Supplement To

Bumb, 38331 3683

SUPPLEMENT TO

Of TUESDAY, the 22nd of JUNE, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE, 1948 RAID ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN THE LOFOTEN ISLANDS. The following Despatch was submitted to the wind or tide. I would stress moreover that Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the any less time than was allowed for rehearsal ^th April, 1941, by Admiral Sir JOHN C. and planning, and it was two days less than TOVEY, KC.B., D.S.O., Commander-in- originally planned, would have been quite Chief, Home Fleet unacceptable. H.M.S. KING GEORGE V. 3. I would mention the valuable part played t by the submarine SUNFISH in her role as a qth April, 1941. D/F beacon.* This scheme worked well, and OPERATION " CLAYMORE " although in the event the force was able to fix by sights, had this not been possible they Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the would have been in an uncomfortable position enclosed report of Operation " Claymore "* without the SUNFISH'S aid prepared by the Captain (D), 6th Destroyer Flotilla, H.M S. SOMALI, in command of the 4. iWith reference to paragraph 29 of Captain operation. I concur fully in the report and in D.6's report, I had laid particular emphasis in the remarks of the Rear Admiral (D), Home my verbal instructions on the importance of Fleet, in his Minute II, particularly in punctuality in withdrawing all forces at the paragraph 2. end of the agreed time, and I endorse the opinion that it was necessary to sink the HAM- 2. Among the factors which contributed to BURG rather than to attempt to steam her the success of this small combined operation I down the Vestfjord and then some 750 miles would draw attention to the following:— to the Faroes with the resources .available, but (a) The excellent co-operation between all she should first have been boarded and searched ranks and ratings of the Navy and Army for papers or other material likely to be useful. taking part. Each single phase required a joint decision to be taken, and in each phase (Signed) JACK C. TOVEY, Naval units and Army units were working Admiral, side by side in complete agreement and Commander-in-Chief, harmony. It is appropriate to record the Home Fleet. appreciation of the Naval officers and ratings who took part for the qualities of their MINUTE II soldier opposite numbers. H.M.S. TYNE. (&) The weather. It had not been prac- ticable to carry out more than elementary $th March, 1941. drills in the short time at Scapa, and it was Forwarded. a great relief to me that the landing craft 2. Great credit is due to Captain C. Caslon, did not have to contend with swell, strong Royal Navy, for his part in the efficient Admiralty footnote •— planning and execution of this operation. * Operation "Claymore"—the destruction of fish 3. It was fortunate that the conditions were oil plants in the Ports of Stamsund, Hennirigsvaer, Svolvaer and Brettesnes in the Lofoten Islands, the ideal. The weather throughout the passage arrest of local supporters of the Quisling party, the could not have been better, and the opposition capture of enemy personnel in the ports, the evacuation was negligible. , of recruits for the Free Norwegian Forces, and the destruction or capture of enemy ships and of Norwegian A dmiralty footnote —- vessels found to be working for the Germans. • * D/F beacon—a.n aid to navigation. 59403 SUPPLEMENT TO,THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948

4. It is thought that future operations of this sea 24.* It was unnecessary, therefore, even to nature will not only need equally efficient and consider postponing the operation as conditions careful, preparation and execution, but also promised to be excellent. Special weather re- adequate air support, if the geographical ^ports made by Admiralty were received, also position is not so favourable to us. reports of air reconnaissance patrols from the (Signed) L. H. K. HAMILTON, Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth. Rear Admiral (D), 9. During the approach to position Q, D/F Home Fleet. bearings were obtained of SUNFISH at the expected times and these bearings confirmed the H.M.S. SOMALI. position obtained by astronomical observations. 8th March, 1941. It is estimated that the force passed 2 miles south of SUNFISH at 2335. This method of OPERATION '' CLAYMORE "—REPORT checking the position was most valuable in OF PROCEEDINGS making the landfall. Had no sights been ob- I have the honour to forward the following lained, it would have been the only means of report of the proceedings of Force " Rebel " fixing the position of the force at this critical in Operation " Claymore ". stage of the approach. 2. Force " Rebel " consisted of the j£-!k»wing 10. From position Q the force moved up Vestfjord towards position C (68° 05' N. 14° 29' ships: — E.), continuing in night cruising order until Destroyers 0300 when ships formed into single line ahead. SOMALI—Captain C. Caslon (Captain Position C was reached without incident at (D), 6th D.F.). 