PHILLIP LOHAUS A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

ABOUT AEI

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PRESERVING THE RIGHT MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Cover photo: US Army photo by Spc. Steven K. Young

Phillip Lohaus

American Enterprise Institute 1150 Seventeenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE A Precarious Balance Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and Special Operations Forces

By Phillip Lohaus

A MERICAN E NTERPRISE I NSTITUTE

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V

INTRODUCTION 1

US C ONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 3 SINCE WORLD WAR II

AFGHANISTAN , I RAQ , AND THE ASCENDANCY OF 31 US S PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

CURRENT DYNAMICS 44

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 48

CONCLUSION 59

NOTES 61

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 73

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 75

iii

Executive Summary

American special operations forces (SOF) are in the midst of a golden age. From references in pop culture to commendations from the White House, praise for America’s quiet professionals has become anything but quiet. Such adoration is well-deserved, but underlying SOF’s newfound popularity, questions remain as to how they should be employed in the future. When should they lead conventional forces, and when should they act in a supporting role? How might we apply the counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to a conven - tional conflict? Above all, should SOF retain all of their current responsibilities, or should the tip of the metaphorical spear be sharpened to allow SOF to focus on the tactics and techniques that only they can bring to the battlefield? Many crises are best addressed with the innovation and discreet - ness of SOF, but others require the mass that only conventional forces bring to bear. More often than not, successful military cam - paigns involve some mixture of both conventional and special operations forces, but tensions between the two have impeded suc - cessful cooperation in the past. The United States military remains the world’s most formidable fighting force, but tools of military power are just that. Neither a scalpel nor a sledgehammer has intrinsic value—their utility is a function of the skill of the beholder. Without a careful calibration of its overall force, the United States risks failure in both conven - tional and asymmetric conflicts—or, at the least, continuing the cycle of misunderstanding and competition that has characterized the relationship between conventional and special operations forces. This report traces the history of the relationship between

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these two forces to examine how each might be optimized to face future conflicts. Although their roots extend as far back as the Revolutionary War, the modern identity and ethos of American SOF were forged dur - ing World War II. Their interaction with foreign partisans and rela - tive isolation from their conventional counterparts acted as a crucible, one that was understood only dimly by conventional com - manders and was thus undervalued. In subsequent years and wars, their identity evolved from an undervalued and misunderstood force to a force of elite regulars to a force with skills and a purpose distinct from conventional forces. But by the early 21st century, the roles of each force also became increasingly blurred: conventional forces conducted SOF-like mis - sions in Iraq, for example, and SOF were employed in a manner more suited to conventional forces in the early stages of the War in Afghanistan. Current directives to increase the flexibility of America’s fighting forces, though important in spirit, also threaten to erode skill sets that take careers, not days or months, to build. Special operations forces are currently defined in Joint Doctrine literature as constituting units that are “particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments” that apply their unique capabilities in circumstances “for which there are no broad conventional force requirements.” 1 This definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, as nearly every military operation might be defined as “politically sensitive,” and the complexities of modern warfare present many requirements that, strictly speaking, might be interpreted as outside of “broad conventional force requirements.” Today, the scales that balance the use of conventional and special operations forces are increasingly heavily weighted toward the latter. But can a small, elite force on its own adequately address the breadth of national security threats that America might face in the future? Achieving the optimal balance between conventional forces and SOF will require recalibration through sound policy. The policy rec - ommendations in this paper reflect the conclusion that each force brings a different comparative advantage to the fight. The peculiar capabilities of special operations forces are crucial tools in America’s EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii quiver, but they are not the only ones. The mass of the conventional force is ideal for missions aimed at a large population—that is, those that require an amplification of America’s military power. Con - versely, the flat hierarchy and cutting-edge war-fighting skills of SOF are ideal for surgical and secretive missions—that is, those that require innovation. Given this, some missions currently assigned to SOF should be transferred to the larger conventional force. Carefully delineating the roles of each force, taking a measured approach to flexibility, and allocating missions based on each force’s comparative strengths will bring a sustainable equilibrium between the forces.

Introduction

Special operations forces (SOF) have in recent years entered a golden age of popularity. Not only were they shielded from many of the effects of sequestration and other cuts endured by the major services, but the number of civilian and military personnel allocated to US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has increased since FY 2012. 2 The president’s 2012 strategic guidance to the Defense Department specifically calls for “selective additional investments” to maintain and enhance the counterterrorism and irregular warfare capabilities of the US armed forces. Many of those investments have been placed into special operations forces. 3 Although the rest of the Defense Department faces hiring freezes and personnel cuts, USSOCOM will add 3,700 personnel to align with the goals of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2015 defense budget proposal allocates a 10 percent increase over USSOCOM’s 2014 budget appropriation. 4 Because SOF are drawn directly from the services, the reallocation of some of the best and brightest soldiers into USSOCOM will affect the efficacy of the conventional force. Outside the military, these tradeoffs have largely been accepted as part of the assessed future direction of warfare, in which, some argue, great-power confrontation will be less likely and irregular warfare in far corners of the globe will become the norm. 5 But how might we know what kinds of wars we will fight in the future? Each aspect of American military power—naval forces, ground forces, air forces, and special operations forces—has an integral role to play in providing for America’s defense. Cuts to certain capabilities over others will create opportunities for potential enemies of the United States to exploit newfound weaknesses or, at the least, reduce the deterrent effect that results from cross-service strength.

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Given current resource constraints, some cuts may be unavoid - able. But it behooves defense analysts and policymakers alike to think of special operations forces as a tool, or as a “precarious value,” as Susan Marquis put it, not as a panacea for all of America’s future strategic challenges. 6 A strong defense relies singularly on the strength of special operations forces no more than it would on one of the conventional services. This study seeks to define how special operations forces should fit into the larger defense enterprise in the 21st century. Special operations forces are no doubt best equipped to handle covert mis - sions and many counterterrorism efforts. But what of other conflict scenarios? Or of efforts to prevent conflict from occurring in the first place? Through an examination of the historical development of special operations forces vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts and an analysis of current capabilities and funding dynamics, this study seeks to identify the optimal balance between special and conventional force capabilities in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan war- fighting realm. US Conventional and Special Operations Forces since World War II

Unconventional warfare is not a new concept in American war fight - ing. From the American Revolution to the Barbary Wars, from the Boxer Rebellion to incursions into Russia during World War I, Ameri - can forces have taken part in unconventional warfare since the dawn of the republic. 7 During the Seven Years’ War in the mid-1700s, colo - nial forces recognized the utility of organizing irregulars into distinct units, as exemplified by Major Robert Rogers’s formation of the Army Rangers. 8 But as the American military became more centralized through the 18th and 19th centuries, specialized units frequently came under the jurisdiction of conventional commanders. 9 The SOF of today, though informed by the techniques developed by unconventional forces of the past, are more than just guerrilla warriors. Yet for a country that has consistently faced unconven - tional threats both on its frontiers and abroad, the extent to which this type of conflict influenced American military doctrine prior to WWII is remarkably limited. For example, the Small Wars Manual , the first publication outlining US military doctrine for what would come to be known as counterinsurgency, was not published until 1940. Irregular warfare and other unconventional disciplines were tools in the conventional commander’s toolbox but were infre - quently, and sometimes only reluctantly, used.

WWII and the Origins of US Special Operations Forces

The increased mechanization of armed conflict, along with the general expansion of warfare to encompass nearly every aspect of

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society, demanded not only increased specialization within the military but also the establishment of new disciplines to address modern threats. 10 Militaries integrated air forces into their con - cepts of operation, developed submarine warfare, leveraged the power of radar, and adapted to new tactical challenges in uncon - ventional ways. Initially, top commanders reacted tepidly to these innovations. Close air support of ground troops, for example, was originally viewed as merely a supplemental tactic, whereas by the end of WWII, both the Axis and Allied powers regularly fielded complex tactical air maneuvers. 11 The challenges facing Allied forces in WWII also led to the crea - tion of specialized military units that could respond to unconven - tional threats separately from the main force. Faced with the possibility of interisland warfare in the Pacific, for example, the US Navy established demolition teams that could clear the shore of potential obstacles and perform underwater reconnaissance. 12 The US Army honed its raiding skills; experimented with short-term task forces that worked behind enemy lines, such as the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional); and reestablished the psychological warfare units that had been disbanded after WWI. The US Army Air Force established units to support SOF from the other services and established a strategic bombing doctrine that would have a special operations component. 13 Of the many specialized units created during WWII, three deserve special attention because of their lasting impact on the ethos and doctrine of America’s modern SOF:

• Jedburgh teams, which are particularly noteworthy for their integration with the American intelligence appara - tus, their multinational composition, and the precedent their recruitment methods set.

• The 5307th Composite Unit (also known as Merrill’s Marauders), which established an ethos of independence and otherness as compared to other units that would US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 5

influence modern ground-based special operations long after the unit’s disbandment.

• Underwater Demolition Teams, which bequeathed a legacy of rigorous training and flexibility to modern Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams.

Each of these units used specialized skills to address specific— and, in some cases, completely new—types of threats. But none existed within a vacuum; each relied directly or indirectly on con - ventional forces.

Jedburgh Teams. Jedburgh teams were originally conceived by British planners, who imagined “auxiliary units” that could wage guerrilla warfare against the Germans in the event of occupation. 14 As the likelihood of a German invasion of Great Britain began to fade, the units were used to liaise with elements of the French resist - ance and to coordinate air drops of arms and munitions in the sup - port of guerrilla warfare behind German lines. That the original idea for these units came from the British is no coincidence: they had attained significant experience with guerrilla warfare during the Boer Wars, and Winston Churchill himself harbored a fascination with special operations forces. 15 With the British in the lead, the newly formed US Office of Strategic Services and the French Bureau Central de Renseigne - ments et d’Action coordinated their efforts to create multilingual, three-person teams. These units began operating in advance of the invasion of Normandy and continued to assist French resistance efforts throughout the rest of 1944. Many former members of the Jedburgh teams went on to serve in high-level positions in the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the war. The extent to which the Jedburgh teams contributed to the success of the French resistance is up for debate. 16 Their contributions to the doctrine of modern American SOF, however, are still evident today. First, Jedburgh teams were created under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services, which established a direct link between 6 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

FIGURE 1 JEDBURGH TEAMS TRAINING WITH PISTOLS

Pistol qualification was one of the first joint training exercises underwent by Jedburgh teams, the newly formed Office of Strategic Services, and Allied partners at Milton Hall training cen - ter, just outside of London. Source: Office of Strategic Services Field Photographic Branch, “MH-49 Jeds on Pistol Range,” ca. 1943–1944, 226-FPL-MH-49, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

America’s nascent intelligence apparatus and a paramilitary group charged with what we would now characterize as a foreign internal defense (FID) mission. In marked contrast to the British model, which drew clear organizational lines between special operations and intelligence, the newly formed Office of Strategic Services over - saw military and intelligence operations in addition to intelligence analysis. 17 This organizational alignment laid the groundwork for the debate about the relationship between the most discreet ele - ments of the military and intelligence organizations that exists in the United States to this day. Second, a tradition of allied cooperation was formed that still exists. 18 Since WWII, combined special operations missions have provided the United States with vital information and specialized support to conduct a wide range of missions around the globe. US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 7

FIGURE 2 JEDBURGH RADIO OPERATORS IN MORSE TELEGRAPHY CLASS

In addition to training in the craft of light infantry, Jedburgh teams also learned some of the most cutting-edge military technology of the era. Source: Office of Strategic Services Field Pho - tographic Branch, “MH-38 Jeds in W/T training room,” ca. 1943–1944, 226-FPL-MH-38, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Operation Enduring Freedom provides in Afghanistan the most recent example. Countries as disparate as Albania and Australia con - tributed their special operations forces in support of International Security Assistance Force missions. 19 Third, these teams were recruited from the ranks of the conven - tional force for their specialized skills and steady temperaments, a practice that continues to this day. 20 Recruiting soldiers from the existing force provided (and still provides) distinct advantages to the receiving unit: with baseline training already accomplished, recruits could quickly begin developing new and specialized skills among a select group of individuals. Then, as now, however, the larger con - ventional force from which SOF were recruited suffered a drain of talent. Moreover, the independent ethos of the special operations culture did not (and still does not) always translate well to the larger 8 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

force, which can lead to tension in the event that a soldier is reas - signed to a conventional unit. Fourth, Jedburgh teams were seen as units that were elite but not sufficient in manpower or capabilities to accomplish their goals independent of either friendly conventional forces or irregulars that they supported behind enemy lines. In fact, it was precisely because of the existence of these other types of units that the Jedburgh teams were able to accomplish their goals. Jedburgh teams benefited, for example, from the urgent threat of a massive invasion that conven - tional Allied forces presented to the Germans because, without that distraction, Jedburgh operations would more likely have been dis - covered. The teams also benefited from the French resistance move - ment, which in addition to being well-trained, possessed unparalleled knowledge of the terrain and the political and military situation in German-occupied France. 21 The Jedburgh teams succeeded at connecting the main Allied war effort and the French resistance. But, much as is still the case, it is unlikely that small groups of SOF could have waged large-scale guerrilla warfare independent of existing resistance elements.

