Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
PB 80–03–4 May 2004 Vol. 16, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare
In recent years, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has placed a great emphasis on the Special Forces training pipeline, and much of our activity has been concerned with recruiting, assessing and training Special Forces Soldiers to enter the fight against terrorism.
Less well-publicized, but never- theless important, are our activi- ties devoted to training Special Forces Soldiers in advanced skills. These skills, such as mili- focus on a core curriculum of tary free-fall, underwater opera- unconventional warfare and tions, target interdiction and counterinsurgency, coupled with urban warfare, make our Soldiers advanced human interaction and more proficient in their close- close-quarters combat, has combat missions and better able proven to be on-the-mark against to infiltrate and exfiltrate with- the current threat. out being detected. Located at Fort Bragg, at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., and at Key West, Fla., the cadre of the 2nd Battal- ion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group provides such training. Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert Not surprisingly, the global war on terrorism has engendered greater demand for Soldiers with selected advanced skills. Despite funding constraints and short- ages of personnel, SWCS military and civilian personnel have been innovative and agile in respond- ing to the new requirements.
The success of Special Forces Soldiers in the global war on ter- rorism has validated our training processes on a daily basis. Our PB 80–03–4 Contents May 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 16, No. 4
Commander & Commandant Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert Features Editor 2 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG: Sharpening the Edge of the Spear Jerry D. Steelman by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland Associate Editor 5Blending Technology With Warrior Skills: Co. A, Janice L. Burton 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG Graphics & Design by Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts Bruce S. Barfield 8Training SF Advanced Skills in the Air: Co. B, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG by Major Buck Dellinger 11 The SF Underwater Operations School: Co. C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG by Major David K. Hsu 14 Providing Relevant Training for the GWOT: Co. D, V E AS R I RT T A E S LI B 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG E T by Major Shannon Boehm Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission 19 SF Warrant Officers to Become Part of SF Officer Branch is to promote the professional development of special- by Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson and operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Jenkins Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This 20 The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. and the Future of SF Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special 28 The 18X Program: Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forces Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where by Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Breasseale copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. 32 Evaluating Psychological Operations: Planning Measures Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private of Effectiveness subscriptions should forward their requests to: by Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web 38 Analysis of Operation Gothic Serpent: TF Ranger in Somalia (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm). by Major Marshall V. Ecklund By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 48 ‘Father of Special Forces’ Dies at Age 101 in California Home Peter J. Schoomaker General, United States Army Departments Chief of Staff 50 Enlisted Career Notes Official: 51 Officer Career Notes 52 Foreign SOF Joel B. Hudson 54 Update Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 56 Book Reviews 0332802 Headquarters, Department of the Army Cover: Underwater photo and photo of Soldiers in kayak copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes. 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG: Sharpening the Edge of the Spear
by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland
hile the Special Forces pipeline execution of special-operations courses. trains Soldiers in the SF basic There are many challenges within SWCS Wskills, SF advanced skills make that outsiders never see — challenges such Soldiers more lethal, better able to gather as providing manpower, resources and facil- intelligence and harder to detect during ities for expanding training in SOF skill infiltration and exfiltration. Advanced- sets. This challenge is especially daunting for skills training is the job of the 2nd Battal- 2nd Battalion because it is the last priority in ion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. SWTG. Many Soldiers are impressed, and right- The battalion does, however, enjoy two ly so, by training in advanced skills, such unique benefits. One benefit is that in certain as sniper operations, military free-fall and companies, cadre members and students are underwater operations. But those who members of other services, and the variety of have never been assigned to the Special their experience and terminology lends a Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, or to joint nature to the training. Another benefit the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or is the large number of retired SOF soldiers SWTG, have no appreciation of the train- who serve as civilian instructors throughout ing apparatus “behind the waterfall.” They 2nd Battalion. Their special-operations expe- may not be aware of the difficulties of rience and their teaching experience are training management or of the day-to-day invaluable to the success of 2nd Battalion’s training. Training modifications Over the past two years, 2nd Battalion has modified its courses, equipment and instruction in order to remain relevant for its customers — U.S. special-operations forces. The battalion has made great strides in opening communications with the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and U.S. Army photo the rest of the SOF community in order to Graduates of the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course are prepared to serve as assistant SF detachment validate current instruction or to make commanders. changes based on customer feedback. In
2 Special Warfare An SF Soldier learns to coordinate close air sup- port in the Special Oper- ations Terminal Attack Control Course.
U.S. Army photo making those changes, the battalion works development of the Special Operations Ter- closely with various elements of the SWCS minal Attack Control Course (in conjunction Directorate of Training and Doctrine. with the U.S. Marine Corps) and the Special Using feedback from operational units and Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course; the from instructors who have just come from plans for doubling the number of student operational units, 2nd Battalion follows the slots in ASOT before fiscal year 2005; the innovate, change and execute process, or ICE. ICE is constant, dynamic and cyclic, and it applies to every course taught by 2nd Bat- talion. Examples of innovation are the recent changes to the program of instruction in the Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, Exploitation Techniques Course, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course and the Com- bat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC. Other examples include instructor assistance for CDQC pre-scuba; the integration of com- puters into the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOTC; cadre adjust- ments for larger class sizes in the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course, CDQC, ASOTC and the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course; and the creation of the Military Free-Fall Challenge Course for Spe- cial Forces. In some cases, the changes have been Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes more drastic, affecting methods of instruc- SF Soldiers practice waterborne-infiltration skills in the SF Underwater Operations School at Key West, Fla. tion, course content or the courses them- selves. Examples of those changes are the
May 2004 3 dents succeed, there is attrition in 2nd Bat- talion’s courses. The battalion’s instruc- tors, as all instructors in SWTG, do not lower or compromise standards in any course. The cadre drops students who com- mit safety violations or fail to follow proce- dures. Some students withdraw or fail because they lack proper pre-training and preparation, or because they have extreme difficulty learning or lack a sufficient desire to train. But despite their adherence to high standards, the battalion’s instructors have reduced attrition in all courses over the past 18 months. As a result, the 2nd Bat- talion is producing more graduates of SF advanced-skills training than ever before, U.S. Army photo giving commanders more options for mis- Students practice urban- development of the Advanced Regional sion accomplishment and making the force combat operations dur- Studies Course; the change in the automat- more lethal and more undetectable. ing the Special Forces ic-opening device used in SWCS military Advanced Reconnais- free-fall operations courses; and the plan- sance, Target Analysis, ning and development of the Special Opera- Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland is Exploitation Techniques tions Uninhabited Platform Training the commander of 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Course. Course, a future course designed to institu- Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare tionalize tactical training in the use of Center and School. His previous assignments unmanned aerial vehicles. include infantry platoon leader, 2nd Battalion, All 17 of the battalion’s courses have 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; pla- been modified to some degree to give stu- toon leader and executive officer, Company B, dents every opportunity to grasp the con- 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; detach- cepts being taught, to be successful in the ment commander and assistant group S3, 7th course and to return to their unit ready to SF Group; exchange officer and Lancero find, fix or destroy the threat. instructor, Tolemaida, Colombia; company commander, battalion S3 and group S3, 7th Instructor cadre SF Group; chief of current operations, Special Soldiers should take advantage of any Programs Branch, Special Actions Division, opportunity to serve as instructors in U.S. Special Operations Command; and com- SWTG. It is a rewarding experience that mander, Combined Joint Special Operations will broaden exponentially Soldiers’ hori- Task Force, Stabilization Force in Bosnia- zons and their understanding of training Herzegovina. He holds a bachelor’s degree in and training management. It will also give biology from Catholic University of America, them a chance to serve among the ranks of Washington, D.C., and a master’s degree in the top-shelf military and civilian instruc- national security and strategy from the Naval tors at SWTG. The 2nd Battalion’s instruc- War College, Newport, R.I. tors, whether military or civilian, are all professionals. They are teachers who have a deep desire to improve the force. They define success not as weeding students out but as helping them to understand the instruction, to learn to execute the tasks at hand and to pass the course. Despite the instructors’ desire to see stu-
4 Special Warfare Blending Technology With Warrior Skills: Co. A, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG by Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts
orking in a variety of environ- ments, Special Forces Soldiers Wmust be able to employ ad- vanced special-operations techniques, and they must be as comfortable working with computers and digital imagery as with maps, pencils and paper. Providing training to ensure that flexibility is the job of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe- cial Warfare Training Group. Company A conducts four courses; the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, or SFWOBC; the Special Forces War- rant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC; the Advanced Special Opera- tions Techniques Course, or ASOTC; and the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, or SFISC.
SFWOBC U.S. Army photo The SFWOBC provides newly appoint- The 19-week SFWOBC is taught twice a Students in the SF War- ed SF warrant officers with entry-level year and has a class capacity of 24 stu- rant Officer Advanced training in Military Occupational Spe- dents. The course awards a military edu- Course learn to perform strategic and crisis- cialty, or MOS, 180A prior to their first cational level 7, or MEL 7. SFWOBC action planning. assignment as assistant SF detachment training modules include general sub- commanders within one of the SF groups. jects; regional studies; training manage- SF warrant officers are the only combat- ment; force protection; advanced special- arms warrant officers who lead soldiers operations techniques; SF doctrine, organ- in direct ground combat. They have ization and operations; and personnel proven themselves in combat and in recovery. Students learn to conduct other operations in Panama, Kuwait, research, to improve their writing skills, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and to design and conduct military brief- and in the many other places where SF ings. Warrant-officer candidates who has operated. haven’t already attended the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE,
May 2004 5 Level III Course will also attend SERE cial Operations Techniques (U). The FM training. Each class also makes a week- will assist units in preparing individuals, long visit to Washington, D.C., where stu- their equipment and their orders for dents receive capabilities briefings at the course attendance. Central Intelligence Agency, at the ASOTC is taught at Fort Bragg, but in Defense Intelligence Agency and at the September 2004, a detachment from Pentagon. Company A will begin teaching the course at Fort Lewis, Wash., with classes SFWOAC running concurrently with those at Fort The SFWOAC is a nine-week course Bragg. The ASOT (West) Detachment, that is conducted twice a year and has a already permanently assigned to Fort capacity of 20 students. Senior warrant Lewis, will also provide information nec- officers receive training in the history of essary to assist units of the U.S. Army unconventional warfare; in joint, strategic Special Operations Command, or and crisis-action planning; in antiterror- USASOC, and selected Navy special-war- ism; in force protection; and in personnel fare units in preparing their personnel to recovery. The course objective is to pre- attend ASOTC. Detachment members pare SF warrant officers to perform their will also serve as USASOC subject-mat- duties at a forward operating base, as ter experts on ASOT, providing assist- members of a joint special-operations task ance to all theater special-operations force, or as members of the staff of a the- commands seeking to employ their staffs ater special-operations command. in planning and preparing ASOT support for their operations. ASOTC SFISC The ASOTC is a 13-week course that is conducted six times each year. “Advanced The SFISC, established at the Special special-operations techniques” is a gener- Warfare Center and School in 2003, trains al description of the techniques, tactics selected SF NCOs in the intelligence func- and procedures covered in the course. For tions that are necessary for supporting SF specific information on the type of opera- missions across the operational continu- tions that ASOTC teaches, refer to FM 3- um. The SFISC detachment conducts the 05.220, (S) Special Forces Advanced Spe- 13-week course three times a year. SFISC
The SF Intelligence Ser- geant Course teaches students traditional and state-of-the-art tech- niques in intelligence- gathering. U.S. Army photo
6 Special Warfare A Special Forces warrant officer talks with Iraqi civilians during Opera- tion Iraqi Freedom.
U.S. Army photo graduates are awarded MOS 18F (SF develop tactics, techniques and proce- intelligence sergeant) and are qualified to dures that will integrate emerging tech- fill positions ranging from the SF-detach- nologies with the traditional SF warrior ment level to the unified-command level. ethos, allowing SF Soldiers to fight and In addition to training students in the tra- win in the network-centric environment of ditional skills of SF intelligence the 21st century. sergeants, SFISC trains them in the lat- est techniques of intelligence-gathering and analysis, and it acquaints them with Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts recent advances in the technology of geo- is the commander of Company A, 2nd Bat- spatial information systems. The result is talion, 1st Special Warfare Training the creation of an SF intelligence sergeant Group. Prior to his current assignment, who is prepared to leverage technology CWO 4 Watts spent 21 years in the 5th SF and his analytical skills in order to Group, serving in a variety of duty posi- achieve information dominance by estab- tions that included SF engineer sergeant, lishing a holistic, network-centric per- SF intelligence sergeant and assistant SF- spective of warfare in any operational detachment commander. From 1990 to environment. 1995, he was commander of SF Detach- ment 546, which saw service during the Conclusion Gulf War and in Somalia. During his most Recent reports from the field reveal recent assignment, CWO 4 Watts was a that Company A’s advanced-skills train- member of Forward Operating Base 51, ing has contributed significantly to battle- participating in the planning and execu- field successes in the global war on terror- tion of operations in western Iraq. CWO 4 ism. Today, more than ever, the skills that Watts holds a bachelor of science degree in SF Soldiers learn in Company A’s courses public management from Austin Peay are in high demand. Company A’s cadre State University, Clarksville, Tenn. faces the challenge of keeping pace with that demand, keeping abreast of rapidly- changing technology, and maintaining time-honored traditional SF advanced skills. To meet the challenge, the cadre constantly examines the threat environ- ment and operational demands in order to
May 2004 7 Training SF Advanced Skills in the Air: Co. B, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG
by Major Buck Dellinger
hen missions call for Special ment, oxygen-assisted parachute infiltra- Forces Soldiers to perform air tions from high altitudes — generally Winfiltration or to coordinate 12,500 feet above ground level and high- close air support for ground operations, er. The course is taught 10 times per Soldiers rely on the advanced-skills year. Training begins at Fort Bragg, N.C., training provided by Company B, 2nd where students learn body stabilization Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training in a free-fall simulator. During their five Group. days of training at Fort Bragg, students Company B trains four advanced-skills “fly” for 42 minutes in the vertical wind courses: the Military Free-fall Parachutists tunnel — 14 flights of three minutes Course, or MFFPC; each. Each of their wind-tunnel flights is the Military Free-fall digitally recorded and later reviewed by Jumpmaster Course, the student and an instructor. On the or MFFJMC; the sixth day, the students and cadre travel Advanced Military to Yuma, where they conduct 28 free-fall Free-fall Parachutists jumps, using the MC-4 RAM-air para- Course, or AMFFPC; chute system, during the next 14 days of and the Special Op- training. erations Terminal At- Generally, the first five days of MFFPC tack Control Course, training at Yuma are one-on-one training or SOTACC. Since with an instructor, including the stu- the summer of 1995, dents’ jumps with combat equipment and U.S. Army photo Company B has been oxygen. The next five days focus on the The MFFPC now includes based at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. Yuma collective skills of grouping, ending with two high-altitude, high- Proving Ground’s consistently favorable two high-altitude, high-opening, or opening jumps, one with weather, nearly unlimited air space and HAHO, jumps. The second of these combat equipment and abundant ranges make it an excellent train- HAHO jumps is conducted from 17,500 oxygen. ing location that allows consistent and effi- feet above ground level and requires stu- cient year-round training. dents to use oxygen and carry combat equipment. The last four days of training MFFPC are conducted at night, and training con- The MFFPC is a 20-day course that cludes with two night, combat-equip- qualifies members of special-operations ment, oxygen jumps. forces to conduct night combat-equip- Recent changes to MFFPC training include the addition of the two HAHO
8 Special Warfare U.S. Army photo jumps. Equipment changes include the MFFJMC has been high, but new tech- Instructors evaluate a stu- replacement of the AR2 automatic para- nology, training aids and the dedication dent’s free-fall technique chute-opening device with a military ver- of the instructor cadre have increased and ensure that he is sion of an electronic automatic-activation the student success rate to nearly 90 per- aware of his “pull” altitude. device equipped with closing loop cutters. cent. Taking into account lessons learned Another equipment change is the replace- from recent operations, military free-fall ment of the improved equipment-attach- infiltration planning has been added to ment sling (known as the spider harness) the portion of training that covers jump- with the Parachutists Drop Bag. master duties and responsibilities. The goal of the addition is to provide students MFFJMC with a framework for considering all The MFFJMC is a 17-day course that aspects of military free-fall infiltration, trains students to conduct safe, stan- from pre-mission isolation through con- dardized military free-fall operations. solidation on the drop zone. Taught 10 times per year, the course is open to officers, warrant officers, NCOs AMFFPC and enlisted members of all the services, The AMFFPC is a 40-day course as well as to selected students of allied taught four times per year to selected countries. personnel assigned to special-operations The bedrock of the MFFJMC training units and to the Department of Defense. plan consists of jumpmaster personnel AMFFPC focuses on producing advanced inspections, oxygen operations, calcula- military free-fall trainers for the force tion of the high-altitude release point, while creating a pool of future military and jumpmaster actions in the aircraft. free-fall instructors. During the course, Historically, the attrition rate of students make an average of 140 jumps
May 2004 9 Marine Corps, aims at producing fully cer- tified joint tactical attack controllers. SOTACC uses state-of-the-art comput- er simulations and live aircraft controls in training. The simulations replicate the various types of call-for-fire missions (mortars and artillery) and tactical attack controls of all common aircraft. Prior to controlling live bombing runs, students receive prerequisite training and a comprehensive written test. Dur- ing the last week of training, students move out onto Yuma Proving Ground’s vast range facility, where they will con- trol at least 12 live bombing runs by fixed-wing fighter aircraft. SOTACC also employs the most recent battle-tested U.S. Army photo lasers and other equipment used for ter- A student falls away from as they are being taught multiple in-air minal guidance of aircraft. In the near the aircraft, followed skills and evaluated on their perform- future, the cadre plans to expand the closely by the instructor ance. Like MFFPC, AMFFPC begins at SOTACC lesson plan to include the use who will critique his Fort Bragg, with five days of training in of unmanned aerial vehicles in call-for- performance. the vertical wind tunnel, where each stu- fire operations. dent receives nearly five hours of indi- vidual training. The remainder of the course is taught at Yuma Proving Major Buck Dellinger is the command- Ground. The final tests in AMFFPC focus er of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe- on observing and critiquing individuals cial Warfare Training Group. His previ- and groups as they conduct military free- ous assignments in Infantry and Special fall operations. Forces units include service with the 82nd Airborne Division, the Joint Special SOTACC Operations Command, the 10th SF Group Lessons learned during operations in and the U.S. Military Academy. Commis- Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the sioned in 1988 from the U.S. Military value of close air support to SF opera- Academy, Major Dellinger holds a mas- tions, and SOTACC is the newest course ter’s degree in international relations taught by Company B’s cadre. The 19-day from Rutgers University. He is scheduled course, a joint effort by the Army and the to assume duties as the 1st Special War- fare Training Group S3 during the sum- mer of 2004.
U.S. Army photo Students in SOTACC control live bombing runs by fixed- wing fighter aircraft at Yuma Proving Ground.
