Trump's Indonesian Allies in Bed with ISIS-Backed FPI Militia Seek to Oust

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Trump's Indonesian Allies in Bed with ISIS-Backed FPI Militia Seek to Oust Volume 15 | Issue 9 | Number 6 | Article ID 5034 | Apr 27, 2017 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Trump’s Indonesian Allies in Bed With ISIS-Backed FPI Militia Seek to Oust Elected President Jokowi Allan Nairn With an introduction by Peter Dale Scott Introduction (preman) of the Islamic Defenders Front or FPI (Front Pembela Islam) that led to Ahok’s The following important essay, by thedefeat. respected and reliable journalist Allan Nairn, reports what Indonesian generals and others The FPI was founded in 1998 with military and have told him of an army-backed movement to police backing, and at first served as the army’s overthrow Indonesia’s civilian-led moderate proxy to beat up left-wing protesters at a time constitutional government. Its thesis isof transition in Indonesian politics.3 1998 was a alarming: that “Associates of Donald Trump in key year: with the retirement of Suharto, the Indonesia have joined army officers and a end of over three decades of “New Order” army vigilante street movement linked to ISIS in a dictatorship, and reforms (reformasi) that led campaign that ultimately aims to oust the to the army’s surrender of its domestic security country’s president… Joko Widodo (known function to a newly created civilian police more commonly as Jokowi).” force. More recently a New York Times editorial, To others, the army’s connection to the FPI is pointing to the electoral defeat on April 19 of less clear now than it was in 1998. At that time Jakarta’s incumbent Christian governor, Basuki the connection was reminiscent of the army’s Tjahaja Purnama (or Ahok), has also expressed use, in its 1965 suppression of the Communist concern about the fate of Indonesia’s fragile PKI, of paramilitary preman or thugs from its democracy.1 But the threat perceived by the creation, the Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Times is that from “hard line Islamic groups” Youth). Eventually the FPI, initially financed by (many of them Saudi-funded), not that from the Police General Sutanto, began to be supported leaders (often U.S.-trained and financed) of the by funds from Saudi Arabia.4 As the FPI Indonesian army. The editorial reflects the fear expanded, its makeup and policies became of many scholars that traditional Indonesian more diverse. Islam, relatively tolerant but unable to compete with Saudi wealth, may lose out to well-funded According to Nairn, the army still prevails: Salafi extremism. (Last October Margaret Scott warned in the New York Review of Books that it In repeated, detailed conversations with me, was “far-fetched” to think that Indonesia’s the key protest figures and officials who track Islamic moderates “can stop Salafi recruitment, them have dismissed the movement against much less ISIS recruitment.”2) Ahok and the charges against him as a mere pretext for a larger objective: sidelining the Important in both narratives are the massive country’s president, Jokowi, and helping the recent protests in Jakarta by Islamist thugs army avoid consequences for its mass killings 1 15 | 9 | 6 APJ | JF of civilians — such as the 1965 massacres that candidate at a press conference at Trump were endorsed by the U.S. government, which Tower during the opening days of the [Trump] armed and backed the Indonesian military. presidential campaign.”8 Allan Nairn has been following and exposing Given Nairn’s sterling press record, we can be the brutalities of the Indonesian Army (TNI) for confident that he has accurately reported what decades. He has also been remarkablyKivlan and Admiral Ponto and others told him. successful in gaining access to key figures, What we can ask is the reason for their notably former General Prabowo Subianto, “a apparent candor: is it simply to reveal truth, or US trainee and protege … implicated in torture, is it rather to restore the threatening image kidnap and mass murder.”5 Prabowo in that the generals long used to maintain their particular is a poster boy for America’sinfluence? (As someone who has never been to duplicitous policies in Indonesia. Congress cut Indonesia, I cannot say, but my main off funds for training his Kopassus shock troops Indonesian source advises me not to trust in 1991, after they murdered up to 270 Kivlan Zein “when he says anything.”) protesters, including schoolchildren, at a peaceful demonstration in East Timor. But the It does seem clear that the Prabowo faction Pentagon, undeterred, secretly continued the have reached out to Trump and taken heart training under a Pentagon project called JCET from Trump’s election. Prabowo himself has (Joint Combined Education and Training).6 boasted to Nairn about his excellent connections with the DIA, the Defense As Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Intelligence Agency that was once headed by Command, KOSTRAD, Prabowo repressed the Trump’s now disgraced former National bloody 1998 Jakarta riots that led to the Security Adviser Michael Flynn.9 And