accident. The Soviet government other cover-ups continued. The full effects of promoted the view that workers at the unit caused the accident by carrying out un- authorized tests of safety measures. This view 1. Zhores A. Medvedev, The Legacy of was presented by Soviet officials to the August Chernobyl (New York: Norton, 1990), 263– 88. 4. David R. Marples, The Social Impact of the 2. Zhores A. Medvedev, Nuclear Disaster in Chernobyl Disaster (New York: St. Martin’s the Urals (New York: Norton, 1979). Press, 1988); Grigori Medvedev, The Truth 3. In a retrospective assessment, Mikhail about Chernobyl (New York: BasicBooks, Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Disaster that 1991); Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl; Alla Opened Our Eyes to the Truth,” The Yaroshinskaya, Chernobyl: The Forbidden Australian, 19 April 2006, p. 12, claims there Truth (Oxford: Jon Carpenter, 1994). was no cover-up, but that the Politburo simply 5. V. M. Chernousenko, Chernobyl: Insight did not have sufficient information to under- from the Inside (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, stand what was happening. 1991), 46. Environmental disasters 71

1986 meeting of the International Atomic public anxiety; exonerate the real culprits; Energy Agency. The IAEA, well known for its minimize expenses.”7 Critics would say the promotion of nuclear power, accepted this main purpose of official statements and explanation without much question. For official programs was to give the appearance nuclear power promoters, blaming the workers but not the substance of properly dealing with was better than blaming the technology. the problem. Indeed, the Soviet government was praised for Another use of official channels was the being so open at the IAEA meeting about the July 1987 trial of plant officials held in the causes of the accident. town of Chernobyl. This use of the court gave An alternative view was that the key to the a legal stamp of approval to the authorities’ accident was the Soviet RBMK reactor design, interpretation of events, namely blaming which critics said had serious deficiencies: it individuals rather than the reactor design or was not designed to be failsafe in the face of the Communist Party elite. Foreign journalists operator mistakes. By this interpretation, those were permitted to attend only the opening and who designed and approved RBMK reactors closing days of the trial, being banned from should have been held responsible. the rest of its three weeks, during which many The Soviet government attributed much of revelations about the accident occurred.8 The the criticism over the accident to anticom- trial of plant officials thus played multiple munism. On 14 May 1986, Gorbachev, in a roles: it was an official channel giving a major televised statement about the accident, formal endorsement of the dominant interpre- claimed the Soviet Union had faced “a tation, combined with cover-up of more veritable mountain of lies — most dishonest damaging information. and malicious lies” from Western politicians Finally, intimidation played a role in who intended “to sow new seeds of mistrust reducing the expression of concern. The and suspicion towards the socialist countries.”6 secrecy about previous accidents, and the The use of official channels was most failure to learn from them, can be attributed to apparent in the role of experts in making the climate of fear in the Soviet Union, in pronouncements about the accident. Soon after which voicing criticism could be met by the accident, groups of Soviet experts were serious reprisals. For example, Dr Ivan flown to the site to make assessments. In Zhezherun, long before the accident, pointed August, when Soviet officials reported to the out design defects of the RBMK, but couldn’t IAEA about the accident, this provided an go to the media because of the likely conse- account taken by most western nuclear experts quences.9 After the accident, journalist Alla to be authoritative. Western media coverage Yaroshinskaya investigated health conse- also was influenced by the Soviet official line. quences of the accident and came under attack The government set up the “Chernobyl after having articles published in news- Rectification Program” to undertake decon- papers.10 tamination, resettlement, food provision, and In earlier Soviet nuclear accidents, gov- other work to deal with the ongoing human ernment efforts to inhibit anger and concern and environmental impacts of the accident. had been largely successful. The outside According to a Soviet scientist intimately detection of radiation helped the Chernobyl involved in the aftermath of the accident, “The disaster break through the usual Soviet pro- Program’s purpose seems to be only to: soothe

7. Chernousenko, Chernobyl, 263. 6. Mikhail Gorbachev, “Television Address by 8. Marples, Social Impact of the Chernobyl Mikhail Gorbachev, 14 May 1986, Moscow,” Disaster, 118–24. in Chernobyl: The Real Story, ed. Richard F. Mould (Oxford: Pergamon, 1988), 195–201, at 9. Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 259. 198. 10. Yaroshinskaya, Chernobyl, 45.

72 Justice Ignited cesses of censorship, disinformation, and Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. intimidation, contributing to worldwide Eight of its 11 cargo tanks were ruptured, criticism of nuclear power. causing over 10 million gallons of crude oil to be spilled. At the time, Captain Joseph Exxon Valdez Hazelwood was in his cabin, quite possibly under the influence of alcohol, and the ship Since the 1960s, there have been numerous oil was being navigated by third mate Gregory spills, with millions of gallons of oil escaping Cousins. into the sea. Yet only a few of these spills have Before retiring, Hazelwood directed the generated massive publicity. Among the ship to travel in inbound shipping lanes and prominent accidents, named after the ships had the ship’s autopilot speed increased to the involved, are the Torrey Canyon spill of 36 maximum. Cousins, who was fatigued, did not million gallons off southwest England in 1967, respond to several indications the ship was off the Amoco Cadiz spill of 67 million gallons off course. When he finally realized the problem, France in 1978, and the Prestige spill of 23 it was too late to avoid grounding on the million gallons off Spain in 2002. However, reef.14 some of the largest spills generated little media Immediate cleanup efforts were plagued by coverage or public outcry. During the 1991 terrible weather, insufficient resources, and Gulf war, over 250 million gallons of crude oil poor safety procedures. The environmental and were spilled in the Persian Gulf, with minimal legal repercussions of the spill continue today attention or public response.11 and remain controversial. Also receiving little attention are slow Alyeska, the consortium of oil companies spills, such as the Guadalupe Dunes spill in that managed the Valdez terminal and the California that released 8 to 20 million gallons Trans-Alaska Pipeline, was not well prepared over four decades. Because there is no sudden for such a large accident. Its cleanup equip- crisis, such spills often evade scrutiny even ment was inadequate, with many of its booms when the long-term damage is huge.12 buried in snow. Soon after the accident, Of all spills, the Exxon Valdez is most well Alyeska put the responsibility for the spill onto known. Because it occurred in what was seen Exxon. Other oil companies with Alaska as a pristine Alaskan ecosystem, the spill operations tried to avoid criticism by keeping a generated huge international media coverage low profile. and mobilized support for the protection of the The reaction against Exxon was enormous. environment.13 For example, eight weeks after the spill: Just after midnight on 24 March 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on At the annual shareholders’ meeting on May 18, [Exxon CEO Lawrence] Rawl faced a firestorm of criticism from both 11. Abelard News Archives, “Oil 1–2.” shareholders and the general public. Thou- http://www.abelard.org/news/archive-oil1- sands of people across the country had 2.htm#spills (accessed 27 June 2006). already cut up their Exxon credit cards and mailed the pieces to Rawl. Crowds of 12. See Thomas D. Beamish, Silent Spill: The protesters marched in the streets outside the Organization of an Industrial Crisis meeting. Some stockholders wanted an (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) for an environmentalist on the board, while others insightful analysis of how the Guadalupe spill has evaded attention. We thank Kevin Wehr for referring us to this book. 14. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and Maurie 13. John Keeble, Out of the Channel: The S. Cohen, eds., The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Readings on a Modern Social Problem Sound (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). (Dubuque, IA: Kendall-Hunt, 1997). Environmental disasters 73

demanded the resignation of top manage- Exxon said 1,300 miles of coastline had ment. Pension fund representatives holding been oiled by the spill. In contrast, the large amounts of Exxon stock made it clear National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini- that they would be watching Exxon’s stration reported 3,240 miles had been oiled. cleanup performance.15 According to court records of lawsuits filed by sick workers, Exxon’s cleanup led to There were dozens of legal cases targeted at sickness among approximately 6,700 of its Exxon. In the 1991 legal settlement, Exxon 11,000 workers. Exxon did not report these was fined $150 million for an environmental cases to state and federal agencies, thereby crime, paid $100 million for injuries to fish, avoiding requirements to monitor the long- wildlife, and lands, and agreed to pay $900 term health consequences of hazardous waste million over a decade as civil settlement to cleanups.18 These examples of discrepancies in restore resources harmed by the spill.16 Exxon figures about oil spilled, coastline oiled, and said it spent $2.1 billion as a result of the spill. workers made sick can be attributed to cover- The media outcry and public support for the up by Exxon or to a genuine divergence of environment after the disaster created a situa- views, in which case they fit into the reinter- tion in which Exxon’s efforts to inhibit outrage pretation method of inhibition. were not very successful in the face of a local In the first few weeks, Exxon paid for wild- and wider community of environmentally life rescue boats that reported on the number conscious individuals. Still, there is evidence of dead birds and mammals observed. But then of Exxon’s use of several inhibition methods. Exxon cut back on the operation: fewer boats First, cover-up: Exxon claimed 11 million meant fewer reported wildlife fatalities.19 In gallons of crude oil were spilled when the ship effect, by not collecting data, the full effects of ran aground, and this is the figure normally the spill were covered up. quoted. However, the Alaskan government, in For the purposes of devaluation, one poten- an unpublished investigation, found the actual tial “target” is the environment itself. This figure was roughly 35 million gallons, a figure might work with some environmental issues, three times as great. After the spill, other such as a proposal for a waste dump in an area Exxon vessels removed most of the remaining already polluted by toxic chemicals: degraded oil from the Exxon Valdez. Exxon claimed all areas are commonly seen as less worthy of the salvaged liquid was oil, but ballast water protection. But this was far from the case for survey forms showed about 24 million gallons the unspoiled areas polluted by Exxon Valdez of the salvaged liquid was water, implying an oil. Many communities, from Anchorage to additional 24 million gallons of oil — besides Cordova, maintain strong environmental the 11 million admitted by Exxon — was values; national park and heritage sites cover spilled.17 thousands of miles of coastline. Therefore it would have been futile, and probably counterproductive, for Exxon to attempt to devalue 15. Art Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon the environment. Instead their devaluation Valdez: The Devastating Impact of the Alaska attempts were targeted towards Captain Oil Spill (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, Hazelwood (as discussed below) and the 1990), 205. validity of scientific research that deviated from Exxon’s own claims. 16. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, The third method of inhibition is reinterpre- The Court Settlement. http://www.evostc.state. tation. The accident received such immediate ak.us/History/settlement.htm (accessed 27 June 2006). 17. Riki Ott, “Why Exxon Owes Alaska $5 18. Ibid. Billion,” Anchorage Daily News, 25 June 19. Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon 2002. Valdez, 208–9.

74 Justice Ignited news coverage that Exxon could hardly deny a failure to comply with regulations? Or should major accident had occurred. The main con- the Alaskan government have been held troversy lay not in what happened but who responsible for approving oil development but was to blame: Captain Hazelwood, Exxon, not enforcing its own regulations?23 Alyeska, or the oil industry generally? A deeper challenge to the oil industry is to Captain Hazelwood was Exxon and question the feasibility of oil cleanups even Alyeska’s favorite scapegoat. He had a long with the best possible protection. According to record of alcohol intoxication, and had had his risk analyst Lee Clarke, when organizations car driver’s license repeatedly suspended for create plans to handle disasters such as nuclear drunk driving. Nine hours after the accident, reactor accidents and massive oil spills, they Hazelwood had a blood alcohol test, indicating can sometimes reassure the public but actually his alcohol level could have been extremely they are producing “fantasy documents” that high at the time of the accident.20 Exxon CEO obscure dangers and give a false sense of Rawl portrayed Hazelwood’s drunkenness as security. Experiments in trying to recover the crux of the problem and strongly disasso- spilled oil show it is not feasible in practice, so ciated Exxon from “the captain … this man” contingency plans are largely symbolic rather who was unable to deal with his alcoholism.21 than practical.24 On the other hand, Exxon could be blamed for Exxon maintains the spill has had no not addressing known alcohol abuse. adverse long-term environmental impacts. In There is another perspective: it was normal 1993, it claimed that, “Biological recovery of for captains to leave the ship’s bridge after affected species has been rapid and in most leaving the sound, and third mate Cousins was cases is nearly complete.” A government well qualified, so it may be unfair to blame official from the National Oceanic and Hazelwood. It can be argued Cousins’s sleep Atmospheric Administration said Exxon had debt was the prime cause of the accident.22 put up a “smokescreen” and that Exxon’s Or perhaps the problems were more deep- assertions made no “difference in the big rooted. The magnitude of the cleanup totally picture in regards to damage.”25 A study by a overwhelmed the mechanical capabilities of team of researchers published in the journal the Valdez terminal and its vessels. Alyeska Science in 2003 found the long-term impacts and Exxon’s lack of emergency preparation of the spill on wildlife were greater than led to delays in obtaining permission to apply expected, and therefore it should not be chemical dispersants to the oil. Alyeska and assumed the main effects were the immediate Exxon both downplayed their ongoing failure ones.26 to meet the annual safety requirements of the Alaskan Department of Environmental Con- servation. Should Alyeska have been held 23. Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon primarily accountable due to its decade-long Valdez, 79–98. 24. Lee Clarke, Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster 20. Ibid., 64–70. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 21. Edmund Faltermayer, Alex Taylor, III, and See also Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Marshall Loeb, “In Ten Years You’ll See Valdez, 297–301, who says the oil industry Nothing” (interview with Exxon CEO and government officials must have known Lawrence Rawl about the Valdez oil spill), that plans to recover spilled oil were Fortune, 8 May 1989, pp. 50–53. unrealistic. 22. William C. Dement and Christopher 25. “Exxon Valdez Controversy Revived,” Oil Vaughan, The Promise of Sleep (New York: and Gas Journal, 26 April 1993, pp. 26–27. Dell, 2000), 51–53. We thank Kevin Wehr for 26. Charles H. Peterson, et al., “Long-Term pointing out this reference. Ecosystem Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Environmental disasters 75

In summary, Exxon reinterpreted events by is neither toxic nor harmful.”29 In contrast, blaming the captain and by playing down the scientists not funded by Exxon reported that scale of the disaster, the company’s lack of pockets of crude oil had the potential to preparation, and the long-term environmental disperse toxic chemicals into the food chain, effects. causing long-term damage.30 Several official channels were involved. On 7 April 1989, President George Bush Sr. Exxon tried to give the impression justice was reportedly exempted Exxon from some being carried out by dealing with the spill cleanup requirements. He put the Coast Guard through the courts, scientific research, and the in charge, and promised to send troops to federal government. Prince William Sound.31 Exxon managed and The legal aftermath of the Exxon case paid for the cleanup and supplied equipment extended well over a decade. Federal and state while the Coast Guard made final decisions governments settled their criminal and civil and approved and monitored the plans. cases against Exxon in 1991, but private legal Although there was no evidence from histori- cases were still proceeding in 2004.27 But is cally declared national disasters to suggest moral or social justice achieved through these federal intervention would improve the effec- legal channels, which focus on financial tiveness of the response,32 the fact that the compensation? The legal agenda does not Coast Guard was making the final decisions include any radical change in the regulation of gave the impression that appropriate action Exxon’s transportation of oil, Alyeska’s was being carried out and the situation was operations, or the oil industry as a whole. being dealt with professionally. Exxon, using a multi-million dollar budget, Cases of intimidation and bribery in the contracted science advisors to monitor and corporate sphere are often difficult to verify report on damage from the spill. As part of publicly as there is usually such an imbalance this, Exxon flew three British scientists, of power and influence that individuals are known to be skeptical about oil-spill ecologi- afraid to speak out. There have been claims cal damage, to Valdez. (At an Institute of Exxon harassed and fired whistleblowers who Petroleum seminar, Otto Harrison of Exxon had access to compromising information at the said a scientific message was more credible to time of the early court cases.33 Investigative the U.S. public when spoken in a British journalist Greg Palast claims the oil industry accent.28) Exxon said it had chosen these used dirty tricks against individuals who scientists to provide impartial findings from warned, before the oil spill, of shortcomings in the field. One of the scientists wrote that, “The containment systems. For example, in 1984, effects of the cleanup, coupled with the Captain James Woodle, Alyeska’s commander scouring action of winter storms, left the of Port Valdez, warned of weaknesses in shoreline largely free of oil by the spring of 1990. … There is evidence that remaining oil 29. Robert Clark, “Recovery: The Untold Story of Valdez Spill,” Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy (Winter 1991): 24–26, at 25.

Spill,” Science 302 (19 December 2003): 30. CTV, “Contamination From Exxon Valdez 2082–86. Still a Problem,” 19 December 2003. 27. Ashley Shelby, “Whatever It Takes: Exxon 31. Keeble, Out of the Channel, 51. Has Used the Legal System to Avoid Paying 32. Ibid., 95. Damages for the Valdez Spill,” The Nation 33. Cecilia Hunter, “Lasting Lessons,” Living 278 (5 April 2004): 16–23. on Earth (5 March 1999). http://www.loe.org/ 28. Corporate Watch, “Degrees of Involve- series/exxon/lessons.htm (accessed 27 June ment,” Magazine Issue 8 (Spring 1999). 2006).

76 Justice Ignited cleanup equipment and training, and pointed misery,” causing her much “emotional dis- out an earlier oil spill in Valdez. Palast reports tress.”36 that, This case reveals that a multi-billion dollar oil company, Exxon, was unable to inhibit When he prepared to report it to the backfire from its catastrophic oil spill in government, his supervisor forced him to Alaska. This shows that accidents offer take back the notice, with the Orwellian opportunities to rally support against the ac- command, “You made a mistake. This tivities of large companies. As a consequence was not an oil spill.” … When Alyeska of the disaster, tougher tanker regulations were got wind of Woodle’s complaints, they put in place. Thomas A. Birkland, who has responded by showing Woodle a file of studied the policy consequences of the spill, his marital infidelities (all bogus), then says it “was the event that tipped the balance offered him pay-outs on condition that in favor of more stringent oil spill legisla- he leave the state within days, promising tion.”37 The U.S. Coast Guard now uses satel- never to return.34 lite monitoring in Prince William Sound, two vessels are required to escort tankers through Also in 1984, according to Palast, Charles the Sound, pilots are trained specifically for Hamel, an “independent oil shipper,” learned this region of Alaska, all vessels in the Sound from Alyeska employees of problems in will be required to be double-hulled by 2015, Valdez and flew to London to warn British and safety equipment is monitored regularly.38 Petroleum executives. Many grassroots organizations, environmental monitoring bodies, and protection services … a secret campaign was launched to emerged after the Exxon Valdez disaster. Ar- hound him out of the industry. A CIA guably, the high profile of the accident made it expert was hired who wiretapped more difficult to promote oil exploration in Hamel’s phone lines. They smuggled Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.39 microphones into his home, intercepted So outcomes of the disaster included both new his mail and tried to entrap him with opportunities for environmentalists and new young women. The industrial espionage guidelines for organizations. caper was personally ordered and controlled by BP executive James Hermiller, president of Alyeska. On this caper, they were caught. A US federal judge told Alyeska this conduct was “reminiscent 36. David Ridenour, “Jury Tampering in of Nazi Germany.”35 Exxon Valdez Trial Pollutes America’s System of Justice,” National Policy Analysis 232 Intimidation can happen from both sides. The (February 1999). only juror to oppose the decision to charge 37. Thomas A. Birkland, “In the Wake of the Exxon $5 billion in punitive damages was Rita Exxon Valdez: How Environmental Disasters Wilson. A pro-environmentalist security offi- Influence Policy,” Environment 40 (September cer, at the time of the court decision, allegedly 1998): 4–9, 27–32, at 27. pulled his gun out to “put her out of her 38. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Preparing for the Next Spill. http://www. evostc.state.ak.us/Habitat/improvements.htm (accessed 27 June 2006). Of course it is possible that some of these measures may be 34. Greg Palast, The Best Democracy Money more symbolic than substantive. Can Buy (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 101–2. 39. Birkland, “In the Wake of the Exxon 35. Ibid., 102. Valdez,” 29. Environmental disasters 77

Conclusion Exxon Valdez, where Exxon apparently did not attempt to challenge environmental values. Environmental disasters can backfire against For both environmentalists and organiza- industry and government, sometimes spec- tions, clearly it is best to avoid disasters tacularly as in the cases of Chernobyl and the altogether, though accidents will always be a Exxon Valdez. But these are the exceptions. possibility in many technological fields such Dozens of nuclear reactor accidents have as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, large occurred that have received little, if any, dams, and nuclear weapons. But when disas- publicity, such as the 1957 Fermi reactor ters do occur, backfire analysis gives insight meltdown near Detroit.40 At that time, the anti- into how to wage the struggle over responses. nuclear-power movement was virtually non- Our case studies reveal the various ways in existent, so there was less prospect for turning which organizations — namely the Soviet the accident against the budding nuclear government and Exxon — attempted to inhibit industry. The movement, once it developed, outrage. promoted new ways of understanding nuclear Backfire analysis can also give guidance to power, for example as a runaway technology environmentalists wishing to prepare to use or one that escaped public accountability. such disasters to promote better policies and These frameworks for thinking about nuclear practice. To counter cover-up, strong links power, or in other words “interpretive pack- should be built with investigative journalists, ages,” offered alternatives to the previously sympathetic editors, and workers on all levels dominant framework of nuclear power as from production to management, in order to progress and allowed members of the public to reveal the full story. Alternative media are understand nuclear accidents in different vital when the mass media underplay the ways.41 The important point here is that raising issues. environmental consciousness increases the Devaluing the target can reduce concern. likelihood an accident will backfire, which in Environmentalists can emphasize the value of turn further stimulates environmental aware- all environments and all peoples, not just ones ness and action. that are fashionable or highlighted in western Similarly to nuclear reactor accidents, news. dozens of oil spills have occurred, such as the Reinterpretation of events is the most massive 1991 release in the Persian Gulf, only common method used to inhibit outrage once a few of which generated widespread concern. cover-up has failed. Governments and industry Timing and location are crucially important, as typically try to minimize concern by saying an well as environmental constituencies. accident was an isolated occurrence and by As discussed above, rhetoric and action by blaming individuals rather than top officials, industry and government can reduce outrage organizations, or the entire technological through the usual five methods. As envi- enterprise. Environmentalists should draw ronmental consciousness becomes more wide- connections between the disaster and the wider spread, it becomes harder to use these web of responsibility. mechanisms, as shown in the case of the For environmentalists, it is tempting to respond by calling on counter experts and making submissions to investigations or court cases. This is sometimes effective, but it does 40. John G. Fuller, We Almost Lost Detroit. reduce popular concern by transferring the (New York: Ballantine, 1976). struggle to specialist and legal forums, which 41. William A. Gamson and Andre are slow and technical, and where powerful Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public interests have an advantage. Therefore, Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist environmentalists should carefully consider Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95 the risks of heavy involvement in expert and (July 1989): 1–37. legal struggles. A public campaign promoting

78 Justice Ignited awareness and indignation about envi- Acknowledgements ronmental damage may be more likely to We thank Phil Collier, Truda Gray, David foster greater participation in activism and to Hess, Colin Lendon, Chris Moore, Greg Scott, change policies and practices. Gareth Smith, and Kevin Wehr for valuable Finally, exposure is a powerful antidote to comments on drafts of material in this chapter. intimidation and bribery, because people are often angered by the abuse of power. In summary, protesters can promote outrage by exposing what has happened, insisting on the worthiness of targets, giving their own interpretation, avoiding or discrediting official channels, and refusing to be intimidated. Thomas Birkland says that, “Groups would do well to seize on such events and use them not to distort facts or policy but to promote more responsible and responsive environmental policies.”42 But what about the other side? Sometimes governments and corporations are blamed for activities in a way that is unfair in their own eyes and in the view of some observers. What implications for such groups can be drawn from backfire analysis? For organizations, it is risky to use methods perceived as constituting cover-up, devaluation, intimidation, or bribery. Each of these is seen by some people as discreditable in itself. Therefore, when these methods are exposed, they can increase opposition. The safest methods are reinterpretation — the honest presentation of one’s own view — and use of official channels, if they are genuinely independent and fair and seen to be so. Taking this course maximizes the possibility that attacks by environmentalists will themselves be seen as unfair and backfire against the environmentalists.43

42. Birkland, “In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez,” 32. 43. For comprehensive and engaging advice for companies along these lines, see Peter M. Sandman, Responding to Community Outrage: Strategies for Effective Risk Communication (Fairfax, VA: American Industrial Hygiene Association, 1993). Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 9 (author’s prepublication version)

9 The invasion of Iraq

On 19 March 2003, U.S. military forces, and significantly weakened global public supported by forces from Britain and a few support for the pillars of the post-World other countries, invaded Iraq and soon War II era — the U.N. and the North overwhelmed Iraqi military resistance. The Atlantic alliance.1 U.S. government had spent months pushing its case for the operation, arguing that the Iraqi A note on terminology: because the initial regime had, or was trying to obtain, weapons military conflict was so one-sided, I seldom of mass destruction (WMD), especially refer to the invasion of Iraq as a “war.” In nuclear weapons, and implying it had links western media reports, the attackers were with the terrorist group al Qaeda. There had conventionally called “the coalition.” Here I been popular opposition to the invasion in usually refer to the “U.S. government” because numerous countries, including in the United it was the prime mover, with the British States itself. government playing second fiddle; other mili- In the months following 19 March, the tary contingents, such as from Australia and occupying forces were met by a guerrilla Poland, were token and mostly unremarked. I resistance. As U.S. soldiers died, George W. avoid referring to “the United States” as an Bush’s promise of a glorious transition to actor — as in “the United States said” or “the democracy faded. Meanwhile, the search for United States attacked” — because it doesn’t Iraqi WMD came up with a blank, undercut- distinguish between the government and the ting the primary justification for the attack. people. But even to refer to the U.S. govern- These were signs the Iraq operation might be ment as the attacker is misleading, because a going wrong for the U.S. administration. But small group within the government made the signs of backfire had been apparent for a long key decisions. time. In examining the Iraq case, I look at the Prior to the invasion, protest rallies at- five principal ways the attackers tried to tracted huge numbers of people, with the inhibit outrage and how opponents attempted largest single-day numbers in history — some to express it. There is such a wealth of material ten million people across the world — on 15 on the events that only a few of many possible February, including large numbers of people examples can be presented here. I concentrate who had never joined a rally before. Public on the events leading up to the invasion. I opinion in most countries was strongly against the attack. Many governments opposed it, most prominently several key members of the 1. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a UN Security Council. Interviews in 20 Changing World (Washington, DC: Pew countries in May 2003 revealed that, Research Center for the People and the Press, June 2003), 1. Similar findings were reported in most countries, opinions of the United the following year: Pew Global Attitudes States are markedly lower than they were a Project, A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of year ago. The war has widened the rift America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim between Americans and Western Europe- Anger Persists (Washington, DC: Pew ans, further inflamed the Muslim world, Research Center for the People and the Press, softened support for the war on terrorism, 16 March 2004).

80 Justice Ignited examine only backfire dynamics associated supported military operations in Vietnam was with the attack on Iraq; terrorist acts by the limited.2 Iraqi resistance, such as beheadings, can also However, there was no prospect of covering be analyzed in backfire terms. Wars are filled up the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Throughout with so many atrocities that they are a rich 2002, long in advance of the actual assault, the source of material on backfire. U.S. government increasingly signaled its In the cases described in previous chapters, intention to invade Iraq. This made the likeli- the targets of attack — peaceful protesters, hood of backfire much greater, at least if citizens being arrested, whistleblowing em- people perceived the attack as unjust. ployees — were relatively harmless, at least to Nevertheless, cover-ups played a significant wider society. The Iraq attack brings in a new role. It is often perceived that the attack on dimension: the target, namely Saddam Hussein Iraq only began in March 2003, but actually and his regime, was itself a menace. The Iraqi attacks occurred throughout the period after regime was built on ruthless violence against the first Gulf war, in 1991, until 2003. This internal opponents. It had launched two major included frequent bombings of Iraq that wars, against Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in seldom attracted news coverage or protest. 1990. Yet despite its terrible record of aggres- After the first Gulf war, the U.S. and British sion and human rights violations, many people governments unilaterally set up “no-fly” zones opposed the U.S.-government-led attack on — no flying for Iraqi aircraft — over parts of Iraq, because it represented an injustice of its Iraq, though these had no legal status, and own, whether seen as a violation of interna- made thousands of overflights between 1991 tional law, as an assault by an overwhelmingly and 2003, including regular bombings leading powerful military on a weak one, or as a self- to many civilian casualties.3 interested attack on an opponent that posed no Some attacks on Iraq in the period 1991- threat. For an attack on a reviled opponent to 2003 were undertaken covertly, but others backfire, the violation of norms must be corre- were made openly, sometimes with fanfare spondingly greater. When protesters are reso- such as the bombings beginning in December lutely nonviolent, as in Dharasana, a brutal 1998. For these latter attacks, the description beating can echo around the world. When the “cover-up” is not quite appropriate, but still target is a ruthless regime, attackers can get captures some of the dynamics. By being a away with much more — but there are limits. matter of routine and usually operating below The invasion of Iraq illustrates these limits the threshold of interest for news media and starkly. peace groups, the attacks largely escaped scrutiny and seldom caused concern. The very Cover-up normality and banality of the attacks served as a sort of de facto cover-up. Some wars are carried out in secrecy or by use of proxy armies, limiting the prospect for revulsion. For example, the U.S. government financially supported the French military in 2. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam for years until its defeat in 1954, and Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (New York: subsequently supported the South Vietnamese Viking, 2002). government and military before, during, and 3. Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq under Siege: The after direct participation by U.S. troops. The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War low profile of this involvement is one key (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); reason why, from the late 1940s until the mid Jeremy Scahill, “No-fly Zones: Washington’s 1960s, opposition to U.S.-government- Undeclared War on ‘Saddam’s Victims’,” IraqJournal.org, 2 December 2002. http:// www.iraqjournal.org/journals/021202.html (accessed 29 June 2006). The invasion of Iraq 81

Such de facto cover-ups applied to many address, Bush did not mention that his admini- other matters involving Iraq. The U.S. stration had undermined international efforts government’s support for Saddam Hussein’s to develop a stronger biological weapons regime throughout the 1980s was, following convention, nor that the United States has the the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1990, world’s largest biological weapons program. seldom mentioned by U.S. government offi- The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq begin- cials, especially in the 2002-2003 lead-up to ning in 1990 resulted in enormous levels of attack. Nor did officials mention the U.S. suffering and death, with figures commonly government’s unwillingness to topple Saddam quoted of around a million extra deaths over a Hussein in 1991 when, just after the first Gulf decade, but with no apparent impact on the War, it had the opportunity, and indeed had rule of Saddam Hussein. Such a death toll promised to support anti-Saddam uprisings but might have been treated, in other circum- then allowed them to be brutally crushed by stances, as an emergency warranting humani- the regime. tarian intervention. The process of de facto This silence about earlier complicity with cover-up — namely, lack of attention or Saddam became more salient as U.S. officials concern by government officials — turned this castigated the Iraqi regime for having biologi- into an unremarkable occurrence or a “price cal and chemical weapons and for using that had to be paid.”7 chemical weapons against Iranian troops and The investigation of Iraqi WMD was sub- Kurdish civilians in the 1980s. Little was said ject to more conventional cover-ups and by official sources about the role of U.S. and disinformation, at least by some accounts.8 British governments and companies in sup- The lack of evidence of effective, deliverable plying materials for Iraqi weapons programs. biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons in For example, in President Bush’s address to Iraq was covered up by false and misleading the nation of 17 March 2003, on the eve of the claims, for example of Iraqi importation of invasion of Iraq, he stated, “This regime has uranium from Niger. U.S. spying under the already used weapons of mass destruction cover of the UN weapons inspectors was also against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s covered up. In March 2003, diplomats from people.”4 However, he did not mention this half a dozen countries met in secret in an occurred in the 1980s when the U.S. govern- attempt to find a compromise that could ment supported the Iraqi regime, nor did he prevent the invasion of Iraq, but a British-U.S. mention that the U.S. government covered up spying operation disrupted the initiative. This the chemical weapons attack.5 Similarly, the too was covered up.9 British government covered up its role in Cover-up is greatly aided when mass media building the chemical plant in Iraq used for report U.S. government pronouncements with production of chemical weapons.6 In his

7. Arnove, Iraq under Siege; Sarah Graham- 4. George W. Bush, “President Says Saddam Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Hussein Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours: Intervention in Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, Remarks by the President in Address to the 1999); Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Nation,” 17 March 2003. http://www.white Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, 2d ed. house.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). html (accessed 29 June 2006). 8. William Rivers Pitt with Scott Ritter, War 5. Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982– to Know (New York: Context Books, 2002). 1990 (New York: Norton, 1994). 9. Martin Bright, Peter Beaumont, and Jo 6. David Leigh and John Hooper, “Britain’s Tuckman, “British Spy Op Wrecked Peace Dirty Secret,” Guardian, 6 March 2003. Move,” Observer, 15 February 2004.