10 Special Warfare The SF Underwater Operations School: Co. C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG by Major David K. Hsu
n 1964, the Army began sending Spe- cial Forces A-detachments to Key IWest, Fla., on temporary duty to train selected special-operations forces in the infiltration skill of combat diving. Today, that training, marking its 40th anniver- sary, continues through the permanent cadre of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. During the late 1960s a permanent cadre was assigned to Key West to form the SF Underwater Operations School. Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes Since the school’s creation, the majority of The Underwater Operations School is located on Flem- the instructors have been Soldiers from ing Key, near Key West, Fla. SF, but over the years, the instructor pop- competent, safe and tactically proficient ulation has grown to include Army combat divers. Rangers, Navy SEALs, Navy deep-sea Company C conducts three courses: the divers, Air Force combat-control techni- Combat Diver Qualification Course, or cians and Air Force pararescuemen. The CDQC; the Combat Diver Supervisor joint cadre brings a broad spectrum of Course, or CDSC; and the Dive Medical expertise and experience to the training of Technician Course, or DMTC. future combat divers. The cornerstone of the training at the CDQC Underwater Operations School is clandes- CDQC is a 24-day course, taught five tine underwater infiltration using times per year, that qualifies members of rebreather technology. Through the years, special-operations forces as combat the rebreather equipment used at the divers. Instructors train students on two school has changed from the Emerson rig underwater breathing apparatuses: open- to the CCR-1000 to today’s Draeger LAR V. circuit scuba and closed-circuit Despite changes in the cadre makeup, rebreathers. The focus of CDQC is subsur- the replacement of antiquated equipment face infiltration, and the course empha- with new technology and the replacement sizes underwater navigation. Students of old training events with new ones, the complete navigation dives ranging from mission of the school remains unchanged: 500 meters to 2,000 meters. Throughout to train special-operations forces to be
May 2004 11 the course, students swim distances of graduate of CDQC will also receive train- more than 30 kilometers. ing in selected advanced CWIC critical Open-circuit training involves naviga- tasks after he returns to his home station. tion, search dives, a 130-foot deep dive, Recently, SF soldiers have attended submarine operations and a 50-foot free- CDQC in record numbers. More 18-series swimming ascent. Closed-circuit training Soldiers have graduated from the past two involves underwater individual and team iterations of CDQC than previously gradu- navigation, as well as procedures for ated during an average year — enough to establishing a beach-landing-site. fill more than four SF dive detachments. CDQC also includes a rigorous academ- ic component. Students receive more than CDSC CDSC, three weeks long, runs concur- rently with the DMTC. Both courses are conducted two times per year. In order to be selected to attend CDSC, applicants must have served on dive status for at least one year. CDSC graduates are qual- ified to plan and supervise military com- bat-diving operations. The dive supervi- sor is to the combat diver as the jump- master is to the parachutist. Thus, the dive-supervisor personnel inspection, dive planning and emergency procedures form the bedrock of this intense course. Training also includes nautical naviga- tion, inspection of closed-circuit rigs, and operation of the hyperbaric chamber. During the final mission of CDSC, the emergency-procedures situational train- Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes ing exercise, students work closely with Students practice underwater navigation while wearing closed-circuit rebreather students of the DMTC in retrieving, equipment. assessing, transporting and treating seven hours of instruction on dive physi- injured divers. ology and dive physics, four hours of instruction on U.S. Navy dive tables, two DMTC hours of instruction covering dive The DMTC is three weeks in length. injuries, and two hours of instruction on Applicants for the course are not tides, waves and currents. required to be dive-qualified, but they In October 2004, CDQC will add the fol- must be members of military occupation- lowing critical tasks: al specialty 18D (SF medical sergeant) or • Nautical navigation and charts. members of MOS 91W (medical special- • Small-boat operations (combat rubber ist) who are also graduates of the Special raiding craft and kayaks). Operations Combat Medical Course. • Maritime air-operations classes (rotary- DMTC covers the prevention, assessment wing personnel casting and personnel and treatment of dive injuries. A dive recovery, and infiltration of boats by air). medical officer, SF medics and Air Force In the past, Company C trained these pararescuemen provide instruction on waterborne-infiltration skills during the subjects including neurological exams, six-week Combat Waterborne Infiltration decompression, anatomy and physiology Course, or CWIC. When CWIC was can- of the neurological and cardiopulmonary celled, the JFK Special Warfare Center system, dive pharmacology, decompres- and School distributed those basic critical sion sickness, diving diseases and inva- tasks to the pre-CDQC and the CDQC. The
12 Special Warfare sive procedures. Students also conduct a chamber dive of 165 feet while treating a patient. Future The future of combat diving is one of expansion, in personnel as well as in tech- nology. Fiscal year 2004 has already wit- nessed the addition of a second dive detachment to each SF battalion, which doubled the requirement for SF personnel who are qualified as combat divers. In addition, the Air Force, which has long sent students to the CDQC, projects a greater than 90-percent increase in the number of Air Force students who will attend CDQC over the next two years. Although the number of students will dra- Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes matically increase in the coming years, Students conduct dry-land based submarine escape trunk lock-out procedures at the the objectives of the school will not SF Underwater Operations School. change, and the cadre will ensure that the quality of training will not decline. forces. In its 40th year of operations, the Recent technological breakthroughs Underwater Operations School remains promise dramatic improvements in dedicated to providing professional underwater safety, underwater naviga- instruction and to training competent, tion, underwater mobility and underwater safe and tactically proficient special-oper- communications. As the subject-matter ations divers. experts in combat diving, the cadre mem- bers of Company C are taking part in identifying future technologies that will Major David K. Hsu is the commander aid underwater infiltration. Cadre mem- of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG, bers are studying the capabilities of which conducts the SF Underwater Oper- underwater global positioning systems, ations School at Key West, Fla. Commis- diver-propulsion vehicles, and diver-to- sioned in the Infantry Branch upon his diver and diver-to-ship communications graduation from Boston University, he systems. served as a Bradley Infantry Fighting Underwater infiltration remains a criti- Vehicle platoon leader and staff officer in cal capability for Army special-operations the 3rd Infantry Division in Schweinfurt, Germany. Since his graduation from the SF Qualification Course in 1995, Major Hsu has served as detachment command- er for A-detachments 125 and 126 in the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. He holds a master’s degree in defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.
Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes Students in the CDQC line up at the edge of the pool, ready to begin training.
May 2004 13 Providing Relevant Training for the GWOT: Co. D, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG
by Major Shannon Boehm
ome of the most directly beneficial on orders to an SF CIF. SOTIC exclusively and relevant training for Army spe- trains Soldiers assigned to SF, Ranger or Scial-operations forces, or ARSOF, who other ARSOF units. are successfully prosecuting the global war ATD conducts three antiterrorism cours- on terrorism, or GWOT, is taught by Com- es: the Individual Terrorism Awareness pany D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Course, or INTAC; the Antiterrorism Training Group. Instructor Qualification Course, or AIQC; Company D trains Soldiers in the United and the United Nations Peacekeeping States Army Special Operations Com- Observers Course, or UNPKO. All three mand, or USASOC, in advanced skills and are Department of Defense-directed train- serves as USASOC ’s subject-matter exper- ing courses available to service personnel tise base for close-quarters battle, or CQB; who are on orders to high-threat locations breaching operations of a commander’s in- outside the continental United States. extremis force, or CIF; and the tactics, Although many members of ARSOF are techniques and procedures, or TTPs, of spe- aware of the existence of the courses listed cial-operations sniper and antiterrorism above, many are not aware of the courses’ operations. scope or intent, or of the numerous changes To accomplish its training mission, Com- that have recently occurred in the training. pany D is organized into a headquarters That lack of awareness has created a num- detachment and three training units: the ber of misconceptions, outdated perspec- Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, tives and inaccuracies regarding Company Target Analysis, Exploitation Techniques D’s training courses. Course, or SFARTAETC, Committee; the During the past two years, Company D Special Operations Target Interdiction has expanded the scope of its training con- Course, or SOTIC, Committee; and the siderably, from being responsible for con- Antiterrorism Detachment, or ATD. ducting four 48-man SFARTAETC itera- Although the courses conducted by Com- tions and five 24-man SOTIC iterations pany D provide training critical to success- each year to absorbing the ATD and its ful prosecution of the GWOT, the customer courses, increasing SFARTAETC to 68- base for each course varies in accordance man classes, planning and resourcing the with classified and unclassified training- expansion of SOTIC to 10 32-man classes mission guidance and directives, as well as per year, and standing up the Special Oper- with command priorities. SFARTAETC is a ations Terminal Attack Control Course non-solicitation course, taught exclusively (later transferred to the 2nd Battalion’s to 18-series Soldiers who are assigned to or Company B).
14 Special Warfare SFARTAETC provides students with high-risk live-fire assault training. Instruction focuses on discriminate target en- gagement and close- quarters battle. U.S. Army photo The resourcing and manpower changes criminate fire. The CQB portion includes necessary to support this training growth, training in combatives; rappelling; special- although they were a substantial chal- ized target assaults; and breaching by lenge, were essential for meeting the needs explosive, mechanical and ballistic means. of the force. To date, Company D has In September 2002, USASOC directed the accomplished many of the increases and JFK Special Warfare Center and School to has done the planning necessary for the expand the size of SFARTAETC classes others, all the while maintaining the high- from 48 students to 68 students in order to quality training for which Company D is better meet operational-force requirements. known. Iterations of the 68-man classes began in January 2003, but because of instructor SFARTAETC vacancies created by operational contingen- SFARTAETC, taught four times per cies, SWCS temporarily curtailed the year, is an eight-week course that focuses increase in class size until the instructor on providing quality training in advanced shortage could be alleviated. As of March marksmanship and CQB assault. Because 2004, the SFARTAETC committee is once SFARTAETC provides specialized and again conducting 68-man classes. comprehensive instruction and training in Another significant change in SFAR- the TTPs needed by CIFs, it is the prereq- TAETC during the last year has been the uisite qualification course for assignment improvement in the student graduation to CIFs. rate. Based on input from the operational During the eight weeks, students receive force and suggestions from instructors, two weeks of advanced combat marksman- Company D made substantial refinements ship followed by six weeks of training in to the execution of the SFARTAETC pro- CQB. The marksmanship training involves gram of instruction. During the last five high-risk, live-fire drills that emphasize courses, the graduation rate has been the employment of pistols and carbines greater than 80 percent. This represents a and focus on the precise application of dis- significant increase from the course’s his- toric graduation rate of 66 percent. The com-
May 2004 15 mittee has increased the graduation rate ple target engagement; stalking; camou- while maintaining high-quality training flage and concealment; observation tech- and adhering to validated standards. The niques; reporting techniques; and hide-site success of SFARTAETC graduates when construction. SOTIC begins training with their units are deployed on operational mis- iron-sight, known-distance marksmanship sions continues to validate SFARTAETC’s (advanced rifle marksmanship). The course training methods and content. soon transitions to known-distance marks- manship using optics (sniper marksman- SOTIC ship), and further evolves to unknown-dis- The six-week SOTIC is taught five times tance sniper marksmanship (field fire). per year. SOTIC trains selected personnel SOTIC culminates in a comprehensive in the technical skills and operational pro- field-training exercise that tests the stu- cedures necessary for delivering precision dents’ capabilities for infiltration; move- rifle fire from concealed positions (sniping) ment; fieldcraft; distance-judging; observa- in support of ARSOF missions. SOTIC is tion; target-surveillance and -reporting; the only Level-1 sniper-qualification course and sniper engagement. for ARSOF soldiers, and it is the best As with SFARTAETC, in September 2002, course in DoD for learning the art and skill USASOC directed SWCS to expand the of accurate, discriminate, long-range SOTIC student output. That expansion — sniper engagement. from 120 to 320 students per year — would SOTIC students focus the majority of mean increasing the size of each course their time training on the essentials of iteration from 24 to 32 students and long-range, precision shooting. In the proc- increasing the number of annual iterations ess, they become intimately familiar with from five to 10. Unfortunately, the lack of their assigned weapon and with foreign an adequate number of existing range and nonstandard sniper weapons systems. facilities and the scarcity of land suitable SOTIC provides students with the solid for the construction of new ranges at Fort foundation of skills essential for them to Bragg has stalled SOTIC expansion form effective sniper-observer teams. efforts. During the course, students are trained In May 2003, SOTIC underwent a criti- in distance determination; precision cal task skills board, or CTSB, through engagement (static targets out to 800 which the operational force identified addi- meters, snap targets out to 400 meters and tional training requirements. Despite the moving targets out to 300 meters); multi- constraints on facilities, the SOTIC com- mittee has implemented changes to
SOTIC students receive training in a variety of subjects, including cam- ouflage and conceal- ment, stalking, observa- tion techniques and sniper engagement. U.S. Army photo
16 Special Warfare address some of the needs identified dur- ing the CTSB: training on day and night digital and video systems; better limited- visibility shooting exercises; and more complex urban-sniping scenarios. SOTIC is also in the midst of integrating the newly fielded universal night sight, the .50-caliber Barrett sniper system, and the SR-25 sniper system. In concert with those changes, the committee has updated the SOTIC program of instruction to incorpo- rate the new equipment and to support the U.S. Army photo mandated 320-man annual output once the INTAC includes training in terrorism awareness, surveil- required range facilities have been lance-detection, and self-defensive measures such as approved and constructed. vehicle bomb-checks. es in threat-vulnerability assessment and ATD in surveillance-detection. ATD executes the only DoD-directed UNPKO is a 10-day course coordinated training in the SWCS 1st Special Warfare with the State Department and DoD. Training Group. The combined course stu- UNPKO provides military officers and dent load for INTAC, AIQC and UNPKO is NCOs on assignment to U.N. missions the 650 per year, and the student population AT training they will need in order to work ranges from sergeants to general officers. and survive in high-threat locations outside INTAC is a five-day antiterrorism the U.S. After five days of training that are course, with a class load of 20 students, identical to INTAC, UNPKO provides addi- taught 24 times per year. INTAC is intend- tional instruction on off-road vehicle ed for DoD personnel (and their adult dynamics, mine-awareness and first-aid dependents) who are scheduled for assign- skills. Students also receive classified brief- ment to high-threat locations outside the ings pertinent to the U.N. mission to which continental U.S. INTAC provides classroom they will be assigned. The course is taught training on antiterrorism TTPs, as well as twice per year, in June and in December, practical exercises on surveillance-detec- and has a student load of 20 to 45 per class. tion, survival shooting and evasive-driving The logic of having SF warriors — expe- procedures. The course is recognized as the rienced in working, living and surviving in premier AT course in DoD by the J-34, high-threat regions — instructing others Joint Staff. who will be assigned in small numbers to AIQC is a two-week qualification course high-threat locations outside the U.S. is for antiterrorism instructors. Taught eight indisputable. The ATD instructors are times per year with a class load of 16 stu- world-class, and the constantly increasing dents, AIQC is open to DoD officers and demand for the three AT courses validates NCOs who will be assigned as antiterror- the quality and relevance of the training ism officers, or ATOs. AIQC provides poten- the detachment provides. tial ATOs the Level-1 AT training informa- tion and the instruction skills they will Facilities need for conducting unit-level AT training. In support of its courses, Company D uses Recent analysis of the AIQC by J-34 per- many facilities in and around the Fort sonnel resulted in the expansion of the Bragg installation. The Miller Training course’s program of instruction from the Complex is the hub for all the company’s original Level 1 AT curriculum to a Level 2 training, consolidating the classroom AT curriculum. The course change has instruction and support components. Fort resulted in the inclusion of a force-protec- Bragg’s Range 37, Range 66E and Range 30, tion module that includes practical exercis- as well as the ATD driving track, serve as
May 2004 17 the primary ranges for Company D’s range work and practical exercises. The SFARTAETC Committee also uses Fort Bragg facilities for military opera- tions on urban terrain, or MOUT, and other selected target areas on and off the military installation. The SOTIC Com- mittee uses several additional ranges on Fort Bragg for training in distance fire and field fire, uses drop zones and train- ing areas for stalking and observation exercises, and uses the Fort Bragg MOUT facilities for training in urban sniping techniques. The ATD uses vari- ous facilities in and around Fort Bragg for its surveillance-detection training and for practical exercises in threat-vul- nerability assessment. For all three of Company D’s subelements, the use of numerous facilities creates flexibility, enables continued training execution despite operational priorities, and pro- vides increased training realism by miti- gating the tendency to execute “canned,” unrealistic scenarios. Conclusion In conclusion, Company D conducts a number of high-risk, realistic and relevant training courses. The focus of all Company D’s courses is the live-fire or practical application of each course’s skill sets. That focus on practicality makes the training valuable, effective and relevant to current operations. In the ongoing GWOT, the training provided by Company D is vali- dated every day. The instructors who man the organization, epitomizing the quiet professional, maintain their focus on imparting advanced-skills training that is essential for operational forces to be suc- cessful on the battlefield.
Major Shannon Boehm is the command- er of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe- cial Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous SF assignments include detachment com- mander and company executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. He was commis- sioned through the U.S. Military Academy.
18 Special Warfare SF Warrant Officers to Become Part of SF Officer Branch
by Chief Warrant Officer 5 William McPherson and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Jenkins
n July 9, 1984, one month rant officers were different from other SF warrant officer has become an after the first class of 24 warrant officers. SF warrant officers essential member of the modern OSpecial Forces warrant offi- are language-qualified; regionally ori- special-operations force. cers graduated from the SF War- ented and regionally experienced. The JFK Special Warfare Center rant Officer Technical Certification They are trained in mission-planning; and School is planning a ceremony Course at the JFK Special Warfare staff organization; combined tactics; to commemorate the 20th anniver- Center, the Army created the SF advanced special-operations tech- sary of SF warrant officers and the Warrant Officer Branch. The SF niques; and survival, evasion, resist- changing of their branch. Details warrant officers were brought into ance and escape. While they have ful- on the ceremony will be released the force to provide the SF detach- filled the role of technician, the SF through command channels and ment with tactical and technical warrant officers have also had the via e-mail as soon as the planning expertise based on their in-depth additional requirement of command- is complete. knowledge and experience of SF ing at the SF-detachment level, and operations. they are designated as combat com- On July 9, 2004, the 20th manders. That requirement has led to Chief Warrant Officer 5 William anniversary of the SF Warrant Offi- SF warrant officers’ re-designation as A. McPherson is the chief warrant cer Branch and the 86th anniver- assistant detachment commanders — officer of the SF Branch and the sary of the Army Warrant Officer a change that recognizes their warrant officer proponent manager Corps, SF warrant officers will unique capabilities and leadership in the SWCS Special Operations become part of the SF Officer responsibilities. Proponency Office. Mr. McPherson, Branch. Their change of status will Today SF warrant officers serve formerly assigned to the 10th SF be acknowledged by the changing of with pride and distinction through- Group, has more than 30 years of their collar branch insignia from out the special-operations commu- service in the Army. the warrant-officer eagle, worn by nity: on SF detachments, at the SF all Army warrant officers since May group level, in the JFK Special Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas 1921, to the crossed arrows, worn by Warfare Center and School, in the Jenkins is chief of the Collective SF officers since June 1987. U.S. Army Special Forces Com- Training Branch, Special Forces When the Army created the SF mand, in the U.S. Army Special Doctrine Division, Directorate of Warrant Officer Branch, Military Operations Command, and in the- Training and Doctrine, SWCS. Mr. Occupational Specialty 180A, SF war- ater special-operations commands. Jenkins has served more than 21 rants were designated as SF techni- Sought for their experience and years in SF, and his assignments cians, in keeping with the Army tra- maturity, SF warrant officers also have included service in the 1st, dition of warrants serving as techni- serve on various joint special-oper- 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1st cal experts and advisers to command- ations task forces actively involved SF Group and the 1st and 2nd bat- ers. But from the beginning, SF war- in the global war on terrorism. The talions of the 7th SF Group.
