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Owen D. Young Papers, 1874-1962 MSS

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Owen D. Young Papers, 1874-1962 MSS Owen D. Young Papers, 1874-1962 MSS. COLL. NO. 087 500 linear feet Biographical Note Owen D. Young was born on October 27, 1874 in Van Hornesville, New York, educated at St. Lawrence University (B.A., 1894) and Boston University Law School (LL.B 1896). He died July 11, 1962 in St. Augustine, Florida and is buried in Van Hornesville. Young served as a trustee of St. Lawrence from 1912 to 1934, and was chairman of the board from 1924 to 1934. Practicing law in Boston until 1912, Young was appointed general counsel for the General Electric Company. He was chairman of the board of directors from 1924 until 1939. He was one of the founders of RCA (Radio Corporation of America) in 1919. From 1919 to 1930 he was a key figure in a series of international conferences concerning German war reparations and stabilization of the German economy. In 1924, he was co-author with Vice President Charles Dawes of the Dawes Plan and author of the Young Plan in 1929. Mr. Young was married twice; first to Josephine Sheldon Edmonds (SLU class of 1895, B.A., Radcliffe, 1896), who predeceased him in 1935, then to Louise Powis Clark of St. Augustine. Scope & Content The Young Collection documents five decades of national and international business and political history, including the post World War I reparation period which saw Young as the key figure in the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929 with its provisions for the still existing Bank of International Settlements. The collection chronicles Young's leadership as chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, creator of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Vice President and Chairman of General Electric, as well as his progressive role in labor relationship, education and agriculture. The collection reflects Young's career as a lawyer, diplomat, humanist, bibliophile and as a leader in business and industry. Provenance The Owen D. Young papers were given to St. Lawrence in October, 1987 by Richard Young. An additional gift of papers was given in May 2004. See boxes 1075-1080. References Men And Volts; The Story Of General Electric, / John W. Hammond. Phila.: Lippincott Company, 1941 Owen D. Young, A New Type Of Industrial Leader, / Ida M. Tarbell. NY: Macmillan Co., 1932 Owen D. Young And American Enterprise / Josephine Young Case & Everett N. Case. Boston: Godine, 1981 Owen D. Young, Book Collector / Lola L. Szladits. NY: New York Public Library, 1974 Additional Owen D. Young and GE material can be found at the Schenectady Museum Archives, Schenectady, NY. Abbreviations DIRSHIPS = DIRECTORSHIPS HOTL/CLUB = HOTELS AND CLUBS INDIVDLS = INDIVIDUALS MISC = MISCELLANEOUS SLU = ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY REPARAT = REPARATIONS Organization & Arrangement The collection has been refoldered and reboxed, but is in the same order & arrangement that Young used. The finding aid shows current box and folder numbers on the left followed by Young’s folder numbering system. The collection consists of four parts. Parts 1 and 2 consist of Young’s day-to-day files. Part 3 consists of Young’s reparation files. Part 4 contains papers used by various individuals prior to 1987 and not refiled in their original order as well as papers created after Young’s retirement and the closing of his Manhattan office where the files in parts 1-3 were arranged and stored. PART 1. Numbered Files File prefix No. Box 1-233 Individuals 1- Companies & Corporations 2- Financial 5- Foreign 6- Legislation 7- Patents & Inventions 11- Miscellaneous 15- Dallas 16- Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. 