Merrill’s Marauders. The experience of Merrill’s Marauders in Southeast Asia provides a further example of the extent to which SOF required support from outside entities to successfully accom - plish their missions. The soldiers, who got their nickname from their commander, General Frank Merrill, incorporated Chinese sol - diers into their midst as they attempted to unseat the Japanese from their base at Myitkyina, Burma (figure 3). 22 The Chinese troops— though ill-prepared for battle, in many respects—provided knowl - edge of local terrain and, when necessary, stepped in as replacements for wounded American soldiers. Without the addition of the Chinese supplemental force, it is unlikely that Merrill’s Marauders would have taken Myitkyina. And without capturing Myitkyina, the Burma Road, a crucial supply line between China and the Bay of Bengal, may not have been secured. 23 Although the Marauders were disbanded shortly after the battle for Myitkyina, their experience in one of the first major jungle-based US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 9

FIGURE 3 GENERAL MERRILL EXPLAINING A BATTLE PLAN TO TWO TRANSLATORS

General Merrill discusses the battle situation with two translators; he was known to interact as comfortably with low-ranking soldiers as with top brass. Source: David Lubin, “MM 140 Hsamshingyang, Burma; General Merrill Explains Battle Situation,” April 1944, NWDNS-200- QMM-140, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

missions in US military history provided enduring operational les - sons for future SOF. The experience of the Marauders marks the first time that an American unit needed to rely exclusively on air-based units for insertion and provision of supplies; their mission would have been nearly impossible without the newly developed air drop technique. 24 The unit’s reliance on air drops highlighted the impor - tance of air-ground coordination: if the unit did not reach a ren - dezvous point by a specified time, the men went without supplies or risked having them intercepted by locals or enemy troops. Close air-ground coordination would eventually become a linchpin of special operations concepts, and effective communications between 10 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

these elements remains an essential, and not entirely unproblematic, component of a successful mission to this day. The most enduring impact of the Marauders’ experience, though, is perhaps cultural: because of its isolation, the unit developed an acute sense of otherness vis-à-vis the conventional forces from which they were originally drawn. 25 Repeated promises for leave time and better provisions were broken by higher command, and by the time the force arrived in Myitkyina, the men felt all but forgot - ten by the larger service from which they had been recruited. Anger toward the generals who repeatedly disappointed them created an indelible bond among the men in the unit, but few of the Marauders demanded attention for their accomplishments once the mission ended. The unit’s experience of quiet self-reliance in the face of extremely difficult circumstances would leave a mark on the cul - tural ethos of both its legacy unit, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and on American SOF writ large. 26

Underwater Demolition Teams. Just as the need to insert inde - pendent units deeply into difficult terrain led to the creation of Merrill’s Marauders, the evolving demands of amphibious warfare in the Pacific theater led to the establishment of the units that would eventually inspire the creation of the Navy Sea, Air, and Land teams (SEALs). 27 The disastrous assault on Tarawa, where more than 1,000 ill-prepared Marines died because of faulty hydrographic intelligence and the clumsy nature of their large combat formations, showcased the need for agile, multifunctional units that could serve as a force of first resort. 28 To avoid another Tarawa, the US Navy required units that could conduct underwater demolition, operate small-motor torpedo boats, and collect intelligence. In addition to these specialized functions, the new units needed to be highly pro - ficient in combat, as they would likely be the first to encounter the enemy and would need to prepare the way for the larger assault that would follow. To develop these teams, the US Navy turned to demolitions expert Draper Kauffman, whose unique combination of experiences pro - vided him with the varied skills required to create multifunctional, US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 11

amphibious units. Kauffman learned how to neutralize unexploded ordnance during his brief stint as Royal Navy Volunteer Reservist in London, during which he was nominated for the George Cross for his service dismantling unexploded German ordnance around London in the first years of WWII. 29 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Kauff - mann aided with the dismantlement of Japanese bombs and then was made responsible for training underwater demolition teams (UDTs) for deployment in the Pacific Theater. The UDTs that Kauffman would ultimately train had very high casualty rates—more than 50 percent for some missions—but their preparation of the battle space for conventional forces undoubtedly saved the lives of many Marines. Much like that of their newly cre - ated special mission counterparts in the ground forces, the training that UDTs received set them apart from their colleagues; the basic SEAL training course known as “Hell Week” is a legacy of Kauff - man’s training for UDTs. 30 By the end of the war, however, only 200 UDT specialists remained in the Navy. Partly because the future util - ity of UDT-unique skills was unknown, the teams were never fully integrated into other naval units, and despite their small size, they maintained a distinct and separate culture. In fact, as WWII drew to a close, American military command - ers did not quite know how to handle the specialized units developed during the previous decade. The sense of separateness fostered in these units, though deliberate at the time, raised ques - tions as to how they might fit back into the conventional main - stream, and the value of maintaining skills in soldiers that were tailored to what some saw as ephemeral and location-specific con - tingencies remained unclear. 31 At a societal level, the continued existence of covert units would have set a controversial precedent for a country that had yet to establish a permanent intelligence bureaucracy. Consequently, most of the specialized units were dis - banded after the war or were integrated into other components of the State Department or the War Department. 32 The legacy of these units and the intra- and interservice dynam - ics in which they were embedded would echo in the experiences of future SOF. The otherness of special operations forces, for example, 12 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

would never square neatly with the larger services, and even today, many wonder whether the specialized skills present in these units should be transmitted to the larger force. But the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and especially those that occurred in the 1980s, showed that separate, highly trained units are often just the right tool to accomplish specific missions.

From Korea to Vietnam

The dissolution of SOF units following WWII diluted the military’s ability to conduct unconventional warfare. From the perspective of America’s military leaders, however, there was little reason to presume that SOF skills would be needed in the near future. In contrast, America’s civilian leadership identified a need to maintain SOF capabilities, especially those of a clandestine nature. 33 With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the newly formed CIA took responsibility for covert warfare, and most military lead - ers seemed content to allow the CIA to take responsibility for unconventional warfare writ large. 34 Distaste among military leaders for unconventional units was due neither to a lack of interest nor to a lack of a pressing need for their skills. Many veteran conventional officers remembered and resented both the extent to which the importance of special units had been, in their opinion, overblown during WWII and the special units’ ten - dency to recruit the most able and talented men from the conven - tional force. 35 Moreover, the escalation of the Cold War brought a potential conflict with the Soviet Union, a near-peer competitor, to the top of Washington’s strategic agenda. One could forgive the mili - tary planners of the era for concluding that “small wars” might be a thing of the past. The United States thus entered the Korean War in 1950 with a far different outlook on the use of SOF than it had developed dur - ing WWII. Unconventional warfare operations were, if nothing else, viewed as a sometimes necessary evil that should be conducted within and subordinate to the larger, conventional force. This changed attitude is perceptible even in the 1951 Army Field Manual US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 13

for the Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare , which charac - terized support to local guerrilla forces as merely “a phase of total war,” and in its companion guide, Operations against Guerrilla Forces, which characterized counterguerrilla operations as of “limited and short duration” and downplayed the necessity of using specialized units to conduct such missions. 36 Given this confusing guidance, it is little surprise that, when the need to conduct specialized missions arose during the Korean War, many military leaders simply did not know how to use what few SOF were available to them. 37 Army Rangers, who were trained extensively in the antiguerrilla methods outlined in the aforemen - tioned field guides, were underutilized by both the conventional commanders to whom they were attached and by the CIA because of poor coordination between Army and CIA leadership. Psycho - logical operations units had by this time become an institutionalized part of the Army, but they were mostly engaged in limited, overt operations as opposed to the covert missions they had conducted during WWII. Naval and Air Force special operations units fared little better than their Army counterparts. UDTs were used fleetingly during the landing at Incheon and then were mostly utilized by the CIA; the Air Force established three composite wings to support counterinsurgency missions, but these units were infrequently used during the war and were disbanded in 1953. 38 Despite the general lack of enthusiasm for SOF within military leadership circles during the Korean War, the fortunes of SOF were about to change. President Harry Truman’s containment policy required that the American military prepare for the possibility of counterguerrilla warfare to prevent the sread of Communism in an expanding number of geographic fronts. 39 Special operations forces were uniquely prepared to fight in such contingencies, as they had proven their ability to work discreetly with foreign partisans during World War II. The disconnect between how SOF were used in Korea and their applicability to the Truman Doctrine was reconciled when a group of veteran special operations officers established the 10th Special Forces Group in 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This group 14 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

was the first permanent, airborne group of its kind to build the skills necessary to train partisans in advance of a potential war with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. 40 At the time of its establishment, the group consisted of volunteers, many with advanced degrees and most with combat experience from WWII. By the late 1950s, the group was also seen as a potential asset to counter the rise of Com - munist influence in East Asia, particularly in China. 41 Two SOF veterans, Colonels Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann, were chosen to lead the 10th Special Forces Group. They succeeded at establishing an organization that could build on lessons from combat in WWII and Korea, but this did not initially translate to a wider military recognition of the importance of SOF tactics. In fact, the very existence of a group specifically dedicated to unconven - tional warfare gave many Army officers reason to avoid thinking about it altogether. It was not until the presidency of John F. Kennedy that SOF would be recognized as more than irregular par - tisans latched onto a conventional force. Kennedy’s fascination with SOF reflected both his national secu - rity outlook and his personal experience with them. Even before entering office, Kennedy was troubled by the potential threat com - munist insurgencies posed, a concern underscored by Nikita Khrushchev’s famous 1961 pledge to support “wars of national lib - eration.” 42 Kennedy’s administration viewed special operations forces as a likely tool to implement the policy of “flexible response,” and even more so after the disastrous, CIA-led Bay of Pigs invasion. Kennedy’s general satisfaction with the progress of Operation White Star in Laos, coupled with a public diplomacy coup on the part of Colonel William Yarborough, who introduced Kennedy to the superb fighting and language skills of 10th Special Forces soldiers at Fort Bragg, effectively sealed the president’s keenness for SOF (figures 4 and 5). As the situation with Communist insurgents in Southeast Asia grew tenser, the temptation to solve the problem with as small of a group of soldiers as possible also had obvious political advantages. This keenness, however, did not immediately translate into support from the military’s leadership cadre. In National Security US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 15

FIGURE 4 JFK R EVIEWS 82 ND AIRBORNE DIVISION AT FORT BRAGG

In October 1961, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 10th Special Forces Group arranged a field day display of the unique capabilities and talents of their soldiers for President Kennedy and a group of close advisers, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Source: US Army, “Trip to North Carolina: Visit to Fort Bragg, North Carolina,” October 12, 1961, JFKWHP-1961- 10-12-D, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA.

Memorandum 57, the Kennedy administration explicitly provided for each service to establish its own counterinsurgency capability, but many of the service chiefs initially responded by adapting exist - ing units to deal with the counterinsurgency problem. 43 The reluc - tance of military leadership to fully embrace Kennedy’s vision did not prevent the proliferation of specialized units that occurred under Kennedy’s watch, nor did it stanch the development of tech - nologies aimed at supporting them. It would, however, influence the way that military leadership used SOF in Vietnam. At the beginning of America’s involvement in Vietnam, before the mass influx of conventional troops, the Defense Department acqui - esced to the president’s wishes and established the Civilian Irregular Defense Group to work with the CIA to counter the escalating communist insurgency in the Vietnamese countryside. Funded by 16 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

FIGURE 5 JFK WITH BG W ILLIAM P. Y ARBOROUGH

William Yarborough, head of the Army Special Warfare School, diligently established SOF- specific tactics and techniques and raised the profile of special operations forces. President Kennedy was so impressed with the 10th Special Forces Group that he increased their funding and allowed them to differentiate from conventional soldiers by wearing green berets. Source: United States Army, “Trip to North Carolina: Visit to Fort Bragg, North Carolina,” October 12, 1961, JFKWHP-1961-10-12-D, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA. the CIA and run by Army Special Forces, the group conducted civil affairs and self-defense training with tribespeople that the Viet Cong otherwise targeted as a source of populist support. 44 By 1962, the program was judged a success and, by some accounts, took up to “300,000 tribespeople out of the hands of the Viet Cong” (figures 6 and 7). 45 Not all were pleased, however, with CIDG’s approach. Keeping tribespeople in their ancestral villages and helping to build a func - tional civil society within otherwise impoverished and isolated locales were key elements of the organization’s inital strategy. This approach ran counter to the inclinations of Army leadership, which US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 17

saw potential in the newly trained villagers as soldiers for the com - ing conventional conflict. After President Kennedy’s assassination, few remained to champion CIDG’s methods: Army Special Forces units were reassigned to border patrol missions and to targeted, kinetic missions aimed at the Viet Cong (figures 6 and 7). 46 By 1963, CIDG’s presence in the Vietnamese countryside had signifi - cantly decreased, and many of the newly trained villagers were left to fend for themselves. Funding continued to flow to CIDG, but by the late 1960s the organization was increasingly used as a pipeline to place Special Forces–trained locals in combat roles. As conventional Army officers had noted, the training provided by CIDG yielded a sizable pool of local, trained, military-aged men. As CIDG’s initial objective of keep - ing villagers in their hometowns began to wane, many of these men were recruited into other, mainly covert, groups led by American SOF with varying oversight from conventional leadership. Some of these villagers turned their anger against the Republic of Vietnam, and, ironically, CIDG was then blamed for exacerbating the disaffec - tion of the local population. The few Special Forces officers that remained in local villages only nominally retained their advising and training roles and spent most of their time on intelligence gathering and direct-action missions. Over time, the training and advisory elements of CIDG were placed under the control of the Republic of Vietnam, and the group never regained the influence or impact that it had enjoyed in its early years. 47 The CIA also had a hand in the operations of some of these groups. For example, the Studies and Observation Group, nominally a part of the Defense Department’s Military Assistance Command— Vietnam, was jointly overseen by Defense and CIA. This group enlisted American SOF and Vietnamese trainees to conduct recon - naissance and raids inside Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and focused on the kinetic aspects of SOF capabilities that would come to define SOF activities for the remainder of the war. 48 Additional groups used in this manner were the Mobile Strike Forces and the Phoenix Pro - gram, the latter of which controversially pushed the limits of Special Forces behavior into the realm of law enforcement and assassination. 18 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

FIGURE 6 CIDG C AMPS ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL , CIRCA 1961

Source: Eugene G. Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The First Years: 1961–1967,” Veritas 5, no. 4 (2009): 1–10.