0430 when the force split, SOMALI, BEDOUIN-Xomdr. J. A. McCoy, D.S.O. BEDOUIN, TAkTAR and QUEEN EMMA TARTAR—Comdr. L. P Skipwith. proceeding to position D (68° 14' N. 14° 42' E.) LEGION-jComdr. R. F. Jessel. and LEGION, ESKIMO and PRINCESS BEA- TRIX to position E (68° 08' N. 14° 01' E.). It ESKIMO—Comdr. E. G. Le Geyt. is believed that the force was observed by coast- Troop Carriers watchers during this passage, but that no re- QUEEN EMMA—Comdr. C. A. Kershaw. porting message got through to the mainland. PRINCESS BEATRIX—Comdr. T. B. This point may be mentioned by the military Brunton. who gave me the information after our return to Scapa. 3. During the afternoon of Friday, 28th Feb- 11. Passage up the Vestfjord was much sim- ruary, Bngadier J. C. Haydon, D.S.O., plified by the fact that all lights were burning O.B.E., embarked in SOMALI with his head- at full brilliancy and with normal characteris- quarters staff which consisted of Major A. R. tics, with the following exceptions: —Skomvaer, Aslett (Brigade Major), 2nd Lieutenant L. M. Tennholrn, Grytoy. By 0445 the outline of the Harper-Gow (interpreter in Norwegian), and coast could be distinguished. four other ranks 12. After the splitting of the force, SOMALI, 4. Force " Rebel " sailed from Scapa at oooi with BEDOUIN, TARTAR and QUEEN on ist March, 1941, and proceeded to Skaale- EMMA in company, moved towards position D fjord, Faroes, arriving there at 1900 on the where the landing craft for X landing were same day. Destroyers refuelled from WAR lowered by 0508. These were taken in charge PINDARI and the force sailed at oooi on 2nd by TARTAR while SOMALI, BEDOUIN and March. Course was set for position L (64° oo' QUEEN EMMA proceeded to position F (68° N. 3° oo' W.) and thence for position P (67° 12' N. 14° 52' E.). 12' N. 02° oo' W.). 13. The weather conditions now were—wind 5. After clearing the Faroes a speed of 20 E N.E , force 3, sea 10 to 20.f It was intensely knots was maintained until noo on 2nd March cold, the temperature being between 20° and in order to be as tar to the northward as possible 25° F. The weather continued to be fine and by that time. It was hoped that, by so doing, very clear throughout the day, with brilliant the force would evade detection by the Zenit sunshine. flight.* No aircraft was in fact sighted. 14. By this time it had become apparent that, 6. After passing through position P at 0130 in view of the lightness of the dawn and the on 3rd March course was shaped for position Q perfect visibility, the landing of troops could, (67° 09' N. 11° 55' E ) which was reached as with advantage, have been made earlier than planned at oooi on 4th March, speed having at 0645, the projected time. No alteration, ex- been adjusted as necessary. cept in the case of X landing, was however 7. Up to this rime the passage had been un- possible owing to the distances to be covered eventful and rhe weather conditions very by landing craft after paving been lowered. favourable. These were particularly so while 1 15. Craft for X landing, covered by making the approach to position Q from the TARTAR, were comparatively close to their westward. The sky was, for the most part, objective on being lowered and must have been overcast with low cloud and frequent snow clearly visible to those ashore. To avoid the loss showers were experienced which tended to re- of the element of surprise, therefore, they duce the chances of detection. The weather moved off to Port Xf at 0530 and arrived cleared sufficiently at intervals, however, for there approximately half an hour before the navigational observations to be taken to fix the planned time. position of the force. Admiralty footnotes '— 8. During the passage from P to Q the wind * Wind force 3—gentle breeze of 7-10 knots ; sea 24 was from E.N E., force 3, and the state of the —slight sea, moderate average length swell. ^ft -.._ f Sea i o to 20—smooth to slight sea with no swell. Admiralty footnote — j For positions of Port A (Stamsund), Port B * Zenit flight—a daily meteorological flight flown by (Henmngsvaer), Port X (Svolvaer), and Port Y the Germans, (Brettesnes), see Plan 2, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948 3685

16. In the meantime LEGION, ESKIMO and wounded by gunfire, two seriously. The balance PRINCESS BEATRIX had reached position E of the crew, consisting of the captain and at 0540. Landing craft were lowered and led thirteen ratings, had been killed in the action. inshore to Ports A and B by LEGION and 23 The boarding officers, Major A. R. ESKIMO respectively. Disembarkation pro- Aslett, Lieutenant Sir Marshall G. C. ceeded in accordance with the timetable and Warmington, Bart, R.N , the Signal Officer landings were made at 0645. on my staff, and 2nd Lieutenant L. M. Harper- 17. At 0610, shortly before the arrival of Go w, searched the ship so far as was possible. BEDOUIN and QUEEN EMMA at position F, 24 The wheelhouse was found to have SOMALI parted company to proceed to Ports received a direct hit and nothing could be A and B to see if the landings were being recovered from there, other than a number of effected satisfactorily there. On passage, an charts. The captain and one rating were found armed trawler, later found to be the KREBS, dead by the wheel; one or two bodies which was sighted steering away from Port X. Fire could not be identified were also in the wheel- was opened at a range of 3,000 yards at 0620 house. and the enemy very quickly hit. Our fire was returned by three rounds fired from a small gun 25 The ship was still on fire below and no in the bows of the