82 Justice Ignited no critical analysis or historical background, Iran and North Korea, the “axis of evil.” An and do not run stories presenting other even more potent form of devaluation was to perspectives. This is characteristic of much demonize Saddam Hussein and to treat him as western reporting, especially in the United the personification of Iraq. There is no doubt States.10 Saddam was a brutal and dangerous dictator, The counter to these forms of cover-up is guilty of gross human rights violations and straightforward in principle: exposure of launching wars against Iran and Kuwait. Even information, for example of U.S. government so, U.S. government officials painted Saddam support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. as an even greater monster, for example by Some writers and activists made great efforts comparisons with Hitler. Bush in a talk in to expose the horrific consequences of the Prague on 20 November 2002 said, “Czechs sanctions. Finally, as mentioned, the conquest and Slovaks learned through the harsh experi- of Iraq was undertaken openly and signaled ence of 1938, … that aggression left un- well in advance. In these circumstances, cover- checked by the great democracies can rob up did not work very well to inhibit public millions of their liberty and their lives.” He fury over the attack. went on to say, “A dictator who has used weapons of mass destruction on his own Devaluing the Target people must not be allowed to produce or possess those weapons. We will not permit In January 2002, President Bush, in his State Saddam Hussein to blackmail and/or terrorize of the Union address, labeled Iraq, along with nations which love freedom.”11 This was an implicit comparison between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, at least as interpreted by 10. Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, reporters.12 Similarly, British Prime Minister Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Tony Blair, in an interview with The Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq (New Guardian, drew parallels between confronting York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2003); Paul Ruther- fascism in the 1930s and confronting Iraq.13 ford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing The comparison with Hitler was misleading the War Against Iraq (Toronto: University of in more than one respect. Hitler was a far Toronto Press, 2004); Danny Schechter, greater danger to the world because he Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception: How commanded the extremely powerful German the Media Failed to Cover the War on Iraq military machine and embarked on a program (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); of conquest; Saddam, though probably more Norman Solomon and Reese Erlich, Target Iraq: What the News Media Didn’t Tell You (New York: Context Books, 2003). For critical 11. George W. Bush, “President Bush Pre- assessments of the mass media more generally, views Historic NATO Summit in Prague see for example Cees J. Hamelink, Trends in Speech: Remarks by the President to Prague World Communication: On Disempowerment Atlantic Student Summit,” 20 November 2002. and Self-Empowerment (Penang: Southbound http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 and Third World Network, 1994); Edward S. 2/11/20021120-4.html (accessed 29 June Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing 2006). Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Robert 12. Anne E. Kornblut and Charles M. Sennott, W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democ- “Bush Seeks NATO Solidarity,” Boston racy: Communication Politics in Dubious Globe, 21 November 2002. Times (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 13. Jackie Ashley and Ewen MacAskill, Press, 1999); Gerald Sussman, Communica- “History Will Be My Judge,” Guardian, 1 tion, Technology, and Politics in the Informa- March 2003; “Blair Likens Saddam to Hitler,” tion Age (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997). CNN.com, 1 March 2003. The invasion of Iraq 83 brutal personally, commanded only the medio- For a long time, the main theme was that cre Iraqi military, with limited capacity for Iraqi militarism was a threat to the world, external aggression after 1991. To compare including to the United States, especially via Saddam with Hitler, as dangers to the world, WMD. This cleverly reinterpreted the attack- was to confuse personal evil with state capaci- ers as the targets, and the target, Iraq, as the ties. Many torturers and serial killers are just attacker. The attack on Iraq then could be as evil personally as Saddam or Hitler, but interpreted as a form of defense, an interpreta- they do not pose more than a local danger to tion that was formalized as the doctrine of pre- the world. emption.15 Military aggressors have long Opponents of the invasion did not try to painted their targets as threats. argue Saddam was virtuous. Instead, their The interpretation that the Iraqi regime was response can be summarized by the questions the (potential) attacker was pursued in various “Why Iraq?” and “Why (attack) now?” They ways, including reference to Iraqi military use pointed to double standards: there were plenty of chemical weapons in the 1980s, claims that of brutal dictators in the world, including some evidence for Iraqi weapons programs existed, who ruled countries allied in the “war on and claims that the UN weapons inspection terror,” such as China, Pakistan, and Uzbeki- process was not working. Underlying the stan. Critics questioned why Iraq was singled ongoing claims by U.S. and other officials was out, among all the world’s repressive regimes, the assumption that the primary danger was for attack. Double standards were also in- from Iraq, indeed such an overwhelming and volved in demonizing Saddam, given that in immediate danger that military action was the 1980s, when he had been just as ruthless required and that any other course of action and was more powerful militarily, he had been constituted appeasement. an ally. At one point, inspectors found that some The demonization of Saddam no doubt Iraqi al-Samoud II missiles, in testing, traveled helped convince some people to support the further than the 150-kilometer limit placed on invasion. Others, though, used the double them after the first Gulf war: to be specific, standard test to draw an opposite conclusion. they could travel up to 183 kilometers. Iraqi officials claimed that this was because the Interpreting the Attack missiles had no payload. However, U.S. and British officials made great play over this The attack on Iraq was perceived by many as a case of the world’s sole superpower and possessor of overwhelming military force On war and the media more generally, see conquering a relatively weak country that Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: posed no immediate threat. The invasion was Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth seen as unjust because it was illegal and Century (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000); because it was disproportionate to any threat Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The posed by Iraq. War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker To counter this perception, supporters of from the Crimea to Kosovo (London: Prion, the attack offered a series of interpretations of 2000); Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The what was going on. Whether these interpreta- Media and the Military: From the Crimea to tions are considered to be honest views or as Desert Strike (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, calculated public relations,14 they operated to 1997). reduce opposition. 15. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002); “Bush 14. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Outlines Strategy of Pre-emptive Strikes, Deception; Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Cooperation,” USA Today, 20 September Persuasion. 2002.

84 Justice Ignited evidence of a threat — the missiles might be supplying WMD to terrorists, or was capable able to deliver biological or chemical weapons of doing so. Bush, in his address to the nation — and over Saddam’s alleged unwillingness just before the attack, stated, “The regime … to disarm, even though a 183-kilometer range has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, was far short of what could reach Israel, much including operatives of al Qaeda.”19 Carefully less the United States. The key point here is crafted statements gave the impression that that the focus was entirely on the Iraqi military Saddam Hussein was implicated in the threat. September 11 attacks — polls showed that The obsessive focus on the danger of the many U.S. citizens believed this was the case20 Iraqi regime can be seen as a facet of — though no substantive evidence was ever “American exceptionalism,” a pervasive dou- presented to show any link between al Qaeda ble standard in which, for example, the U.S. and the Iraqi regime.21 government demands that others adhere to A third argument was that Iraq must be human rights principles but does not expect attacked to liberate Iraqis from Saddam these principles to be applied to its own Hussein. This received relatively little play behavior.16 before the invasion, but as the occupation Language played a big role in attempts to continued and no evidence of WMD or Iraqi justify the attack. During the Cold War, the links to al Qaeda could be found, Bush and his expression “weapons of mass destruction” supporters put greater emphasis on liberation referred exclusively to nuclear weapons. In the as a justification and downplayed their earlier lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, U.S. govern- reliance on fears of imminent danger from ment officials expanded the meaning to WMD and al Qaeda links. include biological and chemical weapons, even Although many people were persuaded by though there were no examples where biologi- one or more of these interpretations, many cal or chemical weapons had ever caused or others found them wanting. Critics presented were likely to cause “mass destruction” evidence of the absence of any serious threat approaching the scale routinely achieved using from Iraq, of the effectiveness of the UN conventional weapons.17 Other U.S.-govern- weapons inspection process, of Osama bin ment favored expressions included “regime Laden’s hostility to the secular Iraqi regime, change” (rather than “government over- and of fraudulent documents used to make the throw”), “death squads” (instead of “feday- case against Saddam Hussein.22 een”), “thugs” (instead of “troops”), and “liberation” (instead of “conquest” or “occupation”).18 19. Bush, “President Says Saddam Hussein The second main argument used by the U.S. Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours.” government was that the Iraqi government was 20. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Americans Thinking about Iraq, but Focused on the Economy: Midterm 16. Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Election Preview,” Washington, DC, 10 Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: October 2002. http://people-press.org/reports/ Routledge, 2004). display.php3?ReportID=162 (accessed 29 June 17. Vic Carroll, “Some Words Can Make a 2006). War Cry Foul,” Sydney Morning Herald, 28 21. Gethin Chamberlain, “Experts Scorn May 2003, p. 13. Saddam Link to al-Qaeda,” The Scotsman, 6 18. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Even Critics of War February 2003; Pitt, War on Iraq. Say the White House Spun It with Skill,” New 22. Milan Rai, War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons York Times, 20 April 2003, p. B14; Rampton against War on Iraq (London: Verso, 2002). and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, For critiques of Bush speeches, see Solomon 113–30. and Erlich, Target Iraq, 125–54. The invasion of Iraq 85

Critics also pointed to double standards. example, many U.S. respondents had a false Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was nonexist- memory that WMD had been discovered in ent or at least far from making a bomb; why Iraq. The researchers concluded that their was it seen as such an urgent threat when results “are consistent with previous findings known weapons states, including Pakistan, in that the differences between samples reflect Israel, China, and indeed the United States greater suspicion about the motives underlying itself, were not subject to the same stric- the war among people in Australia and tures?23 Why was Iraq’s meager potential to Germany than among people in the United make deliverable chemical and biological States.”24 weapons seen as such a threat when dozens of For many commentators, the case for the other countries had a greater capacity? As for invasion involved so many transparent lies and the alleged need to liberate Iraqis, why not contradictions that they found it hard to take also undertake wars to liberate Pakistanis or seriously and so responded with humor, such Uzbekis, among others? as in the British Channel 4 television comedy Of the huge outpouring of words leading up “Between Iraq and a Hard Place” of January to the invasion, a large proportion were about 2003. In a Doonesbury strip, an instructor of interpretation of what was going on. Those CIA trainees says, “We’re here to serve the who supported an attack presented evidence President. When he asks us to jump, what does and, just as importantly, made assumptions the C.I.A. reply?” Dismissing the answer that framed attack as necessary, just, even “How high?” the instructor says “No. That’s emancipatory. Opponents of the attack coun- Congress. We say, ‘Into which country?’” In tered these interpretations using evidence and July 2003, inserting “weapons of mass de- exposure of double standards. They also struction” into the Google search engine led to presented alternative interpretations, including a fake error message saying, “These weapons that conquering Iraq was about U.S. access to of mass destruction cannot be displayed,” with Iraqi oil, about U.S. power in the Middle East, a series of mordant options for fixing the about revenge, about U.S. world hegemony, or problem. about diverting U.S. public attention away from domestic scandals and economic Official Channels problems. The way people responded to all this infor- Because it seems unfair when a powerful mation and opinion varied individual to country invades a weaker one without good individual, with systematic differences across justification, it is common for attackers to seek cultures. One fascinating study found differ- authoritative endorsement for their actions. In ences between countries in the way people the international scene, one of the best en- remembered misinformation, namely false dorsements is from international bodies, statements made in the media that were later especially the United Nations. After the Iraqi retracted. The respondents were surveyed in army invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, the weeks immediately after the invasion of the UN Security Council endorsed the use of Iraq. When the media published misinforma- force against the invaders. This gave credibil- tion that was later corrected, respondents in ity to the U.S.-led assault in 1991. Although Germany and Australia tended to discount it, many people favored other measures against whereas respondents in the United States Iraq, notably sanctions, the existence of a UN continued to believe the misinformation even though they knew it had been retracted. For 24. Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G. K. Stritzke, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael 23. Ian Williams, “Double Standards, UN Morales, “Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Style,” Globalvision News Network, 3 Febru- Misinformation: The Iraq War 2003,” Psy- ary 2003. chological Science 16 (2005): 190–95.

86 Justice Ignited endorsement made a big difference in justify- U.S. officials to obtain a favorable UN resolu- ing the first Gulf war. tion,27 many people would have been unaware In 2002-2003, though, there was no imme- of these behind-the-scenes machinations. UN diate pretext for attacking Iraq: no hard endorsement remained a potent tool for legiti- evidence of Iraqi WMD, no immediate risk of mating an invasion. an Iraqi military attack on the United States, However, unlike previous occasions in no illegal Iraqi invasion or occupation of which the Security Council was more suscep- neighboring countries. An attack in these tible to pressure, this time few member circumstances could backfire. Obtaining UN governments acquiesced. The existence of approval for an attack would greatly reduce massive popular opposition to war played a popular opposition. significant role in stiffening the resolve of The U.S. government decided in 2002 to government leaders. seek a UN resolution permitting an invasion. The delicacy of the “politics of endorse- This can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce ment” is suggested by the U.S. government’s the backlash from unilaterally launching an hot-and-cold approach to seeking a vote at the illegal, unjust assault. If UN approval had been Security Council. Not long before the inva- obtained, it would have made a big difference sion, U.S. officials said they would bring a in many people’s minds. To be sure, some resolution before the Council. But then, as it people supported military action even without appeared that the vote would go against them, UN approval and others opposed it under any the resolution was not put forward. circumstances, but opinion polls showed a substantial middle ground of people who This was a tacit admission that it could not supported an invasion with UN endorsement have passed. If the resolution had been but opposed it otherwise. submitted to a vote and rejected, the nega- As noted, official channels may give only tive vote would have further undermined the appearance of fairness. The UN is very far the doubtful claim by the sponsors that from being a neutral, independent body, as earlier resolutions by the Council author- many analyses reveal,25 and the UN Security ized them to use armed force if and when Council is even less neutral and independent. they deemed that Iraq was in non-ful- The U.S. government applied its formidable fillment.28 persuasive powers — primarily threats and bribes, along with tendentious evidence — in In other words, for minimizing public back- an attempt to obtain a resolution authorizing lash, it was better to have no vote at all than a attack, and British prime minister Tony Blair hostile vote. Even so, having sought UN added his eloquence.26 Though there was some endorsement for months, the failure to obtain reporting of the heavy-handed tactics used by it made the backfire even more powerful than if no resolution had been sought. U.S. leaders displayed an ambivalent atti- 25. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A tude towards the UN. On the one hand, they U.S.–U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999); Shirley Hazzard, Countenance of Truth: The United Nations and the Waldheim 27. Ed Vulliamy, Peter Beaumont, Nick Paton Case (New York: Viking, 1990); Abraham Walsh, and Paul Webster, “America the Arm- Yeselson and Anthony Gaglione, A Dangerous twister,” Observer, 2 March 2003; Martin Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in Bright, Ed Vulliamy, and Peter Beaumont, World Politics (New York: Grossman, 1974). “US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq War,” Observer, 2 March 2003. 26. Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis, and John Cavanagh, Coalition of the Willing or 28. Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Coalition of the Coerced? (Washington, DC: Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: Institute for Policy Studies, 2003). Bloomsbury, 2004), 7–8. The invasion of Iraq 87 sought UN endorsement for their preferred areas may suffer censorship and dismissal.30 options, but when this gambit failed, they NBC dismissed veteran journalist Peter Arnett attacked the UN as irrelevant. As soon as the for making a few comments during the UN became an obstacle, it was subject to conquest that, though innocuous enough in the familiar sorts of denigration, reinterpretation, eyes of many, were labeled as treacherous by and intimidation. high officials. His treatment was an object Another example of the role of official lesson for anyone who might stray from the channels is the UN team, headed by Hans mainstream. Blix, sent to Iraq in 2002 to look for WMD. If Tami Silicio, a worker in Kuwait, took a the team had found damning evidence, it photo of coffins of U.S. soldiers. After it was would have provided convenient legitimation published in the Seattle Times, she was fired for an attack. However, by failing to report from her job. U.S. military forces in Iraq have substantial Iraqi violations of UN-imposed attacked, arrested, beaten, bombed, and killed conditions, Blix became an obstacle to U.S. independent journalists.31 For example, on 8 government plans. Blix himself later claimed April 2003, a U.S. missile hit the Baghdad that some U.S. officials had tried to discredit bureau of the satellite broadcaster Al-Jazeera, the UN team — and him personally — killing Tareq Ayyoub. U.S. officials claimed implicitly recognizing that his team’s work that their forces were responding to enemy was valued by the U.S. government only for fire, but Al-Jazeera said no fire was coming its potential role in legitimating an attack.29 from their building.32 Experts who do not toe the line can come Intimidation and Bribery under attack. U.S. government officials exposed the cover of covert CIA operative When a powerful government threatens a Valerie Plame as a reprisal against her weaker one, that itself constitutes intimidation. husband Joseph Wilson, who publicly chal- In addition, many forms of intimidation can be lenged official claims that Niger supplied used before, during, and after an attack. As uranium to Iraq.33 U.S. troops in Iraq have described earlier, Iraq came under repeated been threatened with reprisals should they be military assault over the years 1991-2003. In openly critical of U.S. government policy.34 the invasion in March 2003, the initial “shock and awe” bombardment served to intimidate 30. Kristina Borjesson, ed., Into the Buzzsaw: both Iraqi resisters and any other government Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free that might consider defying U.S. government Press (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, demands. 2002). Another target is commentators, who may be threatened or wooed. It is well known that 31. Christian Parenti, “Al Jazeera Goes to journalists who write uncritically about U.S. Jail,” The Nation 278 (29 March 2004): 20– government policy can be rewarded with 23; Jeremy Scahill, “Shooting the Messenger,” greater access to officials, whereas those who The Nation 280 (7 March 2005): 4–6. are too critical may be penalized by denial of 32. For details about this and many other access. Journalists who venture into sensitive cases, see Committee to Protect Journalists, http://www.cpj.org/ (accessed 29 June 2006). 33. Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Put the White House on 29. Ibid., 215–28; Helena Smith, “Hans Blix Trial and Betrayed My Wife’s CIA Identity Interview: One Last Warning from the Man (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005). Who Made an Enemy of Bush: UN Weapons 34. Steve Liewer, “Servicemembers Speaking Inspector Says Iraqi Guilt Is Still Not Proven,” Out: A Look at the Policies, Consequences,” Guardian, 11 June 2003, p. 4. Stars and Stripes, 22 August 2003.

88 Justice Ignited

The pettiness of reprisals is shown by the target the Security Council for espionage attack on Mick Keelty, the Australian Federal and outright subversion.36 Police Commissioner, Australia’s highest ranking police official, who was interviewed Intimidation and bribery are risky strate- about terrorism on Australian television in gies: if revealed, they can discredit those who March 2004. He made a passing and oblique use them. Therefore, a central task for those reference to the possibility that a country who want to magnify indignation is to expose having troops in Iraq was more likely to come the use of these unsavory means. under terrorist attack: “The reality is, if this turns out to be Islamic extremists responsible Conclusion for this bombing in Spain, it’s more likely to be linked to the position that Spain and other The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq allies took on issues such as Iraq.” This was generated enormous hostility around the contrary to the Australian government’s posi- world, a popular and political reaction that can tion. The Prime Minister’s office immediately be interpreted as an example of how state- put pressure on Keelty to retract, and govern- sanctioned attacks can backfire. Much of this ment officials apparently even wrote the hostility can be attributed to the attack being “clarifying statement” that he had to make. perceived as unjust and disproportionate to Keelty’s original comment would probably anything the Iraqi regime had done, or threat- have passed unnoticed; forcing him to make a ened to do, to the attackers. Each of the five humiliating retraction drew more attention to usual methods for inhibiting outrage was used, it, as well as adverse comment on the govern- but without great success. The impending ment’s intolerance.35 invasion was announced to the world, so Yet another target is members of official cover-up played a limited role, though it was bodies. The bribes and threats used to pressure important in limiting awareness of the ongoing members of the UN Security Council have attacks from 1991. The demonization of already been mentioned. The connections Saddam Hussein was perhaps the most effec- between reinterpretation, official channels, and tive tool in inhibiting outrage, convincing intimidation are captured in this comment: many people the invasion was justified, but was powerfully countered by exposure of The glaring contradiction in the UK-U.S. double standards such as via the queries “Why posture toward the UN seems to be lost on Iraq?” and “Why now?” Various arguments Downing Street and the White House. On were advanced for invading Iraq: to prevent the one hand, Bush administration and Iraqi aggressive use of WMD, to prevent Iraqi Whitehall officials declare that war was government support for terrorists, and to liber- necessary to uphold the authority of the UN ate the Iraqi people. However, these arguments Security Council against alleged Iraqi were not very effective, partly because of denial and deception. President Bush even transparent inconsistencies and partly because cited the electronic bugging of UN weapon of powerful counter-arguments. An attempt inspectors by Iraqi officials in his eve of was made to legitimate the invasion by war address to the nation. On the other obtaining UN endorsement, but this failed, hand, the U.S. and British governments causing further delegitimation. Finally, there was some intimidation of critics of the attack,

36. Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, “Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Diplomatic Missions: 35. Alan Ramsey, “Bad Call of a Keystone A Question of Law and Morality” (Silver City, Cop Routine,” Sydney Morning Herald, 20–21 NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in March 2004, p. 39. Focus, 2 March 2004). The invasion of Iraq 89 but this did not appear to significantly reduce much greater importance for attackers than the overall volume of criticism. sometimes realized. These techniques are To a casual consumer of the media, the widely used in ostensibly open societies and, lead-up to the invasion of Iraq could well have even more extensively, by repressive regimes. appeared bewildering, with multitudinous These regimes do not rely solely on force. claims and counter-claims involving Saddam Examples include secrecy and state propa- Hussein, WMD, disagreements between ganda in the Soviet Union and the secrecy governments, and so forth. The concept of with which the Nazis carried out their exter- backfire brings some order to this complex minations. Official channels are also important picture by focusing attention on the struggle for dictatorial regimes, such as when they hold over perceptions, specifically the perception of elections that are transparently fraudulent, but an attack as unjust or disproportionate. nevertheless give a facade of legitimacy. The Iraq case suggests many ways to Backfire analysis can give a new apprecia- increase outrage, and roles for doing so. For tion of the diverse means of opposing attacks. exposing cover-ups, vital roles are played by Opposition to the attack on Iraq was most investigative journalists, whistleblowers, obvious in massive rallies throughout the outspoken advocates, researchers, independent world and in resistance by many governments commentators, and courageous publishers. To to joining or endorsing an invasion. These expose cover-ups can be very difficult: persis- forms of resistance cannot easily be separated tence in both gathering and distributing infor- from an ongoing struggle over information and mation in a credible fashion is vital. meaning, involving news reports, articles, Countering rhetorical means of justifying letters, leaflets, e-mails, and everyday conver- attack — devaluing the target and reinterpret- sations. This struggle will continue long after ing events — requires knowledge, commit- the invasion of Iraq, for example in the ongo- ment, eloquence, and access to communication ing debate over what U.S. officials actually channels. Commentary about an impending knew in advance about the presence or invasion, or one that has already occurred, is absence of WMD. far from irrelevant; instead, it is crucial in In many cases, such as the Sharpeville shaping attitudes that influence whether an massacre and the beating of Rodney King, invasion proceeds or, if it does, how and public anger occurs after the attack. In the case whether future attacks occur. of Iraq, in contrast, much of the anger occurred The role of official channels for legitimat- beforehand. This suggests that an early ing attacks is a challenging obstacle for warning system, raising concern about poten- opponents. There are two basic approaches to tial attacks, can be a potent way of resisting ensuring appropriate concern: to influence the injustice. official body to refuse to endorse the attack, or to undermine the credibility of the official Acknowledgements body or its deliberations. The first approach is This chapter is based on an article published in often more effective in the short term but, for Economic and Political Weekly 39 (17-23 official bodies whose appearance of fairness April 2004): 1577-83. I thank Don Eldridge, and neutrality is a facade, the second approach Truda Gray, Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for may be better. Finally, a good way to oppose valuable comments on drafts. intimidation is to expose it, thereby making it backfire. This analysis of backfire dynamics points to the crucial role of information and communication. Attacks backfire because of perceptions of injustice and disproportionality. Therefore, secrecy, disinformation, spin- doctoring, and public relations may be of

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 10 (author’s prepublication version)

10 Abu Ghraib by Truda Gray and Brian Martin

In April 2004, photos of torture and abuse at government disowned what it called the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were broadcast, “abuse” at Abu Ghraib, sociological and causing revulsion and anger throughout the historical studies have looked at the continui- world. Abu Ghraib had been a notorious ties of U.S. government practice, showing that prison during the regime of Saddam Hussein, the conditions for such behavior lay in policies but the photos showed something different: going back decades.4 this time it was U.S. soldiers who were the The very words “Abu Ghraib” have now perpetrators. Their own photos revealed gro- become shorthand for the torture scandal. tesque rituals in which prisoners were sexually Understanding the policy background of the humiliated, terrorized with dogs, and brutally events is important, especially because most restrained, accompanied by grinning and ap- media reports treat the events at Abu Ghraib parently shameless prison guards. The U.S. out of context. Here, though, we examine a government had claimed the conquest of Iraq different facet of Abu Ghraib: the tactics used was a liberation from tyranny, but this graphic by perpetrators and opponents to stifle or material suggested the new rulers were not express outrage over torture and abuse. living up to their espoused principles. In the following sections, we examine in The revelations about Abu Ghraib seriously turn each of the five areas of contention damaged the reputation of the United States. contained in the backfire model. In the conclu- Polls in Arab countries showed that support sion, we sum up the implications of this for the U.S. occupation declined at a greater analysis for understanding responses to torture rate than usual, with most respondents believ- and abuse. ing Abu Ghraib was typical of a wider Given the huge volume of material about problem and that most U.S. people behaved Abu Ghraib, our examination is not intended like the prison guards.1 In the United States, to be comprehensive: rather than try to present polls revealed an increase in opposition to the every possible example in each of the five war generally.2 The Abu Ghraib story triggered a torrent of commentary as different groups tried to make 4. Jennifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the sense of what had happened or to shape public American Way: The History and Conse- perceptions of the events.3 While the U.S. quences of U.S. Involvement in Torture (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Gregory Hooks and Clayton Mosher, “Outrages against 1. Michael Hirsh, “Grim Numbers,” News- Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuse and week, 15 June 2004. Torture in the War on Terror,” Social Forces 83 (2005): 1627–45; Alfred W. McCoy, 2. John Ritter, “Poll: War Opposition Up amid “Cruel Science: CIA Torture & U.S. Foreign Iraqi Abuse Scandal,” USA Today, 10 May Policy,” New England Journal of Public 2004. Policy 19 (2005): 209–62; Alfred W. McCoy, 3. Lila Rajiva, The Language of Empire: Abu A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, Ghraib and the American Media (New York: from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New Monthly Review Press, 2005). York: Metropolitan, 2006).

Abu Ghraib 91 areas, we select a range of illustrations of the spoke openly with journalists and others.7 techniques. Further investigations and revela- Human rights groups are active in collecting tions about Abu Ghraib will take place, testimony about abuses in prisons.8 throwing new light onto the tactics used to However, evidence gleaned from prisoners contain or express outrage. Indeed, further received relatively little attention in the mass investigations and revelations will be part of media, being especially rare in the U.S. media. the ongoing struggle over the significance of For example, in 2003 there were reports of Abu Ghraib. This struggle is likely to continue torture at numerous U.S. foreign prisons, but for years and even decades after the events they did not reach the media threshold for a themselves. major story in the U.S. media.9 Prior to April 2004, most reporting about Cover-up and Exposure human rights abuses in U.S. foreign prisons was framed by the perspective of the U.S. Cover-up at Abu Ghraib is best understood in government: official reassurances were re- the context of cover-up at all U.S. prisons in ported without much critical commentary, and the “war on terror.” U.S. authorities have the issue of torture received little attention. sought to cover up as much as possible of their Evidence of torture in these foreign prisons activities at prisons in Guantánamo Bay, was not sufficient to move coverage from elite Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in- framing to event-driven framing.10 In effect, volved in their rendition policy. Furthermore, the mass media aided in a de facto cover-up. they hold some prisoners at secret locations: The Abu Ghraib photos were the key to even the existence of these prisoners is kept breaking through the media’s usual orientation secret. The prisons at Guantánamo, Afghani- to government framing. Suddenly the treat- stan, and Iraq are physically remote from the ment of prisoners was a huge story. Even so, United States, and off limits to journalists. the mass media did not report everything they These basic features of the prisons are enough could have. Only some photos were published. to indicate the centrality of secrecy to their Many of those published were cropped so they operation. One of the few groups permitted access to these U.S. prisons is the International Com- 7. David Rose, Guantánamo: The War on mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, Human Rights (New York: New Press, 2004). U.S. authorities tried to stop ICRC spot visits 8. Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu 5 to Abu Ghraib. They also held some “ghost” Ghraib (New York: Human Rights Watch, 6 detainees in secret, away from the ICRC. 2004). These measures limited public awareness of prison abuses, but could not stop all informa- 9. Rajiva, Language of Empire; “Report of the tion leaking out. Prisoners, after their release, International Committee of the Red Cross could tell about their ordeals. For example, (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition British citizens imprisoned at Guantánamo Forces of Prisoners of War and Other were all released at the request of the British Protected Person by the Geneva Conventions government and subsequently many of them in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interro- gation,” in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge: Cambridge 5. Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, University Press, 2004), 383–404. Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New 10. Elite and event-driven framing were dis- York: New York Review Books, 2004), 216. cussed in chapter 5, drawing on Regina G. 6. Josh White, “U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds,” the Construction of Police Brutality (Berkeley: Washington Post, 1 December 2004: A01. University of California Press, 2000).