Despite the headline-grabbing nature of the raid and reconnais - sance squads, other SOF elements also attribute defining moments to the Vietnam War. Psychological operations, though mostly under conventional control, were used extensively. The Vietnam War marked the first opportunity for the US Navy SEALs to contribute to clandestine missions, and in addition to educating the Viet - namese about underwater demolition techniques, they assisted with the delivery of aid to anti-Communist elements and conducted search-and-destroy missions throughout the Mekong Delta region. 49 The experience of Air Force SOF somewhat mirrored the fate of CIDG: though initially they developed a counterinsurgency support capability, by the end of the war they were mostly relegated to conventional support. 50 Arguably the most important contribu - tion of Air Force Special Forces was to the raid at Son Tay toward US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 19

FIGURE 7 SPECIAL FORCES DISPOSITION IN VIETNAM , 1962 AND 1963

Source: Col. Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971 (Wash - ington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 31 and 39.

the end of the war, which deserves specific mention as it set a prece - dent for the use of SOF in sensitive rescue missions. The raid at Son Tay, also known as Operation Ivory Coast, show - cased the ability of joint SOF to penetrate enemy territory with pre - cision and rapid execution. Preparations for the mission began months in advance, with the ultimate goal of freeing the American prisoners of war (POWs) kept at a high-security camp in Northern Vietnam. The execution of the raid, which employed both Air Force and Army SOF, was nearly faultless; in his case study of the operation, Admiral William McRaven states that it is the “best modern-day example of a successful special operation mission” and that “it should be considered textbook material for future missions.” 51 Yet despite the near-flawless execution of the operation, when the commandos arrived at the compound, no POWs were found. 20 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

Reliance on faulty and outdated intelligence was blamed for this embarrassing outcome, and the intelligence community’s inade - quacies in supporting the mission would eventually lead to its reorganization. 52 In the eyes of a war-weary press, the mission was deemed a failure. But ultimately the raid showed for the first time that US special operations forces could leverage various elements of power to insert a small yet lethal force deep into enemy territory. The raid at Son Tay showed how far American special operations forces had come from their fragmented beginnings during WWII. They had yet to come into their own in an institutional sense, and coordination between units was still conducted on an ad hoc basis. But by the close of the Vietnam War, the development of SOF- specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, along with the estab - lishment of permanent SOF units, considerably furthered the understanding of how and when SOF could be used. During WWII and the Korean War, the role of special operations forces was mini - mized vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts, whereas in Viet - nam, despite the misgivings of many conventional officers, their activities took center stage. With notoriety, however, also came blame, and few wished to be reminded of the importance of uncon - ventional warfare in the years following Vietnam.

From Iran to Somalia

Following the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, the Nixon admin - istration implemented a foreign policy doctrine that deemphasized American military involvement in the developing world. President Richard Nixon unfurled this new outlook in a February 1971 radio address, in which he emphasized the primacy of America’s nuclear deterrent; called on other countries to “assume primary responsibil - ity for their own defense”; and offered that, going forward, the US would provide assistance only when its interests led it to do so and when it could assuredly “make a difference.” 53 In other words, mili - tary engagements in the developing world were no longer treated as an essential front in the Cold War. US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 21

Within the military, this new outlook resulted in a renewed emphasis on strategic and conventional mechanisms of power. Mili - tary leaders began to question the utility of counterinsurgencies, or in the parlance of the time, “low-intensity conflicts.” This reorienta - tion included criticisms of civil affairs, which some leaders viewed as counterproductive in light of the sometimes-close relationships that civil affairs officers developed with local populations, and renewed prominence of the belief that the political costs of special operations were not worth the benefits. 54 The positive impact of SOF, particularly in the beginning of the Vietnam War, were consis - tently overlooked and recast as mere extensions of conventional soldiers’ efforts as the military (as much as the public) sought a scapegoat for the conflict’s embarrassing conclusion. The Nixon administration’s increased emphasis on realpolitik and the changing attitudes of military leadership led to significant manpower reductions in special operations forces. Four of seven Army Special Forces groups were deactivated between 1969 and 1974, resulting in an overall personnel reduction of 10,000 troops. 55 The special operations forces that remained increasingly felt the need to prove their value to the conventional force. The resulting inclination of SOF to perform tasks more closely associ - ated with conventional forces, but simply to perform them better, would continue well into the 1980s. 56 Yet the very attributes of special operations forces that garnered them criticism—their independence, agility, and employment of unorthodox tactics, techniques, and procedures—made them well- suited to address an increasingly alarming problem: international acts of terrorism. Although the United States had demonstrated a superior ability to conduct targeted raids at Son Tay in 1970, the Nixon administration did not initially meet the idea of conducting counterterrorism operations with enthusiasm. 57 As acts of terrorism outside of the Middle East increased in frequency throughout the 1970s, however, the need for such capabilities became increasingly difficult to ignore. Consequently, the Nixon administration became the first to consider international terrorism a federal problem, and later President Jimmy Carter approved the establishment of the 22 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

Delta Force to respond to hostage situations following the Israeli and German raid at Entebbe, Uganda. Carter’s creation of Delta Force, which would encounter its first test during the 1980 hostage crisis in Tehran, marked the first time since Vietnam that a president was specifically interested in developing the potential of America’s special operations forces. The original plan for Operation Eagle Claw, one of the code names for the mission to rescue the 52 US diplomats held hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran, was to parachute Delta Force troops into the city, have those troops make their way to the embassy, and then drive the hostages to the Turkish border, some 400 miles away. 58 The final plan was only slightly less ambitious: first, Delta Force and CIA would conduct the hostage raid while Army Rangers captured a nearby air base; next, the Delta Force –CIA team would transport the hostages via helicopter to the air base; and, finally, the hostages would be flown out of Iran by Air Force Special Operations Command (figure 8). It was assumed that the ad hoc coordination mechanisms between Delta Force and the ele - ments of the military they relied on for transportation would work as they always had and, further, that with Delta Force in the lead, command and control among the various elements of the mission would be smooth. On the day that the mission was executed, the folly of these assumptions became abundantly clear: the operation was scrapped before Delta Force ever reached Tehran because of a deadly helicopter collision in the Iranian desert. Iranian leaders quickly broadcasted the incident on Iranian television as an exam - ple of American incompetence. 59 In addition to creating questions about President Carter’s leader - ship, the failure of Operation Eagle Claw led some to question the US Defense Department’s ability to launch a combined assault effort against far-flung enemies. An after-action report on the operation known as the Holloway Report placed the blame on command and control in the “center of the spear”: although top military com - manders and interagency partners coordinated effectively, commu - nication broke down as orders were sent down the chain of command. 60 Some argued that this situation was exacerbated by US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 23

FIGURE 8 OPERATIONS PLAN FOR OPERATION EAGLE CLAW

Source: John Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change,” Parameters (Autumn 1992): 74–75.

excessive compartmentalization of the mission, while others blamed interservice rivalries. 61 On one matter, though, almost everyone agreed: American special operations forces needed reform. The authors of the Holloway Report cited communications issues among different parts of the Defense Department as the central rea - son for the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. To address these prob - lems, they called for the creation of an organization that could serve 24 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

as a central authority for the constellation of SOF-related activities of the US military. The organization needed to be permanent, over - seen by an interservice advisory board, and focused on coordinating counterterrorism missions. The urgency of this policy prescription increased, and its scope expanded, when special operations forces encountered additional command-and-control–related failures during the 1983 invasion of Grenada. 62 In response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum that called for expanded SOF manpower, enhanced command-and-control capabilities, and increased fund - ing for unconventional units. Responding to the need for reform and the recommendations contained in the Holloway Report, Con - gress, through the leadership of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), went on to create the Joint Special Operations Agency in 1984. At the time of its creation, though, it had neither operational nor com - mand authority over SOF . 63 Despite the increased use of SOF and the scale of problems facing them, initial reform efforts were modest. Bureaucratic inertia and diag - nostic issues were somewhat to blame, but many national security decision makers were also reluctant to solidify the existence of SOF as a permanent and separate element of American military power. Although SOF were increasingly relied upon in the 1980s, their use did not fit distinctly into the prevailing military thought of the time; many within the military were adherents of an emerging school of doctrinal thought, AirLand Battle, which minimized the importance of SOF. AirLand Battle enthusiasts tended to limit the role of SOF to reconnaissance and raiding missions (much as they had operated during WWII) and considered low-intensity conflict a symptom or side effect of major power interactions. 64 The deem - phasis on SOF in AirLand Battle occurred in the absence of a con - vincing alternative: for all of the media attention that special operations forces had attained since WWII, no overarching doctrine for their use existed in the early 1980s. 65 Civilian leaders, particularly those in Congress, were less trans - fixed with AirLand Battle than were their military counterparts. This was due to both political considerations and their perceptions of US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 25

how the military could be used to address the rapidly evolving security landscape. Whereas proponents of AirLand Battle called for a focus on the “big war,” political aversion to large military deployments and the global scope of American security interests made special operations forces an attractive option to civilian deci - sion makers. In 1983, Congress began a two-year study of the Defense Depart - ment that included an investigation into the problems facing special operations forces. The study, which included a series of hearings led by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), shed light on the penchant of conventional commanders to reallocate resources away from special operations forces. It also examined the chaotic, ad hoc SOF command-and-control system that had con - tributed to the embarrassment of Operation Eagle Claw. The findings of the investigation led to the formulation of the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authoriza - tion Act, which added provisions to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the creation of United States Special Operations Command and for a dedicated assistant secretary of defense for special operations/ low-intensity conflict. 66 Although they were now required to recog - nize the establishment of a permanent SOF presence, military com - manders pressed Congress to make sure that USSOCOM was located in Tampa, Florida, far away from the center of power in Washington. Despite the negative reaction of many military leaders to the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, some saw the creation of USSOCOM as an opportunity to finally bridge the gulf of understanding between unconventional and conventional units. During his speech at the 1987 activation of USSOCOM, Admiral William Crowe, who had opposed the creation of the command, implored its new leadership to “break down the wall” that had risen between special and con - ventional forces, to educate the rest of the services about the capabilities of special operations forces, and to integrate special operations forces into the “full spectrum of military capabilities.” 67 The challenge for USSOCOM, which remains today, was to find the appropriate balance between distinction and integration. 26 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

From 1987 to 1990, the United States deployed SOF to respond to “low-intensity” contingencies throughout the world. The mis - sions of these deployments were varied, ranging in scope from sur - gical, such as when Navy SEALs were employed to counter Iran’s harassment of international oil tankers, to vast, such as Operation Just Cause in Panama, which employed nearly every facet of USSOCOM’s capabilities. Because of the scale of Just Cause—nearly 4,000 SOF troops and 77 aircraft were deployed as part of a 27,000- soldier task force to depose Manuel Noriega in Panama—many saw this engagement as the new command’s first major test. 68 SOF per - formance was mixed: civil affairs teams, long neglected by the mili - tary, were neither sufficiently sized nor sufficiently skilled to keep up with the demands placed on them by the operation. The per - formance of direct-action SOF had noticeably improved, but most of their missions could just as easily have been accomplished by conventional troops. Perhaps recognizing the need to define a comparative advantage for special operations forces, General Carl W. Stiner, who served as the commander in chief of USSOCOM from 1990 to 1993, began acquiring “special operations peculiar” supplies, services, and equipment. 69 Conventional commanders responded less than enthusiastically to Stiner’s initiatives. Rather than serving, as Admiral Crowe had implored, to “break down the wall” between conventional and special operations forces, the establishment of SOF-unique equipment and services was seen as an additional obstacle to intercommand cooperation. USSOCOM was stuck in a Catch-22: it could gain the confidence of conventional command - ers only by proving its utility in conventional conflict, but doing so also raised questions as to the purpose of a dedicated command for special operations forces. Special operations forces needed to specialize to prove their value, but specialization served to alienate the very forces that would have benefited from the distinct special operations approach. Stiner’s initiatives would also take a back seat to more pressing concerns: the commencement of Operation Desert Storm (and, sub - sequently, Operation Provide Comfort). This mission saw American US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 27

