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H050.1 Naval Action in the Korean War, 25 June to 1 September 1950 Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 20 June 2020 North Korea

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H050.1 Naval Action in the Korean War, 25 June to 1 September 1950 Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 20 June 2020 North Korea H050.1 Naval Action in the Korean War, 25 June to 1 September 1950 Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 20 June 2020 North Korean Offensive – 25 June 1950. At 0400 on Sunday morning 25 June 1950, an armored brigade and six divisions of 89,000 soldiers of th the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in four main avenues of attack poured crossed the 38 ​ Parallel ​ marking the boundary between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea.) Spearheaded by about 200 Soviet-supplied T-34 tanks and 120 fighter and ground attack aircraft along with heavy artillery and with the advantage of tactical surprise, the North Koreans quickly routed the 38,000 Republic of Korea (ROK) troops in the forward area, who had no tanks, no anti-tank weapons, no air support, not much training, and no warning. The armored rd th brigade and two NKPA infantry divisions (the 3 ​ and 4 D​ ivisions,) with two divisions in reserve, headed ​ ​ th th st directly toward the ROK capital of Seoul, only 30 miles south of the 38 ​ Parallel. The 6 ​ and 1 ​ NKPA ​ th ​ ​ Infantry Divisions attacked further west before funneling into Seoul, while the 7 ​ Infantry Division th ​ attacked through the central mountains and the 5 ​ Infantry Division attacked southward on the highway ​ along the ROK east coast on the Sea of Japan (East Sea to the Koreans.) Although there had been strategic intelligence warning that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea in 1948 would risk a Communist North Korean attempt to reunify Korea by force, and there had been extensive warning of the North Korean build-up of strength and capability along the border, the exact timing of the attack still came as a surprise. By the end of the first day, ROK ground forces had been decimated and were in full retreat, and the South Korean air force (about half a dozen trainers and no combat aircraft) was of no use. The NKPA would be in the outskirts of the ROK capital of Seoul by early on 27 June. The Battle of the Korea Strait – 26 June 1950 The lone bright spot in an overwhelmingly bleak situation on the first days of the attack was provided by the fledgling Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN.) Before dawn on 26 June 1950, the most-capable ship in the ROKN was underway from the main base at Chinhae and was on patrol about 18 miles from Pusan (now Busan) at the southeast tip of the Korean Peninsula, and sighted an unidentified ship in the darkness. The submarine chaser Bak Du San (PC-701,) the former USS PC-823, challenged the unidentified steamer with signal lights, but received no response. PC-701 then turned her searchlight on the steamer and received heavy machine gun fire in return that killed the helmsman and seriously wounded the Officer of the Deck. PC-701 then engaged the steamer with her single 3-inch gun and six 50-caliber machine guns. The unidentified 1,000-ton steamer was actually a former U.S. transport that had been hijacked by South Korean Communist guerillas in October 1949 and taken to the North. On the night of 25/26 June th 1950, the steamer was carrying 600 troops of the North Korean 766 ​ Independent Infantry Regiment ​ with the intent of seizing the port of Pusan. In a running gun battle at ranges of less than 400-yards, the PC-701 sank the steamer as it tried to flee, with the loss of almost all the North Korean troops on board. ROKN sailors used M-1 rifle fire against North Korean troops that tried to reach PC-701. PC-701 suffered two dead and two wounded. The “Battle of the Korea Strait,” as the ROKN would call it, had major strategic importance. At the time, the port of Pusan was very poorly defended. Had the North Korean surprise operation succeeded, the outcome of the war might have been very different, because by the beginning of August, Pusan was the last remaining port in South Korea that had not fallen to the North Koreans. It would be the only initial entry point for U.S. forces that prevented the North Koreans from overrunning the entire Korean Peninsula. Also on the previous morning of 25 June 1950, the ROKN had partial success interdicting one of two North Korean landings along the east coast of South Korea. The first North Korean convoy (two submarine chasers, one minesweeper, and 20 troop-carrying schooners) put ashore four battalions of th NKPA troops near Kangnung, just far enough south of the 38 ​ Parallel to cut off the retreat of ROK ​ troops along the coast road. A