92 Justice Ignited did not show the presence of other U.S. Abu Ghraib. The report by Major General personnel and thus did not reveal wider Antonio M. Taguba15 on treatment of prisoners official involvement in the actions.11 at Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the CBS’s 60 Minutes II, having obtained the U.S. military. Authorities tried various means photos, delayed broadcasting them at the to limit its circulation. Defense Under Secre- request of the Pentagon. It required the im- tary Douglas Feith banned discussion of the pending publication of Seymour Hersh’s story Taguba report within the Pentagon itself, about Abu Ghraib in The New Yorker to prod despite it being widely available. After the CBS into action. After Hersh’s story and report was leaked and reported by the media, accompanying photos were published, all Feith warned staff not to read or even mention major U.S. newspapers followed.12 De facto it. The report itself was classified secret by the cover-up can sometimes occur when major Defense Department. When the report was outlets do not want to rock the boat, but there sent to Congress, one-third of its 6,000 pages is a countervailing pressure: the desire to break were missing — supposedly due to an “over- a major story. Therefore, investigative jour- sight.”16 nalists and courageous editors, by breaking Although the Pentagon has formidable through usual mass-media orientation to elite powers to control information, in this case its perspectives, play a central role in the expo- efforts were insufficient. It is worth noting the sure of injustice. many players and activities in the communica- With the publication of the photos, the tion process leading to exposure. In the early primary methods of cover-up had failed stages, the ICRC and human rights groups dramatically and the U.S. government had to were able to gather information from ex- resort to rearguard actions to limit the damage. prisoners and other sources to produce In this, cover-up continued to be a key tactic. damning reports. There were two key roles in After the mass media published photos, this aspect of exposure: credible witnesses and U.S. officials tried to get them to stop, arguing credible groups to document and communicate among other things that it was unpatriotic and their stories. endangered U.S. troops.13 They prevented The photos played a crucial role in expo- hundreds of photos and videos from being sure. They were made possible by cheap circulated.14 The photos were thus the focus of digital technology and the willingness of a continuing struggle over cover-up and soldiers to capture their own behavior in exposure, a struggle that continues today, images: their treatment of the prisoners given that some of the most graphic images appeared to be an occasion for boasting rather have never been broadcast. than for being ashamed. This insensitivity to A parallel struggle over cover-up and expo- what would cause outrage, and thus what sure took place over textual materials about needed to be covered up to prevent it, laid the

11. Susan Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of 15. Antonio M. Taguba, “Article 15–6 Investi- Others,” New York Times, 23 May 2004. gation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (The Taguba Report),” in Danner, Torture and 12. David Remnick, “Introduction,” in Truth, 279–328; also in Greenberg and Dratel, Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Torture Papers, 405–556; also in W. Frederick Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London: Allen Zimmerman, ed., Basic Documents about the Lane, 2004), xviii. Treatment of the Detainees at Guantánamo 13. Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of Others.” and Abu Ghraib (Ann Arbor, MI: Nimble 14. Matt Welch, “The Pentagon’s Secret Books, 2004), 1–38. Stash: Why We’ll Never See the Second 16. Michael Hirsh and John Barry “The Abu Round of Abu Ghraib Photos,” Reason, 36(11) Ghraib Scandal Cover-Up?” Newsweek, 7 June (2005): 18–19. 2004, p. 34. Abu Ghraib 93 foundation for a scandal of enormous propor- To sum up, the key elements in cover-up — tions. (In principle, someone opposed to what both successful and less successful — were: was occurring might have taken photos in isolation, namely preventing outsiders access order to expose it, but this apparently did not to the prisons or to information about them; take place at Abu Ghraib.) conventional media framing oriented to elite The next stage in the communication chain perspectives; and censorship. The key ele- was Joseph M. Darby, a soldier not involved ments in exposure were: witness reports and with abuse. Asking for information about a information-gathering by concerned groups; shooting incident, he was given, by Charles A. vivid, damning images; soldiers willing to Graner, Jr., two CDs that Darby found filled report on and to genuinely investigate evi- with disturbing images of prisoners. After dence of wrongdoing; people willing to leak confronting Graner, Darby gave the CDs to the the information; journalists and editors willing Army’s Criminal Investigation Command. The to run the story. story might still have remained dormant except for the willingness of individuals in Devaluation and Validation CID to take the issue seriously and instigate an investigation. Major General Taguba also In all U.S.-run prisons outside the United played a key role. States, devaluation occurred through labeling. Then there was journalist Seymour Hersh, The very designation “war on terror” implies who broke the story in The New Yorker.17 prisoners are “the enemy” — the opponents in (Hersh had also played a key role 35 years the so-called war — and terrorists. Further, earlier in breaking the story of the My Lai calling those held “detainees” suggests even massacre during the Vietnam war.) Hersh fewer protections than referring to them as relied on many anonymous informants who prisoners. gave him confidential information and leaked International law, such as the Geneva documents to him. Hersh and his supportive Conventions, provides formal protection for editors and colleagues at The New Yorker — prisoners. For prisoners in Afghanistan and including fact-checkers — gave the story Guantánamo Bay, the U.S. government sufficient credibility to break any remaining adopted a new label, “unlawful combatants” reluctance of the mainstream media to cover (or “enemy combatants”) arguing that the the story. Geneva Conventions did not apply because al Key Abu Ghraib photos have become so Qaeda was not a conventional army. This line familiar that they now serve as symbols of of argument has been contested by legal abuse. This makes it hard to realize that they scholars; the point here is that, in relation to might never have been revealed or that the international norms for treating prisoners, the story might have remained on the back pages. new label signified a further devaluation of The prominence of the Abu Ghraib story is the those designated. The term “unlawful combat- contingent outcome of a struggle over cover- ants” was also used in Iraq, even though the up and exposure. Some months later, a brief original justifications for using it did not apply story appeared reporting that photos had also there. been taken at Bagram prison in Afghanistan, Devaluation is far easier when the target is but in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal a faceless abstraction. By restricting access to these had been destroyed. It is likely many the prisons, the U.S. administration helped other atrocities, similar to Abu Ghraib, have maintain the image of a cruel, malevolent, occurred but remain hidden. ruthless enemy who deserved no rights. Isolation of those imprisoned thus served both as cover-up and devaluation. Most of those arrested were presented as alien to European- 17. Hersh, Chain of Command, incorporates Americans: from another culture, adherents to stories from The New Yorker.

94 Justice Ignited a different religion, from a different ethnic them. In a rare news-page reference to social group — and generally presented as inferior. science experimentation, the 1971 prison The prisoners at Abu Ghraib were given a simulation run by Philip Zimbardo and col- variety of negative labels: terrorists, insur- leagues at Stanford University was described. gents, rebels, towelheads, suspects. U.S. In this pioneering and eye-opening study, U.S. Senator Inhofe stated, “you know they’re not male university students were randomly there for traffic violations.”18 allocated the roles of prisoner or guard in a Challenging devaluation, human rights simulated prison. The experiment was termi- groups proceed on the assumption that all nated after less than a week because partici- humans have intrinsic rights. Those who pants had dangerously adopted behaviors promote the application of international law corresponding to their roles.19 The implication are in essence arguing the same: the prisoners of this study is that ordinary members of the are humans like anyone else and deserve the U.S. public can become abusive in an envi- same rights. ronment that sanctions or encourages such Abstract argument and information can help behavior: hence, the Abu Ghraib guards were validate targets of attack, but far more power- responding to their circumstances. What is ful is humanization through stories and striking is how seldom such an analysis is images. Some of the prisoners at Guantánamo applied to behavior at conventional prisons or were citizens of countries such as Australia, to the behavior of terrorists. Britain, and Germany. Journalists were able to In summary, prisoners at Abu Ghraib were write stories about them using photos, quotes devalued by being categorized as enemies in from relatives and friends, and comments from the war on terror (and hence implicitly as lawyers. This personalized these individuals terrorists), by being placed in the new classifi- and, in the eyes of many, made their treatment cation of unlawful combatant that allegedly seem more worthy of concern. exempted them from human rights protections, The photos from Abu Ghraib made the by being seen as undesirably alien in race and prisoners seem much more real: they were religion, and by remaining abstractions flesh-and-blood people and no longer abstrac- through prevention of personal contact. These tions. In many of the photos, prisoners’ heads techniques of devaluation were countered by were covered or their faces not presented, civilizing human rights discourses, by infor- thereby limiting identification with the vic- mation about the innocence of many prisoners, tims. Photos showing the faces of prisoners by personal stories of some prisoners, and were especially powerful in awakening most of all by the photos showing real people. empathy, such as the image of a terrified Iraqi prisoner face to face with an aggressive attack Interpretation Struggles dog. Many photos showed prisoners in humiliating poses, which in general would not be In relation to Abu Ghraib, reinterpretation was considered positive imagery — compared for minimal prior to the publication of the photos, example to photos of a graduation, wedding, but arguments proliferated subsequently.20 The or family gathering — but nevertheless this instinctive response of many observers was offered a greater opportunity for identification that the actions at Abu Ghraib were disgusting and validation than abstract labels. and deplorable. The task of those seeking to At the same time, the beaming faces of U.S. minimize the damage from these exposures prison guards were conspicuous in many was difficult, but followed a predictable pat- photos. Some articles included attempts to explain their actions, though seldom to justify 19. Philip G. Zimbardo, “Stanford Prison Experiment,” http://www.prisonexp.org/ (ac- 18. Quoted in Sontag, “Regarding the Torture cessed 29 June 2006) of Others.” 20. Rajiva, Language of Empire. Abu Ghraib 95 tern. We look briefly at the key interpretation ating without any encouragement by superiors. techniques used by U.S. officials. Pentagon officials said it was a matter of In a few cases, events were relabeled into individual misconduct, of lack of discipline. nonexistence: some of the deaths at Abu The dominant government line served to Ghraib, and other prisons, were said to be due blame aberrant individuals and to distance the to natural causes, despite evidence of physical government itself from any responsibility. But abuse.21 this was challenged by rival interpretations. A key form of redefinition was to say the Some of the soldiers involved, such as Charles actions at Abu Ghraib did not constitute Graner, Jr. and Lynndie England, said they torture. Memos within the U.S. government were only following orders. argued that many of the techniques used in Those who gave a more structural explana- interrogation should not be classified as tion of Abu Ghraib referred to reports of torture.22 So far as most human rights legal similar treatment occurring in Afghanistan, experts were concerned, these reclassifications Guantánamo, other prisons in Iraq, and else- did not conform to international laws on where. They also referred to a history of policy torture. development and application of interrogation U.S. government officials never used the techniques that portrayed Abu Ghraib as a word torture but instead referred to “abuse” logical outcome rather than as an anomalous and “humiliation.” The mass media mostly incident.24 followed the government’s terminology, so the Following revelations that something bad prevailing term became “abuse.” This linguis- had happened, the next question was who or tically reinterpreted the events as far less what to blame. As indicated, the main candi- serious than would be suggested by “torture.” dates were the individual soldiers, and possi- There were other euphemistic descriptions of bly the line of command and top policy- what had occurred, such as “setting condi- makers. But there was also another possibility: tions” or “loosening up” for interrogation. blame those who revealed the abuse, including One of the central issues involving interpre- the media and even the general public. George tation was whether Abu Ghraib was an Bush said he was sorry for the damage to the isolated incident or represented a common- image of the United States and Donald place and pervasive practice. The government Rumsfeld said the photos would tarnish the pushed the isolated-incident explanation, say- reputation of U.S. troops, evincing more ing the photos portrayed the actions of a few concern about damage to U.S. interests than rogue guards in just one prison block. U.S. about damage to Abu Ghraib prisoners.25 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld de- To sum up, the meaning of the Abu Ghraib clared it was “an exceptional, isolated” case.23 photos was not self-evident but rather the Responsibility for this isolated incident was subject of an ongoing struggle. A few com- sheeted home to a few lower-level troops. mentators said the matter was not all that These perpetrators were said not to be repre- serious.26 Those who wanted to minimize the sentative of the Army, of the United States, or of the country’s “true nature.” Only the lower 24. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American ranks were blamed: they were said to be oper- Way; Hersh, Chain of Command; Hooks and Mosher, “Outrages against Personal Dignity”; McCoy, “Cruel Science”; McCoy, A Question 21. Human Rights Watch, Road to Abu of Torture. Ghraib, 28–29. 25. Robert Plummer, “US Powerless to Halt 22. Danner, Torture and Truth; Greenberg and Iraq Net Images,” BBC News, 8 May 2004. Dratel, Torture Papers. 26. Dick Meyer, “Rush: MPs Just ‘Blowing 23. Human Rights Watch, Road to Abu Off Steam’,” Against the Grain (CBS News), Ghraib, 1. 6 May 2004.

96 Justice Ignited seriousness of the events referred to “abuse” strong recommendation was one thing; acting rather than “torture.” They blamed a few on it is another. A strong recommendation deviant troops who were said to be misbehav- suggests the system is working to deal with its ing in a single cell block. own problems, but this may be an illusion The contrary interpretation was that Abu when implementation is piecemeal, purely Ghraib revealed torture that had become symbolic, or nonexistent. tolerated or even encouraged by high-level There were some hard-hitting reports, but policies, and which represented the tip of an their impact was muted by their internal iceberg of atrocities. nature. The Taguba report was a courageous treatment; its major impact, though, was the Official Channels result of being leaked to the media and providing authoritative support for what was The Abu Ghraib exposures led to numerous apparent in the photos. inquiries, including at least ten general inquir- It is worth noting the sorts of inquiries that ies plus more than a hundred individual were not carried out. There were no well- investigations.27 Most of these were by the funded independent inquiries and no televised U.S. military itself, with all the limitations of hearings — and no prosecutions for war internal inquiries, including limited public crimes. To our knowledge, there were no access to the proceedings and findings. In the inquiries to determine whether and which case of a significant investigation by George Iraqis held at Abu Ghraib had been mistakenly R. Fay,28 military procedure did not allow the or falsely detained, or to determine whether to inquiry to hold anyone accountable above the offer anyone compensation for ill-treatment. level of the investigating officer, in Fay’s case There were accusations made against many Major General, and the same sort of restriction soldiers, but many were not punished judi- applied to several other investigations.29 cially, with over 70% of official actions being The inquiries varied in the depth of their administrative punishment.31 Brigadier Gen- analysis and the breadth of their recommenda- eral Janis Karpinski, commander of the Abu tions. Some, such as the report by James R. Ghraib prison at the time, was relieved of her Schlesinger,30 said responsibility for Abu command, but all other officers were cleared Ghraib went all the way to the top. But a and no civilian policy-makers were even charged. No one was charged with torture or war crimes. Some charges were dropped, but 27. Seymour Hersh, “The Unknown Un- only a few soldiers were sentenced. From knowns of the Abu Ghraib Scandal,” media stories, it would have been easy to gain Guardian, 21 May 2005. the impression of a flurry of prosecutions. 28. George R. Fay, “AR 15–6 Investigation of However, due to the large number of disparate the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th cases, it was difficult to grasp the scale and Military Intelligence Brigade (U),” in Danner, pattern of outcomes. In other words, it would Torture and Truth, 436–579; also in be easy to gain the impression that the system Greenberg and Dratel, Torture Papers, 1018– was working, but exactly how was not clear. 131. Our argument is that the inquiries and trials gave the appearance of providing justice 29. Hirsh and Barry “Abu Ghraib Scandal without providing much substance. One key Cover-Up?” 30. James R. Schlesinger, “Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention 31. Amnesty International, “One Year after Operations (The Schlesinger Report),” in Abu Ghraib, Torture Continues,” 28 April Danner, Torture and Truth, 329–402; also in 2005; Dave Moniz and Tom Squitieri, “U.S. Greenberg and Dratel, Torture Papers, 908– Works to Repair Damage of Abu Ghraib,” 75. USA Today, 27 April 2005. Abu Ghraib 97 impact of the numerous investigations and targeted those at lower levels, thus comple- trials was to dampen public anger. Officials menting the administration’s interpretation seemed to be doing something, though the that Abu Ghraib was an isolated incident complexity, slowness, and technicalities meant involving misconduct by individuals. few could follow the details even of those In summary, in response to damaging procedures in the public domain. This fits the revelations from Abu Ghraib, U.S. officials pattern of other cases in which official launched numerous investigations and prose- channels are used by perpetrators in a way that cutions. Arguably, though, the net effect of dampens outrage. But Abu Ghraib reveals these formal processes was more to dampen another dimension to the failure and facade of public concern than to implement substantive official channels: members of the Bush justice. Furthermore, the U.S. administration administration went to considerable effort to had previously made strenuous efforts to limit ensure that laws could not be used against the vulnerability of officials to prosecution for them. torture and war crimes, in essence trying to In the aftermath of 9/11, key members of ensure it could act with impunity and official the administration wanted to use tougher channels would be toothless. forms of interrogation but were concerned about international law. Their response was to Intimidation and Resistance solicit legal opinions that expanded what was deemed legal interrogation practice short of Just as the attack on Iraq was a process of torture, in effect redefining torture.32 (Most intimidation of the Iraqi people, torture at Abu independent human rights experts condemn Ghraib and elsewhere served to intimidate this.) The U.S. administration admitted the prisoners. Here. though, we focus on the use of Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, but intimidation against U.S. soldiers and civilians violated them all the same. Although the in relation to Abu Ghraib. designation “unlawful combatant” did not One key target was whistleblowers those apply to the circumstances in Iraq, the prac- who leaked infomration, who could expose tices in prisons in Afghanistan and Guan- wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib to wider audiences. tánamo were imported to Iraq as if it did.33 In this regard, Douglas Feith, U.S. Under Finally, the U.S. government refused to Secretary of Defense, sent a message to support the International Criminal Court, officials warning that leaks of the Taguba making extraordinary efforts to ensure it could report were being investigated with the possi- not try U.S. citizens. President Bush in bility of criminal prosecution. Indeed, Feith particular was exempt from legal scrutiny by was said to have made his office a “ministry of the claim of presidential war powers. These fear.”34 Similarly, Donald Rumsfeld estab- were among the many actions taken well lished what was called a “command climate” before Abu Ghraib to reduce the vulnerability in which bad news was not welcome.35 of U.S. soldiers and both military and civilian Within the U.S. Army, threats of discipli- commanders from independent legal scrutiny. nary action or other penalties were made As a result, the numerous investigations and against soldiers who spoke out. Some of the trials concerning Abu Ghraib took place Army’s investigators seemed to pursue within a legal and policy context in which top whistleblowers with greater eagerness than officials were exempted from challenge, at they did those alleged to have committed least so far as the administration could human rights violations, with threats of manage. The inquiries and trials mainly

34. Hirsh and Barry “Abu Ghraib Scandal 32. Danner, Torture and Truth; Greenberg and Cover-Up?” Dratel, Torture Papers. 35. Evan Thomas, “No Good Defense,” 33. Hersh, Chain of Command. Newsweek, 17 May 2004, p. 24.

98 Justice Ignited prosecution made unless the names of whistle- At U.S. prisons other than Abu Ghraib, blowers were revealed.36 After Sergeant Frank secrecy more effectively prevented informa- “Greg” Ford reported, to his commanding tion from reaching wider publics. Some former officers, witnessing torture by fellow soldiers, prisoners told what had happened to them, but he was forcibly removed (“medivaked”) out of the media’s news values prevented this from Iraq on psychiatric grounds, though psychia- becoming a major story. Information from trists subsequently pronounced him fully sane. prisoners failed to have impact because they Other military whistleblowers were treated the were devalued — as terrorists, the enemy, and same way.37 so forth — and because the U.S. government’s Intimidation itself is usually covered up, so interpretation of actions and responsibility was the available evidence is only a sample of what treated as credible. No soldier who witnessed actually occurs. But whatever its scale, intimi- ill-treatment of prisoners at other prisons was dation was insufficient to keep a lid on what able to achieve a high-profile stand in expos- happened at Abu Ghraib, because there were a ing what occurred. number of prisoners, soldiers, investigators, In contrast, the Abu Ghraib photos cut journalists, and publishers who were willing to through all these defenses. Their release broke speak out. Furthermore, many of them have through cover-up, constituting one of those spoken out about intimidation itself, making it exceptional events that challenges usual elite- an additional source of outrage. oriented perspectives. With the images going directly to the public, the photos largely Conclusion surmounted the obstacles of devaluation, reinterpretation, and official channels: viewers In retrospect, it may seem inevitable that the felt they could see and interpret the events well-documented events at Abu Ghraib would themselves, without requiring much explana- lead to public outrage. We have argued, tion. Finally, individuals in the chain through though, that this outcome was never guaran- which the photos reached the public played teed, but rather was the result of a multi- their roles despite the possibility of reprisals. faceted struggle continuing to this day. The Although the photos played a crucial role in contingent nature of the Abu Ghraib struggle turning Abu Ghraib into an international is shown by the parallel cases of prisons in scandal, there has been nothing automatic Afghanistan, Guantánamo, and elsewhere in about the trajectory of the case. As we have Iraq, in which there is evidence of similar outlined, the U.S. administration and military treatment of prisoners but far less public command used a host of techniques to mini- outcry. The crucial difference is the release of mize outrage and direct it towards a few photos from Abu Ghraib, which circumvented soldiers and away from senior officials and the usual processes by which wrongdoers officers. But these efforts were inadequate: the prevent or minimize reactions to their actions. Abu Ghraib events backfired on the U.S. On the other hand, we should not assume the government, causing far more damage than Abu Ghraib scandal, as it has occurred, was any benefit from intelligence gained or the worst possible outcome for the U.S. through intimidation of the Iraqi opposition to government: it is plausible that cover-up, the U.S. occupation. devaluation, and other techniques prevented the scandal being even larger than it has been. Acknowledgements We thank Steve Wright for many valuable comments. 36. Tony Allen-Mills, “Witch-hunt Fears Stall New US Abuse Investigation,” Sunday Times (UK), 2 October 2005. 37. David DeBatto, “Whitewashing Torture?” Salon.com, 8 December 2004. Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 11 (author’s prepublication version)

11 Countershock: challenging pushbutton torture by Brian Martin and Steve Wright

Torture, by its nature, can be expected to abuses.3 The thriving market for such tech- trigger revulsion. On the one side is the torture nologies is revealed through the many sales victim, who is unable to resist, much less hurt fairs around the world where the latest repres- the torturer. On the other side is the torturer, sion technology is touted; representatives from inflicting pain and harm with impunity. Many countries with repressive governments are people perceive the situation as inherently evil. frequently present, as vividly revealed in the This helps explain why no government British television documentary The Torture acknowledges using torture and why Amnesty Trail.4 International and other human rights organiza- There is growing evidence that “non-lethal tions have such high levels of participation and weapons” are not benign — indeed, they can credibility. To be exposed using torture can be lethal — and are forming a new arsenal backfire, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, so used primarily against the exercise of freedom extraordinary efforts are made to cover up and rather than in defense of it.5 At an expert deny the practice. briefing in October 2002 between Amnesty As well as opposing torture itself, it is International, European Commission officers, possible to raise concerns about the tools of the Omega Foundation, police and medical torture. However, unlike arms production and experts, and the UN Special Rapporteur on sales, which have long been a focus for peace Torture, participants were told there are 230 activists, technologies used for restraint, known manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, surveillance, assault, and torture have received or brokers of electroshock weapons and 69 of relatively little attention. Yet the scale of leg irons, shackles, or thumb-cuffs. The United production and trade in such technologies is States has the largest number of companies enormous.1 They include everything from providing restraint technology (43) followed thumb cuffs and leg irons through crowd by Western Europe (10); similarly, the United control weapons such as riot shields and stun States has the most companies providing grenades to sophisticated computer surveil- electroshock equipment (81), followed by the lance systems.2 Much of the research and Asia-Pacific (56), Western Europe (41), development on so-called non-lethal weapons Eastern-Central Europe (23), Africa (11), the contributes to the capacity for human rights

3. Steve Wright, “The Role of Sub-lethal 1. Mike McBride, ed. Janes Police and Weapons in Human Rights Abuse,” Medicine, Security Equipment 2002–2003 (Surrey: Conflict and Survival 17 (2001): 221–33. Jane’s Information Group, 2002). 4. Martyn Gregory, The Torture Trail, 2. Steve Wright, Omega Foundation, An Channel 4 (UK), Dispatches, 11 January 1995. Appraisal of Technologies for Political Control, Report to the Scientific and Techno- 5. Omega Foundation. Crowd Control Tech- logical Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of nologies (An Appraisal of Technologies for the European Parliament, 6 January 1998. Political Control). Report to the Scientific and http://www.uhuh.com/laws/europar3.htm (ac- Technological Options Assessment (STOA) cessed 29 June 2006). Panel of the European Parliament, June 2000.

100 Justice Ignited

Middle East (10), and Latin America (8).6 Much campaigning on these issues is Thus the West provides the largest share of the heuristic and repetitive when each new torture technology supply pipeline with most campaigning generation has to forge its tools of the companies actively involved in the anew: institutional learning in peace activist provision of restraint technology and over half communities is still embryonic. One useful of those involved in the proliferation of elec- approach to the problem is through exploration troshock weapons. Of course, the number of of the psychological and political processes by companies is only one part of the story: in which atrocities can be denied at the level of China, where production is enormous, a single the individual and the state. This provides company might be making scores of thousands insight into why human rights organizations of electroshock weapons. have such difficulty gaining support and what These weapons provide means for restraint they can do to cut through denial.8 and torture, yet there are powerful corporate, Electroshock weapons can be used to inflict government, and public relations forces seek- torture in a conscious fashion but they can also ing to present them in a favorable light and, be used for other purposes, such as crowd despite rhetoric about human rights, to carry control. Even so, use of these weapons can on business as usual. In such circumstances, it backfire if people believe serious pain or harm is important for researchers to expose what is is being inflicted in a highly unequal situation. going on and investigate how these weapons We adopt the term “countershock” for backfire can best be opposed. against torture: because we focus on electro- Therefore, we start with the assumption that shock weapons, we let the part stand for the it is important to oppose the production and whole. trade in the technology of repression. The In the beating of Rodney King, outrage was question is how to go about it. One approach is from the beating itself. In the case of torture through government regulation. This can be technology, in contrast, outrage is directed at valuable, but has seldom proved effective on both the torture and the tools used to carry it its own. Nor do international agreements about out. King was hit by two tasers — electro- torture, simply by their existence, appear to shock weapons — and by metal batons, but achieve very much. After all, no government little attention was given to these weapons. In admits to using torture, yet it is known that the case of torture, the weapons are a primary dozens use or tolerate it as a matter of policy. focus, due to the efforts of human rights Our focus is on independent campaigning. A groups. number of non-government organizations When people witness or hear about the (NGOs), such as Amnesty International and existence of torture technology — even such Campaign Against the Arms Trade, play an unsophisticated technology as restraints and important role in exposing and opposing the apparatus for causing electrical shocks — trade and use of repression technologies.7 Our many are appalled. They can imagine such aim here is to assess what types of intervention technology being used and are disgusted by are likely to be most effective in generating the very thought. Increasing people’s aware- support and action. ness of torture technology and preparations for torture thus can help build a network of support for human rights defenders. This is 6. Omega Foundation, “Stun Weapons and vital, because few victims of torture have the Their Effects,” A draft paper to the Interna- psychic resources to foster public anger during tional Meeting of Experts on Security the time of their incarceration without the Equipment and the Prevention of Torture, London, 25–26 October 2002. 7. Amnesty International, Stopping the Torture 8. Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing Trade (London: Amnesty International Publi- about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: cations, 2001). Polity, 2001). Countershock 101 assistance of NGO networks. Even afterwards, intimidate those who expose participants in the individuals may be too damaged to immedi- torture system. For each method, we look at ately speak out. ways for activists to counter these tactics. One powerful exception was the Tibetan monk Palden Gyatso, who endured 33 years of Hiding and Exposing Torture imprisonment by the Chinese authorities for supporting the independence of Tibet and was If outsiders are not aware of events, then the tortured every day. He told Steve Wright he potential for outrage is minimized. Some was so hungry he ate his boots. On his release, regimes cause dissidents to “disappear,” which he traveled to Northern India to seek the is harder to mobilize against than open or permission of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala acknowledged killings. Minimizing outrage to go back to his prison and buy the electro- explains why torture is nearly always carried shock and other torture instruments used upon out in secret: if done openly, it would generate him. In one of the most powerful literal widespread revulsion. For the same reason, examples of countershock, this incredibly very few torturers try to justify their actions in brave monk has subsequently toured the world public. to tell his story. By displaying the implements Exposure is a powerful tool against torture. used to torture him, he acts politically against As described in chapter 3, the filmmaker Max the perpetrators of these human rights crimes Stahl videotaped the 1991 Dili massacre and and their Chinese masters. His story9 has smuggled the tapes out of East Timor. Broad- received widespread publicity and illustrates casts of the images he recorded were in- two powerful effects. One is the role of NGOs strumental in triggering a huge increase in like Amnesty in freeing political prisoners, international support for the East Timorese which Gyatso acknowledges in his own case. liberation struggle. There was an extraordinary The other is the role of exemplars in achieving follow-up to this. political change: Amnesty used Gyatso’s case Stahl was later the cameraman for the in its own effective “Stop Torture Campaign.” British comedian Mark Thomas, who posed as Those involved in torture systems include a public relations consultant to torturing states the people who inflict torture themselves at an arms exhibition in Defendory, Greece in (torturers), governments that knowingly spon- 1998. There he came face to face with General sor or tolerate torture, scientists and technolo- Widjojo who had authorized the Dili massacre. gists who research and develop technologies It might have been understandable if Stahl had that can be used for torture, and companies been provoked to an attack, but instead he that manufacture and sell torture technologies. watched Thomas convince the General and his Our focus here is intervention at the point of staff to do ridiculous calisthenics on the production and sale, so the key players are pretext that they needed to relax for the corporate and government leaders and related camera. apologists and public relations agencies. We Thomas advised the General that their look at the ways these players seek to inhibit government’s credibility was being affected by outrage using the five standard categories: (1) Amnesty’s publicity about their human rights hiding torture; (2) devaluing the opponent; (3) abuses and that if they denied everything no reinterpretation, including denying that tech- one would believe the regime. He gave a list of nologies are being used for repressive pur- atrocities the regime had been guilty of in East poses and denying that technologies can or do Timor and said to the General, if you admit cause harm; (4) claiming proper procedures one, people will believe you’re being honest are being followed; and (5) attempting to and willing to change. Stahl was then in the position of filming the first admission of torture by the Indonesian military authorities 9. Palden Gyatso, The Autobiography of a — and in an astonishing twist, Thomas was Tibetan Monk (New York: Grove Press, 1997). offered the job as their public relations

102 Justice Ignited consultant in follow-up talks in London. The Reinterpretation 1: Denying Use for resulting program — including the calisthenics Repressive Purposes — was later broadcast on British TV.10 It caused public indignation and ridicule and Companies producing electroshock weapons played a role in firming up opposition to the commonly deny that their products are used illegitimate Indonesian military role in East for repression. What is the problem with Timor. producing a technology if it used for “legitimate” purposes? In the Alice in Wonderland Devaluing the Target of definitions where words mean exactly what a company spokesperson says they do, no one Not everyone sees torture as a crime in itself. actually admits to making torture technology Some people identify with torturers; others or ever confesses to using it: ergo it does not assume victims must have done something to exist. Many of the technologies used in torture deserve their treatment. As discussed later in have other names. To get around restrictions chapter 13, many people implicitly believe the on exporting leg irons, they are called “jumbo world is just; because torture of an innocent cuffs.” Electroshock prods — what Helen victim is a brutal challenge to this belief, some Bamber, the founder of the UK Medical will assume the victim must be guilty of Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, something. has called the “universal tool of the torturer” Devalued groups are easier targets for use — are in other security quarters simply called of torture technologies. In many societies, non-lethal weapons for facilitating “compli- prisoners have a very low social status. Some ance through pain.” For example, they might members of the population believe prisons be sold to women as anti-rape devices. Indeed should be places for punishment rather than some companies have only sold them for such rehabilitation. Such attitudes help to inhibit the purposes and can back up that claim with backlash from using electroshock weapons evidence. Any effort to make a universal claim against prisoners. about the undesirability of such technology For torture to cause the maximum repug- will undoubtedly draw legal fire from such nance, then, the victim must be believed to be “legitimate” businesses. worthy of respect, simply as a human being or The obvious counter to such claims is to even better as a defender of freedom. This present evidence that specific weapons are helps explain why Amnesty adopts as prison- sold to named repressive regimes and used for ers of conscience only those who have not torture. It is especially powerful when victims used violence. Not all prisoners of conscience are willing to come forward and bear witness. are victims of torture, but the rationale still If a company’s denial can be unmasked, applies. people will be angered. In the UK, investiga- Various methods can be used to counter tive journalists have played a critical role in devaluation of victims of torture, including exposing corporate collusion. Revelations sur- highlighting their good points, emphasizing rounding The Torture Trail program were common bonds of humanity and the univer- incredibly damaging to companies such as ICL sality of human rights, and providing personal Technical Plastics, Royal Ordnance, and Hiatt, information about and pictures of victims. and led eventually to political reform, including changes in British export regulations and a new trade regulation by the European Commission.11

10. “The Mark Thomas Comedy Product: The Third Series,” Channel 4, January 1999, 11. Steve Wright, “The New Trade in Tech- Shows 1 and 2. http://www.fnord.demon.co.uk nologies of Restraint and Electroshock,” in A /mt/third/ (accessed 29 June 2006). Glimpse of Hell: Reports on Torture World- Countershock 103

Official data sources can make for dry weapons do not cause lasting physical damage, reading but often contain valuable campaign- their use can constitute torture. ing data. In 1993, the Omega Foundation made A case in point is electroshock belts and a Freedom of Information request via the restraint chairs in U.S. prisons. Amnesty Federation of American Scientists for the gathered evidence of prisoners who were following export administration codes: tortured to death in restraint chairs in U.S. jails. Subsequent legal cases used the discrep- (OA82c) * saps, thumbcuffs, thumb- ancies between actual use and manufacturers’ screws, leg irons, shackles and hand- warnings. In one key case the warning said, cuffs, specially designed implements of torture, straight jackets etc; and The purpose of the Prostraint Violent Pris- oners Chair is to provide law enforcement (OA84c) * Stun guns, shock batons, and correctional officers with the safest, electric cattle prods and other immobili- most humane and least psychologically zation guns. traumatizing system for restraining violent, out-of-control prisoners … The chair is not The statistics from 1991-1993 revealed that meant to be an instrument of punishment the U.S. Department of Commerce had and should not be used as such.13 approved over 350 export licenses under category OA82c and 2000 licenses under Similarly, Amnesty has challenged the use category OA84c. The material released was of remote control induction of electric shock highly embarrassing. Although the latter via the use of body belts that use kidney- category also included shotgun shells, people proximate probes to pulse 50,000 volts just assumed all the licenses were for electro- through a prisoner, by arguing that devices shock weapons. The negative media coverage psychologically damage, humiliate, and de- and subsequent Amnesty reports12 persuaded grade prisoners.14 Amnesty’s campaign against the Department of Commerce to further disag- this weapon used a highly successful poster of gregate these categories. Muhammad Ali that said

Reinterpretation 2: Denying Damage from 25 times in his career, Muhammad Ali the Technology fought for a belt. Now he’s fighting against one. Even “the greatest” couldn’t stand up Companies producing electroshock weapons to today’s stun technology. Around the commonly say their products are “safe”: there U.S., police and prison guards are using is no lasting harm from their use, and any pain electro-shock weapons of up to 50,000 volts or other effects are minimal, transient, or on suspects and prisoners as young as 17. otherwise acceptable. Such claims can be countered by revealing the actual conse- Within Europe, stun belts now form part of the quences of the weapons, which often cause European Commission proposed list for lasting damage to susceptible individuals or banning or regulating technology that can be due to improper use. Furthermore, even when

wide, ed. Duncan Forrest (London: Cassell, 13. Ann-Marie Cusac, “The Devil’s Chair: 1996), 137–52. Intended as a Restraint, It Has Led to Torture 12. Amnesty International, Arming the Tortur- and Death,”Progressive (April 2000): 22–28. ers: Electro-shock Torture and the Spread of 14. Amnesty International, United States of Stun Technology (London: Amnesty Interna- America: Use of Electro-shock Stun Belts, 12 tional, March 1997). June 1996.