and British SOF enter Iraq before the conventional ground cam - paign to conduct reconnaissance of and sabotage against Iraq’s communications and missile infrastructure. 70 Yet because US com - manders remained wary of involving the United States in an extended conflict against Iraq, SOF were kept on a tight leash. Operation Desert Storm featured an impressive display of America’s ability to quickly enforce its will against an enemy state, including those with powerful armies. By choice, it was not to become the type of protracted conflict that would have benefited from counter - insurgency, civil affairs, and psychological operations skills. 71 General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM), limited SOF missions to those with a conventional flavor: coalition and combined warfare support, special reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, and training of Kuwaiti forces. By ending Operation Desert Storm after only 100 hours, the United States was able to avoid the kind of protracted insurgency that it would face in Iraq 10 years later. But it had not entirely avoided the need to support the local population affected by the operation. Soon after Desert Storm ended, and before the no-fly zone was enforced in Northern Iraq, the United States and its coalition partners launched Operation Provide Comfort to aid the Kurds who fled Baghdad to avoid Saddam Hussein’s wrath. In another test for the civil affairs and psychological operations elements of SOF, this operation would rely heavily on the nonki - netic aspects of SOF capabilities. 72 Operation Provide Comfort, which, save search and recovery missions, was largely humanitarian in nature, was deemed a suc - cess. But the fact that America’s deployed SOF lacked fluency in Arabic or Kurdish and much, if any, background knowledge of Iraqi or Kurdish culture showed just how much development SOF lan - guage and cultural skills needed before they could be reliably employed in rapidly evolving crisis scenarios. Despite the compressed timeframe, SOF enjoyed success in con - ducting direct-action missions at the outset of Desert Storm. But SOF still struggled both during and after the conflict to maintain an 28 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

appropriate balance between acting independently of conventional units and leveraging them for support. The insertion of special operations troops into Somalia in 1992 provides a case in point. The US military first deployed SEALs, civil affairs teams, psycho - logical operations teams, conventional troops, and members of the 5th Special Forces Group into Somalia in 1992 to support the UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force, whose mission was to provide relief to those affected by the conflict-driven famine that was esca - lating in the region. Initial efforts to provide aid were deemed insuf - ficient, and after an ambush against United Task Force–affiliated Pakistani soldiers in June of 1993, the task force’s mission was expanded to include establishing and preserving security for the Somali population. 73 Perhaps anticipating a speedy and successful end to the conflict, President Bill Clinton reacted to the deteriorating security situation by authorizing the use of force in Somalia and relied heavily on spe - cial operations forces to capture or kill key antagonists in Somalia’s civil war. 74 The Department of Defense responded by assembling Task Force Ranger, comprised of members of the 75th Ranger Reg - iment, Delta Force, and SEAL teams, along with the support of 16 helicopters from the Special Operations Aviation Regiment. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger set out on a mission to capture the foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Somali president. The mission ended disastrously, with one US UH-60 Blackhawk shot down and another struck by rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Although the remaining soldiers performed valiantly during their subsequent march out of Mogadishu, the public perception of the conflict was forever scarred by the dramatic scene of American sol - diers being dragged through the city streets. 75 What went wrong that day? Some argue that the members of Task Force Ranger were blinded to the strategy of the enemy by their focus on securing tactical victories; in other words, they were focused on winning a battle even if it meant losing a war. 76 This would make sense in context: after their underutilization in Iraq, special operations forces were keen to showcase their utility in direct-action missions. Others, including then-Secretary of Defense US FORCES SINCE WORLD WAR II 29

Les Aspin, took the view that the mission failed because of a dearth of ground-based armored support vehicles. 77 This is likely the case, as effective ground support would have increased operational secu - rity and diminished the risk from rocket-propelled grenades. Despite the very public failure in Mogadishu, special opera - tions forces had proven themselves as a crucial asset to the US military. They were the first into Desert Storm and Somalia and were relied on for both direct and indirect missions of the highest national priority. Their tactics, techniques, and pro - cedures required further refinement, to be sure, but the hostility toward these forces by their conventional counterparts had begun to diminish. The political calculations of the Clinton administration no doubt played a role in the increased acceptance of special operations forces as well. The blunt fact that it was cheaper and more discreet to deploy a small contingent of special operations forces than, say, an Army division also played well to an increasingly austere defense budget environment and to the post–Cold War hope that wars would become a thing of the past. The rest of the 1990s was characterized by an increased reliance on special operations forces to conduct “operations other than war.” 78 Special operations forces were particularly well-suited to these types of missions: their training for what had previously been called “low-intensity operations,” their civil affairs and psychologi - cal operations capabilities, their agility, and the relatively small size of their deployments were all applicable to the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and targeted-strike missions characteristic of opera - tions other than war. As a result, worldwide deployment figures for special operations soldiers tripled between 1991 and 1997 and included support to operations in Bosnia and Haiti. Special operations forces were also finally able to acquire specialized equipment, such as the CV-22 helicopter and minisubmarines for SEAL insertion operations, and to refine previously neglected psychological operations capabil - ities. 79 USSOCOM also expanded its core mission to include coun - terproliferation, a priority of the Clinton administration. 30 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

A new paradigm began to emerge in which the combination of special operations forces and technology could achieve military objectives efficiently and with minimal loss of American life. Special operations officers themselves began to promote this narrative. For example, General Peter Schoomaker, commander-in-chief of USSOCOM, extolled that employing special operations forces gen - erated a “strategic advantage that is disproportionate to the resources SOF present.” Around the same time, William McRaven published a book that used case studies to support the idea that special opera - tions forces could “reduce the [Clausewitzian] friction of war to manageable levels,” implying that the use of special operations forces was appropriate and preferable in nearly every conflict scenario. 80 Conventional forces suddenly found themselves on the defensive, trying to fit into a theory of war that prized efficiency and surgical operations over large numbers of troops and the medium- and high- intensity conflict environments in which they worked best. As the 1990s drew to a close, SOF had finally proven their value to conventional commanders, and SOF began to recognize the importance of conventional support. But key questions remained: To what extent should special operations forces focus on missions such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, psychological operations, and civil affairs versus assisting with other missions such as search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and counter- narcotics? 81 During military engagements, how much should SOF rely on conventional forces for support, and vice versa? As we will see, the Global War on Terror brought the core competencies of SOF into sharper focus, but even after Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the answers to these questions are not nec - essarily straightforward. Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Ascendancy of US Special Operations Forces

The attacks of September 11, 2001, increased the demand for the capabilities of American special operations forces more than any prior event in the history of the US military. The fact that the 9/11 attacks were acts of terrorism meant that special operations forces, because of their counterterrorism mandate, would play a central part in any potential US response. The sweeping and unprec - edented expansion to USSOCOM’s powers and authorities in the aftermath of 9/11 would provide far-reaching opportunities for special operations forces to lead American military efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 82 Following the 9/11 attacks, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted one organization to take the lead in what had become known as the Global War on Terror, and the responsibility for this task fell to USSOCOM. 83 The specifics of what this meant in practice were still to be determined, but the authority essentially meant that USSOCOM would become the clearinghouse, the coor - dinator, and in many cases the executor of the various campaigns that fell under the US military’s counterterrorism rubric. During the 1990s, special operations forces had engaged in numerous human - itarian, peacekeeping, and security assistance missions; many of these responsibilities would be passed to conventional forces so that USSOCOM could focus on its new leadership role and on direct action, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, psycho - logical operations, and civil affairs. 84 For the first time since Vietnam, SOF became the supported force rather than the supporting one. Early successes in countering

31 32 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

al Qaeda–trained Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines underscored the effectiveness of special operations in countering terrorists. But the greatest test for SOF would come during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were to follow. Their experiences in these two theaters was markedly different, and the contrast sheds light on the risks inherent in relying too heavily on special operations forces at the expense of their conventional counterparts.

Conventional and SOF Relations in Operation Enduring Freedom

Planning for the insertion of special operations forces into Afghani - stan began immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The planners sought to avoid the mistakes of the Soviets, who had relied too heavily on modern armor and underestimated the resilience of local tribesmen during their invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. The plans thus involved a heavy reliance on SOF and an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of American efforts by involving local forces in the ouster of the Taliban. 85 The Defense Department also intended for the State Department and CIA to lay the political groundwork for what would become a US-sponsored insurgency. Capturing Osama bin Laden, however, required decisive action, precluding a lengthy ramp-up of military and diplomatic efforts. Special operations forces thus joined the CI A’s paramilitary group, the Special Activities Division, as the first American forces into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001. 86 Over the next six months, American special operations forces worked with what remained of the Afghan Northern Alliance and the Southern Alliance to wrest control of Afghanistan from the Tali - ban (figure 9). The initial seizure of the northern city of Mazer-e- Sharif by the Afghan forces of warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, which was augmented by US special operations forces and supported by close air support from the US Air Force, proved consequential beyond its immediate strategic implications in that it served as a template for how the US and its Afghan allies would approach the rest of the initial phase of the war. 87 This approach placed a high ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 33

FIGURE 9 US SOF M ISSIONS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF OEF

Source: Richard W. Stewart, The US Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREE - DOM , October 2001–March 2002 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Mili - tary History, 2004), 9. 34 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

degree of confidence in the performance of local Afghan forces and relied on the force-multiplying effect of American SOF. Rather than count on the insertion of massive amounts of conventional forces, as the Soviets had in the 1990s and as the US had during every simi - larly scaled conflict since WWII, a combination of American SOF, precision weaponry, close air support, and indigenous forces was deemed sufficient to oust the Taliban and to neutralize the al Qaeda elements encamped along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 88 Combining forces in this way led to some initial successes: in addition to seizing Mazer-e-Sharif, the combined American-Afghan Task Force seized Kabul by November 13 and secured the Taliban surrender of the northern city of Konduz by November 23. But as the task force turned its attention to the Afghanistan-Pakistan bor - der, it underestimated the resolve, size, and pervasiveness of the al Qaeda fighters located there. This misjudgment might have been mitigated by well-placed sources in the area, but neither American SOF nor the CIA had maintained previously established ties with Pashtun tribesmen well enough to get an accurate read on al Qaeda’s force disposition. 89 As a result, America and its Afghan allies would encounter many surprises when they launched their campaign against al Qaeda early the following month at the Tora Bora cave complex south of Jalalabad. The Battle of Tora Bora featured the same operational template that was established at Mazer-e-Sharif. Even if different concepts of operation were under consideration, American commanders were constrained by the lack of additional support forces in the area. 90 The battle began on December 3, 2001, with the insertion of a small detachment of members of the Fifth Special Forces Group and the CI A’ s National Clandestine Service, known collectively as Jaw - breaker. In addition to identifying targets for the subsequent bomb - ing campaign, Jawbreaker reported that it had pinpointed the location of Osama bin Laden and requested the immediate support of additional troops to ensure bin Laden’s capture. 91 This request went unanswered. Instead, the mission continued as planned, with Afghan troops slowly making their way into Tora Bora through difficult terrain. The Afghans, who had fewer incentives to capture ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 35

bin Laden than American forces did, ultimately accepted the sur - render of al Qaeda’s troops rather than following through on the American commander’s intent to fight al Qaeda to the end. 92 The battle would go on for 10 more days, and although the squelching of al Qaeda troops in Tora Bora meant that Afghanistan was “effec - tively liberated,” bin Laden was still at large and would remain so for 10 years. 93 Among the many critiques of the Battle of Tora Bora, the criti - cism that America might have captured Osama bin Laden had it dedicated an adequately sized force to the task is one of the most compelling, if not controversial. Some argue that the insertion of a large-enough force to seal off the cave complex from neighboring Pakistan would have been logistically impossible. 94 But the absence of an adequate logistics support structure only under - scores the importance of conventional support in these types of missions and does not hold water as a reason for not deploying more troops. Logistics aside, few additional troops were available to augment the efforts of US special operations forces and their Afghan allies, anyway: the only other forces in-theater at the time were insufficiently manned and located too far away to support the mis - sion in Tora Bora. 95 Even if a force adequate to seal off the entire cave complex was not available, the insertion of a small number additional troops surely would have increased the amount of ground that could have been covered and thus increased the chances of capturing bin Laden. Had commanders not considered that more troops or support may be required than they may have originally planned? Beyond the scale of potential troop insertions, why did it take so long to provide Jawbreaker with additional sup - port? Had additional troops been deployed when the Jawbreaker teams requested them, a small force may have proven adequate to capture bin Laden. America’s overreliance on Afghan forces at Tora Bora is also worth noting. Unlike in Vietnam, American special operations forces and the CIA had not spent the period preceding combined combat operations building trust with and training their new allies. Despite 36 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

the obvious political benefits of building an alliance with local forces to oust the Taliban, these shared interests did not necessarily extend to a conflict with al Qaeda. Absent the trust and efficiency that comes with combined training—which, admittedly, could not have been adequately conducted because of time constraints—American commanders should have, at the least, employed a larger number of American troops. Doing so would have mitigated the inevitable con - fusion that would result during a complex combined mission for which adequate preparations had not been made. Had they relied less on Afghan troops and increased the presence of American forces, not only would the odds of capturing bin Laden have increased, but al Qaeda’s ability to reconstitute in Pakistan would also have decreased. The importance of mass was recognized before America’s next consequential fight against al Qaeda, Operation Anaconda, before which military leaders specifically turned to con - ventional forces for increased support. 96 Operation Anaconda eliminated al Qaeda’s last stronghold in Afghanistan, but characterizing it as an “unqualified success,” to quote General Tommy Franks, is a bit hyperbolic. 97 Poor planning, bad weather, and insufficient coordination both inside the military and among relevant intelligence agencies precluded the combined force from dealing al Qaeda forces a deathblow; rather, many al Qaeda fighters again escaped into Pakistan. 98 The battle plan was ambitious, and though conventional forces were present, artillery— a staple of military power—was not. In fact, Operation Anaconda marked the first time since WWII that the US Army sent a “brigade- sized infantry formation into battle against prepared enemy posi - tions with no supporting artillery.” 99 Moreover, communication between ground elements and the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment, which provided close air support, was chaotic and likely to blame for several American casualties. Although the centraliza - tion of command under USSOCOM was supposed to help eliminate the ad hoc coordination that had stymied other operations in the past (such as Eagle Claw in the 1980s), the command had yet to determine how best to leverage the power of the conventional forces that it oversaw. ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 37

