Survivability and the Design of Modern Naval Warships

ArsenalArsenal ShipShip ConceptConcept –– 1996 1996

Presented By: Russell Kupferer CSC Survivability Senior Engineer 202-675-8531, [email protected] 29 June 2010

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 1 Introduction

• The primary difference between a Naval ship and a Commercial ship is SURVIVABILITY – Navy Ships are expected to be exposed to and survive enemy attack. – Safety ≠ Survivability, i.e. Design for safety does not ensure survivability. • Modern Naval Ships must balance a number of factors including weights, arrangements, missions, powering, propulsion, life cycle, cost, crewing, and survivability. • Survivability itself is a balance between expected threats, doctrine/tactics, susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, damage control, and recoverability.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 2 Topics •Who am I? •An exceptionally brief review of warship evolution. •The Ship Design Spiral •The Kill Chain •Threat Weapon Types and Effects •Survivability Design –Susceptibility Reduction –Vulnerability Reduction –Damage Control Recoverability •Trends in Naval Ship/Survivability design •Conclusion/Questions

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 3 CSC Advanced Marine Center Survivability Department •The CSC Advanced Marine Center Survivability department supports the NAVSEA design community, program offices, and technical warrant holders •Expertise in two main areas of survivability –Design and Assessment –Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) •CSC AMC supports multiple programs: –CVN 78, DDG 1000, JHSV, LCC(R), LCS, LHA 6, LPD 17, and MPF(F)

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 4 Evolution of Warship Design

Greek Galley (~600 BC) Korean Turtle Ship (~1600 AD) Dutch Ship of the Line (~1800 AD) HMS Warrior (1861)

SMS Von der Tann (1910) IJN Yamato (1941) USS Monterey (1990)

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 5 Ship Design in Brief

• Ship design occurs in a spiral development, during which Analysis of design requirements are revised and finalized to create Alternatives an optimal final design. Requirements Concept Arrangements Hull Design Design

Preliminary Structures Hydrostatics Design

Detail Stability Weights Design

Powering Construction • Survivability is just one of many design considerations Change of Difficulty/Cost that are considered as the ship proceeds through the design spiral. Tests and – Survivability design requirements will often drive key aspects Trials of the ship’s design. – Survivability design support facilitates intelligent trade-offs and Follow-on design decisions during the design process. Flights EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 6 The Kill Chain

Detection – Can occur through a variety of Susceptibility means, from satellite reconnaissance to the Mark I eyeball

Identification/Localization – To shoot at a target you need to know where it is, where it is going, and most importantly, who it belongs to Engagement – Weapons that are fired have to successfully acquire and track the target, find their way to the engagement zone, and evade the target’s defenses Vulnerability Primary Damage – Weapons that strike the target must do enough damage to the ship to render it mission incapable, i.e. eliminate its contribution in the fight Recoverability Secondary Damage – Weapons are also designed to cause progressive damage, including fire, smoke, and flooding, which must be combatted by damage control crews

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 7 Threats Types

• Conventional threats fall into two broad categories: – AIREX threats are those that are delivered and do the majority of their damage above the waterline. These threats include: • Missiles/Rockets • Ballistic Projectiles • Bombs – UNDEX threats are those that are delivered and do the majority of their damage below the waterline. These threats include: • Mines • Torpedoes • Other threats can induce weapons effects that subject the ship to adverse environments: – These threats can be quite varied, but can include: • Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) effects • Information Warfare

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 8 AIREX Weapons • Missiles/Rockets – Guidance is typically active, semi-active, or passive radar homing for longer range weapons, and infrared (IR) or electro-optical (EO) for shorter range weapons, with some remote- guidance and dual-sensor weapons. – Warheads are typically either: • Semi-Armor Piercing – Will penetrate several meters into a ship before detonating, therefore maximizing internal damage. • Fragmentation – Will detonate above the target to damage topside electronics, equipment, and personnel. • Shaped Charge – Will generate a jet of superheated metal to penetrate as deep into the ship as possible, with the intent of defeating armor and detonating internal magazines. • Ballistic Projectiles – Includes major and minor caliber bullets and shells, fired from shore or ship mounted guns and cannons. – Damage is primarily generated through the kinetic energy of the shell hitting the target, but larger shells can include explosive, fragmentation, and incendiary effects. • Bombs – Bombs can either be ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’, depending on whether they are guided or unguided as they approach the target. Targeted weapons can either be directed by onboard sensors or directed by an external illuminator. – Warheads are normally semi-armor piercing or fragmentation, though some shaped-charge, deep penetrating, and kinetic-kill bombs have also been developed. – Bombs lack the range of modern missiles, but are relatively cheap, and modern ‘glide-bombs’ can travel for miles downrange when released by high-speed, high-flying aircraft.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 9 Video of SAP Weapon Test

