THE ROYAL NAVY and the MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November1940-December 1941 the ROYAL NAVY and the MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November 1940-December1941

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

THE ROYAL NAVY and the MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November1940-December 1941 the ROYAL NAVY and the MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November 1940-December1941 WHITEHALL HISTORIES: NAVAL STAFF HISTORIES SeriesEditor: Capt. ChristopherPage ISSN: 1471-0757 THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November1940-December 1941 THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN VOLUME II: November 1940-December1941 With an Introduction by DAVID BROWN Former Head ofthe Naval Historical Branch, Ministry ofDefence i~ ~~o~~~;n~~~up LONDON AND NEW YORK NAVAL STAFF HISTORIES SeriesEditor: Capt. ChristopherPage ISSN: 1471-0757 Naval Staff Historieswere producedafter the SecondWorld War in orderto provide as full an accountof thevarious actions and operations as was possible at the time. In some casesthe Historieswere basedon earlierBattle Summarieswritten much soonerafter the event,and designedto provide more immediateassessments. The targetaudience for theseNaval Staff Historieswas largely servingofficers; someof the volumeswere originally classified,not to restrict their distribution but to allow the writers to be as candidas possible. The Evacuationfrom Dunkirk: Operation 'Dynamo: 26May-4 June 1940 With a prefaceby W. J. R. Gardner Naval Operationsof the Campaignin Norway, April-June 1940 With a prefaceby ChristopherPage The RoyalNavy and the Mediterranean,Vol. I: September1939-0ctober 1940 With an introductionby David Brown The RoyalNavy and the Mediterranean,Vol. II· November1940-December 1941 With an introductionby David Brown German Capital Shipsand Raidersin World War II: VolumeI: From Gra! Speeto Bismarck,1939-1941 VolumefL· From Scharnhorstto Tirpitz, 1942-1944 With an introductionby Eric Grove The RoyalNavy and the PalestinePatrol With a prefaceby Ninian Stewart During the productionof this Naval Staff History, it was learnedwith greatregret that David Brown, OBE FRHistS,the authorof the new Introductionto this volume, died on 11 August 2001. He had dedicatedhis life to naval history and was Headof the Naval Historical Branchof the Ministry of Defencefor more than a quarterof a century. CONTENTS page Forewordby Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh,First SeaLord ix Introductionto the new edition by David Brown Xl MediterraneanVolume II: [i] Preface [iii] Contents [iv] Illustrations [v] Figuresand Plans [vi] Abbreviations [vii] PhaseI: AIR AND SEA POWER,November 1940 to June1941 Chapter1: Fighting at seain both halvesof the Mediterranean,November 1940 1 Chapter2: Fighting on land, at seaand in the air: Cyrenaica,convoys andbombardments, December1940 to February1941 29 Chapter3: Axis forces attackin the Balkansand Cyrenaica,February to April 1941 54 Chapter4: Withdrawal from Crete,advance into Iraq and Syria, April to June1941 88 PhaseII: SUPPORTTO THE ARMY, Juneto December1941 Chapter5: Stalematein the WesternDesert, June and July 1941 132 Chapter6: Attacks on the enemy'spipe-line, August, September1941 156 Chapter7: Preparingfor assaultin the desert,October, November 1941 182 Chapter8: Advanceinto Cyrenaica,December 1941 210 Appendices(A-G) 239 Bibliography 269 Index 271 Plans(1-19) and Maps (1-8) 319 Forewordby Admiral Sir Nigel EssenhighKCB ADC First SeaLord and Chiefof the Naval Staff This Naval StaffHistory, publishedin 1957,was the secondin a serieswhich originally was intendedto comprisefour volwnes. [n the event, it was decidedthat the historiesof the subsequent operationsin the Mediterraneantheatre were coveredin othervolwlles, althougha first draft for Volume III wasprepared. At the beginningof November1940, we had somereason to be confidentof the