May 2004 19 The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism and the Future of SF
by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert
n Jan. 15 and 16, 2004, an eclectic by collecting the ideas, opinions and sug- group of thinkers assembled in gestions of a group of gifted, informed and OCody, Wyo., to identify concepts that committed American citizens. will be necessary for shaping the future of United States Army Special Forces. Terrorist characteristics Hosted by the commander of the JFK The terrorists the world faces today are Special Warfare Center and School, Major masters of deception and denial. The ter- General Geoffrey C. Lambert, the group rorist threat is global, regional and local. consisted of participants from academia, Terrorists are spread out in classic cellular industry, the media, the military and the structures and use centralized guidance public-service sector.1 Cody was selected and decentralized planning and execution. not only for its central location but also They are astute at indirect warfare, propa- because its accommodating, relaxed atmos- ganda, training, recruitment, dispersion, phere might foster uninhibited intellectual operational security, fieldcraft skills that debate. prevent the detection of their cellular Addressing a range of issues pertaining to structures, and logistics. Many terrorist the war on terrorism, the conference focused organizations are well-funded, and they principally on the role of Special Forces. It make extensive use of multilayered fronts. began with an attempt to define terrorists’ Terrorists are skilled in the use of auxil- operational and behavioral characteristics, iaries and support networks, both humani- followed by a debate on appropriate respons- tarian and paramilitary, including auxil- es to the terrorist threat. The participants iaries that provide security and support in then discussed contributions made by Spe- proximity to key cells. The Internet pro- cial Forces, as well as courses of action that vides disparate terrorist groups a ready- might be pursued by the JFK Special War- made medium for collaborating, exchang- fare Center and School in preparing special- ing ideas and sharing lessons learned. operations forces to meet the changing threat Terrorists operate in failed states, in of terrorism. ungoverned or uncontrolled areas, and in This article is an attempt to capture the the seams and cracks where nation-states fruits of the Cody Conference’s debate and are lax or ineffective. Terrorists seek sup- discussion. It is not a critical essay on ter- port — including technology, funding, logis- rorism or a definitive solution for the tics support, recruits, transnational mobil- problems associated with the global war ity and media access — from a wide base of on terrorism. Instead, it presents a map sponsors, although nation-state sponsor- for further exploration and development
20 Special Warfare ship appears to be decreasing. by isolating the U.S., eroding the will of its Ideology is key to terrorists’ success. coalition partners, and escalating costs of Islam is the source of legitimacy for radical imported goods in the U.S. to intolerable Islamists. Radical Islamist terrorism has levels. significant informational advantages to As al-Qaeda has demonstrated, terrorist exploit: U.S. support for Israel and the organizations adjust rapidly to take advan- U.S.’s insatiable need for oil are successful tage of any opportunity. In Iraq, the call to terrorist propaganda themes that the U.S. arms to fight the “crusaders” is an example has yet to counter effectively. Ideologies of agile armed propaganda. It exploits can be defeated (as was Marxism); howev- opportunities of killing Americans for er, defeating ideology requires long-term propaganda value while it supports the planning and persistent efforts over time. strategic goal of eroding American will For the radical Islamist terrorist, the over time. strategic goals may be to spread his ideolo- Tribes historically have believed in their gy and to attain a Middle East that is free respective goals, yet tribes have changed of Western influence. Recent pronounce- over time. The Internet has created new ments by al-Qaeda and other groups, cou- tribes — those connected globally and hor- pled with tactical target selection that is izontally by common interests. Analyzing based on achieving the maximum psycho- and engaging the threat in the context of logical effect (such as the March 11, 2004, the Internet will have merit as linkages attacks in Spain), seem to support those develop, as support groups mutate, and as strategic goals. However, the terrorists’ “delinked” supporting tribes emerge. intent may also be to make a long-term While the U.S. is constrained by rules effort to destroy strategic economic targets left over from the Cold War and the post- such as the Panama or Suez canals, there- Vietnam era, the terrorist threat is unfet-
May 2004 21 tered. To win the global war on terrorism, sponsors; and use courts, economic sanc- we may need to wage unconstrained war- tions or other means as necessary. fare, but we need to envision a return to We must penetrate enemy organizations normal constraints after the victory. The with human intelligence, or HUMINT.This U.S. has forced the terrorist leadership fur- difficult task may fall to surrogate intelli- ther into the shadows and has shattered at gence personnel or to intelligence assets of least two-thirds of terrorists’ leadership other nations. We have to create a global and organization. Yet terrorists continue to environment of seamless information- and co-opt other groups, winning support in intelligence-sharing; improve coalition, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, allied and surrogate intelligence and oper- Iraq and other locations. Although al- ational capabilities; and advance our capa- Qaeda has been rocked by the worldwide bilities of intercepting low-level signal efforts of the U.S. and its allies, the group intelligence. It is imperative that we con- retains its agility and can still strike when duct deception operations to throw the and where it desires. enemy off balance. Conduct of area-denial, area-control and remote-area operations, What must be done either directly or with partners, is critical, We must gain and maintain the initia- as are integrated computer attack and tive. We must decapitate terrorist organi- defense capabilities. It is essential that we zations by killing or capturing their lead- develop and execute plans for disrupting ers. We must deter, punish or destroy spon- terrorist recruiting and flatten the enemy’s sors; harass, attack and eliminate nonstate execution structure. We must re-energize military-to-military relationships with our
22 Special Warfare allies to assist in building a global consen- nations’ intelligence, and possibly their sus against terror. policing actions, that will win the global We must begin, develop and support an war on terrorism. We need to define our Islamic renaissance. The U.S. and U.N. enemies as narrowly as possible and our should export ideas, and they should allies as broadly as possible. Cold War def- rebuild, fund and support modern univer- initions of our enemies — even pre-9/11 sities overseas. The best and brightest of definitions — no longer apply. the Middle East, both civilian and military, We must develop strategic themes and should be educated in the U.S., and there strategic information campaigns, then should be an increase in student streamline our information operations exchanges. Scholarships for U.S. language and delegate the approval authority for students overseas should be coupled with information products down to the lowest the development of cultural, academic and levels — the country teams and military business exchange centers. Economic aid units. Bringing public diplomacy fully into should include funding for publishers to the mix of informational tools will help. translate more books into Arabic and other Decapitating terrorist organizations will appropriate languages. Economic-assist- work well in the near-term, but over time, ance programs that would encourage, train new leaders will arise if we do not examine and fund Muslim countries to alter living and address the root causes of terrorism. conditions and create better opportunities Not all unemployed, underemployed or rest- could also be beneficial. less youth in many societies, including Mus- The U.S. should adopt a broader defini- lim societies, are willing to commit suicide tion of “just governance.” Promoting safe or to join radical, murdering clans. We and secure operations of nongovernment should develop campaigns that synchronize organizations, and expressing universal and balance U.S. objectives against those of values (not only U.S.-based “freedom and emerging indigenous leaders or factions democracy”) could have merit as a means that are attempting to recruit. If we are to of moving neutral audiences away from be successful in disrupting terrorist recruit- terror. By winning the support of uncom- ing, our examination needs to analyze the mitted Muslims around the world, the U.S. mechanics of terrorist recruitment. could deprive al-Qaeda and other organiza- tions of potential allies and recruits. Potential SF contributions Special Forces’ niche is unconventional What can be done better warfare, which includes counterinsurgency We should separate the metrics of the and guerrilla warfare. Special Forces global war on terrorism from those of Oper- should be chartered to monitor and combat ation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Free- insurgencies, even though other U.S. forces dom is a regional combat activity with will move on to new priorities. implications for the global war on terror- To effectively combat nagging insur- ism. Global measures of effectiveness need gency problems and to conduct sustained to be carefully articulated, and we need to guerrilla warfare, the U.S. needs to develop grasp the international ramifications of a standing, deployable Special Forces information. headquarters. The headquarters would The image of self-policing Muslim gov- have to be capable of conducting long-term ernments is priceless. Why didn’t Muslim operations in multiple locations. police capture Saddam Hussein? Why did In order to gain allies against the terror- Americans announce his capture? Why was ist threat and to develop the long-term per- the “we” who captured him not the popu- sonal relationships needed for information- lace whose members he had murdered by sharing and teamwork, the Special Forces the hundreds of thousands? headquarters would conduct prevention Global perceptions and cooperation do and mitigation operations. Those opera- matter. In the long term, it will be other tions would include advising and training
May 2004 23 host-nation military forces or police, intel- Special Forces can conduct operations to ligence units, counterterrorism forces, bor- force enemy activity — any action or reac- der guards and other members of the state tion that can be analyzed. SF operations security apparatus. allow us to expand the intelligence data- The headquarters could also conduct med- base, to conduct raids where appropriate or ical civil-assistance programs, joint/com- to deliver precision fires anywhere in the bined exercises and training, mobile train- battlespace. Even down to the individual ing teams, engineer civil-assistance pro- level, Special Forces Soldiers can be grams, and other projects in high-threat employed as a national asset. areas in order to improve the situation, to create opportunities and to open doors. Actions for transforming SF If required, Special Forces could operate Invest in people and training.We must in denied areas, assisting insurrections by ensure that Special Forces Soldiers remain recruiting guerrillas or other armed enti- the best in the world, tuned for independent ties. The best examples of the success of an operations far from logistics support. Our pri- indirect approach in the global war on ter- mary goal should be to build regional rorism is the expulsion of the Taliban gov- experts. We should consider seconding offi- ernment by the 5th Special Forces Group cers to foreign armies and allied special and other government agencies and the forces. We could also recruit selected minori- virtual elimination of the terrorist threat ties and native speakers, and employ off-the- on Basilan Island in the Philippines by the street and out-of-college recruiting programs. 1st Special Forces Group. We might also explore the use of non-citi- Special Forces must be capable of gath- zen/no-security-clearance detachments or ering and exploiting HUMINT. SF must bring women into the force for use in certain also be educated in the latest techniques special-operations fields. If Special Forces for collecting signal intelligence and looks the same after the war on terrorism, imagery intelligence and equipped with someone will have failed. the latest technology for both. These intel- Special Forces must revolutionize its ligence skills will allow Special Forces to language program. Language and cultural prepare the battlespace with ground-truth training must be intensified and revolu- intelligence and information. tionized by creating partnerships with Intelligence assets must be on the street — leading civilian and military educational everywhere. Special Forces has the ability institutions. Consideration should be given to train and assist other nations and gov- to immersion education overseas, extended ernment agencies in penetrating enemy participation by the Defense Language organizations. We should develop a capa- Institute, and other solutions. Promotion bility for tracking and analyzing insurgent for Special Forces officers and enlisted Sol- movements worldwide for the long term, diers should be tied to their language capa- guaranteeing an indefinite “eye on the bility and to their completion of improved problem” regardless of changing national training in cross-cultural communication threats. We should publish new doctrine and negotiation. for counterinsurgency and guerrilla war- We should develop an out-of-system Sol- fare that captures ongoing field develop- dier track that would allow Special Forces ments and lessons learned. Soldiers who have unique skills and poten- The worldwide deployment and rotation tial to “max out” at a certain pay grade in of Special Forces regional experts provides order to contract out or go outside of service long-term presence in problematic areas. promotion norms to become regional The Special Forces unit of action will experts or subject-matter experts in other remain the SF Operational Detachment areas, such as weapons of mass destruction. Alpha, which is designed, trained and We must train and develop SF personnel equipped to operate in remote, isolated to work in smaller elements that will be areas. This force multiplier conserves con- employed in urban terrain and in covert or ventional military force for the main efforts.
24 Special Warfare clandestine environments. To allow Soldiers and training exercises with other government to learn to fight battles before they begin, it intelligence organizations. Special Forces is a necessity that we create enemy-terrain should create an interagency exchange pro- training sites in all theaters. These would gram. The interagency training could prepare provide Soldiers with opportunities for individuals for challenges yet undefined, and training with the fires and mobility plat- the blending of intelligence and operational forms requisite in that theater. capabilities would result in a dynamic and Another component of educational change proactive force. The new interagency poten- would be to refocus the Army Special Opera- tial would allow operators to provide a more tions Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, on solving the intellectual response at the tactical level and problems of unconventional operations and policy-makers and planners to distinguish counterinsurgency. ARSOBL should be a between the threat and the environmental “skunk works,” a hothouse of creative thinking context within which the threat is emerging. that generates strategies in its distinctive In addition to interagency training and coop- areas of operations. eration, we must develop aggressive coali- Intelligence is now a basic competency of tion-training programs that align with the Special Forces. Each Soldier graduating programs of our potential partners in the from the Special Forces Qualification global war on terrorism. Course, or SFQC, must have a journey- The JFK Special Warfare Center and man’s understanding of intelligence opera- School, or SWCS, must develop a world- tions, emphasizing HUMINT. Expansion of class special-warfare network that pro- the Special Forces intelligence curriculum vides Special Forces Soldiers and their sur- would require developing and implement- rogates with full-time access to training, ing an additional Special Forces advanced- resources and lessons learned. SWCS skills intelligence course. needs to develop a simulations capability Another part of the education realignment that is multinational-compatible and capa- would be integrating and sharing instruction ble of analyzing and comparing unconven-
May 2004 25 tional-warfare courses of action. All SWCS in HUMINT training, skill sets and field- instruction must develop and continuously craft through a comprehensive focus on the improve students’ skills in information- redesign of military occupational specialty- management and Internet use. producing courses and advanced-skills A Special Forces Soldier’s best weapon is courses. We must redesign reachback and between his ears. Special Forces instruction- information-sharing networking to uncon- al education and training must be physically ventional-warfare centers of excellence and robust and academically challenging — build a precision-fires school that will be kinetic as well as nonkinetic. Special Forces open to joint and interagency audiences. A must foster adaptive thinking and innovative Special Forces course should also be execution by leveraging advanced behavioral designed to teach the use of uninhabited and cognitive concepts with tough, imagina- vehicles for reconnaissance, fires and tive, practical exercises. Through the uncon- deception. We must also imbed joint-fires ele- ventional-leader development program, we ments into Special Forces and use all “engage- must develop Soldiers who can transition ment” tools available for shaping the battle- quickly from kinetic to nonkinetic solutions space, including unconventional-warfare fis- on the battlefield. cal rules of engagement. Army Special Forces officers should be We must develop and continually enhance awarded branch-qualification credit for fight- our capabilities of intelligence, surveillance ing on the staffs of joint/combined special- and reconnaissance, or ISR. We must also operations task forces or in similar positions design and adopt interagency and interser- in theater special-operations commands. vice intelligence systems, and the ISR capa- This would be a reversal of the current para- bility would allow improved interagency digm: Instead of placing officers in key joint training, exchange of information, integra- billets after they have attained their Army tion and experimentation. qualification, we would place them in key Develop or procure materiel. Special joint billets that would provide their Army Forces must make equipping the Soldier its qualification. Special Forces must also number-one priority.The nature of our oper- develop career paths for specialties that ations requires that special-operations require skills for planning and coordinat- forces-specific, compatible, nonlethal ing unconventional-warfare operations at weapons be developed or purchased; that the strategic and operational levels. fixed-wing, short-take-off-and-landing avia- Enhance battle command/operations.We tion capability be procured; and that Special must build a standing, deployable Special Forces mobility platforms be developed that Forces headquarters that is focused on the are tailored for each theater of operation. long-term, shadowy, unconventional fights of We must make advancements in the surrogate and guerrilla operations, and coun- areas of unmanned aerial vehicles and terinsurgency. The headquarters would sus- unmanned ground vehicles, integrated and tain the focus on terrorism after the regional persistent ISR technology, and state-of-the- component commands, services and other art communications. national resources have shifted to the next Special Forces units should be moved to threat. better locations for long-term training We must build small, rotational Special and theater alignment (in conjunction Forces elements in problematic regions and with the 2005 Base Realignment and countries. These elements, immersed in the Closing program). specific language and culture, would be char- Modify doctrine. Special Forces must tered to establish permanent relationships in publish new doctrine for interagency the host nation and to maintain potential bas- operations, counterinsurgency, guerrilla ing and training sites. Engagement programs warfare and counterguerrilla operations. will be tailored to force enemy action, to act as Special Forces must also expand its use of a deception, or to build beneficial relation- the military decision-making process to ships and establish avenues for information. better address course-of-action develop- Special Forces must make improvements ment in an operational environment that
26 Special Warfare comprises disparate adversaries. We must officer of games2train.com and Corporate Gameware develop the tactics, techniques and proce- LLC. dures needed for flushing the enemy out as • Jim Quinlivan, senior analyst for the Rand Corporation. a component of “finding and fixing.” • Linda Robinson, senior writer, U.S. News and World Report, and member of the Council on Foreign Rela- Conclusion tions and the International Institute for Strategic The Cody Conference was a valuable Studies. • Sarah Sewall, project director, Carr Center for Human tool in focusing the requirements for Rights Policy, Harvard University; former Deputy change and transformation for U.S. Army Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Special Forces. Transformation does not Humanitarian Assistance. happen overnight, because Special Forces • Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.), for- Soldiers cannot be mass-produced. Never- mer commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and of the U.S. Army Special Forces theless, Special Forces institutions must Command. work quickly and untiringly so that our • Major General John K. Singlaub, U.S. Army (ret.), Soldiers will be prepared for the ever- member of the Office of Strategic Services during changing face of the global war on terror- World War II, former commander of the Joint Uncon- ism. A participant at the conference ventional Warfare Task Force, MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War, and former Chief of Staff, United asked, “How do we train people for a task Nations Command, United States Forces, Korea and that does not yet exist?” The answer is of the Eighth U.S. Army in Seoul, Korea. that we must educate them to improvise, •Wayne Williams, president of U.S. Comm-Sults adapt and overcome on their own … any- Inc.; member of the Greater Tampa Chamber of thing, anytime and anywhere. Commerce. •Dr. Leonard Wong, associate research professor of military strategy (human and organizational dimensions), Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Major General Geoffrey C. Army War College. Lambert is commanding gen- eral of the JFK Special War- fare Center and School. He previously commanded the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, which provided SF units for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and Colombia in the global war on terror- ism. He has been an Infantry and Special Forces officer for more than 30 years, and he has held the additional specialties of for- eign area officer and Civil Affairs.