Ex-USS Peterson Test

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 10 UNDEX Weapons

• Contact Mines – Typically are moored or floated in ‘choke points’, such as narrow straits or harbor entrances. Detonation occurs on contact. – Contact detonation will result in ‘water hammer ’ effect, in which explosive gasses from the explosion vent against the hull of the ship, penetrate, and then pull a ‘slug’ of water into the ship at very high speeds. • Underbottom Mines – Typically are laid on the seafloor in relatively shallow water (<300 ft), in fields or lines. – Use acoustic, magnetic, and pressure sensors to detect when ships are transiting above them. Sensors can include logic to prevent false or early activation. – Kill mechanisms include the following: • Underwater Shock – The explosion induces a shock wave through the water, which can break equipment, overload structure, and unseat personnel and system components. • Whipping – The induced load and follow on bubble pulse can result in high-load oscillation of hogging and sagging moments, which will can severely damage ship structure. • Torpedoes – Modern torpedoes are either acoustic or wake-homing, with some remote control capability in ‘wire-guided’ variants. Most will use magnetic fuses to determine when they are under the hull of the target. – Modern torpedoes are usually designed to combine the kill mechanisms of contact mines and underbottom mines, creating shock, whipping, and water hammer effects that may literally break a ship in two.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 11 Video of Torpedo Test

DDG 81 Shock Test

Torpedo Vid

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 12 Nuclear, CBR-D, and Information Warfare Threats

• Nuclear Environments – Nuclear weapons can generate shock fronts, blast overpressures, radiant heat loads, and transient electromagnetic effects. – The damage mechanisms associated with nuclear explosions tend to be less severe than conventional weapons, but occur over longer durations to the entirety of the ship. • CBR – Contamination of an environment by chemical, biological, or radiological agents require specialized equipment and design to protect the crew. – A hostile CBR environment may restrict the ship’s ability to operate by limiting the crew’s ability to go topside and access unprotected spaces. • Information Warfare – Modern combatants require continuous situational awareness and external communication. Information warfare can deny these activities through: • Jamming of Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) radars and radio communications using high- powered land, sea, or air based jammers. • Denial of Line of Site (LOS) assets through destruction of key satellite nodes or directional jamming of communication relays. • Hacking of communications and data links between ships and the battle group and between the battle group and command centers.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 13 Susceptibility Reduction

• Fundamental Survivability Truth #1: If they can’t hit you, they can’t hurt you. • Susceptibility reduction harnesses this truth to improve the survivability of naval combatants. The primary methods of accomplishing this are: – Avoid being detected by reducing above and below water signatures. – Avoid being targeted by preventing the enemy from establishing and maintaining a track – Shoot the enemy before they can shoot you, i.e. “Shoot the Archer.” – Deceive, distract, or confuse inbound weapons using ‘softkill’ systems such as decoys, chaff, and jammers. – Destroy the inbound weapons before they can hit with self- defense missiles and guns.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 14 Signature Reduction

• Above Water Signatures are used by aircraft, land-based, and surface craft to detect and engage ships. They can be reduced in the following ways: – Radar – By use of shaping, shrouding, and radar absorbent materials, the radar signature of a ship can be significantly reduced. – Infrared – Through waste heat extraction, exhaust treatment, and shielding, the infrared signature of a ship can likewise be reduced. – Electromagnetic – The ship’s own electromagnetic signals (radar, radio, jamming, etc.) can be used to target weapons. By managing the level of electronic emissions (EMCON) the ability of the enemy to use these signals is reduced. Sea Shadow Research – Visual – Camouflage can still be effective in Sea Shadow Research limiting the ability of the ship to be seen, as is Ship (1985) evidenced by some of the ‘dazzle’ schemes used on littoral craft.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 15 Signature Reduction (cont.)

