Yearbook of in Europe The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/yme Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 5

Editor-in-Chief Jørgen S. Nielsen

Editors Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Egdūnas Račius

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

The Editors ...... ix Editorial Advisers ...... xi Foreword ...... xiii List of Technical Terms ...... xix

European and Muslim Europes: Some Thoughts about Studying Europe’s Contemporary ...... 1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis

Country surveys

Albania ...... 21 Olsi Jazexhi Armenia ...... 37 Sevak Karamyan ...... 47 Thomas Schmidinger Azerbaijan ...... 65 Bayram Balci and Altay Goyushov Belarus ...... 87 Daša Słabčanka Belgium ...... 99 Nadia Fadil and ...... 123 Aid Smajić ...... 143 Aziz Nazmi Shakir ...... 163 Dino Mujadžević Cyprus ...... 173 Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay Czech Republic ...... 195 Štěpán Macháček ...... 209 Brian Arly Jacobsen vi contents

Estonia ...... 229 Ringo Ringvee ...... 237 Tuomas Martikainen France ...... 247 Franck Frégosi Georgia ...... 263 Satenik Mkrtchyan Germany ...... 281 Mathias Rohe ...... 307 Konstantinos Tsitselikis ...... 319 Norbert Pap and Éva Ladányi ...... 327 Göran Larsson Ireland ...... 333 Victoria Montgomery Italy ...... 351 Stella Coglievina Kosovo ...... 369 Ismaili Latvia ...... 383 Valters Ščerbinskis Liechtenstein ...... 391 Thomas Schmidinger Lithuania ...... 399 Egdūnas Račius Luxembourg ...... 407 Sylvain Besch ...... 417 Muharem Jahja Malta ...... 429 Martin R. Zammit Moldova ...... 437 Aurelia Felea ...... 455 Sabina Pacariz Netherlands ...... 465 Martijn de Koning contents vii

Norway ...... 487 Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik Poland ...... 501 Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź Portugal ...... 517 José Mapril and Nina Clara Tiesler Romania ...... 531 Irina Vainovski-Mihai Russia ...... 547 Elmira Akhmetova Serbia ...... 569 Srđjan Barišić Slovakia ...... 585 Jaroslav Drobný ...... 593 Christian Moe Spain ...... 603 Jordi Moreras ...... 619 Göran Larsson Switzerland ...... 633 Stéphane Lathion and Andreas Tunger-Zanetti ...... 649 Ahmet Yildiz Ukraine ...... 669 Elmira Muratova United Kingdom ...... 681 Dilwar Hussain and Seán McLoughlin

The Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen is a Danish National Research Foundation Professor of and Director, Centre for European Islamic Thought, Fac- ulty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd edition 2004), editor of Islam in Denmark: The Challenge of Diversity (Lanham: Lexington, 2012), and editor of Muslim Political Participation in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

Samim Akgönül, is Professor at University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University, USA, and International Relations at Yeditepe University, . Among his recent publications are Minorité: regards croisés sur le concept de minorité dans le contexte turc (Istanbul: Isis, 2010) and The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context: Prac- tices and Perceptions in Turkey, Greece and France (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

Ahmet Alibašić holds a PhD from the Faculty of Political Sciences, Univer- sity of . He is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, , and director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He writes on Islam in SE Europe, Islamic political thought, and interreligious relations.

Egdūnas Račius is Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies and head of the Department of Regional Studies at the Faculty of Political Sci- ence and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. He is the author of the chapter on Islam in Lithuania in Göran Larsson (ed.) Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), and “Muslims in Catholic Lithuania: between the status quo and alterna- tives”, in Milda Ališauskienė and Ingo W. Schröder (eds.), Religious Diver- sity in Lithuania: Ethnographies of Hegemony and Pluralism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011).

Editorial Advisers

Prof. Felice Dassetto, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Dr Franck Frégosi, Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France

Dr Lene Kühle, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark

Dr Nico Landman, Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands

Prof. Tariq Modood, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom

Dr Ferid Muhic, University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia

Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk, Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland

Prof. Alexandre Popovic, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (EHESS), Paris, France

Dr Nina Clara Tiesler, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal

Dr Kari Vogt, Associate Professor, Institute of Cultural Studies and Orien- tal Languages, University of Oslo,

FOREWORD

This is the fifth volume of the now well-established Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, covering the calendar year 2012. As was the case with the most recent volumes, this one covers 46 countries coinciding roughly with the continental region covered by the Council of Europe—we have included Belarus, although not a member, and we have omitted the Vatican and the three mini-states, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, which are members. During the last couple of years, the European financial crisis led to a change of focus among politicians and the media which took some of the pressure off issues to do with Islam. But only in some countries, as it was clear that public attention in other countries either continued or in some cases grew. The perception of a fast-growing Muslim population has con- tinued to be mobilised for narrow local and national political purposes, for which reason the population data in this volume, with all the uncer- tainties that they point to, should be a useful corrective. This is also a time when a number of European countries have been holding national censuses. The results of a few were reported in volume four, but many more have been published during 2012 and this is reflected in the present volume of the Yearbook. The great political changes which have taken place in the and North Africa since the beginning of 2011 interestingly remain mostly absent from this volume, beyond the occasional appearance in the sec- tion on public debate and the media. Even in those countries where there traditionally has been a close connection between Libya and local Muslim organisations it has not yet been possible to register the impact of the fall of the old Libyan regime. The clarification, both in relation to specific organisational connections as well as in terms of public attitudes to Islam and Muslims, which we had expected during 2012 has, on the whole, not materialised. As announced in the previous volume, the sections with analytical arti- cles and book reviews have been replaced with a new Journal of Muslims in Europe. Initially appearing twice a year, the first volume was published in 2012 and the second volume is in progress in 2013. For the current edi- tion of the Yearbook we have decided to revive the practice from the first volume, published in 2009, of inviting a scholar to write an introductory article recording and analysing a dimension of current research on Islam xiv foreword and Muslims in Europe. The aim is to provide users of the Yearbook with a perspective which should be of general interest and also help to interpret some of the data in the country reports. We are grateful to Dr ­Konstantinos Tsitselikis for having accepted the invitation on this occasion. In this fifth volume of the Yearbook the structure of the country reports remains unchanged. The information is presented under the same head- ings for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2012, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2013 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing, all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of April 2013. It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries dif- fer enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of indi- vidual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the pre- sentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what infor- mation to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3, where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller popu- lations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–16, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the country in question and which especially have impacts on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. Section 10 has been expanded to include broader reference to Islamic products and services. foreword xv

To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful:

1. Muslim Populations: Muslim populations including their history within the country and ethnic composition, including overview statistics cov- ering current numbers and ethnic and geographical distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any sta- tistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the State: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim Organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including con- tact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shi’i, Sufi, or other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, politi- cal parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4.  and Prayer Houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local practice. Prayer rooms in public institutions. Legal issues, espe- cially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s Education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curricu- lum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or -managed schools. 6. Higher and Professional Education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the pro- vision of private or public professional training for . 7. Burial and Cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries. xvi foreword

8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions: Provision of Muslim religious coun- selling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious Festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly rec- ognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrange- ments. Numbers of pilgrims on the annual . 10. Halal Products and Islamic Services: Access to halal food and its sale, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is avail- able in public institutions; special arrangements for hajj travel, access to Islamic banking and finance. Where appropriate including agency/ company names and contacts. 11. Dress Codes: How far—and where—Muslim dress, especially for women, (head scarf ) and niqab (face covering), is permitted and practised, including reference to photos in ID cards and passports. 12. Publications and Media: A survey of the main Muslim print and elec- tronic media. 13. Family Law: The practice of elements Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Interreligious Relations: National interreligious councils and Muslim members, if any; interreligious events with Muslim participation (e.g. public celebrations/programmes, statements). 15. Public Opinion and Debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 16. Major Cultural Events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others.

The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the coun- try authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. The country chapters necessarily use various terms in use by Muslims and others for aspects of Muslim life and worship. Some may be familiar to readers and others not, so this year we include a list of technical terms which we trust will be useful. foreword xvii

Our thanks are due to the many researchers that have contributed to the volume. We are particularly indebted to Mark Bebawi for often compli- cated copy-editing, and colleagues at Brill, Nicolette van der Hoek, Ingrid Heijckers and Joed Elich for their continuing enthusiastic support and cooperation.

The Editors Copenhagen, Kaunas, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, May 2013

LIST OF TECHNICAL TERMS

(While many Islamic terms originate in , many have also acquired local variations. In the following we try to cover the most common variations, and the user will occasionally have to use a bit of imagination to adjust spellings.) /azan/ezan call to prayer Ahl al-bayt/Al al-Bayt the family/descendants of the . Ahmadi/ reform movement founded in India in the 19th century and widely regarded by other Muslims as heretical. Alevi movement with traces back to the 12th century, often esoteric in nature and with links to Shi’ism; today ­especially strong among Turks and of eastern Anatolian origin. ‘ festival on the 10th of Muharram (1st month of the ) marking the death of Husayn at the battle of Karbala in 680; a central Shi’ite celebration. bayram festival (esp. Turkish for ‘id, q.v). Bektashi a heterodox Sufi order with strong Ottoman roots; ­marginalised during the mid-19th century Ottoman reforms and banned with other Sufi orders by the ­Turkish republic in the 1920s. burqa specifically the Afghan-style female full body covering, incl. the face; in common usage in Europe now taken to mean any form of female full body and face covering. dershane “cram school”, type of specialised school a common term for Sufi. ritual practised by devotees of a Sufi tradition fatwa statement of opinion on a point of theology or law issued by an authority in response to an application. person who knows Qur’an by heart. Hajj the annual pilgrimage at at the beginning of the 12th month of the Islamic calendar; the highpoint is ‘Id al-Adha. halal permitted. haram prohibited. xx list of technical terms hijab head scarf worn by women Hijra migration of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Madina in 622. husayniyya popular centre of learning and devotion in the Shi’ite tradition. ‘id festival (Arabic). ‘Id al-Adha Feast of the Sacrifice during the pilgrimage at Mecca. ‘Id al-Fitr festival ending the fast of Ramadan. iftar breaking of the fast at the end of the day during ­Ramadan, increasingly celebrated in invited company by mosques, churches and other organisations. religious leader, most commonly the one who leads the congregation at the regular prayers; also used about prominent scholars and spiritual leaders. Among Shi’i Muslims, a legitimate leader of the community. jum‘a Friday noon prayer. khutba sermon. kurban/qurban sacrifice, as in Turkish kurban bayram (‘Id al-Adha). Lailat al-qadr the ‘night of power’, 27th Ramadan, the celebration of the revelation of the Qur’an. school of law or theology. /medrese school at any level, usually elementary and high Islamic. masjid . /mevlud birthday of the Prophet. Mizar/miziar cemetery muadhdhin/muezzin the person who calls to prayer. mufti person who issues fatwa; in some modern states the title of the leading Islamic official. muftiate office of mufti. nawruz/nevruz new Year in the Persian/Turkish tradition. nikah marriage formalised in the Islamic tradition. niqab female face covering. ra’is al- ‘dean of the scholars’, applied in some countries to the official head of the Muslim community. Ramadan the 9th month of the Islamic calendar, the month of fasting. list of technical terms xxi riba (unlawful) interest on capital. Sabantuj tatar and Bashkir cultural festival. sadaqa alms given at various occasions, often in connection with a religious festival. /salat prescribed prayers five times a day. Shari’a Islamic law and ethics, the principles of good Islamic behaviour. shaykh/ leader of a congregation, especially of a Sufi character; honorific for someone learned. Shi’i/Shi’ism the branches within Islam which trace their authority through the descendants of ‘Ali, the Prophet’s nephew and son-in-law; make up 12–15% of the total number of Muslims. Sufi/Sufism the mystical tradition. Sunni/Sunnism the majority tradition within Islam, sometimes (mistakenly) called ‘orthodox’. talaq divorce by repudiation. /tarikat sufi order. tekke/teke a Sufi meeting place (Turkish). turbe/turba tomb of a venerated person (‘saint’), often the object of ­popular devotion. umma the global community of believers. ‘umra the lesser pilgrimage at Mecca taking place at times other than Hajj. vakf/waqf religious foundation (of property) providing income for ­religious, charitable or educational purposes. zakah/ obligatory almsgiving. a Sufi meeting place (Arabic). zikr see dhikr. ziyara visiting family graves at set times of year.

EUROPEAN ISLAMS AND MUSLIM EUROPES: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT STUDYING EUROPE’S CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

Konstantinos Tsitselikis1

1 Introduction2

Studying Islam in the European context has become a complex task, and as an autonomous academic topic is discussed by a series of differ- ent disciplines,3 mostly in Western Europe. Furthermore it has acquired an increasing interest, not only academic but political and societal, as interest in the topic stems from discussions on integration and segrega- tion patterns. Old or static perceptions about ‘what Europe is’ crosscut with new and developing ideas about what ‘Europe will be’ in numer- ous domains of confrontation. Studying European Islam could not be a

1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in . He holds degrees in inter- national law and human rights and is co-director (with Dimitris Christopoulos) of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre on Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 2 This article is the fruit of a series of discussions and considerations about Islam in Europe that took place in two conferences in in 2012 and Elsinor in 2013 gathering correspondents to the Yearbook and other researchers. I want to thank cordially all par- ticipants that have contributed to this artıcle. Of course any misunderstanding or unsuc- cessful use of their ideas should be seen as my fault. I want also to thank Jørgen Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Riem Spielhaus and my partner Meriç Özgüneş for their valuable com- ments and suggestions on the present text. 3 The past decade has seen Islamic studies take on a new prominence in academic cir- cles. Governments are demanding increasing amounts of research to inform foreign policy towards the Islamic world and to improve relations with domestic Muslim communities. In certain cases this interest can be connected to security policies after the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the events that followed 11 September 2001. Also, student interest in Islam also appears to be rising, whether through demand for courses or choice of PhD subjects. But while individual academics are busy researching and teaching about Islam in the European context, it has not yet become a distinct discipline. Islamic studies are offered by a series of universities as a substantial option and specialist programmes such as master’s degrees all over the European continent: in Copenhagen, Erlangen, Lund, Upp- sala, Helsinki, Tartu, Prague, Oxford, Gloucester, London, Edinburgh, Strasbourg, Louvain, Fribourg, Lucerne, Granada, Utrecht, Amsterdam, Malta, Vilnius, Dublin, Baku, Sarajevo, Vienna, Yervan, Skopje, Istanbul, Kiev, Leiden, and Warsaw among others. Sometimes it is difficult to make a distinction between studies for Muslims and Islamic studies, or studies on historical Islam and contemporary Islam (especially European Islam). 2 konstantinos tsitselikis more ­fascinating field of research unravelling aspects of both multiple ‘Europes’ and ‘Islams.’4 Many of these aspects remain invisible to public debate. Islamic studies often see the world as if it were composed of sepa- rate social echelons, perpetuating the existence of imaginary places, such as ‘Christendom’ and ‘The Islamic World,’ ‘The First World,’ ‘The Third World,’ and ‘Europe’ which are misrepresented as separate socio-cultural entities, rather than as integral parts of the human world. It is a very delicate task not to group Muslims and consider them as a collective subject merely because of their religion, which often is taken by the majority European ideology as a negative or alien trait. The challenge for Islamic studies would be to enhance its restitution as a scientific field of research as Islam constitutes per se a multifaceted factor of otherness, among many others. In the past twenty years there has come to be an abundance of research on Muslims in Europe, which has been conducted with legal, political, or anthropological methodological tools.5 Some of the research deals with country case-studies; others attempt to discuss specific issues, such as , Muslim religiosity, Islamic law and education or the posi- tion of Muslim women in the European context. Whatever the content or the approach of the relevant literature, it seems that developing global methodological and comparative approaches would be useful in order to

4 On the notion of a multifaceted Europe or multiple Europe(s) see, among others, Strath, Bo, (ed.), Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, Multiple Europes, No. 10. (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000) and Ray Hudson, “One Europe or Many? Reflections on Becoming European”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 25/4 (2000), pp. 409–426. Mutatis mutandis, Islam(s) in Europe could be considered as unrav- elling a wide spectrum of cultures, ethnicities and political stances in the Western and Eastern parts of Europe, see Maréchal, Brigitte, “Introduction”, in B. Maréchal, S. Allievi, F. Dasseto, J. Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in the enlarged Europe, (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), p. xvii, X. Bougarel, “Balkan Muslims and Islam in Europe” Südost Europa 55 (2007), p. 339, Górak-Sosnowska, Katarzyna, “Muslims in Europe: different communities, one discourse? Adding the Central and Eastern European perspective”, in K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European perspective, (Warsaw: Uni- versity of Warsaw, Faculty of Oriental Studies, 2011), pp. 12–26. 5 Among many others see B. Maréchal, S. Allievi, F. Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe—Religion and society, (Leiden: Brill, 2003); S. Ferrari and A. Bradney (eds.), Islam and European Legal Systems, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); J. Malik (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre, (Münster: LIT, 2004); B.-P. Aluffi and G. Zincone (eds.), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); R. Potz and Wieshaider, W. (eds.), Islam and the European Union, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004) and Nielsen, Jørgen, Muslims in Western Europe, (Edinburgh: Edin- burgh University Press, 3rd ed. 2004). european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 3 understand similar or different backgrounds that tend to homogenise or divide these multiple and multifaceted ‘Europes’ and ‘Islams.’ This article aims at putting forward a series of methodological thresh- olds that could assist readers of the comprehensive reports presented in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe and to debate and present research in an inter-disciplinary, holistic and comparative manner. One of the incentives to attempt such an endeavour is to clarify misunderstandings stemming from the terminology used that often has different connota- tions in various European institutional, legal and political contexts, in the past and present, East or West. After all, attempting to define ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ is not an easy task6 since European Islam is spread in 46 countries with different features and profiles. In most of the cases, it constitutes a small minority (from less than one per cent to ten per cent, e.g. Ireland, Poland, UK, France, Germany etc.), a strong minority (20 to 45 per cent, like Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia) or, exceptionally, represents the majority of the population (, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Turkey, and Northern Cyprus).

2 A System of Variables to be Considered

In order to locate grades of variability that could determine the rela- tion between Islam and Europe, certain questions should be given a set of answers. Does Islam or Muslims have identical characteristics in the countries of ‘origin’ and in the European continent? What makes Islam a ‘brand’7 and under which modalities? Which factors render Islam a ­flexible/inflexible religion or permeable/impermeable culture and what are the grades and characteristics of resistance to osmosis between Mus- lims and non-Muslims? How does religion affect society and what is the role of Islam in this discussion? How do states manage or accommodate Muslim communities, and how do the latter set up organisational struc- tures? In which ways do the communities voice their claims for rights or for a better position? Do international relations and interference from

6 Jeldoft, Nadia, “On defining Muslims”, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1 (2009), pp. 9–14. 7 With reference to the presentation by Stefano Allievi “Islam as a brand” at the confer- ence organised by the University of Copenhagen, Helsingør, 20–23 May 2013. See also Paul Temporal, Islamic Branding and Marketing: Creating a Global Islamic Business, (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley, 2011). 4 konstantinos tsitselikis abroad affect Islam in European societies? How does loyalty to both state and Islam affect the position of Muslim communities, their image and self-perceptions? Does citizenship play a role on the position of Muslims in Europe? In order to discuss these questions and conduct research to find answers one would need to consider, on a comparative basis compris- ing all European countries as continuum, a series of variables such as:

– State institutional organisation and legal tradition – International politics and international legal commitments – Muslim community organisation, leadership and membership – Degree of religiosity (Muslims and non-Muslims) – Integration and exclusion – ‘Old’ Islam (traditional or historical) and ‘new’ Islam (immigrants and converts) – Islam as minority (most of the cases) or majority – Citizenship – Transnationalism and nationalism – Class position and access to socio-economic rights

3 Legal, Political and Historical Legacies as a Background

Having an overview of Europe as a common space with important con- tradictions and differences, a common denominator of coexistence puts together these 46 states as a unified canvas for research. In this canvas one could distinguish three major areas, where Islam is understood, placed, acting or reacting in different ways or patterns. These ‘areas’ could be defined as post-colonial, post-Ottoman and post-communist (or post- socialist), or the West, the East and the South-East. These ‘areas’ can be seen also as shaping more or less unified sub-regions within Europe, hav- ing common legacies that influence policies and societies in the present and the future. The degree of osmosis among these regions would be also a research question as far as Islam takes part in this process. Thus, there are no clear cut boundaries between the three areas and the divisions as discussed hereinafter should be considered as an analytical facilitator. One could argue that in some cases convergence has shadowed common char- acteristics. Still the following categorisation could be helpful for a com- prehensive appraisal and contextualisation of European Islam taking into account regional legacies that left their mark on political, ideological or legal domains. One could argue also that West-East-South East ­represent european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 5 a main divide. Russia could be discussed under the post-colonial area, and Balkan countries with a communist past could be discussed under the East. However, the divide of the proposed categories could render more visible the trends of convergence between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Islam8 and the reverse resistances exerted by policies and law. Law still makes a clear division between historical minorities and immigrants and that creates a significant differentiating factor between the two categories of Islam, even though recent societal experiences would suggest convergence rather than division. a. Postcolonial: The West (Austria, France, Belgium, Switzerland, UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Holland, Luxemburg, Ireland, Malta, Nor- way, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland).

Post-colonialism shaped a certain economic environment that facilitated immigration from former colonies to former metropolises. In this context, Muslims settled already before decolonisation, as early as the 19th century in Western Europe (in UK, France, the German and Austrian Empires). Nowadays Muslims of Western Europe are partly the offspring of early migrants, so their grand- and great-grandchildren, are residents and citi- zens of the respective states. Intermarriage and conversion, along with a transmission of Islam through generations, created multiple Muslim com- munities with variable connections to Islam. In different ways they are interconnected to colonial subjugation and anti- or counter-colonialism narratives. Anti-colonial narrative analyses the identity politics that are the social and cultural perspectives of the subaltern9 colonial subjects, represented for parts of the society by these Muslims. The way Islam is perceived within post-colonial identity determines the “Us and Them” binary social relationship, as a power relationship, between the West and the non-West,10 often imagining non-Western Europe through a ‘local’ ori- entalism. The postcolonial era has witnessed tremendous transformations­

8 I would use the term Old Islam as a reference to those Muslim communities with a long presence in Europe, whose members are citizens of the respective state. New Islam would comprise Muslim immigrants. As 2nd or 3rd generation descendants of immigrants acquire citizenship of the state of residence, there is a gradual tendency of convergence between the two categories. Last, converts could be seen as parts of New Islam, as indi- viduals, or of Old Islam if they adhere to a historical community. 9 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subaltern_%28postcolonialism%29. 10 Sharp, Joanne, Geographies of Postcolonialism, (SAGE, 2008), see Chapter 6 “Can the subaltern speak?”. 6 konstantinos tsitselikis in Europe, and European Islam is among the societal material that has been part and parcel of this transformation. Recent Muslim immigration has been connected after 2001 to new reflexes based on notions such as ‘security’ or ‘national interest,’ and a new position of Islam has been formed first in the West, and then in the East. What we would need to understand is “the displacement of Islam from the margins to the centre, from the postcolonial past to the European present, as it follows various historical trajectories and creates new inter- penetrations and mixings between different cultural codes, values, and practices.”11 After all, the interconnected histories of Muslims and Europe raise the issues of what Europe is today through a dominant position of what is Western Europe, and thus postcolonial Europe, within the broader European context. The dichotomy of European/non-European is shaped through collective memory and today’s experiences that are determined throughout Europe—in a latent way—through the mirror of the postco- lonial politics of the West. Scandinavian countries could be seen as forming a subgroup of the West, although they were not important colonial powers—if at all—in the past, and have not experienced an old Muslim immigration. With the exception of Finland, Scandinavian countries are not home to traditional Islam. However, as countries of highly developed democracy and stable economies, they attracted considerable numbers of Muslim immigrants and refugees early in the 1970s. Finland, which was under Russian and Soviet influence and which has a historical Muslim minority () could be placed together with the countries of the ‘East.’ However, the important Muslim immigration of the last two decades makes Finland a country with strong similarities to countries of Western Europe. On the other hand, “in the literature on Western Europe’s Muslim com- munities, the question of whether Muslim beliefs and practices are trans- forming (or not) in a historically new environment and, one hastens to add, in a new global setting, has become a central issue in the course of the last decade or so. In an often highly politicised environment where transformation continues to be measured by the criteria of compatibility with supposedly European values, interest in this question has notably

11 Göle, Nilufer, “Decentering Europe, Recentering Islam”, New Literary History, 43/4 (2012), pp. 665–685. european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 7 stimulated an ongoing debate about the structure of religious life inside Europe’s Muslim populations.”12 b. Post-communist/post-socialist (post-Soviet): The East (Armenia, Azerbai- jan, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Moldova, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia).

Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which experienced communist regimes, were marked by this period of their political history and therefore could be grouped as belonging to a post-communist group that experi- enced parallel transitions, more or less successful, to democratic liberal- ism. This area embeds post-Tsarist or post-Habsburg elements regarding the position of Islam which contributed to the homogenisation of ideol- ogy, law and policies. Balkan countries that also shared this history (with the exception of Greece), supplemented by economic reasons, also do not attract immigrant Muslims and have a different legacy that stems from their experience as part of the . These common Otto- man legacies left strong ideological and political influences on the way that Muslims are perceived, as a minority or majority. Consequently these countries will be discussed under the ‘post-Ottoman’ area. In the late 1980s, Islam had the second largest number of believers in the Soviet Union, comprising 45 million Muslims. At the time, Soviet law forbade religious activity outside the approximately 500 mosques and Islamic schools under tight government control. As immigration to the Soviet Union was very rare, no migrant Islam was present during this period with the exception of Muslims who migrated from Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia to Soviet Russia. In other East European socialist countries, very small and dispersed communities of Muslims were a result of this kind of immigration, inter-marriage or student mobility (as in East Berlin or Prague). Russia has similarities to the (post-)colonial West with regard to the mobility of Muslims from the periphery to the metropolis. However, Russia has inherited from its colonial and Soviet past a territorial conti- nuity that comprises important Muslim populations. Today, as a federal

12 Frank, Peter, “Individualisation and Religious Authority in Western European Islam”, in Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 17/1 (2006), pp. 105–118, http://frankpeter.net/pdfs/ authority.pdf. This article provides a broad survey of the current literature and presents some of the key scholarly contributions and aims to explore convergences and divergences with respect to the questions of individualisation and religious authority. 8 konstantinos tsitselikis state with seven federative republics with ethnic local Muslim majori- ties or strong minorities—comprising also unresolved conflicts related to Muslim ethnicity (Chechnya, Daghestan)—Russia constitutes a quite complex case to study. A sub-group of this area comprises countries also with historical Muslim minorities under legal protection, falling under the category of ‘traditional religious community’ (mostly Tatars) such as Poland, Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, though representing a quite small percentage of the total population. On the contrary, Azerbaijan is the only country of this area with a majority Muslim population, where Shi’i Islam is considered part of the national identity and represents a minority. After 1991, all countries, with the exception of Belarus, became elec- toral democracies, gradually adhered to the Council of Europe and some of them joined the European Union. In all former socialist countries, sec- ularism or institutional neutrality towards religion seems to be coupled with state control exerted on Muslim organisations, both features being a legacy borrowed from the pre-1990s regimes. In most of the countries there were strong claims from all religious communities to restore the status quo ante. In this context Muslim communities/minorities were to a certain extent granted collective rights to property (over waqf real estates) and religious leadership (right to select the mufti).13 In addition to tradi- tional Islam, as mentioned above, member states of the EU (Poland, Hun- gary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), after the early 2000s, started attracting immigrant Muslims, so they too are gradually experiencing what is well known to Western Europe. However, it seems rather unlikely that these countries will achieve a similar immi- gration level to the one of the West in the near or even distant future.14 It seems that what makes East Europe different (in general terms both post-communist and post-Ottoman) when compared to the West is the economic factor as determinant for the settlement of New Islam. The divi- sion between East and West is illustrative in the internal division between Eastern and Western Germany: In the Länder of the former East Germany

13 See Nalborczyk, Agata and Borecki, Pawel, “Relations between Islam and the state in Poland: the legal position of Polish Muslims”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 22 (2011), p. 343. 14 Górak-Sosnowska, Katarzyna, “Muslims in Europe: different communities, one dis- course? Adding the Central and Eastern European perspective”, in K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European perspective, (Warsawa: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Oriental Studies, 2011), 18. european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 9 immigrant Islam represent less than 1% of the local population whereas in what was West Germany Muslims represent 3–10%. One additional remark regards the Western perceptions of traditional Islam of the East. Locally important Muslim populations, like in Russia or the Caucasus, are perceived in the eyes of the ‘West’ as not essentially ‘European,’ let alone when in the eyes of certain researchers even Russia does not belong to European civilisation.15 The further East in the Euro- pean context Islam is (e.g. Muslim republics of Russia) the less Europe perceives it as a part of herself, a stance with clear hegemonic resonances. The presence of strong historical Islam in Eastern Russia and the Cau- casus is precisely the geographical point where the borders of ‘Europe’ acquire vagueness. In the end, (Western) Islamic studies hardly include in their research these Muslim groups as part of European Islam. c. Post-Ottoman: the South-East (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus).

For reasons that have been already stated, Balkan post-communist coun- tries are discussed under this group. By ‘post-Ottoman’ is meant the areas once part of the Ottoman Empire where the legal and political accom- modation of ethno-religious difference was known as the millet system.16 The legacy of millet determined the institutional position of religious minorities within the Christian states of the Balkans and Turkey that were established gradually from the early 19th century to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire (which finally ceased to exist in 1923). The consolida- tion of national states by the beginning of the 20th century found Muslim

15 With reference to the notorious “The Clash of Civilisations and the remaking of the world order”, by Huntington, Samuel, Foreign Affairs (1993), p. 72. 16 The Ottoman authorities granted ethno-religious communities a certain institutional autonomy from the 15th to the 20th century. Greek-Orthodox, Armenians and Jews were the ‘minority’ communities falling under this special status under the hegemonic posi- tion of Islam. On the millet system, see Barkey, Karen, Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 13, 152. Karen Barkey illustrates how ‘difference and separation was a value pursued by the Otto- man state and the communities themselves’ and how the Empire instituted boundaries of different degrees of permeability, while organising communities around and across such classificatory systems. See also, Braude, Benjamin and Bernard Lewis, “Introduction”, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The functioning of a plural society, vol. I, (New York: Holms and Mayer, 1982), pp. 1–34. 10 konstantinos tsitselikis communities scattered all over the Balkans forming minorities within Christian national states, except for Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia. This legacy of institutional autonomy for Muslims and non-Muslims was kept within post-Ottoman Christian states vis-à-vis Muslim communities, who acquired special protection status as minorities. The perception of non- Muslims in the Empire had been reversed, according to which Muslims were enjoying equality and minority rights but potentially they could be put under a ‘special status.’ All these Muslim minorities were seen by Christian majorities as a price to be paid for independence. In that context Muslim communities are legally recognised and attributed spe- cial status, whereas New Islam is in most of cases institutionally ignored. As Todorova remarks, “ironically, Balkan nationalism, which irrevocably destroyed the imagined community of Orthodox Christianity, managed to preserve a frozen, unchangeable and stultifying uniform of the Muslim community, and consistently dealt with it in terms of millet.”17 Accord- ing to the mainstream national discourse of the Christian nation states of the Balkans, the Muslim presence still constitutes an alien element in the area. However, Muslims of the Balkans have deep rooted feelings of representing Islam, are entitled to historical rights and political powers over the land.18 The structural formation of the Islamic communities was able to embed national ideas where appropriate: quite often acquiring Turkish nationalism or (as in Bosnia) developing a distinct nationalism. Albania constitutes the only case where national identity was not based on reli- gious affiliation. Turkey built its national identity on Islam, despite the legal-theoretical accommodation of secularism. Greece is the only case that did not experience the socialist/communist regime and thus millet- like legal status remained unchanged. Cyprus has a unique position in this spectrum, as after the division of the island in 1974, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots separated on the basis of ethno-religious affilia- tion. Moreover, as the only post-colony in Europe, Cyprus retains a flow

17 Todorova, Maria, “The Ottoman legacy in the Balkans”, in Imperial legacy. The Otto- man imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 68. 18 For an overview see Popovic, Alexander L’Islam balkanique (Berlin: Osteuropa- Institut an der Freien Universität, 1986), Bougarel, Xavier and Natalie Clayer (eds.), Le nou- vel Islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990–2000 (Paris: Mai- sonneuve & Larousse, 2001) and Clayer Natalie and Xavier Bougarel (eds.), Les musulmans de l’Europe du Sud-Est. Des Empires aux Etats (Paris: Karthala, 2013). european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 11 of emigration towards the West (the UK). This pattern is not unknown throughout the Balkans and especially Turkey from where a significant Muslim emigration has settled in the West, representing a transposi- tion of Old Islam from the post-Ottoman area into the West as a form of New Islam. The division into three groups sketched above can facilitate an over- view of European Islam taking into consideration three broad and dif- fering legacies: A. The West, which has been accommodating immigrant Islam for about a century, forms a new indigenous Islam along with incoming immigrant Muslims. High numbers of population and impor- tance of their presence in all aspects of life make Western European Islam an important component of today’s Europe. B. In the East, Islam is present in the form of small communities. With the exception of Azerbaijan and the Muslim populations of the periphery of Russia, historical and immi- grant Islam seems to play, up to date, very little role in political, economic and societal transformations. In this generalisation, it could be asserted that Islam in the East lacks particular significance in central politics. C. In the post-Ottoman area, Islam is characterised by a history that to a certain extent plays a crucial role in today’s societies. Its national affini- ties and well established ideological connotations are of key importance for both majorities and minorities in these countries. Muslim majorities in ­Turkey, Kosovo, Albania, and Muslim Bosnia, shape the Muslim profile in the broader area. However, as already said, there are no clear-cut boundaries between the above mentioned three areas and patterns of convergence are devel- oped. Overlapping of features and similarities is not rare and is subject to change. With the passage of time, eventual differences that are visible today will not be in the future. The sharp divide between Old and New Islam seems to be fading as Muslim immigrants settle not only in the West but in the East and the Balkans. New patterns of behaviour, poli- cies and societal transformations are formed as “Old” and “New” Muslims are getting closer and “New” Islam (in the West) tends to become “Old.” Converts are also part of this trend of convergence. Defining the degree of change would be one of the major research challenges in the future, through the comparison of these three areas. In the future, a new clas- sification and contextualisation would be needed with a view to under- standing new patterns of accommodation of Muslim communities within Europe. 12 konstantinos tsitselikis

19

<1% 1-4% 4-10% 10-20% 20-50% >50%

Map 1: Islam in Europe19

Although the legacy of each group of countries that derives from a differ- ent historical path, political circumstances, practices and realities impacts today’s law and policies, European Muslims have internal divisions, as any part of society, susceptible to change with new and multiple affilia- tions. This dichotomy between stability and mobility could be considered through the following research axes.

4 Drawing (Three) Research Axes

Studying Old and New Islam in Europe in the West and the East/South- East could be oriented in three major axes. The position of Islam in these axes is variable. To opt for one or the other axis, and the position at the

19 <1%: Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia; 1–4%: Andorra, Belarus, Croatia, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine; 4–10%: Austria, Bel- gium, Germany, Greece, Lichtenstein, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom; 10–20%: Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Montenegro; 20–50%: Bosnia and Herze- govina, Macedonia; >50%: Albania, Kosovo, Turkey. european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 13 axis, offers a different perspective for the research questions and thus could guide the analysis for more comprehensive results.

Past ←------→ Future Visibility of political, legal, social or demographic changes through the axis of time, from past to present and future, would enrich research data and findings and render them more comprehensive. Comparison through history could be applied to any Muslim community in a specific country through time, under different regimes, or socioeconomic conditions (e.g. Muslims in Bulgaria in the 1930s or in 2000s, in France in 1900, in 1980 and in 2010 etc.).

Majority ←------→ Minority Insiders/outsiders to the Muslim community (minority, majority).20 Often research cannot avoid the bias of being member of a community, or being an ‘outsider’ to the community. Such a position for the observer can become a topic for further discussion. Moreover minorities within minori- ties often becomes a controversial topic for research.

Historical minority ←------→ Immigrant community Old and New Islam, both as minority phenomena often provide different perspectives vis-à-vis the relationship with the state such as in issues of citizenship, residence and ties to the soil. Traditional minorities have the prerogative to share a common politi- cal, legal and symbolic area with the national majority where they can socialise through common citizenship. First generation immigrants do not while their children and grandchildren can do. In European legal tra- dition, as formed within the Council of Europe, minorities and migrants are two distinct groups subject to different categories of norms. How- ever, cultural, political and socio-economic changes that are taking place in Europe due to long-term migration may affect this legal dichotomy. Only in a few European countries do Old and New Islam coexist (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Finland, Poland, and Russia). In most of the cases, the East has only since the early 1990s experience immigrant Islam. As said before, in the West (France, UK), old Muslim immigration tends

20 The term is used in both numerical and power relation terms. 14 konstantinos tsitselikis to become Old Islam21 through acquisition of citizenship in a quite dif- ferent ideological and cultural sphere.22 Policies and law are unable to define in many cases where a minority would start to exist and where an immigrant group would end: staying in the host-country over two or more generations through acquisition of citizenship would attribute minority characteristics to groups which formerly would have been called ‘immi- grant.’ More than Old Islam, that was related to the notion of ‘minority,’ New Islam in Europe has brought up the question under the prospect of ‘multiculturalism.’ With the increasing mobility of capital and labour, new economic and political challenges have driven new policies, theories and practices. Traditional cultural otherness and recent immigration rep- resent in effect two sides of the same challenge: to re-determine European citizenship, and accommodate internal ethnic and religious divides. Does the ‘common cultural heritage’ as set by European self-perception encom- pass Islam as a religion, or as a culture, including Muslims’ ethnicities and languages? Would Islam be part of the European future or will the differ- ence mark out religion as a conflictual field? Muslim immigrants and minority Muslims often share a distinc- tion from other groups in society in terms of origin, language, culture, and religion. With convergence of the two phenomena under a unified legal framework, religious and linguistic specificities would need to be ­reconsidered, focusing at social participation factors. Thus, immigrant Islam and historical Islam would have been seen under the scope of equal social inclusion. Both groups may, or may not, preserve a culture and reli- gion of their own, having a strategic option between ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration.’ The comparison of two categories of minoritised Islam, as converging political paradigms, would re-determine the comprehension of the process of minoritisation and its ideological justification and de- dramatise the cultural and the ‘ethnic/religious difference.’ To approach and study Islam in Europe under these perspectives, a series of guiding questions of both methodological and scientific charac- teristics could be put forward. The degree of individualisation as an ele- ment of Muslim religiosity, the role of Muslim institutions, and the role

21 But research also suggests that the offspring of Yemenis who settled in Liverpool after 1869, so creating ‘Old Islam,’ became ‘New Islam’ when the later migration brings society to merge the two groups (see www.liverpoolarabiccentre.org.uk/). 22 Felice Dasseto, Silvio Ferrari and Brigitte Marechal, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the future”, 23 June 2007, European Parliament, http://www.euromedalex .org/sites/default/files/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 12 February 2013. european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 15 of leadership and their representation, the degree of activism in favour of human rights, the degree of secularisation or radicalisation of Islam, are some of such topics that through a comparative analysis could lead to a comprehensive picture of what was and what would be European Islam. Multidisciplinary approaches combining methodological and ana- lytical tools of law, political science, history, sociology, psychology etc., could offer new dynamic and multi-faceted results. The following four topics could be placed under such research questions and methodology facilitating the understanding of European Islam as representing a broad spectrum of different situations in the European canvas.

1. State-religion affairs are set in different institutional modalities that go from strict neutrality (France) to hegemony of a religion (Ireland, Greece). The distinct political, ideological and juridical legacies of Catholic, Prot- estant or Orthodox countries often shape—through different forms—the institutional position of Muslim minority communities. In this variable framework, each European government attempts to regulate its local version of Islam in different ways and for various reasons. In some coun- tries, there is no official institution, but ethnic and religious-based mobili- sation is guaranteed within the sphere of civil society (UK). Others attempt to balance a top-down approach, and the state requests the establishment of a representative body by the Muslim communities (Italy). In Greece institutional visibility regards only Old Islam (according to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923), whereas Russia imposes a strict Islam community sys- tem control by the government. In other cases, like France, Belgium, and Spain, Muslims are free to choose, by election or appointment, their own representatives, though governments can retain the right to co-opt addi- tional members. One more factor should be taken into account. States conduct adminis- trative and organisational changes in accordance with their political plan- ning within the frame of binding international treaties. When domestic law does not correctly implement these obligations, minority-state rela- tions as well as those between ‘host’-state and kin-state23 are affected.

23 Kin-state is considered to be the ‘homeland’ or ‘fatherland’ for its ‘kin-minority,’ so the minority with which there are ties of national, religious or linguistic kinship. For an extended discussion see European Commission for Democracy through Law, The protec- tion of national minorities by their kin-state, Science and Technique of Democracy, No. 32, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002. 16 konstantinos tsitselikis

Kin-states, such as Turkey,24 often intervene over the institutionalisa- tion of the kin-Muslim communities and are not all pursuing a common agenda. Patterns of political involvement through religion are different among post-Ottoman and post-colonial spheres. In the post-communist sphere, there are no kin-states of historical Muslim minorities, and those of immigrant Islam seem to be—to date—quite unwilling to assume such a role. In the West—and to a certain extent in the East—neo-radicalism exerts strong influence and politicises Islam. In the East and South East, neo-Sufi movements, such as the one led by Fethullah Gülen25 also play an important role in reshaping Islam.

2. Human rights: The increasing importance of human rights includes safeguarding of freedom of religion and legal mechanisms for protection and supervising. Human rights bodies constitute institutions that could accommodate claims for ‘common’ rights or to resolve disputes interre- lated to the preservation of the community. Thus strategic litigation before national or international instances (such as the European Court of Human Rights, or before the supervising organs of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities) by members of Muslim minori- ties, historical or migrant, could instigate new legal status and alteration of socio-economic position. The right to be recognised as a religious or ethnic group and, most important of all, the right to equal participation in the socio-economic sphere are important topics for research. Research on economic rights and their interrelation to the class position and mobil- ity of Muslims, in a comparative perspective of vertical and horizontal relations within the Muslim community and within the society general, could also reveal previously less explored aspects of European Islam.

3. Ideology/Ethnicity: National or religious ideologies shaping minority and majority identities form communities beyond borders. Muslim com- munities are subject to a complex ethnicisation process stemming from the national origins of the community or the national identity fostered by the state. Contemporary globalisation has entailed a series of socio- economic, political, legal and symbolic changes for states, and both for

24 Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, Old and New , From historical minorities to immigrant newcomers (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 170–175. 25 Solberg, Anne Ross, “The role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans”, Südost Europa 55 (2007), p. 429. european islams and muslim europes: contemporary islam 17 majorities and minorities. Hybrid identities accommodating both state national ideology and Islam cannot be excluded from a spectrum of iden- tities encompassing different forms of European Islam. On one hand, monolithic interpretations of religion, either stemming from majorities or minorities, could hamper integration processes. Some cultural and normative aspects of Islam which reinforce self-referential schemes put- ting forward community values at times lead to social exclusion.26 On the other hand, there are cases of Muslims who opt for membership in the majority’s identity/culture/religion. Hence, transnationalism,27 or the trend towards ­ethnicities’ change throughout generations, counters and interacts with trends towards religious fundamentalism which radi- calises the role of Islam as a strong and visible entity in Europe. Converts and reverts act as a bridge or a buffer between Muslims and non-Muslims as a symbolic and pragmatic border area. Transposition of Islam among Muslims, such as ‘salafisation’ of individuals or communities, the ‘sunnifi- cation’ of Bektashis etc, illustrate how these borders are ever shifting.

4. Citizenship (legal, political, social): Muslims in European are divided into those who are citizens of a European state and those who are not. Possessing citizenship in the state of one’s residence unquestionably con- stitutes a fundamental factor for social integration, while not being a citi- zen is likely to become a potential factor for social marginalisation. Thus acquisition or loss of citizenship, dual citizenship or statelessness, take on major importance for social inclusion. The choice by the state to permit or to prevent dual (or multiple) citizenship is essentially political in nature, regulated by law and conditioned by historical factors reflecting the state’s view of its national character. This choice affects the position of ‘old’ and ‘new minorities,’ Muslims included. In this context, ius sanguinis and ius soli offer European legislators a series of options embedding ideological stances. The divide on the basis of citizenship is not static and affects the institutional visibility of individuals and communities.

26 It should be noted that being of “Muslim descent” does not necessarily mean that that individual is a practising Muslim. 27 See Grillo, Ralph, “Islam and transnationalism”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Stud- ies, 30/5 (2004), pp. 861–878; Merdjanova, Ina, Rediscovering the Umma. Muslims in the Bal- kans between Nationalism and Transnationalism, (N. York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 55. 18 konstantinos tsitselikis

5 Conclusions

Europe embraces old and new evolving cultural, ethnic, religious and soci- etal realities. Scientific research on Islam in Europe seeks to comprehend different legacies and a patchwork of dynamic and changing legal, politi- cal, and socio-economic realities which determine the status of persons and groups by virtue of their nationality or religion. If Old and New Islam indicate two distinct starting points, one cannot ignore the process of con- vergence between the two that is ongoing in many cases. One of the major challenges for scientific research is to approach the trend holistically in assessing the degree and characteristics of what constitutes ‘assimilation,’ ‘coexistence’ and ‘integration.’ Political and institutional legacies affect the differing political and soci- etal importances of Islam in the West and the East/South-East Europe. This dichotomy is reflected in the literature on Islam: in the West, it focuses on immigration, whereas in the East/South East, it focuses on history and ethnicity. Moreover, hegemonic scientific narratives from the West have overwhelmingly been exported to and reproduced by the East. Studying Islam should not adopt an approach which segregates the area of study but rather aim at explaining the different overlapping realities of worlds that coexist as variable faces of a fluid and palpitating society, with inner contradictions, constraints and limitations. Research on Islam in Europe has to confront all above mentioned ques- tions, in addition to others not discussed here, through interdisciplinary approaches and synergies. Rapid transformation patterns that character- ised Europe in past decades through new political ideologies, national- isms, and economic neo-liberalism further complicate the picture and require more rigorous classification and analysis. In this changing context, on the one hand religion becomes an ambivalent marker for ethnicity and national belonging. On the other, however, it also constitutes a fac- tor of solidarity for many communities, with cultural, social and political connotations in the frame of each European state. That makes European Islams and Muslim Europes a complex, challenging and fascinating topic for research. COUNTRY SURVEYS

ALBANIA

Olsi Jazexhi1

1 Muslim Populations

The question of religious affiliations in Albania has been a matter of dispute for several past decades. The official results that were avail­able from population registrations of 1937 and 1945 estimated the Muslims to make 69.3% and 72% of the total population.2 Albania did not conduct any census tracking the religious affiliations of its population until 2011, since religious and ethnic registration was considered to be a threat to the national security of the country.3 However, in 2010 the government of Albania announced plans to organise a national census which was going to ask people about their religious and ethnic affiliations. The census which started on September 30, 2011 and whose results were announced in December 2012 concluded that the distribution of the residing religious population of Albania was as follows:

– Muslims 1,587,608 or 56.70% of the population; – Bektashi (Muslims) 58,628 or 2.09%; – Catholic (Christians) 280, 921 or 10.03%; – Orthodox (Christians) 188,992 or 6.75%; – Evangelical (Christians) 3,797 or 0.14%; – Other Christians 1,919 or 0.07%; – Believers without denomination 153,630 or 5.49%; – Atheists 69,995 or 2,50%; – Others 602 or 0,02%; – Preferred not to answer 386,024 or 13,79%; – Not relevant/not stated 68,022 or 2.43%.4

1 Olsi Jazexhi holds a PhD in history and civilisation from the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 2 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Nation and Religion in Albania 1920–1944) (: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 3 See: “Firmoset Peticioni kundër ‘Kombësisë’ ”. 20.03.2011, www.aleancakuqezi.al/2011/ lajme/firmoset-peticioni-kunder-kombesise/, accessed 6 February 2013. 4 Instat, POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS 2011, (Shtypshkronja “Adel Print”, 2012), p. 71. 22 olsi jazexhi

The results of the census have changed the picture of religious distribu- tions in the country and some religious groups have not welcomed it. Some officials from the Muslim Community of Albania have expressed their unhappiness with the census results, claiming that according to their calculations the percentage of the Muslims was 70%. They have also claimed that many members of the Muslim Community were not counted in the census.5 The census has been officially rejected even by the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania which denounced it in a press release, labelling it incorrect and unacceptable.6 To challenge it, the Church organised its own registration, by handing registration cards to its members throughout the country.7 Even though the census is still disputed by some religious communities and commentators, it is the only official census that Albania has had for its residing religious populations since 1945. The census of 2011 has shown that the number of Muslims of Albania as of 2011 (Bektashis and Sunnis included) was 1,646,236 or 58.79% of the population. They are the largest religious community of the country, followed by those who did not declare any religion, and then the Catholic and Orthodox Christians. As the cen- sus of 2011 shows, most of the Muslims of Albania have defined themselves as Muslims and only 2.09 % have defined themselves as ­Bektashis. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as being ethnic Alba- nians in many publications. However, after the fall of Communism and moderation of state’s official nationalism, many have redefined them- selves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma, Egyptians, etc. The census of 2011 showed that the ethnic Albanian population of Albania was 82.58 % of the total population. The rest was declared to be Greek (0.87%), Macedonian (0.20%), Montenegrin (0.01%), Armenian (0.30%), Roma (0.30%), Egyptian (0.12%), Others (0.09%), Not stated (1.58%) while

5 Jonida Tashi, “KMSH: Mbi 70% e shqiptarëve janë myslimanë, nuk u numërua as Selim Muça.” (MCA: Over 70% of the are Muslims, Selim Muça was not counted too.) MAPOONLINE, 20 December 2012, www.mapo.al/2012/12/15/kmsh-mbi-70-e-shqiptareve- jane-myslimane-nuk-u-numerua-as-selim-muca/, accessed 13 January 2013. 6 “The results of the 2011 Census regarding the Orthodox Christians in Albania are totally incorrect and unacceptable,” The Orthodox Autochephalous Church of Albania, www .orthodoxalbania.org/new/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13539%3 A-kisha-orthodhokse-autoqefale-e-shqiperise-deklarate-zyrtare-&catid=2048%3Alinks, accessed 13 January 2013. 7 “Censusi, Kisha Ortodokse shpërndan formularë, regjistron 10.000 besimtarë” (The Census, the Orthodox Church distributes forms, registers 10.000 believers). Balkanweb. 26 December 2012, www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/censusi-kisha-ortodokse-shperndan- formulare-regjistron-10-000-besimtare-114588.html, accessed 13 January 2013. albania 23

13,96% did not answer.8 During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usu- ally concentrated in the urban centres of Ottoman Albania, and in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated mainly in the south. However, since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have migrated towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modern- day Albania in the ninth century, while the lasting Islamisation started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges and mis- sionary work that the Albanian-speaking populations benefited from the Ottomans.9 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the num- bers and positions of Muslims have changed markedly. An important factor was the establishment of a secular Albanian state in 1920, which adopted laicism as its official ideology, and diminished the role of Islam in soci- ety. Islam and other religions were suppressed in the extreme after World War II, when Communist Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991) and banned all the religions in the country. The official state ideology of Albania during these years, ­national-communism, taught the Albanians that religion was not important for them, and the only religion of the Albanians was Albanianism. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, the majority of the citizens of Albania today are secular in orientation and know little about Islam (or other religions). According to the findings of the Pew Research Centre survey of August 2012 religion matters for 15% of the Albanian Muslims, 7% of them pray, 5% attend mosques, 43% give zakat, 44% fast the Ramadan and 72% believe in God and .10