104 Justice Ignited used for torture and other human rights electrical injuries18 including the possibility of violations.15 motor neuron disease.19 It is also essential for Activist researchers need to use a variety of activist researchers to have the requisite scien- approaches to challenge dubious assumptions. tific approach to deconstruct the claims of These include participant observation manufacturers who have continued to use data investigations such as those of Dr Brian gathered for much less powerful devices to Rappert who joined a taser instructors’ course justify the safety of new generations of this over two days and wrote up his findings that technology.20 only one trainer was willing to take the full It can be helpful to use counter-experts to five-second jolt — the taser default setting — challenge denials of damage. For example, it and not one was willing to repeat the may not seem very damaging to restrain experience.16 Such material may become even prisoners, put hoods over their heads, and turn more important in the future once taser on mild white noise. Experts, though, con- technology is used in anti-personnel mines. cluded such a regime can be highly damaging. Refugees might be captured at borders via Given a convenient label, “sensory depriva- such devices that paralyze them, potentially tion,” this form of treatment became widely for hours, until troops arrive. The effects are acknowledged as a form of torture.21 Until the likely to induce severe post traumatic stress early 1960s, disparate elements of sensory syndrome in anyone who is unfamiliar with deprivation such as denial of sleep had been such weapons, especially in the elderly, the used in pre-interrogation softening-up proce- infirm, and vulnerable persons such as dures. By the 1970s, new methods were being children.17 explored by states wishing to refine these Activist researchers need to be familiar techniques using the social, psychological, and with the literature in order to challenge claims pharmacological sciences. The focus of these of harmlessness, for example by highlighting modern methods is to cause sufficient suffer- the effects of stun weapons on pacemakers, ing to intimidate and break the will of the and the delayed neurological consequences of prisoner, without leaving any embarrassing physical evidence of brutality. Some of these individual techniques were originally melded into a technology by the British in the 1970s22

15. Article 6 of the “Proposal for a Council 18. Donald F. Farrell and Arnold Starr, “De- Regulation concerning Trade in Certain layed Neurological Sequelae of Electrical Equipment and Products which Could Be Injuries,” Neurology 181 (June 1968): 601–6. Used for Capital Punishment, Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 19. Michael D. Sirdofsky, Rollin J. Hawley, Punishment” EC, COM (2002) 770, 30 and Herbert Manz, “Progressive Motor December 2002. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ Neuron Disease Associated with Electrical en/com/pdf/2002/com2002_0770en01.pdf (ac- Injury,” Muscle and Nerve 14 (October 1991): 977–80. cessed 29 June 2006). 16. Brian Rappert, “Shock Tactics,” New 20. Omega Foundation, “Stun Weapons and Their Effects.” Scientist 177 (15 February 2003): 34–37. 17. Landmine Action, Alternative Anti-Per- 21. G. Gudjonsson, “Custodial Confinement, sonnel Mines: The Next Generations (London: Interrogation and Coerced Confessions,” in A Landmine Action, 2001): 46–47; Brian Martin Glimpse of Hell: Reports on Torture World- and Steve Wright, “Looming Struggles over wide, ed. Duncan Forrest (London: Cassell, Technology for Border Control,” Organisa- 1996), 36–45. tional Transformation and Social Change 22. John McGuffin, The Guineapigs (Har- (2006). mondsworth: Penguin, 1974). Countershock 105 and are reported as being used on al-Qaeda situation, namely the use of damaging suspects being processed by the U.S. govern- weapons against defenseless victims, and redi- ment in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, and rected to an arena seen as fair and balanced, Iraq.23 The military utility of these techniques namely courts and bureaucratic regulations. is to fool the public that they were not techni- Activist researchers are beginning to challenge cally torture. the “following-procedures line” by directly When scientific evidence and authority can learning what standard operating procedures be used to identify and explain what measures are being advocated in training. For example, are actually being applied, this can promote Dr Brian Rappert, following his training popular concern. In the 1970s, scientists from experience, warned of the danger of these the then British Society for Social Responsi- weapons being used routinely as instruments bility in Science introduced a new framework to ensure compliance through pain. they called the “technology of political control.”24 One of them, Dr Tim Shallice, Indeed, company literature advocates the recognized that these techniques had roots in “early, aggressive use” of the Taser in order the studies of sensory deprivation and wrote to minimise injuries to everyone involved. them up for the scientific journal Cognition. But that means the Taser could easily be Shallice said the techniques, whilst not pure employed as a convenient way of gaining sensory deprivation, mimicked its effects compliance, rather than as a last resort for causing visual, auditory, tactile, and kines- dealing with people who pose a threat. thetic deprivation.25 To maximize outrage, then, it is vital to Rappert also spoke of the training based on the mobilize scientific evidence and expertise to practice in the United States of using the taser reveal the harmful effects of electroshock to get unruly individuals into police cars. weapons. Give a shock to the side of the knee, for Official Channels: Claiming to Follow instance, and a suspect quickly folds. You Procedures don’t have to fire the barbs to do this: remove the barb cartridge, and the Taser Companies producing and selling electroshock becomes a stun gun that can deliver a shock weapons often justify their actions by the directly to the body.26 claim that they are obeying the law, following official procedures, and only doing what has The emergence of such ad hoc procedures been approved. They say complaints should be undermines the claim that the weapons are made to the proper authorities. This takes the only used as substitutes for lethal force and focus away from a highly unequal and unjust opens up the debate about street punishment routines. Without such direct-access field research by 23. Duncan Campbell, “US Interrogators Turn articulate experts, the alternative may be that to ‘Torture Lite,’” Guardian, 25 January 2003, of attempting to act through courts and p. 17. bureaucracies, which is slow, expensive, procedural, and very unlikely to produce 24. Carol Ackroyd, Karen Margolis, Jonathan justice or action. Furthermore, these channels Rosenhead, and Tim Shallice. The Technology put a premium on insider knowledge of courts of Political Control (Harmondsworth: Pen- and bureaucracies, so most activists have little guin, 1977). role to play, further reducing the potential for 25. T. Shallice, “The Ulster Depth Interroga- popular action against torture. Meanwhile tion Techniques and Their Relation to Sensory Deprivation Research,” Cognition 1 (1972): 385–405. 26. Rappert, “Shock Tactics.”

106 Justice Ignited serious harm continues, but many people British-sponsored Torture Trail. Senior sales perceive laws and regulations to be fair. Thus, staff from BAe-owned Royal Ordnance were the potential for generating public concern shown offering electroshock batons for sale through legal and bureaucratic interventions is and admitting they had sold 8000 to Saudi very low if followed in isolation. Arabia as part of the Al Yamamah deal. A In the first empirical study of the effect of director of Scottish firm ICL Technical joining an international human rights agree- Plastics, Frank Stott, also admitted on the ment, Linda Camp Keith looked at the program that he had sold thousands to the connection between a government signing the Chinese authorities, “who had copied them.” International Covenant on Civil and Political The European Parliament responded by calling Rights and the government’s subsequent on the Commission to incorporate these tech- human rights behavior. She found there was nologies within the scope of arms export no correlation whatsoever. She concluded controls and ensure greater transparency. cautiously that “it may be overly optimistic to In a June 2000 report to the European expect that being a party to this international Parliament’s Scientific and Technological covenant will produce an observable impact,” Options Assessment Committee, the Omega noting that enforcement mechanisms are so Foundation formally requested that the EU weak that governments know they can join, introduce “severe restrictions on the creation, gain good public relations, but not actually deployment, use and export of weapons which have to change their human rights behavior.27 cause inhumane treatment, superfluous injury This assessment of official channels is or unnecessary suffering.”28 Following further supported by the fact that it is hard to find a campaigning by Amnesty, the European case where laws and regulations provided a Commission, in a landmark move at the end of prompt and effective counter to the production 2002, published a draft regulation to ban and trade in torture technologies. In principle, member states trading in “certain equipment laws and regulations should offer a potent and products which could be used for capital avenue for dealing with the problem but in punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or practice there is a litany of shortcomings and degrading treatment or punishment,” including failures. gallows, guillotines, electric chairs, gas cham- These problems with official channels bers, lethal automatic drug injection systems, highlight the importance of mobilizing outrage electric shock belts, leg irons, and individual as a crucial factor in campaigns. With outrage shackles exceeding 190mm. dynamics as a foundation, it is possible for The last measure is important: British some legal actions initiated by knowledgeable companies supplied medieval ironmongery to human rights groups to form a complement to the slave trade, and they continue to manufac- activist action rather than a substitute for it. ture similar material. Although the export of For example, recent European Union (EU) leg shackles was outlawed in the UK in 1997, efforts to control the proliferation of such the government granted six licenses for technologies only came about because NGOs equipment within this category in 2001. In such as Amnesty vigorously lobbied govern- December 2002, Birmingham journalists re- ments worldwide to stop the trade in torture. ported they had bought leg irons in the United Their catalyst was the previously mentioned States that looked identical to oversized hand- 1995 Channel 4 program that revealed a cuffs made in the UK, with a chain attached.29

27. Linda Camp Keith, “The United Nations 28. Omega Foundation, Crowd Control Tech- International Covenant on Civil and Political nologies, ix. Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human 29. Caroline Wheeler, “Torture Shackles Made Rights Behavior?” Journal of Peace Research in Brum: Leg Cuffs Traced to Midlands,” 36 (1999): 95–118, quote at 112. Sunday Mercury, 15 December 2002, pp. 1, 6. Countershock 107

The draft regulation would have controlled What really matters is the changing situation a second class of equipment, including on the ground rather than what should be portable electroshock devices, restraint chairs happening procedurally. In this regard, coun- and shackleboards, as well as certain riot tershock has a vital role to play in calling control devices using the disabling chemicals malefactor companies and state agencies to CN, CS, OC, Pava, and CR, by requiring prior account. authorization by an EU committee. Since equipment of this type has been used in human Attacking Critics rights abuses and push-button torture, there should be a presumption that supply should be The nature of torture is so horrifying that any denied if there are reports of human rights public association with it is seen as contami- violations in the receiving country. nating and is both politically and economically Unfortunately, vested interests lobbied potentially disastrous for the agencies against this measure to make the EU territories involved. For these reasons, those who expose torture-technology-free zones. A watered- and oppose torture, and challenge perpetrators down version was finally passed in mid 2005: — including governments and companies European Commission oversight of the trade involved in the torture trade — can come was eliminated, so control of torture technolo- under attack. Company and government gies remains in the hands of member states, lawyers will actively punish any NGO that with various possibilities for getting around gets critical facts wrong, can’t properly back the regulation. up a story, or inadvertently libels associated More generally, it is likely that technologi- individuals and related companies in published cal innovation will spawn new tools for tortur- allegations. Legal attacks can be potentially a ers, designed to get around any controls, and major diversion of effort, so great care needs new descriptions of them designed for the to be exercised to make sure the process is as same purpose. In particular, many so-called legally fireproof as possible. non-lethal weapons can be used for torture and In the aftermath of The Torture Trail can even enable human rights abuse to be program broadcast in 1995, the Campaign more automated, moving from one-on-one Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), a major procedures to a situation where a single British-based NGO, carried a less-than-precise operator can induce pain and paralysis on a editorial mentioning the collusion of COPEX mass scale. Non-lethal weapons symposia in in promoting electroshock. The company 2003 in the United States, Britain, and threatened legal action. The wider NGO Germany discussed weapons using micro- research community provided further evidence waves to heat humans up to unbearable from field research that not only prevented the temperatures, using wireless or plasma tasers legal action for libel proceeding but, in a to head them off at borders, and using painful powerful boomerang process, earned CAAT electric shock to paralyze muscle function.30 many thousands of pounds in damages, used Therefore activists should not see legal for further campaigning. instruments as ends in themselves. They are Indeed it might be argued that one of the merely milestones, albeit important ones. aims of the countershock technique is to draw the opponent into unwise actions. Often this currently happens by accident in follow-up 30. Steve Wright, “Future Sub-lethal, Inca- defense actions. For example, following the pacitating and Paralysing Technologies — furor after the broadcast of The Torture Trail, Their Coming Role in the Mass Production of the program makers, who had operated a Torture, Cruel, Inhumane & Degrading Treat- complex and daring series of “stings” on ment,” Statewatch News (November 2002). British suppliers of electroshock technology, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/tort were accused by then Deputy Prime Minister ure.pdf (accessed 29 June 2006). Michael Heseltine of contriving the evidence.

108 Justice Ignited

Most program makers would have just nearly as much protection and support for shrugged this off, but Martyn Gregory sued in perpetrators as with some other injustices. the High Court, won £50,000 in damages, and International human rights agreements and used this money to make a successful follow- courts do not provide much of an escape up program, Back on the Torture Trail, which avenue. However, using official channels can highlighted how brokers of such weapon deals still reduce outrage simply by moving the can get around government restrictions by issue to a venue that is procedural, dependent operating extra-territorially. on experts, slow, and out of the public eye, as Legal action is just one of many means of the Abu Ghraib story shows. attacking critics, which include rumor-mon- Another special feature of torture, as an gering, harassment, ostracism, and dismissal; injustice, is that victims are seldom able to the form of attack depends primarily on the play a major role in opposing it. This is unlike resources available to the attacker. The general male domination, against which women have sorts of tactics used against torture technology played the leading role, but instead similar to also can be used against attacks on the critics environmental destruction, against which of such technology. humans (rather than the environment itself) necessarily have taken the lead. For torture Conclusion victims, it is a major achievement simply to survive and try to regain a semblance of On many issues — such as dismissal of an ordinary life. The task of opposing torture falls employee — there is considerable disagree- largely on others, including human rights ment about whether an action is or isn’t an campaigners and people from all walks of life injustice, because so much depends on the who care about what happens to their fellow particular circumstances. Torture is different. humans. It is universally condemned, both by governments and most citizens. This was not always Acknowledgements true: torture used to be much more acceptable, This chapter draws on Brian Martin and Steve at least in specific situations. Today’s rejection Wright, “Countershock: Mobilizing Resistance of torture is an achievement of campaigners to Electroshock Weapons,” Medicine, Conflict for human rights. and Survival 19 (July-September 2003): 205- But despite this condemnation, torture is all 22. We thank Truda Gray and Greg Scott for too common in dozens of countries. So it is valuable comments on drafts. not surprising that perpetrators deploy the usual range of techniques to prevent outrage. Cover-up is the first and most effective tool of all those involved in torture and the torture trade, along with intimidation of victims. But sometimes cases escape cover-up, so other techniques are brought into play. Devaluation is found in virtually every case of torture or alleged torture, with the victims being labeled as terrorists, subversives, enemies, apostates, or some other category associated with danger or evil. Reinterpretation is used regularly to say that what happened wasn’t actually torture or, if the evidence is too obvious or overwhelming, to deny responsibility by blaming someone else. Because torture is so universally condemned, official channels do not provide Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 12 (author’s prepublication version)

12 Terrorism as predictable backfire

On the face of it, terrorism seems to be an in- ros gradually escalated their tactics, eventually credibly counterproductive method of action.1 engaging in urban terrorism including kidnap- When violent attacks are made against inno- pings, bombings, and assassinations. The cent civilians, the usual response is revulsion government used the Tupamaro attacks as a and increased popular support for government pretext for heavy-handed repression, including action against the terrorists and those associ- police searches, arrests, and torture. The ated with them. In short, terrorism is almost actions of the Tupamaros, rather than leading guaranteed to backfire. This suggests the to revolution, resulted in 1973 in the destruc- motivation for terrorism may often be some- tion of democracy and descent into repressive thing other than effectiveness. military rule.2 The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 In some cases, terrorism seems to be suc- were a challenge to U.S. corporate and cessful in achieving gains for oppressed military power but, rather than weakening the groups, as in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.3 United States, instead had the effect of gener- But in such struggles, there was widespread ating enormous sympathy around the world for community support for the cause. The question the U.S. people and mobilizing U.S. public is whether terrorism as a tactic helped or hin- opinion in favour of attacks on anyone held dered the cause. As discussed later, nonviolent responsible. The 9/11 attacks legitimized the tactics may be more effective in achieving unleashing of U.S. military power in ways goals with fewer casualties along the way. previously only contemplated — including Terrorism is widely seen as an injustice, attacks on groups not responsible for 9/11. because it is a blatant violation of human The same pattern can be observed time and rights. What is both strange and striking about again in other terrorist incidents. Every terrorism is that it flouts all the techniques Palestinian suicide bombing gives greater usually used to dampen outrage over injustice legitimacy to harsh policies by the Israeli — in other words, it seems designed to back- government. The spectacular attacks by Che- fire. Terrorism is widely perceived as unjust chen rebels against the Russian people have and it is often intended to generate attention, led to greater support for brutal methods used thus satisfying the two fundamental conditions by the Russian government in Chechnya. This pattern has prevailed for a long time. Uruguay used to be a model liberal democ- 2. See, for example, Arturo C. Porzecanski, racy, known as the Switzerland of South Uruguay’s Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla America. In the 1960s, as the economy stag- (New York: Praeger, 1973). After restoration nated and corruption worsened, the govern- of representative government in 1985, the ment was challenged by the Tupamaros, a left- Tupamaros became a political party. I owe this wing revolutionary movement. The Tupama- example to Andrew Mack. 3. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strate- gic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: 1. Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New Random House, 2005), argues that most York: Random House, 2002), argues that all suicide terrorism is part of campaigns with forms of violence against civilians have been instrumental aims. However, he does not com- counterproductive throughout history. pare terrorism, as a tactic, with alternatives.

110 Justice Ignited for backfire. Indeed, terrorism has been called processes for justifying their actions.5 Quite “communication activated and amplified by the contrary: these processes are regularly used violence.”4 against them, for example when alleged Terrorism illustrates a very different back- terrorists are brought to trial. fire dynamic than the cases described in Fifth is intimidation and bribery. The power previous chapters. In massacres, beatings, of terrorists to intimidate opponents and critics dismissals, wars, and torture, perpetrators — politicians, military forces, intelligence normally do everything possible to reduce agencies, journalists, ordinary citizens — is outrage from their actions. But with terrorism, seldom very great, as evidenced by the number all the usual rules are ignored. The whole point of citizens willing to publicly denunciate ter- is to generate shock and horror. rorists and their attacks. After the March 2004 Look in turn at each of the five methods of Madrid train bombings, large numbers of inhibiting outrage. First is covering up the Spaniards joined public protests against the event. Terrorists commonly carry out their bombings. On the other hand, terrorists are actions publicly or announce responsibility for usually more able to intimidate those who them or both. Sometimes they even claim criticize them from within their own milieu. responsibility for actions they didn’t carry out. Finally, their ability to bribe targets and wit- They expose their actions rather than covering nesses is limited. them up. In summary, terrorists have limited capacity Second is devaluing the target. Usually to inhibit repugnance resulting from their terrorists have lower status than their targets, actions. Indeed, they often go out of their way especially when prominent citizens are kid- to magnify the sense of revulsion, for example napped or assassinated. The potential for by seeking media coverage. Therefore it is devaluing the targets of terrorism is not great. predictable that most terrorist actions backfire If al Qaeda has used derogatory labels for the against the terrorists. victims of 9/11, these labels have no popular In the next section, I explore some possible acceptance. reasons for the persistence of non-state terror- Third is reinterpreting the event. Terrorists ism despite its poor record of instrumental seldom say there wasn’t really a bombing or success. Then I use the same framework to the number of dead was small or the attack examine terrorism by states, which have a was a mistake. Indeed, they are more likely to much greater capacity to reduce disgust from celebrate and exaggerate their attacks. their actions. Finally, I look at the implications Fourth is using official processes to give the for nonviolent responses to terrorism. appearance of justice. Terrorists usually have no access to courts, commissions of inquiry, Why Terrorism by the Weak? panels of prestigious experts, or other official The question thus arises of why terrorists behave in a way almost guaranteed to be counterproductive. It is possible to identify several explanations. 4. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London: Sage, 1982), 54. See also Brigitte L. 5. Al Qaeda leaders have sought opinions from Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Islamic scholars to justify their killing of Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and civilians, but the purpose of this seems mainly Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & for ideological support within the network. Littlefield, 2002); Joseph S. Tuman, Commu- (Note that the search for theological justifica- nicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of tion for killing is peculiar neither to terrorists Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003). nor to Islam.) Terrorism as predictable backfire 111

First, terrorism can be an expressive act, use violence more effectively than bad guys, rather than an instrumental one.6 It can be an and in history books that concentrate on wars expression of resistance against humiliation or and governments. So, despite the dismal degradation experienced, consciously or un- record of terrorists in promoting their causes, consciously, or an expression of revenge many of them assume violence on behalf of against previous acts by the opponent. Expres- their cause must be effective. sive acts can serve emotional purposes even Fourth, terrorism can be used instrumen- when they are not effective in practical terms.7 tally to provoke counter-violence from the Second, terrorism is a characteristically state. If this counter-violence is seen as exces- masculine act.8 Nearly all terrorists are male. sive — as it sometimes is — then this can The few female terrorists — such as some create more support for the cause espoused by Palestinian suicide bombers — are unusual the terrorists. In other words, although terror- and often generate disproportionate attention. ism backfires, it can lead to state repression Even when women are involved, men are that itself backfires by generating greater almost always the commanders, for example support for the cause. This sort of process, the organizers of suicide bombings. spelled out in some writing on guerrilla Males are far more likely than females to be warfare, can be seen in many encounters, for involved in all types of violence, not just example in British military actions against terrorism. Violence is seen by some — such as IRA terrorists and in Israeli military actions Frantz Fanon, theorist of decolonization — as against Palestinian terrorists. The military a psychologically liberating act.9 This psychol- actions are sometimes so excessive that many ogy is, in my view, largely masculine. civilians are humiliated, injured, or killed, Third, some terrorists and observers believe leading to greater support for the anti-govern- violence is an effective way of achieving their ment cause.10 After all, state terror is some- goals. The belief in the potency of violence is times motivated by revenge rather than a pervasive in many cultures, for example un- calculated assessment of benefits and costs. derlying news reports that concentrate on Thus, sometimes, non-state terrorism, by violence and ignore low-profile nonviolent provoking an even greater state terror, has the action, in Hollywood movies where good guys result that more people oppose the government. But a full assessment of terrorism in this scenario should look at its costs — lives, 6. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: property damage, loss of civil liberties — as Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: well as its benefits, and should also look at Ecco, 2004), 7, 282. alternative routes to the same ends, as dis- 7. Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge: cussed later. Emotions, Nationalism, and War (Boulder, Fifth, terrorism can be part of a cycle of CO: Westview, 1994), highlights the role of violence that cements the role of leaders at the unacknowledged shame in protracted conflict, expense of the success of the struggle. A especially war. viable struggle using conventional, legal, and/or nonviolent means can be derailed by a 8. Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover: On the terrorist campaign that gives greater power to Sexuality of Terrorism (New York: Norton, 1989). 9. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 10. According to Alan Cullison, “Inside Al- trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly 294 Grove Press, 1963), 94: “At the level of (September 2004), 55–70, internal communi- individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It cations of al Qaeda revealed that, “its aim was frees the native from his inferiority complex to tempt the powers to strike back in a way and from his despair and inaction; it makes that would create sympathy for the terrorists” him fearless and restores his self-respect.” (58).

112 Justice Ignited the terrorist leaders, most commonly when attention by governments and the media. violence provokes counter-violence. For States that exercise terror, in contrast, have a example, in Kosovo, there was a decade-long much greater capacity to inhibit outrage: they nonviolent struggle for independence. But routinely cover up their actions, for example after the Kosovo Liberation Army adopted by hiding the use of torture and by using death terrorist tactics, leading to counter-violence by squads and proxy armies12; they smear their the Serbian rulers and then NATO interven- targets as criminals or terrorists; they say they tion, the KLA gained leadership of the inde- are protecting borders, dealing with crime, or pendence struggle.11 countering subversion, and claim that abuses The other side of this dynamic is the value are aberrations; they often establish legal to some government leaders when opponents processes for their actions to give the appear- resort to violence. Every Palestinian suicide ance of justice; and they can intimidate or bombing cements the position and policies of bribe those who might challenge or expose Israeli leaders who take a punitive stance their actions. So it is not surprising that state towards Palestinian aspirations. In this context, terror, though it leads to vastly more deaths nonviolent struggle is a threat, which many and suffering than non-state terror, seldom people believe is why the Israeli government generates much public concern. deported Palestinian nonviolence advocate Consider for example the killings carried Mubarak Awad. out by the military in Indonesia in 1965- Some governments — operating either in a 1966.13 The trigger for the launching of terror calculating or an instinctive fashion — may was an alleged Communist Party coup attempt provoke or fail to prevent terrorism by their against the left-wing Sukarno government, opponents to both discredit the opponents and though this explanation has been disputed. In cement the government’s own position. This is any case, the military action was justified as a version of the process of using agents provo- necessary to defend the country against a cateurs to instigate or provoke violence in communist takeover. Western governments protest movements in order to discredit them largely supported this interpretation, and raised and justify the use of state force against them. little protest against the scale of killing. Those More generally, conventional government targeted were labeled communists — some, anti-terrorism policies, by killing, subjugating, certainly, were members of the very large and humiliating members of oppressed groups, Communist Party, but many were not — and seem ideally designed to foster the terrorism maligned as such. The killings thus constituted they ostensibly seek to oppose. Violence on what Chomsky and Herman call “constructive both sides serves to polarize the population, terror,” namely for a “good cause” and against giving more power to leaders, whereas peace- a suitably stigmatized enemy.14 ful measures have a greater capacity to build bridges between erstwhile opponents. There are thus many possible reasons for 12. Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, adopting terrorism, most of which have noth- eds., Death Squads in Global Perspective: ing to do with being effective in bringing Murder with Deniability (New York: St. about social change. Martin’s Press, 2000).