future: on land, the Italians hadbeen checked near Sidi Barrani, andWavell was receiving reinforcementsfor his intendedcounter attack; at sea,the Italians showedlittle inclination to contestthe Royal Navy's aggressivepatrolling, and the carrier ILLUSTRIOUS and severalother smaller ships had joined the MediterraneanFleet. The situation looked evenmore favourableafter the raid on Tarantoon II Novemberwhen three Italian battleshipswere put out of action. In Decemberthe Army beganits advanceinto Cyrenaicain a seriesoftri-Service combined operations, which althoughminor in comparisonwith later amphibiousassaults, provided valuable lessons. But by Januarythe situationhad begunto changefor the worsewith the arrival of Germandive- bomberswhich seriouslydamaged ILLUSTRIOUS, sankSOUTHAMPTON, and threatenedthe supply lines to Malta. Thesenaval disasterswere followed by Germanattacks on land in Greece leadingto the costly duel with the Luftwaffe to evacuatethe Army from Crete. 1941 endedwith the daring attackon AlexandriaHarbour by Italian charioteerswhich disabledtwo of Cunningham's battleships:casualties in that yeartotalled 33 destroyersand above sunk or seriouslydamaged, and 8 submarineslost. The Afrika Korps had reinforcedthe flagging Italians and, significantly, Japanhad enteredthe war. Therehad beensuccesses, at CapesSpartivento and Matapan, in the continued supply by seaof Malta andTobruk, and particularly in the efforts madeto supportArmy operations and interdict the logistics of the Axis groundforces. Rommel'smobile tacticsresulted in a very high consumptionof all types of his stores,and it was on the interruptionof his logistic supply chain that the campaignagainst the Axis army hinged. On balance,although it had beena very hardyear, the Commander-in-Chiefcould look backwith somesatisfaction on the part played by the Royal Navy. A Germannaval view of the end of this secondphase of the war in the Mediterraneanis providedby Admiral Weichold, who from November1941 was in commandof all Germannaval forces operating mthetheatre. He highlights variousfailings of the Axis conunandersin this period, notably the pursuit of an independentair war by the Luftwatfe, andthe very seriouslong-term problemsto the Axis army in North Africa posedby the loss of over half a million tons of merchantshipping in one year. Rommelexpected that his supply deficiencieswould be madegood during the next few months.Weichold concludedhis appreciationofthis phase:'This miscalculationsprang from an under-estimationof the importanceof the war at seato the campaignin North Africa'. The resonance of this conclusion,that expeditionarywarfare carrieswith it the essentialprerequisite of being able to supportland forcesfrom the sea,was well-learnedby the Allies at the time, and remainsequally importanttoday. Ministry of Defence June2001 ix INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW EDITION Volume II of the Naval Staff History of MediterraneanOperations covers the period from the beginning of November1940 until the end of December1941 - effectively, from the entry of Greece,through the involvementof theSoviet Union, to theoutbreak of war in theFar East.All threeevents brought welcome allies - Greecewas Britain's first effective ally sincethe fall of France- but the first and last diverted British forces to shoreup new 'fronts' just when it seemedthat victory in the WesternDesert was a realisticpossibility. The Germandiversion of forces,particularly air forces,to the Russianfront occurred during a period when Axis victory in the easternMediterranean and Egypt was no lesslikely. The presentvolume begins with the action which gave the MediterraneanFleet the superiority it neededto conduct its operationsin support of the Army in Egypt and Cyrenaica,and to transport personneland storesto Greecefree from interference;initially from all forms of attackand latterly from naval surfaceforces, at least. The air attackon Tarantoin early