2 Islam and the State

Albania is a secular parliamentary republic with no official religion, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Constitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state

8 Instat, POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS 2011, (Shtypshkronja “Adel Print”, 2012), p. 71. 9 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 10 James Bell, 2012. The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, Washington DC: Pew Research Centre, www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/ the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf, accessed 19 April 2013. 24 olsi jazexhi is neutral in questions of faith.11 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslima­nët), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijtë), Catholic Christians (known as katolikët) and Orthodox Christians (known as ortodoksët) are ‘recognised’ by the state as the four “traditional” religious communities and are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations.­ In recent years, Protestants (mostly associated with the Albanian Evangelical Alli- ance (VUSH)) are also called to attend national ceremonies, but other faith communities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Baha’is and other minor groups do not enjoy this status. While Albania is a secular state, Islam and the other four ‘recognised’ communities often are pre- sented as being part of the Albanian mosaic of religious tolerance, even though the state rarely fulfils their expectations. During the past decades, neither the traditional nor the non-traditional communities received any funding from the state. However this situation changed in 2009 when the government decided to fund those communi- ties who were willing to sign agreements with the state. The change was proposed by the Council of Ministers on April 15, 2009 and approved by the Albanian Parliament on May 15, 2009. The communities that are ben- efiting from the funds are the four traditional ones: the Muslim Commu- nity, the Bektashi Grandfather-Headquarters (Kryegjyshata), the and the Orthodox Church. In the budget of 2012 the Council of Ministers allocated 99,243,000 Albanian lekë (around 950,397.73 USD)12 to the four traditional religious communities.13 After the distribution, the Muslim Community received 28,160,000 lekë (269,670 USD), the Bektashi Kryegjyshata 21,993,000 (210,612 USD), the Catholic Church 24,720,000 (236,730 USD) and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church 24,370,000 lekë (233,375 USD). The money allocated to the Muslim Community was to be used to pay its administrators, teachers and reconstruct its headquarters.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë (Muslim Community of Albania, MCA, Rr. George W. Bush, Nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 42269123/ 4223701/

11 Constitution of Albania, Chapter I General Provisions, Article 10, www.parlament.al/ dokumenti.asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008. 12 These exchange rates are as of January 2013. 13 Keshilli i Ministrave, Vendim për përcaktimin e masës së financimit, në buxhetin e vitit 2012, për bashkësitë fetare, që kanë nënshkruar Marrëveshje me Këshillin e Ministrave, www .km.gov.al/?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=15998&gj=gj1, accessed 13 January 2013. albania 25

23492, www.kmsh.al, email: [email protected]) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania, recognised by the state as the national organisa- tion of country’s Muslims. It administers most of the mosques and is per- ceived to be the main representative of Sunni Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Muslims of Albania were officially separated from the in Istanbul.14 After having been abolished during the Communist era, the Muslim Community was re-established in 1991. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (World Headquarters of Bektashism, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 4355227/ +355 4355090, www.komunitetibektashi.org, email: info@komunitetibektashi. org) is the largest Sufi tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bek- tashiane is recognised by the state as a national organisation and a sepa- rate religious community. The Bektashis claim their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis liv- ing outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane was transferred from Tur- key to Albania in 1931, after the banning of the order in Turkey in 1925. In 1946, the tariqa separated itself officially from Komuniteti Musliman (which represented the Sunnis and other ) and became a separate religious community.15 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of other Muslim bodies are active in the country. We can mention different Sufi tariqas such as the Rifa’is, Qadiris, Sa’dis, Khalwatis and Tijanis. Important Muslim organisations include a number of non-governmental organisa- tions which run many activities of the Muslim Community of Albania. They are Shtëpia Botuese Prizmi (“Muhamet Gjollesha”, prane Fakultetit te Ndertimit, Tirana tel.: ++355 42233013, http://prizmi.com, email: prizmi [email protected]), a publishing house of Fethullah Gülen movement, and Fondacioni Sema which runs most of the and Beder University (email: [email protected], www.sema.edu.al). Other important organisa- tions are a Turkish Sufi organisation Qendra Kulturore “PROGRESI”, (Vasil Shanto / Rr: Çajupi Shkodër / Albania, tel.: ++355 22254634, www.progresibo time.com), which runs one of the madrasas of Shkodra, a Salafi organi- sation The League of the Imams of Albania (Unaza e Re, Rruga: Teodor Keko mbi Alfa Bank, Tirana, Albania, email: [email protected],

14 Jazexhi, Olsi. Ottomans into Illyrians, passages to nationhood in 20th century Albania. (PhD Dissertation. Florence: European University Institute, 2011), pp. 190–194. 15 Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Bektashism as a mystical sect of Islam) (Tirana: KOHA, 1999), pp. 228–229. 26 olsi jazexhi tel. & fax: ++355 48320160, Mobile: ++355 672304520 ++355 672582271, www .lidhjahoxhallareve.com) which tries to represent, support and defend the Salafi imams, a family run NGO The Albanian Institute of Islamic Though and Civilization (Rr. Isuf Elezi Nr.10, VILAT SELIT, P.O. Box. 2905, Tirana, Albania, tel.: ++355 42215087, www.aiitc.net, email: [email protected]) established in 1996, which publishes religious and national books, etc.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

As of 2012, the Muslim Community of Albania had 535 mosques operating in the country.16 A number of mosques which originate from Ottoman times and are administered by the Muslim Community, are classified as historical monuments by the state and enjoy its protection. For restoring these mosques that are presently ruined, on February 16, 2010 the Muslim Community, the Institute of Cultural Monuments and the Turkish Inter- national Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) signed a protocol of cooperation whereby TIKA agreed to finance the restoration of histori- cal mosques.17 This cooperation continued well into 2012. In May 2012 the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sports signed a new agreement with TIKA for the restoration of five historical mosques in the country. The mosques were the mosque of Preza Castle, the mosque of Kruja’s Bazaar, Naziresha’s mosque in Elbasan, the Leaden mosque of Berat and Iljaz Mirahori’s mosque in Korça.18 Apart from the historical mosques and those constructed after 1991, a small number of prayer houses and masjids (small mosques without minarets), operate throughout the country. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana and the Rifa’i tariqa runs a masjid in Tirana. The Bektashis have some 138 tekes (Sufi lodges),19 and the other Sufi tariqas have altogether an estimated 384 tekes, turbes, maqams and zawiyas.20

16 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions, Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youths and Sports, 13 January 2012. 17 “Firmoset protokolli per restaurimin e xhamive historike. (A protocol for ­restoring his- torical mosques is signed)”, Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/66- firmoset-protokolli-per-restaurimin-e-xhamive-historike.html, accessed 14 February 2012. 18 “Turqit do të restaurojnë pesë xhami historike” (Turks will restore five historical mosques), , 28 May 2012, http://gazeta-shqip.com/lajme/2012/05/28/turqit- do-te-restaurojne-pese-xhami-historike/, accessed 19 January 2013. 19 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions, 13 January 2012. 20 Ibid. albania 27

5 Children’s Education

Religious education was prohibited in Albania under Communism and religion itself was attacked by the educational system. After the fall of Com- munism, school textbooks have adopted a more positive stance towards religion but Islam is not always portrayed in very positive terms.21 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the Mus- lim Community of Albania and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the Muslim Community include seven high schools (madrasas), two pri- mary schools and five other teaching facilities.22 The latest madrasa to be constructed is the madrasa of Korça which was licensed on November 21, 2009.23 Until 2003, most of the madrasas of the Muslim Community were sponsored and run by Arab NGOs. However, after the start of the United States-led “war on terror”, most of the Arab NGOs which were sponsoring the madrasas were removed from the country or reduced their activities. They were replaced by Turkish organisations (mostly of the Fethullah Gülen movement which at present runs five out of seven madrasas). Mosques and some Muslim NGOs also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and other Sufi organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. But the Bektashis are reported to operate a few religious clerical training centres.24

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since the creation of Albania in 1913, the Islamic organisations of the country have not been able to develop any institutions of higher ­learning.

21 Jazexhi, Olsi, “Depicting the Enemy: the Image of the Turk and the Muslim in ­Albania’s High School Textbooks”, Sarajevo: Islam in South East Asia Forum—ISEEF, Paper No. 1, July 2008. 22 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. See also: “MEDRESETE DHE KURSET FETARE, (Madrasas and religious classes)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/ medresete.html, accessed 12 January 2013. 23 “Keshilli i Ministrave licenson Medresene e re te Korces. (The Council of Ministers licenses the new madrasa of Korça)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/ aktualitet/93-keshilli-i-ministrave-licenson-medresene-e-re-te-korces.html, accessed 12 Janu‑ ary 2013. 24 Albania, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, July–December, Interna- tional Religious Freedom Report for 2011, www.state.gov/documents/organization/192989 .pdf, accessed 12 January 2013. 28 olsi jazexhi

Muslims were dependent on institutions elsewhere in the for training their imams. Since nowadays the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher learning and, moreover, because of the concern that the Albanian authorities had with the “Arab Islam” after 2001, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised on a number of occasions. While the Bektashis have made no demands for the establishment of a university, the Muslim Community faced many media attacks during the past decade over the education of its imams and has repeatedly asked the state to permit it to open of an Islamic university. The request of the Muslim Community of Albania for opening an Islamic University was finalised in September 2010, when in an extraordi- nary meeting it approved the opening of a Theological University with the justification that this university will be “providing higher education com- patible with the culture, tradition and the characteristics of the Albanian society. Through its opening, the Albanian youth will no longer need to go to foreign countries for continuing their theological studies.”25 The Uni- versity of the Muslim Community, which is called Bedër (Full Moon), got approval from the Council of Ministers of Albania on April 6, 2011 and is presently manned by the Turkish Foundation Sema. It is not a fully theo- logical university as the Muslim Community legislated in 2010. The uni- versity runs two faculties; one in Humanities and another in Philology and Education. A department of Islamic Sciences exists under the Humanities faculty. The Department of Islamic Sciences offers a ­Bachelor’s programme in Islamic Sciences, a Master’s programme in Basic Islamic Sciences and another in Modern Islamic Sciences.26 Ilir Kulla, the former head of the State Committee on Cults, who was the first Albanian official to announce the Albanian state’s plans for opening an Islamic University in the country, argued in 2005, that the reason for the creation of such a university was to replace the Arab-educated imams in the structures of the Muslim Community.27 This logic is repeated even in the pages of the university. In the “about department” link of the uni-

25 “Kryesia e KMSH-se miraton themelimin e Universitetit Teologjik Islam ne Shqiperi (The leadership of the MCA approves the establishment of a Theological Islamic Univer- sity in Albania)” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/249-kryesia- e-kmsh-se-miraton-themelimin-e-universitetit-teologjik-islam-ne-shqiperi.html, accessed 12 February 2012. 26 For more on the programmes of Bedër University see: http://isc.beder.edu.al/en/ content/default/programs-13/0/330, accessed 12 January 2013. 27 Kulla, Ilir. “Pse-të e universitetit islam!” (Why-s of the Islamic University), Gazeta , 23 January 2005. albania 29 versity, students who study Islamic sciences are told that after graduat- ing, they will be given priority in employment at the headquarters of the Muslim Community of Albania (MCA), its local offices in all the cities, all the mosques, tutoring and cultural centres, the madrasas and in Bedër University itself.28 While the university seems to have been created to reform and de-Arabize Islam in the country and the Prime Minister Berisha has described it as a university which “will make Islam speak Albanian in the world,”29 its Rector Ferdinand Gjana has downplayed its Islamic character, describing it as “a private university focused on social sciences . . . and as the only university which has a department of Islamic sciences in its structure.”30 During its opening ceremony in 2011, Mustafa Ozcan, a representative of Sema Foundation in Tirana declared that “these schools will be the archi- tects of the future, where mankind will no longer be different in religion or race, but knowledge, morals, love and dialogue will rule.”31

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Due to the Communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not com- mon in Albania. In graveyards built during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, Christians and Muslims are buried together. However, a number of cemeteries exist outside Tirana, where Muslims are bur- ied separately from Christians. In 2012, when the Municipality of Tirana announced plans to construct mural catacombs for burying the dead, the Muslim Community rejected the proposal and its mufti suggested cre- ation of separate cemeteries according to religious beliefs.32

28 See “About Departments”, Bedër University: http://isc.beder.edu.al/en/content/default/ about-departments-14-1/243/247, accessed 12 January 2013. 29 “Berisha, myslimanëve: Xhamia e re nis së shpejti” (Berisha, to Muslims: The new mosque will start soon), Gazeta , 7 April 2012, www.panorama.com.al/2012/04/07/ berisha-myslimaneve-se-shpejti-xhamia-e-re/, accessed 6 February 2013. 30 “Intervistë me Rektorin e Universitetit “Hëna e Plotë” (BEDËR), Dr. Ferdinand Gjana, dhënë në revistën “Monitor” (Interview with the Rector of “Full Moon” (Beder) University, Dr. Ferdinand Gjana,” given for The Monitor magazine), www.beder.edu.al/faqe .php?kategoria=rreth-universitetit&hap=marredheniet-me-publikun-median&sub=110, accessed 12 February 2012. 31 “Hapja e Universitetit Beder (The Opening of Beder University),” Top Channel, 7 April 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Bmko40wwAs, accessed 12 January 2013. 32 Ermelinda Hoxhaj “Varret murale, Myftiu: Feja s’e lejon, po duhen” (Mural Cata- combs, the Mufti: The religion does not allow, but they are needed), , 12 April 2012, www.balkanweb.com/gazetav5/artikull.php?id=114228, accessed 26 January 2013. 30 olsi jazexhi

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, including the army, but religious preachers may have access to prisons to offer religious counselling to inmates. However, religious chaplains are strictly prohib- ited in public schools.

9 Religious Festivals

The Albanian state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ‘Id al- Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Kurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ‘Id al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims fast the month of Ramadan and celebrate five special sacred nights. In recent years the Mus- lim Community has developed a modern concert to celebrate the birth- day of Prophet Muhammad in one of the weeks of April. The concert, which is organised in Tirana, is attended by political authorities, muftis, the head of the Muslim Community and ordinary citizens who often are not practising Muslims.33 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Nawruz’ which is celebrated by the Bektashis on March 22, in memory of the birth of Imam Ali. In addition, the Bektashis celebrate the day of ‘Ashura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, as well as some other local festivals such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania. Halal food is available

33 The birthday of Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated in one of the weekends of the month of April. The organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The initiators and organisers of this concert are the Fethullah Gülen Tariqa, which, since 2005, have developed a strong influence inside the Muslim Community of Albania. The ­latest concert was organised on April 7, 2012. See: “7 vjet program festiv ‘Profeti Muhamed a.s.— Krenaria e Njerëzimit’ ” (7 years a celebratory program “Prophet Muhamed” (pbuh) the Pride of Mankind), Drita Islame Online, www.dritaislame.al/7-vjet-program-festiv-profeti- muhameda-s-krenaria-e-njerezimit/, accessed 27 January 2013. albania 31 in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities of the country. However, there is no central institution for halal certification and this food is not available in state institutions, such as in the army, hospitals, schools, etc. The requests of Muslim believers in these institutions, for halal food, are generally ignored.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in schools. However school principals have the right to set standards for “appropriate clothing” which at times includes restrictions on public dis- plays of religious symbols. In recent years a number of incidents involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their head scarves have occurred. Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing the hijab, in most state and public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. In December 2010, the Ministry of Education announced a bill, which was to be discussed by the civil society, for adopting a new Law on Pre-University Education. Accord- ing to article 36, students were prohibited from displaying any religious symbols in the schools. However, as the media reported in April 2011, the Ministry of Education removed point 4 of article 36 which prohibited stu- dents from displaying their religious symbols. The media interpreted this move as a state’s approval of the hijab in public institutions.34

12 Publication and Media

The main Muslim newspapers, magazines and radios in Albania are:

Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), the monthly official newspaper of the Muslim Community of Albania; Zani i Naltë, a quarterly scientific and cultural journal of the Muslim Community of Albania;

34 “MASH lejon ferexhete ne shkolla, hiqet paragrafi per ndalimin e simboleve fetare (The Ministry of Education allows veils in schools, the paragraph prohibiting religious symbols is removed)”, Gazeta Sot, 21 April 2011. 32 olsi jazexhi

Vjetar i aktiviteteve 2011–2012 (2011–2012 Working Annual Report), annual report of MCA’s activities; Udha Islame (The Islamic Path), journal of the Muftiate of Shkodra; Drita e Kuranit (The Light of ), magazine published by the Qur’an Foundation; Këshilla (The Advice), magazine published by the Qur’an Foundation; Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Qadiri tariqa; Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Rifa’i tariqa; Etika (The Ethic), monthly magazine published by the Progresi Foundation; Etika për fëmijë (Ethics for children), monthly magazine published by the Progresi Foundation; Urtësia (Wisdom), magazine of the Bektashi Community; Familja (The Family), a magazine published by the ‘women’s’ associa- tion—Shoqata Kulturore “GRUAJA”; Radio Kontakt (Radio Contact)—broadcasts secular and religious programs.

Apart from the above and Ardhmëria association newspapers and maga- zines, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organisations, which produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arabic, Persian and Turkish. The most prominent are the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, “Prizmi” Publishing House, Jehona Association, Tradita Association, Future’s Youth Organisation, ALSAR association

13 Family Law

Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical prac- tice. The Sunni Muslim Community recognises the practice of nikah (reli- gious marriage), but this is not often practised and few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam.

14 Interreligious Relations

Even though Communist Albania was one of the most ruthless countries of Eastern Europe in suppressing religious freedoms, the official myth that state politicians have adopted after the fall of Communism is that Albania is a country of religious tolerance and harmony. In the last few albania 33 decades a number of projects for fostering interreligious relations have been sponsored by Western agencies such as USAID and “World Congress of Religions for Peace”. On October 22, 2009, the four heads of the Muslim, Bektashi, Orthodox and Catholic communities established in Tirana the Interreligious Council of Albania the aim of which is to foster coexistence in the country. The Council was registered in the court of Tirana on Octo- ber 25, 2009. However, it has not reported any events in 2012. Major interreligious activities for 2012 included a visit to the Headquar- ters of the Muslim Community by Farah Pandith, Special Representative to Muslim Communities, and Hannah Rosenthal, the Head of the Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, both from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs (DRL) at the United States Department of State.35 Another was the promotion of the proceedings of the confer- ence “Perspective on Socio-Cultural and Religious Diversity in the Balkans from a Global Perspective; experiences of Fethullah Gülen as a model and interfaith harmony in Albania” by the University of Tirana and the Centre for Dialogue “Prizmi.”36

15 Public Opinion and Debate

A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2012. The most noticeable event was related to the dismissal of Lulzim Plloci, the imam of the Mosque of the Madrasa in Tirana, and its , Ferid Piku from their preaching positions in the mosque. The removal of these two Arab-educated imams from the mosque of Tirana’s Madrasa was interpreted by believers as part of the ongoing struggle for controlling Islam in Albania between the Arab- educated clerics and the Turkish Fethullah Gülen movement which in recent years has taken control of the institutions of the Muslim Commu- nity. The removal of the imams which started in March 2012 and lasted for a few months involved a court case,37 blocking of the mosque by the

35 Drita Islame, “Përfaqësueset amerikane, vizitë në Medresenë e Tiranës” (American representatives, visit the Madrasa of Tirana), www.dritaislame.al/perfaqesueset-amerikane- vizite-ne-medresene-e-tiranes/09/03/2012, accessed 27 January 2013. 36 Drita Islame, “Promovohet libri për Diversitetin Fetar dhe Kulturor në Ballkan” (Pro- motion of the book Religion and Cultural Diversity in the Balkans), 19 June 2012, www .dritaislame.al/promovohet-libri-per-diversitetin-fetar-dhe-kulturor-ne-ballkan/, accessed 27 January 2013. 37 “Urdhri i gjykatës: Imami të mos i afrohet xhamisë së Medresesë” (Court Order: The imam should not come near the mosque), MAPO Online, 25 May 2012 www.mapo 34 olsi jazexhi believers, the intervening of the anti-terror police and the removal of the Arab-educated deputy mufti of Tirana who was part of this group.38 These actions were condemned by the League of the Imams of Albania which claimed that “the dismissive tendencies transmitted by the MCA leader- ship will only bring conflicts among believers, disturb social peace among them while brewing unnecessary hatred.”39 Another issue which drew much media attention was related to the protest that the League of the Imams of Albania and the Muslim Forum of Albania organised against a planned exhibit by the LGBT community of Tirana on May 17, 2012. The Muslim groups staged their protest near the area where the LGBT community and a number of Western diplomats and ambassadors were celebrating the international day against homophobia. The Muslim protestors rejected homosexuality and called for the protec- tion of the values of the family.40 The League of the Albanian Imams drew media attention again on September 19, 2012 when it requested permission from the state police to organise a symposium in the city of Pogradec, in defence of Prophet Muhammad and condemnation of the “Innocence of Muslims” movie. Their request was interpreted as a “planned demonstration” by the United States Embassy in Tirana which warned its citizens to stay away from the city.41 However, and as the Voice of America showed later on, the sympo- sium of Pogradec was not a demonstration but a symposium, where the attending clerics denounced the violence that was happening in certain countries in the name of the Prophet.42

.al/2012/05/26/urdhri-i-gjykates-imami-te-mos-i-afrohet-xhamise-se-medresese/, accessed 27 January 2013. 38 “Sulm frontal ndaj Ardhmërisë, shkarkohet Zëvendësmyftiu” (Frontal attack against Ardhmeria organisation, the deputy mufti is sacked), E-zani. 3 May 2012, www.e-zani.com/ 2012/05/03/sulm-frontal-ndaj-ardhmerise-shkarkohet-zevendesmyftiu/, accessed 27 Janu- ary 2013. 39 Gjergj Erebara, “Imam’s Dismissal Divides Muslims in Albania. Sacking blamed on leadership of Albanian Muslim Community’s intolerance of more Arab-influenced follow- ers.” Balkan Insight, March 14, 2012, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/imam-s-dismissal- sparks-row-in-albania-s-muslim-community, accessed 27 January 2013. 40 Shpresa Mezini, “Parada” LGBT, e paktë dhe e paqtë. Forumi mysliman akuzon: “Studentët dhe gjimnazistët u paguan të dilnin në boulevard” (The LGBT parade, few peo- ple, peaceful. The Muslim Forum accuses: Students were paid to march in the boulevard). 18 May 2012, Gazeta Shqip, http://gazeta-shqip.com/lajme/2012/05/18/parada-lgbt-e-pakte- dhe-e-paqte/, accessed 27 January 2013. 41 “SHBA: Kujdes ne Pogradec nga protesta e myslimaneve” (USA: Be careful in Pogradec from the Muslim Protest). Shqiptarja, September 19, 2012, www.shqiptarja.com/home/1/ shba-kujdes-ne-pogradec-nga-protesta-e-myslimaneve-120586.html, accessed 27 January 2013. 42 “Lidhja e Hoxhallarëve organizon simpozium për vlerat e profetit Muhamet” (The League of the Imams organises a symposium celebrating the values of Prophet Muhammed). albania 35

An issue which also drew much media attention during 2012 was the continuous request by the Muslim Community of Albania for authorities to get permission to build a great mosque in Tirana. On February 20, 2012 the mayor of Tirana, Lulzim Basha, announced the creation of a working group to supervise the future mosque project.43 On March 20, 2012 the mayor of Tirana announced that the new mosque will be built in the lands of “Namazgjah” park which belongs to the Muslim Community.44 While on April 7, 2012 when the Muslim Community organised the celebratory programme for “Prophet Muhammad,” its chairman Selim Muça, called on the Prime Minister to join the Community in placing the first brick in the foundations of the mosque by the forthcoming Bayram.45 However, the mosque was not build until the end of 2012. When the mayor of Tirana congratulated the Muslim Community for the festival of the Kurban Bay- ram on October 25, he reassured the chairman that the disputes regarding the ownership of the land of the mosque were resolved, and the munici- pality was waiting for the designers to submit their proposals regarding the new mosque.46

16 Major Cultural Events

Besides the events noted in section 9 above, mention should be made of Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shi’i saint Abbas Ali.

Zeri i Amerikes, 29 September 2012, www.zeriamerikes.com/content/muhamed-sympozium/ 1513374.html, accessed 27 January 2013. 43 “Ngrihet komisioni për xhaminë e re” (A commission for the new mosque is estab- lished), Top Channel, 19 February 2012, www.top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=229263&ref=fp, accessed 27 January 2013. 44 “Bashkia: Xhamia e re e Tiranës, tek ‘Namazgjaja’ ” (The Municipality: The New Mosque at the “Namazgjaja). Gazeta Panorama, 20 March 2012, www.panorama.com.al/2012/03/20/ pranohet-propozimin-e-k-mysliman-xhamia-tek-%E2%80%9Cnamazgjaja%E2%80%9D/, accessed 27 January 2013. 45 “Muça: Xhamia në Tiranë, puna të nisë sa më shpejt” (Muca: The mosque in Tirana, the work must start as soon as possible). Top Channel, April 7, 2012, www.top-channel.tv/ artikull.php?id=232356&ref=fp, accessed 27 January 2013. 46 “Basha uron Kurban Bajramin: Është zgjidhur pronësia e truallit të Xhamisë” (Basha congratulates the Qurban Bayram: Mosque’s land ownership has been resolved). Bal- kanweb, 25 October 2012, www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/basha-uron-kurban-bajramin- eshte-zgjidhur-pronesia-e-truallit-te-xhamise-107307.html, accessed 27 January 2013.

ARMENIA

Sevak Karamyan1

1 Muslim Populations

The National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia has never con- ducted a census of religion in Armenia. However, the last census that took place from 12 to 21 October 2011 included an optional question concerning denomination, only for those who are permanent residents of Armenia.2 The list of answers on religion, church or denomination also included a category “Muslim.”3 The result of this census will be published only in the second quarter of 2013.4 The 2001 census5 included a question on ethnicity according to which there were small numbers of traditionally Muslim ethnic groups, more specifically, 29 ,6 123 Tatars, 158 Ingushes, 322 Abazines, 326 Persians (Iranians), and 1,519 Kurds. This total of 2,477 people7 consti- tuted 0.08% of the population.8 According to various research publications, as well as the information provided by non-governmental organisations, the number of Muslims in Armenia is about 8,000 and 80% of them are resident non-citizens who stay in Armenia for extended periods of time.

