Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the

A. Kovacs¹; I. Fertő²; L. Kóczy²; B. Sziklai²; A.A. Nás²

1: Tec de Monterrey, Department of International Business, Mexico, 2: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Hungary Corresponding author email: [email protected] Abstract: We analyze the voting power of the members of the agricultural committee of the European Parliament using a spatial Banzhaf power index. Using a novel dataset of roll-call votes in the current EP-term, we identify critical members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that committee members with formal positions, EP group coordinators as well as German, French, Italian and British members are powerful actors. Nevertheless, rapporteurs are not necessarily influential. We also concluded that members with moderate ideological position but from Member States with extreme agricultural importance are the most powerful ones. Acknowledegment: JEL Codes: C71, A12

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Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament

Abstract

We analyze the voting power of the members of the agricultural committee of the European Parliament using a spatial Banzhaf power index. Using a novel dataset of roll-call votes in the current EP-term, we identify critical members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that committee members with formal positions, EP group coordinators as well as German, French, Italian and British members are powerful actors. Nevertheless, rapporteurs are not necessarily influential. We also concluded that members with moderate ideological position but from Member States with extreme agricultural importance are the most powerful ones.

Keywords: European Parliament, Common Agricultural Policy, voting games, Banzhaf index, voting game over a convex geometry

1. Introduction Discussion about the content as well as the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the (EU) have been high on the political agenda in the last decades and generated strong scientific attention as well. CAP reforms have been subject to comprehensive analysis both from political and policy aspects. In his landmark book, “The Perfect Storm” on the 2003 Fischler reform, Swinnen (2008) shares the view that this has been the most radical reform of the CAP since its creation. Ten years later, another, more moderate CAP reform, the “Imperfect Storm” (Swinnen, 2015a) took place. Swinnen (2015a) identifies four key domains of this reform: first, the drivers and the assessment of the reform (see Swinnen, 2015b); second, the factors influencing policy outcomes, including internal, like the Multiannual Financial Framework (Matthews, 2015), as well as external factors, like the WTO negotiations (Swinbank, 2015); third, the content, including direct payments (Sahrbacher et al., 2015) or the so-called greening (Erjavec et al., 2015); finally, the institutional aspects, with focus on the role of the European Parliament after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Fertő and Kovács, 2015; Olper and Pacca, 2015). Throughout the last CAP reforms and the EU’s legislation on agricultural policy, scholars focused on the external and internal stakeholders, their motivations and influence on the policy and legislative outcomes. Similarly, the driving forces, constraints and achievements of reforms have been part of the political and scientific discourse. On the other hand, the decision-making of the CAP, the role and influence of various stakeholders on the legislative outcome is still largely uncovered. This is especially true for the European Parliament and its members. This article aims at filling this gap by analyzing the role of the Members of the European Parliament’s agricultural committee (COMAGRI, Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development) in the CAP legislation through coming up with quantifiable power scores based on the roll-call votes of agricultural legislative pieces.

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The aim of article is to analyze the power relations and the legislative influence of the COMAGRI members of the European Parliament. This paper provides the voting power ranking of the MEPs – both Members and Substitute Members – of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development based on their policy positions along two dimensions: ideological spectrum of national parties and the agricultural value-added in the total GDP of the Member States of the MEPs. Unlike previous research on the power of Member States in the Council, we focus on the analysis of the European Parliament. Contrary to previous studies on intra-EP structures, like committees or EP Groups (Whitaker, 2005), we concentrate on the decision-making at the level of individual EP members. The main novelty of the paper is that it comes up with quantified power scores of individual MEPs in any policy domain, based on the members’ position in the ideology space. We provide the ranking of the MEPs – both Members and Substitute Members – of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the basis of their Banzhaf power index in a voting game over a convex geometry. We classify members along two dimensions: an ideological spectrum and the value-added to the GDP by agriculture. These two dimensions induce an ideology space, where the members are placed. For the first dimension the member is assigned a value based on -right measure (ParlGov) of the political party he/she belongs to. For the latter we use the World Bank agricultural value added index of the member’s home country.

