PHILLIP LOHAUS A PRECARIOUS BALANCE ABOUT AEI The American Enterprise Institute is a community of scholars and supporters committed to expanding liberty, increasing individual opportunity, and strengthening free enterprise. AEI pursues these unchanging ideals through independent thinking, open debate, reasoned argument, and the highest standards of fact-based research. Without regard for politics or prevailing fashion, we dedicate our work to a more pros- perous, safer, and more democratic nation and world. A PRECARIOUS BALANCE PRESERVING THE RIGHT MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Cover photo: US Army photo by Spc. Steven K. Young Phillip Lohaus American Enterprise Institute 1150 Seventeenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE A Precarious Balance Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and Special Operations Forces By Phillip Lohaus A MERICAN E NTERPRISE I NSTITUTE Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION 1 US C ONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 3 SINCE WORLD WAR II AFGHANISTAN , I RAQ , AND THE ASCENDANCY OF 31 US S PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CURRENT DYNAMICS 44 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 48 CONCLUSION 59 NOTES 61 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 73 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 75 iii Executive Summary American special operations forces (SOF) are in the midst of a golden age. From references in pop culture to commendations from the White House, praise for America’s quiet professionals has become anything but quiet. Such adoration is well-deserved, but underlying SOF’s newfound popularity, questions remain as to how they should be employed in the future. When should they lead conventional forces, and when should they act in a supporting role? How might we apply the counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to a conven - tional conflict? Above all, should SOF retain all of their current responsibilities, or should the tip of the metaphorical spear be sharpened to allow SOF to focus on the tactics and techniques that only they can bring to the battlefield? Many crises are best addressed with the innovation and discreet - ness of SOF, but others require the mass that only conventional forces bring to bear. More often than not, successful military cam - paigns involve some mixture of both conventional and special operations forces, but tensions between the two have impeded suc - cessful cooperation in the past. The United States military remains the world’s most formidable fighting force, but tools of military power are just that. Neither a scalpel nor a sledgehammer has intrinsic value—their utility is a function of the skill of the beholder. Without a careful calibration of its overall force, the United States risks failure in both conven - tional and asymmetric conflicts—or, at the least, continuing the cycle of misunderstanding and competition that has characterized the relationship between conventional and special operations forces. This report traces the history of the relationship between v vi A PRECARIOUS BALANCE these two forces to examine how each might be optimized to face future conflicts. Although their roots extend as far back as the Revolutionary War, the modern identity and ethos of American SOF were forged dur - ing World War II. Their interaction with foreign partisans and rela - tive isolation from their conventional counterparts acted as a crucible, one that was understood only dimly by conventional com - manders and was thus undervalued. In subsequent years and wars, their identity evolved from an undervalued and misunderstood force to a force of elite regulars to a force with skills and a purpose distinct from conventional forces. But by the early 21st century, the roles of each force also became increasingly blurred: conventional forces conducted SOF-like mis - sions in Iraq, for example, and SOF were employed in a manner more suited to conventional forces in the early stages of the War in Afghanistan. Current directives to increase the flexibility of America’s fighting forces, though important in spirit, also threaten to erode skill sets that take careers, not days or months, to build. Special operations forces are currently defined in Joint Doctrine literature as constituting units that are “particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments” that apply their unique capabilities in circumstances “for which there are no broad conventional force requirements.” 1 This definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, as nearly every military operation might be defined as “politically sensitive,” and the complexities of modern warfare present many requirements that, strictly speaking, might be interpreted as outside of “broad conventional force requirements.” Today, the scales that balance the use of conventional and special operations forces are increasingly heavily weighted toward the latter. But can a small, elite force on its own adequately address the breadth of national security threats that America might face in the future? Achieving the optimal balance between conventional forces and SOF will require recalibration through sound policy. The policy rec - ommendations in this paper reflect the conclusion that each force brings a different comparative advantage to the fight. The peculiar capabilities of special operations forces are crucial tools in America’s EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii quiver, but they are not the only ones. The mass of the conventional force is ideal for missions aimed at a large population—that is, those that require an amplification of America’s military power. Con - versely, the flat hierarchy and cutting-edge war-fighting skills of SOF are ideal for surgical and secretive missions—that is, those that require innovation. Given this, some missions currently assigned to SOF should be transferred to the larger conventional force. Carefully delineating the roles of each force, taking a measured approach to flexibility, and allocating missions based on each force’s comparative strengths will bring a sustainable equilibrium between the forces. Introduction Special operations forces (SOF) have in recent years entered a golden age of popularity. Not only were they shielded from many of the effects of sequestration and other cuts endured by the major services, but the number of civilian and military personnel allocated to US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has increased since FY 2012. 2 The president’s 2012 strategic guidance to the Defense Department specifically calls for “selective additional investments” to maintain and enhance the counterterrorism and irregular warfare capabilities of the US armed forces. Many of those investments have been placed into special operations forces. 3 Although the rest of the Defense Department faces hiring freezes and personnel cuts, USSOCOM will add 3,700 personnel to align with the goals of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2015 defense budget proposal allocates a 10 percent increase over USSOCOM’s 2014 budget appropriation. 4 Because SOF are drawn directly from the services, the reallocation of some of the best and brightest soldiers into USSOCOM will affect the efficacy of the conventional force. Outside the military, these tradeoffs have largely been accepted as part of the assessed future direction of warfare, in which, some argue, great-power confrontation will be less likely and irregular warfare in far corners of the globe will become the norm. 5 But how might we know what kinds of wars we will fight in the future? Each aspect of American military power—naval forces, ground forces, air forces, and special operations forces—has an integral role to play in providing for America’s defense. Cuts to certain capabilities over others will create opportunities for potential enemies of the United States to exploit newfound weaknesses or, at the least, reduce the deterrent effect that results from cross-service strength. 1 2 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE Given current resource constraints, some cuts may be unavoid - able. But it behooves defense analysts and policymakers alike to think of special operations forces as a tool, or as a “precarious value,” as Susan Marquis put it, not as a panacea for all of America’s future strategic challenges. 6 A strong defense relies singularly on the strength of special operations forces no more than it would on one of the conventional services. This study seeks to define how special operations forces should fit into the larger defense enterprise in the 21st century. Special operations forces are no doubt best equipped to handle covert mis - sions and many counterterrorism efforts. But what of other conflict scenarios? Or of efforts to prevent conflict from occurring in the first place? Through an examination of the historical development of special operations forces vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts and an analysis of current capabilities and funding dynamics, this study seeks to identify the optimal balance between special and conventional force capabilities in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan war- fighting realm. US Conventional and Special Operations Forces since World War II Unconventional warfare is not a new concept in American war fight - ing. From the American Revolution to the Barbary Wars, from the Boxer Rebellion to incursions into Russia during World War I, Ameri - can forces have taken part in unconventional warfare since the dawn of the republic. 7 During the Seven Years’ War in the mid-1700s, colo - nial forces recognized the utility of organizing irregulars into distinct units, as exemplified by Major Robert