1 Dr Sevak Karamyan is an Expert of the Group of Independent Experts of The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. 2 www.armstat.am/file/doc/99465273.pdf, accessed 20 November 2012. 3 Ibid. 4 http://armstat.am/file/doc/99471368.pdf, accessed 24 December 2012. 5 www.armstat.am/en/?nid=52, accessed 24 December 2012. 6 But according to specialists, the number of Azerbaijanis is probably higher, and it is possible that during the census many of them hid their Azerbaijani origins. For example, according to H. Kharatyan, Head of the Chair of Inter-Cultural Communication at Yerevan State Linguistic University after V. Brusov, there are about 120 Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 7 Mkrtumyan, Y., H. Sargsyan and A. Tadevosyan (eds), Հայաստանի Հանրապետու­ թյան ազգային փոքրամասնությունները քաղաքացիական հասրակաության կայացման արդի պայմաններում (National Minorities of the Republic of Armenia in the Present Conditions of Formation of Civic Society), vol. 2 (Yerevan: National Acad- emy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, Gitutyun Publishing, 2005), pp. 220–221 (in Armenian). 8 According to the 2001 census, the population of Armenia was 3,210,000. According to the Statistical Yearbook of 2012, it has increased to 3,274,300; www.armstat.am/file/ doc/99471433.pdf, accessed 24 December 2012. 38 sevak karamyan

The majority of Muslims are from Iran, others come from elsewhere in the Middle East and India and most are businessmen, students and diplomats. The ratio of Shi’is to Sunnis is about 3:1. There is some contradictory information concerning Kurds in Arme- nia. There are more than 60,000 Kurdish-speaking people, but the major- ity of this group identify themselves as Yezidis,9 who detach themselves from Islam in terms of religion and from the Kurds in terms of ethnicity.10 Their language is Kurmanji, a Northern Kurdish dialect, although Yezidis call their language Ezdiki in order to underscore their separate identity. It should be mentioned that some Yezidis identify themselves as Kurds or Yezidi-Kurds on the basis of language, traditions and customs.11 Accord- ing to the Head of the Kurdish National Council of Armenia, K. Hasanov, there are about 300 Kurds in Armenia who do not have a strong religious identity, and who are distinguished from Armenians mainly by the fact that they do not eat pork. Other sources give the number of Muslim Kurds in Armenia as about 1,000.12 Islam reached the territory of today’s Armenia shortly after the foun- dation of the religion. The first Arab invasion of Armenia took place in 640 CE and thereafter Armenia was under Arab rule for more than 200 years. In the second half of the 9th century the Armenians succeeded in overthrowing Arab rule and restoring independence which lasted till the beginning of the 11th century. From the mid-11th century Armenia underwent a number of invasions by the Seljuk Turks who, until the first half of the 12th century, kept Armenia under their control. As a result of Armenian-Georgian military cooperation, most Armenian territories were liberated from the Seljuk Turks. In 1236, a major military incursion of Mongols took place after which Armenia remained under Mongol rule for almost two centuries. Throughout the 15th century Armenia was under the rule of two Turkoman tribes, the Ak Koyunlu or Aq Qoyunlu (the

9 An ethno-confessional group, whose main identity is religion—Yezidism or Sharfa- . Yezidism is a syncretic doctrine which combines the belief in the One God with the veneration of a Holy Trinity—Malak Tawus (Peacock angel), Shaykh ‘Adi and Sultan Yezid (all being incarnations of God), as well as an extensive popular pantheon that includes a number of divinities, saints and patron-deities having parallels with both Iranian and Semitic traditions. 10 Asatryan, G. and V. Arakelova, The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia (Yerevan: Cauca- sian Centre for Iranian Studies 2004), p. 10. Also available at www.hra.am/file/minorities_ en.pdf. 11 Sardar, A., Քրդերը Հայաստանում (Kurds in Armenia) (Yerevan: Hayastan Press 1996), p. 59 (in Armenian). 12 Asatryan and Arakelova, Ethnic Minorities, p. 14. armenia 39

White Sheep) Turcomans, and Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) Turcomans. From the 16th century, Armenia was divided between two Muslim powers, Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran (Persia). The situation changed after the Russian-Persian wars of the 19th century, when some Armenian territories (including the territory of today’s Republic of Armenia) passed to the Rus- sian Empire. In spite of the long presence of Islamic authority, the Arme- nians remained strongly attached to their church and did not change their Christian religion, which the Armenian state had first adopted officially in 301 CE. During the period of the First Armenian Republic, from 1918 to 1920, as well as in the following period of the Soviet Republic, the num- ber of Muslims (Muslim Turks later called Azerbaijanis13 and Kurds) was high—about 80,000,14 and according to the last Soviet census that took place in 1989, there were 4,151 Kurds and 84,860 ­Azerbaijanis15 in Arme- nia. The majority of these Azerbaijanis left the country during the conflict with Azerbaijan that began in 1988. Kurds who used to live in Azerbai- jani enclaves in Armenia by virtue of confessional and cultural related- ness (children attending Azerbaijani schools, mixed marriages, etc.) left Armenia along with the Azerbaijanis. Most Azerbaijanis and Kurds went to Russia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Turkey, as well as Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, some traditionally Muslim ethnic groups living in the former Soviet Union, such as Abazines and Ingushes, as well as Iranians, have tended to migrate to Armenia.

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 8.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, The church shall be separate from the state in the Republic of Armenia. The Republic of Armenia recognises the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the national iden- tity of the people of Armenia. Freedom of activities for all religious organi- sations in accordance with the law shall be guaranteed in the Republic of

13 After 1929, this group began to be called Azerbaijanis in official documents (where they were formerly called Turks). See Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926г. (Census of the Population in 1926), Vol. 14 (Moscow: CSU Publishing 1929), pp. 8, 13 (in Russian). 14 Mkrtumyan et al., National Minorities, p. 151. 15 Газета Коммунист № 115 (17002) от 24.05.1990 (Daily Communist No 115 (17002) from 24.05.1990). 40 sevak karamyan

Armenia. The relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apos- tolic Holy Church shall be regulated by law.16 In 1991, a law was adopted to protect Freedom of Conscience and regu- late Religious Organisations (amendments and additions were made to it in 1997, 2001 and 2011). This law guarantees the equality and freedom of religious organisations, and defines the process for their registration.17 Before becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 2001, Armenia had already signed and ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which guarantees such freedoms. In practice, the Armenian Apostolic Church has some privileges. It has its own television channel, and the History of the Armenian Church is a mandatory subject in Armenian secondary schools. A picture of the Catholicos (Patriarch) of All Armenians is required to be hung in schools, along with other national symbols such as the flag and coat of arms. There is a Council of National Minorities under the President of Arme- nia, coordinated by one of the advisors to the President. The council is comprised of the representatives of the main minorities and their organi- sations in Armenia, but does not include any religious organisations. There is a Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs in the Gov- ernment of Armenia (headed by Vardan Ascatryan, tel.: ++37410 51 57 40, www.gov.am/en/religion/), which deals with issues concerning minori- ties and religions and provides recommendations and expert evaluations regarding the registration of religious organisations. There is no law, or any other legal framework, that applies specifically to Islam. Muslim mon- uments are included in the list of sites of historic and architectural value that are protected and maintained by the state.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are no officially registered Muslim organisations in Armenia, but there are organisations that carry out religious activities. The main organi- sation in Armenia is the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (14, Baghramyan 2nd lay, tel.: ++374 10229053, +374 10229054, fax: ++374 10 269160, http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre is a

16 The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, Article 8.1, www.president.am/library/ constitution/eng/?pn=1, accessed 20 November 2012. 17 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2041&lang=arm, accessed 20 Octo‑ ber 2012. armenia 41 branch of the Iran-based and Relations Organisation (www. icro.ir) and was established in 1999 and is led by the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Armenia. The activities of the Centre include free courses, translation of Persian and Islamic literature into Armenian (in 2006, the Qur’an was published in Armenian), courses on Qur’an study and calligraphy as well as exhibitions and conferences. There are also a variety of organisations attached to Muslim ethnic groups which do not have any religious activities. They are: the Associa- tion of Iranian Students (12, Mashtoc Ave., Yerevan, tel.: ++374 10525730); the National Kurdish Council (Hatis Str., Cinema building, Abovyan, tel.: ++374 22220456); Kurdistan Committee (62/19, Terian Str., Yerevan, tel.: ++374 10582207); the Kurdish Council of Intellectuals (2, Arshakuniats Ave., 12th floor, Yerevan, tel.: ++374 10529612). The activities of these Kurd- ish organisations mainly focus on the issues of language, culture, and tra- ditions, but not religious affairs. There are no Muslim political parties or political organisations in Armenia.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There is a Shi’i mosque in the centre of Yerevan called the Blue Mosque (founded in 1798). There is no permanent imam and nor are there regular calls to prayer, although an imam comes from Iran and provides services during religious festivals. In the absence of an imam, the most educated individuals in the congregation perform the functions of imam. Apart from this mosque, Muslims use two unofficial places of worship, one of which is located in a room in the dormitory of Yerevan State Medical University (10, Davit Anhakht, Yerevan) and the other one is in Nor Nork Student campus (12/6, Moldovakan str., Nor Nork, Yerevan). These loca- tions are more convenient for the mainly Sunni students. The role of the imam there is performed by one of the Muslim students who know the Qur’an well.

5 Children’s Education

The only school that provides optional Islamic education is the educa- tional centre “Martyr Fahmide”, (8, Lvovyan str., tel.: ++374 10633718) sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Yerevan. Besides the children of the diplomatic staff, the school is attended also by children of Iranian residents. According to the data of the Cultural Centre there are 42 sevak karamyan more than 200 children in this school.18 The staff of the school is mainly from Iran and is of both Persian and Armenian origin. The school operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels.

6 Higher and Professional Education

More than 30 academic courses on Islam are offered at the Yerevan State University (YSU) within the departments of Arabic, Turkish and Persian Studies (Faculty of Oriental Studies), including BA, MA and PhD pro- grammes. There is no institution for imam training in Armenia.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are some Azerbaijani and Kurdish cemeteries, particularly in the regions of Masis, Ararat Marz, and in the villages where Azerbaijanis and Kurds used to live in the greatest concentrations. There is a medieval Turkoman in the village of Argavand (Armavir Marz) built by Kara Koyunlu Emir Sadayi dating back to 1413. The majority of Muslims living in Armenia on a non-permanent basis usually send the bodies of deceased relatives to their homelands for burial.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Armenian armed forces or any other state insti- tutions such as hospitals, schools, prisons, etc. However, the Law Regard- ing the Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church allows the Armenian Church to have perma- nent representatives in hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and all places of detention,19 while the Law on Freedom of Con- science and Religious Organisations permits other religious organisations to have representatives in these places on demand only.20 There is also

18 http://armenian.irib.ir/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5488:matraseye- -fahmide-dar-irevan-va-safire-iran-dar-irevan&Itemid=71&lang=en, accessed 28 Sep‑ tember 2012. 19 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2911&lang=arm, accessed 10 Sep‑ tember 2012. 20 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2041&lang=arm , accessed 21 Octo‑ ber 2012. armenia 43

Law on Alternative Service. According to Article 3 of the Law on Alterna- tive Service (adopted in 2004, amendments and additions were made to it in 2006), alternative service may be performed by the citizens of Armenia whose religious beliefs or convictions are in contradiction with the per- formance of military service in armed forces, as well as carrying, keeping, maintaining and using weapons.21

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are incorporated into the official calendar of the Republic of Armenia. The Iranian community celebrates Ramadan and the main Shi’i events, such as Muharram. An imam comes from Iran and provides the services for these celebrations. The communities of Muslims from the Middle East and India, mainly consisting of students, organise their celebrations in their dormitories.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

There are at least two recognised halal butchers in Yerevan. One is located in an agricultural market (35, Khorenaci str., Yerevan); the second offers halal meat at the Blue Mosque (12, Mashtoc ave., Yerevan) once a week. There is no special provision for halal food in public institutions. Mus- lim students report that they usually buy meat produced by Sadia which is internationally recognised as halal. The only Armenian meat producer which has a halal certificate (issued in UAE) is Geghard. One bank in Armenia can be considered Islamic, namely the Iranian “Mellat Bank” (6, Amiryan str., Yerevan, tel/fax: +374 10581791 www.mellatbank.am). At the time of writing there is no organised provision for hajj travel.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. In the streets of Yerevan as well as the regions bordering Iran, hijab and other Muslim dress elements can be seen very occasionally; they are mainly worn by

21 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1884&lang=arm, accessed 15 Decem‑ ber 2012. 44 sevak karamyan students, tourists, or employees (and their family members) of diplomatic missions from Muslim countries.

12 Publications and Media

There are at least two magazines, Mihr and Parsian, published by the Iranian Cultural Centre. They are not officially religious, but are rich in Islamic content. The former is published twice a month, the latter once a month and both are published in Persian and Armenian. The Centre also posts its information on its website (http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre has published a number of books and brochures with religious content. In 2006 the Qur’an was published in Armenian (Hayastan Press). There are two Kurdish tabloids, Ria Taza (in Kurdish) and Zagros (mainly in Arme- nian with one or two pages in Kurdish), which have no religious content. Apart from the newspapers, there is a 30-minute daily radio programme in Kurdish on public radio, but it too is without any religious content.

13 Family Law

Before 2007 Armenian legislation did not recognise religious marriages, including those contracted at the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. Only civil marriages were recognised by the state. Since 2007, the Law on the Relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Church22 regu- lates the special relationship between the state and the Armenian Church and grants certain privileges to the Armenian Church that are not avail- able to other religious groups. It makes the Armenian Church’s marriage rite legally binding, but the supporting legal acts to enforce this are not yet in place.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are no interreligious councils in Armenia; nor are there interre- ligious events with the participation of representatives of different reli- gions, including Islam. However, the church leadership participates in the Interreligious Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (8/29,

22 http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2911&lang=arm, accessed 10 Sep‑ tember 2012. armenia 45

Michurinskiy Prospekt, Hotel Universitetskaya, Moscow,117192, Russian Federation, www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/54211.html). According to some experts, recent mutual visits between the Catholicos and the Shaykh al- Islam will be a new stage in resolving the Karabakh conflict.23

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media very rarely cover issues concerning Muslims living in Armenia. However, the coverage of the situation in Turkey and Azerbai- jan, as well as the conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, is consider- able. In 2012 there were many reports concerning the situation in , where a huge Armenian community lives. During 2012 more than 7,000 Syrian Armenians came to Armenia.24 Acts such as Qur’an burning and the video “The Innocence of Muslims” were actively discussed, and the Armenian Church officially condemned these acts.25 From time to time, the media publish speeches made by ambassadors of Muslim countries in Armenia, as well as reports from the Muslim coun- tries with Armenian communities. The media become particularly active at times of official visits by leaders from Muslim countries. If a leader of a Muslim country does not visit the Armenian Genocide memorial in Yere- van, the media and the public discourse often interpret it as a sign of the solidarity of that particular leader and his country with Turkey.

16 Major Cultural Events

The Iranian Cultural Centre occasionally organises sports events and other social activities such as conferences, exhibitions and debates. On 7 June 2012 the Cultural Centre and the Oriental Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia organised a conference devoted to the ideas of Imam Khomeyni and their influence in Iran and in the world.26 On 10 June 2012 a library with more than 20,000 books mainly on Iranian

23 www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/72754/, accessed 17 October 2012. 24 www.voanews.com/content/armenian-pm-syrian-refugees-plan-to-stay/1571891.html accessed 29 December 2012. 25 www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=2208&y=2012&m=8&d=20&lng=en accessed 30 October 2012. 26 http://hy.yerevan.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=250&pageid=11740&newsview=584380 accessed 30 June 2012. 46 sevak karamyan culture, literature and Islam was opened in Blue Mosque.27 On 1–7 Febru- ary 2012 an Iranian art exhibition titled “In the name of God” dedicated to the 33rd anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran took place in the National Gallery of Armenia.28 The Kurdish community celebrates Nawruz on 21 March. Numerous performances of music and dance are staged during the celebration and the events are attended by many guests. Each year the President of Arme- nia conveys congratulations to the Kurdish community of Armenia on the occasion of Nawruz.29 In 2012 more than 15,000 Iranians30 came to Arme- nia to celebrate Nawruz.

27 http://hy.yerevan.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=250&pageid=11740&newsview=585932 accessed 30 June 2012. 28 www.gallery.am/en/Exhibitions/archive/?Month=02&Year=2012&by_date=Որոնել accessed 30 March 2012. 29 www.president.am/en/congratulatory/item/2012/03/21/news-2066/, accessed 22 March 2012. 30 www.panorama.am/am/economy/2012/06/07/m-apresyan/, 20 October 2012. Austria

Thomas Schmidinger1

1 Muslim Populations

The history of Muslims living in the later Habsburg territories predates the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the region. Smail Balić argued that together with the Hungarian establishment in the Pannonian plains in 895, nomads of Asian origin, who were followers of Islam, entered the region.2 Hungarian documents write about izmaeliták and böszörmények as Muslims in Hungary. It is possible that some of these Muslim groups conserved their religious identity until the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century. However, with the conquest of the region by Austria in the late 17th century almost all Muslims were deported. But with the treaty of Passarowitz (16 August 1718) subjects of the Ottoman Empire were per- mitted to settle in the Empire, although it was mostly Jews and Arme- nians who settled in cities like Vienna and . The largest number of Muslims came under Austrian control after the former Ottoman prov- inces of were occupied by Austrian troops in 1878. Despite the fact that many Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to the Ottoman Empire, the majority stayed within the region and became Austrian subjects after the annexation of the territory in 1908. But after the collapse of the monarchy in the First World War, these territories were lost and only small groups of Muslims stayed within the borders of the new republic of Austria. Only a few private associations like the Orientbund or the Islamischer Kulturbund, led by Umar Rolf von Ehrenfels continued working as an organised Muslim community. After the Anschluß (the annexation of Austria to Nazi-Germany) Ehrenfels,

1 Thomas Schmidinger is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna, the University for Applied Science Vorarlberg and secretary general of the Aus- trian Association for Kurdish Studies. In 2012 he was participating in one of the expert round tables of the Dialogforum Islam initiated by the state-secretary of integration. 2 Balić, S. “Zur Geschichte der Muslime in Österreich I. Lebensräume und Konflikt- felder”, in S. Heine (ed.), Islam zwischen Selbstbild und Klischee. Eine Religion im österrei­ chischen Schulbuch (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), pp. 23–35. 48 thomas schmidinger who was in opposition to the Nazis, had to emigrate and his association ­dissolved.3 But in 1943 another Muslim association was founded under Salih Hadžialić and with the patronage of the regime.4 After World War II some Muslim collaborators of the Nazis, predomi- nately of Bosnian and Soviet origin, were stranded in the American zone of occupation in . That was one of the reasons why Salzburg became a centre of Muslim activism after 1945. A bigger number of Muslims immigrated from the 1960s on, when agreements for labour immigrants (‘Gastarbeiter’) were signed with ­Turkey (1964) and (1966). But Austria also received refugees from Islamic countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and, in the 1990s, from Kosovo and Albania. In addition, Muslim diplomats lived in Vienna, where the UN, OPEC and other international organisations have offices. How- ever the biggest Muslim populations in Austria are of Turkish, ­Bosnian and Albanian origin. An assessment based on the census of 2001 suggests that in 2009 there was slightly more than 500,000 Muslims in Austria, making approx. 6% of the total population.5 Due to naturalisation, 49% of the Muslim popula- tion were Austrians in 2009; 21% were Turkish nationals; 10% had a pass- port from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7% were from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, 3% from Macedonia, and 4% from the Russian Federation.6 Most of the latter were in fact who are one of the biggest groups of refugees in the last decade. But not all of these 500,000 Muslims are reli- gious and this number contains all Islamic groups, including heterodox groups like the Alevis or Nusayris. However, it must be stated that these numbers do not give any infor- mation about the self-definition of Muslims, their sectarian affiliation, personal beliefs and ‘religiosity’.

3 Krammel, G. / Abdelkarim, A., “Die Geschichte des Islam in Österreich”, in Schmidin- ger, T. / Larise, D., (eds.) Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie, Handbuch des politischen Islam (Vienna: Deuticke, 2008), pp. 47–58. 4 Pritz, O., “Vom Moslemischen Sozialdienst zur islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft”, (Dissertation, Universität Wien, 2006), p. 88. 5 Marik-Lebek, Stephan, ‘Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs: Bestand und Veränderung 2001–2009’ (The Muslim population of Austria: state and changes 2001–2009), in Jane, Alexander and Mathias Vogl (eds.), Islam in Österreich (Islam in Austria), (Vienna: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds), 2010, pp. 5–9 (5). 6 www.integrationsfonds.at/wissen/publikationen/islam_in_oesterreich/#c6384, accessed 31 December 2012. austria 49

2 Islam and the State

The Staatsgrundgesetz (Basic Law of the State) of 1867 (art. 14, 15, 17) for the Austrian half of the Empire (Cisleithania) already guaranteed freedom of religion. The law concerning the recognition of religion of 1874, RGBl Nr 68, also gave non-Christian religions a legal framework to be recognised as Cultusgemeinden (faith communities). The law does not mention Islam or any other specific religion, but it gives the legal ground for the recogni- tion of religions including Islam.7 The Islamgesetz of 1912 then officially recognised adherents of Islam, more precisely of the ‘Hanafite rite’ as a recognised religious community.8 Today Austria is a secular republic, but it still gives officially recognised religious communities certain privileges like the possibility to offer reli- gious education in schools or to collect tax-free funds from their members. These privileges in general reproduce the concordat Austria signed with the Vatican in 1933. The rights guaranteed to the Roman-Catholic church by the authoritarian regime of Engelbert Dollfuß are still the model for the rights of other officially recognised religions. Other recognised Christian churches, the ‘Hanafite’ Muslim, the Buddhist and the Jewish communi- ties share the same rights. Besides these officially recognised religious communities (gesetzlich anerkannte Kirchen und Religionsgesellschaften), smaller groups are also officially recognised as religiöse Bekenntnisgemein­ schaften with less privileges then the big Glaubensgemeinschaften. The for- mer status can also be the preliminary stage towards the latter. In 1979 the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, Islamic Religious Community in Austria, www.derislam.at, Bernhardgasse 5, 1070 Wien) was recognised by the bureau of religions (Kultusamt) of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and Education as the official representative of all Muslims in Austria on the base of the law concerning the recogni- tion of religion of 1874 and the Islamgesetz of 1912. While officially they represented all Muslims of Austria, they always had a very limited num- ber of members who were voluntarily paying their membership fees and who were participating in elections. In 2010 the IGGiÖ tried to recruit new members before their new elections.