• Below Water Signatures are used by mines, submarines, and to a certain extent surface craft to detect and engage ships. They can be reduced in the following ways. – Acoustic – The acoustic signature of a ship can be reduced through rafting and isolation of mission equipment internally and externally through use of shaped appendages and acoustic dampening hull treatments. – Magnetic – The inherent magnetic signature of the ship can be counteracted through the use of artificial magnetic fields generated by degaussing coils. – Wake – Many modern torpedoes are ‘wake homers’, i.e. they use the turbulence created in a ship’s wake to detect and track the presence of a large ship. Wake signature reduction can be effected by hull shaping, propulsor design, and tactics. – Pressure – The pressure signature of the ship is the most difficult signature to reduce or modify, but fortunately is only detectable by certain weapons at relatively short ranges. Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD) on Lake Pend Oreille

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 16 PLAN Type 022’s Signature Reduction Features

Shrouded Exhaust Vents to Shaping/Sloping Reduces Reduce IR Signature Radar Signature

Camouflage for Littoral Combat Waterjet Propulsors

Catamaran Hull Form Aluminum Hull

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 17 Self-Defense

• Softkill – Refers to means of defense that attempt to prevent an inbound weapon from hitting the ship without directly engaging it. Softkill methods include the following: – Decoys – Decoys generate an artificial signature that is similar to the parent vessel or more attractive than the parent. Towed decoys are common to deal with torpedoes, and airborne ‘hovering’ decoys are becoming common to deceive missile threats. – Chaff/Flares – Chaff and flares attempt to create a false signature that is much larger than the parent vessel through use of large metallic blooms or brilliant phosphorous flares. – Electronic Warfare – By mimicking, spoofing, or blinding the seekers of inbound threats, weapons can be prevented from targeting the ship. • Hardkill – Refers to means of defense that attempt to destroy inbound weapons at a safe distance from the ship. Hardkill methods include the following: – Gun systems – Gun systems tend to rely on high rates of fire to create a ‘wall of lead’ in front of inbound weapons. – Missile systems – Missile systems are effective at longer ranges than guns, and are better equipped to deal with terminal maneuvers. – Directed Energy Weapons? – Future ships will likely employ microwave and laser weapons to blind or destroy incoming weapons.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 18 LPD-17 Class Hardkill and Softkill Features

Volume Search Radar

Gun Mount

Towed Torpedo Decoy Electronic Warfare Array

Decoy/Chaff Launchers

Missile Launcher

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 19 Vulnerability Reduction

• Fundamental Survivability Truth #2: No one’s untouchable. • No matter how well susceptibility reduction systems are designed, a determined attacker will find a way to defeat them. • Vulnerability reduction reduces the chance that if the ship is hit it will be rendered mission inoperable (or sunk). The primary methods or vulnerability reduction are: – Inclusion of redundancy in vital systems. – Separation of redundant systems in the hull. – Design of survivable arrangements and subdivision . – Armoring of key vulnerabilities. – Hardening of structure and equipment to withstand damage effects. Kamikaze Damage to USS Sterett - 1945

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 20 Survivable Arrangements and System Design • Redundancy – By providing redundant systems and equipment, damage to any given piece of equipment will not result in loss of the total ship capability. – Full Redundancy in systems is very expensive, but ensures continued functionality after damage. This is key for electrical, damage control, and control systems. – Partial Redundancy in systems is usually far more practical, allowing for ‘graceful degradation’ of mission systems. This is preferable for sensors, weapons, propulsion, and other mission systems. • Separation – Redundancy alone provides little benefit to survivability. To be survivable, redundant systems must be physically separated inside the hull. – Longitudinal separation is most effective in ships, because most ships are eight to twelve times longer than they are wide or tall. – For distributed systems, transverse separation of port and starboard runs are best combined with vertical separation by at least two decks. • Citadeling – Systems and equipment that are too expensive or complex to duplicate are often grouped in selected locations, such that they can be more easily armored and protected. – Citadeling is also used for manned spaces to limit the exposure of crew to damage.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 21 Survivable Arrangements in Concept Ship

1. Hull Form/Propulsion 2. Machinery Spaces 3. Weapon & Mission Spaces 4. Command & Data Spaces 5. Utility Spaces 6. Living Spaces, Stores, & Tankage

Sensors & Communications Bridge Hangar and Data Aviation Spaces Missile Gun Mooring Mooring Living Spaces/Damage Control Deck Launcher Magazine Main Prop. SSMC Data SMC Main Main Take Stores Stores Auxiliary Data Auxiliary Home Machinery Machinery Machinery Stores Machinery Prop.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 22 Hardening and Armoring