Although it occurred belatedly, the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command was eventually established to oversee the theater-wide activities of special operations forces. With the place - ment of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force– Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) under the command of CENTCOM’s Combined Joint Task Force in 2002, communication between conventional and spe - cial operations forces seemed to improve. 100 Yet the so-called “black” activities of special operations forces—that is, the covert and clan - destine missions—operated under a separate command structure inside both conventional and CJSOTF-A areas of operation. Although their activities were coordinated with the commander of the Interna - tional Security Assistance Force, and later, with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a lack of communication and intelligence sharing at the operational level led at times to counter - productive efforts on the part of conventional commanders. A con - ventional company commander, for example, might establish relationships with local tribal leaders without knowing that such leaders were actually aiding the Taliban; such partnerships might have been avoided with better intelligence sharing. Regarding CJSOTF-A, however, the placement of special opera - tions forces back under the jurisdiction of conventional command - ers helped improve communication among the various elements of the International Security Assistance Force. Yet it also increased the chances that SOF would be “conventionalized,” much as had hap - pened in Vietnam. 101 By parsing special operations forces into spe - cific territories, the International Security Assistance Force and the United States ran the risk of missing important cross–battle-space linkages; insurgents did not operate neatly within a single com - mander’s area of operations. And because not all conventional com - manders fully understood the value of SOF or, for that matter, fully believed in counterinsurgency doctrine, the purpose of CJSTOF-A increasingly came into question during the mid-to-late 2000s. 102 The advent of Village Stability Operations, which were essentially Vietnam-era Civilian Irregular Defense Groups adapted to the Afghan context, helped ameliorate the problem of the convention - alization of CJSOTF-A forces as well as the pervasive instability in 38 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

many of Afghanistan’s rural districts. The program, through which small groups of special operations forces known as Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs) built relationships with village leaders and supported the ability of local populations to defend themselves from Islamist insurgents, mirrored the success at a micro level that provincial reconstruction teams eventually enjoyed at a more macro level in Iraq. The presence of each ODA required the approval of the local jirga, or council of elder Afghan tribesmen. This not only empow - ered local tribes to defend themselves but also built trust between coalition forces and the populations they were charged with pro - tecting. 103 The governance of villages was also improved through police and civil affairs training provided by the ODAs. 104 Once certain areas were stabilized by ODAs, responsibility for main - taining the security of different districts was passed to conven - tional units. Sensing that civil affairs was becoming a task that conventional units could handle effectively, the Army eventually realigned opera - tional control for civil affairs units from USSOCOM to the conven - tional army. 105 Many of the roles that they began to play closely mirrored the tactics and techniques of SOF civil affairs units. Con - ventional units, then, began to play a role more traditionally associ - ated with SOF as the latter focused on direct action and on establishing initial relationships with indigenous groups. In Afghanistan, special operations forces led the initial charge, ceded some control to conventional forces, and then began apply - ing unconventional warfare techniques and counterinsurgency strategy, piecemeal, to gain traction among the local population. Although the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are often compared, the nature of the latter conflict required a much more central role for conventional forces.

Conventional and SOF Relations in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Much as during Desert Storm, the enemy’s possession of a large army and the central importance of controlling urban centers placed ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 39

conventional forces at the center of the plan to oust Saddam Hus - sein in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). At the outset of the opera - tion, Navy SEALs were sent to secure petroleum infrastructure on the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) was tasked with leveraging Kurdish forces and conducting unconventional warfare in the north, and another CJSOTF provided special reconnaissance mis - sions in support of the larger conventional force moving into Iraq from Kuwait. 106 This time, unlike in the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Special Operations Command–Central ensured that units were prepared with the forces and resources needed to address the array of challenges that they would face. They also established liaison offices with coalition and US conventional forces to coordinate missions and reallocate resources on the fly. Because the scale of conflict in Iraq in many ways eclipsed that of Afghanistan—Iraq’s population was much higher, the infrastructure was better, and coalition forces faced not only a wider variety of Islamist groups but also former regime loyalists—the spectrum of special operations activities was wider as well. Special operations forces targeted and neutralized some of the highest-priority targets in Iraq, such as Saddam Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and fused direct action and psychological operations to take control of two of Iraq’s largest oil refineries. Most important, SOF and con - ventional units worked together more seamlessly than ever before, and their experiences implementing counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq therefore deserve particular attention. The initial invasion of Iraq quickly gave way to a large-scale insurgency as both Sunni and Shi’a factions sought to establish spheres of control within the country. Whereas counterinsurgency was once considered almost exclusively the domain of special operations forces, conventional commanders increasingly found themselves countering insurgents as well. Although it would be difficult to characterize them as textbook examples of counterinsur - gency, the First and Second Battles of Fallujah showed the utility that large, conventional forces could bring to bear against insurgents in an urban environment. 40 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

By late winter of 2004, Fallujah, which was overseen by the US Marine Corps, had become a hotbed of the expanding Sunni insur - gency. The situation in Fallujah had grown so volatile that in late April 2004, following what has become known as the First Battle of Fallujah, Coalition Forces withdrew all troops from the city. 107 In the Second Battle of Fallujah, commanders leveraged over 10,000 troops—mostly light infantry—to recapture the city (figure 10). Coalition forces were able to again gain a semblance of control over the city, though not without facing some of the “heaviest urban combat that the US military had seen since Huê in Vietnam.” 108 It is doubtful that special operations forces would have been able to take back Fallujah on their own; overwhelming force was required to both wrest insurgents from their domiciles and communicate the scale of coalition power to fence-sitting locals. 109 Fallujah proved that when insurgencies metastasize across an urban landscape, conventional artillery, armor, and infantry are best suited to squelch them. As General Schoomaker suggested in a later interview with Defense News , the larger the force, the more capabilities a commander has on hand to deal with complex challenges. 110 Appropriately, special operations forces played a supporting role to the larger conventional force during the Second Battle of Fallujah (figure 10, part 2). 111 In the lead-up to the battle, though, some important shifts took place in the relationship between conven - tional and special operations forces in Iraq that helped define the approach of special operations forces for the remainder of the con - flict. As General Stanley McChrystal describes in his 2013 memoir, elements of a secretive task force comprised of USSOCOM’s most elite units had begun to conduct special reconnaissance in Fallujah and, more important, to finally establish permanent liaisons with the Marines (who oversaw US military efforts in Anbar province, including Fallujah) as well as with what would become known as intelligence fusion cells. 112 These fusion cells were replicated throughout Iraq and Afghanistan and would serve as the engine of the targeting cycle that would drive many special operations mis - sions throughout the remainder of OIF and OEF. ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 41

FIGURE 10 THE SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH

Source: Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “Second Battle of Fallujah: Urban Operations in a New Kind of War,” Field Artillery (April 2006): 5–6. 42 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

By combining intelligence gathered by national agencies, con - ventional units, and special reconnaissance teams, the fusion cells were able to drive both conventional and special forces operations efficiently and effectively. Through such cells, the US military was finally able to harness the powerful combination of real-time signals and human intelligence with new intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance tools such as Predator drones. Perhaps more important, though, the cells provided a clearinghouse where both conventional and special operations forces could deconflict intelligence reports and coordinate future operations. The military also established new approaches to foreign internal defense (FID). Unlike in previous conflicts, conventional and spe - cial operations forces split responsibility for the training of local military forces: training of the new Iraqi Army and most local police forces was overseen by the conventional force’s Multinational Secu - rity Transition Command–Iraq, whereas SOF and CJSOTF provided support for counterterrorism and Special Weapons and Tactics training. 113 Because of their tendency to accompany trainee units into battle, special operations forces also supported units whose training requirements were complex. They also filled gaps for con - ventional forces: when the US Army could not muster enough units to provide training in northern Iraq, special operations forces pro - vided support. As of this writing, the effectiveness of the training provided by American forces is very much in question. But, as when US SOF handed training of Georgia’s security forces over to conventional units in advance of Operation Enduring Freedom, conventional forces showed in Iraq that they too could handle foreign training–related tasks. The time allocated to US forces for their training mission, however, may prove to have been inadequate. As national security scholar Anthony Cordesman and his coauthors point out, the abrupt exit of US forces from Iraq may have occurred before the Iraqi Army was ready to handle the full spectrum of secu - rity threats that it might face. 114 Special operations forces played an important role in Iraq—OIF represented the largest deployment of special operations troops ASCENDANCY OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 43 since the creation of USSOCOM—but their role was largely that of a “supporting” force, rather than that of a “supported” force, as was the case in Afghanistan. 115 This was largely due to the different nature of the two operations and to the arguably disproportionate share of resources allocated to each: SOF are at times confused as an ideal tool for war “on the cheap.” 116 Although Baghdad’s ability to maintain stability and ensure the security of the Iraqi state is in doubt, it cannot be said, as it could be after Vietnam, that this is because of a lack of coordination between the different segments of the US military. But will the relationships established in Iraq lead to enduring cooperation between special operations forces and their conventional counterparts? How might SOF be best utilized in the future, and how might the answer to this question change the role of conventional forces? Current Dynamics

Two main factors have historically driven the relationship between conventional and special operations forces: competition for resources and a lack of mutual understanding. As cooperation between SOF and conventional forces has increased, the impact of these inherent tensions has decreased. SOF have also proven their unique value in countering terrorism. As a result, understanding between SOF and conventional forces has improved considerably since WWII, as has the amount of resources available for SOF. Today, special operations are arguably more valued than at any point in US history. Building off of SOF successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, Admiral William McRaven, before leaving his post as commander of USSOCOM, proposed a series of changes to the Unified Command Plan that would give USSOCOM more author - ity over the regional SOF employment and support the command’s efforts to combat threats that “simultaneously take on both a local and global dimension.” 117 The first step toward accomplishing these goals was approved in February 2013, when responsibility for training, resourcing, and staffing the Theater Special Operations Commands was transferred to USSOCOM from the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). This change laid the foundation for what is now being called the Global SOF Network, a system whereby SOF maintain a regular presence at SOF-centric overseas command posts that loosely mirrors the conventional geographic commands in struc - ture (figure 11). 118 Additional proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan Congress is considering would allow USSOCOM to synchronize the “planning, coordination, deployment, and employ - ment” of SOF with the approval of the GCCs, military services, and

44 CURRENT DYNAMICS 45

FIGURE 11 MAP OF THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS

Source: USSOCOM Factbook 2012 , 23.

“appropriate” US government agencies. 119 This change would allow USSOCOM operational control over SOF for the first time. Personnel-wise, special operations forces fared relatively well during the Pentagon’s recent budget cuts: the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review authorizes additional manpower increases for USSOCOM. 120 If the recommendations of the QDR are imple - mented, the command’s manpower levels will have risen 22 per - cent since 2008—the height of OEF and OIF. 121 To help fund these increases, the command has justified moving annual supple - mental funding to its base budget to avoid the cuts that are affect - ing conventional forces. 122 Yet even in fiscal year 2013, USSOCOM still relied on supplemental funds for a large portion of its budget, and the total funds available per soldier each year are projected to decrease through fiscal year 2015. 123 Although the 2014 review calls on SOF to take the lead on “distributed opera - tions to defeat al-Qaeda,” among other priorities, it makes no men - tion of how SOF will counter a metastasizing threat with fewer future resources. 124 46 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

FIGURE 12 RECENT USSOCOM B UDGET TRENDS

$12 $10.8 $10.3 $9.9 $10 $9.8 $9.3 $9.2 $8.9

$8 $7.7

$6 $

i n $4

B $ i $ $ $ l 6 l 6 6 6 $ $ i . o $ . . . 6 6 0 $ 1 2 2 7 n . . 7 9 9 $2 . s . 4 7

$0 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14* FY 15* $ $ 3 2 $ $ . . 2 $

3 Base OCO 8 3 . 4 $ . $ 3 7 . 3 2 1 . . 9 4 *Data for 2014 and 2015 reflect estimates. Source: Data obtained from United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command: FY 2015 Budget Highlights , March 2014, 6.