7 Gesetz vom 20. Mai 1874, betreffend die gesetzliche Anerkennung von Religionsgesell- schaften. StF: RGBl. Nr. 68/1874. 8 Gesetz, betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islams nach hanefitischem Ritus als Religionsgesellschaft. StF: RGBl. Nr. 159/1912. 50 thomas schmidinger

Heterodox groups like the Alevis have been trying for years to get recognised as an official religious community. After a long legal dispute, where three different groups of Alevis tried to get the official recognition to establish an independent state-recognised religious community, one of these two groups succeeded in December 2010 and now has the status of Religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft.9 This was made possible by a decision of the Austrian constitutional court on 1 December 2010 that saw the deci- sion of the Kultusamt of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and Education to accept only one Islamic community in Austria (the IGGiÖ) as a violation of religious freedom.10 That decision could have a strong impact on the status of the IGGiÖ as well, because the constitutional court regarded the denial of recognition of the Islamisch-alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and concluded that Article I and § 1 of the Islamgesetz cannot be interpreted in a way that the Austrian law only accepts one officially recognised Islamic religious community. Nevertheless the IGGiÖ still claims to be the “official representative of the Muslims in Austria.”11 Although established experts on Islam, like Rüdiger Lohlker or Richard Potz still see the mem- bership of the IGGiÖ as “ex lege” for all Muslims,12 Oliver Henhapel, the director of the Kultusamt, shares the argument that since the decision of the constitutional court B 1214/09–35 the IGGiÖ can no longer claim to be the sole representation of all Muslims in Austria.13 In December 2010 further Islamic groups, including a Shi’ite and a third group of Kurdish Alevis requested official recognition. After the application of the Kurdish Alevis was rejected for technical reasons, they applied again in 2012 under the name of Qizilbasch-Alevitische (Alt-Alevitische) Glaubensgemeinschaft. Their new application has not yet received a final decision. In 2012 the state-secretary of integration, Sebastian Kurz, and the IGGiÖ started a forum for dialogue on Islam (Dialogforum Islam), following the example of the German Islamkonferenz (DIK). The Dialogforum Islam did not only include representatives of the IGGiÖ, but also independent Mus- lim and non-Muslim experts, scholars and some other organisations, like

9 www.wienerzeitung.at/default.aspx?TabID=5127&Alias=wzo&cob=532648, accessed 24 December 2010. 10 Entscheidung des Verfassungsgerichtshofs B 1214/09–35 on the 1st of December 2010. 11 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=IGGi%D6&navid=10&par=0, accessed 18 Febru- ary 2012. 12 Heine, Susanne / Lohlker, Rüdiger / Potz, Richard: “Muslime in Österreich. Geschichte, Lebenswelt, Religion. Grundlagen für den Dialog” (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2012), p. 60. 13 Interview with Oliver Henhapel, 9 February 2012. austria 51 the Forum für emanzipatorischen Islam. However, it did not include rep- resentatives of Shi’ite and Alevi organisations. One of the results of the Dialogforum Islam was the announcement to start academic education for imams at the University of Vienna and to establish counselling centres for family members of radicalised youth.14

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Alongside with the official IGGiÖ there are large numbers of other Muslim organisations in Austria. Some of them cooperate in different ways with the IGGiÖ, some do not. The IGGiÖ adopted a new constitution in 2010. The long-postponed elections for the Council of the IGGiÖ resulted in a new Shura Council and a new president in summer 2011. After a publicity campaign in schools and the registration of thou- sands of school-children by their teachers the then IGGiÖ president Anas ­Schakfeh proclaimed in March 2011 that 100,000 Muslims had been reg- istered of whom 27,000 would be entitled to vote.15 The rest were either younger than 14, did not pay the membership fee or had not been living in Austria for at least one year. That means that about 5% of the more than 500,000 Austrian Muslims were eligible to vote for the elections of the IGGiÖ in 2010 and 2011. 20,500 of these 27,000 Muslims really went to vote,16 which is less than 4% of the Austrian Muslim population. The influence of the Turkish Islamic associations became much stronger than previously. On 26 June 2011 Fuat Sanaç, an affiliate of Milli Görüş, was elected as the new president of the IGGiÖ.17 The new constitution expands the number of the regional religious communities from four to nine, one for each federal state.18 The former youth organisation of the IGGiÖ, the Muslimische Jugend Österreichs (MJÖ) lost its status as the official youth organisation in February 2012. A new Jugendrat der Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich ( JIGGiÖ) that includes the youth organisations of Milli Görüş and other

14 http://religion.orf.at/stories/2561600/, accessed 30 December 2012. 15 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/643567/Nur-jeder-fuenfte-Muslim- bekennt-sich-zur-IGGiOe, accessed May 10, 2010. 16 http://derstandard.at/1304552252914/Islam-Muslime-Wahl-Beteiligung-von-765- Prozent, accessed May 19, 2011. 17 http://kurier.at/nachrichten/3917654.php, accessed 27 June 2011. 18 www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=169&mode=flat&order=1, accessed 20 September 2010. 52 thomas schmidinger

Turkish Muslim associations was created by the new leadership of the IGGiÖ. This led to some conflicts between the MJÖ and the new leader- ship of the IGGiÖ under President Fuat Sanaç.19 Most of the other Muslim organisations are based on the ethnic back- ground of Muslim immigrants. Many also have specific political affiliations. The Austrian Islamic Federation (Österreichische Islamische Föderation, Avusturya Islam Federasyonu, AİF), with its stronghold in Vienna (Rauch- fangkehrergasse 36, 1150 Wien, www.ifwien.at), is the Austrian section of the Milli Görüş movement and runs about 60 associations, including prayer rooms in Vienna, Upper- and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarl­- berg, and .20 It cooperates with the IGGiÖ and some of its functionaries also have functions within the IGGiÖ. In the last elec- tions they managed to elect 152 delegates out of the total of 501. The AİF is one of the strongest Muslim organisations in Austria and runs Qur’an classes as well as many specialised organisations for students, women, workers or entrepreneurs. Members of the AİF run for local elections in Lower Austria and were elected to the labour council under the name Bündnis Mosaik. Some insiders of the IGGiÖ see the leadership of the Aus- trian Milli Görüş as even more conservative than the mother organisa- tion in Germany. The internet-project www.islam-landkarte.at, run by the Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP) Department of the University of Vienna mentions that most of the leaders of the Austrian Islamic Federation were educated in , oppose any changes in the Milli Görüş movement in Europe and stress their loyalty to the leadership of the Saadet Partisi in Turkey.21 Another big Muslim organisation that cooperates with the IGGiÖ is the Union islamischer Kulturzentren, Avusturya İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği (UIKZ, Pelzgasse 9, 1150 Wien, www.uikz.org) affiliated to the Turkish Sufi tariqa of the Suleymancılar. It runs 43 prayer rooms all over Austria.22 Since 1980 the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet) has been sending imams and religious teachers to Austria.23 It runs a Federation of

19 See also the statement of the MJÖ concerning the creation of the JIGGiÖ: www.mjoe .at/pdf/Stellungnahme.pdf, accessed 23 March 2012. 20 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Islamische%20F%C3%B6deration_0.pdf, accessed 30 March 2012. 21 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Islamische%20F%C3%B6deration_0.pdf, accessed 25 March 2012. 22 www.uikz.org/, accessed 20 October 2012. 23 Strobl, A., “Der österreichische Islam. Entwicklung, Tendenzen und Möglichkeiten,” in SWS-Rundschau Nr. 4/2005: 520–543, p. 530. austria 53

Turkish Sunni prayer rooms, called Türkisch-Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit, Avusturya Türk Islam Birligi, ATİB (Sonn- leithnergasse 20, 1100 Wien, www.atib.at). ATİB is the biggest Muslim organisation with 65 associated organisations (including prayer rooms) all over Austria.24 Until 2010 ATİB did not cooperate with the IGGiÖ but it took part in the new elections in 2010/11 and supported the election of Fuat Sanaç as the new IGGiÖ President. The Turkish extreme national- ist political party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP (Party of the nationalist movement) also has a union of cultural clubs called Türkische Föderation that include 29 prayer rooms with 26 imams.25 The same is the case for the even more extremist MHP-splinter party Büyük Birlik Partisi, BBP (Great Union Party) acting under the name Nizam-e Âlem. The fastest growing groups of Turkish Muslims are the organisations affiliated with Fethul- lah Gülen and his movement. Many of these organisations are active in education and include a private high school in Vienna,26 but they have not yet established a formal umbrella organisation. There are also some other smaller Turkish Muslim associations of different political, regional or religious affiliation. In Vienna, , Linz and Salzburg there are different Muslim organisa- tions of Arab origin, some of them affiliated with different currents of the . The biggest of these organisations is the Liga Kultur with five prayer rooms. The Liga Kultur is one of the organisations affiliated with the conservative wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, dominated by Syr- ian Muslim brothers. The Initiative Muslimischer ÖsterreicherInnen, IMÖ (www.islaminitiative.at) is also dominated by Arab Muslims. There was also a big Bosnian Muslim Federation, the Islamska Zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji (www.izb-dachverband.com) that was affiliated with the Bosnian Islamic Community. In 2004 the Union der Bosnischen Sport-, Kultur- und Religionsvereine with 10 prayer rooms split from that Union.27 How- ever, in 2012, these two Associations reunified under the name Verband der bosniakischen islamischen Vereine in Österreich. The unified Associa- tion claims to have 40 member associations all over Austria. The Union of Albanian Muslims runs 12 prayer rooms. In Vienna Pakistani, African,

24 www.atib.at/atib/atib-yapisi-ve-hizmetleri, accessed 1 November 2012. 25 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/T%C3%BCrkische%20F%C3%B6 deration_0.pdf, accessed 30 March 2012. 26 http://phoenixrealgymnasium.at/, accessed 10 October 2011. 27 www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/T%C3%BCrkische%20F%C3%B6 deration_0.pdf, accessed 30 March 2012. 54 thomas schmidinger

Indonesian, Afghan and Chechen Muslim organisations with their own prayer rooms also exist. Since 2009 some Salafi groups became popular within a minority of the Muslim youth. The most popular of these groups seems to be ‘Die wahre Religion’ (The true religion) (www.diewahrereligion.at), a Salafi network that was spread from Germany to Vienna and is partly based on the pros- elytisation of converts. Salafi preachers like Abu Dujana,28 Ibrahim Abu Nagie29 or the German convert Pierre Vogel (Abu Hamza)30 repeatedly preach and convert non-Muslims in Vienna and Linz, where the most important Salafi groups are situated. However, due to social media like Facebook or Youtube the videos of these preachers are also popular for some young Muslims outside these bigger cities. Even in the rural county of Vorarlberg, a small Salafi group called Islamische Jugend Vorarlberg was established in 2010. The Salafi network of Ibrahim Abu Nagie got some attention in 2012 when it expanded its campaign to distribute the Qur’an for free to proselytise in Austria. Besides the Salafi preachers, the Hizb ut-Tahrir also got some public attention. After the ban on the party in Germany its headquarters for the whole German-speaking region in Europe moved to Austria. Although they are a small cadre organisation with limited support, they had some influence in Islamic student circles, particularly in the Catholic church-run Afroasiatisches Institut (AAI), a student dormitory where Shaker Assem, spokesman of the Hizb ut-Tahrir for the German-speaking region, held the Friday prayer for more than 30 years. After launching a conference on the proposed Caliphate in February 2012 Assem lost his position as Imam in the prayer room of the AAI. Protests of media and politicians finally led to the cancellation of the Caliphate-conference.31 On the other hand more liberal Muslim organisations also openly criti- cise the IGGiÖ and other conservative Islamic organisations. The Initiative Liberaler Muslime in Österreich, ILMÖ (www.initiativeliberalermuslime .org) and the Islamisches Informations- und Dokumentations-Zentrum Österreich, IIDZ (www.halal-iidz.eu) predominately attack the ­leadership

28 See: http://alghorabaa.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/abu-dujana-unterscheidet-haqq-und- batil-seminar-wien-25-02-2012/ or www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6bAWCVnv9c, accessed 23 March 2012. 29 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVF5Faz3G4Y, accessed 23 March 2012. 30 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1TwjOYl71c or www.youtube.com/watch?v=goSr4 WmpKsk, accessed 23 March 2012. 31 www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/deutsch.php/contents/entry_16676, accessed 5 March 2012. austria 55 of the IGGiÖ for being undemocratic and extremist. The Forum für emanzipatorischen Islam (www.fei.or.at) promotes progressive thinking in Islam. Most Alevi associations are represented by the Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich, Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF (Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, www.aleviten.or.at) or the Islamisch ­Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, Avusturya Alevi İslam İnanç Toplumu, İAGÖ (Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, www.aleviten.at). Organisations close to the pro-governmental Turkish Cem Vakfı are generally members of the İAGÖ, while organisations closer to the Alevi-Bektaşi Federasyonu, ABF32 and the Işıkçılık33 are closer to the AABF and their rival attempt to get recognised as an independent official religious community. Addition- ally there is a rival Alevi organisation of Kurdish origin, the Alevitisches Kulturzentrum in Österreich (Linke Wienzeile 78, 1060 Wien, http://alevi- heute.tripod.com) that applied for official recognition as Altaleviten. Only a small group is affiliated with the pro-Iranian Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Fed­ erasyonu, ABAF. Pro-Iranian Shi’ite associations are represented by the Islamis­ che Vereinigung Ahl-ul-Bayt Österreich, Verband der schiitischen Vereine34 with their main prayer room, the Islamisches Zentrum Imam Ali (Mol- lardgasse 50, 1060 Wien, www.izia.at). Most Iraqi Shi’is and other Shi’is who are following the hawza ‘ilmiyya under Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf, left the Association. Their association, the Islamisches Kulturelles Zentrum Al Mufid (Ahl ul Bait Moschee, Pezzlgasse 58, 1170 Wien) also applied for official recognition as a Religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft sepa- rate from the IGGiÖ.35 There is also a small community of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (Sandrockgasse 22, 1210 Wien, www.ahmadiyya.at). There are about 100 believers in Vienna who participate in the community and another 200

32 Gorzweski, A.: Das Alevitentum in seinen divergierenden Verhältnisbestimmungen zum Islam (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2010) p. 63. 33 Schmidinger, T.: “Alevitische ‘Identitäten’—Eine heterodoxe Religionsgemeinschaft zwischen Islam und Pantheismus, türkischen, kurdischem und Zaza-Nationalismus” in Schmidinger, T. (ed.) Kurdistan im Wandel. Konflikte, Staatlichkeit, Gesellschaft und Reli­ gion zwischen Nahem Osten und Diaspora (Frankfurt/Main; Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 53–62: p. 59. 34 www.iphpbb.com/foren-archiv/2/68800/68320/islamischen-vereinigung-ahlulbayt- oesterreich-93510334-17659-229.html, accessed 30 December 2012. 35 www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/archiv/55663_Schiiten-wollen-eigene-Vertretung .html, accessed 10 December 2012. 56 thomas schmidinger scattered around Austria. Ahmadiyya Muslims are not integrated in the IGGiÖ. Imam Munir Ahmad Munawar is responsible for religious services for all Ahmadiyya Muslims in Austria.36 Despite the fact that there are also between 2000 and 3000 Alawis or Nusayris—a different heterodox Shi’i sect that sees their origins in the teachings of Imam Hassan al-’Askarī (d. 873), and his pupil (d. 868) and not to be confused with the Anatolian Kurdish-Turkish Alevis— from the regions of Antakya, Adana and Mersin in Austria, they did not yet establish a permanent organisation. In 2005 they organised their first asso- ciation under the non-religious name Çukurova Kültür Merkezi with 350 members,37 but it is now inactive. Additionally, there are some families of Ibadi Muslims and a small number of adherents of Ahl-e Haqq (Kaka’i) in Austria—another heterodox Shi’i sect form the Hawraman region of Kurdistan on the Iraqi and Iranian border region—but none of them ever established any religious organisations or any places of worship.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are five mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district; Telfs and Innsbruck in Tyrol; Saalfelden in Salzburg and Bad Vöslau in Lower Austria. In Graz, Linz and Wiener Neustadt mosques are under construction. The approximate number of prayer rooms is 260–280 spread throughout Austria, most of them in private apartments or basements often combined with shops or a tea room. The mosque in Vienna, with a 32m high minaret, was opened in 1979 and predominantly financed by the king of . Building regulations in two federal states (Carinthia and Vorarlberg) have been formulated in such a way as to make the erec- tion of minarets illegal.

5 Children’s Education

As with other officially recognised religious communities the state funds Islamic religious education in schools. This has been the case since 1982/83.

36 Interview with Munir Ahmad Munawar, Imam of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Gemeinde Österreich, 6 February, 2012. 37 www.hallac.org/index.php?id=9&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37&cHash=56105d4eb9e658ad 26d29a4bb1cb9468&PHPSESSID=d2ad2947dc1665c89b14168f2e9e3858, accessed 30 Decem‑ ber 2012. austria 57

According to the IGGiÖ, there are 430 teachers teaching about 57,000 ­children in 2,000 schools.38 Additional to this Islamic religious education in public schools, there are six private Islamic schools in ­Vienna.39 Teach- ers have been able to study at the Private Academy for Islamic Education (IRPA, Islamische Religionspädagogische Akademie), run by the IGGiÖ since 1998, but many also became teachers by passing a written and oral examination under the commission appointed by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ without completing a formal education. In January 2009 a study by the Islamic theologian and sociologist Mou- hanad Khorchide demonstrated problems with the attitudes of some of the Islamic religion teachers in public schools.40 After a controversial debate and public pressure on the IGGiÖ, its then president Anas Schakfeh signed a five-point agreement with the Ministry of Education to improve religious education in schools. New curricula, leading to some disputes about the content and the possibilities of implementation between the IGGiÖ and Prof. Ednan Aslan from the Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP) department of the University of Vienna in 2009,41 had come into effect in September 2011.42 Since then public debate on religious education has calmed down. However, no further studies were done about the results of the implementation of the new curricula. The IGGiÖ also lists six different Islamic kindergartens and nurs- ery schools on their website. All of them are in Vienna.43 However, it is planned that the new Islamic Centre in Graz will have a kindergarten and a school as well.44

38 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=Schulamt/Rel.Unterricht&navid=904&par=40, accessed 30 December 2012. 39 For additional information about Islamic education in Austria see: Aslan, E: Islam­ ische Erziehung in Europa. Islamic Education in Europe (Wien: Böhlau, 2009). 40 Khorchide, M.: Der islamische Religionsunterricht zwischen Integration und Parallel­ gesellschaft. Einstellungen der islamischen ReligionslehrerInnen an öffentlichen Schulen (Wies- baden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), p. 135. 41 http://derstandard.at/1237229593020/Das-koennen-die-Moscheen-besser, accessed 30 December 2012. 42 Lehrpläne für den islamischen Religionsunterricht an Pflichtschulen, mittleren und höheren Schulen: BGBl. II Nr. 234/2011. 43 www.derislam.at/?c=content&cssid=Kinderg%E4rten/Hort%20&navid=460 &par=40, accessed 30 December 2012. 44 www.gsp-architektur.at/portfolio/islamisches-kulturzentrum-graz/, accessed 30 Decem‑ ber 2012. 58 thomas schmidinger

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since 2006, the University of Vienna has offered a Masters in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP).45 This degree is the qualification for teaching Islamic religious education in high schools. Since 2010 the University of Vienna also offers a two semester course ‘Islam in Europe’ as an advanced training for imams.46 In 2011/2012 the course had 40 students, which is about the number the University expected.47 In 2012 it was announced that Islamic religious studies will be established at the University of Vienna in 2015.48 In a new study Ednan Aslan, the Professor at the Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP), calls for an Institute for Islamic theology as an interim solution and outlines a curriculum for a Bachelor in Islamic theology.49

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In the Zentralfriedhof in Vienna there are three sections reserved for Muslims, an old and a new general Muslim section and one for Egyptian Muslims. The İAGÖ signed an agreement with the administration of the Zentralfriedhof to open an Alevi section on 11 April 2011. The first funeral in the new section took place in September 2012.50 Also in Graz, Linz and some other larger cities there are Muslim sec- tions of public cemeteries. In 2009 a denominational Islamic cemetery of the IGGiÖ in the 23rd district of Vienna was opened. A second Islamic cemetery for the Muslims of Vorarlberg was inaugurated in June 2012 in the village of Altach.51 This Islamic cemetery is not operated by the IGGiÖ like the one in Vienna, but by the municipalities of Vorarlberg in coop- eration with an umbrella organisation of different Muslim organisations, including Alevis, meaning that the cemetery is also open for Alevis.

45 http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/, accessed 30 December 2012. 46 http://mie.univie.ac.at, accessed 10 February 2012. 47 Interview with Marietta Behnoush, Programme Manager of the Course ‘Islam in Europe’, 13 February 2012. 48 http://religion.orf.at/stories/2561600/, accessed 30 December 2012. 49 E. Aslan: “Islamische Theologie in Österreich. Institutionalisierung der Ausbildung von Imamen, SeelsorgerInnen und TheologInnen” (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2013), pp. 159–166. 50 Interview with Ertürk Maral, press officer of the İAGÖ, 30 October 2012. 51 www.vol.at/islamischer-friedhof--eroeffenet-%E2%80%93-tag-der-offenen-tuer- bis-17-uhr/3269655, accessed 3 June 2012. austria 59

A high proportion of Muslim families still return the bodies of their deceased relatives to their former homeland, but the number of burials in Austria is increasing.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service is provided in hospitals, military and prisons. The chaplains are selected by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ. There has been a Muslim prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna since 2004.52 Since 2000 the Islamic visit and chaplaincy service (Islamis­ cher Besuchs- und Seelsorgedienst) runs the chaplaincy in hospitals for the IGGiÖ in Vienna. Chaplaincy in prisons was done by different Muslim organisations in different federal states until 2010. In January 2010 the Ministry of Justice signed a contract with the IGGiÖ for future organisa- tion of chaplaincy in prisons to be run by the IGGiÖ.53

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals of Islam have no legal status in Austria, but Muslims have the right to take a day off work for high religious festivals. The same is the case for Muslim school pupils. 2012 marked the centenary of the Islamgesetz of 1912 which was celebrated by both, the IGGiÖ and the state. On 29 June 2012 the city of Vienna and the IGGiÖ had an official celebration to commemorate the Islamgesetz of 1912 in the Vienna city hall. The University of Vienna celebrated the law with a symposium in the faculty of law on 28 June 2012.54 This was followed by celebrations of the IGGiÖ at the mosque in Vienna. Also outside of Vienna the law was celebrated by various institutions. For example the city of Linz organised a symposium together with the IGGiÖ in 20 October.55 While most of these celebrations focused on the success of Islam in Austria and portrayed the Islamgesetz of 1912 as an

52 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/index.do?direct=351928&_vl_ backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index.do&selChannel=, accessed 30 Decem- ber 2012. 53 www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=174&mode=flat&order=1, accessed 20 September 2010. 54 http://medienportal.univie.ac.at/uniview/wissenschaft-gesellschaft/detailansicht/ artikel/muslime-in-oesterreich-100-jahre-islamgesetz/, accessed 30 October 2012. 55 http://derislam.at/deradmin/images/veranstaltungen/extern/islamtagung_public .pdf, accessed 30 October 2012. 60 thomas schmidinger exemplary form of organising the relation of a secular state and its Mus- lim communities in Europe, only few events also discussed the problems resulting from the Austrian system of organised Islam. A panel discussion in context of a conference of the contributors of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe at the University of Vienna on 5 June also included critical voices about the consequences for pluralism within Islam.56 Scientists from Aus- tria and other succession states of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire also discussed these questions at a conference at the University of Minnesota in the US from 27 to 28 April.57

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

In the cities there are many Turkish, Kurdish, Arab and Iranian stores and restaurants where halal food is available. Ritual slaughter is legally guar- anteed as part of the freedom of religion and thus comes under Article 14 StGG, article 63, paragraph 2 Staatsvertrag of St. Germain and article 9, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is a cer- tification of halal products by the IIDZ that is recognised by the Austrian Standards Institute (ONR 142000/142001), but not by the IGGiÖ. There is limited access, but also limited demand for so called ‘Islamic banking’ in Austria. In 2008 the first Islamic investment fund started its service in Vienna. The Baraka (www.baraka.co.at) fund was established by Mouddar Khouja in 2008, when he was the personal assistant of IGGiÖ President Shakfeh. However, the certification of ‘Islamic banking’ at the Austrian Standards Institute was again not done by the IGGiÖ but by the rival IIDZ in 2010.58 There are some Turkish and Arab banks but no explicitly Islamic bank in Austria and none of the Turkish or Arab banks specialise in ‘Islamic banking’. Hajj travel is organised by the different Islamic organisations in Austria.

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in employment or

56 www.fei.or.at/?p=740, accessed 20 October 2012. 57 http://igs.cla.umn.edu/research/globalCities.html, accessed 20 October 2012. 58 www.as-institute.at/index.php?id=6085, accessed 30 December 2012. austria 61 public services. But there was a court decision that a female defendant in a court case against two Islamic extremists was not allowed to wear the niqab.59 In 2010 the Medical University of Graz banned students from wearing the niqab at exams.60 Other forms of the scarf that show the face are not prohibited. Public debates on banning the “burka”—a term often erroneously used in the media for the hijab or the niqab—also continued to some extent in 2012, but drew less attention than in previous years.

12 Publication and Media

The IGGiÖ started to publish a quarterly e-magazine called Der Islam in 2012. The second issue of the magazine mainly focused on celebrating the centenary of the Islamgesetz of 1912. There are also several weekly and monthly Turkish newspapers which focus on Turks living in Austria and discuss Austrian affairs as well as global events. Some of these newspapers, like Zaman Avusturya, Pusula or Dewa are affiliated to Islamic networks close to the Turkish AKP and the Gülen movement or to Milli Görüş. Beside Turkish, there are also a few newspapers in some other languages of Muslim immigrants like Bosniak, and Russian. But many of them are completely secular and are not declared Muslim newspapers. Like other official religious communities, Muslims have short TV pro- grammes on the official Austrian TV station ÖRF. During Ramadan or other important religious festivals these programmes explain the religious background of the Muslim religious traditions. Islam also plays some role in other TV programmes about religion and about migration such as Ori­ entierung, Kreuz und Quer or Heimat, fremde Heimat.