trawler, but no hits were entry could be made into the fore-peak or the obtained on SOMALI. Immediately afterwards engine room. three shells were observed to be effective, one 26. The search of the KREBS occupied three apparently exploding the -ready-use ammuni- quarters of an hour and while SOMALI was tion, another bursting in the wheelhouse and stopped numbers of fishing craft took the op- the third in the (boiler room. A considerable portunity to come alongside and throw their volume of smoke was seen to be coming from fish on board as gifts to the ship's company. the trawler which was clearly out of control. The fishing boat which took the boarding party Fire was accordingly checked. Five survivors was rewarded with gifts of food and cigarettes. were then seen to be swimming in the water; 27. At 1015 the KREBS was sunk by gun- they were picked up by 0655. fire after an unsuccessful attempt had been 18. At this time gunfire could be heard at made to destroy her by depth charge fired from Port X. As W/T communication with the the port thrower. She finally disappeared at landing places had not yet been established 1030. Her armament consisted of a 3 or 6-pdr. and the Brigadier was anxious to find out if gun forward, a 2-cm Madsen machme-gun aft any landings had been opposed, SOMALI left and eight depth charges in two chutes. the now helpless trawler, which had run aground on a small island, and proceeded to 28. A summary of the happenings at the ascertain the state of affairs at Ports X, B various ports is given in the ensuing paragraphs. and A. 29. At Port X an important success was the 19. At 0710 SOMALI, made the negative destruction of the HAMBURG by gunfire from W/T silence sign and from then on, throughout TARTAR. This was a ship of 9780 tons which the operation, satisfactory W/T communica- had been specially converted into a fish-refri- tions were maintained with all landing places. gerating and factory ship. From the report V/S* communication was also established at of the officer in charge of the naval demolition each landing place. party at Port X it appears that a plan was made to take possession of this ship and to 20. At each port, operations were proceeding steam her as a prize to England and that this according to plan and by 0735 reports had been plan was frustrated by TARTAR opening fire received that at all four ports landings had been and destroying her. I consider that the Com- effected successfully without (opposition and manding Officer, HM S TARTAR, was justi- that relations with the Norwegian population fied in the action he took, having regard to the were most cordial. From this time onwards, general ,instructions for the conduct of -the reports came in from all military landing parties operation and to the fact that no information that allotted tasks were being earned out suc- of the plan to seize the ship had been communi- cessfully and the Brigadier, from his position cated *o him Nor was I, myself, aware of it. on SOMALI'S bridge, was kept in continual touch with the progress of operations. 30 In addition, , TARTAR sunk the PASAJES, 1996 tons, and completed the 21 .By now the local Norwegian fishing fleet destruction of the FELIX -HEUMANN, 2468 had put to sea; there were literally hundreds of tons, which was still floating after partial des- little -fishing smacks and small puffers begin- truction by the naval demolition party. The ning to fish in the adjacent waters. It quickly latter, from H M.S. (NELSON, under the com- became clear to them that our operations were mand of Lieutenant D. D. Bone, :R.N., sank directed against the Germans and that they were the EILENAU, 1404 tons, the trawler RISSEN not to be molested. They showed their friend- and, as stated above, commenced the destruc- liness and enthusiasm by cheering and waving tion of the FELIX HEUMANN.' The work and hoisting Norwegian flags. performed by this party was most creditable. 22. From Port A SOMALI then proceeded It is believed that the large majority of the back to Port X. During the passage the trawler crews of all these ships were made prisoners KREBS, still burning, was seen to have re- by the military landing parties and brought floated and to be drifting towards the centre back in QUEEN EMMA. of the fjord As SOMALI closed, a white flag 31. At 1035 the Norwegian trawler MYR- was seen being waved and at 0910 a boarding LAND, whose crew wished to proceed to party was sent over in a Norwegian fishing boat England and asked for instructions, was who volunteered their services. The survivors directed by TARTAR to proceed independently consisted of five ratings, all of whom were to Skaalefjord in the Faroes. This was re- Admiralty footnote — ported in my signal timed 1444 of 6th March, * V/S—visual signal. 1941. She arrived safely today, 8th March. 3686 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948