Moreover, SOF are not exempt from the effects of sequestration. If sequestration continues, USSOCOM will lose around $1 billion in funding, or about 13 percent of its requested budget for fiscal year 2015 (figure 12). 125 As the commander of Special Operations Forces– Europe put it, the “open checkbook approach to SOF has passed.” 126 In other words, the responsibilities of USSOCOM are increasing at the same time that its ability to fund its ambitions is decreasing. If the open-checkbook approach has recently passed for SOF, it has long since passed for conventional forces. A full discussion of the effects of sequestration and defense budget cuts is beyond the scope of this paper, but as the services face reductions to readiness, equipment modernization, and force size, they will be required to do more with less. Because SOF frequently rely on conventional support, decreased funding to conventional forces will impact the former’s responsiveness and agility. Increasing resources to SOF at the expense of conventional forces will increase intercommand CURRENT DYNAMICS 47 tensions and lead to a misuse of SOF as they fill in to address issues that conventional forces might better address. 127 The tendency of leaders to think of SOF as a panacea to foreign policy troubles is not new, nor is it necessarily characteristic of a fee - ble strategic mind. 128 Because they are viewed as “force multipliers,” it is tempting to regard SOF as an inexpensive solution to national security problems or as a politically safer choice than deploying con - ventional troops. In his May 2014 address to the US Military Acad - emy at West Point, for example, President Obama announced that 9,800 American troops will stay in Afghanistan until 2015; approx - imately one-third of these will be SOF. 129 But as witnessed at Tora Bora, the force multiplier effect of SOF is conceptual, not actual, and SOF cannot always substitute for larger levels of conventional troops. By some estimates, it would take closer to 25,000 troops— most of them conventional—to maintain security in Afghanistan. 130 Policy Implications and Outlook

Taking into account the lessons of history, and despite the complex current budget environment, the leaders of USSOCOM and con - ventional forces should take three steps to build the optimal balance between their forces in the future: (1) clearly delineating the respec - tive roles of SOF and conventional forces; (2) promoting flexibility and coordination while also protecting skills that take careers, not days or months, to build; and (3) transferring much of the respon - sibility for irregular warfare to the conventional force. Without pur - suing these reforms, the military risks needing to relearn the lessons of previous conflicts in a future one.

A Clear Delineation of Roles

Joint Doctrine literature spells out the definition of SOF as units that are “particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments” that apply their unique capabilities in circumstances “for which there are no broad conventional force requirements.” 131 The vagueness of this definition naturally leads to confusion: how should we define precisely what constitutes a “politically sensitive” environment? In which circumstances are there no broad conven - tional force requirements? Separately, the current definition does not address leadership dynamics: under what circumstances should SOF lead conventional forces and vice versa? What should be the limits of SOF responsibilities with respect to irregular warfare? Moreover, an even more fundamental question remains unan - swered: what makes SOF special? Over the past seven decades, SOF have conducted a wide set of missions that relate to both direct and indirect action. Many of their

48 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 49

missions could also have been performed by conventional forces, and many conventional missions could also have been conducted by SOF. SOF are an important and vital tool for national security decision makers, but as their power, size, and influence increase, precisely defining their unique value will optimize their utility and reduce the chances that they will be misused. The “otherness” of SOF is suggested in the terms associated with their use, namely “unconventional” and “irregular” warfare. SOF teams have been used in these types of conflict because of their rela - tively flat hierarchy, agility, and specialized training and because the small number of soldiers included in a typical SOF deployment maximizes soldiers’ flexibility and adaptability. Special operations forces exist outside of typical military standard operating pro - cedures, training regimens, and in environments and battle spaces that are atypical of conventional conflict. They are able to operate in ways that are incompatible with the order and rigidity of traditional military hierarchies and are thus free to leverage their exceptional training and to adapt their responses to threats with a rapidity and creativity atypical of conventional forces. The true value of SOF, then, is the innovation that their employ - ment brings to the battlefield and to military doctrine. This has been the case in both conventional conflicts in which SOF have played a supporting role and in unconventional ones in which they have taken a leading role. From WWII, when Jedburgh teams worked with foreign partisans and Merrill’s Marauders helped pioneer the concept of close air support, to the Vietnam War, when the Civilian Irregular Defense Group supported Vietnamese villages and the Son Tay raid set a precedent for American surgical strike capabilities; from the large-scale civil affairs efforts in Panama to the humanitar - ian missions in northern Iraq in the early 1990s; and from the advent of fusion cells during Operation Iraqi Freedom to the devel - opment of SOF-centric warfare in Afghanistan, SOF have main - tained their place at the tip of the war-fighting spear. But SOF’s ability to develop new techniques and to innovate in new war-fighting environments does not, and should not, equate with a monopoly on the application of the doctrines that they 50 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

pioneer. In many situations, SOF-developed doctrine may be even more effective when it is transmuted to the larger conventional force. A prime example of this is irregular warfare doctrine. Given that Islamic extremist insurgencies appear to be increasing in size and frequency around the world, the US military should protect and promote its ability across all services to conduct counterinsurgency. It may have made sense for SOF to keep primary responsibility for the indirect approach when counterinsurgency seemed like a pass - ing phase of American warfare. It makes much less sense to do so now, when it will likely remain a central tenet of American war fighting for the foreseeable future. In the past, responsibilities for irregular warfare have roughly fol - lowed the arc of military funding, with SOF picking up the respon - sibility for missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance during times of decreased spending. 132 This cycle is also partially to blame for the nature of the relationship between SOF and conventional forces. Clearly delineating which force should take the lead on specific issues or in particular contingencies will curtail redundant training, reduce the likelihood of cross-command tension, and aid in streamlining command and control when forces cooperate on the battlefield. By organizational component, questions for further research and recommendations include: • Leadership. Operation Enduring Freedom marked the first time that SOF led conventional forces at a campaign- wide level. This so-called “Afghan model” might be applied to future operations in places where low-intensity conflict often prevails, such as Africa, but would be inap - propriate in theaters where medium- and high-intensity conflict is more likely. 133 An assessment of the impor - tance of irregular warfare should govern this decision, as should the enemy’s level of organization and sophistica - tion. Further research is needed, perhaps by military col - leges or independent research organizations, to determine the conditions under which SOF should lead conven - tional forces and to determine the optimal use of SOF in POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 51

hybrid warfare. The question of which force should lead under different contingencies is particularly urgent in light of proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan that would greatly expand USSOCOM’s mandate. • Joint Special Operations Command–Affiliated SOF. Units affiliated with the Joint Special Operations Com - mand tend to be on the cutting edge of SOF warcraft. These units are thus often the first called upon to address the nation’s most sensitive national security needs. These SOF should continue to focus on the direct approach and the nation’s highest priorities, such as direct action against terrorists and counterproliferation. 134 Their num - bers should remain small to maximize their agility, adapt - ability, and ability to innovate. The Unified Command Plan should be adjusted to allow more flexibility for their use, including providing operational control to the commander of USSOCOM. • Other SOF. Units not dedicated to direct-action mis - sions should take the initial lead on FID in circum - stances where the military in the target country is nonexistent or in need of SOF-related training and also in covert or clandestine missions. USSOCOM should create a small cadre of experts in the areas of civil affairs and psychological operations, skills that have long been neglected, as indicated by SOF performance in Opera - tions Just Cause and Provide Comfort. 135 They should not, however, retain primary responsibility for FID, humanitarian, or peacekeeping missions. Their num - bers should decrease, as many of their responsibilities should be transferred to the conventional force. Further, changes to the Unified Command Plan should not apply to these SOF. The need for interaction between SOF specialized in the indirect approach and conventional forces will occur most naturally by keeping the opera - tional control of these units within the domain of the geographic combatant commands. 52 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

• Conventional Forces. Conventional forces have demon - strated their ability to conduct FID with professional mil - itaries, such as when they trained Georgia’s military in 2001 and Iraq’s during OIF. As demands on SOF continue to grow, military leadership should permanently transfer the responsibility for training professional militaries to the conventional force. Conventional forces are also the best resource for internal stability-related training, and their performance in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that they are the best force to conduct these missions in large- scale, protracted conflicts. 136 As the scope and application of psychological and civil affairs operations expands, the small cadre of special operations forces with the skills mentioned previously should take the lead on trans - muting skills from these disciplines into the toolkit of rank-and-file infantrymen. As the American military’s experience in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti has demon - strated, humanitarian missions frequently benefit from mass, and conventional forces should take primary responsibility for these missions as well.

Break Down the Wall: A Measured Approach to Flexibility

Given the uncertainty surrounding current budget dynamics, politi - cians and military commanders from both the conventional and SOF communities must square the circle between a decrease in resources and an expanding spectrum of national security threats. To address this challenge, military commanders have called on their forces to become more flexible and adaptive. The “flexible force” concept has both civilian and military propo - nents. In 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for the creation of an “American military that . . . [has] the maximum pos - sible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and conflicts,” and two years later General Raymond Odierno, chief of staff of the US Army, called on his service to “provide the most POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 53

efficient, effective, and flexible forces to joint force commanders,” ones that “retain a high level of war-fighting competency while still training for other missions as appropriate.” 137 This policy, if not implemented carefully, risks creating a force of generalists at the expense of developing soldiers with deep expertise. Skills relevant to the indirect approach are particularly vulnera - ble to increased calls for flexibility. For example, sophisticated language skills and regional expertise are developed over a career, not overnight. A policy of flexibility increases the risk that these skills will be viewed as more fungible and easier to inculcate than actually is the case. As SOF experiences in Operations Provide Comfort and Just Cause demonstrate, the ability to influence local populations is directly related to these capabilities. Time focusing on a particular region and its languages is needed to develop understanding in sol - diers, but an effort to make forces more “flexible” could reduce time available for this. 138 In addition, efforts to build relationships with foreign forces, a key tenet of the indirect approach, will not reach their potential if the military does not allow individual soldiers to establish trust with their trainees over time. In many cases, con - stancy is just as important as flexibility. Without a measured approach to flexibility, conventional and special operations forces risk repeating the mistakes of the Nixon and Clinton years, when confusion about responsibilities, a lack of well-developed skills (particularly language skills), and poor coordination precluded the success of several important missions. Flexibility should not be viewed simply as a cost-saving measure, nor should it discourage soldiers from acquiring deep knowledge in their assigned area of expertise. It should also not change how indi - vidual soldiers are used on the battlefield. Increased flexibility should, however, improve the ability of commanders to leverage the most important skills available in a timely matter for any contin - gency. Most of the areas of expertise the military may need to draw from already exist, but insufficient communication and coordina - tion have stymied past efforts to allocate the right resources to the right place at the right time. In sum, flexibility should facilitate 54 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE communication, improve logistical coordination, and familiarize soldiers with a broad range of skills outside of their primary area of focus. It should not create a force of generalists. To enhance the flexibility of both special and conventional forces while providing for the degree of constancy necessary to achieve the goals of the indirect approach, improved mechanisms for commu - nication among SOF, conventional forces, and interagency partners are essential. Options, by organization, include • Special Operations Forces. SOF should maintain their peculiar capabilities. But USSOCOM should also encourage greater cross-fertilization with conventional forces to ensure that such peculiarity does not exist in isolation, as it did during WWII and in the early 1990s. Because of their small size and varied, specialized skill sets, SOF will remain the military’s most versatile asset. To remain responsive to changing national security requirements, SOF should consider fostering an organi - zational culture that encourages soldiers to spend time outside of USSOCOM, as is common between the con - ventional Army and the 75th Ranger Regiment, with exceptions for those who specialize in roles relevant to the indirect approach. Reformers should balance the sense of otherness endemic to the SOF ethos while still promoting intercommand understanding and, when appropriate, interoperability. • Conventional Forces. As Admiral Crowe noted at USSOCOM’s creation, a “wall” has historically existed between conventional and special operations forces. To ensure that the recent gains in understanding between conventional forces and SOF endure, conventional com - manders should encourage, not discourage, familiariza - tion with SOF. For some, this might include a rotation in a SOF unit; for others, it might include SOF-relevant training. This is particularly important for soldiers who possess specialized skills, such as linguists, or those who may support SOF, such as logisticians. Along similar POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 55

lines, conventional Geographic Combatant Commands should maintain liaisons with Theater Special Operations Command Centers outside their usual area of geographic responsibility. This will enhance both SOF and conven - tional capabilities to react to transnational threats and, as a byproduct, will create additional intracommand linkages that will complicate the ability of potential ene - mies to understand American command-and-control mechanisms. 139 • Interagency Partners. As the success of the fusion model in Iraq demonstrates, instruments of national power work best when mechanisms exist to deconflict contradictory information and to coordinate opera - tions. 140 Relevant interagency partners, including but not limited to intelligence agencies, should send repre - sentatives to fusion-style organizations and ensure that said representatives are of sufficient rank that they can exercise appropriate decision-making authority as evolving situations dictate.