17- United States Govt. 20- Daily Digest Clippings 22- President’s Com. On Mobilization of Relief Resources 24- PART 2. Personal Files Box 234-763.9 Books Directorships Hotels & Clubs Individuals Insurance Miscellaneous Property Regents – Univ. of State of New York St. Lawrence University Speeches Clippings Copy Books (Found in part 4, box 1013-1074) PART 3. Reparations Files Box 764-851 PART 4. Additional Files Box 857-1001 Not in use Box 1002-1011 Oversized in Reading Room Cabinet 5 Box 1012 Copy Books Box 1013-1074 PART 5 Additional papers, given in 2004. Boxes 1075-1095 Part 1. Numbered Files SLU O.D.Y. BOX FOLDER FOLDER 1 - - Owen D. Young’s notebook finding aid and filing system for his papers. Name index for individuals in part 1 only Abbott, Gordon 1-9 Laogaire, M. 1-142 Adler, Edward A. 1-7 Lamont, Thomas W. 1-221 Alexanderson, E.F.W. 1-102 Langmuir, Dr. Irving 1-284 Appleton, Charles W. 1-37 Leeper, Robert D. 1-250 Ardis, W.F. 1-257 Lehman, Herbert H. 1-256 Arkell, Bartlett 1-186 Lemaire, Sylvan 1-246 Aron, Harold G. 1-297 Lent. W.F. 1-113 Auld, George P. 1-149 Lijdsman, Dr. A.H. 1-123 Badulescu, Victor V. 1-302 Lindsley, Henry D. 1-65 Baker, Newton D. 1-98 Logan, Thomas F. 1-25 Baldwin, Mrs. George P. 1-272 Lovejoy, J.R. 1-109 Barnes, Julius H. 1-222 Lowden, Gov. Frank O. 1-75 Barney, Charles Neal 1-18 Lynch, Arthur 1-153 Barton, Bruce 1-135 Maltzan, Baron Ago Von 1-138 Beasley, John T. 1-184 Mann, C.R. 1-163 Bemis, Mrs. Marion Hess 1-294 McAdoo, William G. 1-93 Bertron, S.R. 1-136 McClatchy, V.S. 1-60 Bishop, George T. 1-83 McGoldrick, Joe 1-274 Brisban, Arthur 1-235 Minor, Clark 1-211 Burchard, A.W. 1-10 Mitchell, S.Z. 1-107 Campbell, Thomas D. 1-244 Monroe, H.L. 1-14 Carlisle, F.L. 1-218 Morgan, Gerald M. 1-206 Carpenter, Dr. Frank B. 1-237 Morgan, J.P. 1-247 Case, J. Herbert 1-290 Morrison, George F. 1-95 Child, Starling W. 1-70 Morrow, Dwight W. 1-94 Coar, John Firman 1-200 Moscovitz, Maurice 1-1 Cobb, John Candler 1-205 Mowrer, Edgar A. 1-187 Coffin, C.A. 1-30 Munsey, Frank A. 1-124 Cohen, Emanuel 1-173 Murch, Maynard H. 1-133 Collins, Dr. John H. 1-182 Nagel, Charles 1-298 Coolidge, Calvin 1-58 Nally, E.J. 1-111 Couzens, Senator James 1-96 Newton, E. Swift 1-268 Cox, Gov. [James M.] 1-79 Noyes, C. Reinold 1-207 Crockett, Albert S. 1-139 Ottinger, Albert 1-201 Crowther, Samuel 1-189 Owens, John W. 1-242 Cummings, Homer 1-89 Parker, Edwin B. 1-40 Dahl, G.M. 1-56 Perkins, Thomas Nelson 1-13 Daley, Florence 1-273 Poindexter, Senator Miles 1-71 Davis, John W. 1-88 Pratt, F.C. 1-126 Dawes, Beman G. 1-217 Price, Ward 1-243 Dawes, Charles G. 1-121 Pugh, Irving E. 1-215 Dawes, Rufus C. 1-129 Raskob, John J. 1-192 Davila, Don Carlos G. 1-231 Reed, P.D. 1-300 Davis, Charles 1-234 Reed, Senator James A. 1-180 Dennison, H.S. 1-168 Rice, E.W., Jr. 1-97 Deppe, W.P. 1-251 Rogers, Sherman 1-156 Dewey, Charles S. 1-190 Robinson, Henry M. 1-72 Dewy, Thomas E. 1-308 Root, Elihu 1-295 Edison, Thomas A. 1-172 Rosenwald, Julius 1-191 Fay, Charles Norman 1-105 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1-202 Feld, Rose C. 1-225 Roth, William C. 1-304 Finley, Dr. John H. 1-127 Russell, Helen B. 1-150 Flavelle, Sir Joseph 1-203 Sard, Frederick N. 1-223 Fleischer, Dr. Charles 1-110 Sarnoff, David 1-101 Forbes, B.C. 1-204 Schaffer, Joseph 1-178 Ford, Henry 1-276 Schuette, Oswald F. 1-264 Fordyce, S.W. 1-19 Silbey, Ernest 1-240 Sloan, James Jr. 1-143 Fraser, Leon 1-130 Smith, Governor Alfred E. 1-175 Gaiger, Philippe 1-230 Smitney, Stephen J. [folder is missing] 1-305 Gary, Elbert H. 1-253 Steinmetz, C.P. 1-112 Gibson, Mrs. Charles Dana 1-303 Stettinius, E.R. 1-106 Glynn, Martin 1-86 Stevens, H.H. 1-229 Green, Henry 1-208 Stevenson, Lewis G. 1-193 Hall, Charles C. 1-213 Straus, Honorable Oscar S. 1-115 Hall, E.K. 1-8 Sunny, B.E. 1-128 Hanson, Victor H. 1-183 Swift, Frederic J. 1-289 Harding, Senator Warren G. 1-77 Swope, Gerard 1-67 Harris, Ray B. 1-261 Swope, Herbert Bayard 1-245 Heckscher, August 1-165 Tait, Frank M. 1-309 Henry, Joseph 1-145 Taylor, C.K. 1-236 Henry, Philip W. 1-248 Thomson, Elihu 1-185 Hildreth, Caroline 1-292 Traylor, Melvin A. 1-226 Hollis, Henry French 1-137 Trench, W.W. 1-17 Hoover, Herbert C. 1-73 Tyler, C.H. 1-27 Howard, Clarence H. 1-162 Upshaw, Honorable W.D. 1-169 Imrie, Daniel F. 1-199 Vogel, Martin 1-144 Insull, Samuel 1-104 Wagner, Robert F. 1-255 Javits, Benjamin A. 1-181 Weed, C.F. & A.H. 1-29 Job, Leonard B. 1-285 Whitney, Dr. W.R. 1-99 Jones, Boyd B. 1-160 Wightman, Merle J. 1-291 Kellogg, Frank B. 1-132 Willkie, Wendell 1-307 Knight, Peter O. 1-134 Woolley, Clarence M. 1-196 Knight, Robert E. Lee 1-6 Wozencraft, Frank 1-103 Knoeppel, C.E. 1-209 Wilson, Charles E. 1-306 Knox, Colonel Frank 1-281 Young, W.I. [William] 1-126 SLU O.D.Y. BOX FOLDER FOLDER INDIVIDUALS 2a 1 1-1 Moscovitz, Maurice 2 1-2 [Farley, James A.] Jan. 1, 1938-Jan. 1, 1941 [1 of 2] 2A 1-2 [Adams, Nathan] Jan. 1, 1938-Jan.
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