Notes: 1 Participants were: •Dr. Patrick Geary, professor of medieval history, Uni- versity of California-Los Angeles. • Robert D. Kaplan, contributing author, Atlantic Month- ly; author of Balkan Ghosts, Warrior Politics: The Ends of the Earth and The Coming Anarchy. •William H. Lyerly Jr., director of the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and Incident Man- agement for the Department of Homeland Security’s Under Secretary for Science and Technology. •Dr. Gordon McCormick, chairman of the Department of Defense Analysis; director of the special-operations degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.. • Marc Prensky, founder, president and chief creative
May 2004 27 The 18X Program : Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forces
by Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Breasseale
How much better our unit will be if we of the three 18X Soldiers who have come into ever learn that length of service and our battalion during the past year, and on my experience are no test whatsoever of limited exposure to some of the 18X candi- the capacity to lead; and that charac- dates undergoing training during SF assess- ter fortified by knowledge is the only ment and selection, I believe the 18X pro- charm which attracts unequivocal gram is selecting the right Soldiers. The 18Xs success. assigned to our battalion are some of the — Major General Eldon Bargewell finest operators with whom I’ve ever had the privilege of serving. The truth is, business as usual will not Twenty-five years ago, the Army made an provide the capabilities we need to deal attempt to recruit SF Soldiers “off the street,” with the transnational and asymmet- and the experiment caused controversy and ric opponents of tomorrow. A rapidly negative perceptions that persist today. The changing world deals ruthlessly with 18Xs of 2004 are better Soldiers: They are organizations that do not change. … more mature, their average GT score is 121 We must constantly reshape ourselves and 50 percent have attended college. to remain relevant and useful members The U.S. Army Recruiting Command of the joint team. … As new threats began recruiting 18X Soldiers in January arise we must decide which of our cur- 2001. Training for 18X Soldiers lasts for two rent capabilities to retain or modify, years. A Soldier enlists in the Army as an which new ones to develop, and which 18X and attends Infantry one-station unit old ones to discard.” training and airborne training at Fort Ben- ning, Ga. He then makes a permanent- — General Peter J. Schoomaker change-of-station move to Fort Bragg, N.C., to attend Special Forces Assessment and ecently a senior leader in the United Selection. If he is selected for SF, he attends States Army Special Forces Command the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, as an asked my opinion of the Special Forces R SF weapons sergeant or SF engineer Initial Accessions Program, known as the sergeant. Following the SFQC, he will 18X program. This article is an expression of attend language training and the Survival, that opinion. As the command sergeant Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course major of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, my before being promoted to sergeant. Approxi- views and opinions are narrow in scope, and mately 150 18Xs are expected to arrive in it is difficult for me to comment on the entire SF groups during FY 2004, and eventually, SF career field. But based on my knowledge SF detachments will average receiving a
28 Special Warfare new 18X every eight to 12 months. own history. I joined the Army in 1980 The quality of the 18X recruits is impres- because of the Iran hostage crisis; I felt sive, and so far, the 18Xs have exceeded all that it was my chance to serve the nation expectations. The success of the 18X program and to make a difference. The hostages to this point could be due to many factors, but were released before I got my chance to four factors are most critical: the maturity of participate in their rescue, but I continued the operators, the 18Xs’ patriotism, the 18Xs’ to serve in the U.S. Army for the last 24 commitment to the global war on terrorism, years. and the Army’s decision to pursue the best Today, I see Soldiers, particularly 18Xs, interests of the SF force. coming to SF to join in the fight against terror. Timing is everything. Many heroes Maturity came to light only because of an exception- It is primarily the maturity of the 18X al need, higher than any personal agenda, that puts him a step above his predeces- when our nation is at war. When I talk sors from the late 1970s. The 18Xs in the with 18Xs, the global war on terrorism is a 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, are, on aver- common theme of conversation. Patriotism age, 26 years old. They are not teenage is not lost on these young men — they are recruits experiencing life away from home neither cynical nor for the first time. They have sown a few embarrassed about wild oats and have made a conscious deci- their pride in their sion to better themselves and to serve a country. This is higher calling than they found in the civil- something that can- ian world. not be taught in a The 18X is also being assessed, selected class. Every time I and trained by a more capable force that is have conducted my drawing on experiences from Grenada, El CSM interview with Salvador, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, incoming 18Xs, they the Balkan Theatre and current operations have made it clear in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 18X’s SF to me that they training is complemented by his previous were successful in Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt civilian education and life experience. Two civilian life and did not need to enter the An 18X candidate per- of the three 18Xs in our battalion hold Army in order to make ends meet. They forms a road march. The undergraduate degrees in political science. came into SF because of a desire to be part quality of recruits for the 18X program to this point The dedication and commitment they of a very special and unique family of high- has been impressive. demonstrated in earning a college degree ly trained men who want to serve their is being applied to their new occupation as nation. I find that to be the truest definition an SF Soldier. Being an SF Soldier requires of patriotism. cunning, an ability to operate alone or in small groups with little or no supervision, Commitment and the highest levels of integrity and hon- But it is the 18Xs’ commitment to be the esty. SF Soldiers must do what is right best from the very beginning that sets when no one is watching. Combine all of them apart from the average Soldier. The these attributes and you have a person majority of new 18-series personnel come who has made a career decision, not a first- from the ranks of officers and NCOs who time enlistee who is seeking college bene- have spent three or more years learning fits or a paycheck. and understanding what it takes to be a Soldier. They are men who have made a Patriotism decision to stay in the Army beyond their The maturity of our 18X Soldiers is initial enlistment, and they realize what backed by their desire to serve the nation their commitment to the Army and their as patriotic warriors. Part of my positive careers will involve. perception of the 18Xs may come from my The 18X shows up with a commitment and
May 2004 29 dedication that speaks for itself. For example, is not so much a “fix” for the current one of our battalion’s 18Xs was the distin- recruitment shortage as it is a means of guished honor graduate of his SF engineer- ensuring the health of SF in the future. sergeant course, another made the comman- dant’s list for the SF engineer-sergeant Continuity course and has passed the Pre-Scuba Course, The 18X program will provide not only and another has already graduated from the more SF Soldiers but also more long-term Combat Diver Qualification Course and 7th continuity in the force. SF NCOs today are Group’s Special Forces Advanced Urban fortunate if they can serve four continuous Combat Course, Level III. years on an A-detachment before they must move to an assignment at the Special War- Best interests of the force fare Center and School or to positions within Despite the obvious quality of the 18Xs the U.S. Army Special Forces Command or in our battalion, at this point we might ask the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. the question, What is the big picture — is An 18X could easily serve multiple SF- the 18X program good for the future of the detachment tours of four years or more, as SF community? well as additional nontactical assignments, In order to remain relevant, SF must prior to being considered for promotion to grow and develop. That will demand a sig- master sergeant. Ironically, at a time when nificant increase in the personnel invento- SF skills are highly sought-after, a large pro- ry of Career Management Field 18 as we portion of our SF NCOs are reaching retire- build over the next few years to meet the ment eligibility. The 18X program, bringing requirements of the Enhanced Special an infusion of quality SF Soldiers who have Forces Group. In May 2003, during the U.S. the potential of serving nearly 20 years in the Army Special Operations Command’s Pre- community, is a critical force-management Command Course, the commander of the tool. The bottom line is that without the 18X 1st Special Warfare Training Group gave a program, SF will be extremely hard-pressed presentation on 18X recruitment. He to maintain its current manning levels, not to explained that even if current in-service SF mention actually growing as a force. recruiting reaches its goals, there will be a The 18X program will large gap — about 1/3 of the total force — Mentorship provide not only more SF between the manpower requirement and While 18X recruitment has been a Soldiers but also long- the actual manpower level. The 18X pro- resounding success, the true success of the term continuity for the gram is intended to help fill that gap, but it 18X program will be determined only in force. years to come. We, the current generation of leadership in SF tactical units, not the recruiting system or the training pipeline, will determine the ultimate success or fail- ure of the 18X program. When the new 18X shows up in his bat- talion, it is extremely important that he be put on a strong team that has an excellent team sergeant. The significance of the ini- tial team assignment cannot be stressed enough. We all learn positives and negatives from our leaders, and as we get more senior in rank, our ability to discriminate the good from the bad increases. But a young opera- tor coming to his first team will get a look at SF, and the Army, for the first time. His eyes will be wide open, and he will take good and bad influences indiscriminately. The Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt
30 Special Warfare impressions he receives will last his entire an even greater problem than the stability career, which could be either a long and of NCOs on SF teams. With a program for rewarding experience or a short and nega- SF lieutenants, we could have future com- tive one, depending upon whether he has a pany commanders with more than four superior team sergeant for a role model. years of detachment time and a much If the 18X program has an inherent broader understanding of special opera- weakness, it is that the new 18X Soldier tions — from team to SF-group activities. has served all his Army time in a school Maintaining a core of experience while con- environment, without experiencing the tinuing to stabilize the NCOs and officers daily drill and discipline of a regular Army is what will make SF a viable fighting force unit. His frame of reference doesn’t encom- in the future. Bringing back the SF lieu- pass the huge disparity between the free- tenant to complement the 18X program dom and autonomy granted to the SF NCO would take SF into the next two decades, and the strict control prevalent in conven- ready to fight for our nation in the global tional units. An 18X put under the mentor- war on terrorism. ship of a mediocre senior NCO might never In closing, I reaffirm my belief that the 18X learn to appreciate what “right” looks like. program is successful. Current selection, This “1/3 of the force” contains many of assessment and training of the 18X appears tomorrow’s team sergeants, and the 18Xs’ to be hitting the mark. To remain relevant, first two years on an SF team will be criti- SF will need not only to constantly review cal in their development. and modify the 18X program but also to con- sider other programs, such as the SF lieu- Suggested program tenant program, in order to meet the chal- As a final observation, I believe the lenges of the global war on terrorism and the demonstrated success of the 18X program unforeseen threats of tomorrow. for the NCO corps could lead to related programs for the officer corps. While the quality of the SF warrant-officer program Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Bre- is high, recruiting successful WO candi- asseale is the command sergeant major for dates is difficult, and it may never be suc- the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. During 24 cessful at keeping SF detachments fully years of Army service, he has served in a num- manned with WOs. We have many SF ber of special-operations leadership assign- NCOs who choose not to “go warrant” ments, including senior enlisted adviser and because of their current job satisfaction company sergeant major to the European and their love of the NCO corps. combatant commander’s in-extremis force, If the 18X program succeeds, then why Company C, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, not have a similar program for officers, Stuttgart, Germany; training and exercises recruiting second lieutenants to supple- NCO, Joint Special Operations Command; ment and complement the SF warrant offi- and Ranger team and squad leader, 2nd Bat- cers? The new SF lieutenants would not talion, 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Wash. Com- only help relieve the WO shortages at the mand Sergeant Major Breasseale served in detachment level but would also sustain combat during Operations Urgent Fury and the force in the future as company execu- Just Cause. He has served in operations other tive officers and staff officers. When the than war in Colombia, Ivory Coast and the first lieutenant made captain and was Balkans Theater. In addition to graduating assigned to be a detachment commander, from the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Acade- he would be an experienced, trained asset my and a number of other military schools, he from the start. holds an associate’s degree and has complet- Today, SF detachment commanders are ed four years of undergraduate study at fortunate if they get 24 months on a team Campbell University, Buies Creek, N.C. before they must move to other assign- ments or to mandatory schooling. This is
May 2004 31 Evaluating Psychological Operations: Planning Measures of Effectiveness
by Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg
n the current military operating environ- evaluation method that relies heavily on in- ment of two major conflicts, Psychological depth, articulated planning of PSYOP efforts. IOperations forces will play a larger and The proposed method will allow PSYOP forces more visible role as combat operations give to effectively assess their activities during — way to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency not following — an operation, so that they can and rebuilding operations. But with more make adjustments that will ensure the suc- visibility will come closer scrutiny, and it will cess of the PSYOP effort. become more important for PSYOP forces to provide analyses of what they have done and PSYOP objectives how effective their actions have been. Planners develop the PSYOP plan using Assessing the effectiveness of a PSYOP several sources of information in the sup- effort is always a difficult task. In the past, ported unit’s operations plan, or OPLAN, or PSYOP forces have measured their effec- operations order, or OPORD. Those sources tiveness by numbers of products dissemi- include the commander’s intent or end-state, nated or by interesting anecdotal occur- tasks to PSYOP units, and verbal guidance rences that do not, with any certainty, indi- from the supported commander. cate the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort. Planning begins with mission analysis and An example of an anecdotal occurrence is, the development of psychological objectives, or “PSYOP was successful because General Ratko POs, that will enable the supported commander Mladic sent a letter of complaint to the IFOR to achieve his desired end-state. POs are the commander about our information activities.” centerpiece of the PSYOP plan: They can be In the case of General Mladic, had PSYOP thought of as what PSYOP will do for the sup- caused a behavioral change? Did its informa- ported commander.A PO is a statement of mea- tion activities influence him to change the sub- surable response that reflects the desired behav- versive behavior of his subordinates? ior or attitudinal change of selected foreign tar- Before we can determine a PSYOP effort’s get audiences, or TAs. effectiveness, we must develop specific mea- POs should be written in a verb-object for- sures that will allow us to collect the necessary mat. The verb describes the type and direction indicators. By identifying those measures of of the desired change. The object is the overall effectiveness during planning instead of fol- behavior or attitude that is to be changed. lowing execution, PSYOP forces will improve Some verbs commonly used in POs are their ability to evaluate the effectiveness of “reduce,” “decrease,” “prevent,” “increase,” their efforts. A complete and coherent PSYOP “gain” and “maintain.” Verbs that are not mea- plan is thus essential to an evaluation of surable, such as “inform,” “publicize,” “dis- PSYOP effectiveness. This article proposes an
32 Special Warfare suade,” “encourage” or “facilitate,” should not PSYOP will do to influence the TA in order be used in POs. For example, a specified task to achieve the POs. They are the specific from the commander’s intent of the OPORD behavioral or attitudinal responses desired could be, “Create a safe and secure environ- from the TA as a result of PSYOP. ment for the people of Pineland.” This is not a All SPOs must assist in accomplishing statement of measurable response that the POs. SPOs are specific to each PO, and reflects a desired behavior or attitudinal each PO should have two or more SPOs. If change. Restated as “Decrease violence in the planners cannot develop at least two SPOs, area of operation,” it would describe a behav- then the PO is probably too narrow in focus ior or change of attitude that could be mea- and should be rewritten. sured, and it could be used as a PO.1 Other SPOs should be written in a noun-verb- examples of valid POs are: object format, and the noun should always • Increase participation in national demo- be “TA.” Specific TAs are not written into cratic institutions. the SPOs because often several TAs can be • Decrease effectiveness of insurgents or targeted to accomplish the desired behavior opposition force. • Decrease casualties caused by mines and unexploded ordnance. The PSYOP planner must develop POs PO: Reduce effectiveness of insurgent activity that will cover all aspects of the operation, in the AO. from the entry of U.S. forces (whether the entry is permissive or nonpermissive) to the SPO 1: TA ceases insurgent activity. transition back to host-nation authorities. SPO 2: TA decreases support for insurgent activity. Depending on the size of the operation, plan- SPO 3: TA provides information about insurgent ners may develop from four to 10 POs. activity. Although POs are developed at the highest level of PSYOP support, they do not change Figure 1. Example of PO and SPO Linkage when subordinate units develop their own plan. Soldiers assigned to the PSYOP task force, or POTF, and Soldiers assigned to tacti- or attitudinal change. The verb-object com- cal PSYOP teams, or TPTs, use the same POs. bination describes the desired behavior or For example, the POTF may develop the PO, attitudinal change.2 Figure 1 is an example “Decrease combat effectiveness of enemy of the linkage between the PO and its SPOs forces.” At the beginning of the operation, and the proper format for stating POs and PSYOP forces might develop, design and pro- SPOs. The SPOs shown support the PO of duce a radio broadcast disseminated by Com- reducing the effectiveness of insurgent mando Solo aircraft that would advise enemy activity. SPOs that could be used for other soldiers not to activate their air-defense- types of operations include: artillery equipment. The broadcast would sup- •TA voluntarily eradicates coca crop. port the PO at the operational level. Two •TA decreases number of acts of intereth- weeks later, after ground forces had entered nic violence. the area of operations, a TPT might broadcast •TA reports the locations of mines and a loudspeaker message that would instruct unexploded ordnance. enemy soldiers how to surrender. The loud- •TA registers to vote. speaker message would support the PO at the tactical level. Even though the PSYOP forces Target audiences would implement the PO in different ways, After they develop POs and SPOs, plan- the objective would remain constant. ners begin identifying potential TAs — the audiences who have the ability to accom- Supporting PSYOP objectives plish the SPOs. Planners then group poten- Planners next develop supporting tial TAs under the appropriate SPOs. The PSYOP objectives, or SPOs. SPOs are what initial potential target-audience list, or
May 2004 33 PO A PO B
SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 3
TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 3 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2
PO C PO D
SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 3 SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 7
TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 3
Figure 2. Example initial portion of a PSYOP Plan
PTAL, will be broad, as the planner rarely products and actions) has on TAs. PSYOP has time to perform exhaustive research on MOEs change with the mission, and they TAs. The PTAL will be refined several encompass a range of factors that are fun- times during the PSYOP process.3 damental to the overall effect of PSYOP. Figure 2 shows what the PSYOP plan Simply put, MOEs are questions to be would look like at this point. The number answered at set points during the operation. of POs, SPOs and TAs needed for a PSYOP For example, for one of the SPOs used in Fig- plan will be determined by the size of the ure 1, “TA decreases support for insurgent operation and the culture or cultures with- activity,” MOEs for a hypothetical operation in which the operation takes place. could be, “How much money does the Nation- The concepts of POs, SPOs and PTALs al Liberation Front give to the Slobovia dis- are not new to PSYOP planners. In fact, to gruntled slave traders?” or “How many this point our example of the planning proc- recruits (male, ages 15-18) from Garbone ess has been grounded in PSYOP doctrine. joined the Slobovia disgruntled slave traders But PSYOP doctrine does not specify any this month?” Neither of these MOEs alone evaluation structure that can be established would determine whether the SPO was being during planning. We will now explore the achieved. They would be, however, verifiable idea that POs, SPOs and PTALs, rather occurrences that could be measured. than being the final steps of planning, are The key to effective evaluation is focus- the basis of further steps. Those further ing the data collection on factors that will steps are essential in building a structure indicate the extent to which POs are being for determining the extent to which PSYOP met. MOEs must be developed during the forces are achieving their objectives. planning process to ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as the Measures of effectiveness assets for intelligence, reconnaissance and PSYOP doctrine states that measures of surveillance, or ISR, can be tasked to assist effectiveness, or MOEs, provide a system- in collecting the answers to MOEs for eval- atic means of assessing and reporting the uation by PSYOP forces. If other Army or effect that a PSYOP program (PSYOP joint assets can answer some of the MOEs, it lessens the intelligence-collection burden
34 Special Warfare on the PSYOP force. Furthermore, when effectiveness of the PSYOP program. For MOEs are written as part of the initial example, under the SPO, “TA decreases sup- PSYOP plan, PSYOP units will know what port for insurgent activity” and the MOE to look for as they conduct their missions. “How many recruits (male, ages 15-18) from Given the inherent difficulties and com- Garbone joined the Slobovia disgruntled plexity of determining cause-and-effect rela- slave traders this month?,” the impact indi- tionships regarding human behavior, it may cators might be 12 recruits on Feb. 1 and nine take weeks or longer to evaluate the effec- recruits on March 1. An impact indicator may tiveness of PSYOP.4 MOEs enable the also be a spontaneous, unpredictable event PSYOP force to assess an operation as it that can be linked directly or indirectly to the progresses and make adjustments to ensure PSYOP effort. Spontaneous indicators that POs and SPOs are being addressed, include events, such as bombings or riots, rather than waiting until the end of an oper- that do not occur over time, but which may ation to determine the degree to which the serve as signs of a PSYOP program’s impact. PSYOP plan succeeded. MOEs need to be assessed more than Analysis once. Initial answers to the MOE questions A series of PSYOP products and actions give PSYOP forces the baseline data, and are disseminated to a TA in an attempt to subsequent assessments help determine modify the TA’s behavior. PSYOP units or whether the SPO is being achieved. Figure intelligence-collection assets then obtain 3 shows what the PSYOP plan would look impact indicators, which they analyze in like once MOEs have been developed. relation to the products disseminated and the TA’s actions to see if there is a correla- Impact indicators tion between the PSYOP program and the Impact indicators are particular events or TA’s behavior. That analysis will allow the facts that can be known at a particular time. PSYOP commander to determine the extent Collectively, they provide an indication of the to which he has achieved his objectives and
PO A
SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 3
TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2
MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3
PO B
SPO 1 SPO 2 SPO 3
TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2 TA 1 TA 2
MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3
Figure 3. PSYOP plan with MOE determined
May 2004 35 PO A – Reduce effectiveness of insurgent activity
SPO 1 – TA decreases support for insurgents
TA 1 – Garbone men TA 2 – National Liberation TA 3 – Politically active Garbone age 15-18 Front Members females age 18-35
MOE 1 – How many MOE 1 – How much MOE 2 – Number of MOE 1 – How many MOE 2 – What is the MOE 2 – What is the Garbone recruits have money has the NLF meetings between Alar females attended the weekly circulation of weekly circulation of been attained this given to the insurgents Sablah and Halah Islat weekly Garbone tribal insurgent newspaper? insurgent newspaper? month? this month? this month? council this week?