November1940 and the Battle of Cape Matapanin late March 1941 did not 'drive the Italian Navy from the seas',but thesesuccesses deterred it from challengingfor evenlocal supremacy,except in the westernbasin, where the weakerForce 'H' had the effrontery to shell the mainland dockyard at La Spezia and the good fortune to withdraw unhindered.The arrival of theLuftwaffe in January1941 restoredsome ofthe balance, but, despiteserious losses,units of the MediterraneanFleet and the merchant navies continued to put themselves'in harm's way' to supportthe Allies andtheir armies,culminating in the evacuationsof Greeceand Cretein April and May 1941, in the courseof which air attacks sank or severelydamaged nearly 30 major British warships. In spite of theselosses, the MediterraneanFleet retained an ascendancywhich continuedto be unchallengedeven though the Italian Navy now had a materialadvantage in all major classes.During the secondhalf of 1941, indeed,the Fleetcame closer to establishinggenuine 'Sea Control' than it haddone at the time of its greateststrength, and in Novemberthe Eighth Army was able to launch a successful offensiveagainst an enemywhose consumption had outstrippedresources rendered inadequate by the loss of too many supply ships.A month later, the British naval position in the Mediterraneanwas more precariousthan ever before: in the eastone of its threebattleships had beensunk and the othertwo badly damaged;in the centralbasin the surfacestriking force had sufferedserious losses; and in the westthe only modernaircraft carrieravailable, the Ark Royal, had beensunk. U-boats had beenresponsible for two of the losses,more were enteringthe Mediterranean,and Luftwaffe units which hadbeen operating in Russiawere now flying southfor the winter. In the Far Eastthe loss of two capital ships(the Prince of Wales and Repulse)made the need for reinforcementso urgent that ships had to be found from the MediterraneanFleet, which reachedits nadir as 1941 ended. This Staff History tracesthese developments but leavesthe detail of the major actions to be fully coveredby othervolumes in theNaval StaffHistory series/as are the convoy operations, each amounting to a full-scale battle, undertakenby
Recommended publications
  • 9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
    Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5.
    [Show full text]
  • JFQ 31 JFQ▼ FORUM Sponds to Aggravated Peacekeeping in Joint Pub 3–0
    0203 C2 & Pgs 1-3 3/3/04 9:07 AM Page ii The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning and unified command. —General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold Report to the Secretary of War Cover 2 0203 C2 & Pgs 1-3 3/27/04 7:18 AM Page iii JFQ Page 1—no folio 0203 C2 & Pgs 1-3 3/3/04 9:07 AM Page 2 CONTENTS A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili In This Issue 6 by the Editor-in-Chief Living Jointness 7 by William A. Owens Taking Stock of the New Joint Age 15 by Ike Skelton JFQ Assessing the Bottom-Up Review 22 by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Living Jointness JFQ FORUM Bottom-Up Review Standing Up JFQ Joint Education Coalitions Theater Missle Vietnam Defense as Military History Standing Up Coalitions Atkinson‘s Crusade Defense Transportation 25 The Whats and Whys of Coalitions 26 by Anne M. Dixon 94 W93inter Implications for U.N. Peacekeeping A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 29 by John O.B. Sewall PHOTO CREDITS The cover features an Abrams main battle tank at National Training Center (Military The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions Photography/Greg Stewart). Insets: [top left] 34 by Thomas C. Linn Operation Desert Storm coalition officers reviewing forces in Kuwait City (DOD), [bottom left] infantrymen fording a stream in Vietnam Preparing Future Coalition Commanders (DOD), [top right] students at the Armed Forces Staff College (DOD), and [bottom right] a test 40 by Terry J.