it is resignation of his then father-in-law Suharto. indeed telling that Fadli Zon, Prabowo’s Prabowo was subsequently discharged from the contact with Trump, has been an active TNI, after he acknowledged responsibility for defender of the FPI and appeared with their the kidnapping of thirteen activists wholeader in the FPI-led anti-Ahok demonstrations. “disappeared.”7 He then became a multibillionaire businessman, but also sought a Americans should also be concerned that the political career. With the support of two pro- Freeport-McMoRan Mining Company has military parties he contested the 2014 election, engaged as attorney Munarman, an FPI losing narrowly in a runoff to the civilian spokesperson and former Commander of the populist Jokowi. FPI’s paramilitary group Laskar Islam. Historically Freeport has not been friendly to Underlying Nairn’s latest story is the desire of democracy in Indonesia. A declassified U.S. Prabowo, the TNI generals and their parties, to State Department cable reveals that by April preserve what they can of their former1965 (when Sukarno was still in power) privileges, in a new age ofReformasi as Freeport Sulphur had reached a preliminary civilians like Jokowi nudge Indonesia slowly “arrangement” with unnamed Indonesian towards a more egalitarian future. Nairn’s chief officials for what would become a multi-billion source, Gen. Kivlan Zen, is a Prabowo ally and dollar investment in West Papua.10 Today associate from KOSTRAD. Kivlan in turn points Freeport is currently in a dispute with the to the central role in the alleged “coup” plan of Jokowi government, and reportedly may be “on Prabowo’s 2014 campaign manager Fadli Zon, the verge of losing what is arguably its most who as Nairn reports “is known for publicly important asset, as Indonesia prepares to strip praising Donald Trump and appeared with the ownership from it of the massive Grasberg 2 15 | 9 | 6 APJ | JF copper and gold mine.”11 Indonesia’s democracy is fragile, and its In Indonesia, a Trump-Army-pro-Isis constitution will continue to be challenged by Alliance? both generals and Islamists with foreign backing. But the complexity of Indonesia’s pluralist society, which makes it difficult for democracy to function smoothly, also makes it Allan Nairn difficult to overthrow it. So many conflicting forces are at work. As Nairn points out, Associates of Donald Trump in Indonesia have Jokowi’s military defender, Gen. A.M. joined army officers and a vigilante street Hendropriyono, (former BIN chief and CIA movement linked to ISIS in a campaign that asset), has also been implicated in major ultimately aims to oust the country’s president. crimes. According to Indonesian military and intelligence officials and senior figures involved We should not forget that in 2014 Allen Nairn in what they call “the coup,” the move against posted a warning similar to his present one, President Joko Widodo (known more commonly that Indonesia's army special forces (Kopassus) as Jokowi), a popular elected civilian, is being and the state intelligence agency (BIN) are impelled from behind the scenes by active and involved in a covert operation … designed to retired generals. ensure that the July 9 [2014] vote count will be won by General Prabowo Subianto, the former Prominent supporters of the coup movement Kopassus commander who was a longtime include Fadli Zon, vice speaker of the 12 protege of the Pentagon and US intelligence. Indonesian House of Representatives and Donald Trump’s main political booster in the Nairn’s warning then was well documented. country; and Hary Tanoe, Trump’s primary But Jokowi won. Indonesian business partner, who is building two Trump resorts, one in Bali and one outside We in America should pursue what Nairn’s Jakarta. current essay has to tell us about Trump’s global alliance in Indonesia. Elsewhere he has This account of the movement to overthrow reminded us that after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 President Jokowi is based on dozens of there were actually presented, at the White interviews and is supplemented by internal House and at Camp David, proposals for a US army, police, and intelligence documents I Special Forces attack on Indonesia. The idea obtained or viewed in Indonesia, as well as by was for a dramatic strike to send a message to NSA intercepts obtained by NSA whistleblower the Muslim world. It would involveEdward Snowden. Many sources on both sides simultaneous moves against Indonesia and of the coup spoke on condition of anonymity. other countries.13 Two of them expressed apparently well-founded concerns about their safety. No such attack was launched. But if such ideas could be discussed in the presence of George The Coup Movement W. Bush, what may not be contemplated in Donald Trump’s call to fight “Islamic terrorism On the surface, the massive street protests all over the world”? surrounding the April 19 gubernatorial election have arisen from opposition to Peter Dale Scott Jakarta’s ethnic Chinese incumbent governor, 3 15 | 9 | 6 APJ | JF Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known as Ahok.
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