A Force for Innovation and a Force for Amplification

The Joint Special Operations Command is a “subunified command of USSOCOM” that studies special operations requirements, tech - niques, plans, and tactics. 141 The organization has led innovation in special operations tactics, has had members involved in every major SOF operation since Operation Eagle Claw, and has members located throughout the world. As the main center for the develop - ment of direct-action tactics, many of the most elite units in the US military have benefited from the work of the command. In essence, the Joint Special Operations Command exists as a center of excel - lence for developing tactics for the direct approach to unconven - tional warfare. Yet no existing organization could act as a development center for the indirect approach. Civil affairs teams, psychological operations 56 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

organizations, regional experts, and humanitarian specialists exist within the larger USSOCOM umbrella, but no single organization has been mandated as a center of excellence to develop the tactics of these units or to serve as a focal point for conventional and inter - agency coordination. The existence of such an organization is not without precedent: the early successes of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, as described in this paper, may not have been achieved absent a specific organization to coordinate and imple - ment indirect techniques. 142 USSOCOM should create a center to oversee the development of advanced techniques related to the indirect approach, potentially including those related to information warfare. The creation of such a center squares with the recommendations of many in the SOF scholar community, such as Linda Robinson and Robert Marti - nage. 143 Previous scholarship on this issue, however, tends to over - look the important role that the conventional force should play in the application of the indirect approach. Because less than 5 percent of active-duty US military soldiers are members of USSOCOM, the command’s ability to fully implement strategies related to the indirect approach will naturally be lim - ited. 144 Clandestine and surgical missions will still require the agility and flexibility that only SOF can bring to bear, but the suc - cess of the indirect approach will ultimately be a function of not only skill but also longevity and application en masse. USSOCOM’s training center for the indirect approach, then, should be made widely available to the conventional force. This cross-fertilization will not only transmute what used to be thought of as SOF-specific skills to conventional forces but also provide a mechanism for improved intracommand coordination and cement the lessons and mechanisms for interforce cooperation developed in Iraq and Afghanistan. As USSOCOM innovates, the conventional force should amplify. Certain skills related to the indirect approach that require ampli - fication are already well-developed, and responsibility for both training and leveraging these skills, which include civil affairs, area knowledge, language acquisition, humanitarian aid, and economic POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 57

development, should be largely transferred to the conventional force. The historical distaste for irregular warfare tactics explains why USSOCOM was established in the first place. But given the extent to which conventional forces practiced unconventional war - fare techniques during OIF and OEF, along with the continued and expanding presence of irregular threats around the globe, conven - tional forces cannot afford to rely solely on SOF to address the chal - lenges of irregular warfare. The transference of skills from SOF to the conventional force is hardly unprecedented, and once the expe - riences and lessons of SOF are transferred to the conventional force, important shifts in overall doctrine will take place. The spread of close air support and the advent of humanitarian missions are just two examples of this phenomenon. Further, providing conventional forces with responsibility for certain skills currently in SOF jurisdiction will help prevent them from forgetting about the importance of those skills, as has hap - pened in the past. For example, SOF experiences in Vietnam showed that information operations and economic development initiatives are an important tool to eradicating environments where objectionable ideologies thrive. 145 But it took several years of trial and error in OIF and OEF for these lessons to be applied via Provin - cial Reconstruction Teams and Village Stability Operations. Going back even further, the Jedburgh teams in WWII showed the value of working with local dissidents behind enemy lines. But in Korea, such tactics were not employed, as conventional commanders continued to view such activities as superfluous to the larger con - flict. 146 In OEF and OIF, an amplification of SOF-developed tech - niques helped prevent defeat; the same might have happened if SOF techniques had been applied en masse during the Korean War. National security priorities dictate the need to expand the indi - rect approach, and expanding the roles of conventional forces for this purpose will be resource-intensive. But from a budget perspec - tive, a window of opportunity to expand knowledge of unconven - tional warfare techniques to the conventional force may have recently opened. Part of the Obama administration’s recent proposal to provide $5 billion for a “counterterrorism partnerships fund” 58 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE could partially offset these costs. 147 If most of the responsibility for FID is transferred to the conventional force, as suggested by the findings of this study, the president’s counterterrorism partnership fund could help increase the prevalence of unconventional warfare skills in the American conventional forces. Thus, the conventional force, rather than USSOCOM, may be the best entity to oversee partnership fund monies. But regardless of how these new funds are allocated, strategic imperatives do not always fit nicely within current resource con - straints. History has shown that, over the long run, an ounce of pre - vention is often worth a pound of cure. The better the conventional force integrates irregular warfare techniques into its doctrinal approach, the more effective the US military will be in both pre- and postconflict environments, and its efforts may very well deter or mitigate future conflicts. Conclusion

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom provided many opportunities for conventional forces and SOF to work together toward common objectives and to gain improved understanding of the distinct advantages of working in tandem or of when the use of a particular force might be preferable to the use of the other in dif - ferent contingencies. But these operations did not mark the first time that these lessons were learned. America’s experience on the battlefield since WWII shows that SOF are often on the leading edge of operational development. The raid at Son Tay, for example, set an operational precedent for America’s efforts to conduct surgical raids deep behind enemy lines, a legacy passed down to the Delta Force and SEAL direct-action missions frequently conducted as part of the Global War on Terror. Looking back further, during WWII, Jedburgh teams established a tradition of foreign military training through their work with French partisans and developed a tradition of working with the intelligence community. Even though the SOF of the 21st century have far more resources than did units such as Merrill’s Marauders or the original members of Delta Force, their ethos of excellence in the face of adversity and self-reliance lives on, as does their agility and adapt - ability. For these reasons, SOF should continue to operate at the tip of the operational spear. But while certain missions that rely on the presence of small and well-trained units, such as surgical, direct-action missions, should remain within the purview of SOF, other concepts developed by SOF, such as FID and interagency collaboration, need not remain the exclusive domain of SOF war fighting. Rather, the comparative advantage of each force should dictate roles and missions. The flat

59 60 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

hierarchy and cutting-edge war-fighting skills of SOF are ideal for surgical and secretive missions—that is, those that require innova - tion. Conversely, the mass of the conventional force is ideal for mis - sions aimed at a large population—that is, those that require amplification. Given the recent ascendancy of SOF, some may bristle at any wholesale transfer of responsibilities out of USSOCOM. But the definition of what constitutes the “tip of the spear” changes over time, and many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures SOF developed might have a larger effect if practiced by the larger con - ventional force. The concepts of close air support, for example, and of stability and security operations, have transmuted from being SOF-exclusive concepts of operation to having wide-ranging applicability across the conventional force. In fact, freeing SOF of some responsibilities may be precisely what is needed for them to retain the intellectual flexibility and focus to remain the military’s innovators. The current budget environment necessitates that the military to do more with less, but this should not preclude strategy from driv - ing budgetary decisions. By clearly delineating the roles of each force, judiciously improving flexibility between them, and transfer - ring much of the responsibility for the indirect approach to the conventional force, military leaders will protect the independent and innovative spirit of SOF, amplify the impact of critical irregular warfare tactics, and make permanent the improved understanding between forces built over the last decade. We cannot know what shape the next battle will take, but if we take steps to improve and better understand the nature of SOF and conventional force rela - tions, we will maximize the chances that we will not repeat the same mistakes we have made in the past. Notes

1. United States Special Operations Command, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations , April 18, 2011, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf. 2. United States Special Operations Command, FY 2014 Budget Highlights , October 2014, 8–9. 3. United States Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 4, www.defense.gov/news /Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf; United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, March 4, 2014, xi, www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_ Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; and Department of Defense, “DoD Releases Fiscal 2015 Budget Proposal and 2014 QDR,” news release, March 4, 2014, www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16567. 4. United States Special Operations Command, FY 2014 Budget Highlights , 9. 5. See Goldstein, “Think Again: War; World Peace Could Be Closer Than You Think,” Foreign Policy (August 15, 2011). For a discussion of the increased importance of irregular warfare, see Seth G. Jones, The Future of Irreg - ular Warfare , RAND Corporation, 2012. 6. Susan Lynn Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 8. 7. See Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of Ameri - can Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 8. For a description of the utility of special forces tactics in early American history, see Eliot A. Cohen, Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War (New York: Free Press, 2011), 71–94. 9. David Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: Colum - bia University Press, 2007), 69. 10. See William H. Mengel, Guerilla Diplomacy: Germany and Unconventional Warfare, 1884–1945 (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2007), 1–8. 11. Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 180–81. 12. Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces , 73–74.

61 62 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

13. V. K. Bhatia, “On Unusual Missions,” SP’s Aviation no. 7 (July 2010): 32–35; and Nigel Cawthorne, The Mammoth Book of Inside the Elite Forces (Lon - don: Running Press, 2008). 14. Benjamin F. Jones, Freeing France: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Jedburghs (PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008), 4. 15. Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces , 160. 16. See Jones, Freeing France , 19–23. 17. S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group , August 1944, Combat Studies Institute, October 1991, 3, http://usacac.army.mil /cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lewis.pdf. 18. Leadership dynamics within combined operations, however, have largely changed; within the Jedburgh teams, the British took the lead, if not in structure than in practice. See ibid., 8. 19. United States Army, Mission Success: Albania Commando Regiment (October 15, 2010), www.army.mil/article/46635/; and Australian Department of Defence, Afghanistan Fact Sheet , n.d., www.defence.gov.au/operations/afghanistan/facts.asp. 20. Kenn Finlayson and C. H. Briscoe, “Case Studies in Selection and Assess - ment: The First Special Service Force, Merrill’s Marauders and the OSS OGs,” Special Warfare 13, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 25–28; Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces , 74–79; and Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (New York: Presidio Press, December 1986), 1–12. 21. Jones, Freeing France , 7. 22. Charlton Ogburn, “Merrill’s Marauders: The Truth about an Incredible Adventure,” Harper’s Magazine (January 1, 1957): 39–40. 23. For those interested in the Army’s counterinsurgency efforts in World War II, also see Mike Guardia’s American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Rus - sell W. Volckmann (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), which recounts one man’s experience in leading Filipino irregulars against the Japanese. 24. Center of Military History, United States Army, Merrill’s Marauders (February-May, 1944): An Account of the Operations of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) in North Burma (Washington, DC: Author, 1945), 22, www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-fw.htm. 25. Ogburn, “Merrill’s Marauders,” 41–44. 26. Special operations forces to this day refer to themselves as the “quiet pro - fessionals”; see United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Opera - tions Command Fact Book 2012 (October 2011), 60, www.fas.org/irp/agency /dod/socom/factbook-2012.pdf. 27. “This Week in History,” Navy Times , December 28, 2009, 23. 28. Dick Couch, “The Forerunners: World War II Frogmen,” Naval History 26, no. 1 (February 2012): 20. NOTES 63

29. Robert F. Dorr and Fred L. Borch, “Anti-Sub, Bomb Acumen Made Kauff - mans Heroes,” Navy Times , November 2006, 46. 30. Couch, “The Forerunners,” 21. 31. Even before the end of WWII, specialized units were improperly utilized in combat or did not fit well into the strict hierarchies required of successful con - ventional battle. 32. Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces , 79. 33. See Douglas Waller, “The CIA’s Secret Army,” Time , February 3, 2003, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145,00.html. 34. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20 (FM31-20): Special Opera - tions Forces , June 2001, 1–2. The CIA’s unconventional warfare capabilities were further extended by a classified annex to NSC-4, which provided for the CIA’s psychological warfare capabilities. 35. See Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Chal - lenge of Unconventional Warfare (New York: Psychology Press, 1998), 39. 36. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare , October 1951, 11, http://ciehub.info/ref/FM/31-21_ 1951.pdf; and United States Army, Operations against Guerrilla Forces , September 1950, 2 and 69, https://ia601606.us.archive.org/15/items /OperationsAgainstGuerrillaForces/OperationsAgainstGuerrillaForces.pdf. 37. Richard Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the ‘Forgotten War,’” Special Warfare 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 26–37. 38. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 48–51. 39. D. George Kousoulas, “The Success of the Truman Doctrine Was Not Accidental,” Military Affairs 29, no. 2 (July 1, 1965): 88, doi:10.2307/1983964. 40. Army Special Operations Command, The History of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 2002, http://web.archive.org/web/20090920094659/http:// www.soc.mil/SF/history.pdf. 41. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 55–58. 42. Department of the Army, FM31-20, 1–2. 43. David Tyler, “The Evolution of Naval Aviation and Naval Special War - fare,” Naval Aviation News , February 2003, 10–17. 44. Note that in this paper, the term “Special Forces” is in reference to Army Green Berets. This should not be confused with “special operations forces,” of which the Army Green Berets are just one component. 45. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 84–85. 46. Ibid., 84–106. 47. John Kelly, Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces, 1961–1971 (Wash - ington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 151–59, www.history.army.mil/ books/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C.htm. 64 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

48. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 116–20. 49. Tyler, “The Evolution of Naval Aviation,” 10–17; and Barry Bishop, “‘Silent Option’: Navy’s Elite SEALs,” Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine (July 2002): 14. 50. George H. Hock Jr., “Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap: The Missing Puzzle Piece: Rugged Utility Aircraft and Personnel,” Air & Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 57–68. 51. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 318. 52. Benjamin Schemmer, The Raid: The Son Tay Prison Rescue Mission (New York: Random House, 2002), 206. 53. Richard Nixon, “Radio Address about Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress” (speech, February 25, 1971), www.presidency.ucsb .edu/ws/?pid=3322. 54. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 155. 55. Ibid., 157–59. 56. See Steve Fondacaro, Air Land Battle and SOF: A Proposal for an Interim Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, School of Advanced Military Studies , May 15, 1989, 1–5, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a215563.pdf. 57. Tim Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 35. 58. Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Bat - tle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 138. 59. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Restructuring Special Opera - tions Forces for Emerging Threats,” Strategic Forum no. 219 (January 2006), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps496 /Strforum/sf219/SF_219.pdf. 60. J. L. Holloway, Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report , Joint Chiefs of Staff Spe - cial Operations Review Group, August 1980, 58, www.history.navy.mil/library /online/hollowayrpt.htm#conclusions. 61. John Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change,” Parameters (Autumn 1992): 74–75. 62. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 188–92. 63. Susan Lynn Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 83; United States Special Operations Command, FY 2014 Budget Highlights , 5; and Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One,” 69. 64. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 157, 168, 183. 65. Fondacaro, Air Land Battle and SOF , 1–3, 5, 11. 66. See United States Special Operations Command History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 2007, 3–5, NOTES 65 http://web.archive.org/web/20070610021200/http://www.socom.mil /Docs/Command_History_26Feb07webversion.pdf. The service chiefs, who remained opposed to the creation of a Special Forces–specific command, ensured that the command would be headquartered in Florida, “far away from the centers of power in Washington, DC.” See Adams, US Special Opera - tions Forces in Action , 203. 67. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 211–12; and USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 7–8. 68. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 216. 69. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 9. 70. Jonathon Riley, Decisive Battles: From Yorktown to Operation Desert Storm (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 207; and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare , 228–29. 71. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace , 320–21; and Adams, US Special Opera - tions Forces in Action , 233–34. 72. See Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 , Department of the Army, 2004, 63–64, www.history.army.mil/html/books/humanitarian_intervention/CMH_70- 78.pdf. For a discussion of the current balance between the direct and indirect approaches, see Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Coun - cil on Foreign Relations , April 2013, www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense /future-us-special-operations-forces/p30323; and Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005). 73. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare , 252–53. 74. National Archives and Records Administration and William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States , William J. Clinton, 1995, Bk. 1, January 1 to June 30 , 1995 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 283; and Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 258. 75. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 57–59. 76. See Marshall V. Ecklund, “Analysis of Operation Gothic Serpent: TF Ranger in Somalia,” Special Warfare 16, no. 4 (May 2004): 38–47. 77. Shirley Anne Warshaw, The Clinton Years (New York: Infobase Publish - ing, 2009), 16. 78. Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 112. 79. Peter J. Schoomaker, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead,” Special Warfare 11, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 2; and Harold Kennedy, “Special Operations Forces Gain Clout,” National Defense 85, no. 560 (July 2000): 26–27. 66 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

80. Schoomaker, “U.S. Special Operations Forces,” 4; and McRaven, Spec Ops , 8. 81. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 164–76. 82. For an excellent and detailed analysis of the rapid evolution of SOF since 9/11, see Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces , Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 10, 2013, www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyond -the-ramparts-the-future-of-u-s-special-operations-forces/. 83. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 11–12. 84. Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces , 166. 85. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 91. 86. Ibid., 87–89. 87. Ibid., 89. 88. See Stephen Biddle, “Special Forces and the Future of Warfare,” Military Technology 30, no. 3 (2006): 13–14. Special Forces had been relied upon in the early stages of the Vietnam War, but not in a direct-action role. 89. Benjamin Runkle, “Tora Bora Reconsidered: Lessons from 125 Years of Strategic Manhunts,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 70 (Third Quarter 2013): 45–46. 90. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 94. 91. John F. Kerry, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today , US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, 7–9, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT 53709.htm. 92. Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (April 2003): 31–46. 93. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 98. 94. See Runkle, “Tora Bora Reconsidered.” 95. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 94. 96. Ibid., 98. 97. As quoted by Charles Briscoe et al., The United States and South Asia (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005). 98. Linda Williams, Intelligence Support to Special Operations in the Global War on Terrorism , Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, 2004, 7, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424015. NOTES 67

99. “Not a Good Day to Die: An Inside Account of the Failures in Joint-Force Planning for Operation Anaconda,” Armed Forces Journal (March 1, 2005): 30. 100. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 106–07. 101. Mark L. Brown, “Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal , March 28, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/village-stability-operations-an-historical- perspective-from-vietnam-to-afghanistan. 102. See Sean D. Naylor, “Special Ops ‘Surge’ Sparks Debate,” Army Times , December 20, 2008, www.armytimes.com/article/20081220/NEWS/812200303 /Special-ops-8216-surge-sparks-debate. 103. Brown, “Village Stability Operations.” 104. For a discussion of the practice of Village Stability Operations, see Stephen N. Rust, “The Nuts and Bolts of Village Stability Operations,” Special Warfare 24, no. 3 (September 2011): 28–31. 105. See Gregory Grimes, “Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins,” Small Wars Journal , March 23, 2009, 2, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/civil-affairs- gathering-the-reins. 106. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 113. 107. Darrin Mortenson, “Marines Settling into New Home in Fallujah,” San Diego North County Times , March 18, 2004, http://archive.today/YTev. 108. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 399. 109. Earlier during OIF, special operations forces were given the lead role in seizing Mosul and were supported by a conventional brigade to accomplish this task. A key difference between Mosul and Fallujah, though, was the existence of local, indigenous allies (the Kurds), who were available to support USSOCOM’s push into the city. No such allies existed in Fallujah. 110. “Gen. Peter Schoomaker U.S. Army Chief of Staff: [1],” Defense News , October 3, 2005. 111. See figure 11, also F. J. “Bing” West, “The Fall of Fallujah,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 7 (July 2005): 53. 112. McChrystal, My Share of the Task , 130–32, 136. 113. Stuart W. Bowen, Interim Reports on Projects to Develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, March 25, 2010), http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/sigir /audits/us_sigir_10-009.pdf; and USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 122. 68 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

114. Anthony Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit, Shaping Iraq’s Secu - rity Forces, Center for Strategic and International Studies , December 16, 2013, 2–29, http://csis.org/files/publication/131213_Iraq_Security_Forces.pdf. 115. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 , 115. 116. See Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 344–46. 117. Andrew Feickert, US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress , Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2014, 2–3, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf; and United States Special Opera- tions Command, SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear , May 2013, 3, www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf. 118. For an explanation of current analysis surrounding the use of the Global SOF Network, see Thomas Szayna and William Welser, Developing and Assess - ing Options for the Global SOF Network, RAND Corporation , 2013, www.rand.org /content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR340/RAND_RR340.pdf. 119. Feickert, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) , 3. 120. United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review , xi. 121. See United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review March 4, 2014, xi, www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense _Review.pdf, which assigns 69,700 troops to USSOCOM by 2015; United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command: FY 2015 Budget Highlight s, March 2014, 6, www.socom.mil/News/Documents/FY% 202015%20USSOCOM%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf; and United States Special Operations Command, FY 2013 Budget Highlights , February 2012, 6, www. socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_Budget_Highlights.pdf. 122. Eric T. Olson, Posture of Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008), 15, http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom /posture2008.pdf. 123. United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Opera - tions Command: FY 2015 Budget Highlights , 6. 124. US Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review , xi. For a discussion of al Qaeda’s continued strength, see Mary Habeck, Getting It Right: US National Security Policy and al Qaeda since 2011 , American Enterprise Insti - tute, April 2014, www.aei.org/papers/foreign-and-defense-policy/terrorism/ al-qaeda/getting-it-right-us-national-security-policy-and-al-qaeda-since-2011/. 125. Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), Summary; and Sydney Freedberg, “Admiral Bill McRaven: SOCOM Struggles with CR, Sequester,” Breaking Defense , January 29, 2013, www.breakingdefense.com/2013/01/adm- bill-mcraven-socom-struggles-with-cr-sequester/. NOTES 69

126. Paul McLeary, “Special Ops to Feel Budget Pain, Leaders Say,” Navy Times , January 29, 2013, www.navytimes.com/article/20130129/NEWS /301290305/Special-ops-feel-budget-pain-leaders-say. 127. This is precisely what occurred the last time the Defense Department faced sizable cuts, in the 1990s. See Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces , 183. 128. For example, Winston Churchill prized commandos over other troops, as did President Kennedy. Fascination with military elites is traceable as far back as ancient Greece and Sengoku Japan and influenced force allocation choices of Prussian and French leaders during the 18th and 19th centuries. For a discus - sion of the international and historic nature of this tendency, see Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians (Cambridge, MA: University Press of America, November 1984); and A. Hamish Ion, Roch Legault, and Keith Neilson, Elite Military Formations in War and Peace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). 129. Kimberly Dozier, “Obama Is Betting His Whole Afghan Plan on These Commandos,” Daily Beast, May 28, 2014, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 2014/05/28/obama-is-betting-his-whole-afghan-plan-on-these-commandos .html . 130. Kimberly Kagan, “Why the Taliban Are Winning—for Now,” Foreign Pol - icy , August 10, 2009, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/10/why_the _taliban_are_winning_for_now. 131. United States Special Operations Command, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations , April 18, 2011, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf. 132. Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces , 167. 133. For a discussion of a situation where SOF might take the lead, such as Africa, see John B. Alexander, Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent , Joint Special Operations University, May 2009, www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/report/2009/0905_jsou-report-09-5.pdf; for a discussion of a situation where conventional forces should play a primary role, see Francisco Wong-Diaz, Retooling for the Future, Joint Special Operations University , May 2013, https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-2_RetoolingfortheFuture _Wong-Diaz.pdf. 134. SOF have bolstered their counterterrorism skills frequently in recent years but have had fewer opportunities to gain operational experience in coun - terproliferation. USSOCOM should assess current counterproliferation training levels and adjust as necessary. 135. See Michele L. Malvesti, To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict Center for a New American Security , June 2010, 13, www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_To%20Serve %20the %20 Nation_Malvesti.pdf. Malvesti argues that this occurs because the impact of these 70 A PRECARIOUS BALANCE units is harder to measure and is less tangible than that of their direct-action counterparts. 136. For a discussion of the importance of training police in a counterinsur - gency environment, see Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line, Joint Special Operations University Report 09-2, February 2009, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0902_jsou-report- 09-2.pdf. Celeski writes from the point of view of SOF conducting these mis - sions, but the stability and security operations experience that conventional forces gained in OIF and OEF have equipped them with many of the skills nec - essary to train local police. 137. Kathleen H. Hicks, “Force Planning in the 2010 QDR,” ed. Samuel J. Brannen, Joint Force Quarterly no. 59 (October 2010): 140; and Raymond T. Odierno, “The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition,” Foreign Affairs , May 1, 2012, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137423/raymond-t-odierno/the-us-army-in-a- time-of-transition. USSOCOM, in its SOCOM 2020 strategy document, also calls on SOF to achieve greater “flexibility.” 138. See Russell D. Howard, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives , Joint Special Operations University, December 2011, https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications /11-6_Final.PDF. For additional explanation of why language skills are needed yet frequently overlooked due to time constraints, see “The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Holds a Discussion on the Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” Political Transcript Wire, May 13, 2013. 139. See Jessica Glicken Turnley, Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, Joint Special Operations University , March 2006, https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU %20 Publications/JSOU06-3turnleyNetworkCentric_final.pdf. 140. For a discussion of how interagency teams “played a major role in turning around Iraq,” see Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation , Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 2011, www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/Strat%20Persp%204%20Lamb-Munsing.pdf. 141. United States Special Operations Command, “Joint Special Operations Command, ” www.socom.mil/pages/jointspecialoperationscommand.aspx. 142. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 84–85. 143. Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (December 2012). See Robert Martinage, Strategy for the Long Haul: Special Operations Forces Future Challenges and Oppor - tunities , Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008. Though Robin - son stops short of suggesting the creation of a new subunified command in this NOTES 71 piece, many of the challenges facing SOCOM that she outlines would be more manageable if coordinated by a single organization. 144. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014 (London: Routledge, 2014), 42; and United States Special Operations Com - mand, USSOCOM FY 2014 Budget Highlights . 145. For a discussion about the linkages between economic development and countering Islamic extremism, see James A. Bates, The War on Terrorism: Coun - tering Global Insurgency in the 21st Century , Joint Special Operations University report 05-8, December 2005, 5–8, https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20 Publications/JSOU05-8batesWarOnTerrorism_final.pdf; Malvesti, To Serve the Nation ; and David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 44 (2007): 24–27. 146. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action , 39. 147. See Barack Obama, “West Point Commencement Address” (speech, West Point, NY, May 28, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of- president-obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/ cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html.

Acknowledgments

This report is the culmination of a project executed with the support of numerous individuals. Colleagues at AEI contributed vital assist - ance, understanding, and analysis in the completion of this report. In particular, Thomas Donnelly, Danielle Pletka, and David Adesnik deserve thanks for their thoughtful comments on the initial manu - script, as do as Gary Schmitt and Mackenzie Eaglen for their reviews. Justin Lang deserves particular recognition for his tireless research support. In addition, the paper would not have been possible with - out the assistance of Lauren Sexton, Stuart Bentley, Eric Falcon, or Eddie Linczer. AEI’s editorial and graphics staffs deserve thanks for their patience, professionalism, and insight, especially Christy Sadler, Claude Aubert, and Jennifer Morretta. Credit for this publication belongs to many, but the contents of the report, including any errors, are the responsibility of the author alone.

73

About the Author

Phillip Lohaus is a research fellow in AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies. Before joining AEI, he served as a summer associ - ate with the Long Term Strategy Group and as an analyst for the US Department of Defense. During his tenure with the Department of Defense, he deployed to Iraq to support strategic-level decision makers and also supported the tactical decision-making process of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Afghanistan. At AEI, he coordinates the American Internationalism Project, which seeks to mold a bipar - tisan consensus on the importance of American engagement in world affairs. His current research focuses on over-the-horizon mili - tary and intelligence challenges and the capacity of the American national security establishment to address them.

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PRESERVING THE RIGHT MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Cover photo: US Army photo by Spc. Steven K. Young

Phillip Lohaus

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