second North Korean convoy (two minesweepers, one patrol ship, one submarine chaser, and several schooners) landed Communist guerillas near Samcheok (abouth half-way down the east coast of South Korea.) The small ROKN minesweeper YMS-509 engaged the convoy and sank two schooners but after a short battle with North Korean minesweeper No. 31 was forced to withdraw. At the start of the war, the ROKN was woefully under-funded, under-equipped, and under-trained, consisting of a few ex-U.S. and ex-Japanese vessels, including one submarine chaser, Bak Du San (PC-701,) 15 auxiliary motor minesweepers (mostly ex-Japanese), one ex-U.S. landing ship tank (LST,) most only recently obtained, and about 7,000 personnel, including 1,200 ROK Marines. The “flagship” of the ROKN, PC-701, had been purchased in large part by taxing the salaries of all ROKN personnel, midshipmen selling scrap medal and Navy wives doing laundry. USS PC-823 had been decommissioned in early 1946 and transferred to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and renamed ENSIGN WHITEHEAD. The ship was in poor material condition when the ROKN bought her in September 1949 and then sailed her from New York to Korea via Hawaii (where a 3-inch gun was re-installed) and Guam (where the ROKN had just enough money to buy 100 rounds of 3-inch ammunition.) By contrast, the North Korean Navy was somewhat larger and better equipped than the ROKN, with 13,000 personnel, and equipment mostly obtained from the Soviet Union, including three OD-200-type submarine chasers, five G-5 type aluminum-hulled motor torpedo boats (PT-boats,) two former U.S. YMS-type small minesweepers (via U.S.-Soviet lend-lease during WW2,) one ex-Japanese minesweeper, one floating base, one military transport, six various motor gunboats and up to 100 miscellaneous small craft, schooners, junks, sampans, etc. U.S. Navy Command Structure at the Start of the Korean War. The Secretary of the Navy was Francis P. Mathews, known derisively as “Rowboat” to senior Naval Officers as that was the extent of his Navy experience. A political-fund raiser, Mathews had replaced John L. Sullivan when he resigned in protest over Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson’s (also a fund-raiser for President Truman with service in the Army in WW1 and Assistant Secretary of the Army in 1937-40) unilateral decision to cancel the super-carrier UNITED STATES (CVA-58.) Johnson had no use for the Navy and made no effort to hide his disdain. Secretary Johnson had not even consulted or informed Secretary of the Navy Sullivan or Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld before cancelling the UNITED STATES. Johnson’s primary mission was to drastically slash the defense budget and set himself up for his own run for President. Secretary Johnson believed the Navy was obsolete and was convinced by the new U.S. Air Force (established as a separate service by the National Security Act of 1947) that future wars would be fought and won by B-36 inter-continental bombers with nuclear bombs. Rowboat Mathews was Johnson’s hatchet man, and the two would be substantially responsible for the U.S. Navy’s abysmal state of readiness at the start of the Korean War. (If you wonder why many senior U.S. Navy officers weren’t exactly thrilled by naming an aircraft carrier the HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN-75,) this is why, and in another twist of irony, the original name for CVN-75 was the UNITED STATES.) By 1949, due to drastic budget cuts after Truman was re-elected in 1948, the Navy had been drastically reduced in size. Of 24 Essex-class carriers built during World War II, only five were still operational (plus three Midway-class,) and in 1949 Secretary Johnson directed that the number of operational carriers be reduced to four (which was the number the Army thought was adequate. The new U.S. Air Force argued that zero carriers was the right number.) In addition, all but one battleship had been put into mothballs, along with numerous cruisers and destroyers. Perhaps even more importantly, the number of operational auxiliaries such as oilers had been severely reduced, significantly compromising the Navy’s ability to sustain itself at sea. The Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, at the time youngest person to serve as CNO (until Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in 1970.) He was commander of U.S. Navy Forces in the Mediterranean when he was called back to Washington in October 1949 to replace CNO Admiral Louis Denfeld who had been fired by Mathews in retribution for the “Revolt of the Admirals” in which senior Navy admirals fought hard against the draconian budget cuts (which if fully carried out would have put every U.S. aircraft carrier into mothballs,) as well as fighting against the U.S.
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