12 4000 Copies 4000 Copies $3750 3 17 12 4000 Copies 4000 Copies 1 Feb 02 1 Feb 02 22 Feb 02 1 Feb 02 1 Feb 02 1 Feb 02 22 Feb 02 1 Feb 02 22 Feb 02
9 4000 Copies 4000 Copies $2775 2 14 10 4000 Copies 4000 Copies 1 Mar 02 8 Feb 02 1 Mar 02 1 Mar 02 1 Mar 02 8 Feb 02 1 Mar 02 8 Feb 02 1 Mar 02
7 4000 Copies 0 Copies $6000 1 15 9 4000 Copies 0 Copies 1 Apr 02 15 Feb 02 8 Mar 02 1 Apr 02 1 Apr 02 15 Feb 02 8 Mar 02 15 Feb 02 8 Mar 02
Insurgency print Anti-insurgent Bomb exploded under Local radio station facility burnt rally 400 people empty PSYOP vehicle attacked – 3 killed
Impact Indicators (Answer to MOE) Analysis (In terms of Answers to what degree what has been done PSYOP has achieved or not by PSYOP forces) achieved its objectives Impact Indicators (Spontaneous Events)
LEGEND PSYOP Objective (PO) Target Audience (TA) Impact Indicators (Answer to MOE) Supporting PSYOP Objective (SPO) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Impact Indicators (Spontaneous Events) Figure 4. Example structure for evaluating PSYOP
to identify any necessary adjustments. Fig- be the baseline data, and PSYOP forces will ure 4 shows a PSYOP plan that uses mea- implement their plan to decrease support sures of effectiveness and includes sponta- from the baseline levels. In the example, the neous impact indicators. MOEs have been assessed at weekly and PSYOP units can assess the impact of monthly intervals so that PSYOP forces can their programs only after they have analyzed monitor behavioral changes over time. multiple impact indicators that have been Within TA 1, the number of recruits recorded over a specified period of time. Such declined during the two months follow- a collective analysis will indicate to the ing Feb. 1. Circulation of the insurgent PSYOP commander or to the supported com- newspaper ceased after March 1 (this is mander the degree to which the SPOs, and explained by the spontaneous event of ultimately the POs, are being achieved. the burning of the print facility). In the fictional operation shown in Figure Assessing these impact indicators 4, PSYOP planners have determined that against the PSYOP products dissemi- they must focus on three TAs for the accom- nated may show the positive effect plishment of SPO 1, “TA decreases support PSYOP is having on this TA. for insurgents.” They have developed two The first MOE for TA 2 concerned NLF MOEs for each TA that, once answered, will financial support to the insurgents. The give insight into whether or not there has amount decreased as of March 1, but it been any behavioral change. The MOEs increased dramatically the following month. were initially addressed on Feb. 1. The The increase may reflect money collected to impact indicators for Feb. 1 are considered to help finance the repair of the burned printing
36 Special Warfare facility. Further indicators may show the insurgents. Analysis also indicates that increase as a spike in support, or perhaps as PSYOP may need to focus further effort part of a greater financial commitment. toward reducing the financial support that The impact indicators for the second the NLF is giving to the insurgents. MOE show that there has been diminished This hypothetical example does not include contact between the leader of the NLF and the complete breadth of factors that would be the leader of the insurgents. The PSYOP taken into account during an actual operation; series aimed at dividing these two individ- however, it does give an insight into what uals may be working; however, in an actu- must be done by PSYOP forces so that they al operation, additional MOEs would need can successfully evaluate their efforts. to be developed — perhaps an MOE to determine the number of phone conversa- Conclusion tions, letters and e-mails between them. To be truly effective, PSYOP planners PSYOP may want to concentrate on TA 2’s must articulate clear objectives and identi- financial support of the NLF and continue fy potential target audiences that can ful- to monitor it to see if the April 1 figures fill those stated objectives by exhibiting were indeed a spike or if the NLF is com- the desired behavioral change. Planners mitting greater resources to the insurgent should also develop MOEs that will help to cause. If so, PSYOP in future months may identify the impact indicators that will aid need to concentrate more heavily on the PSYOP forces in measuring their progress NLF/insurgent relationship. and identifying necessary adjustments. In Politically active females compose TA 3, order for PSYOP forces to effectively assess and the impact indicators demonstrate a the impact of their actions, it is imperative continuous decrease in their meeting atten- that the MOEs be established during plan- dance. Indicators also show that the fire in ning and not after the operation has ended. the print facility eliminated newspaper cir- Better integration of MOE development culation. Although the correlation between into the PSYOP planning process will cue the unanticipated elimination of the news- ISR assets to collect the necessary intelli- paper and meeting attendance by females is gence. It will also allow PSYOP personnel anecdotal, it provides evidence that the to better communicate to supported com- PSYOP series discouraging female partici- manders the importance of the early inte- pation in public meetings may be working. gration of PSYOP into the operational- When we evaluate the impact indicators planning process. collected for the six MOEs under SPO 1, five of the MOEs indicate that support for insur- gent activities is decreasing. One area — Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg is a financial support — may actually be doctrine writer assigned to the Psychological increasing, although that may be explained Operations Training and Doctrine Division, by an attempt to overcome the spontaneous Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK event of the burning of the print facility.The Special Warfare Center and School. PSYOP analyst must also factor in the anti- insurgent rally, which supports the SPO. Notes: The bombing of the PSYOP vehicle must be 1 A further discussion of PSYOP objectives can be evaluated to see if it is connected with found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. insurgents trying to decrease the PSYOP 2 A further discussion of supporting PSYOP objec- forces’ ability to reduce support for insur- tives can be found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301. gents. The radio station was attacked after 3 A complete discussion of target-audience analysis it agreed to increase the amount of PSYOP can be found in Chapter 5 of FM 3-05.301. air time. Taking all these impact indicators 4 This is the definition, with a few minor changes for clarity, given in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301. and assessing them against the PSYOP 5 The examples used in this graphic and throughout products and actions allows PSYOP forces the article are fictitious. to conclude that they have succeeded during three months in reducing support for the
May 2004 37 Analysis of Operation Gothic Serpent: TF Ranger in Somalia
by Major Marshall V. Ecklund
n Oct. 3, 1993, the United studies and books have assessed U.N. Security Council passed U.N. States Task Force Ranger the U.S. intervention into Somalia. Resolution 837, which called for Oexecuted a raid into General While there has been an abun- the apprehension of those responsi- Mohamad Farah Aidid’s stronghold dance of lessons learned from TF ble for the ambush. near the Olympic Hotel in Ranger, the lessons have focused Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Mogadishu, Somalia, seeking to primarily on tactical-level leader- Jonathan Howe, the U.N. Special capture two of Aidid’s key lieu- ship, small-unit tactics and indi- Representative to the Secretary tenants.1 Although the task force vidual Soldier skills. Little has General in Somalia, pressed the captured 24 Aidid supporters, been written on the mission as a Clinton administration to deploy a Somali clansmen shot down two strategic employment of special- special-operations task force MH-60L Black Hawk helicopters operations forces, or SOF. specifically trained and equipped using rocket-propelled grenades, or This article will examine the for the task of apprehension and RPGs. actions of TF Ranger within a the- capable of responding if any U.N. With the downing of the first ory of special operations in the workers were taken hostage by MH-60L, TF Ranger’s mission hope that it will assist other spe- Aidid’s clan.4 Partially in response changed from capturing Aidid’s cial-operations Soldiers in plan- to Howe’s persistence, the adminis- supporters to safeguarding and ning and executing direct-action tration finally approved the recovering American casualties. operations. deployment, but only after four From a tactical perspective,2 the U.S. Marines had been killed and actions of TF Ranger members to Background seven others wounded on Aug. 21, defend the position of the downed The 1993 decision of the United 1993, in two separate incidents Black Hawks and to retrieve the Nations to intervene in the clash involving remote-controlled land dead and wounded demonstrated between warring factions in Soma- mines. their superb training, courage, ini- lia was unique — it was the first The U.S. Special Operations tiative, individual Soldier skills time the U.N. had intervened in a Command, or USSOCOM, made and dedication to one another. nation where it was not only unin- numerous objections concerning Several articles, research papers, vited but also warned by the antag- the appropriateness of the mission onists not to intercede. On June 5, through Chairman of the Joint 1993, an ambush by one of the Chiefs of Staff General Colin Pow- Opinions expressed in this article antagonists, Somali warlord ell. The objections appeared to fall are those of the author and do not rep- Mohamad Aidid, killed 24 Pak- on deaf ears, and the task force, resent the viewpoints of the JFK Spe- istani soldiers who were part of named Task Force Ranger, depart- cial Warfare Center and School, the U.N. Operations Somalia II, or ed for Somalia on Aug. 24. U.S. Army Special Operations Com- UNOSOM II.3 In response, the TF Ranger, under the command mand or the U.S. Army. — Editor of Major General William Garri-
38 Special Warfare launch of a direct action force … US Forces UN Forces from pre-launch to launched in 25 8 Commander Force CDR minutes or less,” and getting away USCENTCOM UNOSOM II from the target as quickly as possi- ble. TF Ranger was “normally on the target for just a matter of min- utes before they began exfiltra- Commander Commander Deputy Force CDR tion,”9 which did not allow the TF Ranger USFORSOM UNOSOM II Somalis time to react to the assault force in a cohesive manner. During the Oct. 3 mission, however, a Task Force Quick Reaction Other US Other UN series of unanticipated events Ranger Force Forces – Somalia Forces – Somalia caused the assault force to spend too much time on the target. Coordination Line (Liaison) MG Thomas M. Montgomery, USA McRaven’s theory Figure 1. UN/U.S. force structure and In Spec Ops: Case Studies in Spe- relationships with TF Ranger cial Operations Warfare: Theory and From After Action Report for Task Force Ranger Operations in Support of UNOSOM II; Practice,William H. McRaven ana- 22 August-25 October 1993 (U), Tab A to Enclosure 1, 1-A-1. lyzes eight special operations: six direct-action operations performed son, was a battalion-sized, self-con- targets … only if intelligence indi- by various countries during World tained joint force consisting of 440 cates that Aidid or any of his lieu- War II; the 1970 U.S. raid on the personnel5 who represented each of tenants are present and likely to be Son Tay prisoner-of-war camp in USSOCOM’s components, with captured as a result of the opera- North Vietnam; and the 1976 Israeli selective augmentation from con- tion.” The commander’s intent stat- rescue of skyjacked hostages in ventional forces. TF Ranger’s chain ed, “rehearsals are mandatory and Entebbe, Uganda. of command was separate from include infiltration, isolation of the McRaven’s analyses of the opera- that of the other U.S. forces in objective area, and exfiltration” tions are based on his refined defi- UNOSOM II (see Figure 1). Garri- and that, based on recent activi- nition of a special operation: “A spe- son reported directly to General ties, “it is reasonable for Aidid to cial operation is conducted by forces Joseph P. Hoar, the commander of expect this type of operation will be specially trained, equipped, and U.S. Central Command, or conducted by U.S. forces,” there- supported for a specific target USCENTCOM, without going fore, “special preparations must be whose destruction, elimination, or through U.N. channels, but he made to ensure operational securi- rescue (in the case of hostages), is a maintained a close working rela- ty and force protection.”7 political or military imperative.” tionship with the commander of USSOCOM defined mission suc- McRaven, now a Navy SEAL admi- U.S. forces supporting UNOSOM cess as the capture of Aidid or des- ral, describes the military and polit- II, or USFORSOM,6 Major General ignated personnel, and it made the ical background of each operation, Thomas Montgomery. assumption that Aidid would prob- reconstructs the operation itself, TF Ranger’s mission was to “ini- ably remain underground in and analyzes the operation in terms tiate military operations in Soma- Mogadishu, using his lieutenants of six principles. lia to capture General Aidid, to to direct continued attacks on U.S. According to McRaven, “Six prin- include the capture of his principal and U.N. forces, and employ more ciples of special operations ... sim- lieutenants and targeting of his lethal weapons in ever-increasing plicity, security, repetition, sur- Tier I infrastructure.” Hoar direct- numbers. prise, speed and purpose … domi- ed, “operations should retain [the] The Oct. 3 raid was the seventh nate every successful mission.” He primary objective of capturing assault the task force had conduct- further asserts, “Gaining relative Aidid, with the secondary objective ed since its arrival in Mogadishu. superiority requires proper inte- of capturing blacklist personnel.” TF Ranger’s operations were gration of all six principles … [and] He authorized the task force to founded on speed, surprise and vio- the practitioner of special opera- neutralize Aidid’s critical com- lence of action. Success was tions must take account of the mand-and-control nodes and “other dependent on “react[ing] with a
May 2004 39 All Forces Inserted GRF L/U at TGT Mission Complete – Main Force TF Begins Raid House at 1604 hrs arrives Stadium at 0630 hrs (RS Achieved) Super 61 downed by RPG at 1620 hrs Exfil begins (“Mogadishu Mile”) at 0542 hrs
Super 64 downed by QRF/GRF departs site #2 at 0330 hrs LEGEND RPG at 1641 hrs APC armored personnel QRF/GRF arrive site #2 at 0227 hrs carrier Area of Vulnerability Last body recovered QRF quick reaction force by QRF/GRF at site #1 QRF/GRF arrive site #1 at 0530 hrs GRF ground reaction force at 0155 hrs Probability Relative L/U link up of Mission Superiority Completion Line TGT target (Y-axis) QRF arrives at 1710 hrs QRF/GRF move to port (RS Line) area for L/U with RS relative superiority GRF returns to AF tanks/APCs at 2130 hrs RPG rocket-propelled at 1740 hrs QRF/GRF launch grenade QRF/GRF plan rescue at 2323 hrs complete at 1835 hrs AF airfield
Helos begin insertion at 1542 hrs 3 OCT 1993 4 OCT 1993
Point of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Vulnerability (PV) Helos launch at 1532 hrs Time in Hours (X-axis)
Figure 2. Author’s relative superiority graph for TF Ranger’s raid on 3-4 October 1993 principles in the three phases of an likely the outcome will be affected The graph also “provides a visu- operation: planning, preparation, by the will of the enemy, chance, and al demonstration of the three prop- and execution.” uncertainty, the factors that com- erties of relative superiority: the McRaven defines relative superi- prise the frictions of war.”11 pivotal moment can be seen as a ority as “a condition that exists McRaven uses graphs to show dramatic rise in the probability of when an attacking force, generally how and when each of the eight mission completion; sustaining rel- smaller, gains a decisive advantage special-operations forces he dis- ative superiority is a gradual rise over a larger or well-defended cusses achieved relative superiori- from the pivotal moment to mis- enemy.” He asserts there are three ty. The author’s graph (Figure 2) sion completion; and a decisive basic properties of relative superi- shows how TF Ranger lost and drop in the probability of mission ority. First, “Relative superiority is finally regained relative superiori- completion shows a loss of relative achieved at the pivotal moment in ty. According to McRaven, the superiority.”12 an engagement when a decisive intersection of the X-axis (time) McRaven’s six principles of spe- advantage is achieved, usually and the Y-axis (probability of mis- cial operations are interdependent. within five minutes of the initial sion completion) is the point of vul- When depicted in a graphic model engagement.” Second, “Once rela- nerability, or PV, which he defines (see Figure 3), McRaven’s theory tive superiority is achieved, it must as the point in a mission when the represents his idea that “Special be sustained in order to guarantee attacking force reaches the operations forces succeed, in spite victory.” Finally, “If relative superi- enemy’s first line of defenses. The of their numerical inferiority, when ority is lost, it is difficult to area of vulnerability is a function they are able to gain relative supe- regain.”10 of the time required for mission riority through the use of a simple The key to successful special- completion. The longer it takes to plan, carefully concealed, repeated- operations missions is to gain rela- gain relative superiority, the larger ly and realistically rehearsed, and tive superiority early in the engage- the area of vulnerability and the executed with surprise, speed and ment, because, “The longer an greater the impact of the frictions purpose.” engagement continues, the more of war. Although McRaven’s definition
40 Special Warfare of a special operation has not been erwise compromise surprise and/or that (1) he needed to be careful in widely accepted within the Depart- complicate the rapid execution of populated areas, and (2) in certain ment of Defense, his theory of spe- the mission.” “Innovation is nor- circumstances not to go near the cial operations seems extremely mally manifested in new technolo- Bakara market … We did not have well-suited to an evaluation of TF gy, but it is also the application of good intelligence about that part of Ranger’s mission. unconventional tactics … Either the city. We didn’t have any pres- new technology or innovative tac- ence there or good HUMINT.”17 Simplicity tics [must] assist the assault ele- The most robust and critical por- Of the six principles, McRaven ment in reaching the objective and tion of TF Ranger’s technical sys- says, “simplicity is the most cru- then quickly and effectively elimi- tems was its information infra- cial, and yet sometimes the most nating the enemy.”13 structure (intelligence system). difficult, principle with which to From the onset of TF Ranger’s While TF Ranger’s operations comply.” He lists three elements of planning, two elements were depended heavily upon the greatly simplicity critical to success: a lim- essential to success: timely, accu- deficient HUMINT system in ited number of objectives, good rate and reliable intelligence, and Somalia, its other systems were intelligence and innovation. He the ability to respond quickly to extremely effective, accurate and believes, “Limiting the objectives to whatever mission scenario devel- timely. TF Ranger had a marked only what is essential focuses the oped. The initial focus of all of TF advantage in technical intelligence training, limits the number of per- Ranger’s intelligence-collection collection, not only over the war- sonnel required, reduces the time and analysis was to locate Aidid.14 ring clans but also over other on target, and decreases the num- Thus, mission success for TF U.N./U.S. forces in Somalia, ber of ‘moving parts.’ ” Ranger was highly dependent upon because of the establishment of an He insists that good intelligence accurate and timely intelligence,15 intelligence fusion cell that provid- “simplifies a plan by reducing the specifically human intelligence, or ed the most capable intelligence unknown factors and the number HUMINT.16 network in the country. Unfortu- of variables that must be consid- General Wayne Downing, the nately for TF Ranger, “high tech- ered.” “Innovation,” he states, “sim- USSOCOM commander, said, “I nology applications [did] not plifies a plan by helping to avoid or kept telling [Garrison] … be always overcome a low- to no-tech- eliminate obstacles that would oth- patient, be careful, eventually you nology environment.”18 will get a shot at Aidid … I told him TF Ranger’s mission was simple
EXECUTION
FRICTIONS OF WARSURPRISE SPEED PURPOSE MORAL FACTORS
SECURITY REPETITION PREPARATION
SIMPLICITY
PLANNING
Figure 3: McRaven’s Special Operations Model (From Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, 11.)