Hardening and armoring can not prevent damage to the ship, but it will limit its effects on ship structure and equipment. • Shock Hardening – Is used to limit equipment’s vulnerability to underwater explosions, usually by hardening equipment foundations, use of shock isolation mounts, and structural design. • Whipping Protection – Design of ship structure to improve longitudinal strength while eliminating structural discontinuities can reduce the amount of damage from whipping events. • Blast Hardening – Internal and external hardening of structure can limit the damage caused by blast overpressure. Advanced designs can channel ‘blow out’ paths to prevent damage from spreading internal to the ship. • Fragmentation Protection – Ceramic, steel, and composite armor plate can be placed in key locations to limit • Component Armoring – Individual components and distributed system runs can be armored if they are of special importance to the ship (such as firemain, chilled water, or high voltage electrical mains)

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 23 Armoring of HMS Vanguard (1944)

Layered Armored Decks to Protect against Diving Shells

Heavy Armor Belt to Protect against Direct Fire

No Structural Discontinuities

Armor at Waterline to Protect against Torpedoes Doublebottom Structure to Add Strength and Side Protection Protect against System to Protect Underbottom against Flooding Damage through Damage to Shell

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 24 Recoverability

• Fundamental Survivability Truth #3: If something can go wrong, it will go wrong. • Any damage event can sink a ship if it goes uncontrolled. Effective damage control is contingent on the following factors: – Situational Awareness allows damage control personnel to identify where damage has occurred to prioritize activities in the response. HMSHMS SheffieldSheffield –– May May 19821982 – Damage Boundaries have to be provided to slow fire, smoke, and flooding spread through the ship. – Damage Control systems must be robust and survivable, such that they are available to damage control personnel to contain and control the damage. – Recoverable Systems are key to retaining mission capability. After damage, ship systems must be restarted, realigned, and remanned to restore ship missions. USSUSS StarkStark –– May May 19871987

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 25 Damage Control

The Damage Control (DC) activities associated with any given hit will be determined by the type and extent of damage inflicted. The primary types of actions include the following: • Egress/Evacuation – The first step in any damage event is to get out of the Primary Damage Area (PDA). Every space aboard a ship will have a normal and alternate access route. • Investigation – Once the PDA has been evacuated, the crew will use installed sensors and DC investigators to determine the location of the damage and the potential mechanisms of damage spread. • Firefighting – Fires will be combated using a combination of installed and portable systems, with freshwater, seawater, and foam systems used in different types of spaces determined by the type of fire hazard. • Desmoking – Smoke will quickly spread throughout the ship unless smoke boundaries are established. Smoke removal paths must be set and forced draft ventilation fans will be rigged. • Dewatering – Progressive flooding through damaged bulkheads, doors, and connections will be removed using installed and portable pumps and eductors. • Counterflooding – If asymmetrical flooding creates a stability hazard, counterflooding can be used to bring the ship back to an even keel.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 26 DDG 1000 Firefighting Systems

Low Pressure Watermist PDA Sprinkling TFN Nozzles AFFF Sprinkling

High Pressure Watermist AFFF Bilge Sprinkling Magazine Sprinkling

• •LowLow PressurePressure Watermist Watermistprovidesprovides protection protection to general, living, to general, electronic, living, storage, electronic, and miscellaneous storage, spaces. Sprinkling below the 03 level is wet-head, frangible bulb nozzles. 03 level and above (except SMC) andis provided miscellaneous by automatically spaces. activated Sprinkling dry-head noz belowzles. the 03 level is wet-head, frangible bulb •nozzles.High Pressure 03 level Watermist and providesabove (exceptprotection SMC)to all MMRs, is provid AMR ed3, and by both automatically EDG rooms. activatedSystem manually dry-headactivated. nozzles. • AFFF Sprinkling provided in the hangar, flight deck flush deck, boatbay, FAS stations, machinery space • Highbilges, Pressure flight deck TFN Watermist nozzles, andprovides AFFF hose protection reels. System to manuallyall spaces activated at risk. of fuel fires. • •AFFFMagazine Sprinkling Sprinkling providedprovides sprinkling in the tohangar, AGS, PVLS, flight aviation deck ordnance flush deck,, and miscellaneousboatbay, FAS magazines. stations,System automatically machinery activated. space bilges, flight deck TFN nozzles, and AFFF hose reels. • PDA Sprinkling provides through-bulkhead sprinkling to directly cool combat damage area: frangible bulb. • •MagazineTelerobotic FirefightingSprinkling Nozzlesprovides (TFNs) sprinklingprovides protection to gun, formissile, flight deck and and cargo exterior maga deckhousezines. fires, • PDAand deckhouse Sprinkling countermeasureprovides through-bulkheadwashdown. System manually sprinkling activated. to directly cool PDA. • Telerobotic Firefighting Nozzles (TFNs) provides protection for flight deck and exterior deckhouse fires, and deckhouse countermeasure washdown.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 27 System Recovery