2. Influence on EU decision making There is a broad literature on the role and influence of EP committees. Westlake (1994:191) described the Standing Committees as the “legislative backbone” of the European Parliament. Many authors emphasize the increasing role of committees in shaping EU legislation. In addition, Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) find that the allocation of the rapporteurship measures the power of Committee members. Neuhold (2001) argues that the key players in the EP committees are the committee chairmen, the vice-chairs – holding the formal positions in the committees –, as well as the rapporteurs, also draftsmen of opinion, shadow rapporteurs and party coordinators in the committees. Kaeding and Obholzer (2012) also emphasized the key role of EP Group coordinators in the legislative process at EP committee level. In line with Kaeding (2004), Marshall (2010) also states that rapporteurs are the most powerful actors of the committee, but also added that the distribution of influence among ordinary members of the committees is still unclear. Regarding the role of COMAGRI in the EP, Greer and Hind (2012) concludes that the COMAGRI plays key role in agricultural legislation. Fertő and Kovács (2015) corroborated this finding. Power indices are widely used to measure the actors’ a priori voting power in the legislative and political decisions in the EU institutional setup. In the EU context, most papers deal with the power of Member States in the Council of the European Union – better known by its former name: the Council of Ministers (Algaba et al., 2001; Le Breton et al., 2012; Bilbao et al., 2002; Barr and Pasarelli, 2009; Kóczy, 2012), studying the fairness of voting weights (before the Lisbon Treaty) and how the extensions of the Union affected existing members’ powers. It is important to stress that these models study voting power a priori, that is, without taking policy positions into account. This approach is usually motivated by the assumption that the subject of voting and therefore the voters’ policy positions are not known in advance. When we study voting in the COMAGRI this approach is neither informative nor appropriate. We assume that members have clear policy positions that can be approximated by their

2 political inclinations and the significance of agriculture in their delegating member states. We present a model with this information taken into account. Dataset The dataset of this analysis contains three sources of information. The first source of information is the roll-call votes of legislative proposals and amendments in the COMAGRI during the first two years of the current EP-term. In case of the roll-call votes, we listed the votes of MEPs – for, against and abstention –, both Members and Substitutes of COMAGRI. The second pillar of the dataset is the ideological position of the MEPs based on the left-right ideological orientation of their national parties (Döring and Manow, 2016). The third dataset used in this analysis was the agricultural value-added in the percentage of the GDP (The World Bank, 2013) of the Member State of the MEP. These latter two constitute the two dimensions of the analysis.

3. Methodology We study the COMAGRI members’ ability to make and change decisions using spatial voting indices. Here we introduce and explain the method we use. We consider a set of voters. Subsets of voters are called coalitions. A coalition is winning if it is able to make a decision according to the voting rule, for instance, by having the majority of the votes. Coalitions that are not winning are called losing. We are interested in critical voters, that is, players, whose loss can turn a winning coalition into a losing one. When all members of a coalition are critical the coalition is a minimal winning coalition. A priori voting power then refers to the ability to change decisions without knowing the actual topics the committee must vote on. Formally, let denote the set of voters and the set of winning, ℳ the set of minimal winning coalitions. For each voter in , let = { ⊆ | ∈ , \{}∉ } denote the set of winning coalitions, where voter is critical and = || the number of such coalitions. Then the Banzhaf index – a normalized version of the Banzhaf measure (Banzhaf, 1965) – is defined as

= . ∑∈ The standard version of the Banzhaf index ignores the voters’ policy preferences. It is reasonable to assume that a decision – a CAP policy position – that is acceptable to both a liberal (ALDE) and a conservative (ECR) MEP, will be acceptable to more central, moderate (S&D and EPP) MEPs too, as long as they have a comparable interest in agriculture. In the so-called games on convex geometries (Edelman, 1997) it is presumed that only convex coalitions may form. In the ideology space, convex coalitions are induced by convex polytopes whose facets are parallel with one of the axis of the space – in two dimension these are rectangles (see Fig. 1). In such games only voters residing on the boundary of these convex polytopes are critical. The Banzhaf index has been extended to such games by Bilbao et al. (1998). In this paper, we use a Monte-Carlo method for calculating the Banzhaf-index. This has already been applied for weighted majority games, but not for games over convex geometry (Matsui and Matsui, 2000).

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Fig. 1: Convex (on the left) and concave coalitions (on the right). Note that the coalition on the right is convex in the Euclidean sense, but not as a voting group.