    [Show full text]
  • The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces
    The Dupuy Institute 1497 Chain Bridge Road Suite 100 McLean, VA 22101 Phone: (703) 356-1151 Fax: (703) 356-1152 Website: http://dupuyinstitute.org/ THE HISTORICAL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF LIGHTER-WEIGHT ARMORED FORCES FINAL REPORT Contract Number DASW01-98-D-0058, Task Order 005 6 August 2001 Prepared for: U.S. Department of the Army Center for Army Analysis 6001 Goethals Road Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5230 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................... 1 Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 1 Study Plan..................................................................................................................................................... 2 Technology ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Wheeled Tanks ............................................................................................................................................. 3 The Interim Brigade/Division ....................................................................................................................... 4 II. USE OF ARMOR IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS........................................................................................ 5 Presence of Armor in SSCOs.......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • UK National Archives Or (Mainly) 39
    Date: 20.04.2017 T N A _____ U.K. NATIONAL ARCHIVES (formerly known as the "PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE") NATIONAL ARCHIVES NATIONAL ARCHIVES Chancery Lane Ruskin Avenue London WC2A 1LR Kew Tel.(01)405 0741 Richmond Surrey TW9 4DU Tel.(01)876 3444 LIST OF FILES AT THE U.K. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, THE FORMER 'PRO' (PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE) FOR WHICH SOME INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE (IN MOST CASES JUST THE RECORD-TITLE) OR FROM WHICH COPIES WERE ALREADY OBTAINED. FILES LISTED REFER MAINLY TO DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL TO A PERSON INTERESTED IN GERMAN WARSHIPS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND RELATED SUBJECTS. THIS LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE. RECORDS LISTED MAY BE SEEN ONLY AT THE NA, KEW. THERE ARE LEAFLETS (IN THE LOBBY AT KEW) ON MANY OF THE MOST POPULAR SUBJECTS OF STUDY. THESE COULD BE CHECKED ALSO TO SEE WHICH CLASSES OF RECORDS ARE LIKELY TO BE USEFUL. * = Please check the separate enclosure for more information on this record. Checks by 81 done solely with regard for attacks of escort vessels on Uboats. GROUP LIST ADM - ADMIRALTY ADM 1: Admiralty, papers of secretariat, operational records 7: Miscellaneous 41: Hired armed vessels, ships' muster books 51: HM surface ship's logs, till ADM54 inclusive 91: Ships and vessels 92: Signalling 93: Telecommunications & radio 116: Admiralty, papers of secretariat, operational records 136: Ship's books 137: Historical section 138: Ships' Covers Series I (transferred to NMM, Greenwhich) 173: HM submarine logs 177: Navy list, confidential edition 178: Sensitive Admiralty papers (mainly court martials) 179: Portsmouth
    [Show full text]
  • Supplement To
    Bumb, 38331 3683 SUPPLEMENT TO Of TUESDAY, the 22nd of JUNE, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE, 1948 RAID ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN THE LOFOTEN ISLANDS. The following Despatch was submitted to the wind or tide. I would stress moreover that Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the any less time than was allowed for rehearsal ^th April, 1941, by Admiral Sir JOHN C. and planning, and it was two days less than TOVEY, KC.B., D.S.O., Commander-in- originally planned, would have been quite Chief, Home Fleet unacceptable. H.M.S. KING GEORGE V. 3. I would mention the valuable part played t by the submarine SUNFISH in her role as a qth April, 1941. D/F beacon.* This scheme worked well, and OPERATION " CLAYMORE " although in the event the force was able to fix by sights, had this not been possible they Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the would have been in an uncomfortable position enclosed report of Operation " Claymore "* without the SUNFISH'S aid prepared by the Captain (D), 6th Destroyer Flotilla, H.M S. SOMALI, in command of the 4. iWith reference to paragraph 29 of Captain operation. I concur fully in the report and in D.6's report, I had laid particular emphasis in the remarks of the Rear Admiral (D), Home my verbal instructions on the importance of Fleet, in his Minute II, particularly in punctuality in withdrawing all forces at the paragraph 2. end of the agreed time, and I endorse the opinion that it was necessary to sink the HAM- 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Monitoring of Underwater Archaeological Sites with the Use of 3D Photogrammetry and Legacy Data Case Study: HMS Maori (Malta)
    Monitoring of Underwater Archaeological Sites with the use of 3D Photogrammetry and Legacy Data Case study: HMS Maori (Malta) By Djordje Cvetkovic Monitoring of Underwater Archaeological Sites with the use of 3D Photogrammetry and Legacy Data Case study: HMS Maori (Malta) Author: Djordje Cvetkovic Supervisors: Dr Timmy Gambin Dr Kotaro Yamafune Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Maritime Archaeology Word Count: 25,499 words Department of Classics and Archaeology University of Malta March, 2020 Abstract A photogrammetric survey has proven to be a reliable method for documenting underwater archaeological sites. Still, the potential which photogrammetry could have in the monitoring of underwater cultural heritage has been just briefly discussed in the past. The purpose of this dissertation is to test if a cost-effective and time-efficient monitoring scheme can be created, for a modern shipwreck site such as HMS Maori, by using photogrammetry and legacy data. The credibility of legacy data (old video footage) was explored, alongside software capable of producing deviation analysis (Cloud Compare). Some of the key findings of this research confirmed that it is possible to geo-reference and extract information from legacy data 3D models by using the method of ‘common points’ (PhotoScan/Metashape). Also, a comparative study confirmed that deviation analysis could generate quantitative data of an underwater archaeological site. This research demonstrated that a reliable monitoring scheme could be constructed with the help of legacy data and deviation analysis. The application of this methodology provided a better understanding of the change that is continuously happening at the shipwreck site of HMS Maori.