The recovery of distributed ship systems will depend on the crew’s ability to isolate the damage portions, reconfigure the remaining sections, and restore service to supplied systems. This involves the following: • Isolation – In combatants, isolation valves, breakers, and louvers are installed along the runs of distributed systems to give the crew the ability to isolate damage components with minimal impact on the remainder of the system. • Segregation – Distributed systems aboard combatants will typically be run in a segregated alignment during battle conditions, such that damage in one damage control zone will not directly effect operation of systems in another. • Reconfiguration – Elements that are ‘starved’ due to isolation of damage can often be brought back on line by reconfiguring the system. Mission critical components will usually have normal and alternate supplies to ensure that they are capable of restoration following damage. • Recovery – Depending on the type of system, a recovery ‘Smart’ Valve period may be required to bring temporarily deactivated systems to come back online. This delay can be minimized through the use of expert systems and automation.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 28 Automated System Recovery Animation

Time: 00:00:0000:00:0800:00:1500:00:3000:01:0000:05:00

EME

Starboard Port Forward Expansion EME Expansion Tank Tank

6.3. 2.Expansion4.5. Smart1. ExpansionCriticalExpansion Primary Valves Branches tank Damage Tankstank Close is automaticallydrains Drainswitch Breaksto Isolate intointo to ACP02 Heat ACP01 Multiplerupturedrefilled alternateRupturedand Pipe pipeRuptures CW Segments until pumpsupply. Piping smart restarts. in valve PDA Heat CW Pump Exchanger Exchanger CW Pump closes,Critical causing Loads toare CW Resupplied Pump shut down on low tank alarm.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 29 Naval Ship Design Drivers/Survivability Trends

• The biggest killer of current naval ship programs is COST . – The development, design, construction, and fielding of new ships/systems is amazingly expensive and budgets are tight. – Emphasis on cost has driven navies to consider commercial-based designs built with Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) equipment. • Reduced Manning has the potential to reduce total ship cost – Automated systems allow ships to reduce manning by replacing manual actions with automated and/or remote systems. – Total ship ownership costs are driven down dramatically by reducing the number of crew to train, field, and support. • Many modern navies depend on susceptibility reduction to protect naval assets – Long range strike capabilities reduce the need to expose ships to direct attack. – Signature reduction reduces the ability of combatants to be targeted and engaged. – Massed offensive power is assumed capable of attriting the enemy’s offensive capability before it can be deployed. • For many ship programs, Survivability is only of ancillary concern.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 30 The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

LCSLCS 11 USSUSS FreedomFreedom Displacement:Displacement: 3,0003,000 tonstons Length:Length: 378378 ft.ft. Beam:Beam: 57.457.4 ft.ft. Draft:Draft: 12.812.8 ft.ft. MaxMax Speed:Speed: 4747 kts.kts. Crew:Crew: 4040 core,core, 7575 withwith missionmission crewcrew

MixedMixed PlantPlant (Diesels(Diesels andand GasGas Turbines)Turbines) WaterjetWaterjet Propulsion Propulsion ModularModular MissionMission SystemsSystems ReducedReduced CrewCrew AluminumAluminum SuperstructureSuperstructure AcquisitionAcquisition Cost:Cost: ~$600~$600 MillionMillion

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 31 Conclusions

• Survivability is a complex field, consisting of multiple areas of expertise – Threat characteristics & Damage Mechanisms – Naval doctrine/tactics – Susceptibility Reduction – Vulnerability Reduction – Damage Control & Recoverability • And survivability is only one part of the larger effort. Survivability priorities and decisions must be constantly weighed against ship: – Acquisition and Lifetime Cost – Propulsion and Powering – Weights and Stability – Manning and Habitability – Other Factors (including politics) • Fundamental Survivability Truth #4: Everything’s a trade-off.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 32 The Most Important Thing • Warships are designed and fielded to perform many kinds of duties—from the mundane to the unthinkable. • The objective of survivability design is getting the ship through the fight and its crew home at the end of the mission. • There are myriad survivability challenges to consider and options to see it done, but the ultimate objective is simple.

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 33 Questions/Comments?

OperationOperation CrossroadsCrossroads –– Submerged Submerged NuclearNuclear TestTest atat BikBikiniini AtollAtoll –– 1946 1946

Contact Info: Russell Kupferer, CSC Survivability Senior Engineer 202-675-8531, [email protected]

EVENT/CLIENT NAME or Confidentiality statement 5/28/2008 4:54 PM New Brand FMT-P2_28May086/29/2010 34