In order to establish the convex geometry, COMAGRI members are treated as points in the plane (i.e. the ideology space) where the horizontal axis () represents the ideological position of the national parties of COMAGRI members and the vertical axis () represents the agricultural added-value to the GDP index of their home countries. We calculate the influence of each COMAGRI member by finding all rectangles corresponding to minimal winning coalitions and checking how frequently a particular MEP is placed on the outline of such a rectangles. Kóczy and Sziklai (2015) applied a similar methodology for the power ranking of the cardinals in the Papal Conclave in 2013. Considering that a voting session consists of 46 representatives where some members are replaced with substitute members, the number of possible different configurations is astronomical. Thus, we estimate the Banzhaf-indices by applying a Monte Carlo simulation based on the probabilities of absence and substitution. The scores in the Table (see Appendix B) are obtained from the average of four simulation containing 100,000 samples each. In the current, 8th EP term between 2014 and 2019, the COMAGRI has 46 Members and the same number of Substitute Members. The ideological and national distribution of Members and Substitutes in EP Committees reflect the weight of EP Groups and Member States in the Parliament. It is important to note that substitution in EP committees is not on a Member-to- Substitutes relationship, but any Substitute Member can replace any missing (standing) Member. In the power ranking of COMAGRI Members and Substitutes, we finally ranked 72 members. This is the number of MEPs who participated in the 15 roll-call votes in the first half of this EP-term.

4. Results

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At first glance the results are well in accordance with our intuition. Members with low absence rates are usually ranked higher than members with high absence rates. Similarly high substitution probability comes with better ranking on average. The interesting cases are the exemptions. How come that some members with relatively high absence value, like Rebega (20.0%) and Dăncilă (33.3%) are influential while a member like Dorfmann (6.7%) who is almost always present is virtually powerless? The answer comes from the spatial position of these players. Kóczy and Sziklai (2015) observed that players close to the center of the ideology space are rarely critical, while those with relatively extreme positions are likely to do well and become an influential member. In Appendix A, we see that our results corroborate this finding. COMAGRI members with central ideological position but with extreme agricultural position – that is, the agricultural index of their countries is either extremely high or low – are the most influential ones. The top 6 MEPs in our ranking – Brannen, Buda, Noichl, Rebega, Jahr, Hausling – are all in these spatial spaces (marked with red in Appendix A). Previous research reveals the importance of ‘strong’ persons in EU politics and decision- making. Now, we provide an overview on this fact for the European Parliament’s agri- committee. First, we look at the formal Committee positions, the chair and the vice-chairs. The chair of the COMAGRI in the current EP term is Poland’s Czeslaw Siekierski from the European People’s Party (EPP) EP Group. There are also four vice-chairs of COMAGRI. We see in Appendix B that in the power ranking, the chair of COMAGRI takes the 15th position (out of 72), but he is not the most powerful member of those with formal position, as one of the vice-chairs, Viorica Dăncilă is ranked higher. In sum, we can conclude that all COMAGRI Members with formal positions are in the first half of the ranking, with an average ranking of 21.2. Therefore, our empirical findings are in line with Neuhold (2001). Second, we observe the rapporteurships in the legislative files we analyze. We see that only two MEPs – De Castro and Nicholson – have more than one legislative proposal. Our calculations show that the ranking of rapporteurs – bold in Appendix 2. – does not concentrate on the top of the list. While there are influential rapporteurs – Hausling, De Castro – we observe rapporteurs with minimal influence (Selimovic, Nicholson). Therefore, the rapporteurs of the legislative proposals in our sample are not critical players in voting games. Their results do not confirm findings of earlier research revealing the importance of rapporteurs in the EP committees (Kaeding, 2004; Marshall, 2010). Third, party coordinators of EP Groups in the committees – underlined in Appendix 2. – play a key role in the legislative process (Neuhold, 2001; Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012). Our analysis reinforces this view as four EP Group coordinators are in the top 15, including the coordinators of the two main EP Groups (EPP and S&D). Fourth, power rankings in the European Council show that German, British, French and Italian Council members – ministers – are assumed the most powerful ones. Now, we test whether Members of the European Parliament from these countries are highly ranked.

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Our estimations imply that in case of the top 25 MEPs that members from these four countries dominate the list (14 members out of 25), including positions 1, 3 and 5. These findings are in accordance with the power ranking of Member States in different Council formations. Therefore, we see that political actors from the same, limited number of Member States – , the United Kingdom, France and Italy – dominate both legislative branches of the European Union, the Council and the European Parliament. Note, that 16 out of these 25 MEPs are from net contributor, EU-15 Member States. These 16 MEPs represent only 6 Member States. The other 9 MEPs are from net beneficiary, EU- 13 Member States, but these 9 members represent only three countries: Poland, Romania and Croatia.