    [Show full text]
  • Patrick Joseph Mooney 1910 – 1959 Details of RN Service 1939 -1941
    Patrick Joseph Mooney 1910 – 1959 Details of RN Service 1939 -1941 Pembroke I - 19 Sep 39 - 19 Mar 40 Lynx (Brilliant) - 20 Mar 40 - 30 Sep 40 Pembroke - 1 Oct 40 - 8 Dec 40 Pembroke (Legion) - 9 Dec 40 - 10 Mar 41 Pembroke - 11 Mar 41 - 14 Jun 41 Curacoa - 15 Jun 41 - 13 Aug 41 - "R" The “R” is an abbreviation for "RUN” which is the way the RN indicated that someone had deserted. Where the name of a ship appears in brackets it means that it is the ship served in. The name preceding it is that of the accounting base responsible for pay, etc. Some vessels, from the smallest up to destroyers, (which invariably operated in squadrons or flotillas, had insufficient working space on board, i.e. no victualing office, no stores office and only the tiniest ship's office on the larger frigates and destroyers, to look after the Captain's correspondence, daily orders for the ship etc., and didn't have sufficient sleeping and living accommodation to carry the victualling, stores and writer ratings necessary to fill the positions, i.e. these ships were designed purely as fighting machines - and the people who would organize the pay and service documents for the ship's company, victualing accounts and menus and all the various stores that a ship requires to operate, lived ashore in say Pembroke, where they could look after far more people than they could have done had they lived on board, i.e. there was a saving in manpower e.g. 1 Petty Officer Writer and 1 writer could look after the pay documents for 500 officers and ratings - which would be the pay for several ships - depending on the size of the ship's company.
    [Show full text]
  • Military History Anniversaries 16 Thru 31 January
    Military History Anniversaries 16 thru 31 January Events in History over the next 15 day period that had U.S. military involvement or impacted in some way on U.S military operations or American interests JAN 16 1776 – Amrican Revolutionary War: African-American Soldiers » It was an uncomfortable fact for many in the colonies that at the same time they were fighting the British for their liberty and freedom they were depriving slaves of that same opportunity. African-American soldiers, in fact, had participated in major Revolutionary War battles from its very start: around 5% of American forces at the battle of Bunker Hill were black. New England units were completely integrated with soldiers receiving the same pay regardless of color. Still, fears of a rebellion of armed slaves tempered official American recognition of the contribution of blacks. On this date General George Washington allowed for the first time for free blacks with military experience to enlist in the revolutionary army. A year later, as the American need for manpower increased, Washington dropped the military experience requirement, allowing any free black who so wishes to enlist. The Continental Congress tried to recruit more African-Americans by offering to purchase them from the Southern slaveholders. Unsurprisingly, few agreed. But enterprising states like Rhode Island made an end run around the slaveholders, announcing any slave who enlisted would immediately be freed. (Rhode Island compensated the slaveholder for the market value of their slave.) The “1st Rhode Island Regiment” was comprised mostly of those freed slaves, becoming the only Continental Army unit to have segregated units for blacks.