32. At Port Y, BEDOUIN at 0626,-while landing craft had left the shore and at 1255 leading the landing craft in towards the shore, QUEEN EMMA reported that she was ready intercepted the Norwegian ferry steamer MIRA to proceed. At 1256 PRINCESS BEATRIX flying the Norwegian flag and endeavoured to made a similar report from Port B. stop her 'by firing a shot across her bows. As 39. SOMALI, BEDOUIN, TARTAR, and this had no effect a second shot was fired into OUEEN EMMA proceeded to position C at 20 the fore part of the ship, but as the ship still knots. LEGION, ESKIMO and PRINCESS did not stop effective fire was opened. One BEATRIX joined company at 1330 and the shot entered the ship below the funnel, steam whole force, in day cruising order, set course poured from her and she lost way. BEDOUIN at 'best speed down Vestfjord. 'Columns of then left her to see the landing parties safely smoke were still rising from the burning oil ashore This done, iBEDOUIN, acting in ac- tanks and plant and a heavy pall lay over the cordance with my instructions, returned to sink scene of the day's operations. the MIiRA. It was seen that she was being abandoned and, when this was completed and 40. At 1530 as the force was passing Vaeroy, the- rafts were clear, fire was opened. MIRA a German reconnaissance aircraft was sighted was very soon severely damaged and started to by BEDOUIN and was heard by the same sink slowly. ship to make a 'W/T report: BEDOUIN accordingly carried out jamming procedure. 33. I was subsequently informed by a mili- The aircraft flew at about 6,000 feet making full tary officer of one of the landing parties thac use of cloud cover and was engaged by ships' the captain of the MIRA was forced at the guns as opportunity offered. Although con- pistol-point by a German officer on board to ditions appeared very favourable for a bomb- continue on his course, despite BEDOUIN'S ing attack none was made and the aircraft warning shots. It is ibelieved that this officer disappeared shortly after 1600. In view of this - and 12 German soldiers who were also on board sighting, I made the W/T report of the success- were later taken prisoner and brought back ful completion of the operation at once, without in QUEEN EMMA. It is feared that there waiting aritil the1 force was clear of the area. were some casualties to Norwegian civilians as a result of BEDOUIN'S gunfire. 41. At 1700 course was altered to the westward for position P which was reached at 0900 34. By 0840 it had become evident that the on 5th March, after which course was altered work of the -landing parties at Port Y would to the southward. Vice Admiral Commanding, shortly be completed. QUEEN EMMA, who i8th Cruiser Squadron, in EDINBURGH, with had fceen lying off Port X, was accordingly 1 NIGERIA in company, were sighted at 1020 directed to proceed to Port Y to commence on 5th March and. provided escort for the re-embarkation of A.L C.s.* This was com- •remainder of the passage. pleted at 1024 when QUEEN EMMA, with BEDOUIN, returned to Port X who had re- 42. It was known on the morning of 5th ported all tasks completed at ion and parties March that the Germans had announced that ready to re-embark. a raid had been made and I 'therefore considered it desirable to signal a brief report of 35. By 1030 SOMALI was proceeding to the success' of the operation as early as could cover the landing parties at Port A as LEGION be done with safety. Accordingly when the had moved southward to investigate two force was in position of approximately 64°oo'N. trawlers which subsequently proved to be 4°oo'W and darkness was approaching W/T Norwegian puffers. During 'this passage, dense silence was broken for this purpose. Unfortu- columns of heavy black smoke could be seen 1 nately signalling conditions were very un- at Ports X and A rising to the tops of the favourable and it took much longer than had surrounding mountains, a height of several been anticipated to clear the message. thousand feet, sure evidence of the thorough- ness with which the landing parties were 43. The wounded prisoners from the KREBS carrying out their tasks of destruction. were accommodated in the sick bay, and my 36. At Port A the military completed their harbour cabin during the return passage They tasks successfully and LEGION was not called received the 'greatest care and skilful attention upon to give any, support. Two German from my Medical Officer, Surgeon 'Lieutenant trawlers, the ANDO, 300 tons, and the1 M. G Low, R.N.V.R., assisted by the sick GROTTO, 200 tons, which were the onhy bay staff, the Flotilla chaplain and the canteen enemy ships in the harbour, were sunk by the1 .'manager. The Army'other ranks also assisted. naval demolition party from H.M S. RODNEY Two of the men were very seriously wounded under the command of Lieutenant C. P. N. and owe their lives to the skilled nursing they Wells-Cole, R.N. By the time SOMALI had received. Similar good arrangements for the arrived at noo re-embarkation of troops had wounded were made in QUEEN EMMA. already commenced. 44. The return passage was made without incident and Force " Rebel " arrived at Scapa 37. At Port B, as at Port A, ESKIMO was, at 1300 on 6th March. not called upon to give any support to the landing parties, who completed their tasks 45. After arrival prisoners and volunteers successfully, nor was there any enemy shipping were disembarked from all ships, the wounded present against which she could take action. being discharged to H.M.H.S. AMARAPOORA. 38. SOMALI returned to Port X at 1200 to General Remarks. find re-embarkation in progress. The time 46. I was greatly impressed with the efficient required for this- was increased by the large handling and station-keeping of the troop number of prisoners and volunteers to be em- carriers, particularly as they were both newly barked in QUEEN EMMA who sailed with 852 commissioned ships with no previous experience -persons on board. By 1230, however, the last of working in formation. The lowering and A dmiralty footnote —r hoisting of the landing craft during the opera- * A L C —Assault Landing Craft. tion was carried out in a most efficient manner. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948 3687,