State Terrorism 13. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast This analysis so far applies only to non-state Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). terrorists, the ones receiving the bulk of 14. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume 1: The Washington Connection and 11. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo Third World Fascism (Montréal: Black Rose (London: Pluto, 2000). Books, 1979), 205–17. Terrorism as predictable backfire 113

Although the slaughter was not secret, there ers stood to gain. Fellow travelers from other was no systematic documentation of what countries, who whitewashed the terror, could happened. Considering the vast scale of killing expect to be received favorably by the Stalinist — many hundreds of thousands of people died regime. Thus, the Stalinist state was able to — the events received relatively little interna- use, with good effect, every one of the five tional attention. This was a sort of de facto methods for reducing outrage from injustice. cover-up. Legal processes were not deployed On the other hand, these methods had little against perpetrators of the slaughter, but effect on the most vocal opponents of Stalin- instead used to impose lengthy prison sen- ism, anticommunists in the West, who were tences on thousands of targets whose lives unconvinced or unaffected by vilification of were spared. It is hard to obtain evidence of victims, by Stalinist justifications, by show intimidation and bribery used to prevent trials, and by the potential for intimidation or opposition, but it is reasonable to presume bribery. Indonesians who protested against the killing The success of states in minimizing public would have themselves become targets, disgust and fury from their terrorist activities whereas those who cooperated might be is revealed in the great discrepancy between rewarded. Of course killing is likely to intimi- the massive media coverage of non-state date those who observe or hear about it. terrorism and the scant attention to state Another example of state terror is Stalin- terrorism. Usually governments only condemn ism, in which many millions died in purges state terrorism when perpetrated by certain and prison camps and as a result of forced enemy states, as when the U.S. government relocation and starvation. The scale of the applies the label “rogue state.” The research terror was hidden by pervasive censorship and literature on terrorism follows the agenda set by disinformation, for example guiding by governments and the mass media, concen- visitors through carefully staged tours that trating on non-state terrorism, with relatively gave the impression of a successful socialist few treatments of state terrorism.17 state.15 The victims of Stalinism were vilified as reactionaries, members of the bourgeoisie, traitors, criminals, mentally ill, and enemies of 17. This observation is documented in Edna O. the revolution. The whole process was F. Reid, “Evolution of a Body of Knowledge: portrayed as one of building a socialist society. An Analysis of Terrorism Research,” Infor- Legal processes were established to give the mation Processing and Management, 33 appearance of justice; show trials, in which (1997): 91–106. I thank Steve Wright for dissidents were induced to confess to anti- informing me of this reference. Treatments of Soviet crimes, were the visible face of false state terrorism include Chomsky and Herman, justice.16 Internal opponents of the terror could Political Economy of Human Rights; Frederick themselves become targets, whereas support- H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2004); 15. Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels Alexander George, ed., Western State Terror- of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, ism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Jeffrey China, and Cuba 1928–1978 (New York: Ian Ross, ed., Controlling State Crime, 2d ed. Oxford University Press, 1981). (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Varieties of State 16. Show trials were public and thus went Crime and Its Control (Monsey, NY: Criminal against the tendency to cover up terror. A Justice Press, 2000); Michael Stohl and possible interpretation is that, for the state, the George A. Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist: benefit of formal legitimacy outweighed the The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and benefits of secrecy. Of course, in the show Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984); trials the political motivation of the charges Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., was covered up. Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign

114 Justice Ignited

Even the conventional definition of terror- • Many nonviolent actions are carried out in ism, as violence exercised by non-government public, so covering up attacks is not easy. groups against civilians for political ends, • When protesters dress conventionally and reflects the interests of states.18 A less one- behave moderately and respectfully — rather sided definition of terrorism, as violence than dressing unconventionally and behaving against civilians used for political ends, would aggressively — then it is difficult for the immediately identify states as the world’s government to devalue them. leading terrorists, through torture, warfare, and • When protesters explicitly commit them- the usual range of repressive tactics.19 The selves to nonviolence and are open about their very words “terror,” “terrorism,” and “terror- goals and methods, it is more difficult for ist” thus are political labels, typically directed governments to be convincing with alternative at opponents rather than used in a precise and interpretations. consistent fashion.20 • If, when activists come under attack, they appeal directly to the public — including Nonviolent Action as an Alternative to allies, opponents, and third parties — they are Terrorism more likely to obtain support than by relying on official channels such as making com- Nonviolent action — including methods such plaints about police misconduct. as rallies, vigils, strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins • Nonviolent action is itself a stand in the — is usually far more effective than violence face of potential intimidation. in generating support and bringing about desirable change. Consider for example a Contrasting each of these with the corre- peaceful protest against government policies. sponding method when violence is used, it is If police beat or kill protesters, this can back- apparent that nonviolent action is far more fire against the government, as at Sharpeville, likely to build support. Dili, and Dharasana. Consider each of the five One of the keys to backfire is that people methods for inhibiting backfire. perceive violent attacks on peaceful protesters, or against uninvolved civilians, as unjust. This is the reason nonviolence proponents continu- ally stress the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline.21 A breakdown in disci- Policy of State Terrorism (Westport, CT: pline — even a brief scuffle or some verbal Greenwood, 1988). abuse — changes the nature of the interaction 18. This point is made emphatically by and alters the perception of injustice when Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: police use violence. In contrast, bombings and Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: assassinations completely undercut this South End Press, 1982). dynamic. Nonviolent action has a good track record 19. Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The in liberation struggles.22 The Palestinian Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), point to similarities between genocide and strategic 21. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent bombing. Similar parallels exist between Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 573– terrorism and warfare. 655, includes “solidarity and discipline to fight 20. Conor Geerty, The Future of Terrorism repression” as one of the stages in his (London: Phoenix, 1997), gives a cogent “dynamics of nonviolent action,” just before critique of the content of the term “terrorism” political jiu-jitsu. as evolving from its origins as state terror to an 22. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, incoherent expression of condemnation. How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to Terrorism as predictable backfire 115

Liberation Organization used terrorism for case of a revolutionary overthrow. This can be years but with limited success. The spontane- understood in terms of backfire. Armed strug- ous development of the first intifada in 1987 gle has far greater legitimacy when used — an unarmed struggle rather than a purely against repressive and corrupt regimes. nonviolent struggle — was far more effective Against a system based on the rule of law and in mobilizing support among Palestinians, majority rule, violent opposition has far less winning international sympathy, and splitting legitimacy. Indeed, it can be argued that a Israeli public opinion. Arguably, a completely potent way to reduce non-state terrorism is to nonviolent struggle would have been even ensure realistic opportunities exist to work more effective.23 Instead, in the second through the system (including using nonvio- intifada, from 2000, suicide bombings have lent action) for progressive social change.27 weakened support for the Palestinian cause. Despite nonviolent action’s success record, In apartheid South Africa, armed resistance terrorism is still attractive to many for various was fairly easily crushed by the state. Libera- reasons, including those outlined earlier. tion occurred only after nonviolent action became the main mode of struggle.24 Simi- Nonviolence against Terrorism larly, the East Timorese struggle for independence achieved success after the armed struggle I have argued that nonviolent methods are was subordinated to peaceful protest.25 usually far more effective than violent The failures of armed struggle are legion. methods in promoting beneficial social Not only do many armed struggles completely change, because violence commonly leads to fail, but in many of those that led to independ- reduced support and lower legitimacy. There- ence — such as in Vietnam and Algeria — the fore, one of the ways to reduce terrorism is to death toll was horrific.26 Furthermore, success- convince those who are considering violence ful armed struggle is more likely to lead to a as an option that nonviolent alternatives are centralization of power in the subsequent superior. This line of argument is most government. Armed struggle is especially relevant to reducing non-state terrorism, in ineffective against systems of representative other words terrorism of the weak. government: there is not a single successful Opposing state terrorism is another matter, because states have a vastly greater capacity to Durable Democracy (New York: Freedom reduce abhorrence from their own injustices. House, 2005). The challenge is to make state terrorism backfire by countering each of the five standard 23. Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: methods of inhibiting outrage. Countering Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of cover-up involves exposing state violence and Liberation (Philadelphia: Temple University cruelty, for example through whistleblowing, Press, 1994); Andrew Rigby, Living the investigative reporting, courage of editors, and Intifada (London: Zed Books, 1991). alternative media. Countering devaluation can 24. Stephen Zunes, “The Role of Non-violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (1999): 137–69. 27. Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World 25. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through (New York: Basic Books, 1987), in a well- Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese informed assessment of the driving forces Resistance Movement’s Strategy for Engage- behind terrorism — especially terrorism asso- ment,” Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000): ciated with social revolution and national 17–31. liberation — supports an anti-terrorism policy 26. Two or three million Vietnamese died in that permits “young intellectuals to be reunited the wars for independence and up to a million through collective action with their people” Algerians. (236).

116 Justice Ignited be done through humanizing of targets, for was used against refugees helped to discredit example through personal contact, speaking formal channels for justice in the eyes of tours, and human-interest stories. Countering movement participants. Finally, the church and government interpretations — sometimes sin- associated personal networks provided support cere, sometimes spin and lies — requires for resisting government intimidation. The ongoing efforts to communicate understand- Central America solidarity movement thus was ings from the point of view of victims and effective in countering each of the five critics. Countering the pacifying effect of methods for inhibiting outrage from injustice. official channels — such as investigations that whitewash what is happening — requires Conclusion trusting official procedures less and exposing and discrediting processes that give a false Terrorism, as a tool for bringing about a better appearance of justice. Countering intimidation world, has remarkably poor prospects, even and bribery involves refusing to be cowed or when the cause being supported is a worthy co-opted and exposing attempts to intimidate one. Examining the dynamics of outrage from and bribe. injustice leads to the conclusion that nonvio- In the 1980s, the U.S. government was lent action is usually far more effective than involved in state terrorism in Central America violence in challenging repression and oppres- by assisting governments and paramilitary sion. In spite of this, violence has a continuing groups that imprisoned, assaulted, tortured, appeal to some challengers, for various and killed opponents. The U.S. government reasons including cultural assumptions, the disguised its role by use of proxy armies — way violence serves to polarize populations notably the Contras in Nicaragua — and client and cement the role of group leaders, and the governments. It stigmatized opponents as way violence by non-state groups serves to communists and terrorists and claimed all its justify state violence. actions were in the interests of democracy. State terrorism also has a continuing appeal Opponents in the United States came under to state elites, because it often achieves its surveillance and were subject to disruptive immediate ends, though seldom are these interventions by government agencies. supportive of values such as peace and In opposition to this U.S. state terrorism in freedom. Because terrorism so often serves the Central America, many U.S. citizens joined interests of powerholders in state and non-state peace groups, which together became a power- groups — almost always male dominated, ful movement.28 One of the movement’s most hierarchical, and secretive — it is unlikely potent challenges to the government was violence will be renounced any time soon. support for refugees from Central America, Nonviolent action is a continuing challenge often undertaken through church networks. to violent options, both as an exemplary alter- The stories told by these refugees to groups of native to non-state violence and as a method of church people avoided government censorship opposing state violence. Examining the five and media spin. When church people met main methods for inhibiting outrage over refugees face to face, the refugees became injustice can offer guidance for nonviolent flesh-and-blood humans rather than anony- campaigns, as shown by the example of the mous victims, thereby countering attempts at Central America peace movement. It is also devaluation. The refugees’ stories were a possible to use this same approach to suggest direct challenge to the government’s interpre- ways of highlighting how nonviolence is tations of its policy. Seeing the way the law superior to violence. This leads to the following five suggestions.

28. Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The • Reveal the value of nonviolence by U.S. Central America Peace Movement further studies of historical and contemporary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). use of nonviolent action. Terrorism as predictable backfire 117

• Counter devaluation of nonviolence prac- Acknowledgements titioners by emphasizing their courage and I thank Howard Clark, Truda Gray, Keith suffering and their unwillingness to harm McLeod, Jeff Ross, Greg Scott, and Steve others. Wright for valuable comments on drafts of this • Counter interpretations of nonviolence as chapter. passive and ineffective by documenting its successes and documenting the failures of violence. • Avoid relying on government support for promotion of nonviolent alternatives, and avoid assuming that government initiatives — sanctions, peacekeeping, peace plans, disarmament negotiations, treaties, laws — are going to solve problems or, indeed, are intrin- sically nonviolent. • Refuse to be intimidated by critics of nonviolence and refuse to be bought off by opportunities within the mainstream.

The backfire framework offers a way of analyzing tactics against injustice. In doing so, it reveals the shortcomings of terrorism and the strengths of nonviolent action. Nonviolent action is both an alternative to non-state terrorism, a method of challenging the social conditions that can breed non-state terrorism, and a method of challenging state terrorism. It is thus a potent but neglected anti-terrorist tool.29

29. See, generally, Tom H. Hastings, Nonvio- lent Response to Terrorism (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004). There are other ways that nonviolent approaches can be mobilized against terrorism. One is to replace large, potentially dangerous technological systems, such as large power plants, dams, and refiner- ies, with small-scale decentralized systems, such as energy efficiency and renewable energy systems, thereby reducing the vulnerability of societies to terrorists. See Brian Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle (London: War Resisters’ International, 2001). Another is to replace the present intelligence services, based on secrecy and centralized control, with agencies that openly publish their findings, thereby becoming more accountable as well as more reliable. See Brian Martin, “Nonviolence Versus Terrorism,” Social Alternatives 21 (Autumn 2002): 6–9.

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 13 (author’s prepublication version)

13 Theory and backfire

In the previous chapters, the phenomenon of ways — for example by acquiescing, quitting backfire has been presented through case their jobs, requesting explanations, counter- studies, from massacres to dismissals. These attacking, seeking union support, and making many examples reveal a remarkable regularity: complaints through internal grievance proce- perpetrators of injustice use the same five dures — each of which can be considered a methods of inhibiting outrage. The details vary tactic. Activists know a lot about tactics in from case to case: devaluation of protesters at practice, including how to carry them out and Sharpeville is different from denigration of a whether they are likely to be effective. Sur- whistleblower and in turn is different from prisingly, though, researchers seem not to have demonization of Iraq’s ruler Saddam Hussein. devoted much attention to classifying and Furthermore, each of the case studies gives analyzing tactics. The reasons for this are not additional insights, as discussed in the next obvious. chapter. But, despite differences, the common- In this chapter, I look at how the backfire alities are striking. model relates to various bodies of social My approach to backfire has been to closely theory. Exploring these connections can offer examine case studies and develop a framework insight into both backfire dynamics and the that fits the data. This is an example of what is phenomena that are the focus of the other called “grounded theory”: the theory is built theories. A theory is just a framework for up from observations.1 Observations alone thinking about the world, and each framework cannot dictate how they are explained: in has strengths and weaknesses. By exploring a developing grounded theory, the researcher range of theories for a particular issue, it is draws on a repertoire of concepts, relation- possible to gain greater insight, though at the ships, and ways of thinking drawn from risk of confusion from a proliferation of personal experience, reading, and interactions perspectives. It is important to keep one’s with others. That is what I have done. I started purpose in mind, so examination of theory with Gene Sharp’s concept of political jiu-jitsu does not become an end in itself, separate from — discussed later in this chapter — and the real issues we must deal with in the world. examined techniques that could inhibit or Some theories are clear, precise, and enhance the jiu-jitsu effect. Then I tested these limited in domain; others are ambiguous, ideas on a range of case studies, using them to complex, and sprawling, which for some extend and refine the framework. purposes can be an advantage. When it comes The backfire model highlights tactics used to comparing theories about social dynamics, in situations involving perceived injustice or some messiness is to be expected. Concepts norm violations. Tactics can be thought of as seldom line up in regular ways, and, given that options for action. For example, employees theories contain numerous concepts, relating who are treated unfairly respond in various two theories can be challenging. Because of these difficulties, the way I’ve arranged topics in this chapter is somewhat arbitrary: there is 1. Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, no ideal way to traverse diverse bodies of The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies theory, some of which relate to backfire as an for Qualitative Research (Chicago : Aldine- outcome, some of which relate to the essential Atherton, 1967). conditions for backfire, and some of which

Theory and backfire 119 relate to methods of inhibition and ampli- waged using nonviolent methods such as fication. rallies, strikes, boycotts, and various other I start with the antecedents of backfire in forms of protest and noncooperation. For theories of nonviolent action as developed by example, from about 1850 to 1867, Hungari- Mohandas Gandhi, Richard Gregg, and Gene ans used nonviolent methods — setting up Sharp. Then I look at the two key requirements their own political, economic, cultural, and for backfire, a perception of injustice and educational institutions — to build autonomy communication to receptive audiences. For within the Austrian empire.2 From 1898 to dealing with injustice, I start with the ideas of 1905, Finns used nonviolent methods to Barrington Moore, Jr. and then introduce oppose domination by the Russian empire.3 Albert Bandura’s model of moral disengage- Through these and other campaigns, there was ment and Stanley Cohen’s study of denial by quite a bit of practical experience in using individuals and governments. For dealing with nonviolent action. communication, I look at communication These early nonviolent struggles were technology and the role of the media. Next, I carried out on an ad hoc basis, without a well- compare the backfire model to a number of developed set of ideas to guide action. bodies of theory, on unanticipated conse- Gandhi’s contribution was to conceptualize quences, agenda management, social prob- nonviolence as a method of struggle. He lems, and social movements. Then I mention opposed violence as a matter of principle, but theories relating to each of the methods of he was also acutely aware that nonviolent inhibiting and amplifying outrage. Finally, I action, to be effective, needed to be used in comment briefly on studying backfire. specific ways. Before taking action, it was To begin, it is useful to return to the classic necessary to mobilize popular concern about cases of Sharpeville, Dili, and Dharasana, in injustice. Committed individuals had to be which one side had an overwhelming superi- convinced about the need to take action, but ority in the means of violence and used it not just any action. To be effective, solidarity against opponents who were largely unarmed was required, especially in the face of repres- and peaceful. Many people believe violence is sion. Participants had to be highly principled the definitive means of getting one’s way and and self-controlled, because any use of vio- that the only way to stop a violent person or an lence on their side could discredit the cause. aggressive military force is to threaten or use Gandhi was a master of strategic planning.4 violence. Yet at Sharpeville, Dili, and As described in chapter 4, the salt march, by Dharasana, the attacks turned out to be seri- focusing on a potent symbol of British oppres- ously counterproductive, leading to increased sion, mobilized millions of Indians. The drama support for those who were attacked. These of the lengthy march heightened expectations. cases are a challenge to conventional wisdom about violence. They suggest that being peaceful, indeed refusing to use violence, can be a 2. Tamás Csapody and Thomas Weber, powerful tool against attackers in the right “Hungarian Passive Resistance against Austria circumstances. How can this paradoxical effect and its Place in the History of Nonviolence,” be explained? Peace & Change, in press.

Gandhi 3. Steven Duncan Huxley, Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland: Finnish “Passive In answering this question, the first port of call Resistance” against Russification as a Case of is Mohandas Gandhi, the pioneer of strategic Nonmilitary Struggle in the European Resis- nonviolent action. To explain Gandhi’s contri- tance Tradition (Helsinki: Finnish Historical bution, a bit of context is useful. Society, 1990). For centuries before Gandhi, numerous so- 4. Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist cial struggles throughout the world had been (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979).

120 Justice Ignited

The British were placed in a bind: either nonviolent action. For ease of understanding, I capitulate to Gandhi’s polite but assertive usually use contemporary expressions such as demands, or respond with force and risk “nonviolent action” when describing earlier causing widespread outrage, as well as violat- campaigns, even though people at that time ing their own reputation for fair play. In earlier used different language.6 campaigns, such as in Hungary and Finland, Although Gandhi was the pioneer of strate- nonviolent action had been used in an instinc- gic nonviolence and was a prolific writer, he tive way; Gandhi turned nonviolence into a was not a highly organized thinker. His vast strategy, namely a systematic, calculated way corpus of writings contains many insights, but of using available resources to move towards a nowhere did he systematically spell out the desired goal. basic principles and dynamics of nonviolent Gandhi was not the first person to concep- action. The best way to understand his tualize nonviolent action. Well before the salt methods is to look at his practice, especially at march, some prominent individuals had his most effective campaigns. Fortunately advocated nonviolent methods. The famous there are some writers and researchers who nineteenth century author Leo Tolstoy was a have perceptively extracted Gandhi’s insights pacifist and urged rejection of all violence. about nonviolence.7 These writers might be During World War I, prominent philosopher called interpreters of Gandhi, remembering Bertrand Russell advocated nonviolent resis- that in the process of explaining someone tance as an alternative to military defense.5 So else’s ideas, some aspects are emphasized, Gandhi was not new in his advocacy of others neglected, and new insights added. nonviolence. His great contribution was combining advocacy with the practice of Gregg nonviolent action. He was a leader as well as a thinker and strategist. Richard Gregg, from the United States, was A note on terminology: I have been using one of the earliest and most perceptive inter- the expressions “nonviolence,” “nonviolent preters of Gandhi. A supporter of organized action,” and “nonviolent struggle.” This is labor, Gregg watched the failure of massive standard language today for referring to strike campaigns in the early 1920s, seeing the methods of action such as rallies, strikes, failure of both violence and government action boycotts, sit-ins, and fasts. These are methods to solve industrial problems. After reading that both go beyond conventional political about Gandhi and becoming inspired, in 1925 action (voting, lobbying, writing, speaking) Gregg set off for India in search of a better and avoid physical violence against opponents. alternative. He spent four years in India, A century ago, these terms were not in use. including seven months at Gandhi’s ashram. What today is called nonviolent action was On the basis of his observations, he wrote then often called “nonresistance” or “passive several books explaining Indian ideas for resistance.” Gandhi thought these terms were Western audiences. misleading. The methods he supported involved resistance, but they were active. So he sponsored a competition for a new expression, a process that led to the word “satyagraha,” 6. On early terminology, see Huxley, Constitu- literally “truth force” but also translated as tionalist Insurgency in Finland. 7. As well as Richard Gregg, these include Joan V. Bondurant, Conquest of Violence: the 5. Leo Tolstoy, Tolstoy’s Writings on Civil Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Princeton: Disobedience and Non-violence (New York: Princeton University Press, 1958); Krishnalal Bergman, 1967); Bertrand Russell, “War and Shridharani, War Without Violence: A Study of Non-resistance,” Atlantic Monthly 116 Gandhi’s Method and its Accomplishments (August 1915): 266–74. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939). Theory and backfire 121

Gregg’s most influential piece of writing loss of prestige due to a resort to violence, was a book titled The Power of Nonviolence.8 leading the attacker to lose self-respect and First published in 1934, it was widely read in self-assurance. The fourth is that the attackers pacifist circles and beyond, and in the 1950s become more suggestible to new ideas, in was influential in the U.S. civil rights move- particular to the views of the resister. In ment, being cited by Martin Luther King, Jr. as summary, moral jiu-jitsu succeeds by taking one of the five books most important in the moral initiative, not being surprised, shaping his ideas.9 The book is a classic work conserving energy (by not requiring anger), that can offer insights to readers today. and not being suggestible. The Power of Nonviolence discusses exam- Note that all of these effects are psychologi- ples of nonviolent action, how mass nonvio- cal. Yet Gregg provided no direct evidence of lent action can be effective, nonviolence as a any such effect. He did not do psychological substitute for war, and training for nonvio- experiments with attackers, nor did he system- lence. Each of these topics is worthy of atically examine their behavior using psycho- attention, but here I focus on a particular logical models. Gregg assumed, rather than contribution by Gregg: his concept of “moral demonstrated, that nonviolence succeeds by jiu-jitsu.” Though Gregg’s approach has affecting the attacker’s emotions. weaknesses — discussed later — I present his Gandhi was the inspiration for Gregg’s views here because they laid the foundation analysis. Gandhi treated satyagraha as a moral for later developments. process, which worked by converting the Gregg noted that when a person uses opponent to the view of the satyagrahi, or violence against someone else, if the other nonviolent activist. In essence, Gregg bril- person responds with violence, this gives liantly repackaged Gandhi’s views in terms of “reassurance and moral support” to the western ideas about psychology, thus making original attacker. That’s because the attacker’s them understandable by and more plausible to moral values are not challenged. However, if western readers. the target of violence does not use violence, The weaknesses of Gregg’s — and then the “attacker loses his moral balance” Gandhi’s — assumptions about how nonvio- while the defender maintains moral balance. lence operates were pinpointed by Gandhian Gregg called this process moral jiu-jitsu, an scholar Thomas Weber, who carried out a analogy with the martial art of jiu-jitsu in detailed analysis of the salt march, more than which the opponents’ strength and energy are half a century after the event.10 Weber pointed used against them. out that when the police, armed with lathis, Gregg gave several reasons why moral jiu- brutally assaulted nonresisting satyagrahis at jitsu works. The first is surprise: when faced Dharasana, the police did not become con- with nonviolence, the attacker is caught verted by the satyagrahis’ nonviolence. For unawares. The second is that nonviolence these police, moral jiu-jitsu did not seem to stimulates kindliness in the attacker, which apply. There is no evidence that they were conflicts with the attacker’s anger. The third is surprised, were stimulated to feel kindly that an audience, if present, sees the attacker’s emotions, lost self-respect, or became more suggestible. Some of the police were appar-

8. Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Nonvio- lence, 2d ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 10. Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The 1966). Historiography of Gandhi’s March to Dandi 9. Joseph Kip Kosek, “Richard Gregg, (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997). See also Mohandas Gandhi, and the Strategy of Thomas Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Nonviolence,” Journal of American History 91 Walked Forward until Struck Down’: (March 2005): 1318–48, is an excellent Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion,” Peace examination of Gregg’s work and influence. & Change 18 (July 1993): 267–89.

122 Justice Ignited ently provoked by the nonresistance of the Gandhi’s conception of satyagraha was satyagrahis and became even more frenzied in deeply moral. For him, violence was a viola- their beatings. This is compatible with in- tion of basic humanity, whereas nonviolence creased anger, not what Gregg had presumed. was an expression of the highest principles, Weber decided that, in the case of the salt part of an entire way of life. Accordingly, march, nonviolence worked primarily through Gandhi’s approach is often called principled a different means: by winning over observers, nonviolence. including those who heard about the events Sharp developed an alternative approach second-hand. These third parties were the key that can be called pragmatic nonviolence.12 to the potency of the salt march campaign. Rather than being a moral imperative, for Gregg was actually quite aware that on- Sharp nonviolent action should be used lookers could be won over by nonviolence. because it is effective. Whereas for Gandhi, But he treated this as a secondary means by nonviolence was a way of life, for Sharp, which nonviolence could produce positive nonviolent action is a practical tool for waging emotions in the attacker. Weber, in contrast, struggle. Sharp argues for nonviolence on the pointed to the reaction of the audience as grounds that it is more effective than violence. central to the jiu-jitsu effect of nonviolence. The moral superiority of nonviolence is In summary, Gregg’s The Power of Nonvio- shunted to the background. lence was a pioneering book, especially by Sharp’s pragmatic conception can and explaining and reconceptualizing Gandhi’s should be assessed on its own merits, but it is ideas for a western audience. For understand- worth noting its affinities with western ing the core dynamics of nonviolent action, sentiments. In western secular society, it may Gregg made two crucial contributions. First, be argued, principled stances have long been he developed the concept of moral jiu-jitsu, in the decline, replaced with a practical orien- highlighting the possibility that violence could tation. Doing what’s necessary to get the job rebound against the attacker. Second, he noted done is seen as acceptable, even admirable, the potential role of the audience: nonviolent even though principles may be compromised action could be seen as a performance. Though or jettisoned. Especially in English-speaking Gregg’s analysis has important limitations, countries, theory is commonly subordinated to these two contributions have continuing practical action. Whatever works is given relevance. priority. Even widely supported principles, such as freedom and democracy, become Sharp rhetoric rather than principles, and are mouthed tactically to achieve results. This Gandhi has remained a pivotal influence on contrast between principles and pragmatism is nonviolence research and action. One of the easily overdrawn, but is useful for pointing out many people influenced by Gandhi was Gene how Sharp’s ideas diverge from Gandhi’s. Sharp. Born in the United States in 1928, Today, Sharp is widely regarded as the Sharp became a pacifist and in 1953 spent nine world’s leading nonviolence researcher. His months in prison for refusing military service. crowning achievement was the book The As he studied nonviolence in more depth and Politics of Nonviolent Action, published in began a career as a researcher, Sharp gradually 1973.13 In it, he expounded a theory of power moved away from his Gandhian roots and developed a distinctively different conception of nonviolent action.11 12. The distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence was ably expounded by Judith Stiehm, “Nonviolence is Two,” 11. Thomas Weber, “Nonviolence is Who? Sociological Inquiry 38 (Winter 1968): 23–30. Gene Sharp and Gandhi,” Peace & Change 28, 13. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent (April 2003): 250–70. Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). See Theory and backfire 123 that explains the effectiveness of nonviolent the grant of support to the nonviolent action. He presented 198 different methods of actionists.14 nonviolent action, such as mock awards, symbolic sounds, excommunication, collective Sharp says political jiu-jitsu affects three disappearance, producers’ boycott, peasant groups: third parties not directly involved in strike, working-to-rule strike, blocking of lines the conflict; the attacker’s supporters; and the of command and information, nonviolent air “general grievance group,” namely those who raids, guerrilla theatre, and overloading of support the goals of the nonviolent actionists. administrative systems. Reading through the In the case of the Sharpeville massacre, third methods listed by Sharp, along with the parties included foreign governments and non- historical examples he uses to illustrate them, government organizations plus groups within helps dispel the idea that nonviolent action South Africa not implicated in the struggle for means just rallies or sit-ins. or against black equality; the attacker’s Also covered in the book is what Sharp supporters included the South African calls the “dynamics of nonviolent action.” government, the police, and much of the white Sharp looked at a wide range of nonviolent population; and the general grievance group campaigns and distilled their common ele- was the oppressed black population. ments, ending up with a set of stages or Most of Sharp’s treatment of political jiu- features that constitute the dynamics of jitsu consists of examples of how repression of nonviolent action. First is laying the ground- nonviolent resisters can affect various groups. work, followed by a challenge that leads to He does not delve into why political jiu-jitsu repression. To be successful, activists must occurs: the quote above is pretty much the maintain solidarity and nonviolent discipline. extent of his analysis. In a footnote, he distin- If they do, then attacks on them can result in guishes political jiu-jitsu from Gregg’s moral what Sharp calls “political jiu-jitsu.” Success- jiu-jitsu. Gregg focused on psychological ful nonviolent action results in a redistribution effects of nonviolence on the attacker. Sharp of power, including empowerment of activists accepts these may occur, but says these are themselves. Sharp’s dynamics of nonviolent “part of a much broader process” involving action, emerging from a close examination of social and political processes.15 According to nonviolent campaigns, can be treated as a form Sharp, Gregg “emphasizes the mechanism of of grounded theory. conversion and gives very little consideration My attention here is on the process of to the wider social, economic, and political political jiu-jitsu. Sharp describes it this way: pressures, often coercive, which may be involved in nonviolent action.”16 Sharp agrees By combining nonviolent discipline with with Gregg that a jiu-jitsu process can occur, solidarity and persistence in struggle, the but says it operates not just at the individual nonviolent actionists cause the violence of level, through conversion of individual attack- the opponent’s repression to be exposed in ers, but also through social, economic, and the worst possible light. This, in turn, may political processes. These processes are col- lead to shifts in opinion and then to shifts in lective as well as individual. power relationships favorable to the Sharp makes the point that not all nonvio- nonviolent group. These shifts result from lent struggles involve political jiu-jitsu. withdrawal of support for the opponent and Nonviolent action can be effective by persuading or discouraging oppressors, who

14. Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, 657. also Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century 15. Ibid., 698. Potential (Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005). 16. Ibid., 703.