    [Show full text]
  • The Battle for Convoy HG-75, 22-29 October 1941 David Syrett
    The Battle for Convoy HG-75, 22-29 October 1941 David Syrett In the autumn of 1941 Nazi Germany was victorious. All of continental Europe, from the Iberian Peninsula to the gates of Moscow, with the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, was under German control. The United States was neutral and Russia, reeling under the impact of German invasion, appeared on the verge of defeat while Britain, aided by its Empire and Commonwealth, fought a desperate battle for existence. Key to the continued survival of Britain was the ability, in the face of attack by German U-boats, to sail convoys of merchant ships to and from the island kingdom. The German navy in the autumn of 1941 had every reason to believe that Britain could be defeated by attacking the island's seaborne supply lines with U-boats. In September of 1941, with about eighty operational U-boats, the Germans sank fifty-three British and Allied merchant ships amounting to 202,820 tons, while in the period from 1 January to 31 September 1941 the British had managed to sink only thirty-one Axis U-boats.' The battle with the U-boats was a conflict the British had to win, for without a constant flow of supplies, transported by merchant ships, Britain would have been forced to surrender, for the civilian population would have starved and all industry would have ground to a halt. Britain's continued survival thus depended on the Royal Navy's ability to escort merchant ships to and from British ports.' To combat U-boat attacks on merchant shipping the British had adopted a strategy of convoys.' These had been employed by the British in the great naval wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as in World War I.
    [Show full text]
  • History 4495 World War Two in Europe Dr. Eli Rubin Fall Semester 2015
    HISTORY 4495 WORLD WAR TWO IN EUROPE DR. ELI RUBIN FALL SEMESTER 2015 Dunbar Hall 4204 4-6:30 Contact Information: Dr. Eli Rubin Office: 4418 Friedmann Hall Office Hours: M 12-2 W 1:30-2:30 Office telephone: 387-4646 Email: [email protected] Note: my policy is to reply to all e-mails within 24-48 hours; if you have not received a reply after that time frame, please contact me again (your message may have been filtered or overlooked). Introduction Welcome to History 4495, World War Two in Europe. This is a 4000 level Baccalaureate Writing Course which focuses on the lead up to, the conduct, and the aftermath of WWII in Europe. Among the main areas of focus will be: 1. The rise of fascism and communism in the 1920s and 30s, in the context of the aftermath of WWI. 2. The reasons for German military dominance from 1939-1943. 3. The reasons for the German collapse after 1943 4. The Holocaust and its connection to the War. 5. The moral and ethical dilemma of the bombing war over Germany 6. Resistance to German occupation 7. The end of the War and its connection to the Cold War We will be considering a range of secondary and primary sources which focus on Germany, Italy, France, Eastern Europe and beyond. Course Goals At the end of this course, you should be able to: 1. Explain the connections between the aftermath of WWI and the rise of Communism and Fascism 2. Compare the similarities and differences of Communism and Fascism.
    [Show full text]
  • The 9/11 Commission Report
    THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States official government edition For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 0-16-072304-3 CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5.
    [Show full text]
  • A Precarious Balance
    PHILLIP LOHAUS A PRECARIOUS BALANCE ABOUT AEI The American Enterprise Institute is a community of scholars and supporters committed to expanding liberty, increasing individual opportunity, and strengthening free enterprise. AEI pursues these unchanging ideals through independent thinking, open debate, reasoned argument, and the highest standards of fact-based research. Without regard for politics or prevailing fashion, we dedicate our work to a more pros- perous, safer, and more democratic nation and world. A PRECARIOUS BALANCE PRESERVING THE RIGHT MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Cover photo: US Army photo by Spc. Steven K. Young Phillip Lohaus American Enterprise Institute 1150 Seventeenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE A Precarious Balance Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and Special Operations Forces By Phillip Lohaus A MERICAN E NTERPRISE I NSTITUTE Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION 1 US C ONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 3 SINCE WORLD WAR II AFGHANISTAN , I RAQ , AND THE ASCENDANCY OF 31 US S PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CURRENT DYNAMICS 44 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 48 CONCLUSION 59 NOTES 61 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 73 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 75 iii Executive Summary American special operations forces (SOF) are in the midst of a golden age. From references in pop culture to commendations from the White House, praise for America’s quiet professionals has become anything but quiet. Such adoration is well-deserved, but underlying SOF’s newfound popularity,
    [Show full text]