5. Discussion, conclusions The paper analyzes the voting power of the Members of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Parliament using the Banzhaf index. Our major findings are following. First, those MEPs who hold formal positions, being either the chair or any of the vice-chairs of the Committee. In line with Neuhold (2001) we find that these committee members are highly ranked and powerful. Second, contrary to previous research (Kaeding, 2004; Marshall, 2010) we cannot confirm high power indices for the rapporteurs of the analyzed legislative files. Third, the party coordinators, who are the most important members of EP Groups at committee level and have a big say in formulating the legislative proposals (Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012). We find that most of the group coordinators are powerful and highly ranked, our research results confirm the main findingsof previous empirical investigations. Fourth, we also analyze the role and power of those committee members who are from the most powerful Member States (Germany, France, Italy and UK) are the most powerful politicians. Our results are in accordance with these findings: COMAGRI members from these countries are powerful and highly ranked. Future research can be extended to the calculation of power indices based on plenary roll-call votes. The comparison of the two intra-EP decision-making stage, committee and plenary, may reveal the power gains or losses of COMAGRI members in the legislative process.

6. References Algaba, E; Bilbao, J.M.; Fernández García, J.R.; López, J.J. (2001). Voting Power in the Council of the European Union under the Nice rules. European Voting Games. pp. 317-343. Banzhaf, J.F. (1965). Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 19. 317-343. Barr, J. and Passarelli, F. (2009). Who has the power in the EU? Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (2009) 339-366 Bilbao, J. M., A. Jiménez, and J. López (1998). The Banzhaf power index on convex geometries. Mathematical Social Sciences 36: 157–174.

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Bilbao, J.M., Fernandez, J.R., Jimenez, N., Lopez, J.J. (2002). Voting power in the European Union enlargement. European Journal of Operational Research 143 (2002) 181–196 Edelman, P. H. (1997). A note on voting. Mathematical Social Sciences, 34: 37–50. Erjavec. E., Lovec, M., and Erjavec, K. (2015). From ‘Greening’ to ‘Greenwash’: The drivers and discourses of CAP 2020 ‘reform’. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, : Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 215-244. Fertő, I. and Kovács, A. (2015). Parliamentary Amendments to the Legislative Proposals of the 2013 CAP Reform. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 379-412. Greer, A., Hind, T. (2012). Inter-institutional Decision-making: the Case of the Common Agricultural Policy. Policy and Society, 31(4), pp.331-341. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2012.09.005 Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2016). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov). Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version. Available: http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_party/ Kaeding, M. (2004). Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament - Information or Distribution? European Union Politics, 5(3) 353–371 Kaeding, M. and Obholzer, L. (2012). Pulling the strings: party group coordinators in the European Parliament. EIPAScope, 2012 (1). 13-18. Kóczy, L. and Sziklai, B. (2015). Electing the Pope. Homo Oeconomicus 32(1) 101-116 Kóczy, L. (2012). Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers. Mathematical Social Sciences 63 (2012) 152–158 Le Breton, M., Montero, M., Zaporozhets, V. (2012). Voting power in the EU Council of Ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics. Mathematical Social Sciences 63 (2012) 159–173 Mamadouh, V. and Raunio, T. (2003). The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation. Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2) 333-51 Marshall, D. (2010). Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees. European Union Politics, 11(4) 553–575 Matsui, T. and Matsui, Y. (2000). A Survey of Algorithms for Calculating Power Indices of Weighted Majority Games. Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 43(1) 71-86. Matthews, A. (2015). The Multi-Annual Financial Framework and the 2013 CAP Reform. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 169-192. Neuhold, C. (2001). The "Legislative Backbone" keeping the Institution upright? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 5 (2001) N° 10; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-010a.htm Olper, A. and Pacca, L. (2015). The European Parliament’ s Position on Market Regulation and the Impact of the Economic Context. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 357-378.