47. Owing to the troop carriers sailing for the (b) 250 all ranks of No. 4 Commando Clyde a few hours after our return to Scapa it under the command of Lieut.-Colonel D. S. has not been possible for me to obtain details Lister, M C. (The Buffs) in H.M S. QUEEN of the military operation with sufficient EMMA. accuracy to make any but the most general (c) 250 all ranks of No 3 Commando reference to them in this report. It has, how- under the command of Major J. F. Durnford- ever, 'been arranged for copies of Brigadier Slater (Royal Artillery) in H.M.S. PRIN- Haydon's report to ibe forwarded to the Com- CESS BEATRIX. mander-m-Chief, Home Fleet, as soon as it has (d) One Section No 55 Field Company been prepared. Royal Engineers (2nd Lieut. H. M. Turner, 48 I should like to record with pleasure that Royal Engineers). • ,: . throughout the planning and' execution of this (e) 4 officers and 48 other ranks of the operation Brigadier Haydon co-operated whole- Norwegian Forces, under the command of heartedly and at no tirrte did we have the Captain Martin Linge. slightest difficulty in reaching mutually satis- The detachments of Royal Engineers and factory conclusions. His presence on board of Norwegian troops were divided between SOMALI, with his staff, was most welcome H.M.S QUEEN EMMA and H.M.S. in every way. PRINCESS BEATRIX in accordance with (Signed) C. CASLON, the tasks to be carried out in each port. Captain (D), Concentration of the force and preparatory Sixth Destroyer' Flotilla. work. 4. Operational Headquarters Special Service APPENDIX ,. Brigade, Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos, the Royal REPORT ON OPERATION " CLAYMORE " Engineers detachment and the Norwegian troops embarked at Gourock in H.(M.S. QUEEN by Brigadier J. C. Haydon, D.S.O., O.B.E., EMMA and H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX Commanding Special Service Brigade. during the afternoon of Friday, 2ist February, i$th March, 1941. 1941, and left for Scapa Flow on the evening of that day. Objects of the operation. Scapa was reached at 1430 hours on the 22nd 1. (a) The Military objects of the operation February and the ships were anchored between were to destroy the facilities for producing H.M.S. NELSON and H.M.S KING GEORGE herring and cod oil in the Ports of Stamsund, V. Hennmgsvaer, Svolvaer and Brettesnes, all of The troops remained at Scapa until the force which are situated in the Lofoten Islands; to sailed for me Lofoten Islands at oooi hours arrest local supporters of the Quisling party; on Saturday-, ist March, 1941 Thus, there in- to capture any enemy personnel found in the tervened a period of almost a week during ports, and to enlist recruits for the Free Nor- which all the final arrangements, plans and wegian Forces. orders could be prepared, published and ex- (b) The Naval objective at the ports was the plained and during which those who were to destruction or capture of enemy ships and of operate together during the operation could Norwegian vessels found to be working for the meet and get to know one another. • Germans. There can be no doubt whatsoever regarding Forces taking part in the operation. the essential nature of this comparatively short 2. Naval. • - - ' time of preparation. (a) The 6th Destroyer Flotilla, under the Though the nature of the raid precluded command of Captain C. Caslon, R.N., and meticulous rehearsals of the tasks allotted to composed of: - each troop or detachment, the week at Scapa was invaluable from the military point of view, H.M.S. SOMALI, in that it gave both officers and men time to H.M.S. BEDOUIN, accustom themselves to the ships from which H.M.S. TARTAR, they were to work; to get to know the officers H.M.S. ESKIMO, and crews of the landing craft which were to H.M.S. LEGION, take them inshore, and, in general, to make the formed the Naval escort and were responsible personal contacts which are so essential a pre- tor the safety of the military forces dunng liminary to an enterprise of this kind. the approach to and return from the Lofoten Islands and for the provision of .close sup- 5. So far as the Naval and Military Com- port while the operations on shore were in manders were concerned, the period at Scapa progress. was filled toy a series of conferences, at which all details and difficulties were examined and (b) H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA (Commander solutions reached. / C. A. Kershaw, R.N.) carrying the troops Several points of major importance emerged destined for Svolvaer and Brettesnes. during these meetings. The first concerned the (c) H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX (Com- problem of supporting fire from the destroyers. mander T. B. Brunton, R.N.) carrying the Captain C. Caslon, R.N., the Senior Naval troops destined for Stamsund and Hennings- Officer, having studied the charts of the area of vaer. operations, reached the conclusion that, owing (d) Naval demolition parties carried in to navigational difficulties, the escorting des- H.M S. QUEEN EMMA and .H.M.S. PRIN- troyers would not be able to lie closer than ap- CESS BEATRIX. proximately i mile from each port. 3. Military.