13 Family Law

Family law is not considered to be the responsibility of religious com- munities, but of the state. Austrian Muslims have to follow the same laws as any other Austrian. Polygamy and forced marriage are illegal and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) is not recognised. Muslims can

59 Penz, E. / Prack, G. / Schmidinger, T. / Wittek, T., Dies ist kein Gottesstaat. Terroris­ mus und Rechtsstaat am Beispiel des Prozesses gegen Mohamed M. und Mona S. (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2008). 60 http://derstandard.at/1285199558957/Med-Uni-Graz-regelt-Studienbedingungen- fuer-Schleiertraegerinnen, accessed 15 December 2012. 62 thomas schmidinger conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer rooms or mosques, but this is not considered legally binding.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are various interreligious events at local, regional and national ­levels. Muslims are invited by churches and NGOs for interreligious dis- cussions. Muslims participate in TV debates and organise public iftars during Ramadan. On the national level, the IGGiÖ also participates in political debates concerning integration, migration and political Islam. Muslim critics of the IGGiÖ also take part in these debates. Although the official representatives of the IGGiÖ and the Jewish community highlight their good relation, the Middle East conflict sometimes overshadows Muslim-Jewish relations. But beyond the official religious communities, there are also attempts to work for a better interreligious understanding of Muslims and Jews. In August 2010 a Muslim-Jewish conference, organised by Jewish and Muslim students took place at the University of Vienna.61 Meanwhile the Muslim Jewish Conference is a registered non-profit organisation based in Aus- tria (www.mjconference.de). Follow up conferences were organised in Ukraine (2011) and Slovakia (2012). In October 2011 the King Abdul­lah Bin Abdu­la­ziz Al Saud Inter­na­tio­ nal Centre for Inter­re­li­gious and Inter­cul­tu­ral Dia­lo­gue (KAICIID, www .kaiciid.org) opened in Vienna. While the Austrian government supports this initiative of the Saudi King Abdullah, many liberal Muslims in Austria protested against this dialogue dominated by Wahhabi Islam.62 Its inau- guration on 27 November 2012 was marked by protests of liberal Muslims against Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Arabia.63 The KAICIID is an interna- tional organisation with three founding States (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Austria and Kingdom of Spain) and the Holy See as a Found- ing Observer to the Centre.64 Its ‘board of directors’ includes representa- tives of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sunni and Twelver

61 www.mjconference.org/, accessed 10 February 2012. 62 www.m-media.or.at/gesellschaft/liberale-muslime-%E2%80%9Esaudis-sollen- daheim-dialog-fuhren%E2%80%9C/2011/10/17/, accessed 30 December 2012. 63 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/1316929/AbdullahZentrum_Anzeige- und-Proteste-zur-Eroeffnung, accessed 30 December 2012. 64 www.kaiciid.org/en/the-centre/, accessed 30 December 2012. austria 63

Shi’i Muslims.65 Its secretary general is the former Deputy Minister of Education of Saudi Arabia Faisal Bin Abdulrahman al-Muaammar, its deputy secretary general the former Austrian politician Claudia Bandion- Ortner.66

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Recent election campaigns of the extreme right wing Austrian Free- dom Party (FPÖ) have been explicitly directed against Muslims. Plans to expand an existing prayer house in Vienna have been met with aggres- sive protests by a citizens’ initiative67 that was supported by the FPÖ and other extreme right wing groups. Islam and problems of Muslim immi- grants are heavily debated in newspapers and other media. However, in the last years some journalists tried to focus on a more detailed picture of the Muslim population in Austria and also wrote about differences within the Austrian Muslim community. These reports challenge the homogenising reductionism in reporting about Muslims. Also the growing number of young journalists with a Muslim background helps to draw a more differentiated picture of Islam and Muslim communities in Austria. In 2012 the public distribution of free copies of a translation of the Qur’an by Salafi groups led to a public discussion about proselytising and Salafi radicalism in Austria. In summer 2012 the debate on male circumcision spilled over from Germany to Austria. Some radicalised groups of so-called ‘new atheists’ started campaigning against Muslim and Jewish communities practising male circumcision. However, politicians, representatives of all religions and even a few ‘old’ atheists defended the legal right for male circumcision. But the public debate, where many of the ‘new atheists’ used stereotypes rooted deeply in European anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim resentment, still harmed the image of Muslims and Jews. In November 2012 a group of new atheists even reported a Jewish Rabbi and a Muslim physician to the public prosecutor for personal injury.68

65 www.kaiciid.org/en/team/board-of-directors/board-of-directors-kopie.html, accessed 30 December 2012. 66 www.kaiciid.org/en/team/secretariat/, accessed 30 December 2012. 67 www.moschee-ade.at/, accessed 30 December 2012. 68 http://derstandard.at/1353207708050/Aktivisten-zeigen-Wiener-Rabbiner-und- muslimischen-Arzt-wegen-Beschneidung-an, accessed 30 December 2012. 64 thomas schmidinger

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no specific Austrian Muslim events, but general Muslim festi- vals are also celebrated. Some of them, like iftar during Ramadan are also sometimes celebrated in public. 2012 was dominated by cultural celebra- tions for the centenary of the Islamgesetz. The Muslimische Jugend Öster­ reichs (MJÖ) organised a ‘Muslim Festival’ with 15,000 guests listening to Muslim bands and musicians on 3 November 2012 in Vienna, followed by a smaller similar festival on 16 December 2012 in Salzburg. AZERBAIJAN

Bayram Balci1 and Altay Goyushov2

1 Muslim Populations

Azerbaijan is a secular country with an overwhelmingly Muslim popu- lation. According to official figures provided by Azerbaijani Govern- ment roughly 96%3 (approximately 8,900,000 according to Pew Research Centre)4 of Azerbaijan’s 9.2 million5 inhabitants have a Muslim back- ground. While traditionally approximately 65% of local Muslims are considered Shi’i and 35% Sunnis,6 due to a great success of international Sunni organisations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, cur- rently the estimated numbers of practising Sunni and Shi’i Muslims in the big urban areas are almost equal. A large majority of Azerbaijanis are strongly attached to their Islamic identity and consider it as an inextricable part of their self-image. Although the most recent survey of WIN-Gallup International “Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism” indicates that only 44% of their more

1 Bayram Balci is Senior Research Assistant in Centre National de la Recherche Scien- tifique, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI). Since December 2011 he is Visiting Scholar in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. He was Director of the Institut Français d’Etudes sur l’Asie Centrale, (IFEAC) in Tashkent and Research Assistant in Institut Français d’Etudes Anatoliennes in Baku between 2003 and 2006. He holds degrees in Political Science and Arab-Islamic Civilisation (Sciences Po Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence) and a PhD in Political Science for a dissertation about Turkish in Central Asia. 2 Altay Goyushov is a Professor at the Department of Turkic and Caucasus People’s History of Baku State University. He has a Ph.D. in from the Baku State University, Azerbaijan. For the last decade his research interests have been focused mainly on the issues related to national independence movements, political Islam and Islamic education in the Volga basin, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia. 3 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International Religious Freedom report 2011, Azerbaijan, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm#wrapper, January 2013. 4 http://features.pewforum.org/grl/population-number.php, accessed January 2013. 5 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan www.azstat.org/ statinfo/demoqraphic/en/AP_/AP_1.shtml, accessed January 2013. 6 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International Religious Freedom report 2011, Azerbaijan, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm#wrapper; accessed January 2013. 66 bayram balci and altay goyushov than 500 Azerbaijani respondents replied that they are religious, none considered himself or herself being an atheist.7 However, a majority of local researchers commonly say that, if properly asked, more than 90 per- cent of Azerbaijani Muslims will indicate that they believe in God, but only very small portion will be able to confirm that they systematically follow even the most important of Islamic teachings like daily prayer. The overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis do not regularly perform religious duties, although the number of observant Muslims has been continually growing each year since the fall of Communist regime. Due to persecutions against religious communities during the past few years, believers tend to keep low profile to avoid possible attention of state institutions. This circumstance significantly complicated the research environment in Azerbaijan and it is extremely difficult to ­follow real changes occurring in the number of observant Muslims. However, local observers who monitor developments in the religious realm since the early 1990s estimate that number of those who strictly observe their Shari’a duties is in the range of 10 to 25 per cent of the local Muslim popu- lation. Exceptions are the Ramadan and Muharram months of the Mus- lim calendar, when the number of active worshippers has been visibly increasing in the years since the country’s independence in 1991, particu- larly among younger generations. Since the mid-7th century CE the territory of modern Azerbaijan north of Araxes River has been included within the boundaries of the Caliphate. It took almost two hundred years for Islam to finally become the undis- puted dominant religion, adopted by the vast majority of the local popula- tion along with the ruling elites. In the 11th century Azerbaijan fell under the rule of Muslim Seljuk Turks. Migration from Central Asia triggered a major shift in the ethnic composition of the inhabitants populating Azer- baijan by making Turkic-Oghuz tribes its prevailing constituent, although significant populations of ethnic minorities remain. According to the last Census, Azerbaijanis of Turkic origin comprise the overwhelming major- ity of the local population with a nearly 90.6% share. The other ethnic groups of Muslim background are native Caucasian Sunni (2.2%), (0.6%), Tsakhurs (0.2%), Kryts (Grizs) (0.04%), Xinaligs (0.02%), and Rutuls as well as (0.5%) and (0.4%).

7 www.wingia.com/web/files/news/14/file/14.pdf, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 67

Talyshes (1.3%) and Tats (0.13%) are ethnic minority groups of Shi’i belief. Mixed Sunni and Shi’i Kurds make 0.2% of local populations.8 Major changes in the religious life of Azerbaijanis happened in the early 16th century when Ismayil, a young head of the militant Shi’i Tur­coman movement, established a new ruling dynasty of Safavids. An adherent of Twelver Shiism, Ismayil forced the Sunni population to adopt Shiism. However, Ismayil’s advance to the west was halted by the Otto- man Sultan Selim. For the following two centuries, Azerbaijan­ became the border between the Shi’i Safavids and the Sunni Ottomans. This cir- cumstance also defined the religious loyalties of locals, causing a roughly equal division of the Azerbaijani population to the north of Araxes River into Shi’is and Sunnis. In the early 19th century current territories of the Azerbaijani Republic were conquered by the Russian Empire. The Russians had experience rul- ing over Muslim subjects, but this was the first time they had to deal with Shi’i Muslims. In general, the imperial authorities considered Sunnis­ more hostile and this sentiment was reinforced by the armed uprising in the Sunni-dominated­ North Caucasus. So although the Russian conquest coin­cided with the revival of Sunni Sufi order in Azerbaijan, Sunni revolts across Caucasus forced Russian authorities to implement unprecedented mea- sures, forcing Sunnis to abandon their homeland and move to the Otto- man Empire. This move shifted the centuries-old balance of the number of Sunnis and Shi’is who resided in Azerbaijan­ in favour of the latter.9 Since then Shi’is have been dominant in the regions of Nakhichevan, Qarabakh, Apsheron, Ganja, Mil, Mugan and Lenkoran, while in the regions of Sheki- Zaqatala, Quba-Qusar and Shamakhi-Qabala, Sunnis remained the major- ity. By the time Azerbaijan was absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1920, Shi’is made up more than 60% of the population of Azerbaijan.10 Since the religious reform of Nader Shah Afshar in the 18th century Azerbaijani Shi’is have been using the term Ja’fari for self-identification

8 Official webpage of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic www.president.az/ browse.php?sec_id=51&lang=en, accessed January 2013; The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/en/AP_/AP_1.shtml, accessed January 2013. 9 Altay Goyushov, “Islam in Azerbaijan (historical background)”, www.css.ethz.ch/ publications/pdfs/CAD-44.pdf, accessed January 2013. 10 Ali Abasov, “Islam v sovremennom Azerbaidzhane: Obrazy i realii”, in: D.E. Fur- man (ed.), Azerbaidzhan i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moscow, Letniy sad, 2001), pp. 280–310. 68 bayram balci and altay goyushov purposes. The majority of Azerbaijani Sunnis belonged to the School (madhhab) which is followed mainly by those with a Turkic eth- nic background, while the non-Turkic native Muslim minority embraced the Shafi’i tradition. Throughout the 19th century the Sufi Naqshbandi movement achieved significant popularity among both Hanafi and Shafi’i Sunnis. After the collapse of the atheist Soviet state, a revival of Islam began and stimulated significant changes in the religious life of Azerbaijanis. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these changes was the success of vari- ous Sunni branches, like Salafism and the Nurcu movement in attracting many young urban Azerbaijanis, including those of Shi’i origin. Conver- sions among Azerbaijan’s Sunni minority to Shi’ism, however, have been negligible so far, although surge of Shi’i Islam has been significant since the early 2000s due to active involvement of non-official Shi’i religious communities in political opposition to the ruling regime. In general, today practising Muslims can be identified as members of three main groups (each of which have smaller subdivisions). These are: a) Shi’is who are followers of such religious authorities as the Grand Ayatollahs Khamenei, Sistani and others; b) mainstream Sunnis who are followers of various Turkish Sufi-oriented communities like Nurcu, Naqshbandi, Suleymanci and others; and c) the so-called Salafis/Wahhabis. Local Islamic traditions were completely revamped by these foreign influences, although a decade after the collapse of the USSR, young, popular local preachers took the lead in disseminating the aforementioned three religious views and became the face of Islamic revival. These relatively young preachers enjoyed much more popular support among religiously oriented youth than the state- backed leaders of the semi-official Caucasus Muslim Board.

2 Islam and the State

Article 6 of the Constitution states that Azerbaijan is a secular state. Arti- cle 19 affirms the separation of state and religion while Article 37 guaran- tees freedom of belief and the equality of all religions in the eyes of the law. The law on the freedom of conscience and religious worship which regulates relations between religion and the state was adopted in August 1992. Significant amendments to this law were made in 1996, 1997, 2002, 2009 and 2011. After 1996 Muslim religious communities were no longer allowed to work under the direction of foreign religious organisations. Furthermore, active clerics were denied the right to become elected offi- cials in state institutions. azerbaijan 69

Only those Muslim clerics who have obtained their religious education in Azerbaijan are allowed to lead religious ceremonies. Articles 300.0.1 and 300.0.2 of the Administrative Code penalise sending citizens abroad to study religion or exchanging religious figures without the permission of the executive authority and carrying out religious ceremonies and rituals of the religion of Islam by citizens who have gained religious education outside the Republic of Azerbaijan.11 According to the changes to “The law on the freedom of conscience and religious worship” made in 2009, mosques can appoint preachers only with the official consent of the exec- utive branch of the government. In 2011, a new “Article 167–2” was added in the Criminal Code which sanctions punishment for “Production, sale and distribution of religious literature, religious items and other informational materials of religious nature with the aim of import, sale and distribution without appropri- ate authorisation”. Since these changes were introduced in the Criminal Code, those who are involved in these kinds of activities, and who for- merly could be only punished under the Administrative Code, now face a prospect of imprisonment from two to five years.12 Moreover amendments to the State Tax Code were adopted by parlia- ment in June 2012 and later signed by the President to impose new taxes on import and distribution of religious literature. According to these amendments “literature with a religious purpose (both hard copy and electronic), audio and video material will require a state-issued verifica- tion mark before they can be sold.”13 So far distribution of no other kind of literature has been subject to this sort of state taxes. Although under the Constitution religion and the state are separate. In 2001 the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Reli- gious Communities (SCWRC) was created explicitly to regulate religious life. According to the amendments made in 2009, only those communities officially registered by this Committee are legally allowed to be present on the territory of Azerbaijan. In December 2011 the Caucasus Muslim

11 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1648, accessed January 2013; www.media- forum.az/az/2011/12/12/PREZ%C4%B0DENT-%C4%B0LHAM-%C6%8FL%C4%B0YEV- D%C4%B0N%C4%B0-QADA%C4%9EALARI-S%C6%8FRTL%C6%8F%C5%9ED%C4%B 0R%C6%8FN-071738356c00.html, accessed January 2013. 12 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1648, accessed January 2013; www.media forum.az/az/2011/12/13/D%C4%B0N%C4%B0-YASAQLAR-C%C4%B0NAY%C6% 8FT-M%C6%8FC%C6%8FLL%C6%8FS%C4%B0-D%C6%8F-D%C6%8FY% C4%B0%C5%9ED%C4%B0–092126835c00.html, accessed January 2013. 13 www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1721, accessed January 2013. http://abc.az/ eng/news/66102.html, accessed January 2013. 70 bayram balci and altay goyushov

Board, as the only state designated legal representative of Azerbaijani Muslim communities, received 2 million Manats (approximately 1.98 mil- lion Euros) of financial aid from the Azerbaijani government.14 Recent events in the Arab world caused the Azerbaijani government to reinforce its control over religious life in the country. In May 2012 the President replaced the head of the SCWRC, vocal secularist Hidayet Oru- jov with Elshad Isganderov, well-known for his strong ties with Muslim, particularly Shi’i, communities and organisations both within and outside of Azerbaijan. In August 2012 President Aliyev allocated additional 1 mil- lion Manats (approximately 0.957 million Euros) to the budget of SCRWA from the Special Reserve Fund of the President.15 Just after the appointment of the new head of the SCWRC, in the sum- mer of 2012 semi-official Caucasus Muslim Board announced that start- ing next year, i.e. 2013, preachers in all the mosques will regularly receive common sermon texts to read at Friday ( juma) prayers, causing strong critical reaction of independent religious communities and human rights activists.16

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Changes made in 2009 to the law “On the freedom of conscience and religious worship” required the re-registration of religious communities. As of January 2013, 576 religious communities had attained official state registration (555 of them are of Muslim belief ).17 The law requires all Mus- lim communities to accept the authority of the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB)18—a semi-official religious institution established by the Soviet leadership in 1944 as the highest spiritual authority. Described in the law as the Historical Centre of Azerbaijani Muslims, until the early 1990s this institution operated under the name of Spiritual Board of Transcauca- sian Muslims. The current head of the Board, a Shi’i cleric Allahshukur ­Pashazade, became its leader in 1980. His first deputy, with the religious title of Mufti, is responsible for relations with Sunni communities. In

14 http://anspress.com/index.php?a=2&lng=az&nid=132019, accessed January 2013; www .sherg.az/2011/12/27/read=44912, accessed January 2013. 15 http://abc.az/eng/news/67292.html, accessed January 2013. 16 www.azadliq.org/content/article/24657624.html, accessed January 2013. 17 http://scwra.intro.az/pages/77/?, accessed January 2013 www.azadliq.org/archive/ news/20120921/1/1.html?id=24715422: accessed January 2013. 18 www.qafqazislam.com, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 71 order to be registered as Muslim, community petitioners must address their application to the CBM. After thorough consideration, the CBM has to petition the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities for registration of that particular community. The CBM possesses sole official responsibility for the appointment of clerics to mosques (although it is required to obtain official consent from the executive branch of gov- ernment) and the organisation of the hajj pilgrimage. Although registered communities are compelled to accept the formal leadership of the CBM, in reality many of them deny its spiritual author- ity. In addition, some unregistered communities describe the imposition of the CBM’s leadership by the state as the main reason for their unwill- ingness to apply for official registration. The leader of the former “Juma Mosque” community,19 Iranian edu- cated Hadji Ilgar, is the most profiled Shi’i preacher in Azerbaijan. This community refused to apply for re-registration in 2001 after the establish- ment of the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities and was expelled from its headquarters in the capital city’s historical centre in 2004. Community leader Hadji Ilgar spent several months in jail after the disputed 2003 presidential elections. He also leads a human rights NGO “DEVAMM” which is a vocal critic of the current government; Ilgar also supervises an online information agency “Dəyələr” (Values).20 Currently, “Mashadi Dadash” community, headquartered in central Baku, is the biggest Shi’i congregation due to the popularity of its self- educated and charismatic preacher Hadji Shahin.21 Jailed popular activist Abgul Suleymanov and Zulfugar who led the organisations “Milli Mənəvi Dəyərlər” (National-Moral Values) and “Cəfəri heyəti” (Team of Jafarits) enjoys widespread popularity among radical minded Shi’is.22 The pro-Shi’i Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which came into being just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was stripped of its official registra- tion in the mid-1990s. Although head of the party, Movsum Samadov, was arrested in January 2011, the party still remains the most visible sign of political Islam in Azerbaijan. Since the late 1990s, Saudi-educated Gamet Suleimanov was regarded as unofficial leader of the moderate part of the Salafi community. Under

19 Juma Mosque situated in the historical Old City of the capital. 20 http://deyerler.org, accessed January 2013. 21 www.ahlibeyt.az; www.salaminfo.az; both accessed January 2013. 22 www.islamazeri.az, accessed January 2013. 72 bayram balci and altay goyushov his leadership Salafis were the fastest growing community. A major crack- down was launched by the government against Muslim communities and included the closure of Gamet Suleimanov’s popular mosque for prayers (he still resides there, but mosque is not open for mass prayers) after a terrorist attack in 2008. This seriously damaged the Salafi com- munity’s standing but Gamet is still considered as the most popular Salafi preacher. With the fall of the Soviet Union religious movements of Turkish origin also made some impressive gains in Azerbaijani society. Due to very suc- cessful educational institutions, Fethullah Gülen’s version of “Nur” move- ment has been the most effective among Turkish proselytisers operating in Azerbaijan (they own a chain of successful high schools, a university and very popular college preparatory courses). The so-called “Aid Fund for Youth” which is the local subsidiary of Turkish Mahmud Hudai Foundation (followers of Naqshbandi Sufi order) has also been one of the most successful religious proselytisers in Azer- baijan since the early 1990s.23 They have founded and supervised several madrasas in various regions of the country since then. Original “Nur” i.e. followers of the late Kurdish cleric Said Nursi, as well as a sect called “Suleymancilar” founded by another prominent cleric from Turkey Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan are also listed among the most signifi- cant religious movements in Azerbaijan.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

During a recent interview a representative of the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities said that there are 1834 mosques in Azerbaijan and 135 of them are located in Baku.24 The overwhelming majority of the existing mosques were constructed before the Soviet period and reopened after the fall of the USSR. Since the declaration of independence in 1991, dozens of new mosques were built with the financial support of foreign charities, foreign religious organisations and foreign state institutions. Of these, 63 were constructed with the financial support of Kuwaiti sources, 24 were funded through Turkey, three through Saudi Arabia, one through Qatar and one through Iran. The exact number of mosques, construction

23 www.gyf.org.az, accessed in January 2013. 24 http://scwra.intro.az/structures/60/?, accessed January 2013. www.qafqazinfo.az/news .php?id=25957; http://gun.az/religion/50924.print; both accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 73 of which was locally funded, is unknown.25 In 2012 the Azerbaijani Gov- ernment reported that during the last eight years 117 new mosques were constructed in Azerbaijan.26 The report also stresses that seven mosques and “pirs” (explained below) were built or renovated by the semi-official charity fund bearing the name of the current president’s late father and led by the First Lady.27 Currently the Mashadi Dadash mosque in the central part of Baku city is regarded as the most attended Shi’i prayer house in the capital, due to popularity of its imam Hadji Shahin. Mashadi Dadash replaced the Juma Mosque in an historic part of Baku as an unofficial primary Shi’i centre, after the original community of the latter under the leadership of above discussed Hadji Ilgar was forcibly driven out of it. A prayer house called Huseyniyye located in Baku city, where ceremo- nies are led by an influential Iranian cleric and representative of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, Odjaq Nedjat, is also regarded as one of the primary spots where the Shi’i community regularly comes together. Currently, five major mosques in the capital city Baku and its outskirts are the most important centres of local independent Sunni communi- ties. These are: 1) Mosque built with Turkish funds in the 1990s for the Theology Department of Baku State University (shared by Salafis and Turkish oriented groups; 2) A mosque in “Garachukhur” district of Baku on the outskirts of the capital (dominated by Salafis); 3) Ancient “Lezgi mosque” in the old historic centre (primarily serves Salafi community); 4) A mosque in Mehdiabad town on the outskirts of Baku (also shared by Salafis and Turkish oriented groups); 5) The recently renovated Taza- mosque in Baku serves as an official residence for the Caucasus Muslim Board and its head, Sheykh al-Islam Allahshukur Pashazada. Official Sunni Friday prayers are held by Mufti Hadji Salman at Ajdarbay Mosque in the Central Part of the capital. Closure of two main Sunni prayer houses in Baku city, especially the highly venerated Mosque of Martyrs led to feelings of resentment among both Sunni believers and the Turkish government. In August 2012, a

25 Media Forum News Portal quoted the head of the State Committee of the Azerbai- jani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, www.mediaforum.az/az/2009/05/06/ H%C4%B0DAY%C6%8FT-ORUCOV-XAR%C4%B0CD%C6%8FN-MAL%C4%B0YY %C6%8FL%C6%8F%C5%9E%C6%8FN-D%C4%B0N%C4%B0-%C4%B0CMALAR- 042736077c00.html, accessed January 2013. 26 www.scwra.gov.az/view.php-lang=az&menu=0&id=815.htm; http://apa.az/az/news/ 253513; both accessed January 2013. 27 Ibid. 74 bayram balci and altay goyushov decree was issued by the President to provide land for the construction of a new mosque in cooperation with the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs). The President also allocated an initial 10 million Manats (9.98 million Euros) from the Reserve Fund to start con- struction works.28 In December 2012, President Aliyev personally visited the construction site of this mosque.29 In addition to mosques there are an undefined number of so called - jras, husayniyyas and dershanes serving small groups of believers which are mainly located in private houses and apartments. There are also more than 550 so-called pirs or holy sites and the graves of saints which attract thousands of pilgrims each year.30 During the most recent celebrations of ‘Id al-Adha the pro-governmen- tal Centre for Religious Research monitored the approximate number of worshippers attending holiday prayers in the major mosques throughout the country. According to the published results approximately 27 thou- sand worshippers attended the holiday prayer in those mosques during the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha on 26 October 2012.31 This was the first time such a study was done in the mosques of Azer- baijan since the fall of the USSR, although employed methodology, profes- sionalism and even impartiality of this study cause serious doubts among local observers.

5 Children’s Education

Separate religious classes are not offered in public schools although some basic religious information is provided by the curriculum within the sub- ject called “Life Skills”. Since the early 1990s, dozens of Turkish private schools have opened in Azerbaijan where the basics of Islam are taught as part of the official curriculum (“Culture and Religion” and “Morality” classes). These officially registered and popular private schools are mainly managed by followers of Fethullah Gülen.32 There is also one Iranian sec- ondary school in Baku which has been officially opened to meet the needs

28 http://xeber.azeri.net/olke/prezident-bakida-yeni-mescid-kompleksinin-tikilmesi- ucun-serencam-imzalayib, accessed January 2013. 29 www.atvxeber.az/az/newsd.php?id=2402, accessed January 2013. 30 http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=238606, accessed January 2013. 31 http://az.islam.az/news/a-6609.html, accessed January 2013. 32 Official webpage of Turkish-Azerbaijani schools www.cag.edu.az, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 75 of citizens of that country who are temporarily in Azerbaijan, although local children are also allowed to attend this school.33 Azerbaijani officials have been increasingly concerned over the rapidly growing number of worshippers and their rising involvement in political life during the recent years. This has caused the Azerbaijani government to impose some strict measures. In 2007 the last 19 Qur’anic courses were closed by the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities.34 According to Azerbaijani officials, they will be reopened but will only be able to operate under strict state regulations.35 Despite government agencies’ tough stance on the issue, unofficial mosque education as well as so-called home education provided by local clerics, remains wide- spread. Some language teaching private institutions also provide Qur’anic courses.