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Sahrbacher, A., Balmann, A. and Sahrbacher, C. (2015). The Political Economy of Capping Direct Payments: Applications in – and implications for – Germany. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 277-306. Swinbank, A. (2015). The WTO: No longer relevant for CAP reform? In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 193-214. Swinnen, J.F.M. (2008). The Perfect Storm – The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium Swinnen, J.F.M. (2015a). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International Swinnen, J.F.M. (2015b). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: Introduction and key conclusions. In Swinnen, J.F.M. (eds). The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy - An Imperfect Storm, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies and London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 1-30. The World Bank (2013). Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), World Development Indicators, Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS Westlake, M. (1994). A Modern Guide to the European Parliament. Pinter, London, United Kingdom Whitaker, R. (2005). National Parties in the European Parliament: An influence in the Committee System? European Union Politics 6(1) 5-28. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14651165050496

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Appendix A Most powerful committee members 7

REBEGA BUDA DĂNCILĂ 6

NEKOV Index 5

ERDŐS JAKOVČIĆ PETIR

4 ROPĖ GLEZOS

Agriculture KUŹMIUK SIEKIERSKI GOSIEWSKA TORRES MARTÍNEZ KALINOWSKI WOJCIECHOWSKI 3 SENRA RODRÍGUEZ VALCÁRCEL SISO AGUILERA GARCÍA SEBASTIÀ AYUSO ZULLO RIBEIRO HERRANZ GARCÍA CAPUTO FERNÁNDEZ POLČÁK VIEGAS SERRÃO SANTOS MELO BOGOVIČ MOI DE CASTRO DORFMANN Worldbank Worldbank 2 HAZEKAMP D'AMATO BELDER LOISEAU BOVÉ HUITEMA DELAHAYE KADENBACH MCGUINNESSKÖSTINGER CARTHY ANDRIEU DANTIN FLANAGAN DOHRMANN FERRAND HEUBUCH ERIKSSON FEDERLEYPAULSEN SELIMOVIC ROHDE 1 TARABELLA MÜLLER ASHWORTH NOICHL JAHR ECK AGNEW DEß NICHOLSON HÄUSLING BRANNEN LINS GIESEKE SCOTT CATO GIRLING DODDSMCINTYRE 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 Left-Right index

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Appendix B

Left-right Probability Agricultural ideology COMAGRI Member of absence/ value-added Banzhaf- Rank Name EP Group (ParlGov, position State substitution (World index (%) 1-left; 10- (%) Bank, 2013) right) United 6.7 1 Paul Brannen Member Kingdom S&D 4.35 0.693 4.218 2 Member Romania EPP 0.0 5.38 6.128 3.556 3 Member Germany S&D 13.3 3.64 0.789 3.040 4 Laurenţiu Rebega Member Romania ENF 20.0 4.76 6.128 2.987 5 Member Germany EPP 13.3 6.25 0.789 2.961 6 Martin Häusling Member Germany Greens-EFA 0.0 2.93 0.789 2.797 7 Marijana Petir Member Croatia EPP 0.0 5.30 4.393 2.638 8 Albert Deß Member Germany EPP 0.0 7.28 0.789 2.611 9 Giulia Moi Member Italy EFD 13.3 2.50 2.327 2.212 10 Zbigniew Kuźmiuk Member Poland ECR 0.0 4.18 3.236 2.187 11 Nicola Caputo Member Italy S&D 0.0 2.62 2.327 2.180 12 Member Italy S&D 0.0 2.62 2.327 2.180 13 Viorica Dăncilă Vice-Chair Romania S&D 33.3 3.23 6.128 2.070 14 Member Belgium S&D 6.7 2.93 0.791 2.054 Czesław Adam 6.7 15 Siekierski Chair Poland EPP 4.18 3.236 2.053 16 Rosa D'Amato Substitute Italy EFD 53.3 2.50 2.327 2.050 17 Member Italy EFD 20.0 2.50 2.327 2.044 18 Ivan Jakovčić Substitute Croatia ALDE 53.3 3.42 4.393 2.011 19 Eric Andrieu Vice-Chair France S&D 0.0 2.93 1.627 1.927 20 Jarosław Kalinowski Member Poland EPP 13.3 4.18 3.236 1.917 21 Michel Dantin Member France EPP 6.7 7.49 1.627 1.877 22 Ulrike Müller Member Germany ALDE 20.0 7.40 0.789 1.788 23 Substitute Germany EPP 20.0 6.25 0.789 1.676 24 Esther Herranz García Member Spain EPP 13.1 7.59 2.821 1.643 25 Vice-Chair Poland ECR 26.7 4.18 3.236 1.622 26 Jordi Sebastià Member Spain Greens-EFA 33.3 1.20 2.821 1.620 27 Norbert Erdős Member Hungary EPP 33.3 6.54 4.553 1.593 United 40.0 28 Anneliese Dodds None Kingdom S&D 7.40 0.693 1.522 29 Peter Eriksson Substitute Greens-EFA 40.0 3.37 1.386 1.476 30 Elisabeth Köstinger Member EPP 6.7 6.47 1.433 1.463 31 Mairead McGuinness Member EPP 13.3 6.43 1.430 1.459 32 Momchil Nekov Substitute Bulgaria S&D 26.7 3.00 5.341 1.413 33 Bronis Ropė Member Lithuania Greens-EFA 33.3 3.26 3.952 1.385 Clara Eugenia 0.0 34 Aguilera García Vice-Chair Spain S&D 3.73 2.821 1.194 35 Member ALDE 6.7 7.34 1.920 1.192