124 Justice Ignited may decide attacking is counterproductive or the rest of their lives these same individuals futile. In Eastern Europe in 1989, governments behaved much like family and friends in held an overwhelming superiority in the ability conventional roles and occupations. A small to exercise force, but in the face of mass percentage of soldiers are or become hardened protests, most leaders decided to capitulate to killing, some of them enjoying it. Only a rather than attack. few centuries ago in Europe, public executions By adopting a new label, “political jiu- and torture were routine. History reveals a jitsu,” Sharp emphasizes how his conception human capacity for cruelty and barbarity, and differs from Gregg’s. Through many exam- complacently witnessing them, found in few ples, he illustrates the wide range of social, other species. political, and economic processes potentially Fortunately, though, only some individuals involved. For Sharp, political jiu-jitsu is become indifferent to or enamored with embedded in a wider dynamic of nonviolent violence, at least so far as personal participa- action that he sees as a pragmatic process for tion is concerned. Evidence exists that most waging struggles more effectively than using soldiers prefer to avoid harming their enemies. violence. However, Sharp does not give much Many soldiers would rather be killed than kill. attention to the essential conditions for politi- For example, in World War II, only a quarter cal jiu-jitsu, nor to its relevance to situations of U.S. soldiers on the front line in Western outside the framework of nonviolent action. Europe actually fired their rifles, and many of those who did fire did not aim at the enemy. Injustice Training in the U.S. Army since then has used psychological techniques to increase the firing What is required for political jiu-jitsu to rate.17 occur? One crucial factor is a feeling of If many soldiers are reluctant to kill enemy outrage, shock, or disgust. Sharp simply troops who are trying to kill them, then they assumes, without comment, that people will be are likely to be even more reluctant to kill upset by violent attacks on nonviolent pro- peaceful protesters. The history of nonviolent testers. action provides many examples of this. In However, not all people react in the same 1986 in the Philippines, there was a nonviolent way to an event. Consider an event such as the uprising against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Dili massacre. Some who witnessed it or Marcos. Hundreds of thousands of people found out about it became so passionately filled the streets of Manila: ironically, the aroused that they felt driven to take an open peaceful demonstrators defended military stand against the perpetrators. Others were defectors from armed attack by the regime’s highly disturbed and receptive to initiatives by main forces. Because of the crowd, pilots others. Yet others were not concerned enough refused to attack the defectors.18 to do anything, but nevertheless revised their In 1991, opponents of a coup in the Soviet opinions of the perpetrators. Then there were Union congregated around the Russian parlia- those who tried to ignore information about ment building, which became the centre of re- the massacre or who just didn’t care. On the sistance. A special assault team was instructed other hand, some thought the shootings were to take over the building, but the team refused an unfortunate mistake or that they were fully justified, and perhaps a few thought the soldiers should have killed even more people. 17. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psycho- It is important to remember that even appar- logical Cost of Learning to Kill in War and ently cold-blooded murder can seem accept- Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). able to many of the killers and some observers. 18. Monina Allarye Mercado, ed., People Nazi death camp guards were willing to Power: An Eyewitness History: The Philippine witness and perpetrate horrendous atrocities Revolution of 1986 (Philadelphia: Library without any apparent revulsion, although in Company of Philadelphia, 1987). Theory and backfire 125 to act because it would have meant large determining if a situation does this: it gener- numbers of civilian deaths.19 ates outrage in western society and in some These examples testify to a widespread nonwestern societies (including nonliterate reluctance to harm others, especially when the ones), and, in cases where no outrage is others are not causing harm themselves. observed, there are “social and psychological Society could hardly operate otherwise. mechanisms” present to inhibit it. (Note that Human cooperation is necessary for produc- Moore’s argument assumes only a biological tion of necessities, rearing children, and influence on moral codes, not genetic determi- learning, among many other activities. If every nation. In any case, a biological foundation is second person was prone to use violence not needed for the analysis in this book.) without provocation or restraint, society as we According to Moore, in societies in which know it would not be possible. Therefore it is there are rulers — hereditary, dictatorial, or not surprising unprovoked attacks are widely elected — these rulers are expected to provide condemned. security against attacks, whether physical Social historian Barrington Moore, Jr. in his attacks or threats to food and other vital neces- book Injustice examines the ways people in sities. A feeling of injustice can be created by different societies respond to certain things as certain violations of an implicit and variable unjust.20 From his observations, he draws social contract, including when rulers do not some important conclusions. Moore starts with provide security, when rulers take advantage an example: a man hits another man in the of their position, and — most relevant to face, without any justification. (It’s not a political jiu-jitsu — when rulers exercise boxing match, for example.) The victim will excessive cruelty. Moore says, “every culture feel moral outrage because the attack was seems to have some definition of arbitrary unjustified. The feeling would be much the cruelty on the part of those in authority.”21 same if it was a man striking a woman, or a It is worth expanding on this point. Moore woman striking a man or another woman. The says most if not all societies have definitions anger felt by the victim is due to the violation of what it means to be human. These defini- of a moral code, namely that a person should tions set limits on the severity of punishment not assault another without justification. It’s and how it should be carried out. Exceeding also possible to feel anger about an inappro- these limits leads to “moral outrage and a priate moral code. Workers might well feel sense of injustice.” In summary, “An unjust angry about a rule that allowed bosses to kick punishment we can define as one that arouses them in the shins at any time. revulsion either because it is undeserved or Moore argues that the sense of injustice is because it is excessively severe or cruel, or shaped by human biology, which sets limits on some combination of these two reasons.”22 and influences the direction of moral codes. For example, no moral code exists that requires people to kill other humans on sight, 21. Ibid., 26 (emphasis in the original). because any group with such a code would Another way to look at this is to say that never survive. Moore thinks it is plausible that people adopt an “injustice frame” — a frame is some situations may generate a sense of social a way of looking at the world — when they injustice in every society. He gives criteria for believe that authorities, or the authority system, are linked to injustice. See William A. Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina, 19. Vladimir Pozner, Eyewitness: A Personal Encounters with Unjust Authority Account of the Unraveling of the Soviet Union (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1982), 14; (New York: Random House, 1992), 175. William A. Gamson, Talking Politics 20. Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt 1991), 31–58. (London: Macmillan, 1978). 22. Moore, Injustice, 30, 28.

126 Justice Ignited

The Sharpeville massacre, the Dili massacre, This concept of backfire is an extension of and the Dharasana and King beatings all fit Sharp’s concept of political jiu-jitsu, in two this picture. Indeed, they were both unde- ways. First, whereas political jiu-jitsu deals served and excessively severe. This helps to with violations of the norm condemning vio- explain the massive reaction against the at- lence against nonviolent protesters, backfire tackers in each case. It also explains the deals with violations of a variety of norms, revulsion against torture. such as those relating to free speech, fair I have elaborated on Moore’s examination treatment in the workplace, and appropriate of injustice because I find it especially relevant behavior in international affairs. Second, back- to understanding social struggles, but there are fire examines tactics used in struggles over many others who have studied justice and injustice, specifically perpetrators’ tactics of injustice. There is a great deal of philosophical cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official writing, though much of it is conceptual; its channels, and intimidation and bribery and relevance to practical struggles requires further their opponents’ tactics of exposure, valida- investigation. A huge body of legal writing tion, interpretation, mobilization, and resis- about justice exists; however, much of it is tance. The case studies in this book, from about rules and formal procedures — the sorts Sharpeville to Abu Ghraib, reveal a rich of matters dealt with by courts — often quite variety of tactics that nevertheless can be divorced from the powerful human emotions conveniently classified into five categories. experienced by plaintiffs and defendants. The need to look at tactics is motivated by When I speak of “justice,” I’m referring to the observation that injustices often do not people’s sense of right and wrong, in other backfire. The case studies in this book are words to “moral justice.”23 Even so, legal atypical in that they involve massive public conceptions of justice overlap with moral outrage. For every publicized police beating, justice, and these can influence each other. such as Rodney King’s, there are thousands Finally, there is a large amount of research in that receive little or no public attention. For social psychology about justice. These and every counterproductive massacre, such as the other bodies of theory undoubtedly contain one in Dili, there are numerous others that do insights that can be used for better under- not generate such a massive reaction, such as standing backfire dynamics. the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in 1965-1966.25 So there is a need From Political Jiu-Jitsu to Backfire to explain the relative lack of reaction in these other cases. Moore gives a clue when he notes Backfire, in a general sense, is the recoiling of an action against its originator. My focus is on backfires due to actions taken by powerful came up with a definition of backfire relevant individuals or groups against those less power- to social movements: “a public reaction of ful. Typically, this occurs because information outrage to an event that is publicized and about the action is communicated to people perceived as unjust.” Here, I give a more who perceive it as unjust, disproportionate, general description. A single definition that disgusting, or otherwise inappropriate.24 covers all possible circumstances is likely to be too abstract to be all that useful in specific applications, so it makes sense to use 23. Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral somewhat different definitions for different Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do purposes. What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins, 25. Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian 2004), 17–18. Vickers, “Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian 24. David Hess and I, in “Backfire, Repres- Repression: Studying Lower-profile Nonvio- sion, and the Theory of Transformative lent Resistance,” Pacifica Review 13 (2001): Events,” Mobilization 11 (June 2006): 249–67, 143–56. Theory and backfire 127 that certain types of situations universally it. Psychologists call this the “justice motive” generate a sense of social injustice except and have analyzed how it arises and is when “social and psychological mechanisms” expressed.28 exist that inhibit it.26 The five methods of Related to the justice motive is belief in a inhibition resulted from my search for what just world: many people want to believe the discourages outrage. world is just and people get what they deserve. My concern is primarily with norm viola- This belief can have divergent consequences. tions by powerful groups, such as Moore’s If it is possible to help someone suffering “rulers.” Among the possibilities are police injustice, many people will take action. On the beating protesters, governments jailing oppo- other hand, some people — especially when nents, corporations dismissing whistleblowers, they are powerless to have an impact — will and bosses harassing employees. maintain their belief in a just world by Norm violations by the less powerful, the blaming the victims for their plight.29 opposite situation, seldom generate outrage. Rather than becoming outraged at the When a person steals a car and is caught and injustice, an alternative is “moral disengage- ordered to pay a fine or do some community ment.” Albert Bandura, a leading psychologist service — whatever is the normal penalty in who developed an entire framework for under- that society — most people perceive that standing human thought and action, examined justice has been done, so there is no need to be “mechanisms of moral disengagement,” which concerned. If the penalty is nonexistent or too are the ways a person who is responsible for light, some people will be upset. Likewise if something can psychologically minimize or the law is regarded as unjust or the penalty is eliminate moral concern about it. He identified seen as excessive, some people will be upset. various mechanisms that apply to reprehen- Jean Valjean, the protagonist of Victor Hugo’s sible conduct, to the detrimental effects of the novel Les Miserables, stole some bread to feed conduct, or to the victim.30 his starving family and was sent to prison for 19 years. The social injustice of desperate poverty and the legal injustice of an excessive 28. Claudia Dalbert, The Justice Motive as a sentence provide the motive force for this Personal Resource: Dealing with Challenges powerful and influential story. and Critical Life Events (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 2001); Michael Ross and The Psychology of Outrage Dale T. Miller, eds., The Justice Motive in Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge Moral outrage is a matter of individual University Press, 2002). I thank Truda Gray psychology. It can be thought of as anger for suggesting these references. directed outwards, against social injustice, 29. Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just literally “out-rage.”27 For a given event, some World: A Fundamental Delusion (New York: people become outraged but others do not, Plenum, 1980); Leo Montada and Melvin J. perhaps because they are susceptible to the Lerner, eds., Responses to Victimizations and methods of devaluation, reinterpretation, and Belief in a Just World (New York: Plenum, official channels. 1998). Most people are concerned about justice and many are willing to take action to promote 30. Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of 26. Moore, Injustice, 14. Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–91. 27. Carol Tavris, “A Rage for Justice,” in This chapter is based on Albert Bandura, Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion, rev. ed. Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 251– Social Cognitive Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 85. NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986), 375–89. I thank

128 Justice Ignited

• Moral justification, for example religious little violence, then heavy-handed brutality is permission to kill in certain circumstances. easier to justify. This highlights the impor- • Euphemistic labeling, such as describing tance of maintaining a principled stand in the civilians killed in a bombing raid as “collateral face of injustice, refusing to adopt the repre- damage.” This sort of labeling serves to shape hensible techniques used by the perpetrator. the way perpetrators think about matters, As soon as the victims make a misstep, attack- minimizing the sense of guilt. ers will have a pretext for blaming them. • Advantageous comparisons, such as not- Bandura’s mechanisms of moral disengage- ing that the other side has committed horren- ment offer a psychological framework for dous atrocities. This serves to make one’s own outrage-inhibition techniques of reinterpreta- transgressions seem insignificant by contrast. tion and devaluation. Bandura focuses on the • Displacement of responsibility, for exam- psychology of the perpetrator, but the same ple by saying one was only following orders. analysis can be applied to bystanders and This serves to put psychological distance perhaps even to some victims. between the perpetrator and responsibility. Several of the psychological methods dis- Authorities can use this mechanism by finding cussed by Bandura are exact counterparts of ways to encourage action by others — the the methods used by perpetrators to inhibit the agents of the authorities — while minimizing injustice response. Avoiding thinking about an the sense of responsibility felt by the agents. atrocity can be thought of as psychological For example, state terrorists use proxies to cover-up. Blaming the events on the victims is carry out atrocities, and then, should anyone a form of devaluation. Believing one of the complain, blame the proxies. Bandura notes alternative accounts of what happened is a that agents are most efficient when they take form of reinterpretation. Trusting that official responsibility for executing duties but do not bodies will ensure justice will be done is the feel personally responsible for consequences. psychological foundation for the tactic of • Diffusion of responsibility, for example official channels. through the division of labor. A cook or The backfire model, as I have presented it, accountant in the military may feel little focuses on actions, such as hiding information, responsibility for atrocities carried out by making public statements, and setting up troops. A scientist who develops a mathemati- formal investigations, and gives little overt cal model for bullet design may feel little attention to psychology. There are striking responsibility for the people killed and parallels between these actions and Bandura’s maimed by the bullets actually used. psychological processes for moral disengage- • Disregarding or misconstruing conse- ment. Bandura’s framework offers one way for quences, such as not enquiring into the effects backfire analysis to be extended to the of an assault. This process is easiest when the psychological domain and for studying the consequences are remote, as when missiles are psychological foundations for the generation fired at a great distance from the target. If the and inhibition of outrage.31 suffering caused by one’s actions is immediate and vivid, it is more difficult to disregard. States of Denial • Dehumanization, as when targets are portrayed as mindless, ferocious, or subhuman. A For linking psychology, politics, and injustice, crime against a devalued object does not seem the outstanding treatment is Stanley Cohen’s so bad. book States of Denial, which examines the • Attribution of blame, as when victims are ways people and governments respond to blamed for their plight. If protesters use even a

31. Samantha Reis and I are investigating Samantha Reis for helpful discussions about psychological theories that provide a useful Bandura’s work. underpinning of backfire analysis. Theory and backfire 129 information about atrocities such as torture, method of devaluation, though of witnesses massacres, and genocide.32 In many cases they and concerned citizens rather than the victims prefer to ignore or deny what is happening. themselves. Individuals commonly use psychological Cohen’s category “appeal to higher loyal- techniques to deny the existence or signifi- ties” — in which the loyalty could be to a peer cance of atrocities; governments use a variety group, a nation, or an ideology — could be of procedural and rhetorical techniques. Cohen taken as a psychological form of an official also examines and assesses strategies of channel, but it also affects the other methods human rights groups, especially Amnesty In- of inhibition. Cover-up is easier to justify ternational, to overcome denial. In his when it is demanded by law, government analysis, Cohen acknowledges that denial is policy, or commanding officials. Devaluation inevitable to some extent, at the same time of victims is a natural counterpart to the glori- seeking ways to understand and expose it. fication of peers, nations, or ideologies. Cohen focuses on five key techniques of Reinterpretations are easier to accept when one denial: is loyal to those making them. Finally, • Deny responsibility; intimidation and bribery, like cover-up, are • Deny injury; easier to justify when promoted by those in • Deny the victim appropriate status; authority. Cohen’s model overall is quite • Condemn the condemners; compatible with the backfire model. • Appeal to higher loyalties. There are a number of differences in He looks at how these techniques are deployed emphasis between the two models. Cohen by perpetrators (such as torturers and killers), focuses on denial at the psychological and officials, bystander individuals, and bystander government levels, whereas the backfire model states.33 looks at tactics used by perpetrators, with less Cohen’s five techniques of denial can be immediate attention to psychological dimen- readily related to the methods of inhibiting sions. Cohen focuses on atrocities, whereas the outrage from injustice. Denying responsibility backfire model can be applied to anything for the injustice and denying injury — namely, perceived as an injustice or norm violation. saying the harm is nonexistent or less than Cohen focuses on denial and how to challenge claimed — are two key methods of reinter- it, whereas the backfire model looks at actions pretation. Denying the victim appropriate by perpetrators and targets as a strategic status is much the same as devaluing the engagement. victim. Condemning the condemners — Cohen also looks at many important issues namely, criticizing those who raise the alarm that are not central to the backfire model. One about human rights violations — is also a is the process of turning outrage into action, something the backfire framework simply assumes to happen for a portion of the popula- 32. Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing tion. Cohen probes this process by examining about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: appeals by Amnesty International, looking at Polity Press, 2001). what sorts of images and texts attract attention, 33. Cohen adapts these techniques from whether simplicity or complexity is more Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, effective, how resistance to appeals can be “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of overcome, and how people become involved. Delinquency,” American Sociological Review Cohen also examines ways of acknowledging 22 (1957): 664–70. Sykes and Matza’s past crimes, such as truth commissions. techniques of neutralization are psychological States of Denial thus both overlaps with and mechanisms used by delinquents to justify complements backfire analysis. The book is an their deviant behavior. Cohen shows how essential study for anyone concerned about these techniques are used by both individuals human rights. and deviant authorities.

130 Justice Ignited

Communication On the other hand, many audiences now have a higher expectation of documentation, As well as a perception of injustice, a second especially visual documentation. With a diet of requirement for backfire is that information graphic images in television news, it is plausi- about the event or situation is communicated ble that viewers are saturated with stories to receptive audiences. Sharp simply assumes about wars, atrocities, and starvation, suffering that relevant audiences, notably third parties, “compassion fatigue.” Only something even are aware of what has happened. Yet in many more spectacular and horrific than usual can cases they are not. If photojournalists had not disturb the equanimity of the viewer habitu- been present in Sharpeville, if Max Stahl’s ated to atrocities — or so the argument goes. video had been confiscated by Indonesian Would eloquent prose alone be sufficient troops, or if Webb Miller had not filed reports today to arouse passions about an unseen from Dharasana, outrage about these events event, as did Webb Miller’s stories about the would have been reduced. salt march in 1930? Arguments can be made The case studies reveal the changing role of either way; further study is needed to assess communication technology. In rapidly com- the matter. municating the events at Dharasana in 1930 to Communication certainly involves more an international audience, the principal means than facts: it is also about meaning. Miller’s was text, namely Webb Miller’s eloquent reports were vivid personal accounts, undoubt- prose, sent by cable to press outlets world- edly generating more concern than a dry wide. (Photos were taken, but could not be recital of the number of people injured in the distributed electronically.) Thirty years later, salt raids. Photos and film add another dimen- at Sharpeville, text was supplemented by sion to communication. A picture can drama- photographs, which helped turn the massacre tize a situation in a way virtually impossible to into a front-page story outside South Africa. achieve in words. Another three decades later, at Dili in 1991, Another reason why pictures can communi- video footage supplemented photographs and cate effectively is they seem to be more direct. text, and it was the video images that had the A verbal description has to be composed by greatest impact. That same year, in Los someone, and the credibility of the author Angeles, the videocamera also played a key influences the response by readers. Photos, role, in recording the beating of Rodney King; though, seem to portray reality without furthermore, a portion of the King-beating mediation.34 video was ideal for television, which turned Of course, often this is an illusion: photos the incident into a giant scandal. In 2004, at are taken by photographers, and their choices Abu Ghraib, the key technology was the of what to include and exclude influence the digital camera: quick and easy to use, its meanings inferred by audiences. Every story images can be stored and sent electronically. and every camera shot frames an event and As information and communication tech- excludes or downplays some perspectives. A nologies evolve, their contribution to making photograph can suggest the point of view of injustices backfire is subject to divergent the victim or the perpetrator. Details of angle, influences. Most obviously, devices for cheap, shade, focus, and distance shape the message convenient, and high-quality recording and conveyed. Similarly, subtle changes in the use communication make it possible to obtain ever better documentation of abuses. This trend towards lower cost, smaller size, higher 34. Perceptive accounts of the influence of quality, and easier communication seems images of suffering include Cohen, States of likely to continue, making it ever easier to Denial, 168–95, and Matthew Ericson, “The acquire and distribute evidence of all sorts of Public Epiphany: Photography, Censorship injustice. and Public Policy,” Australian Journalism Review 27 (July 2005): 123–38. Theory and backfire 131 of words can make a big difference in the causing the shootings to backfire on the South impression conveyed by a text. Some African government. manipulation of images and texts is more As described in chapter 5 on the King obvious, as in blatant propaganda; subtle beating, the mass media normally adopt manipulation, intended or not, is ubiquitous. framings by dominant groups, particularly With digital editing technology, available to governments. Official assessments are often anyone with a computer, it is ever easier to lie presented without critical comment, even with pictures. To the extent viewers know when journalists know politicians are being about this potential, they may be more skepti- misleading or attempting to set the agenda in cal about what they see. Furthermore, expo- their own interests.36 For example, in the run- sure of faked images — such as of a British up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. mass soldier allegedly urinating on an Iraqi prisoner media reported government claims about — serves to create wariness about genuine weapons of mass destruction and the danger ones. posed by Saddam Hussein, seldom mentioning The mass media often play a key role in double standards such as lack of government communication about injustice. The attitudes concern about Israeli or Pakistani nuclear and practices of journalists, editors, and weapons or about ruthless dictators in other owners are crucial in determining what issues countries. As noted by Regina Lawrence are reported and how they are portrayed. concerning police use of force, sometimes an Western news practices are guided by what are event breaks through the usual elite framing of called “news values,” which are implicit news, creating an alternative event-driven criteria journalists and editors use to decide framing.37 The King beating and many other what counts as news. News values include backfires fit this model. prominence, proximity, conflict, timeliness, Media coverage is central to many back- action, human interest, and perceived conse- fires, such as Sharpeville, the King beating, quences. Events satisfying these criteria are Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, and Abu Ghraib. more likely to be perceived as newsworthy.35 So it is reasonable to ask, is media coverage For example, no prominent people were essential to backfire? The answer has to be no: involved in the Sharpeville massacre as either the key is communication to receptive audi- perpetrators or victims; proximity was greatest ences; the mass media are just one way for this in South Africa and then in countries, such as to occur, though an exceedingly powerful way. Britain, with historical links to South Africa; In the dismissal of Ted Steele, there was some conflict was obviously a central feature; mass media coverage, but much of the news timeliness was high, as the shootings had just traveled by e-mail and word of mouth. News occurred; the action was dramatic; the victims of the beatings at Dharasana were initially provided limited human interest, because they reported through newspapers, but much of the were unknown as individuals; and perceived subsequent publicity resulted from the efforts consequences were large because of the of groups supporting the Indian independence implications for foreign policy as well as struggle, for example by distributing reprints citizen reaction. The Sharpeville massacre did of Webb Miller’s articles. Social movement not fit all these news values, but it easily groups can operate as information dissemi- fulfilled enough of them to be worthy of nators. feature coverage, and this was crucial in

36. Paul H. Weaver, News and the Culture of 35. On news values and practices, see for Lying (New York: Free Press, 1994). example W. Lance Bennett, News: The 37. Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Politics of Illusion, 2d ed. (New York: Force: Media and the Construction of Police Longman, 1988) and Rodney Tiffen, News Brutality (Berkeley: University of California and Power (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989). Press, 2000).

132 Justice Ignited

The Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez accidents that injustice alone is not enough to cause received saturation coverage by the mass outrage: people need to know about it. media. But other accidents were initially unknown to or ignored by the media, but Unanticipated Consequences publicized by environmental groups. Well before the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile The idea of backfire has similarities with the Island in Pennsylvania, anti-nuclear-power idea that when someone takes action, the groups had circulated information about an consequences may be unexpected. In 1936 incident at Brown’s Ferry, Alabama, in 1975, Robert Merton, in the early stages of his career among others. Collections of stories about as an eminent sociologist, published a accidents and near misses were a staple of pioneering article on “The Unanticipated anti-nuclear brochures and talks, and served to Consequences of Purposive Social Action.”38 sensitize activists, supporters, journalists, and He enumerated, in abstract terms, reasons for much of the wider public to the possibility and the occurrence of unanticipated consequences, consequences of a nuclear disaster. This helps namely ignorance, error, a focus on immediate explain why the mass media were so ready to consequences that neglects concern with other cover Three Mile Island in 1979 and Cherno- consequences, basic values that prevent con- byl in 1986. It might be said that some early sideration of consequences, and self-defeating accidents backfired, to a limited extent, as a prophecy (namely, predictions of conse- result of awareness fostered by anti-nuclear quences that lead to a changed dynamic). groups, whose efforts laid the foundation for There is indeed a connection to backfire, media-driven backfires of Three Mile Island but not as close as might first appear. In most and Chernobyl. cases, perpetrators are aware of what is likely It is also possible for personal attacks to to backfire and take precautionary steps, but backfire in local situations, without any media the situation sometimes doesn’t work out as involvement. If the actions of an adult who they hoped. In other words, the possible sexually exploits a child are exposed to parents consequences are actually anticipated and or peers, there may be serious repercussions, actions are taken to prevent them. For exam- including loss of friends, reputation, or job, ple, police realize brutal beatings can cause even when police and courts are never in- outrage, so they usually hide their actions from volved and there is no media coverage. wider audiences, use intimidation, and so The prominent role of the media in the forth. Merton’s factors are relevant to backfire cases described in this book is, in part, an in a general sense, most commonly in relation artifact of the process by which these cases to the scale of consequences. were selected. The easiest cases to analyze, at a distance, are ones in which there is ample information publicly available, and this often 38. Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated means media coverage. For cases without Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” extensive media coverage, it is an advantage to American Sociological Review 1 (December be close to the events or to talk to people 1936): 894–904. Later, Merton related involved; that is how I gained a perspective on unanticipated consequences to the concepts of the dismissal of Ted Steele. manifest functions (consequences that are The two essential requirements for backfire, recognized) and latent functions (conse- a perception of injustice and communication to quences that are neither intended nor recog- receptive audiences, are sometimes hard to nized): Robert K. Merton, “Manifest and separate. Communication is not a neutral Latent Functions,” in Social Theory and Social process of information transfer, but shapes Structure, enl. ed. (New York: Free Press, meanings through the forms by which infor- 1968), 73–138. I thank Sue Curry Jansen for mation is packaged. Nevertheless, it is useful referring me to Merton’s work in relation to to mention both requirements as a reminder backfire. Theory and backfire 133

Raymond Boudon later developed and Europe tainted the anti-Communist cause. The expanded Merton’s idea by looking at recruitment of criminals and torturers, such as “perverse effects” in which the combined Gestapo officer Klaus Barbie, had a corrupting actions of many people produce effects influence on the CIA, which tried to hide its unintended by any individual. These effects links with such agents, and obstructed efforts may or may not be foreseen and may be by U.S. courts to prosecute war criminals.40 positive or negative. For example, many Chalmers Johnson, in his book also titled people obtain university degrees to improve Blowback, tells of numerous disastrous their status and job prospects, but when lots of outcomes from U.S. covert operations. In people obtain degrees the result is credential 1953, the CIA helped to overthrow Prime inflation, with a reduction in benefits to Minister Mossadegh of Iran and then sup- individuals.39 Backfire is a type of perverse ported the ruthless regime led by the Shah for effect, at least in most cases. However, neither the next 25 years. This caused enormous Merton nor Boudon systematically examined antagonism and contributed to anti-U.S. tactics used by perpetrators or targets to inhibit sentiment and actions by the theocratic Iranian or promote consequences of social action. regime that came to power following the revolution of 1978-79. In the early 1970s Blowback during the Indochina war, the U.S. military carried out massive covert bombing of Blowback is a term for the adverse unan- Cambodia, killing hundreds of thousands of ticipated consequences of foreign covert people. This helped the rise to power of the operations by government agencies. It was Khmer Rouge, who carried out genocidal originally used in the early 1950s by personnel killings from 1975 to 1979. The most famous in the Central Intelligence Agency to refer to case of blowback involves the Taliban in unwelcome side effects of agency operations Afghanistan, supported in the 1980s in their such as undermining governments or funding war against Soviet occupiers by CIA funding. guerrilla forces. Merton’s analysis of unantici- Among those receiving CIA support was pated consequences fits blowback perfectly. Osama bin Laden, who later turned on his Christopher Simpson in his book Blowback backers and launched attacks against U.S. tells of secret U.S. operations after World War targets, most notoriously the 9/11 attack.41 II employing former Nazis or collaborators, In theoretical terms, blowback is one type many of whom were guilty of war crimes. of backfire, namely a backfire from foreign Some scientists who were Nazi collaborators covert operations. Most of the studies of were brought to the United States to work on blowback have focused on the consequences research projects. Other ex-Nazis were re- cruited by the CIA to spy against the Soviet Union or to participate in armed anti- 40. Christopher Simpson, Blowback: Amer- Communist movements in countries in the ica’s Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on Soviet sphere. Simpson describes a range of the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld and negative consequences from these covert Nicolson, 1988). programs. They created distrust between the 41. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs governments of the United States and the and Consequences of American Empire (New Soviet Union, which had been allies during York: Henry Holt, 2004). See also Jonathan World War II, just a short time before. Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Operations by Nazi collaborators in Eastern Unfriendly World (New York: Penguin, 1986); Mark Zepezauer, Boomerang! How Our Covert Wars Have Created Enemies across 39. Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Conse- the Middle East and Brought Terror to quences of Social Action (London: Macmillan, America (Monroe, ME: Common Courage 1982). Press, 2003).

134 Justice Ignited of covert operations, but it is straightforward Reinterpretation to note the role of the five methods of inhibit- • Make symbolic gestures concerning the ing outrage, most obviously cover-up. issue. • Say the issue can’t be solved by government, Agenda Management or can’t be solved at all. • Say the issue shouldn’t be dealt with by Governments have to deal with lots of policy government. issues, some of which are difficult to handle, • Redefine the issue. with the potential to cause loss of popular • Shift attention to a different issue. support and possibly loss of office. Therefore • Redefine data that is being collected. it is predictable that governments will try to manage the issues already on the policy Official channels agenda, to move some issues off the agenda, • Set up consultations, committees, or inquiries and to prevent some issues from emerging in in order to postpone taking action. the first place. Government leaders prefer to • Establish a new organization to deal with a deal with the issues they decide are significant problem. rather than being put in the position of handling issues raised by other groups, Intimidation and bribery whether business, professions, community • Threaten or punish critics, for example groups, or the media. through withdrawal of government funding. In political science, this topic is called • Co-opt critics by inviting them onto official “agenda management.” Here is a list of agenda committees. management techniques.42 I have grouped them under the five methods of inhibiting This list shows it is quite easy to find corre- outrage. spondences between agenda management techniques and methods of inhibiting outrage Cover-up from injustice. Indeed, it might be said that • Stop collection of data, for example on agenda management is a process for govern- people discouraged from seeking work or ments to prevent or minimize backfire. This civilians killed in Iraq. makes sense because a prime reason for • Lie about what action the government is agenda management is to prevent or manage taking. public outrage over government policies or lack of government action. Devaluation There are a few agenda management • Discredit groups and spokespeople critical of techniques that do not fit easily into any of the the government. five categories, such as taking tokenistic actions on an issue and offering concessions in one area in exchange for reduced opposition in another. These are closer to the process of 42. Items on this list are drawn from Ann institutionalizing change. But most agenda Harding, “Unemployment Policy: A Case management techniques fit into backfire Study in Agenda Management,” Australian categories. Journal of Public Administration 44 (Septem- There are some differences between the two ber 1985): 224–46, at 225. See also Robert frameworks. Agenda management treats a host Eyestone, From Social Issues to Public Policy of techniques under one general category; the (New York: Wiley, 1978); Eric A. Nordlinger, backfire model classifies methods into five On the Autonomy of the Democratic State main categories. Agenda management has (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, been studied as a tool used by governments; 1981). I thank Marian Sawer for referring me backfire dynamics apply to all sorts of issues, to agenda management and Harding’s article. not just ones in which the government is seen Theory and backfire 135 as the “perpetrator.” Agenda management Backfire analysis differs from the usual studies look mainly at government actions; in analysis of social problem construction by the backfire model, equal attention is given to directing attention to a diverse range of tactics, responses by targets. But these are differences including but going beyond claims-making, in scope and focus. The backfire framework used in struggles around particular events. To can be seen as an elaboration and generaliza- put it another way, backfire can be conceived tion of agenda management to other arenas. as part of an ongoing construction of a social problem, and backfire analysis as an examina- Social Problems tion of a diverse array of tactics within the general framework of social problem con- When lots of people believe something is a struction. social problem — such as abortion, crime, police beatings, climate change, tax avoidance, Social Movements or war — this seldom happens spontaneously. Individuals and groups take a variety of Social movements are alliances of groups and actions to convince others something should individuals with a common vision for society. be conceived of as a problem. Environmental- Familiar social movements include the ists and others have argued global warming is feminist, anti-racist, peace, and environmental a serious problem; peace movements have movements. Movements can be defined by pushed to have war recognized as a problem what they are for — for example, peace, pro- that needs to be addressed. Others take a life, globalization from below — or what they contrary position: some industry leaders argue are against — anti-war, anti-abortion, anti- global warming is not a big problem; some corporate globalization. Sometimes the name government leaders argue war is sometimes itself is contentious. the solution to a more urgent problem, namely Movements are typically made up of a core a dangerous enemy. In short, defining of activists (sometimes paid, sometimes not), a something as a social problem can be thought set of organizations, members, occasional of as a social struggle.43 participants, and sympathizers. Movements are The making of claims, which is the key usually thought of as challengers to dominant process used in encouraging people to see groups or viewpoints, because powerholders something as a social problem, is much the don’t need to agitate to get what they want. same as the struggles over interpretation in There is an enormous body of writing about backfire dynamics. The backfire over the King social movements, with several well-devel- beating fed into the ongoing construction of oped theories for explaining their dynamics, police brutality as a social problem. Prior to including resource mobilization theory, new the beating, police brutality was already social movement theory, political process recognized, in some circles, as a significant theory, and framing theory. This theory can be social problem. The beating was an opportu- related to backfire in various ways. nity for commentators and activists, both those Members of social movements are often who had previously been active and new ones, motivated by outrage over perceived injus- to make powerful claims about the signifi- tices.44 The movement for gay and lesbian cance of police brutality. 44. For a psychological perspective, see Tom R. Tyler and Heather J. Smith, “Social Justice 43. Joel Best, ed., Images of Issues: Typifying and Social Movements,” in The Handbook of Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Social Psychology, Volume II, 4th ed., ed. Aldine de Gruyter, 1989); Malcolm Spector Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Lindzey (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998), Problems (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings, 595–629. I thank Truda Gray for this 1977). reference.