May 2004 41 in terms of the number of its objec- so much the impending mission that without ammunition sufficient for tives. With only one major mission, must be concealed as the timing and, sustained combat operations. TF Ranger had a task architecture to a lesser degree, the means of inser- Aidid’s use of civilians as part of that was relatively straightfor- tion.” Security is important in achiev- the prepared defenses also con- ward, and it varied only slightly ing relative superiority “because it tributed to TF Ranger’s lack of during any of the seven missions prevents the enemy from gaining an speed on the target. In a report to TF Ranger conducted in Somalia. unexpected advantage.”20 the U.N. Security Council on July The task flow began with an A prevailing factor in the success 1, 1993, Howe stated that there operations order, or OPORD, that of special operations is the ability of was “increasing evidence that Gen- delineated responsibilities for all the attacking force to know what eral Aidid deliberately and person- TF Ranger members during the defenses the enemy has prepared. A ally directed the use of women and execution of one of two mission failed security effort could allow the children for attacks on UNOSOM templates. Because the missions enemy to spring a surprise of his II soldiers; and that he directed his were templated, TF Ranger used a own and either pre-empt the attack militia to shoot into the crowd on standing OPORD for the duration or reduce the attackers’ speed on June 13 in order to create casual- of its mission. To change the target, either of which would dra- ties and embarrass … UNOSOM II OPORD, the task force simply matically reduce the possibility of before the assembled world issued a fragmentary order. achieving relative superiority.21 press.”27 Armed with the knowl- As TF Ranger received time-sen- Only eight days prior to TF edge of Aidid’s willingness to put sitive intelligence, it analyzed the Ranger’s raid, Somalis had used his civilians into harm’s way, TF details, applied them to the appro- an RPG to shoot down a UH-60 Ranger could have better prepared priate template, and quickly syn- Black Hawk helicopter from the its Soldiers for the Somalis’ even- chronized the operation. Time per- air component of the 10th Moun- tual use of civilians as human mitting, the task force conducted tain Division Quick Reaction shields. rehearsals of the actions on the Force, or QRF.22 Knowledge of that objective while it conducted final shootdown, coupled with reports Repetition coordination with adjacent units that Somalis had fired at least 12 Discussing the principle of repeti- and obtained approval from higher RPGs at TF Ranger helicopters tion in rehearsals, McRaven specifi- units. Once approval and coordina- during their sixth mission, should cally addresses units with missions tion were completed, the task force have caused TF Ranger to change similar to TF Ranger’s. He states, could launch to accomplish the its method of operations, especial- “in the preparation phase, repeti- raid. The entire “notification-to- ly its means of insertion.23 The tion, like routine, is indispensable in launch” process usually took less failure to learn that lesson con- eliminating the barriers to success.” than an hour.19 tributed to the two helicopter McRaven contends, “certain combat It could be argued that changes shootdowns on Oct. 3.24 units, such as counterterrorist in Somali tactics should have After conducting six similar mis- teams … perform standard mission caused TF Ranger to modify its sions prior to Oct. 3, TF Ranger profiles as a matter of routine. This techniques. Yet TF Ranger failed to had become somewhat overconfi- routine hones those tactical skills to effectively use unconventional tac- dent in its abilities and in the dom- a degree that allows quick reaction tics, innovation and superior tech- inance of its means of infiltration. to a threat, provided that threat fits nical systems to its advantage, and Had TF Ranger’s leadership ade- within the standard scenario for the routine of TF Ranger’s opera- quately assessed the change in which the unit has been practicing.” tions gave an exploitable advan- Somali tactics evidenced by esca- Additionally, he believes, “repetition tage to the Somalis. lating RPG use against heli- hones individual and unit skills, copters,25 they would have realized while full-dress rehearsals unmask Security the increased operational risk to weaknesses in the plan,” and that “The purpose of tight security,” the task force. The failure to appre- “both are essential to success on the McRaven says, “is to prevent the ciate the increased operational risk battlefield.”28 enemy from gaining an advantage and to anticipate contingencies Largely because of personnel through foreknowledge of the im- also caused TF Ranger to launch constraints imposed by higher pending attack.” Because of the without most of their night-vision headquarters, TF Ranger deployed nature of special operations, “it is not devices, without water sufficient to with a smaller force than usual29 last more than two hours,26 and
42 Special Warfare and without support from AC- extraction because the situation advantages of speed, surprise and 130H Spectre gunships — the task had not been considered during technology that it could have forces’ accustomed platform for contingency planning, and time gained by conducting operations close air support, air interdiction was lost accomplishing essential during hours of limited visibility. and armed reconnaissance. Instead coordination and familiarization.32 Given the low altitudes and the of modifying its tactics to account The task force commander evident- relatively low air speeds of TF for the degradation in capabilities, ly never anticipated and “never Ranger’s helicopters operating in TF Ranger operated as though it thought of a contingency plan for the urban environment, the heli- had a complete and battle-proven backups of equipment like tanks copters were much more vulnera- task-force organization. While TF and APCs [armored personnel car- ble than TF Ranger’s plan Ranger generally faced threats riers],”33 all of which were readily assumed. For example, during the that fit into the standard scenario available from coalition forces fifth and sixth assaults conducted for which the unit had rehearsed, under UNOSOM II, and which ulti- by TF Ranger (both made during the task force had not deployed mately proved to be invaluable in daylight hours on Sept. 18 and 21), with all the tools it had used in the extraction of personnel pinned the Somalis had fired increasing rehearsals at Fort Bragg, N.C. down on Oct. 4. Believing in secre- numbers of RPGs at TF Ranger’s Standard mission profiles, conduct- cy and operational security, TF helicopters. The Somalis were ed without the accustomed tools, Ranger kept its distance from the merely waiting for the helicopters are anything but routine. nations comprised by the U.N. to fly closer to their RPG gunners In order to mitigate some of the coalition, to avoid possible leaks to to use their new tactic with devas- shortcomings of equipment and the Somalis. tating results. Overconfidence led intelligence, assault[s] had to be to the downing of the first MH-60L planned and initiated as quickly as Surprise Black Hawk helicopter, Super 61 possible (using pre-rehearsed bat- According to McRaven, “special “Thunderstruck.” Journalist Mark tle drills fine-tuned for the actual operations forces do not generally Bowden wrote that this “cracked situation). TF Ranger minimized have the luxury of attacking the the task force’s sense of righteous mission-planning time in an enemy when or where he is unpre- invulnerability ... [since] they were attempt to ensure operational pared.” SOF must typically attack in the trump card in this God-forsak- security and to maximize speed spite of enemy preparations. There- en place … The Somalis couldn’t and surprise. There was generally fore, in McRaven’s opinion, surprise shoot [Black Hawks] down.”36 no time available to rehearse means simply catching the enemy off In terms of surprise, the raid of actions at the objective prior to balance. “In a special operation, sur- Oct. 3-4 failed to achieve anything launch. prise is gained through deception, the task force desired to do. TF To facilitate rapid planning for timing and taking advantage of the Ranger failed to: (1) delay the any given situation, “two mission enemy’s vulnerabilities.”34 enemy’s reaction or divert the templates were developed,30 one Using its six previous missions enemy’s attention, (2) attack where for strongpoint assault and the as indicators of its dominance in the enemy was weakest (the Bakara other for assault against a moving Mogadishu, TF Ranger become market was Aidid’s strongest loca- convoy.”31 While routine hones tac- overconfident, underestimated tion and his center of gravity), or (3) tical skills to a degree that allows Aidid’s leadership35 and military attack at a time that was most ben- quick reaction to a threat, especial- capabilities, and violated funda- eficial. Other than the unsuccessful ly in counterterrorist units, there mental special-operations princi- signature or “profile flights” used to were too many other “moving ples of deception and timing. It protect actual mission launches, the parts” and “mission specific conducted operations during day- task force did little to deceive the details” that required more thor- light hours and relied on the same Somalis or to delay their reaction to ough rehearsals in order to suffi- operational templates in order to an actual operation.37 ciently increase the probability of achieve rapid planning and execu- success. tion. By conducting daylight oper- Speed The task force’s failure to con- ations, TF Ranger allowed the In a special-operations mission, duct full-dress rehearsals with Somalis to observe its tactics, McRaven says, “any delay will U.N. QRF units that were eventu- techniques and procedures, virtu- expand [the] area of vulnerability ally used to rescue the task force ally eliminating any of the tactical and decrease [the] opportunity to also contributed to problems with
May 2004 43 achieve relative superiority … enough to overcome the shortcom- members to defend the position of [because] in special operations the ings in the other five interdepend- the first downed Black Hawk and to enemy is in a defensive position and ent special-operations principles. retrieve the dead and wounded his only desire is to counter [the] reflected credit on their training, attack.” McRaven’s theory assumes Purpose courage, initiative, individual Soldier that the enemy’s will to resist is a According to McRaven, “purpose skills and dedication to one another. given and that his ability to react is is understanding and then execut- Their actions were automatic and a constant. The enemy’s ability to ing the prime objective of the mis- required no prompting. The loyalty react makes it essential, “to move as sion regardless of emerging obsta- and sacrifice they displayed could be quickly as possible regardless of the cles or opportunities.” He con- characterized only as “knowing no enemy’s reaction.”38 cludes that there are two aspects limitations.” The clearly defined pur- With the most sophisticated to the principle. First, “the pur- pose of TF Ranger’s “new” mission equipment available, and with pose must be clearly defined by ensured that even in the fog of battle, access to virtually every product of the mission statement. … The and no matter what else happened, the national-level intelligence-col- the Soldiers understood their prima- lection architecture, the task force ry objective and would die before fail- was prepared to launch an assault The clearly defined pur- ing to accomplish that mission. If on extremely short notice, usually pose of TF Ranger’s there was any lack of purpose, it was a matter of minutes. That level of clearly above the tactical level.40 readiness required a high level of ‘new’ mission ensured Above the tactical level organization, training and rehears- that even in the fog of al. To ensure tactical surprise, TF The mission of TF Ranger is Ranger depended on a rapid battle, … the Soldiers typically regarded as more a polit- response and on spending the min- ical failure than a military or tac- imum time on target once it con- understood their primary tical one. From the outset, the ducted an assault. Tactical sur- objective and would die mission had only a 50 percent prise was facilitated by the use of chance of success if HUMINT extremely sophisticated assault before failing to accom- operations were working well, and aircraft such as the MH/AH-6 Lit- 20 percent if they were not.41 With tle Birds and the MH-60L, as well plish that mission. If such a low probability of success, as aerial-reconnaissance assets, there was any lack of TF Ranger’s failures seem ulti- such as the P-3C Reef Point and mately attributable to those who OH-58 Kiowa Warrior. purpose, it was clearly placed the task force in such a dis- Because of the urban environment, advantageous situation. land-based or vehicular technology above the tactical level. A noted authority in national- was relatively “low-tech,” consisting of security affairs, Dr. Lucien S. Van- five-ton trucks and both cargo and mission statement should be craft- denbroucke, classifies TF Ranger’s armored HMMWVs. With few excep- ed to ensure that in the heat of mission as a strategic special oper- tions, the robust communications battle, no matter what else hap- ation.42 TF Ranger’s deployment architecture, even when it employed pens, the individual soldier under- was “approved at the highest level as many as five separate radio nets, stands the primary objective.” The of the U.S. government after worked nearly perfectly.The ability to secondly aspect of purpose is per- detailed review,” and it clearly move quickly and stealthily, to shoot sonal commitment to the extent sought “to resolve, through the sud- accurately and effectively, and to com- that “the men must be inspired den, swift, and unconventional municate with relative ease facilitat- with a sense of personal dedica- application of force, major prob- ed decisive operations in a short dura- tion that knows no limitations.”39 lems of U.S. foreign policy.”43 Van- tion of time. After the first of the MH-60Ls was denbroucke further asserts, “stra- Unfortunately for TF Ranger, downed, the mission of TF Ranger tegic special operations are also gaining relative superiority changed from one of capturing high-risk ventures, for they seek to required the proper integration of Aidid’s supporters to one of safe- achieve difficult objectives in a sin- all six principles of special opera- guarding and recovering American gle bid, with deliberately limited tions. The monopoly that TF casualties. The actions of TF Ranger means. Because failure in such Ranger possessed in speed was not
44 Special Warfare operations is typically both highly tegic effectiveness,”47 and that Hoar, who in September 1993 visible and dramatic, the ensuing there is always the potential strate- attempted to force policy-makers to damage to U.S. prestige tends to be gic disutility of special operations clarify their goals in Somalia. Hoar great.”44 as well. forwarded “an updated strategy TF Ranger found itself as the In order to ensure that strategic assessment to Powell because he best choice of bad alternatives. As ends support national strategy, viewed the increase in U.S. mili- Vandenbroucke explains, “In some Gray says, “SOF need an educated tary operations in Mogadishu as an instances strategic special opera- consumer, political and military unjustified expansion in the mis- tions may seem like the only solu- patrons who appreciate what SOF sion. Hoar’s assessment called for a tion to otherwise intractable major should, and should not, be asked to review of the U.N. strategy that foreign-policy problems. … Deci- do,” in order to “offer the prospect would either require the U.N. to sion-makers can become insidious- of favorably disproportionate ‘scale back its objectives’ or require ly attracted to strategic operations, return on military investment.”48 the U.S. to significantly ‘increase its to the point of engaging in wishful TF Ranger’s tactical operations commitment to underwrite this oper- thinking, in which hopes distort were expected to overcome a ation for an indefinite period.’ ”51 perception and wishes are mistak- neglected area of U.S. foreign poli- Hoar never received a response. en for reality.” This is usually cy, but instead they proved to be a Another critical failure was the attributable to the fact that “the strategic disutility. inappropriate use of SOF in an senior decision-makers who evalu- Crucial to the strategic failure in environment in which both U.N. ate and approve these operations Somalia was the uncoordinated, and U.S. policies were uncoordi- often receive poor information and unclear, shifting and inconsistent nated and unclear. As Under Sec- advice.”45 Powell was under great two-track policy of the U.N./U.S. retary of Defense for Policy Frank political pressure to provide a When UNOSOM II assumed F. Wisner stated, “The single most quick military solution to the prob- responsibility for the mission in serious flaw in our policy was that lems in Somalia. He did not convey Somalia, “the goals of the interna- we tried to accomplish political the potential consequences or polit- tional effort … were greatly expand- objectives solely by military ical ramifications of a mission fail- ed to include: forcibly disarming the means.”52 Wisner also stated, “No ure to Defense Secretary Les warring factions; political reconcili- one in the UNOSOM headquar- Aspin. If he had, Aspin might have ation; and nation-building. … This ters was in charge in concluded that the risk of TF U.N. policy, which was supported by Mogadishu,”53 correctly assessing Ranger’s failure outweighed the the Clinton administration, was the fact that operations lacked a benefits to be gained from captur- being implemented at the same “coordinated over-arching theater- ing Aidid and would have looked time that the administration was level strategy that integrated the for other alternatives to resolve the pursuing a second policy track, political, economic (humanitari- foreign-policy crisis in Somalia. which directed U.S. military leaders an), geographic, and military ele- Noted strategic theorist and to reduce the U.S. military presence ments of power in Somalia. defense analyst Dr. Colin S. Gray in Somalia.”49 Political, humanitarian, and mili- advances an explanation similar to Even as the situation continued tary strategies were developed inde- Vandenbroucke’s in his examina- to change for the worse, policies and pendently.There was no senior-level tion of the strategic utility of SOF. strategies were never adapted to fit UN strategy group charged with Gray says special operations must the new environment. This contra- developing a coherent, integrated be conducted in support of foreign diction in policy resulted in reduc- approach to operations in Somalia policy, and that SOF are a “nation- tions in the size of the task force, the that encompassed the entire mis- al grand-strategic asset; they are a deletion of the AC-130 support from sion.”54 Compounding the effects of tool of statecraft that can be the package, the refusal to send this issue is the fact that TF Ranger employed quite surgically in sup- armor support requested by Mont- was not under the operational con- port of diplomacy, of foreign assist- gomery in September 1993,50 and trol of UNOSOM II and would ance (of several kinds), as a vital the lack of adequate personnel and never be fully integrated into the adjunct to regular military forces, resources for USFORSOM to suc- UNOSOM II/USFORSOM opera- or as an independent weapon.”46 cessfully conduct its missions in tional-level strategy.Although polit- But Gray reminds us, “tactical support of UNOSOM II. ical and military leaders in the U.S. excellence in the conduct of special The only strategic player who realized these factors, they never operations is no guarantee of stra- realized the need to adapt was adjusted their policies and strate-