6 Higher And Professional Education

The Baku Islamic Madrasa was founded in 1989 by the decision of the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims as the first official institution of Islamic education in Azerbaijan. In 1992 it was renamed the Islamic University of Baku (IUB). Only in 2009 did the Ministry of Education offi- cially grant the IUB a license as an Institution of Higher Education. It has two Departments: 1) Department of Shari’a and 2) Department of Islamic studies. According to the information taken from the webpage of the CMB, as of 2012, 1,286 students were enrolled in the University and it had 2,235 alumni.36 Officially, the IUB had four branches in different regions of Azerbaijan and one in the city of Derbent in the Dagestani Autono-

33 This school has been operating in Baku since early 1990-s. It has its own building located in the Yasamal district of Baku. But growing popularity of the school in this district (which due to its demographics was labeled by the Azerbaijani government as a fertile ground for İranian religious propaganda) worried local authorities. As a result to ease the pressure of Azerbaijani Government Iranian Embassy moved the school from this area to another district within Baku city. It is now located in the Shahriyar Cultural Center of Iranian Embassy in the Khatai District. Azerbaijani Ministry of Education allowed some Azerbaijani students to attend this school. But according to the regulations the size of Azerbaijani student body in this school should not exceed 20% of the overall number of students. 34 http://az.islam.az/article/a-96.html, accessed January 2013. 35 Azeri Service of Radio Free Europe quoting the official of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, www.azadliq.org/content/ article/1955460.html, accessed January February 2013. 36 www.qafqazislam.com/az/biu.php, accessed January 2013. 76 bayram balci and altay goyushov mous Republic of the Russian Federation. But when in 2009 the Ministry of Education granted the Islamic University of Baku with accreditation, enrolment to three of its branches in Mingechaur, Lenkoran and Sumgayit city were cancelled. Only the university’s branch in Zaqatala was allowed to continue with enrolment of new students. This campus in the north of Azerbaijan, funded and run by the above mentioned Mahmud Hudai Foundation of Turkey, has been both academ- ically and financially the most advanced branch of the IUB. Since 1992, the Faculty of Theology at Baku State University37 has been providing under- graduate and graduate levels of religious education. There has always been uncertainty regarding the future professional careers of the faculty’s graduates since its foundation in 1992. Initially it was planned that the Faculty would mainly provide public secondary schools with teachers to teach “Basics of Religion” which had been proposed as part of the curricu- lum. Since this subject has never been officially introduced to the public school curriculum, a core of faculty graduates are working as teachers of Arabic. Some others are pursuing academic careers or working for official state institutions. The faculty was founded on the basis of an agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Diyanet). There are three officially registered madrasas operating in the cities of Baku, Zaqatala (Aliabad village) and Lenkoran with a two-year study term. There is uncertainty regarding the status and recognition of their diplomas. The Ministry of Education is currently working on preparation of regulatory documents for these madrasas. One also needs to mention the presence of dozens of Azerbaijani stu- dents abroad, mainly in Iran, Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It is widely accepted that Azeri institutions, due to a lack of qualified staff, are not able to provide quality religious educa- tion. That is one of the main reasons why many graduates of Azerbaijani religious education institutions prefer to continue their studies abroad.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Funerals are the most visible sign of Muslim tradition in Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union’s attempt to get rid of traditional funerals and replace them

37 Official webpage of Baku State Universities’ Faculty of Theology http://theology.bsu .edu.az/en, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 77 with so-called “citizen” funerals was a resounding failure. However, there has been a visible decline in this tradition during the last few years due to the economic hardship of population. Mass commemorations of the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 40th days after death as well as every Thursday between the burial and the 40th day were com- mon phenomena, including in urban areas. Visits to the deceased person’s grave on some of these days continue, as do large ceremonial dinners. According to local traditions, family members of the deceased avoid attending any parties or celebrations, particularly weddings, until the first anniversary of the death. All ceremonies include the obligatory presence of the local mullah, citations from the Qur’an and other Islamic rituals. The attendance at funerals by friends, neighbours, and relatives of the deceased person’s family is almost a binding duty. Some neighbourhoods are provided with buildings specifically constructed to serve the needs of funeral ceremonies of the community. Recently the Caucasus Muslim Board started providing specially equipped and paid venues with full ser- vice included for ceremonial dinners within the main mosques of Baku city. Despite the fact that this vast funeral ceremony tradition stems from the local population’s Muslim identity, some elements of it according to Islamic clerics contradict the basics of Islam. One of them is depiction of the deceased person on the tombstone, which since the mid-1960s has become a widespread custom.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

After the declaration of independence and the formation of the armed forces of the newly emerged state, a chaplaincy institution in the military was introduced and existed until the mid-1990s when it was quietly abol- ished during the modernisation of the military. No official comments were made regarding this matter, although there are claims that measure was taken by Azerbaijani leaders on the advice of Turkey’s military and the then secular political leadership. Currently, there is no kind of chaplaincy in the state institutions of Azerbaijan.

9 Religious Festivals

Both ‘Id al-Adha (Qurban bayrami in the local language) and ‘Id al-Fitr (Orucluq bayrami) are national holidays and include usually three to five non-working days allocated by the government each year. Animal 78 bayram balci and altay goyushov

­sacrifices and accompanying ceremonies are an essential part of ‘Id al- Adha. Small charitable donations are considered vital to the commemora- tion of ‘Id al-Fitr. Tens of thousands attend early morning holiday prayers each year. Almost completely restricted during the Soviet era, Hajj pilgrimage was resumed in 1991 when only 200 pilgrims went to Mecca. In 1996 this number rose to 800. The situation has dramatically shifted since 2003, when the number of Azerbaijanis wishing to participate began to rise sig- nificantly. Four thousand applicants were turned down in 2006; by 2007, nearly 5,700 Azerbaijanis participated.38 The following year this number reached 6,000. There is no doubt that this sharp rise in the number of pilgrims somehow worried the Government and in the following year the head of CMB which held primary responsible for organising Hajj since the fall of the USSR announced that only 2,000 men and women will be allowed to visit Mecca in 2009. The outbreak of swine flu,39 unprepared- ness of Azerbaijani believers to perform the required religious rituals,40 etc. were cited as official reasons; although it was clear that the govern- ment was intending to impose restrictions. Since 2009 only 2,000 men and women have been allowed to perform Hajj each year. Annual mass commemorations of ‘Ashura (the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husain) are another very significant event directly related to the Shi’i Muslim identity of the majority of Azerbaijanis. Tradi- tionally even in the urbanised areas like the capital Baku and other major cities of the country the public avoids celebrating weddings during the Islamic month of Muharram, within which ‘Ashura falls.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

For a long period after independence halal food was certified by the Cau- casus Muslim Board (CMB). Only two local brands: “SAB meat and dairy”41 company operating in Baku and “Halal Qida” (Halal Food)42 operating in

38 Altay Goyushov. (2008) Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan. Current Trends In Islamist Ide- ology, vol. 7, pp. 66–82, www.currenttrends.org/docLib/200811111_ct7.pdf, accessed January 2013. 39 www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?lang=az&page=00&article_id=200909150353 09073#.UQFaZ7-TySo, accessed January 2013. 40 http://news.lent.az/news/55459, accessed January 2013. 41 www.sab.az/indexen.html, accessed january 2013. 42 www.elba.az/main.php?dil=az&bolme=halal_qida, accessed January. azerbaijan 79

Ganja city had received official approval of the CMB to use “halal” labels on their products.43 However, in early 2011 the State Agency on Standardi- sation, Metrology and Patent of Azerbaijan Republic (SASMP)44 started challenging the CBM’s right to certify the halal label.45 SASMP insisted that the CMB does not have the necessary equipment to conduct appropriate laboratory work and that only this State Agency possesses sole responsi- bility for any kind of standardisation by the laws of Azerbaijan.46 In July 2012 SASMP announced that it approved three standards for halal meal. These standards define transportation, storage and sale requirements for halal food. The agency also revealed general requirements for meat and other grocery to be labelled “halal.” These new regulations took effect in August 2012 and require only specially trained staff to be employed in the production of halal food.47 There is a chain of Turkish restaurants (“Böyük Fırat”, “Böyük Lahmacun”, “Atom” and others) belonging to Turk- ish citizen Huseyn Boyukfirat (allegedly follower of a well-known Kurdish preacher Molla Sulayman) which provide halal food. Restaurants belong- ing to this chain are the only ones which are closed during daytime i.e. fasting time of Ramadan.48 In 1991 the Turkish Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation was the first Mus- lim religious organisation to start its activities in Azerbaijan after the fall of the Soviet Union. The local office of this foundation referred to earlier was named “Youth Aid Fund.”49 The most successful Turkish business became an education oriented company (“Çağ Öyrətim işlətmələri”)50 and is connected to the Gülen movement. The firm recently celebrated its 20th anniversary in Azerbaijan. In 1993 when the former Azerbaijani Communist leader Heydar Aliyev returned to power, replacing the president Elchibey, many Iranian and Arab charities found their way to Azerbaijan. President Aliyev appeared in Moscow before representatives of Arab charity foundations, calling upon them to help Azerbaijan to tackle the problem of refugees and ­internally

43 www.milli.az/news/economy/34388.html, accessed january 2013. 44 www.azstand.gov.az/index.php?lang=en, accessed January2013. 45 www.musavat.com/new/%C4%B0qtisadiyyat/93554-%C5%9EEYX%C4%B0N_%E2 %80%9CHALAL%E2%80%9D_B%C4%B0ZNES%C4%B0N%C6%8F_Z%C6%8FRB%C6 %8F, accessed January 2013. 46 APA News Agency quoted the head of the SASMP, http://az.apa.az/news.php? id=53971, accessed January 2013. 47 www.trend.az/news/society/2049555.html, accessed January 2013. 48 http://buyukfirat.com, accessed January 2013. 49 www.gyf.org.az, accessed January 2013. 50 www.cag.edu.az/v2, accessed January 2013. 80 bayram balci and altay goyushov displaced persons the country faced due to war with the neighbouring Armenia. Responding to this call during the next few years 15 Arab chari- ties were established in Azerbaijan. The Saudi Arabia-based International Islamic Relief Organisation, The Kuwaiti Asian Muslims Committee, also Kuwaiti “Revival of the Islamic Heritage,” and the Iranian official Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (Emdadi-Khomeini) were among the most active. After September 11th all the Arab charities except The Kuwaiti Asian Muslims Committee were shut down. In 2011 the Government also briefly closed local branch of “Emdadi-Khomeini.” Although it resumed its oper- ation in Azerbaijan, the scale of the organisation’s activities has never reached previous levels. It should be noted that an Iranian Red Crescent clinic is also present in Azerbaijan currently. The Republic of Azerbaijan has been a member of Islamic Develop- ment Bank (IDB) since 1991. The country’s share in the capital of the bank is 0.13 per cent. From the start of its operation in Azerbaijan to 1 January 2012, the IDB signed 17 loan agreements for 15 projects totalling $726.9 million.51 National Bank of Iran has had its Baku branch since early 1990s.52 There are few local banks which have tried to implement Islamic bank- ing in Azerbaijan since independence in 1991. In August 2007, the Bah- raini International Investment Bank (IIB) acquired an indirect 49% stake in Amrahbank (Azerbaijan).53 In 2009 IIB announced the commence- ment of the conversion of Amrahbank to a bank compliant with Shari’a principles.54 Another local financial institution which practises Islamic Banking principles is “Kövsər Bank.” It was the second bank switched to these principles in the post-Soviet era. Recently one of the major finan- cial institutions of Azerbaijan, International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA), announced opening of the Islamic window and starting up Islamic bank- ing and financing activity.55 There is no special body for collecting Islamic taxes or donations (like zekat, khums (xüms), sadaqa, etc.). For years the CMB has been trying to impose its rules or regulations on Muslim taxes but the well-known

51 www.azernews.az/business/44433.html, accessed January 2013. 52 www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_BankSystem/bankSystem_02_e.html; www.azerb.com/ az-bank.html, accessed January 2013. 53 www.iib-bahrain.com/amrahbank.php; www.iib-bahrain.com/news2008_AMRABANK_ moves.php, accessed January 2013. 54 www.iib-bahrain.com/news2009_Launches_a_Mortgage_Finance.php, accessed Jan- uary 2013. 55 http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2062114.html, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 81 corrupted nature of this body and religious ties of Azerbaijani believers with spiritual leaders abroad derived from Shari’a requirements nulli- fied these efforts. According to Shi’i , believers should send their tax (called khums) to their spiritual leader (marji-taqlid). Until the mid-2000s, all Shi’i marji-taqlids from Iran, Iraq, and had fatwas allowing Azerbaijani Shi’i Muslims to keep collected khums for local needs due to economic hardship after the fall of the Soviet Union and the war with Armenia. But since the mid-2000s special tax collectors appointed by those marji-taqlids have been collecting and sending taxes oversees leav- ing only small portion of them for locals. A majority of Sunnis also provide zakat to their local community lead- ers. The only place where the CMB holds grip is with so-called “sadaqas” (small donations) and sacrifices donated to the “Pirs” (shrines). But some prominent “Pirs” like “Mir Mohsun Aqa” or “Nardaran” also do not share donations with the CMB and keep them for local communities.

11 Dress Codes

Until recently Muslim dress was not officially limited in public places or within educational institutions, although there have been some attempts to impose restrictions on headscarves and coverings by the administra- tions of certain schools and universities. Implementation of public school uniforms by the Ministry of Education was expected to challenge the cur- rent status quo. In November 2010 the Minister of Education in his inter- view to local media announced the immediate enactment of a ban on the wearing of head scarves in public elementary and secondary schools both for teachers and students.56 This caused public outrage among politi- cally active members of the Shi’i community while Sunnis’ reaction was relatively calm. In December 2010 Shi’i believers held a mass rally in front of the Ministry of Education and it became the most hotly debated issue during the ‘Ashura.57 Although implementation of this restrictive mea- sure was pre-planned, the timing of its announcement just before the ‘Ashura commemoration surprised many local observers. On 6 May 2011 some Shi’i religious groups held another mass rally against the so-called

56 http://news.lent.az/news/49021, accessed January 2013. 57 www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_hijab_debate/2257429.html, accessed January 2013 and www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/12/10/129131.html, accessed January 2013. 82 bayram balci and altay goyushov

“hijab ban.”58 Dozens of participants of this last rally were arrested and 12 of them received one to three years of imprisonment on hooliganism charges.59 In September 2011 just before the start of the new school year, education officials reiterated their decision to keep hijab out of classes.60 In October 2012 another rally against the hijab ban was held in front of the Ministry of Education. It was revealed later that jailed organisers of the previous rally masterminded this rally from prison. Thirty four people were arrested for participation in the last rally. It should also be noted that since the mid-1990s some religious groups have been appealing, as yet unsuccessfully, to lift restrictions imposed by government agencies on photographs taken for national passports and identification cards which require the face and head to be uncovered. Despite all of these discussions even after 20 years of Islamic revival which started with the collapse of the Soviet Union, hijab is still a marginal issue within Azerbaijani society. An absolute majority of females do not wear hijab and there is no trend to suggest that the number can significantly grow. Niqab is almost non- existent in Azerbaijan.

12 Publication and Media

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of print media outlets of Islamic orientation (some of them very popular) appeared, although none of them proved to be capable of longevity. These are some newspapers and magazines published in Azerbaijan by religious groups:

1) Since 2009 the State Committee for Work with Religious Associa- tions has published its own newspaper called “Society and Religion” 2) The State Committee for Work with Religious Associations also pub- lishes a journal called “Dövlət və din” (State and Religion) 3) “Kəlam” Magazine is published by the member of Council of under the CMB Miraziz Seyizdzadeh

58 http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2756&Itemi d=43, accessed January 2013. 59 http://deyerler.org/111319-hjbsdj-olan-inancldlardn-sayd-22-oldu.html, accessed Janu- ary 2013. 60 http://en.apa.az/news/154998, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 83

4) “” journal is published by above mentioned “Youth Aid Fund” organisation connected to the Turkish Mahmud Hudai Foundation; 5) The newspaper Nabz (Pulse) is published under the unofficial super- vision of the Islamic Party Print runs for each of these editions are relatively small and do not exceed a few thousand.

There are no religious TV or radio channels in Azerbaijan. As of 2012, two weekly religious TV shows were broadcast: one on the so-called 1st state channel and the other on Public TV. Moreover, religious TV programs broadcasting from neighbouring Turkey and Iran (both in Turkish and Azerbaijani) have long been popular with the Azerbaijani public. Internet media and social networking sites are also actively used by local religious groups. In the last few years Shi’i groups have been particu- larly active on the internet including social networking cites. The follow- ing are a few representative web sources:

The State Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan for Work with Reli- gious Communities www.scwra.gov.az Caucasus Muslim Board www.qafqazislam.com/az/index.php News Agency affiliated with the abovementioned Shi’i preacher Hadji Ilgar www.deyerler.org, For a long period Ojag Nedjat has been the most popular Shi’i cleric in Azerbaijan. Although he is an ethnic Azerbaijani, he is an Iranian citi- zen and the official representative of Khamenei: www.ocaqnejad.net Some other popular Shi’i web sources in Azerbaijan: www.faktxeber.com (Islamic party) www.salaminfo.az (“Meshedi Dadash” community) Sunni Web sources: www.azerimuslims.com (Azerbaijani Sunnis of Turkish orientation) www.Islamevi.az (Salafi preacher Yashar Gurbanov) http://ixlasla.com/index.php (Hadji Gamet, unofficial head of Abu Bakr mosque) 84 bayram balci and altay goyushov

13 Family Law

The CMB requires all local mullahs to perform nikah ceremonies only if official proof of a state issued registration of marriage is provided. But some reports suggest that a few mullahs, by breaking this regulation, are paving the way for underage marriages and polygamy, which otherwise are very uncommon to Azerbaijani society in general.

14 Interreligious Relations

The government has made great efforts to depict Azerbaijan as a non- violent multi-religious country. This effort is underscored by the many government-sponsored conferences, and workshops that have been held over the last several years. In 2011 the Azerbaijani Government launched the “World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue” under the patronage of the First Lady. Ilham Aliyev attended the opening ceremony. In December 2012 the SCWRC organised an international forum called “State and Religion: Strengthening Tolerance in a Changing World” in order to reinforce the dialogue between Islam and other religions in Azerbaijan and the rest of the world. The last significant event was held in April 2010 entitled “World Summit of Religious Leaders.” Despite continuing conflict between Azer- baijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Catholicos (Patriarch) of all Armenians was among the attendees of this conference.61 In November 2011 Sheykhulislam Allahshukur Pashazade visited Armenia to attend the meeting of the CIS Inter-Religious Council and met with the Armenian President.62 It is not uncommon to see the Sheykhulislam accompanied by both the Rabbi of the Mountain Jewish Community and the head of the local Russian Orthodox Church on state sponsored events and local media. However, the official discourse makes a distinction between the so-called traditional and non-traditional religions. For example, Salafis are labelled as non-traditional missionaries.

61 Official webpage of Caucasus Board of Muslims, www.qafqazislam.com/az/xeber .php?id=10, accessed January 2013. 62 http://en.trend.az/regions/scaucasus/armenia/1962843.html, accessed January 2013. azerbaijan 85

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Independent religious organisations take a relatively active part in public life in Azerbaijan. Some independent Islamic community leaders vocally comment on both international and internal political issues and have become very popular public figures. The CBM’s leader also frequently appears in the media with his comments on international and domestic matters and his positions on national presidential elections have been called inappropriate by some local observers. The general population appreciates the Islamic aspect of their identity but at the same time is very cautious in terms of the protection of its secular values and is usually wary of signs of religious revival. The Syrian uprising, which started in 2011, sparked hot debate between Sunni and Shi’i religious groups of Azerbaijan. The Russian conquest of the 19th century and the formation of a local, secularly educated elite under imperial patronage had gradually eased long-lasting tensions between the Sunnis and Shi’is of Azerbaijan. These fresh circumstances paved the way for the formation of a new secular nation. This trend con- tinued and even strengthened during Soviet rule due to the antireligious nature of the regime. Terms “Shi’i” and “Sunni” almost completely disap- peared from public discourse and until recently even the simple public pronunciation of the words “Shi’i” and “Sunni” was viewed as impolite and divisive. The religious revival which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought back religious knowledge, practice and new loyalties and this in its turn restored to Sunni-Shi’i awareness. But Syrian events became the first major occasion when hot debate between local Sunnis and Shi’is proceeded in such a transparent way that religious groups did not even try to hide their external political loyalties, not admitted publicly so far. It should be noted that social networks along with events of Arab spring contributed to that.

16 Major Cultural Events

The annual celebration of the Nawruz holiday on 21 March is histori- cally the biggest event in cultural life of Azerbaijanis. The tradition can be traced to a Zoroastrian belief and commemorates the arrival of a new year, which according to the Zoroastrian tradition comes in spring.

BELARUS

Daša Słabčanka1

1 Muslim Populations

Islam came to the territory of modern Belarus in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries. In 1397 several thousand Tatar families (mostly from the Crimea and the Golden Horde) were invited to serve in the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania2 and, under the terms of their settlement, they were allowed to build mosques and madrasas. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Muslims were permitted to marry Christians and also received a wide range of privileges and noble titles. By 1591, about 100,000 Tatars3 lived in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included today’s Belarus, and about 400 mosques had been built. Belarus was taken over by Russia in 1795, but already from the early seventeenth century attitudes towards Muslims had changed for the worse and many of them moved to the Crimea and to Ottoman territories. Wars also accounted for a high casualty rate. Within a century, the population had fallen to about 30,000, and by 1914 there were only 14,000 left.4 By 1939, Soviet anti- religious policies led to there being only three mosques left. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new situation has arisen characterised particularly by Tatar national renaissance, of which one of the main initiators was Dr Ibrahim Kanapatsky (1949–2005), the author of many articles, publications and books about Belarusian Tatars.5

1 Daša Słabčanka works with CASE-Belarus, Centre for Social and Economic Research, and Movement for Freedom, human rights and training non-governmental organisations. She graduated from Belarus State Economic University and has a master’s degree in Euro- pean Studies from University of Graz (Austria). 2 Pashkow, G.P., Вялікае княства Літоўскае Энцыклапедыя (Grand Duchy of Lithu- ania Encyclopedia), 2 vols (Minsk: BelEn, 2007), vol. 1, p. 688. 3 These Muslims now are often referred to as ‘Lithuanian Tatars’, and include members of the Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Polish Tatar Diasporas. 4 http://tatarica.narod.ru/archive/09.2003/07_01.09.03.htm, accessed 29 December 2012. 5 Magazines: Байрам (Bairam) from 1999 and, in Belarusian, Аль-Ислам (Islam); news- papers: Жизнь (Life) and Жыццё татарскае (Tatar Life). 88 daša słabčanka

Islam in Belarus today, however, is not only represented by Tatars but also by as many as 32 ethnic groups. Besides the 7,316 Tatars,6 the most numerous are immigrant groups of Turks, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Afghans and Iranians. There are no official statistics on the num- bers of Muslims as a question on religion was excluded from the official census in the Stalin period, from 1937, so estimates of the Muslim popula- tion are made on the basis of data on nationality, which cannot, of course, be reliable, as there are Christians among the Tatars, for example, and Muslims among the Belarusians. Bearing that in mind, estimates based on the most recent census of 20097 suggest there are more than 20,000 Muslims in Belarus (estimated from ethnic/nationality figures). The mass media tend to estimate the number of Muslims at 80,000–200,000 and in November 2009 Mufti Shabanovich referred to a figure of 120,000,8 although, according to Mufti Ali Varanovich, there are about 50,000 Mus- lims, including about 300 Belarusian converts,9 while the total popula- tion of Belarus is 9.46 million people. Most Muslims in Belarus are Sunnis, while the Azerbaijanis and Iranians are Shi’is.

2 Islam and the State

The Republic of Belarus is a secular state; there is no state religion but reli- gious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Constitution and relevant international and domestic legislation. The legal basis of state-religion relations is presented in the collection of documents Вопросы совести и религиозных организаций в Республике Беларусь (Questions of Conscience and Religious Organisations in the Republic of Belarus).10 According to the 1992 Law on Freedom of Con- science and Religious Organisations, all religions are equal before the law. Citizens have the right to freely determine their attitude towards religion,

6 According to the 1999 census there were 10,146 Tatars in Belarus, http://belstat.gov .by/homep/ru/perepic/p5.php, accessed 29 December 2012. 7 Public Census 2009, main results, http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/ itogi3_new.php, accessed 29 December 2012. 8 ‘У Беларусі жывуць 120 тысяч мусульман’ (120 thousand Muslims live in Belarus), Nasza Niwa, http://nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=31566 or http://news.tut.by/culture/317722 .html, accessed 29 December 2012. 9 Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed on 27 December 2011. 10 Available at www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/literat/vopr, accessed 29 Decem- ber 2012. Also contains the outlook of history and modern status of different confessions. belarus 89 as well as the right to individually or collectively practise any or no reli- gion. Legislation also defines the rights of religious organisations and the procedures for their establishment and operation. According to Article 15 of the Constitution (adopted in 1994, amended in 1996), the state is responsible for the preservation and development of the country’s historical, cultural and spiritual heritage. Article 16 stipulates that all religions and confessions are equal before the law, and relations between the state and religions are regulated by the law. There are restric- tions on the activities of religious organisations (e.g., on activities against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus or connected with violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms). Article 31 proclaims individual and collec- tive freedom of conscience. In 2002 the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was amended. One of the most significant additions is the Preamble, where the role of various religions in Belarusian history, including Islam, is described and emphasised. There is no con- cept of ‘religious minority’ in the legislation, as all religions are equal. A special separate body called the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs is in charge of the implementation of the state policy towards religion.11 However, the amended law is criticised by international organisations for its restrictive character. The United States Commission on Interna- tional Religious Freedom kept Belarus on its Watch List in 2012, where Belarus has been since 2003. In the 2012 Annual Report it is stated that: The government of Belarus, through intrusive laws and policies, continues to violate the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief through- out the country. Religious communities and individuals found to have vio- lated these restrictive laws have been harassed, raided, fined, and detained. Vandalism of religious properties has occurred with impunity.12 The Belarusian religion law of 2002 is oppressive by European standards, particularly its ban on unregistered religious activity. Active participation in unregistered religious groups may result in a two-year term of impris- onment or heavy court-imposed fines. The government has an extensive bureaucracy that closely supervises religious life throughout the country, and harasses some religious groups, particularly Protestants and others officially viewed as “foreign” or “political.” Conscientious objectors to

11 Приветствует Беларусь (Belarus Welcomes), www.belarus21.by/en. 12 USCIRF Annual Report 2012 - The Commission’s Watch List: Belarus, www.unhcr.org/ refworld/country,,USCIRF,,BLR,,4f71a66dc,0.html, accessed 12 January 2013. 90 daša słabčanka

­military service have been detained for terms of several months and fined. Foreign religious workers continue to face many official obstacles, includ- ing deportations and visa refusals.13 There are also some incentives from the government: from 2005, under Decree No. 571, religious organisations have been exempt from land and real-estate taxes and, in a 2007 addition to the decree, religious organisa- tions were also exempted from land tax on land where religious buildings are under construction.14 In a Presidential Decree on 8 April 2010 Muslim organisations were listed among organisations that pay a reduced rent.15

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Shortly before the end of the Communist period there was only one Mus- lim organisation in Belarus. The First Belarusian Congress of Muslims, held in 1994 in Minsk, initiated the creation of Muslim organisations. At that time, Мусульманскае рэлігійнае ўпраўленьне у Рэспубліцы Беларусь (Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Belarus) was established, with the Mufti as its head. In 2002 the Muslim community split and there have been two muftis in Belarus since then. According to state statistics, as of 1 January 2012, out of 25 Muslim organisations operating in Belarus, two are in the Brest region, four in the Vitsyebsk region, one in the Homyel region, eight in the Hrodna region, one in the Mahilyow region, six in the Minsk region, and three in the city of Minsk. In total there are 3,210 religious organisations in Belarus.16 Today, there are two major Muslim organisations:

1) The Muslim Religious Association of the Republic of Belarus17 (email: [email protected], tel.: ++37517 3285554), whose mufti is Abu- Bekir Shabanovich (tel.: ++37529 6528217). Mufti Shabanovich was re-elected for a second term of 5 years in 2010.