—The Military forces taking part This distance, taking into account the some- in the raid were: — what tortuous nature of the approaches, and (a) Operational Headquarters Special the half-lights of early morning, made it un- Service Brigade in H.M.S. SOMALI. likely that the destroyers would be in a position 594°3 A2 3688. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948 lo afford support by direct fire or that they earlier than the time limit fixed for the other would even Ibe able to keep the landing crait three ports. in view throughout the passage between the 7. The third matter of importance from the ships and the shore. military point of view was the possibility which . These were, of course, important considera- was. explained by the Commander-m-Chief, tions and changed somewhat drastically the Home Fleet, that the escorting destroyers might military aspect of the operation, under which be forced to leave the vicinity of the four ports it had been envisaged that the landing craft should a naval action be precipitated by the would be able to move into each port with' the move of the force to the Lofotens. escorting destroyers in the closest attendance The period during which the destroyers and dominating any possible opposition with might be away could not, of course, be fore- their guns. cast with any accuracy but, as a precautionary However, in view of the information avail- measure, each man was ordered to take ashore able concerning the enemy forces which were with him rations sufficient for 48 hours. likely to be encountered, it was decided to 8 It should be stressed that it was the few accept the disadvantages and difficulties arising days spent at Scapa which gave each Com- from the possible employment of indirect fire mander ample opportunity to examine in the and to insert special instructions in the opera- most complete detail the problems which faced tion order concerning the use of this method of him and to consult naval officers concerned on support. any points of difficulty arising out of them. In this connection, it will be appreciated that the lack of gridded maps, the restricted size of It is also worthy of emphasis that, had the each port, the danger areas which would have nature of the operation entailed a long approach to Ibe allowed for and the desire to avoid any in darkness for the landing craft, or had the unnecessary damage to Norwegian property, all tasks allotted to the various detachments been tended to complicate the situation and to make such as to require exact and repeated rehearsal, it more and more, apparent that there would this preparatory period of six days would not probably be a period in each port during which have been long enough. the troops would have to rely only on their In such circumstances, 14 to 18 days might own weapons and on such covering fire as well have been required. could be given by any detachments which had already been landed. The' approach to the Lofoten Islands. g. The force, which bore the code name In these circumstances] Commanders were " Rebel ", left Scapa Flow at oooi hrs. on instructed to make their approach with caution the ist March and proceeded first to Skaalef jord and to use the leading craft at each port as a in the Faroes where the destroyers were to scout so that all would not be subjected to fire refuel at one and the same time. The fjord was reached at 1900 hrs. on ist Further, troops were to be prepared to open March, and the weather conditions had been fire and mutually support each other from their such that it was hoped, with some degree of landing craft should the need arise. confidence, that Force " Rebel " had escaped The situations which might have arisen enemy observation. clearly called for the use of S.L.C.s* but there 10. After a stay of about five hours, the force were none available. proceeded on its way routed through various 6. A further decision arrived at after a study points previously fixed by the Commander-in- of the navigational difficulties, concerned the Chief, Home Fleet. movement of H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA after the 11. During the night of Monday, 3rd March, landing'craft for Svolvaer had been launched. Force " Rebel " entered the Vestfjord and It was thought originally that the two shortly before 0400 hrs on the following morn- A.L.C.sf required for Brettesnes could be ing, the many navigational lights in the neigh- dropped at the same time as those for Svolvaer bourhood of the Lofotens came into view. and that they would then be able to proceed That these should have been burning at what astern of their escorting destroyer through the appeared to be full brilliance was somewhat narrow channel named on the chart as Holen surprising but certainly gave good cause for the Skjoldver. hope that the arrival of the force had been It was decided, however, that it would be unheralded and that the complete effects of both unsound and unwise to risk passing either surprise might be obtained. Such indeed proved a destroyer or unescorted landing craft through to be the case. this passage. 