May 2004 45 gies to ensure success. Thus, the name: Mohammad and/or Farrah, and/or 8 Colonel James T.Faust, “Task Force Ranger decision-makers at the strategic Aideed. I am using the spelling from an official in Somalia: Isaiah 6:8” (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. and policy levels sealed TF Ranger’s memorandum that was personally signed by Army War College, 1999), 29. A U.S. Army War him in 1993. As for the actual target, it is often College Personal Experience Monograph. fate as a military misfortune. incorrectly identified as being the Olympic 9 Akers and Singleton, 6. Hotel itself. Actually, the target on Oct. 3, 10 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Conclusion 1993, was a house in the Habr Gedir section of Studies in Special Operations Warfare: The- Because the mission resulted in town that was close to the hotel. The alleged ory and Practice (Novato, Calif.: Presidio finance minister and top political advisor for Press, 1996), 4-6. a strategic disutility, the tactical Aidid, Omar Salad, was to be at the meeting 11 McRaven, 4-6. victory of the 15-hour engagement site. Thus, the actual target was the Salad 12 McRaven, 6-8. had and will continue to have a house and not the Olympic Hotel. 13 McRaven, 11-14. negative affect on U.S. foreign pol- 2 The tactical level of war is divided into 14 Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Northacker, icy. While the task force succeeded battles, engagements and small unit/crew United States Special Operations Com- actions. The raid on Oct. 3-4, 1993, is most mand History Office, “Subject: Lessons in its mission of capturing the 24 correctly defined as an engagement. Learned Somalia (TF Ranger),” dated 20 Aidid supporters,55 its combined 3 UNOSOM II, during the period of TF May 1998, 2. Talking paper to provide back- failures at the tactical level Ranger’s involvement, was a coalition of 21 ground for the Defense Writers Group dis- caused it to lose relative superior- nations with an approximate strength of cussion. Downloaded from the USSOCOM ity. Relative superiority was 17,200 (Headquarters, Department of the History and Research Office’s Historical Army, “Subject: United States Forces Soma- After Action Reviews/Lessons Learned regained only with the interven- lia (USFORSOM) After-Action Report Database (http://www.socom.smil.mil/socs- tion of conventional heavy forces. [SAAR] (U), DRAFT, Version 4, Change 1, ho/aarll/somalia) on 12 February 2003. Even though U.S. forces eventual- Volumes I and II, July 1997,” Vol. I, 7. Down- Overall classification (U). ly achieved a tactical victory, a loaded from the USSOCOM History and 15 AAR for Task Force Ranger, 3. 16 better appreciation of the six prin- Research Office’s Historical After Action The impact of the clan culture of Soma- Reviews/Lessons Learned Database lia, and its impact on successful HUMINT ciples of special-operations suc- (http://www.socom.smil.mil/socs- operations cannot be overstated. Access to cess could have produced a quick- ho/aarll/somalia) on 12 February 2003. certain areas of Mogadishu depended on er and more decisive victory, fewer Overall classification (S), and hereafter having the proper clan, tribe, sub-clan, even U.S. casualties, and fewer nega- referred to as USFORSOM AAR). so far as family pedigree. Somalis, being 4 tive political consequences. Frank H. Akers, Jr. and George B. Single- totally dedicated to these hierarchies, made ton, Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examin- it very difficult for TF Ranger to recruit ing the Application of Advanced Technologies Somalis to work against their own. in Modern Urban Warfare (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: 17 U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John Warner, Major Marshall “Vito” Ecklund is National Security Program Office for the “Subject: Review of Circumstances Surround- a student at the Army Command and Department of Energy, November 2000), 4. ing the Ranger Raid on October 3-4 1993 in 5 General Staff Officer Course, Fort Thomas K. Adams, US Special Opera- Mogadishu, Somalia” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. tions Forces in Action: The Challenge of Senate Committee on Armed Services, 29 Sep- Leavenworth, Kan. His previous Unconventional Warfare (Portland, Ore.: tember 1995), 39-41. Memorandum for Sena- assignments include company execu- Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 261. Also tor Strom Thurmond, chairman of the Senate tive officer and assault detachment Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Armed Services Committee, and Senator Sam commander (SFODA 794) in Compa- Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces Nunn, ranking member of the Senate Armed ny C, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group in (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Services Committee (hereafter referred to as Press, 1997), 253. the Warner-Levin Report). Puerto Rico; detachment commander 6 USFORSOM’s mission was to “conduct 18 Faust, 33. (SFODA 763), Company C, 2nd Bat- military operations in Somalia in support of 19 After the first raid, operations were sub- talion, 7th SF Group; and battalion UNOSOM II to establish a secure environ- ject to the following criteria prior to launch: air operations officer, company execu- ment for humanitarian relief operations n (1) receive current/actionable target intelli- tive officer and rifle-platoon leader in Somalia as outlined in the Terms of Refer- gence; (2) coordinate with the commander, ence (TOR).” (USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 19.) USFORSOM; (3) verify initial intelligence the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 7 U.S. Department of Defense, “Subject: report using reconnaissance or other disci- 101st Airborne Division. Major Eck- After Action Report for TASK FORCE pline; (4) confirm no NGO/U.N. facility loca- lund holds a bachelor’s degree in for- RANGER Operations in Support of UNO- tions near the target; (5) deconflict UNO- eign-area studies (Latin America) SOM II; 22 August-25 October 1993 (U),” SOM operations; and (6) notify commander, from the U.S. Military Academy and dated 5 January 1994, 10. (Downloaded from CENTCOM. (AAR for Task Force Ranger, the USSOCOM History and Research enclosure 2, 5.) a master’s degree in defense analysis Office’s Historical After Action Reviews 20 McRaven, 14-15. from the Naval Postgraduate School, /Lessons Learned Database [http: 21 McRaven, 15. Monterey, Calif. //www.socom.smil.mil/socs-ho/aarll/somalia] 22 Warner-Levin Report, 8. 12 February 2003. Downgraded version with 23 If there was a single critical variable that Notes: overall classification (U), and hereafter was unknown to TF Ranger, it was the clans’ 1 Also referred to by different spellings of his referred to as AAR for Task Force Ranger.) ability to adapt their operational tactics and
46 Special Warfare organize quickly to fight TF Ranger. During and this formal set of procedures was fol- and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and the fifth and sixth assaults, the use of RPGs lowed on every mission. TF Ranger’s lack of Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992- had begun to pick up. Fortunately, the ter- competition should have allowed it to be 1998 (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1999), rain during those assaults made effective very deliberate and thorough in its decision- 33. In the words of Montgomery, “It’s obvious RPG use much more difficult than during making and execution. While TF Ranger’s that, if there was no political will in the operations in downtown Mogadishu. template planning was deliberate and thor- United States to hang in there and see it 24 When I questioned retired Major General ough, once the task force arrived in through, we had to come out.” (Adams, 265.) Garrison on May 28, 2003, about his decision Mogadishu, mission planning and execution 41 This assessment of probabilities of mis- to ignore increased Somali RPG use against was anything but slow and deliberate. sion success (capturing Aidid) in relation to helicopters, he argued that the fact was not 31 Northacker, 3. HUMINT was confirmed by retired Major ignored. He stated that he made his decision 32 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tab G to General Garrison on May 28, 2003. to continue using helicopters in the same enclosure 3, 3-G-3. When I questioned 42 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous manner as in the previous missions based on retired Major General Garrison about this Options: Special Operations as an Instru- advice provided by the pilots and the unit decision on May 28, 2003, he stated that ment of US Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford commander of the 1st Battalion, 160th Spe- prior coordination with the QRF units, as University Press, Inc., 1993), 4. cial Operations Aviation Regiment. They well as pre-positioning them at the TF 43 Vandenbroucke, 4. informed/recommended to Garrison that it Ranger airfield, would not have resulted in 44 Vandenbroucke, 4. was an acceptable risk that could be mitigat- an earlier launch time for the rescue. He 45 Vandenbroucke, 6-7. ed at their level. I assumed this to suggest stated that his intelligence indicated that, 46 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy that the pilots believed that such a nonpreci- historically, Mogadishu turned into a ghost (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 149. sion weapon was ultimately no match for town at about 2300 hours every night, and 47 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143. their flying skills. That assumption was con- that he didn’t launch the joint U.N./QRF/TF 48 Colin S. Gray,“Handfuls of Heroes on Des- firmed in Colonel Faust’s monograph, in Ranger rescue force until 2323 hours for perate Ventures: When do Special Operations which he describes a conversation with one of that very reason. He indicated that launch- Succeed?” Parameters (Spring 1999). Down- the pilots who had met with other pilots to ing them that late would give the rescue loaded from Parameters On-Line (http: discuss the 25 September shootdown of the force the best chance for success, consider- //carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters UH-60 from the 10th Mountain Division’s ing that many of the Somalis might already /99spring/gray.htm) on 4 February 2003. Aviation Task Force: “In their [the pilots’] have called it quits for the day. 49 Warner-Levin Report, 4. opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘big 33 Warner-Levin Report, 33. 50 In August 1993, Montgomery assessed sky, little bullet.’ ” According to Faust, the 34 McRaven, 17-18. that the situation required heavy forces pilot suggested that TF Ranger aircraft “flew 35 “In the postmortem of the October 3 bat- (mechanized infantry units) in order to pro- rapidly random and irregular flight profiles,” tle, it transpired that Aidid’s militia divided vide adequate force protection to U.S. logis- and that “the combination of experience and Mogadishu into eighteen sectors, each with a tics convoys and installations. He sent a better tactics minimized the RPG threat to tactical commander … Colonel Harif Hassan request to Hoar in early September 1993. TFR aircraft.” (Faust, 40.) Giumale, the commander of the Somali force After Hoar scaled back the request by more 25 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tabs E and F that engaged Task Force Ranger on October than 75 percent, he forwarded the request to enclosure 3, 3-E-2 and 3-F-1. 3, had attended a Soviet military academy in for additional forces through the Joint 26 Using all six previous missions as an Odessa for three years. His subordinate, Chiefs of Staff. On Sept. 23, 1993, the com- indicator, the majority of the assault and Colonel Ali Aden, summed up his command- mander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the blocking forces on the 3 October mission er’s perspective on U.S. tactics: ‘If you use one Secretary of Defense aware of the request, had not brought their NVDs or sufficient tactic once, you should not use it a third time. but the Secretary elected not to approve the water, since the mission began in daylight And the Americans had already done basi- request at that time. The request was not and all were certain that the mission would cally the same thing six times.’ ” (Jonathan considered essential by policy-level authori- end hours before dark. Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. ties to carrying out the mission (USFOR- 27 Warner-Levin Report, 22. Policy in Somalia [Annapolis, Md.: Naval SOM AAR, Vol. I, 22-23.) 28 McRaven, 15-16. Institute Press, 1995], 93-94.) 51 USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 36. 29 Warner-Levin Report, 38-39. 36 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down — A 52 Warner-Levin Report, 26. 30 Because all operations were conducted Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic 53 Warner-Levin Report, 19. from one of two operational templates, all Monthly Press, 1999), 80. 54 USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 30-31. members of the task force had to know their 37 “TF Ranger randomly launched missions 55 “The ground force fought its way back to individual jobs inside and out; in this man- for training and rehearsal at all times of the the airport from the target. … The vehicles ner the task force could reduce any variabil- day and night. We could not protect our left the target with 24 live and uninjured ity, control and predict behavior of the Sol- launches but the idea was to put the chal- Somalis. There were only 22 alive when the diers, and regulate the activity as much as lenge on the surveillance to determine if it convoy returned. Two Somali prisoners were possible. Through the standardization of was a real launch or not.” (Faust, 16.) dead; a third died shortly after we unloaded rules such as operating on the basis of joint 38 McRaven, 19-21. the vehicles. All were victims of Somali fire.” tactics, techniques and procedures, TF 39 McRaven, 21-23. (USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 54-55.) Ranger was able to ensure that all members 40 After the events of 3-4 October 1993, from varying services and operational back- Aidid’s tactic of “killing Americans” and hav- grounds were focused on the same “tactical” ing that broadcast worldwide succeeded in sheet of music and speaking the same changing a previously apathetic U.S. public “joint” language. The task force had stand- and focused their anger on U.S. policy in ard operating procedures for everything, Somalia (Lester H. Brune, The United States
May 2004 47 ‘Father of Special Forces’ Dies at Age 101 in California Home
he man most often credited with “Colonel Bank’s passing marks a sad day founding United States Army Spe- for the Special Forces regiment,” Gowan Tcial Forces died April 1 at his home said. “Colonel Aaron Bank was the father in Dana Point, Calif., at the age of 101. of Special Forces — he was a legend. His Retired Army Colonel Aaron Bank, initiative and vision allowed the Army to known throughout create the U.S. Army Special Forces as we the military’s spe- know them today, and every Special Forces cial-operations Soldier in the Army will mourn his death.” community as “The Born Nov. 23, 1902, in New York City, Father of Special Bank traveled extensively in Europe and Forces,” died of nat- became fluent in French and German ural causes with before entering the U.S. Army in 1939. his family at his In 1943, after completing Officer Candi- side. He was buried date School, Bank volunteered for duty at Riverside Na- with the Office of Strategic Services and tional Cemetery in was assigned to a Jedburgh team — a Riverside, Calif., small, first-of-its-kind unconventional- April 5 with full warfare outfit. Bank and his Jedburgh military and Spe- team made a combat parachute jump into cial Forces honors. Southern France in August 1944, where Bank most no- they successfully employed hit-and-run tably broke new tactics to harass Nazi forces that were ground when in withdrawing up the Rhone River. 1952 he was named Later, Bank was chosen as the com- commander of the manding officer for Operation Cross (often Fort Bragg-based erroneously referred to as Operation Iron 10th Special Forces Cross), a high-risk plan to snatch Adolph Courtesy USASOC archive Group — the Ar- Hitler and key members of his inner circle Aaron Bank my’s first official should they retreat to the “national special-warfare redoubt” in the Bavarian Alps. From unit, for which he had led the fight to create. French prisoner-of-war camps, Bank The announcement of Bank’s death has recruited a company-sized unit of anti- been difficult news for Special Forces Sol- Nazi Germans, most of whom were com- diers around the world, said Special Forces munist sympathizers. They were to operate spokesman Major Robert Gowan. as an ersatz German mountain infantry
48 Special Warfare company. They spoke German during all their training, wore German uniforms and carried German weapons. The mission was never launched, however. Bank got word that the operation was aborted while he and his unit were waiting to board the air- craft that were to drop them into the target area. After the aborted mission, Bank was transferred to Indochina to search for Japanese POW camps around the Vien- tiane-Laos area. His team located 143 French civilian internees at Naung Kai, 14 French internees at Vientiane, and eight French internees at Thakhek, supplying all with medical supplies and special food items for the numerous children held in the camps. When World War II ended, the OSS was disbanded, but Bank and Colonel Russell Volckmann, another former OSS operative, Photo by Kyle J. Cosner remained in the military and worked tire- Command continue to sustain the fight During the funeral serv- lessly to convince the Army to adopt an that Bank began at the opening of the Cold ice for Aaron Bank, Sol- unconventional, guerrilla-style force. They War. diers from the 1st Spe- found an ally in Brigadier General Robert Today, the Special Forces and other spe- cial Forces Group fold McClure, who at the time headed the cial-operations units that Bank helped cre- the flag that was draped over the coffin. Army’s psychological-warfare staff at the ate serve as the tip of the spear for the U.S. Pentagon. military in the global war on terrorism, Bank and Volckmann convinced Army serving in contingencies such as Operation leaders that there were areas in the world Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Free- not susceptible to conventional warfare — dom and many others around the world. especially Soviet-dominated eastern Bank is survived by his wife, Catherine, Europe — that would be ideal candidates and their two daughters, Linda Ballantine for unconventional-warfare operations. of Dana Point, Calif., and Alexandra Elliott Special operations, as envisioned by the of Anaheim, Calif. two men — and Bank in particular — The Bank family asks that donations be would be a force multiplier, meaning that a made to the Special Operations Warrior small number of highly-trained Soldiers Foundation; P.O. Box 14385; Tampa, FL could create disproportionate amounts of 33690. trouble for enemy forces. It was a bold idea that went against the grain of traditional concepts of warfare, This article was written by the U.S. Army but by 1952, the Army was ready to Special Operations Command Public embark into a new era of warfare. After Affairs Office. months of preparation, the 10th Special Forces Group was activated at Fort Bragg, N.C., with Bank as its commander. On the day of its activation, the 10th Group had a total strength of 10 Soldiers — Bank, one warrant officer and eight enlist- ed men. But that would soon change, and just over 50 years later, the nearly 10,000 Soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Forces
May 2004 49 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare
Proposal would make CMF 38 The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the propo- part of the active Army nent for Civil Affairs, has approved the submission of a request to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command to add the Civil Affairs career man- agement field, CMF 38, to the active Army. With the concurrence of the commanders of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the SWCS commander directed the Special Operations Proponency Office to submit the proposal on March 31, 2004. The Human Resources Command initiat- ed Armywide staffing for comments on April 14, with a suspense of June 14. If approved, the action will recode all enlisted positions in military occupational specialty 38A to MOS 38B and authorize the MOS to be held by Soldiers in the active army and the U.S. Army Reserve effective Oct. 1, 2005. Proposed growth in the force structure of the active Army will expand the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to a brigade with four battalions. The establishment of CMF 38 as an active-component CMF would enable Reservists to transition to the active component and complete a career on active duty. The change would also reduce the strain on Civil Affairs man- power growth and training requirements. For additional information, tele- phone Major Michael J. Karabasz at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432- 6406, or send e-mail to: [email protected].
SF Branch seeks drill According to an agreement between the U.S. Army Special Operations sergeants for 18X program Command, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., the Special Forces Enlisted Branch will begin filling seven drill-sergeant positions at the Infantry School during fiscal year 2005, in support of the 18X program. The SF Enlisted Branch is seeking volunteers from MOSs 18B and 18C for the positions but will consider SF Soldiers in MOS 18E on a case-by-case basis. The Soldiers selected will attend Drill Sergeant Course as early as July 2004 and will report for duty at the Infantry School in October 2004. Requirements are that applicants have at least 48 months service on an SF A-detachment and be able to pass the drill-sergeant selection process and background screening. Drill-sergeant duty lasts 24 months; Soldiers in the positions will not receive jump pay, but they will receive special duty assignment pay at the drill-sergeant level, which is $375 a month. For additional infor- mation on these assignments, contact Sergeant First Class Jorge Vargas at the SF Enlisted Branch, DSN 221-8399, commercial (703) 325-8399, or send e-mail to [email protected].
50 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare
FA 39C officers can Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the Army G1, has authorized regimentally affiliate all officers who are career field-designated as Functional Area 39C (Civil with Branch 38 Affairs) to regimentally affiliate with the Civil Affairs Corps in the United States Army Reserve. This is an exception to AR 600-82, The U.S. Army Regimental System.To request authorization to regimentally affiliate, FA 39C officers must submit their request via DA Form 4187 to: Commander, United States Army Human Resources Command, Attn: AHRC-OPY (colonels) or AHRC-OPF-B (majors and lieutenant colonels); 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922, or send e-mail to: [email protected].
SF officers should read The new DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and new DA Pam 600-3 Career Management,is scheduled to be published during the summer of 2004. The Army is undergoing significant changes in personnel manage- ment, and Special Forces will see changes, though not necessarily as far- reaching as the rest of the Army. An extract of the SF chapter of DA Pam- phlet 600-3 was printed in the February 2004 issue of Special Warfare, but all SF officers are strongly encouraged to read the new DA Pamphlet 600-3, as there have been changes since the extract was published. For additional information, telephone Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Strong at DSN 239-3296 or commercial (910) 432-3296, or send e-mail to: [email protected].
May 2004 51 Foreign SOF Special Warfare
Germans consider Citing a growing role for German military forces in light of the world’s increasing special forces changed political circumstances, commentators in and out of the German gov- ernment continue to identify a need to expand Germany’s special forces. According to some concepts, the expansion would include the small, elite Spe- cial Forces Commando, or KSK, and the 8,000-man Division of Special Oper- ations, or DSO, which now comprises four airborne battalions. Elements of these forces have been widely reported as having been active in the Balkans and, more recently, in Afghanistan. Some anonymous officers have suggested that Germany — drawing on the KSK, DSO and other elements — should cre- ate larger special forces that would include a counterterrorist force, form DSO forces similar to U.S. Army Rangers, and focus on the interaction between spe- cial-operations forces and specialized detachments such as underwater-opera- tions and air-rescue personnel. The establishment of a coordinating joint head- quarters has also been postulated. Impediments to the proposed expansion and restructuring would be the long-standing shortfall in volunteers who can meet the rigorous selection criteria and the necessity of beefing up transport capabilities. These, along with considerations common in military restructur- ing — budget constraints, domestic political considerations and differences of viewpoint within the military establishment — will shape the structure and the mandate of future German special forces.