136 Justice Ignited rights was and continues to be motivated by suffering in its appeals to recruit members and concern over discrimination, persecution, and contributors.46 violence against gays and lesbians. This is Christian Smith, in his study of the U.S. fertile ground for backfire: a movement can be Central American peace movement, found that thought of as an audience that is highly recep- what he calls “moral outrage” was a key factor tive to information about injustice, including in recruitment into the movement, which had injustices concerning the core issues that strong religious roots. Smith found a number concern the movement and attacks on the of factors were important in producing movement itself. Furthermore, movements outrage, including religious murders (such as have the capacity to mobilize outrage, by the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero conceptualizing events in their frameworks, in 1980), refugee stories, and visits to Central communicating with members and supporters, America.47 and taking coordinated action. A person’s perception of injustice is an Studies of the movement against nuclear individual matter, but often it is linked to power, the anti-abortion movement, and the prevailing moral codes. Social movements movement for animal rights shows that they seek both to reveal things already perceived as gain many recruits because of “moral shocks,” unjust and to change people’s beliefs about namely shock at violations of one’s expecta- what is just and unjust. For example, the tions of what is fair. The 1979 nuclear reactor animal rights movement seeks to expose overt accident at Three Mile Island was a key moral cruelty to animals and encourages people to shock for recruiting people into the U.S. anti- see practices such as animal experimentation nuclear power movement. Some people decide and factory farming as injustices that should to join the anti-abortion movement after seeing be opposed. pictures of aborted fetuses; likewise, seeing When a movement exists, therefore, events pictures of animal experimentation can stimu- seen as unjust are more likely to backfire. late people to join the animal rights move- Cover-up is more difficult because movement ment.45 Amnesty International uses images of sympathizers with inside information know there is a receptive audience should they decide to leak information or blow the whistle. 45. Social scientists have examined various When respected figures join a movement, it is cases and ways in which injustice can stimulate social action. Edward J. Walsh, “Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island,” Movements,” Sociological Forum 13 (1998): Social Problems 29 (October 1981): 1–21, 397–424. On the role of emotions in social found that “suddenly imposed major griev- movements more generally, see Jeff Goodwin, ances,” including the Three Mile Island James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds., nuclear accident and major oil spills, could Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social promote mobilization of citizens. The idea of Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago “moral shocks” as means of recruitment into Press, 2001). social movements is analyzed by James M. 46. Cohen, States of Denial, 196–221. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and 47. Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti- U.S. Central America Peace Movement nuclear Protests,” Social Problems 42 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). (November 1995): 493–512; James M. Jasper, Smith describes two factors important for The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, creating moral outrage, “subjective engage- and Creativity in Social Movements (Chicago: ability” and “cognitive accessibility.” These University of Chicago Press, 1997); James M. are similar to what I call perception of Jasper, “The Emotions of Protest: Affective injustice and communication to receptive and Reactive Emotions in and around Social audiences. Theory and backfire 137 harder to devalue it. The movement’s net- dismissal stimulated concern about academic works provide ready means for communica- freedom. tion, and the movement may have access to Given the important role of social move- skilled communicators. Even when the mass ments in raising awareness of issues that media are unsympathetic, a movement may members believe are important — in effect have sufficient communication capacity to turning them into social problems50 — there is circulate its message widely. much to be learned by further study of backfire In social movement theory, an event that in connection with social movement theory. makes a dramatic difference to the success or Further insight into backfire dynamics will failure of a movement is called a “transforma- come from activists using the backfire frame- tive event.” A major backfire can be a trans- work to help choose their tactics.51 formative event.48 Examples include the Sharpeville massacre for the international anti- The Methods of Inhibition and apartheid movement, the Dili massacre for the Amplification East Timor independence movement, and the salt march for the Indian independence Each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage, movement. In some cases, campaigning can and corresponding methods of amplifying turn a seemingly minor event into a major outrage, can be related to bodies of research. issue. For example, the arrest of U.S. alterna- Addressing all of these would be a mammoth tive cancer therapist John Richardson in 1972 task, so all I can do is indicate some directions. became the basis for a massive expansion of If the methods of inhibition and amplification support for alternative therapies; rather than are thought of as tactics, then from a practical suppressing alternative therapies, the arrest viewpoint the main thing is to be able to served as a tool for campaigners to promote recognize what tactics are being used and, if them.49 desired, know how to counter them. For this Not every backfire involves a social purpose, the primary purpose of delving into movement, at least not centrally: few whistle- theories is to gain insights into varieties of blowers are involved with a movement and tactics. Of course, there is much more to neither Rodney King nor Ted Steele was a theories; in particular, they can throw light movement activist. Even so, prominent cases onto why things are the way they are. Suffice can link in with and stimulate movements. The it to say that relating bodies of theory to the King beating gave an enormous boost to methods of inhibition and amplification is a activism against police abuses and the Steele task waiting to be done.

Cover-up and Exposure 48. Hess and Martin, “Backfire, Repression, and the Theory of Transformative Events.” Cover-up can be achieved in various ways, one See especially Bill Moyer, with JoAnn of which is censorship. There is a long history McAllister, Mary Lou Finley, and Steven of censorship by churches and governments, Soifer, Doing Democracy: The MAP Model but any group can practice it. Censorship for Organizing Social Movements (Gabriola assumes one group has information and Island, BC, Canada: New Society Publishers, exercises its power to ensure others cannot 2001), a grounded theory of social movements in which, after laying the groundwork, a “trigger point” can stimulate mobilization. 50. Armand L. Mauss, Social Problems as There are commonalities between Sharp’s Social Movements (Philadelphia: Lippincott, dynamics of nonviolent action and Moyer’s 1975). MAP model. 51. Brian Martin and Iain Murray, “The Parkin 49. Hess and Martin, “Backfire, Repression, Backfire,” Social Alternatives 24 (Third and the Theory of Transformative Events.” Quarter 2005): 46–49.

138 Justice Ignited access it.52 Hence, an analysis of censorship Devaluation follows naturally from an analysis of power: each system of power — state, capitalism, Devaluation is the subject of a large amount of bureaucracy, patriarchy, and other others — theory in social psychology, anthropology, and will have its own characteristic modes of other fields. One explanation of devaluation is censorship. built around the creation of stereotypes, the Another way to achieve cover-up is to construction of in-groups and out-groups, and swamp important information in a deluge of the perception of out-groups as inferior. One trivial or distracting information. Sometimes a psychological basis for this process is projec- corporation, required by a government or court tion, in which despised, unrecognized aspects to disclose documents, delivers boxes or of a person’s personality are projected onto — truckloads of material; the sheer volume in other words, attributed to — some other makes juicy secrets harder to find. In a less person or group. This other person or group is then despised and, in more serious cases, deliberate fashion, the news media offer a 53 kaleidoscope of short items, including on attacked. One example is a man who denies crimes, celebrities, and human interest, so his feminine side and projects it onto women, important stories, requiring understanding of who he treats as inferior. A similar process can history and context, are lost on most of the help explain homophobia. At wider levels, audience. projection helps to explain racism and To make sense of the world, information is militarism. It could be said that U.S. govern- not enough: it needs to be put together in a ment officials, in planning an attack on Iraq, meaningful way. Often, there are various ways denied their own aggression and instead to understand important events; powerful attributed it to the Iraqi regime, which was groups would like to discourage attention to seen as so dangerous it had to be attacked, and ones that highlight their own nefarious roles. encouraged others to use the same process of In this context, “conspiracy theories” — projection. unorthodox explanations for important events, Sam Keen, in his book Faces of the Enemy, usually relying on self-interested actions by a provocative analysis of the psychology of powerful groups — can serve as a form of de war, reproduces war posters and other images facto cover-up. There are so many bizarre of the enemy in various degraded or hostile theories for events such as 9/11 and the assas- forms, including stranger, aggressor, faceless sination of President John F. Kennedy that it is being, enemy of god, barbarian, greedy person, easy to dismiss alternative explanations that criminal, torturer, rapist, beast, and agent of are better documented: every challenge to the death. In Keen’s catalogue, there is only a dominant view is classified as a conspiracy single positive image of the enemy, the worthy theory and dismissed. opponent of heroic warfare. Then there is the To challenge cover-up, the basic idea is modern technological view of the enemy as an exposure: getting information to audiences that abstraction, as a set of coordinates to be bombed. This is less personal but is certainly a can make sense of it. For analyzing this 54 process, theories of free speech are relevant, potent form of devaluation. but they do not focus on tactics of overcoming cover-up. More relevant are studies of investi- 53. Philip Lichtenberg, Community and Con- gative journalism and free speech campaigns. fluence: Undoing the Clinch of Oppression, 2d Using theory in these areas to help understand ed. (Cleveland, OH: Gestalt Institute of backfire is a project waiting to be carried out. Cleveland Press, 1994). 54. Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflec- tions of the Hostile Imagination (San 52. Sue Curry Jansen, Censorship: The Knot Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986). See also that Binds Power and Knowledge (New York: Robert W. Rieber, ed., The Psychology of War Oxford University Press, 1988). and Peace: The Image of the Enemy (New Theory and backfire 139

For challenging devaluation, Wolf Wolf- or responsibility for it, this can be called ensberger offers a theory called social role interpretation. valorization. It is specifically designed for Sometimes, due to secrecy or inherent severely devalued people, such as people with uncertainty, even well informed observers intellectual disabilities.55 The two basic cannot agree about what happened. Therefore, approaches are to increase the competencies of it may be impossible to decide whether an the devalued person, so they obtain more event is being covered up or reinterpreted, respect through their appearance and perform- neither, or both. This type of situation can ance in everyday life, and to put them in operate as a type of cover-up itself. socially valued roles — such as friend, Interpretation can be based on genuine employee, and family member — so they belief or on lies. Lying occurs when there is an acquire status through the roles. If you meet a intent to deceive, and can be either by stating well-groomed person working in a lawyer’s falsehoods, not stating truths, or giving office who greets you pleasantly, you are misleading accounts. There is a fascinating likely to think more highly of them than body of writing about lying that is relevant to meeting the same person who is slovenly, both cover-up and reinterpretation.56 unfriendly, and living on the street or in an The field of semiotics deals with systems of institution. Therefore, abuses frequently signs and how they create meaning. It offers a perpetrated against street people or people in wealth of insight into the ways people under- institutions would very likely backfire if done stand the world, and has influenced studies in to the same person in a lawyer’s office. Social many fields, but seems seldom to have been role valorization is a systematic approach to packaged specifically for activists.57 Closely challenging devaluation and can readily be related to semiotics is the study of rhetoric, applied to a range of circumstances. and on this Ellen W. Gorsevski’s book Peaceful Persuasion: The Geopolitics of Interpretation Struggles Nonviolent Rhetoric is essential reading. She shows how rhetoric can be used to prevent and Interpretation often overlaps with cover-up. To distinguish them, it is convenient to say that cover-up, in relation to a particular audience, occurs when this audience does not know 56. J. A. Barnes, A Pack of Lies: Towards a anything has happened. When the audience Sociology of Lying (Cambridge: Cambridge knows something has happened, but is encour- University Press, 1994); Paul Ekman, Telling aged to believe particular things about the Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, facts involved, the significance of the action, Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 1985); Charles V. Ford, Lies! Lies!! Lies!!! The Psychology of Deceit (Washington, DC: York: Plenum, 1991). On the stereotyping of American Psychiatric Press, 1996); David political resisters, see Austin T. Turk, Political Nyberg, The Varnished Truth: Truth Telling Criminality: The Defiance and Defense of and Deceiving in Ordinary Life (Chicago: Authority (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), University of Chicago Press, 1993); W. Peter 71–81. Robinson, Deceit, Delusion and Detection 55. Wolf Wolfensberger, A Brief Introduction (London: Sage, 1996). to Social Role Valorization: A High-Level 57. One activist-oriented study using discourse Concept for Addressing the Plight of analysis is Mary Richardson, Joan Sherman, Societally Devalued People, and for Structur- and Michael Gismondi, Winning Back the ing Human Services, 3d ed. (Syracuse, NY: Words: Confronting Experts in an Environ- Training Institute for Human Service mental Public Hearing (Toronto: Garamond, Planning, Leadership & Change Agentry 1993). I thank Nicky Evans for a helpful (Syracuse University), 1998). discussion about semiotics.

140 Justice Ignited manage conflicts; it is a short step to apply her as illegitimate. The ways audiences reacted to approach to interpretation struggles.58 sequences were more complex.61 Cerulo’s The study of propaganda offers many analysis reveals something few people notice relevant insights,59 as does work on advertis- — the semantic structure of headlines and key ing, public relations, and spin doctoring. sentences about violence reported in the media Psychological research on influencing people — can both reflect and influence attitudes is also relevant.60 A lot of this is about ma- about that violence. This has obvious rele- nipulating people; the reverse process, vance to struggles over the meaning of violent countering manipulation, is not as well incidents.62 developed, but there are nevertheless Harry Murray studied the introduction of numerous insights in these bodies of research. fingerprinting for welfare recipients in the Studies of debating techniques are another state of New York. The government’s ration- fruitful source of ideas. ale was to prevent multiple claims for benefits, Karen Cerulo in her book Deciphering but in practice the fingerprinting served to Violence says accounts of violence in the degrade a stigmatized group. Murray calls this media can be classified into four sequences: “deniable degradation” because the degrada- the performer sequence, from the perspective tion was justified by a cover story: the of the perpetrator; a victim sequence; a government could deny degradation was contextual sequence, giving priority to the intended. Murray lists four different deniabil- context of the violence; and a doublecasting ity strategies: deny the action; deny knowledge sequence, in which the victim is also presented of the action; deny the meaning of the action; as a perpetrator. “The police beat Rodney and deny any intention for the action.63 Each King” is a performer sequence. “Rodney King of these four strategies can be treated as a was beaten by police” is a victim sequence. technique of reinterpretation, except that “Just after midnight, under the spotlight from a denying the action might be cover-up. hovering helicopter, a confrontation occurred Thomas Mathiesen in his essays titled between Rodney King and the Los Angeles Silently Silenced gives a highly insightful police” is a contextual sequence. “Rodney analysis of methods of silencing opposition, King, after resisting arrest and lunging at an many of which could be classified as forms of officer, was beaten by police” is a double- reinterpretation. For example, he lists the casting sequence. Cerulo found performer following methods of “silent silencing”: sequences were most commonly used when • individualization, in which an action is violence was portrayed as legitimate, with treated in isolation; victim sequences used for violence presented • normalization, in which an action is considered normal; • cooption, in which criticism is accepted; 58. Ellen W. Gorsevski, Peaceful Persuasion: The Geopolitics of Nonviolent Rhetoric (Albany, NY: State University of New York 61. Karen A. Cerulo, Deciphering Violence: Press, 2004). The Cognitive Structure of Right and Wrong 59. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, (New York: Routledge, 1998). Propaganda and Persuasion, 4th ed. 62. Grammar can also influence understand- (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006). ings: see Annabelle Lukin, “Information 60. Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: How and Warfare: The Grammar of Talking War,” Why People Agree to Things (New York: Social Alternatives 24 (First Quarter 2005): 5– Morrow, 1984); Anthony R. Pratkanis and 9. Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The 63. Harry Murray, “Deniable Degradation: the Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New Finger-Imaging of Welfare Recipients,” York: Freeman, 1992). Sociological Forum 15 (2000): 39–63, at 42. Theory and backfire 141

• superficial endorsement; My initial assessment of official channels • displacement of responsibility, namely drew heavily on my experience with whistle- blaming someone or something else.64 blowers, as described in chapter 6, but on Each of these could be considered a technique examining other sorts of cases it became of interpretation, though some go beyond. apparent official channels play a similar role. Mathiesen is concerned with ways that But I have been unable to find much theory to systems — such as bureaucratic structures — say why this should be the case. To be sure, promote silencing, something deeper than the there are plenty of studies showing the failure active techniques deployed in struggles over of official channels in particular cases.66 There outrage. are some excellent critiques covering specific I have commented on a few studies that areas, for example the legal system67 and throw light on interpretation struggles. There disarmament negotiations.68 But there is little is a huge body of research relating to interpre- on the general phenomenon. This is not tation, both theoretical and practical material, surprising, because the usual assumption is which waits to be mined for insights relevant that courts, formal inquiries, ombudsmen, and to backfire dynamics. experts are routes to justice: they are “proper channels.” To argue that they provide only an Official Channels illusion of justice, for those making a challenge from below, is a form of heresy, Official channels in practice serve as powerful highly threatening especially to those who tools to dampen outrage from injustice. For believe the world is fundamentally just. example, when a government sets up a The explanation for the failure of official commission to investigate an issue, it is often channels is quite simple: if agencies were able apparent this is a tactic to delay taking action to dispense justice, then powerful elites could while the commission deliberates over a period be convicted of crimes and unequal social of months or years. Sometimes the govern- structures would be in danger of collapse. A ment, by setting narrow terms of reference and single whistleblower would be able to bring carefully picking the chair of the commission, down top managers; a single victim of obtains exactly the recommendations it discrimination would be able to undermine wanted; if not, the government may just ignore 65 systems of racism; a single victim of economic them. exploitation could overturn global trading rules; a single victim of state terrorism would

64. Thomas Mathiesen, Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiescence in 66. In June 2005, the Sydney Morning Herald Modern Society (Winchester, UK: Waterside ran a series of articles exposing the Australian government’s pattern of ignoring the recom- Press, 2004). mendations of parliamentary inquiries. The 65. This is a popular conception of investiga- government “has not replied on time to a tory commissions, according to Frank Burton single public inquiry out of the 62 it has and Pat Carlen, Official Discourse: On ordered in the House of Representatives since Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, December 1998. It has given no reply at all to Ideology and the State (London: Routledge & almost half of them.” Gerard Ryle and Lisa Kegan Paul, 1979), 7–8; their book, though, Pryor, “Democracy Denied,” Sydney Morning does not explore commissions as tactics but Herald, 20 June 2005, p. 1. rather analyzes the discourse of their reports. See also Adam Ashforth, “Reckoning 67. Rosenbaum, Myth of Moral Justice. Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of 68. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: Inquiry as Power/Knowledge Forms,” Journal How the United States and Russia Run the of Historical Sociology 3 (March 1990): 1–22. Arms Race (New York: Pantheon, 1976).

142 Justice Ignited be able to thwart wars. Agencies that are states — such as Nazi-occupied Europe — are supposed to dispense justice in practice have highly relevant.71 to operate in contexts shot through with Studies of nonviolent action are a fruitful inequality, unfairness, exploitation, and source of ideas for resisting repression. One of domination. That means there are serious the stages in Gene Sharp’s dynamics of limits on what they can do. When those with nonviolent action is “solidarity and discipline less power are in the wrong, agencies can to fight repression.”72 One of the later stages is dispense a semblance of justice, but when political jiu-jitsu, discussed earlier as the powerholders are perpetrators, little can be precursor to the concept of backfire. Intimida- done. tion, used to prevent the expression of outrage, can itself backfire, so increasing the risk of Intimidation and Bribery backfire is one of the ways to counter intimidation. This is a recursive use of backfire There is a vast amount of writing about dynamics. intimidation, especially at the violent end of the spectrum, including studies of torture, Studying Backfire warfare, counterinsurgency, prisons, police powers, rape, and domestic violence. For For studying backfire dynamics, how should milder forms of intimidation (though often just case studies be chosen? Norm violations occur as effective), there are studies of peer pressure, every day. A few of them backfire but most of bureaucratic power, and social control. For them don’t. Which ones are worth studying? examining bribery as a tactic, there are psy- In principle, just about any event can be used, chological and economic studies of incentives, but in practice a crucial requirement is docu- among others. mentation. In many cases in which police use There is not nearly as much material on excessive force, there are no independent tactics of resistance to intimidation and witnesses; cover-up and reinterpretation are bribery. Militaries have studied how to resist successful in containing the story. A promi- torture and brainwashing. Jeff Schmidt in his nent case like the King beating generates book Disciplined Minds gives an excellent enormous interest, stimulates participants to analysis of how military advice on resisting tell their stories, and raises the stakes for indoctrination — commonly called brain- everyone, so there is active use of processes of washing — can be used by students and devaluation, reinterpretation, official adjudi- professionals who want to stand up against 69 cation, and intimidation. The struggle becomes pressures for ideological conformity. more public: the mass media seek all sorts of James C. Scott has studied ways that subju- stories, including investigative probes into gated groups — such as slaves and peasants — backstage behaviors. Partisans on each side use a range of subtle methods to resist domi- 70 have increased access to the media and are nation. Studies of resistance in repressive encouraged to challenge their opponents publicly. All this helps to expose some of the techniques that are usually hidden, especially intimidation and cover-up. Prominent cases

69. Jeff Schmidt, Disciplined Minds: A Criti- cal Look at Salaried Professionals and the 71. Jacques Semelin, Unarmed Against Hitler: Soul-Battering System that Shapes their Lives Civilian Resistance in Europe 1939–1943 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 70. James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 72. Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, 573– Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, 655. See also Sharp, Waging Nonviolent CT: Yale University Press, 1990). Struggle, 387–95. Theory and backfire 143 thus offer a tremendous opportunity to study the dynamics of backfire. But prominent cases of backfire aren’t ideal for every purpose. One shortcoming is that backfire did occur, often spectacularly. There- fore, it is harder to see how backfire can be prevented. So it can be useful to study cases where backfire did not occur, for example due to cover-up. But when cover-up is totally effective, then other methods of inhibiting backfire become redundant and often aren’t used. Sometimes, therefore, learning about backfire dynamics in a particular arena is best done by using a variety of case studies, each illustrating a different feature. That is the approach I’ve taken in this book.

Acknowledgements I thank Truda Gray, Jeff Ross, Greg Scott, Tom Weber, and Kevin Wehr for valuable comments on drafts of this chapter.

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 14 (author’s prepublication version)

14 Conclusion

Sometimes attacks backfire: they end up being The second essential condition for backfire counterproductive for the attacker. A backfire is communication to receptive audiences. This commonly involves a public reaction of can be by direct witnessing of the event or via outrage. reports, photos, and the like. “Receptive There are two essential conditions for a audiences” means those who will be aroused backfire. First, something occurs that some by the information. They could be people people think is unjust, unfair, disproportionate, already concerned about an issue, such as disgusting, disquieting, or upsetting — or any human rights advocates who are campaigning number of other words indicating they are against torture. They could be third parties, not concerned about it. Possibilities include involved with the issue, such as people massacres, beatings, dismissals, censorship, watching news about torture. Or they could be torture, and wars. For convenience, the words people linked with the perpetrators, such as “unjust” or “unfair” can stand in for a full list soldiers who are disgusted by actions taken by of reactions. others in their squad. To be seen as unjust, an event or situation has to be seen as violating normal expecta- Two Essential Conditions for Backfire tions. If two people voluntarily fight each 1. Perception of something as unjust, unfair, other and one is badly hurt, that may well be disproportionate, or otherwise in violation of a thought unfortunate but not unfair. But if a social norm. person attacks and seriously injures someone 2. Communication to receptive audiences. who is not fighting and who is trying to avoid a fight, that is cause for outrage. If there is a Backfires do not occur automatically. Per- qualitative difference between the two sides — petrators can take actions that reduce the for example, one is violent and the other likelihood or scale of backfire. These actions peaceful — then outrage is more likely. can be conveniently classified into five Similarly, a large quantitative difference can methods1 that inhibit outrage, disgust, and lead to a perception of unfairness. The more other negative reactions to an event or the victim is perceived as innocent and situation. incapable of resistance, the greater the outrage. An attack on a child or a person with a Five Methods to Inhibit Outrage disability is seen as more reprehensible than 1. Cover up the action or situation. one on an able-bodied adult. 2. Devalue the target. If the difference between the two sides is 3. Reinterpret what happened. reduced or muddied, then fewer people will 4. Use official channels that give the perceive an action as unfair. If, in a peaceful appearance of justice. protest, even a few protesters throw stones, 5. Intimidate or bribe people involved. then violence by the police will seem less upsetting, even when it is much greater. There- fore, backfire is far more likely when those subject to injustice avoid any suggestion of 1. Strictly speaking, these are five types of being perpetrators themselves. methods, but for convenience I refer to them as five methods.

Conclusion 145

From the case studies in previous chapters, The struggle between inhibiting and ampli- these methods should be quite familiar. In the fying outrage is summarized in Figure 14.1 appendix, numerous specific techniques are (next page). listed for each of the five methods. There are many factors affecting the way a In principle, these methods can be used by message is received. Some of these are anyone, but in practice only powerful groups particularly important for understanding the have significant capacity to inhibit outrage dynamics of backfire. Sometimes a lot of from their actions. A customer who openly groundwork has to be done to convince people assaults an employee has little prospect of that an issue is of concern. The movement inhibiting outrage, whereas senior police who against nuclear power spent years alerting brutalize a suspect can use all five methods. people to the dangers of the technology. Backfire analysis thus becomes most revealing Before this, nuclear accidents received little when analyzing injustices perpetrated by those attention; afterwards, they caused enormous much more powerful than their victims. concern. Another factor is the “information Strictly speaking, only the first four environment,” such as what else is happening methods actually reduce outrage. Method 5, at the same time. If corruption in an organiza- intimidation and bribery, is about inhibiting tion is publicized during a slow news period, it the expression of outrage. But the distinction may receive extensive coverage, but if is not a big one, especially because people revealed during a war or disaster, it may pass often change their beliefs to accord with their without much notice. A third key factor is actions. Therefore, intimidation and bribery whether there are opportunities for taking can actually cause people to feel less outrage action. News stories of foreign atrocities often as well as prevent its expression. generate concern but most individuals have no Those who think outrage is the appropriate idea how they might make a difference. But if response to perceived injustices need to there is a well known organization or avenue counter the methods of inhibition. There are for protest, people are far more likely to join many ways of doing this; five general ways or take action themselves. neatly mirror the methods of inhibition. Three Factors, Relevant to Backfire, that Some Ways to Counter Inhibition of Affect Reception of a Message Outrage 1. Audience receptivity: understanding of 1. Expose the action or situation. things as unjust. 2. Validate the target. 2. Information environment: visibility of 3. Emphasize the injustice involved. stories and the salience of an issue compared 4. Mobilize public support and avoid or with other issues. discredit official channels. 3. Actionability: the existence of social 5. Resist and expose intimidation and bribery. movements and opportunities for action.

Methods of countering inhibition can be These factors are all linked to timing: when an conveniently summed up in five Rs: revealing, action is taken affects the response. If an redeeming, reframing, redirecting, and resist- atrocity is covered up, it may cause outrage ing.2 But it is important to remember there are when revealed decades later, but not as much many possible ways to respond to each of the as if it had been exposed when it occurred. methods of inhibition. The appendix lists Official channels often take such a long time various possibilities. that outrage has died down when a finding is declared.