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36 Substitute Netherlands ECR 40.0 7.40 1.920 1.189 Estefanía Torres 20.0 37 Martínez Substitute Spain GUE-NGL 1.20 2.821 1.177 38 Beata Gosiewska Member Poland ECR 40.0 7.69 3.236 1.177 United 46.7 39 Richard Ashworth Member Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 1.160 40 Luke Ming Flanagan Member Ireland GUE-NGL 40.0 1.20 1.430 1.157 Maria Lidia Senra 40.0 41 Rodríguez Member Spain GUE-NGL 2.91 2.821 1.151 42 Member Portugal EPP 40.0 8.02 2.365 1.076 43 José Bové Member France Greens-EFA 20.0 3.15 1.627 1.069 United 26.7 44 Molly Scott Cato Substitute Kingdom Greens-EFA 2.57 0.693 1.039 45 Substitute Germany Greens-EFA 13.3 2.93 0.789 1.027 46 Philippe Loiseau Member France ENF 46.7 9.65 1.627 1.011 47 Edouard Ferrand Member France ENF 46.7 9.65 1.627 1.011 48 Substitute Sweden ALDE 20.0 5.80 1.386 0.968 49 Marit Paulsen Member Sweden ALDE 60.0 6.29 1.386 0.839 50 Member Ireland GUE-NGL 60.0 1.20 1.430 0.783 51 Sofia Ribeiro Substitute Portugal EPP 60.0 6.29 2.3650 0.781 52 Angélique Delahaye Substitute France EPP 13.3 7.49 1.627 0.778 United 13.3 53 Anthea McIntyre Substitute Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 0.770 54 Jens Gieseke Substitute Germany EPP 6.7 6.25 0.789 0.729 55 Jasenko Selimovic Member Sweden ALDE 66.7 6.29 1.386 0.701 56 Substitute Austria S&D 20.0 3.72 1.433 0.688 57 Substitute Germany GUE-NGL 20.0 1.21 0.789 0.653 58 Jens Rohde Member Denmark ALDE 60.0 7.29 1.488 0.645 59 Member Italy EPP 6.7 5.40 2.327 0.600 United 46.7 60 John Stuart Agnew Member Kingdom EFD 7.84 0.693 0.589 United 6.7 61 James Nicholson Member Kingdom ECR 8.30 0.693 0.534 62 Miguel Viegas Substitute Portugal GUE-NGL 6.7 2.17 2.365 0.479 63 Franc Bogovič Substitute Slovenia EPP 20.0 6.69 2.065 0.476 64 Member Netherlands GUE-NGL 80.0 1.21 1.920 0.472 United 6.7 65 Julie Girling Substitute Kingdom ECR 7.42 0.693 0.461 Ramón Luis Valcárcel 6.7 66 Sisoi Substitute Spain EPP 7.59 2.821 0.433 67 Pilar Ayuso Substitute Spain EPP 6.7 7.59 2.821 0.432 68 Emmanouil Glezos Substitute Greece GUE-NGL 6.7 4.49 3.727 0.400 Czech 6.7 69 Stanislav Polčák Substitute Republic EPP 7.40 2.695 0.367 70 Jørn Dohrmann Substitute Denmark ECR 6.7 8.22 1.488 0.360 71 Ricardo Serrão Santos Substitute Portugal S&D 6.7 4.04 2.365 0.166

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