Armed group challenges Fatal clashes between Mexican police and army units and the well- Mexico’s police and army armed criminal group “Los Zetas” have increasingly concerned Mexican authorities and underscore the near-parity that well-funded criminal groups can achieve with law-enforcement and military organizations. Los Zetas provides firepower, security and coercion for the Gulf drug- trafficking cartel and provides the force needed for settling scores with rival drug-trafficking organizations. Mexican law-enforcement and mili- tary officials believe that Los Zetas is composed, at least in part, of for- mer Mexican military personnel — more so than any other such group in Mexican history. Mexican military special-operations units, such as the Airborne Special Forces Groups, or GAFES, have been used extensively in counterdrug operations, but the units have had problems with cor- ruption and human-rights violations. Disaffected members of the GAFES and similar groups have joined Los Zetas and turned their skills to mur- der, kidnapping and “narco-military” actions. Authorities have reported approximately 100 members of Los Zetas taking training in weapons and equipment at a site that resembles a GAFES training center. There is evidently some form of Zeta internal organization, given the existence of known Zeta components like “Comando Negro,” or the Black Command. In addition to having military training and organization, group members are also well-armed. A 40-minute firefight in Nuevo Laredo in August 2003 revealed that in addition to the standard automatic weapons (AK- 47s and AR-15s), Los Zetas possessed grenade launchers and a 50-cal. machine gun.
52 Special Warfare Indian counterinsurgency Early in November 2003, a report attributed to sources in the Indian Central forces expand dramatically Reserve Police Force, or CRPF, raised the probability that the CRPF would cre- ate a “special strike unit” to deal with what the report characterized as a grow- ing effort by Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence, or ISI, to destabilize India using left-wing extremist groups in at least six Indian states. The strike unit would work hand-in-hand with the actions and efforts of other security resources in the affected states. A special concern is the reported ISI effort to mobilize the Marxist-Leninist/Maoist Naxalite groups in this effort, as well as to obtain support from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. There are several dozen Naxalite groups in India whose roots stretch back to 1948. Naxalite groups have had a mixed inventory of old armaments, but they have recently acquired more sophisticated weapons. In 2002, Naxalite terrorists launched 1,465 attacks and killed 482 people. Serious and fatal attacks continued throughout 2003, featuring more sophisticated small arms and explosive devices. The Naxalite development takes place against the backdrop of a more general CRPF expansion: During the last two years, the CRPF has added 17 new battalions. CRPF recruiting for 22 additional battalions is already under way, and the force could add as many as 25 additional battalions during 2004 — which would bring the expansion to 64 new battalions in three years. If the expansion is successful, the additional 64 battalions would give the CRPF a total of 220 battalions and would likely make it the largest counterinsurgency/para- military force in the world.
Russian special force Combat operations in Chechnya continue to generate casualties and damage to protects Chechen oil all aspects of the infrastructure. The Russian Interior Ministry — which con- resources ducts more than two-thirds of combat operations — as well as the Ministry of Defense and other special units, bear the main burden. Oil represents a special concern: The principal threat is the diversion of oil and the establishment by irregular forces of small, illegal oil-production enterprises. Russian authorities say oil diversion and illegal production are used to generate great sums of money for the support of Chechen armed-opposition groups. They liken the profits from oil diversion to drug-trafficking revenues. The problem of securing oil pipelines and other resources that are subject to attack by irregular forces has preoccu- pied military forces in many parts of the world. In Chechnya, where Russian forces and the key infrastructure they seek to protect face the potential of daily attack or theft, republic police have constituted what they refer to as an “oil spe- cial forces regiment” of some 1,200 men. Armed and equipped much like the Russian Interior Ministry’s special police, the force is divided into mobile groups whose mission is to provide continuous protection to the pipeline as well as to Chechen oil-production facilities generally. The “oil units” patrol roads and stop suspicious trucks they believe to be carrying stolen oil. If their suspicions are borne out, they destroy the vehicles. The oil units come under attack from guer- rillas and need to be continually prepared to defend themselves.
Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army’s For- eign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
May 2004 53 Update Special Warfare
Parker assumes command Doctrine, is writing a new mission spring of 2005. The PSYOP Train- of SWCS training plan, or MTP, for PSYOP ing and Doctrine Division will alert dissemination battalions. The MTP units when the new manual will be Major General James W. Parker will delineate the collective tasks staffed for comments. assumed command of the United and describe operations conducted PSYOP commanders, staff offi- States Army John F. Kennedy Spe- by the highly skilled Soldiers in cers and Soldiers of every skill cial Warfare Center and School those unique units. level should review the initial draft June 10 in the SWCS Auditorium The MTP,ARTEP 33-715-MTP.will and provide input. Once approved, at Fort Bragg, N.C. apply to active-duty and reserve-com- the MTP will be accessible through Parker previously served as ponent PSYOP units. The 3rd Psycho- the ASOCNet, the DOTD Web site, Director of the Center for Special logical Operations Battalion, 4th the PSYOP section of the ARSOF Operations, U.S. Special Operations PSYOP Group, is the only active-duty Doctrine and Training Library, and Command, MacDill Air Force Base, PSYOP dissemination unit. The through Army Knowledge Online. Fla. His other assignments include reserve-component PSYOP dissemi- For additional information, contact director, Intelligence and Informa- nation unit is the 7th PSYOP Group’s the project officer, Captain Matthew tion Operations Center, USSOCOM; 17th PSYOP Battalion, which has Berriman, commander of the 306th commander, Special Operations companies in Joliet, Ill., and Los PSYOP Company (310-995-6288); or Command South; operations officer Alamitos, Calif. In the future, the Staff Sergeant John Tuel, DOTD and chief of staff, U.S. Army Forces Army plans to add an additional PSYOP Division (910-432-7257, DSN Command; deputy commanding reserve-component PSYOP dissemi- 239-7257 or e-mail: [email protected]). general, U.S. Army Special Opera- nation battalion. tions Command; commander, 7th PSYOP dissemination battalions Manuals to update doctrine SF Group; commander, 1st Battal- provide audiovisual and printed for SF advanced skills ion, 3rd SF Group; staff officer, materials, signal support, media- USSOCOM J3 Directorate; and U.S. The JFK Special Warfare Center broadcast capabilities and electronic- and School is working on new and adviser to the Salvadoran 4th maintenance services to PSYOP Infantry Brigade in El Salvador. updated doctrinal publications groups, regional PSYOP battalions that have applicability to Special A native of Miami, Fla., Parker and tactical PSYOP battalions. The enlisted in the Army in 1970. He Forces advanced skills. new MTP will provide doctrinal The Advanced Skills Branch, SF began his special-operations career guidance to assist dissemination bat- at Fort Bragg, where he served on Doctrine Division, Directorate of talions in developing their training Training and Doctrine, has pro- an A-detachment with the 7th SF plans. The MTP will address the Group before attending Officer duced a new manual, FM 3-05.221, tasks required to train Soldiers on Special Forces Advanced Urban Candidate School in 1975. PSYOP-specific systems, such as the The previous SWCS commander, Combat. Incorrectly printed the Special Operations Media System B, first time, FM 3-05.221 has been Major General Geoffrey C. Lam- Deployable Print Production Center, bert, relinquished command June 4 reprinted and is being distributed Theatre Media Production Center to SF units. For more information, and is scheduled to retire from the and the new Media Operations Cen- Army in August. telephone Master Sergeant Step- ter located at Fort Bragg, N.C. hen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952 or SWCS writing new MTP for Active- and reserve-component commercial (910) 432-5952, or send subject-matter experts are develop- PSYOP dissemination units e-mail to: [email protected]. ing the author’s draft of the new The Advanced Skills Branch is The JFK Special Warfare Center MTP with input from key personnel also completing the final draft of and School’s Psychological Opera- from the 3rd and 17th PSYOP bat- FM 3-05.212, SF Waterborne Opera- tions Training and Doctrine Divi- talions. The initial draft is sched- tions. The FM has been updated sion, Directorate of Training and uled to be available for review in the
54 Special Warfare with changes that will enable users Pack Animals.For more informa- from General Bryan Brown, com- to conduct waterborne missions tion, telephone Master Sergeant manding general of the U.S. Spe- more efficiently. The final draft of Joseph Register at DSN 239-5952 cial Operations Command, at FM 3-05.212 is scheduled to be or commercial (910) 432-5952, or MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. ready for distribution by September. send e-mail to: [email protected]. Named for legendary SF Colonel For more information, telephone With SF at the forefront in the Arthur D. “Bull” Simons, the CWO 3 Jeff Kula at DSN 239-5952 war on terrorism, capturing emerg- Simons Award is presented to indi- or commercial (910) 432-5952, or ing SF doctrine is critical to the suc- viduals who embody the spirit, val- send e-mail to: [email protected]. cess of the force. Anyone who has ues and skills that Simons exem- The Advanced Skills Branch is better techniques or lessons learned plified. Previous award recipients also making changes to update FM should forward the information to include H. Ross Perot, the Honor- 3-05.211, SF MFF Operations. The the SF Doctrine Division so that it able William S. Cohen, General updated manual will contain com- can be documented and distributed Edward “Shy” Meyer, the Honor- prehensive information on military to other SF Soldiers. Sharing the able John O. Marsh Jr., Colonel free-fall missions so that users will information can make SF a safer Aaron Bank, Lieutenant General not need to consult any other pub- and more lethal fighting force. Samuel V. Wilson, Lieutenant Gen- lications. FM 3-05.211 is also eral Leroy Manor, the Honorable scheduled for distribution to field 3rd SF Group receives Sam Nunn and Brigadier General units by September. For more new commander Harry “Heinie” Aderholt. information, telephone CWO 3 Colonel Patrick M. Higgins After serving two years with the Randall C. Wurst at DSN 239-5952 accepted command of the 3rd Spe- Hawaiian Territorial Guard, Taba- or commercial (910) 432-5952, or cial Forces Group June 8 at Dick ta enlisted in the Army in 1948. He send e-mail to: [email protected]. Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C. served in the Korean War and was In conjunction with the Army Higgins was previously opera- discharged in 1952 but re-enlisted Corps of Engineers and the Regular tions officer for Special Operations in 1955. After serving as a para- Army, the Advanced Skills Branch Command Central, MacDill Air trooper in the 82nd and 11th Air- has produced a new training circu- Force Base, Fla. His other special- borne divisions, he volunteered for lar, TC 28-8-1, Army Special Opera- operations assignments include Special Forces training in 1961. tions Forces Training Ranges, which detachment commander, battalion Soon after completing SF train- is a restricted supplement to TC 25- S4, battalion executive officer and ing, Tabata volunteered for a clan- 8, Army Training Ranges. TC 28-8-1 battalion commander, 5th SF destine mission in Laos, Operation describes innovative ranges and Group; assignments officer, SF White Star, led by then-Lieutenant complexes that can be built and Branch, Total Army Personnel Colonel Bull Simons. Tabata later used by Regular Army units or by Command; action officer, Special served three tours in Vietnam, two units of Army special-operations Operations Division, Operations of them with the Military Assist- forces, or ARSOF. Directorate, The Joint Staff; and ance Command, Vietnam Studies The information in TC 28-8-1 will chief of the Special Forces Branch, and Observation Group, or MACV give units the opportunity and the Total Army Personnel Command. SOG. On his first MACV SOG tour, ability to train in state-of-the-art The previous 3rd Group com- Tabata was a reconnaissance-team complexes and ranges. TC 28-8-1 mander, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, leader. In 1981, after 30 years of standardizes 10 ARSOF ranges that is scheduled to retire from the active-duty service, he retired as a have been approved by the Army and Army in October. command sergeant major. incorporated into the Army’s Master In 1984, Tabata returned to SF Range Program. For more informa- SWCS civilian instructor as a civilian instructor at SWCS. tion, telephone Master Sergeant receives Simons award Twenty years later, he continues to Stephen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952 teach engineering and demolitions or commercial (910) 432-5952, or A civilian employee of the JFK skills to SF candidates. At age 73, send e-mail to: [email protected]. Special Warfare Center and School he still makes static-line parachute The Advanced Skills Branch has has received a lifetime achieve- jumps as required in the course of also produced a six-part CD-ROM ment honor for his five decades of his duties. — Captain John DeNi- video collection of tactics, tech- uniformed and civilian service with cola, USN; USSOCOM PAO niques and procedures to be used the Army and SF communities. when working with pack animals. Ernest K. Tabata, a demolitions The videos are for use in conjunc- expert and SF instructor, received tion with FM 3-05.213, SF Use of the Bull Simons Award May 12
May 2004 55 Book Reviews Special Warfare
Deterrence and Influence in be exploited to influence the behav- Counterterrorism: A Compo- ior of the terrorist “foot soldiers.” nent in the War on al Qaeda. By In any conflict, there is a range of Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael coercive options available for influ- Jenkins. RAND National Defense encing enemy behavior — from co- Research Institute report MR-1619- option to persuasion, deterrence to DARPA, November 2002. ISBN: 0- destruction. As the title suggests, the 8330-3286-0. 109 pages. $20. Avail- authors focus on deterrence. They able for downloading at http: assert that governments must iso- //www.rand.org/publications/MR late individual terrorist vulnerabili- /MR1619/. ties (family, tribe, home and people) and use both the mailed fist and the This short report from RAND is a velvet glove to deter and disrupt must-read for operators and for poli- future terrorist plans. cy-makers who are developing strat- A successful counterterrorist strat- egy for the global war on terrorism. egy, they argue, shows attributes of War in our civilized age is aimed manifest determination, relentless at influencing the behavior of an actions, moral validity, and a strategy adversary by destroying, or threat- that balances political, economic, mil- ening to destroy, what he values — itary and cultural components. The usually military forces or economic lesson for operators and policy-mak- assets. However, our adversaries in and research perspectives to the ers is that a strictly military strategy the current war do not have a tra- report. He served as a Special Forces cannot defeat terrorism. ditional target array for us to officer during the United States inter- While there may be no single center destroy or threaten. Those targets vention in the Dominican Republic of gravity for terrorists, vulnerabilities that exist are small, mobile and and in Vietnam. An acknowledged should be exploited using a series of often hidden among innocents. terrorism expert, he serves as a con- effects-based actions and a portfolio of Davis and Jenkins analyze the al- sultant and writes extensively on influence techniques.A key emphasis in Qaeda terrorist organization as a sys- international terrorism. the authors’ prescription is the use of tem and propose a method for deter- The authors open the report with tailored, decentralized and adaptive mining ways of influencing both the a discussion of terrorists’ motiva- responses. The report recognizes that individual parts of that system and tion and commitment to their one of the most effective ways of deter- the system as a whole. cause, the cultural traditions of ring terrorist actions is to either disrupt The authors are well-qualified and violence, and al-Qaeda’s organiza- attempted attacks or to destroy as bring complementary capabilities and tional structure. The discussion much of the terrorist system as possible perspectives to the report. Dr. Paul K. covers all parts of the terrorists’ in response to an attack. The authors Davis, a research leader and professor organization, from grass-roots sup- make a fundamental assumption that at the RAND graduate school, has port and sympathetic governments most terrorists (even suicide bombers) extensive practical, academic and to the terrorist core. It provides are rational and will shy away from research experience in military affairs strategic insight into how each futile efforts to concentrate on more and analysis. He served six years in part of the terrorist system can — effective and damaging attacks. the federal government, eventually or cannot — be influenced and The authors complete the report becoming a senior executive and an describes techniques for evaluating with broad strategic prescriptions acting deputy assistant secretary in and predicting the interactions and discussions on deterring the use the Department of Defense. between parts of the terrorist sys- of weapons of mass destruction, on Brian Michael Jenkins brings field tem. Those interactions can then political warfare, and on the clash
56 Special Warfare between American values and those A couple of years later, SOG had inherent vulnerabilities of the of several of our regional allies. developed training courses for its small SOG reconnaissance teams Davis and Jenkins cannot pro- newly assigned reconnaissance per- and had made provisions for find- vide a complete strategy in a short sonnel. including one for the recon- ing and destroying them. Few mis- report, but they do provide a useful naissance leaders, or “one-zeros.” sions were without enemy contact. template and techniques for devel- During the interim between the Meyer, with only local team train- oping a comprehensive strategy for era of highly experienced personnel ing, was soon running missions the global war on terrorism. Their and the establishment of in-country “across the fence,” i.e., into Cambo- report should be on the reading list training programs, the author of dia and Laos, first as a radio oper- of every policy-maker or strategist. Across the Fence,John Stryker ator and later as a one-zero. His Meyer, arrived at SOG. In the grade descriptions of these missions are Colonel John D. Jogerst, USAF of specialist, Stryker, a 21-year-old the essence of the book. Special Operations Chair radio operator who had less than 18 Meyer describes the missions Air University months in the Army, faced demands essentially as he experienced them. Maxwell AFB, Ala. for which he had no experience and Only rarely does he allow subse- had received scant training. quent reflection or facts determined Across the Fence: The Secret When Meyer arrived, the bleak later to intrude into his account. He War in Vietnam. By John Stryker operational conditions that were to is an excellent writer, describing peo- Meyer. St. Ann, Mo.: Real War Sto- exist throughout the duration of the ple, equipment, events, emotions and ries, 2003. ISBN 0-974-3618-1-X. SOG reconnaissance effort prevailed. thoughts with accuracy and a dis- $24.95. 246 pages. Specifically, SOG’s ability to reinforce arming frankness. engaged teams was greatly restricted One of the few faults of this book During the Vietnam War, the by the extended operational ranges is its total lack of maps. Pictures are cross-border reconnaissance teams and the small number of available lift limited to two on the book’s dust of the Military Assistance Com- aircraft. The operational ranges also jacket, but pictures from opera- mand, Vietnam’s Studies and obviated any support by ground fires. tional areas were difficult to take Observation Group, or MACV The teams were totally dependent on and to retain: the intelligence oper- SOG, suffered casualties on a level U.S. Air Force aircraft that were with- ators demanded everything. The reminiscent of Civil War units. in FM radio range for communica- general reader unfamiliar with the Initially, SOG had no formal in- tions, for reporting intelligence, for clothing, equipment and aircraft country training programs. That requesting air support and for Meyer describes might wish to have was a reflection of the newness of requesting withdrawal. a copy of John Plaster’s SOG, a the program and the quality, actu- Also by the time Meyer arrived, Photo History of the Secret Wars al and anticipated, of the partici- the enemy had recognized the (Paladin, 2000) within reach. pants. In order to train their This book does not purport to be teams, team leaders employed all history. It is a highly personal and the skills that they had acquired in exceptionally detailed memoir. For years of Army training and in com- such a level of detail to be included bat in Korea, in Laos and during in a book written 35 years after the earlier Vietnam tours. Among events is truly impressive. Across these early leaders were combat- the Fence is recommended reading savvy veterans such as Master for those who want to know what Sergeants Dick Meadows, Jerry Southeast Asia reconnaissance Wareing, “Snuffy” Conroy, Ted operations were really like and Braden and Don Fowler. who want to know the quality of Unfortunately, the early personnel the SF men who conducted them. wealth did not last. Casualties, pro- motions, commissionings, retire- COL J.H. Crerar ments, the rotation policy and the U.S. Army (ret.) competing demands of both SF and Vienna, Va. the “big Army” for skilled NCOs soon created a shortage of experienced operators. Replacements reporting to SOG were soon considerably less experienced than desired.
May 2004 57 Special Warfare
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