2. Steve Wright had the idea of alliterative labels and we brainstormed them together.

146 Justice Ignited

Cover-up of the event: Exposing the event: hidden attacks, censorship, information, pictures, below media radar credible stories

Devaluation of the target: Validating the target: labeling, personal attacks, evidence of good work, finding dirt positive images

Attacker Reinterpretation: excuses, Emphasizing the injustice: Target and minimizing consequences, countering excuses, blaming and allies passing the blame those responsible defenders

Official channels used to Mobilizing public support: give the appearance of avoid or discredit official justice channels

Intimidation and bribery: Resisting: standing up to threats, attacks, incentives intimidation, refusing for acquiescence bribes, exposing attacks

Figure 14.1

These are the bare bones of the backfire Nevertheless, it can be fruitful to try to extend model. It is quite easy to formulate a more a model based on features of one case study complex model, with lots of factors, inter- and then see how well the extensions apply to connections, exceptions, and special cases. But another. In this way, the model can be turned caution is warranted, because often a complex into a more useful tool. For example, if a case model is not as useful as a simple one: the study reveals a new method of inhibition, it is complexities can be confusing and divert worth exploring whether this same method is attention from the key factors. observed in other case studies. The Sharpeville, Dili, and Dharasana cases Lessons from the Case Studies show that using violence against peaceful protesters can backfire against the perpetrators. There are many things to be learned by apply- This is the phenomenon Richard Gregg called ing a model to case studies, including how it moral jiu-jitsu and Gene Sharp called political can be extended to new domains and what its jiu-jitsu. These cases also reveal the struggle limits are. Models are always simplifications over the consequences of the events, namely and therefore cannot be expected to fit or the use by the perpetrators of each of the five explain every detail of any given case study. methods for inhibiting outrage and the use by Conclusion 147 their opponents of five corresponding methods A second key feature of many whistleblow- to encourage expression of outrage. In other ing cases is that the whistleblower may act words, political jiu-jitsu has a fine texture, instinctively in ways that reduce outrage. Most namely the methods for waging a struggle over whistleblowers avoid publicity, at least in the outrage. The outcome of such struggles deter- beginning. Instead, they put their trust in mines whether backfire occurs. formal processes at their place of work or in The Rodney King beating shows clearly official bodies outside of it. Many whistle- that backfire can occur from violent attacks blowers also accept settlements that muzzle even when the victim resists and when the them. Thus whistleblowers are often parties to victim is neither protesting nor taking a princi- cover-up, are initially enthusiasts for official pled stand. The key factor is a perceived channels (only becoming disillusioned after injustice, in this case a disproportionality experiencing them), and acquiesce in cover-up between what King appeared to do and what through forms of bribery at the end. Whistle- the police were perceived to be doing. Violent blowers are far from unique in doing things attacks on peaceful protesters are just one form that minimize outrage, nor should they be of injustice, though a particularly vivid one; blamed for this; in some instances it is fool- there are many others. hardy to go public. The lesson, though, is that The King beating also reveals the impor- whistleblowers have other options besides the tance of routine media practices in de facto official-channel road. In particular, a cam- cover-up: the mass media generally deal with paigning approach gives a much better pros- police use of force from the point of view of pect for channeling outrage and confronting police, which, for most consumers of the the original problem. media, does little to arouse concern about The Ted Steele dismissal highlights the police behaviors. Only occasionally do inci- existence of multiple backfire processes in an dents such as the King beating break through academic situation. Steele’s dismissal back- the usual police-media framing of matters. fired on the university administration, but prior The King beating also shows how a back- to this Steele’s own provocative behavior had fire can lead those labeled as responsible to alienated many people on campus, especially fall out with each other: Los Angeles police his immediate colleagues. The important les- chief Daryl Gates blamed the officers involved son is that the personal behavior of a dissident in the beating; Stacey Koon, in charge of is important in gaining support. But, as in the King’s arrest, blamed Gates and the police King beating, a person without much credibil- hierarchy. Predictably, they both blamed King, ity can be turned into a martyr if attacked in a but this was not sufficient. From the public’s way seen as unfair. point of view, justice required that blame be The Steele case also shows that only some apportioned to police, whether it be the offi- parties to a dispute may be able to use backfire cers directly involved, the entire force, or top dynamics to their advantage. Steele’s col- officials. leagues in Biological Sciences felt the depart- The examination of whistleblowing as a ment’s reputation had been unfairly tarnished backfire process reveals a twofold injustice: but, caught between Steele’s allegations and first, the issue the whistleblower speaks out the administration’s dismissal of Steele, there about, such as corruption or hazards to the seemed to be little they could do to redress the public; second, reprisals against the whistle- problem. blower. In essence, a whistleblower is a person The study of environmental disasters shows who attempts to expose a problem, challenging that backfires can occur even when the party cover-up and reinterpretation, and who is then held responsible had no intention of creating a dealt with through intimidation. By speaking problem and took no active steps to do so. out and suffering reprisals as a result, the Many observers of the Chernobyl nuclear whistleblower becomes part of a wider accident held the Soviet government responsi- injustice. ble; likewise, many observers of the Exxon

148 Justice Ignited

Valdez oil spill held Exxon responsible. These and occupation of Iraq. The huge opposition to disasters were widely recognized to be acci- the invasion of Iraq created an international dents, not intentional acts, yet most members audience receptive to news critical of the U.S. of the public felt someone should be blamed. role. The Abu Ghraib revelations therefore had These disasters show the usual methods of an exceptional impact, augmenting hostility inhibiting outrage. They also reveal attempts and resistance to the occupation of Iraq. The to shift blame, with the Soviet government Abu Ghraib case suggests that backfires can blaming the Chernobyl plant operators and open the door for further backfires, challeng- Exxon blaming the ship captain. ing the usual process by which a successful The invasion of Iraq illustrates that outrage cover-up lays the basis for further cover-ups, can be generated even before an attack is devaluation lays the groundwork for further launched. Furthermore, the struggle over the devaluation, and so on through the other meaning of the Iraq invasion continues years methods of inhibiting outrage. afterward. This illustrates that backfire strug- The use of electroshock weapons for torture gles may be unbounded in time: every one of is a case in which the initiative for resistance the methods of inhibition, and methods of must be taken by non-victims. While people countering inhibition, can be used over a are being tortured, they have little capacity for period of years or decades. There is no single effective resistance; if and when they become point at which someone can say conclusively safe from their torturers, they often need all that an event has or hasn’t backfired, because their energies purely to survive and recover. new developments may change the assess- Therefore the task of opposing torture falls ment. This reflects the dynamic nature of largely on others, such as human rights groups. backfire as a process. Torture by electroshock weapons is only The Iraq case also illustrates that activists possible if scientists and engineers conceive may be unnecessarily pessimistic about the and design the weapons, companies produce impact of their efforts. Although protests did and sell them, governments allow sales, and not stop the invasion, they greatly increased its governments do not pass or enforce laws negative consequences for the U.S. govern- against them. The injustice of electroshock ment, thereby reducing support for further torture thus has a long path of responsibility, invasions, such as of Iran or Syria, and with a corresponding array of points for inter- reducing support for the Bush administration’s vention. Outrage can be directed at torturers as domestic agendas. Bill Moyer in his book individuals, at technologists designing weap- Doing Democracy, which presents an eight- onry easily usable for torture, at corporations stage model of social movement campaigns, manufacturing the equipment, at governments repeatedly emphasizes that activists commonly that allow torture, and at governments that become discouraged just when they are make no protest about torture in other beginning to succeed.3 Arguably, this is what countries. happened with campaigning against the Iraq The case of electroshock weapons also invasion. offers a somewhat different perspective on The Abu Ghraib story is an example of how official channels. On the one hand, endless a specific backfire, over torture at Abu Ghraib negotiation of treaties and regulations con- prison in Iraq, can occur within and contribute cerning torture gives the appearance of action to a larger backfire process, over the invasion while dozens of countries support or tolerate torture. On the other hand, existing treaties can offer a campaigning platform for human rights 3. Bill Moyer, with JoAnn McAllister, Mary groups, for example when a new technology Lou Finley, and Steven Soifer, Doing violates international law. Although official Democracy: The MAP Model for Organizing channels are regularly used to give the appear- Social Movements (Gabriola Island, BC, ance of justice without the substance, never- Canada: New Society Publishers, 2001). theless this is not automatic: there is an Conclusion 149 ongoing struggle over the content and uses of official channels. Furthermore, rulings by official bodies can affect the baseline for what is perceived as unjust. Shifts in the baseline can make it easier or harder to arouse indigna- Jansen and Brian Martin, “Exposing and tion about a new or existing weapon. Opposing Censorship: Backfire Dynamics in Terrorism is an act almost guaranteed to Freedom-of-Speech Struggles,” Pacific Jour- backfire, according to the criteria used here. nalism Review 10 (April 2004): 29–45. When non-state groups make violent attacks Corporate disasters: Susan Engel and I have on civilians, this inevitably causes outrage. examined the Bhopal disaster and the James There are various explanations for why groups Hardie asbestos tragedy in “Union Carbide undertake these apparently counterproductive and James Hardie: Lessons in Politics and activities, including the desire for revenge Power,” Global Society, in press. (regardless of the consequences), the intention to provoke a counterattack that itself backfires, Defamation: Truda Gray and I have analyzed and the concentration of power in leaders of defamation threats and actions as attacks on violent struggle by alienation of those free speech in “How to Make Defamation supporting more moderate positions. Threats and Actions Backfire,” Australian Actually, terrorism is just one of many Journalism Review 27 (July 2005): 157–66; examples of how attacks reliably backfire “Defamation and the Art of Backfire,” Deakin when launched by those with little power and Law Review, in press. authority. For example, the same process Deportation: Iain Murray and I wrote about occurs when an employee grossly insults a government and activist tactics used in the decent boss. On the other hand, terrorism is far 2005 deportation of U.S. peace activist Scott less likely to backfire when undertaken by Parkin from Australia, in “The Parkin Back- governments. The very fact that terrorism, to fire,” Social Alternatives 24 (Third Quarter most people, means terrorism by non-state 2005): 46–49. groups (or by so-called rogue states) is a striking illustration of the way powerful states Labor struggles: Kylie Smith and I examined have diverted attention from their own activi- this topic, with special attention to the con- ties. The very expression “state terrorism” is frontation between the stevedoring firm little known outside the ranks of terrorism Patrick and the Maritime Union of Australia, scholars. in “Tactics of labor struggles,” Employee Each of these case studies could be mined Responsibilities and Rights Journal, in press. for further insights. Another way to develop Refugees: Andrew Herd, “Official Channels or further insights is to study additional case Public Action: Refugees in Australia,” studies, such as other police beatings and other Flinders Journal of History and Politics, in wars such as the Vietnam war. Some other press; “Amplifying Outrage over Children possible areas of application are bullying, Overboard,” Social Alternatives, in press. censorship, corporate disasters, defamation, genocide, labor struggles, lying, protests, Sexual harassment: Greg Scott and I analyzed refugees, sexual harassment, and social the Anita Hill–Clarence Thomas case in movements.4 “Tactics against Sexual Harassment: The Role of Backfire,” Journal of International Women’s Studies, in press. 4. Work has been done on several of these Social movements: David Hess and I have topics. studied backfire as a type of transformative Censorship: Sue Curry Jansen and Brian event for social movements in “Backfire, Martin, “Making Censorship Backfire,” Repression, and the Theory of Transformative Counterpoise 7 (July 2003): 5–15; Sue Curry Events,” Mobilization 11 (June 2006): 249–67.

150 Justice Ignited

Other Directions distinguish several types of backfire according to the perpetrator’s role. I have focused on backfire analysis as a way of • White backfire. This is the usual case: an understanding tactics and as a guide for attack backfires against the perpetrator. An formulating strategies against injustice. example is the Dili massacre. Another way to use the approach is to measure • Gray backfire. A perpetrator uses a the extent of backfire. Following the beating convenient event, portrayed and widely of Rodney King, public opinion about the Los perceived as unjust, as a pretext for launching Angeles police became less favorable. Like- an attack. Imagine that prior to the Dili wise, following the invasion of Iraq, public massacre, the Indonesian parliament building attitudes towards the United States became in Jakarta had been bombed. The Indonesian less favorable in many countries. The extent of government could have blamed the bombing backfire might also be judged by levels of on the East Timorese and used this to undercut activism in support of a cause, by comments concern about use of violence in Dili. on blogs and e-mail discussion groups, by An actual example is the Tonkin Gulf petitions, and by open dissent within and incident of 1964, in which North Vietnamese defections from the dominant group. PT boats were alleged to have attacked U.S. Another way to assess the extent of backfire ships in international waters. This incident is by looking at the tactics used by the other provoked the outrage necessary for Congress side. If cover-up and reinterpretation are to pass a resolution allowing expansion of the effective, there may be little open opposition U.S. military role in the Vietnam war. Yet, at to an injustice. But if these methods fail, the the time, the evidence for a North Vietnamese perpetrators may resort to devaluation, intimi- attack was far from conclusive. dation, or referring the matter to official • Black backfire. A perpetrator sets out to bodies. This can signify a greater level of create an injustice that will be blamed on backfire. someone else, such as the perpetrator’s victim. A different issue is the evolution of tactics: Imagine that Indonesian troops, in carrying out in an ongoing struggle, each side can learn the Dili massacre, dressed themselves as a from the other side’s behavior. For example, dissident faction of the East Timorese resis- police who are caught on camera beating tance: they would have been aiming to make protesters might decide, next time, to arrest the killings backfire against the resistance. anyone with a camera, or to smash the Black backfire is the aim of the agent provo- cameras. Protesters, if they suspect this might cateur who pretends to be a protester, uses or occur, could be prepared with hidden cameras encourages violence, and thus serves to or ones at a safe distance. Police might then discredit the protesters. find ways to assault protesters that do not look Deciding what is black, gray, or white can so bad even if photographed. And so on. Any be difficult, because cover-up often makes it group that keeps repeating its tactics is at risk hard to know who or what is responsible. The of losing its edge.5 principal message is that things may not be Backfire is based on outrage from per- what they appear to be on the surface.6 ceived injustice. The word “perceived” is important, because perceptions can be wrong, at least as judged from a different perspective. Contrasting perceptions are at the core of struggles over interpretation. It is possible to 6. These terms are inspired by the existing language of black, gray, and white propaganda. Truda Gray and I are working on a study of black, gray, and white backfire in the 5. I thank Steve Wright for valuable discus- Vietnam war and elsewhere. I thank her for sions on this point. useful discussions on this topic. Conclusion 151

The Bigger Picture • Redistribution of power, including em- powering effects on the nonviolent group Backfire analysis can be a convenient tool for and decentralization of power. understanding tactics in struggles against injustice. It is not a guarantee of success. It’s The backfire model is built from political jiu- quite possible to have an excellent under- jitsu, by examining methods of inhibiting or standing of what is happening but lack the amplifying outrage and applying the dynamic power to do much to change the situation. well beyond the violence-versus-nonviolence There are many situations in which powerful template. It is possible to apply this same groups do terrible things and opponents are too generalization process to other stages pre- weak, divided, or discredited to stop them. sented by Sharp. For example, consider There are many things not covered in Sharp’s first stage, laying the groundwork, backfire theory. Among them are skills, which is when a nascent social movement morale, organization, discipline, and courage, builds its knowledge, resources, and organiza- each of which deserves great attention. Under- tion, constructing a foundation from which it standing tactics is certainly valuable but is not might eventually be able to mount credible much use unless there are skilled and com- actions. A repressive government might seek mitted individuals and groups ready and able to inhibit this process of development, for to take action. example by killing, discrediting, or co-opting In the previous chapter, I described Gene potential leaders, infiltrating and subverting Sharp’s concept of political jiu-jitsu, by which developing organizations, and encouraging the a violent attack on peaceful protesters can proto-movement to adopt misleading analyses increase support for the protesters and thus be and counterproductive tactics. In effect, there counterproductive for the attacker. The is an ongoing struggle over a proto-move- concept of backfire is a generalization and ment’s attempt to build its capacity to act and extension of political jiu-jitsu. Sharp’s bigger the government’s attempt to inhibit this picture is his “dynamics of nonviolent action,” development. a set of stages through which nonviolent cam- Consider next an example well outside the paigns often proceed, in which political jiu- violence-nonviolence mold: a boss who bullies jitsu is just one stage. Here are Sharp’s stages.7 selected subordinates by making demeaning comments, assigning tasks that are set up for • Laying the groundwork, including leader- failure, and spreading rumors. Bullying ship, preparation, and strategy. behavior can backfire if co-workers find out • Challenge brings repression, including what is happening and react against it, so it is challenge, repression, persistence, suffer- not surprising to find evidence for the usual ing, and facing brutality. methods of inhibiting outrage, from cover-up • Solidarity and discipline, including main- to ineffectual grievance procedures. That is a taining support and promoting nonviolent straightforward application of the backfire discipline. model. But it is also possible for the boss to • Political jiu-jitsu. intervene at the stage of laying the ground- • Methods of success: conversion, accom- work. If a particular employee seeks advice, modation, and nonviolent coercion. starts building a support network, collects documentation of abuses, or begins trying out defensive techniques, the boss might transfer the employee, reduce bullying behaviors directed at the employee (while continuing to 7. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent target others), or conversely increase the attack Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 447– to break the employee’s will to resist. 814. I have changed some of Sharp’s wording In this way, Sharp’s stage of laying the but maintained his basic structure. groundwork can be generalized beyond his

152 Justice Ignited original framework, just as backfire is a Everyone does some of these things some of generalization of political jiu-jitsu. Similarly, the time. Sometimes there are good reasons to Sharp’s other stages can be generalized by hide information, for example to protect examining tactics used by both sides and by people’s privacy. Sometimes criticism of applying the analysis to a wide variety of others is fully justified. Nevertheless, it can be cases. Sharp’s model is a good basis for this revealing to look for patterns of behavior and sort of generalization because it is based on to compare one’s actions to the actions of observation of numerous actual cases.8 others. If you are spreading nasty rumors but others are not, is this fair? If you are making Self-check threats but others aren’t, is your attack unfair? Most importantly, do you have more or less It is natural to assume that the perpetrators of power than the other party? If you have a lot injustice are someone else: bullies, torturers, less power, then launching an open attack is insensitive aggressive governments, scheming likely to be foolish: backfire is almost guar- enemies. They are bad. We are good. anteed. On the other hand, if you have a lot Yet, reflecting on the matter, most people more power, then there is a risk you may be should have to admit that sometimes they are misusing that power — and this misuse of perpetrators, even if only as a child when power may itself backfire against you! grabbing a toy from a playmate and then lying Psychological research provides strong sup- about it. Yet it is far more difficult to port for Lord Acton’s adage “Power tends to recognize one’s own role in causing injustice corrupt”: the exercise of power makes a person than to recognize injustice against oneself, or think less of those who are subject to power.9 against someone else. Backfire analysis In this sort of situation, a self-check is most provides a convenient way to check what is important. going on: just go through the list of methods of The inspiration behind backfire analysis is inhibiting outrage and see whether you are to aid the effectiveness of those challenging using them. injustice. In principle, the analysis could be used by unscrupulous, scheming attackers who • Am I being completely open, or am I want to be more effective in perpetrating hiding information? injustices. In one way, this is unlikely, simply • Am I saying or implying derogatory because most people who commit evil acts do things about others? not think of themselves as evil — they feel • Am I considering only ways of inter- they are the victims, or that their actions are preting things that are most favorable to me justified in the circumstances.10 On the other and unfavorable to others? Am I lying by omission? • Do I pass off matters to higher authorities 9. David Kipnis, The Powerholders (Chicago: when they should be my responsibility? University of Chicago Press, 1976); David • Do I threaten penalties or promise Kipnis, Technology and Power (New York: rewards? Springer-Verlag, 1990).

10. Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York: Freeman, 1997), makes the case that the usual percep- 8. As noted in chapter 13, Sharp’s framework tions of evildoers as malevolent or uncaring can be considered to be a form of grounded are wrong. See also Fred Emil Katz, Ordinary theory. Bill Moyer’s social movement model People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on in Doing Democracy, also a product of the Beguilings of Evil (Albany, NY: State grounded theory, can also be used in the same University of New York Press, 1993); Philip way as a foundation for a more generalized G. Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on theory. the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Conclusion 153 hand, perpetrators seem to instinctively use methods to inhibit outrage. Targets, in many cases, seem to have less awareness of what will be effective in countering attacks, and thus have more to learn from studying backfire dynamics. There is still much to learn about opposing injustice. What better place to begin than actions that backfire? Finally, there’s another side to opposing injustice — promoting justice, for example by helping those in need. Sometimes this creates a boomerang effect, bringing good fortune to the person doing good deeds.11 That is a type of backfire well worth promoting.

Acknowledgements I thank Stan Cohen, Truda Gray, Samantha Reis, and Greg Scott for valuable comments on drafts of this chapter.

Good People Are Transformed into Perpetra- tors,” in The Social Psychology of Good and Evil, ed. Arthur G. Miller (New York: Guilford Press, 2004), 21–50. 11. Jack Doueck, The Chesed Boomerang: How Acts of Kindness Enrich Our Lives, 2d ed. (Deal, NJ: Yagdiyl Torah Publications, 1999).

Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, appendix (author’s prepublication version)

Appendix Methods of inhibiting and amplifying outrage from injustice

In February 2005, a group of us sat down and • Arena transfer: moving the issue to another considered in turn each of the methods of arena where it has less visibility (e.g. defama- inhibiting outrage, thinking of key techniques tion actions move issues from the public arena found in the case studies with which we were to the legal arena). most familiar: Susan Engel, the corporate disasters of asbestos and Bhopal; Truda Gray, 2. Devaluation defamation and the Vietnam war; Samantha • Dehumanization: treating or referring to Reis, psychological techniques; Kylie Smith, people as animals, inanimate objects, statisti- labor disputes; Steve Wright, the technology cal abstractions, or side effects (“collateral of repression; and myself, the Rodney King 1 damage”). beating and whistleblowing. We brainstormed • Labeling: categorization (e.g. reducing vic- techniques individually and collectively. We tims to a medical category); stereotyping; then did the same for methods of countering name-calling. inhibition or, in other words, of amplifying • Fear-creation: suggesting ideas of what outrage. This is an edited summary of what we might happen. came up with. Many more methods could be • Attributing blame to victims, including via added. belief in a just world (e.g. rape myths; lifestyle assumptions). Some Methods of Inhibiting Outrage • Rhetoric and selective attention by governments, corporations, think-tanks, and the 1. Cover-up media (noting the media’s focus on negative • Denial: false statements, lying by omission, behavior). obfuscation. • Besmirching reputations: finding, publiciz- • Public relations and spin-doctoring: creation ing, and manufacturing dirt (e.g. on Rodney and slanting of news. King). • Media: news routines (e.g. usually adopting police viewpoints; usually taking corporate 3. Reinterpretation perspectives). • Perpetrator’s genuine framework or ideol- • Organizational (e.g. government and corpo- ogy: a system of categories, labels (e.g. rate secrecy; police code of silence). “reform”; “they attack, we defend”), language • Legal (e.g. official secrets; 30-year rule for (e.g. removing undesired emotional connota- release of government documents; sub judice tions), etc. rules). • Rationalizations (e.g. it’s for the good of • Physical: destruction of documents. people; it’s to protect against a feared thing). • Group dynamics: groupthink (mutually pro- • Lying: cover stories (e.g. to explain spying), moted thinking within the box). This is en- sometimes using an official group to legiti- forced by devaluation and intimidation of mize the lie. It may be difficult to distinguish those who challenge the dominant line. between lying (conscious deceit), selective perception, and genuine belief. 1. Andrew Herd, who is researching backfire and refugees, joined us in one session.

Appendix 155

• Minimizing: saying it’s an isolated incident, • Jurisdiction problems (e.g. in relation to only a few people were involved, the harm globalization and corporate responsibility). wasn’t that great, and/or it doesn’t matter. • Distancing of the issue from personal re- • Doublethink: holding and expressing contra- sponsibility. dictory images (e.g. equating commercial interest with consumer interests through the 5. Intimidation and Bribery rhetoric of choice). • Doublespeak: euphemisms; jargon; obfusca- Intimidation tion; vagueness.2 • Belief system destabilization: threat to just • Unspeak: embedding assumptions in lan- world belief. guage.3 • Arrest: charges, prosecution, frame-up, • Blaming others. imprisonment. • Blaming individuals while denying system • Legal action: risk of loss; court formality and failure (e.g. blaming workers, making accusa- complexity. tions of corruption). • Degradation: intimate attack (too embarrassing to reveal); exposure of damaging 4. Official Channels information. • Surveillance. • Systems of laws and regulations designed to • Theft, burglary (encouraged by police or not keep challenges under control and out of the pursued by police). public eye (e.g. industrial relations). • Employment attacks: bullying, demotion, • Court cases (targeting individuals rather than relocation, dismissal; loss of customary bene- the system). fits and opportunities. • Inquiries, commissions (set up to give credi- • Physical attack, “accidents.” bility, but often not acted upon). • Torture, assassination, bombings, blood- • Expert pronouncements. baths. • Consultants chosen to give preferred recom- • Threats: of any of the above. mendations. • Consultation processes (e.g. environmental Bribery impact assessments with mandated community • Conformity: psychological comfort of being consultation but no requirement to take any part of a group. comments into account). • Maintenance of relationships: avoidance of ostracism. Why Official Channels Inhibit Outrage • Promotion.

• Belief in a just world, which encourages • Settlements: out-of-court settlements, no people to believe that official channels dis- convictions of the guilty, “compensation not pense justice. justice.” • Slowness, complexity, dependence on • Dropping of threats. experts, imbalance between resources of • Escape (e.g., asylum seekers allowed to leave detention if they leave the country). dominant groups and challengers (all leading to disempowerment). Some Methods of Countering the 2. On doublesthink and doublespeak, see Inhibition of Outrage or, in other Robert Jackall and Janice M. Hirota, Image Words, Amplifying Outrage Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the Ethos of Advocacy (Chicago: University of 1. Countering Cover-up

Chicago Press, 2000), 140–44. • Belief systems: blame others or systems, not 3. Steven Poole, Unspeak™ (London: Little, oneself. Brown, 2006).

156 Justice Ignited

• Paradigm: describe reality in ways that reveal member), with valued people (e.g. people with information and ideas. intellectual disabilities in valued groups, not • Consciousness raising: put people together to with other devalued people).4 bring out suppressed information and per- • Social roles 2: have valued people voluntar- spectives. ily join a devalued role (e.g. non-Jews wearing • Information gathering: research the topic, a yellow star in solidarity). research cover-up, develop the capacity to do • Social roles 3: proudly adopt a stigmatizing research. label, transforming it (e.g. “gay,” “dissident”). • Evidence: have evidence that upsets people • Imagery: ensure targets are associated with (causes outrage). positive images (names, neighbors, logos, • Agents: cultivate whistleblowers, leakers, etc.). internal sympathizers, investigative journalists. • Competencies 1: increase the competencies • Credibility: collect credible evidence, have of targets (e.g. competencies of people with authoritative sources, independent observers, intellectual disabilities to dress well, maintain believable photos. hygiene, participate in conversations). • Communications medium: have avenues to • Competencies 2: increase the personal ca- communicate with an audience, including pacity of targets to psychologically survive mass media and alternative media. devaluation, humiliation, and direct attacks, • Language: use different language to make the rather than succumbing and conforming to challenge; point out language used in cover- negative expectations.5 up. • Competencies 3: establish credibility of • Arena: move the issue from private to public witnesses and analysts by well-written materi- (e.g. take information about domestic violence als with high-quality data. beyond the family) or from foreign to • Double-standard comparisons: point out that domestic. valued people fit into the devalued category • Organizational support: have allies (unions, (e.g. state terrorism). academics, action groups, etc.) to challenge • Other comparisons: use historical examples cover-up, put pressure on media, give credi- of devaluation (e.g. slavery) that are now bility, plan strategy. discredited; make comparisons to other coun- • System change: reduce barriers to perpetra- tries and other issues. tors speaking out (as in truth and reconciliation commissions).

2. Countering Devaluation

• Humanization: humanize targets; personalize 4. Wolf Wolfensberger, A Brief Introduction them; make them seem normal, like others; to Social Role Valorization: A High-Level show they have thoughts, feelings, motiva- Concept for Addressing the Plight of tions, families; move the focus from a compo- Societally Devalued People, and for nent of a person (“refugee,” “amputee”) to the Structuring Human Services, 3d ed. (Syracuse, whole person (note: this may not work for NY: Training Institute for Human Service group injustices). Planning, Leadership & Change Agentry • Balance theory: promote myriad positives (Syracuse University), 1998), gives numerous about a person, creating a general positive ways to challenge devaluation through putting image, so people will reinterpret specific people in valued social roles and increasing negatives to be compatible with the overall their competencies. positive view. • Support: provide assistance to targets to 5. For surviving and countering shaming at reduce the impact of attacks. work, see Judith Wyatt and Chauncey Hare, • Social roles 1: put targets into valued social Work Abuse: How to Recognize and Survive It roles (e.g., family member, worker, group (Rochester, VT: Schenkman, 1997). Appendix 157

• Direct challenge: confront and rebut deroga- others’ misleading terms; use revealing terms; tory statements or images.6 coin sound bites or memes (e.g. “state terror,” • Counterattack: find and expose dirt on “capital strike”). perpetrators (but be careful, because this tactic • Humor: make fun of perpetrators’ ideas and might backfire); reveal histories of oppression presentations (e.g. through cartoons). or abuse, identifying systemic factors. 4. Countering Official Channels (OCs) 3. Countering Reinterpretation • Avoidance: don’t use OCs. • Ideology: expose the assumptions underlying • Discrediting OCs 1: reveal limited terms of the other point of view; reveal ideology for reference, hypocrisy, bias, corruption, vested what it is. interests, failure to deliver justice. (This works • Evidence 1: present facts, data, pictures, better for those with weaker just-world statistics, examples. beliefs.) • Evidence 2: expose lies; show consequences • Discrediting OCs 2: use humor of other side's actions; talk about who benefits; • Improved OCs 1: insist on openness, inde- show interests behind the other side. pendence, and fair procedures. • Evidence 3: demand that perpetrators pro- • Improved OCs 2: have own evidence, wit- duce evidence for their claims. nesses, and supporters present during hearings • Credibility: use independent experts to sup- (validate victims by peer group presence). port your interpretation. • Improved OCs 3: use OCs cleverly (have • Reiteration: present the evidence and return good lawyers, use technicalities). to it in the face of reinterpretation. • Improved OCs 4: pick the most suitable OC; • Framework: use your own framework to change to a more favorable forum. explain things; critique the other side’s • Improved OCs 5: develop networks of framework.7 supporters in different arenas (lawyers, action • Fairness arguments: use (1) abstract argu- groups, sympathetic insiders, journalists) to ments about rights; (2) historical comparisons put the squeeze on OCs. to show accepted standards; (3) current exam- • Improved OCs 6: make the case highly ples (e.g. exorbitant pay to senior executives). prominent so the wrong verdict/conclusion • Alternatives: present alternative ideas, causes increased outrage. actions, and solutions. • Improved OCs 7: pick test cases carefully. • Presence: accompany the message (e.g. give • Dual track: use OCs in tandem with publicity talks). and mobilization. • Language: use suitable language that sup- • Alternative OCs: set up own panels, courts, ports your framework and evidence; relabel commissions (e.g, a people’s commission into state crime). 6. Jackall and Hirota, Image Makers, 139, say • Alternatives 1: propose/use alternative chan- that removing stigma usually requires nels entirely different from OCs (e.g. personal “symbolic inversion,” a dramatic challenge to negotiation rather than courts). conventional images: “A cardinal rule of • Alternatives 2: use direct action (e.g. boy- public relations is that one must respond to cotts) and all sorts of other non-OC actions. charges made against one; to be silent is to • Counterattack: target individual OC mem- consent to the accusations.” bers, giving them a negative personal face.

7. George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant: 5. Countering Intimidation and Bribery Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, • Belief systems 1: powerholders are expected 2004), is a highly accessible and practical to meet higher standards of justice, so for them approach to framing of conservative and to be seen to use intimidation and bribery progressive policies in the United States. constitutes an admission of guilt.

158 Justice Ignited

• Belief systems 2: intimidation can polarize reactions, causing some to keep quiet but others — who see intimidation as a clear injustice — to speak out. • Time frame: adopt a long term perspective to develop the capacity to survive short term attacks. • Support: have alternative reference groups to counter ostracism and help victims. • Rationality: encourage rational responses to intimidation and bribery (take action, join a group, recognize limits of action) rather than irrational responses (denial, blaming, reinterpretation). • Reinforcement: intimidation and bribery are forms of positive or negative reinforcement or punishment, so positively reinforce speaking out. • Resilience: develop personal capacities to resist. • Collective action: organize, use networks, operate in existing or new groups to reduce the threat to individuals (e.g. worker groups, petitions that challenge repressive laws). • Anonymity: speak out with less risk. • Exposure: document intimidation and its consequences (e.g. effects of plastic bullets; atrocities), collect multiple cases to show a pattern, and publish the documentation; deter attacks by being prepared to expose them. • Visibility: develop a high profile so attacks are more public and consequently less likely (e.g. police informants may be in more danger when they take new identities under police protection). • Refusal to make legal settlements: insist on being able to speak out. • Speaking out: speak out or continue your behavior even though you’ve been bribed; take the money and recycle it. • Reframing: turn attacks into human interest stories; arouse indignation; gain media coverage in advance of attacks. • Safety: set up refuges from attack (e.g. alternative treatment centers to avoid police entering hospitals). • Counter-intimidation (e.g. posters of rogue police, countersuits against intimidatory lawsuits) — but be careful not to nullify outrage from the other side’s intimidation.