12. The exactness of the timing and the ex- As a result of this decision, H.M.S QUEEN Ireme accuracy of the naval approach, both EMMA was instructed that, having dropped the of which were due to the careful arrangements landing craft for Svolvaer, she was to proceed and the untiring supervision of Captain C. to Brettesnes in company with the escorting des- Caslon, R.N., and of his Navigating Officer, troyer, passing to the south of Skravven. Lieut -Commander Shaw, R N., cannot be praised too highly As this route was appreciably longer than There is no doubt whatsoever that the accom- that through Holen Skjoldver and as it was de- plishment of the military tasks on shore was sirable that the concentration of the force after much facilitated thereby. the conclusion of the shore operation should not be delayed, orders were issued that the The operations on shore. troops landed at Brettesnes should be ready to 13 The operations ashore proceeded accord- re-embark at 1130 hours which was i hour ing to plan and all tasks allotted to the force Admiralty footnotes •— were earned out. The times of the initial land- * S L C —Support Landing Craft ings at each port varied but troops were ashore f A L C.-—landing craft for landing troops at all of them by 0650 hours. By 1300 hours SUPPLEMENT TO "THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948 3689 both H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX arid Reception by the inhabitants. H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA had re-embarked all 18. The reports received from the Military their troops and were ready to sail. Commanders at each port show that in every Inter-communications. case our troops were given a welcome, the genuine enthusiasm of which cannot be 14. Owing to Lhe excellence of, the intercom- munication arrangements made by Lieut. Sir doubted. Marshall G. C. Warmington, Bart., R.N., of Although it must have been abundantly clear H.M S. SOMALI, it was possible to obtain at that the demolitions which were being carried all times a mo'st clear and_ accurate picture of the through would inevitably 'have sad effects on the livelihood of many, there always seemed to be progress of the operations on shore. the over-riding realisation that they were well The personnel for the various signal detach- worth aiding and abetting so long as they were ments were all drawn- from the Home Fleet. also the means of retarding and interfering They were faced with the task of operating wire- with production urgently required by the less sets to which they were not accustomed, enemy. and with but little time to practise with them. In many instances, the gifts distributed !by The ease with which they overcame this diffi- our troops were at once matched by presents culty and the speed and accuracy with which given to them by the inhabitants. In short, the many signals were passed says much for they were welcomed by a people whose natural their individual1 skill and for the instruction and ; virility and inherent soundness of character training they were given by the naval officer had ridden safely over the many insidious to whom I have referred above. dangers which must follow from months of State of the light at the time of the landings. enemy occupation. 15 The original intention was to make four Military action at the four ports. simultaneous landings at 0630 hrs. but, after further examination of the meteorological data,. 19. The following were the Senior Military it was considered that such early landings would Officers at each port:— , force the A.L.C.s and M.L.C.-s* to make their At Stamsund—Major J. F. Durnford- difficult approaches in conditions of what may Slater, R.A. be termed " dangerous " darkness. At ,'Henningsvaer—Captain A. S. Ronald, The time of landing was therefore put back K.R.R.C. • to 0645 hrs. At Svolvaer—Lieut.-Colonel D. S. Lister, In the event the morning of March 4th was MC., The Buffs. exceptionally clear and calm. There was no At OBrettesnes—Major M. E Kerr, The fog, no sea mist, no rain or snow and what Rifle Brigade. breeze there was blew from a. favourable though 20. The characteristics which "'seem to stand" unusual quarter. out from the operations as a whole are the Thus the landing craft approached the shore excellent and frequent reports rendered by the under rather better light conditions than were senior officers at each port; the speed with required or were desirable. which the'detachments carried out their allotted However, it is difficult to see how such rare duties, and the initiative shown by junior com- conditions can be legislated for except by manders in seeking for and carrying through abandoning the idea of making the landings useful and important tasks in addition to those simultaneously and allowing instead a 30 or 45 specifically mentioned in the operation orders. minutes period during any part of which they , I. would particularly bring to your notice may take place. Lieut.Colonel iD. S. Lister, M.C., The Buffs, T'he obvious danger of such a procedure is who was in command of the operations at that the defences at the point where the earliest Svolvaer and 'Brettesnes and 'Major J. F. Durn- landing is made may be given time to warn ford-Slater, Royal Artillery, who commanded other points at which landings are attempted 10 the troops at Stamsund and Henningsvaer. or 20 minutes later. 21. Lieutenant H. M.' Turner, Royal Effect of low temperatures. Engineers, and his section of No. 55 Field 16 Even during the short passage between Company Royial Enginers accomplished ex- H..M.S QUEEN EMMA, H.M.S. PRINCESS cellent work and carried out their tasks in a BEATRIX and the various ports, it was found most skilled and competent manner. that weapons had a distinct tendency to freeze 22. Consolidated results of the operation are up and become hard to operate. given in the Annexure Should such low temperatures be anticipated again in the future, some special arrangements Assistance rendered by the Norwegian troops. would have to be made to guard against this 23. It is not too much to say that the opera- danger. tions on shore could not have been carried through within the time limits laid down in Opposition. the Operation Orders or with the ease or good 17. At no point on shore was any opposition relations and understanding that existed -had encountered, though some of the enemy person- it- not been for the enthusiastic help and co- nel, notably those at the air station outside operation of the 'Norwegian detachment com- Svolvaer who were armed with a machine-gun manded by Captain Martin Linge. and other weapons, might well have inflicted This officer never spared himself for* one casualties and delayed progress. So far as is moment either during the preparatory period known, the only shots fired by the enemy were or during the raid, itself. the three or four rounds aimed at H.M.S; His "enthusiasm and personality were infec- SOMALI by the armed trawler KREBS. No tious and it is hoped that his ,most valuable casualties were incurred by our troops. services and those of his detachment may be A dmiralty footnote — brought to the- notice of the Norwegian * M L C —landing craft for mechanised vehicles. • authorities. • 3690 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948

Outline plan for the raid. tribute is paid to the Senior (Naval Officer with 24. The outline plan for the Military opera- Force " Rebel." tions, which dealt with the total force to ibe Captain C. Caslon, R.N. (iH.M.S. SOMALI) employed, the division of the force between the was responsible for carrying through the ar- four ports and the main tasks to ibe accomp- rangements which resulted in the force arriving lished at each, was drawn up in the office of undetected and with absolute accuracy at the the Director of Combined Operations. appointed destination, and for their safe return This plan was not altered in any one of its to this country. essential features. Throughout the operation his bearing, skill Naval assistance and co-operation. and obvious ability could not but give confi- 25. Nothing could have been more inspiring dence to all who came in contact with him. than the help and assistance given to the Mili- " So far as the Military Commanders were con- tary force (by the Royal Navy. cerned there could not have been a more easy It will suffice to say that no officer, N.C.O., person to work with and this comment applies or man left Scapa Flow without the deep seated with equal force to the captains of the other and often expressed hope that it would be his destroyers forming the 6th Flotilla. privilege to co-operate again with the Royal Navy in the very near future. (Signed) J. C. HAYDON, 26. It is hoped that it will not be considered Brigadier, out of place if in this, a Military Report, some Commanding Special Service Brigade.

ANNEXURE CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATION CLAYMORE 4th March, 1941 I. Shipping destroyed and sunk. Sunk by Ship Tonnage Flag H.M.S. SOMALI Armed Trawler KREBS, 300 German H.M.S. TARTAR HAMBURG 9>78o PASAJES 1,996 H.M.S. TARTAR FELIX HEUMANN .. 2,468 (after partial destruction by naval demolition party). H.M.S. BEDOUIN MIRA Norwegian Naval Demolition Parties EILENAU 1,404 German RISSEN 250 ANDO 300 GROTTO 200 R.E. Demolition Parties BERNHARDT SCHULTZE 1,500 19,350 tons 2. Factories destroyed. Stamsund Henningsvaer • Svolvaer Brettesnes Lofotens Cod Boiling Allen & Hanbury* Cuba "I Herring Oil and fish meal Plant. Johannes Malnes* Silda j oil. factory Cod meal factory. Miller Medicinal Oil Aarseather Bros.* Yttervicks Cod Meal Renneberg* Blix Cod Oil Christiansen* Vagle Cod Oil. Linon Seleskap* Clement Johnson* Electric Light Plant Henningsvaer Oil Feeding Stuffs. 3. Oil Tanks and approximate total of oil destroyed. ^ Stamsund Henningsvaer Svolvaer Brettesnes Kerosene Tanks Hendnksen Paraffin Tank Oil Tanks . Oil Tanks. Oil Tanks. S. Bang Oil Tanks. Oil Tanks at Klofterhl. Approximate total = 800,000 gallons. , 4. Quisling supporters captured 12 5. Enemy subjects captured : (a) Naval... "...... 7 (6) Army ( 3 (c) Air Force 15 (d) Merchant Na'vy 172 (e) Civilians 14 (/) S.S. Police 2 = 213 Total Prisoners 225 * Boiling Plant SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948 3691

64°00'A/. 03°00'fV.

, i0 • i—i 1 1—T;—i 1 1 1—x 5 Longitude West 0 Longitude East b Based on Admiralty Chart N° Misc- 33d, TRACK OF FORCE "REBEL"FROM SCAPA FLOW TO VESTFJORD 3692 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 JUNE, 1948

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