13 United States Commission of Religious Freedom, Annual Report of May 2011—Belarus, www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCIRF,,BLR,,,0.html, accessed 29 December 2012. 14 Presidential Decree of the Republic of Belarus No. 571 About land and real estate taxes exemption for religious organisations, 1 December 2005, http://law.sb.by/329/, accessed 29 December 2012. 15 Instruction of the President of the Republic of Belarus № 113рп, About setting addi- tional reducing coefficient to base rent rate, 8 April 2010. 16 www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/relig_org/new_url_174769964, accessed 29 December 2012. 17 Мусульманскае рэлігійнае аб’яднаньне ў Рэспубліцы Беларусь. belarus 91

2) The Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Belarus (email: khu- [email protected], www.islam.by, tel.: ++37517 3408247, ++37529 5561053, fax: ++37517 2006615), whose mufti is Ali Varanovich,18 elected in Sep- tember 2011 after the death of his father, Ismail Varanovich, who had been the previous mufti of the Muslim Spiritual Board.

Both muftis are members of the Interethnic Advisory Board.19 By the end of 2011, nineteen Muslim organisations were included under the umbrella of the first, and four were members of the second. One organisation, in Hrodno, is independent.20 Moreover, one of the 25 Muslim organisations is based more on national criteria, uniting Azerbaijanis who are Shi’is. The split of the Muslim community into two muftiates is explained by personal disagreements between the then leaders of the community, but the organisations are of the same spiritual orientation. Less formal but with some spiritual influence is the Light of Islam (Святло Ислама), a member of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Belarus (vul. K.Marksa 8, Minsk, www.islam.by). The Light of Islam operated from 2001 till 2004 and then restarted in 2008. It provides classes in Qur’an and Arabic language and assistance with funerals, weddings, etc. Among regional Muslim communities, one of the newest, in Homyel, is especially active (Syalanskaya-st 1, room 300, Homyel). Most Muslim organisations have been established by Tatars. The two major ones based on national identity are Zikr ul-Kitab and Chimsha. Zikr ul-Kitab was created as the Community of Muslim Tatars, with the name Al-Kitab, in 1991 and was at the forefront of a Tatar national renaissance. It changed its name in 2001, when it was granted the status of a republican organisation.21

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Nowadays, there are eight active mosques in Belarus, in Iwye, Klyetsk, Lowchicy, Maladzyechna, Navahrudak, Slonim, Smilavichy, and Vidzy.

18 Духоўнае ўпраўленьне мусульман у Рэспубліцы Беларусь. 19 Міжэтнічная кансультатыўная рада, www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/ new_url_145141106, accessed 29 December 2012. 20 http://muslimby.info/?p=682, accessed 29 December 2012. 21 www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 29 December 2012. 92 daša słabčanka

There are also three prayer houses, in Ashmyany, Hrodna, and Brest.22 Homyel has a temporary mosque. Currently Belarusian Muslims call for fund raising to buy a building for a Homyel mosque. The first mosque in the capital city Minsk was built in 16th century and was of timber. In 1901 it was reconstructed in stone but then was demol- ished in the 1959 by the Soviet government. A new mosque planned to be a replica of the old one in Minsk has been under construction since a building permit was issued in 1998, with the construction work started in 2004. However, a lack of sufficient financial resources and disagreements between Muslim organisations have led to a slowdown in construction.23 First, the general investor in the construction was Saudi Arabia, but in 2006 it stopped financing the construction. Belarusian Muslims still can- not find sufficient resources to complete the project (it has an estimated cost of two million US dollars).24

5 Children’s Education

Schools are separate from the church, and pupils receive a secular edu- cation. Material on religion is included in courses on ‘world history’ and ‘man, society and state.’25 Legislation provides for religious organisations to set up groups or weekend schools for religious education. Currently there are five Muslim weekend schools, which are declining in numbers.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

At the Belarusian State University26 students can specialise in the his- tory of the Middle East and North Africa, Arabic, Turkish and Persian

22 Мечети Беларуси. Историческая справка (Mosques in Belarus. Historical Refer- ence), http://muslimby.info/?p=549, accessed 29 December 2012. 23 История мечети в г. Минск (History of Minsk Mosque), http://muslimby .info/?p=552#more-552, accessed 29 December 2012. 24 Масштабы возводимой в Минске мечети превосходят возможности верующих, считают в Аппарате уполномоченного по делам религий и национальностей (The Scale of the mosque that is under construction in Minsk overcomes the possibilities of believ- ers, the opinion of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs), http://naviny.by/pda/ material/?type=news&id=328859, accessed 29 December 2012. 25 Kharin Yu, Человек. Общество. Государство: Учеб. пособие для 11-го кл. общеобразоват. учреждений с рус. яз. обучения. В 4 кн. Кн. 4. Человек в мире культуры (Minsk: Narodnaya Asvyeta [Public Education], 2002) (Man. Society. State: Study guide for pupils of 11th grade, in 4 Volumes, Vol. 4 Man in the world of culture), pp. 92–123. 26 www.bsu.by/. belarus 93 languages, literature, mythology and religion, and the art of the Middle and Far East, as well as ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ (Humanities Faculty, Department of General Sciences).27 There are no imam training courses. Belarusian Muslims undergo imam training abroad, mostly in Kazan, Russia. But some also study in Jordan, Libya, and Turkey. Mufti Ali Varanovich is a distance-learning student in the Russian Islamic University.28 In 2012 the first Muslim from Belarus entered Saratov “Sheikh Said” Madrasa. The same year two Belarusian Muslims graduated from Kazan Madrasa.29

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The law grants the right for burial to take place in accordance with religion and traditions. Religious organisations can request the establishment of a religious cemetery and land for religious burial may also be provided in public cemeteries.30 However, there is still no Muslim cemetery in Minsk. In 2012 a group of Belarusian Tatars, who now live in Poland, came to visit Belarusian Muslim cemeteries and help with their reconstruction. Some local Muslim communities have decided to revive a tradition to visit cem- eteries of other communities annually.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There is no Muslim ‘chaplaincy’ in state institutions, but the Penal Code31 guarantees freedom of conscious for prisoners and their right to practise their religion. A separate space should be provided for religious needs, so long as it does not disturb general order and in some cases, an imam may be invited. However, it is difficult to assess the implementation of such provisions. However, representatives of other religions are also often

27 Department of General Sciences, Humanities Faculty, www.bsu.by/ru/main.aspx? guid=6831, accessed 29 December 2012. 28 http://e-riu.ru/riu_news/?ID=1096, accessed 29 December 2012. 29 www.islam.by/ns/?id=143&page=28, accessed 10 January 2013. 30 Закон Республики Беларусь от 12 ноября 2001 г. № 55–3 O погребении и похоронном деле (The Law of the Republic of Belarus 12 November 2001 No. 55–3 On Burial and Funeral), Articles 3, 16, 22. 31 Article 12, www.levonevski.net/pravo/norm2009/num36/d36268/index.html, accessed 29 December 2012. 94 daša słabčanka subject to discrimination and abuse, and attitude to believers in prisons mostly depend on the person in charge.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals are not public holidays. However, the law provides that Muslims may ask for one day off work without pay to celebrate each of the two main festivals and Mawlid.32 In 2012 four Belarusian Muslims made hajj.33 On 26 October Belarusian Muslims celebrated ‘Id al-Adha and distributed halal meat among poor Muslim families. The Turkish Embassy helped with buying products.34 For ‘Id al Fitr the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Belarus organised a party for children.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Halal food is not widely sold in Belarus. It is not provided in hospitals, the army or prisons. The first halal shop in Minsk was opened at Zhdanovichy market in 2009 by a Turkish businessman. In 2011 he opened another shop in Kamarousky market. The owner has noted that it is not an easy busi- ness, but plans to open a halal mini market.35 On 18 April 2012 the Eurasian Union for Halal Standardisation and Cer- tification was established in Astana, the capital of the Republic of Kazakh- stan. Currently, the Union consists of the Customs Union countries: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Belarus. The headquarters of the organisation is based in Moscow. Among co-chairs is deputy mufti of the the Muslim Religious Association.36

32 Постановление Совета Министров РБ от 22 января 1992 г. № 30 О порядке определения нерабочих дней для верующих нехристианских религий в связи с их праздниками (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 22 January 1992, No 30, On the specifying of holidays for non-Christians based on their festivals). 33 http://islam.by/ns/?id=334&page=65, accessed 10 January 2013. 34 www.islam.by/ns/?id=342&page=65, accessed 10 January 2013. 35 www.islam.by/ns/?id=221&page=43, accessed 10 January 2013. 36 www.halaleuroasian.com/o-soyuze.html, accessed 10 January 2013. belarus 95

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules or legislation restricting the wearing of hijab and increasing numbers of women wear head scarves. Attitudes to them at work and in universities are varied. Some women, especially converted Belarusians, mention negative reactions in public, but in most cases there are no problems.37 Mufti Ali Varanovich asserts that in Minsk there have been cases of women being allowed to wear hijab for passport photo- graphs, although this is forbidden.38 Around 200 women wear hijab in Belarus today.39

12 Publication and Media

The topic of Islam is quite rarely covered in the mass media. The press mostly covers Muslim-related events in other countries. Material about Belarusian Muslims mainly stresses interfaith concord and usually has a descriptive character. The two main Muslim organisations distribute their own newspapers, but only among their own members and with limited circulation.

13 Family Law

All residents of the territory of the Republic of Belarus are subject to the law of the country and Shari’a norms are not officially recognised. Polyg- amy is prohibited by the Criminal Code. Many Muslims enter into a Mus- lim marriage contract as well as a civil marriage.

14 Interreligious Relations

In 2008, the Interethnic Advisory Board was created under the Com- missioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs.40 The Board consists of

37 See, for example, Быть мусульманкой в Беларуси (To be a Muslim Woman in Belarus), www.islam.by/at/?id=39, accessed 29 December 2012. 38 Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 27 December 2011. 39 According to Muslimby.info. 40 Консультативный межэтнический совет при Уполномоченном по делам религий и национальностей, www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/new_url_145141106, 96 daša słabčanka

­representatives of major religious organisations, including Muslim ones. The Board aims to maintain and strengthen interfaith concord, create opportunities to enjoy the right to freedom of conscience guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution, and facilitate the realisation of socially important initiatives by religious organisations.41 The Conference “Belarus and Turkic-Islamic World” was held in Minsk on 4–5 October 2012, and was dedicated to the 615th anniversary of Tatar arrival to Belarusian lands. It was attended by many distinguished guests from Germany, Great Britain, and Crimea in Ukraine, in addition to Belar- usian scientists.42 Representatives of all confessions, including Islam, participated in a seminar dedicated to a research project “Typology of religiousness in Belarus”, organised on 20 September 2012 by the Belarusian State Univer- sity. Within the project’s framework, about 1,600 believers will be inter- viewed about their religiousness.43 A book “Who lives in Belarus” by National Academy of Science was presented in September 2012; it contains information about nationalities and religions within the territory of Belarus.44

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The Muslim community in Belarus is not big enough to be the subject of broad public debates. Traditional Belarusian Muslims, Tatars, and their religion and culture are perceived as part of Belarusian history. However, the movie Innocence of Muslims, did catch public attention. Mufti Varanovich denounced what he called an anti-Islamic campaign in a range of Western mass media, and also argued against a wave of indig- nation in the Islamic world. He called for the banning of the movie.45

accessed 29 December 2012. The contact details for the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs may be found at www.belarus21.by/en/office_comm. 41 www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/sotr/new_url_333730627, accessed 29 Decem‑ ber 2012. 42 http://tatbel.by/show.php?dir=news&id=022&mode=1, accessed 10 January 2013. 43 http://news.tut.by/society/311911.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 44 www.belta.by/ru/all_news/culture/Izdana-kniga-ob-etnicheskix-gruppax-i-konfessijax- v-Belarusi_i_607340.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 45 Interview of Mufti Ali Shabanovich to Belarusian news agency Telegraf on 21 Sep- tember 2012 http://telegraf.by/2012/09/belorusskii-muftii-dostup-k-filmu-o-muhammede- nado-zapretit, accessed 10 January 2012. belarus 97

16 Major Cultural Events

The Muslims of Belarus organise various cultural events throughout the year, among which are Qur’an recitation competitions, literature eve- nings, music festivals, and presentations of national cultures. There are also a number of more specifically ethnic events, which have no religious dimensions.46 The organisation Diyalog Avrasya,47 which was created in 2009 in Minsk for realisation of activities within the Diyalog Avrasya Platform in the ter- ritory of Belarus, makes a great contribution to cultural life of Belarusian Muslims. Its aims are: to disseminate ideas of dialogue and tolerance among nations; to develop cultural, social, and educational links between countries and peoples of the Eurasian region. During 2012 Diyalog Avrasya helped the Muslim community with organising of charity events, confer- ences, publications, etc.48

46 www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 29 December 2012. 47 www.dabelarus.by/. 48 E.g. organisation of charity visit to homes for the elderly http://islam.by/ns/ ?id=369&page=66, visit of Belarusian researches to the conference in Turkey http://islam .by/ns/?id=339&page=65, with presentations of Muslim cuisine.

Belgium

Nadia Fadil1

1 Muslim Populations

While the first reports indicating the presence of Muslims in Belgium date from the 19th century,2 their presence only became an issue in the second half of the 20th century.3 Most Muslims in Belgium are descendants of migrant workers who came from the Mediterranean basin starting from the 1960s. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their fami- lies lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000. The exact number of people of Muslim background living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the popula- tion’s ethnic and religious ties. Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approximation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign nationals. Between 1990 and 2002,

1 Nadia Fadil is Assistant Professor at the Interculturalism, Migration and Minority Research Center at the KU Leuven. She is grateful to the previous authors of this section, Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz, for permission to use some of their material. 2 In 1828, the Turkish Consul of Antwerp Ismaël Hakki Bey Tevfik reports the presence of 5751 Muslims, half of them of Algerian background and the other half of Asian back- ground; see Panafit, Lionel, Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’intégration juridique de l’Islam en Belgique (When law writes Islam. The Juridical integration of Islam in Belgium) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), p. 15. 3 Contrary to its neighbouring countries France and the Netherlands, little contact existed between Belgian officials and Muslims during the colonial era as only few Congo- lese were of Muslim confession. An often forgotten aspect in this Belgian colonial history is, however, that negative representations of the ‘Arab elites’ did exist at the beginning of the 20th century, this as a consequence of their role as slave traders in and presence in valuable mining areas in East Congo. Especially the latter turned into important source of tension with Belgian officials, which resulted in a war at the end of the 19th century preceding the appropriation of the Congo by the Belgian King Leopold II (Congo Free State). The idea that the Belgian colony was installed in order to liberate Congolese from Arab slave traders figured as an important—yet often forgotten—legitimising discourse of the colonial enterprise in monuments and schoolbooks throughout the first half of the 20th century. For an analysis of this discourse in schoolbooks, see De Baets, Antoon, “Gedaantewisseling van een heldendicht: Congo in de Geschiedenisboeken” (Transforma- tions of a hero’s poet: Congo in the History Books) in Jacquemin, J.P. (ed.) Racisme, donker continent: clichés, stereotiepen en fantasiebeelden over zwarten in het Koninkrijk België (Rac- ism, a dark continent: clichés, stereotypes and fantasies about blacks in the Kingdom of Belgium) (Brussels: NCOS, 1991), pp. 45–56. 100 nadia fadil however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim popu- lation now have Belgian citizenship. The latest generally accepted esti- mates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s population.4 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim popula- tion. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendants) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (, India, Afghanistan, and Iran), and Sub-Saharan Africa (chiefly Senegal and Mali). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis. Shi’is are very much in the minority. With regard to the Sunnis, those from belong to the rite, whereas the Turkish Muslims are (although some Kurds follow the Shafi’i school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds. The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the Brussels-Capital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brus- sels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for 17% of the Brussels Region’s population.5 This makes Brussels one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flanders are Muslims. This northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country contains some 39% of the country’s Muslims, who are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wal- lonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas

4 These are the generally accepted estimates used by the Executive of Muslims in Bel- gium and various scholars on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics (foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data of naturalisations by country of origin). In November 2010, the Francophone Daily Le Soir reported that Sociologist Jan Hertogen estimated the number of Muslims in Belgium at 623.000 on the basis of a demographic survey and German estimates on the number of practising Muslims. The latter method has however been subjected to critique, and is reason for some scholars to dismiss Hertogen’s estimates, see Le Soir, 14 November 2010. 5 Although the recent estimates by Jan Hertogen assess it at 21%, see www.npdata.be. belgium 101 of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). Socio-economically, the Muslim population belongs to the lower segments of society, with levels of pov- erty estimated at 55.56% for the Moroccans and 58.94% for the Turks, and unemployment around 38%.6 Both communities also belong to the lowest educated segment of the Belgian society, with 63.1% of Turks and Moroc- cans having no high school degree, and only 6.1% of Turks and Moroccans in higher education.7 Those immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a strong population of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels.8 As a result, candi- dates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all the politi- cal parties and in all the elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, some ministerial positions in regional governments and several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life.9 None of these politicians favour their religious identity over their ethno-national identification (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that a significant number of the Muslim electorate tends to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade that have for the largest

6 Van Robaeys, B.; Vranken, J.; Perrin, N.; Martiniello, M. De Kleur van armoede. Armoede bij personen van buitenlandse herkomst (The colour of poverty. Poverty among people of foreign origin) (Leuven: Acco, 2007), pp. 26, 31. This is the first comprehensive study on the poverty level of minorities from Turkish, Moroccan and Italian backgrounds. Data have been drawn from the national household survey, which allows for a specific measurement on the basis of ethnic background instead of nationality. These estimates of poverty have been measured on the basis of income, taking the EU poverty line (60% of the median income) as threshold: i.e. 777€/month per household for Belgium. 7 Ibid., pp. 31–32. For a comprehensive study on the unequal school performances between minority and majority in Flanders and Francophone Belgium, see also Jacobs et al. De Sociale lift blijft steken/L’Ascenseur Sociale reste en panne (The social elevator remains broken) (Brussels: Koning Boudewijn Stichting, 2009). 8 Pierre-Yves Lambert notes that since the last 2006 municipal elections, there are 147 municipal representatives (unequally spread over the 19 Brussels communes) from a minority community, of which 94 Moroccans, 22 Turks, 2 Algerians and 1 Tunisian, http://suffrage-universel.blogspot.com/2006/11/combien-dlus-allochtones-dans-les.html, accessed 05 January 2010. 9 Fadila Laanan, the current minister of Culture in the Government of the Franco- phone Community, is the only sitting minister of Muslim background in any of the Belgian regions while Emir Kir holds a mandate of Secretary of State of Urban Planning for the Brussels Capital Region. 102 nadia fadil part failed to gain any seats.10 During the municipal elections of October 2012, a new political party called ISLAM—headed by a Shi’i convert Rad- ouane Ahrouch—managed to gain three electoral seats in three munici- palities of Brussels Regional Capital (Brussels city centre, Anderlecht and Molenbeek). The relative success of this political party, which centred its campaign on access to and quality of education and public service, unemployment and discrimination (notably the head scarf ban),11 didn’t pass unnoticed and caused a large controversy, especially after one of its spokespersons declared being in favour of the introduction of Shari’a in Belgium if a majority supported this.12

2 Islam and the State

Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on the con- stitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitution estab- lishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions actually reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality towards religious affairs, which differs from the forms of sec- ularism that assume a strict separation between the State and religion(s). Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance vari- ous religions. Since the state reform of 2001, the latter has partly turned into a regional competence. Whereas the federal government maintains the responsibility over the salaries of the recognised faiths’ ministers, including those of its chaplains in the prisons and the army, the upkeep of religious buildings has become a regional competence in 2001 and is thus borne by the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital). The recognised religions are also given time slots in state broadcasting net-

10 On the French speaking side, the best known attempt to create an Islamic political party has been the Brussels based Parti des Jeunes Musulmans led by the convert Jean- François Abdullah Bastin: www.mvjm.be/. It ran in the elections in 2004 gaining 0.93% at the regional elections in Brussels and 3.38% at the local elections in the Brussels com- mune of Molenbeek St. Jean. In Flanders, the political movement Arab European League launched the Islamic party Moslim Democratische Partij (MDP) at the regional elections of 2004, gaining 0.42% at the Flemish level (the party only ran in the Flemish provinces Antwerp and Oost-Vlaanderen). 11 See the website of the ISLAM party www.islam2012.be/programme2012.html, accessed 23 January 2013. 12 See “Lijst Islam: Ambtenaar of agent in hoofddoek moet kunnen”, 30/10/12 in www .brusselnieuws.be/artikel/lijst-islam-ambtenaar-agent-hoofddoek-moet-kunnen. belgium 103 works for religious programs (such as MTRO, cf. sect. 12 below), which are organised on a regional level, while public schools must provide religious education of the recognised religions if asked by a number of parents. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are on the payrolls of the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose powers include education and cultural affairs. At a local level, municipalities also play an important role in dealing with certain matters concerning the organisation of Islamic religious practices. Issues such as mosque settlement, Islamic parcels in cemeteries, the infrastructural organisation of ‘Id al-Adha for the sacrifice of sheep or the provision of halal food in public schools are dependent of local regulations and may thus strongly differ across several localities.13 Six denominations (in addition to the non-denominational Ethic Move- ment) are recognised today. They are the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam, and Judaism. In order for a reli- gion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated, who will become its spokesman with regard to the religion’s administration and the representative of its followers.14 Yet this question of representativeness remains a thorny issue in the case of Islam. The establishment of a representative body that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant source of ten- sion, both in relations between the state and the Muslim communities as well as within the Muslim communities. Until the 1980s, the representa- tiveness of Muslims was primarily addressed as a foreign concern, since

13 Corinne Torrekens offers in her PhD study a detailed account of the relationship between local officials and representatives of mosques and Muslim organisations in the public management of mosques (and the instalment of minarets), the organisation of Eid al Adha and halal food at schools. See Torrekens, C., La visibilité de l’islam au sein de l’espace public bruxellois: transaction, reconnaissance et identité (The visibility of Islam in the Public Sphere of Brussels: transaction, recognition and identity). Thèse de doctorat. Bruxelles, Université Libre de Bruxelles/Université Catholique de Louvain, 2008. For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence in the Brussels borough of Schaerbeek see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From conflict to co-operation between Mus- lims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaerbeek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migra- tion Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123 and for the case of Ghent see Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra (Muslims in Ghent: the Development of worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres) (Ghent: Academia Press, 2009). 14 The conditions for recognising a religion are: (1) having a large considerable follow- ing (tens of thousands), (2) being organised in such a way that a representative organ maintains contacts with the civil authorities, (3) being present in the country for a number of decades, (4) fulfilling a social function. See http://theo.kuleuven.be/icrid/icrid_religies/ icrid_religies_index.html#erkenning, accessed March 2012. 104 nadia fadil the Moroccan and Turkish embassies and the Saudi-funded Islamic Cul- tural Centre figured as main interlocutors with the Belgian government. This changed, however, at the late eighties when the “Islam question” gradually turned into a national preoccupation (with incidents such as the Rushdie affair or the growing visibility of Muslims in the public space as illustrated through the first head scarf controversy in 1989). The need for an institutional body, which would not only act as a representative of the Belgian Muslims, but also act as direct interlocutor with the Belgian government on issues of integration became an important domestic pre- occupation from the 1990s. Because of the absence of a proper ‘representative’ head, Muslim com- munities could not access state financing other than for schooling until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed to prepare for gen- eral elections in order to nominate a new representative body.15 In 1998, elections were held which resulted in an executive body for the Islamic faith, called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium or EMB (Executif des Musulmans de Belgique/Executief van de Moslims van België). The creation of this body did however not settle the matter, as various internal crises have afflicted the body and disagreements over the precise procedure to follow for the renewal of the body after the termination of the mandate of the actual Executive in 2009 have paralysed the organisation (cf. infra). Since then, several extensions have been granted to the successive interim boards while a stable solution for the renewal of the board is still pending.16

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Executive for Muslims in Belgium has been the main representa- tive body since 1998. However, as noted above, its operation has been

15 The Royal Decree of 3 July 1996 provided for a modest subsidy for the material organisation of the Islamic cult which was 74.500€ in 1996, 495.000€ in 2000, 1.180.000€ in 2005 and 996.000€ in 2007. Figures from Husson, Jean-François, “Le financement du culte islamique en Belgique”, www.cil.be/files/PC7%20Le%20financement%20du%20culte%20 islamique%20en%20Belgique%20JF%20Husson.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 16 The question of the renewal of the board of the EMB is still pending, but current affairs (appointment and inspection of teachers of Islam, administrating the applications of mosques for state funding etc.) are taken up by a temporary board and the Belgian gov- ernment has granted an allowance of 320,000 Euros for the year 2013 [27/12/12 Koninklijk besluit tot toekenning van een subsidie van 320.000 EUR voor de werking van het Executief van de Moslims van België (Royal Decision for the allowance of a subsidy of 320.000 EUR for the functioning of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium), published on the 18/01/13 in Het Belgisch Staatsblad/Le Moniteur Belge, http://staatsbladclip.zita.be/staatsblad/wetten/ 2013/01/18/wet-2013009012-print.html, accessed 23 January 13. belgium 105

­contested from the very start. A large part of the difficulties has to do with the conflicting views regarding the procedure to follow in order to guaran- tee the “representativeness” of the body: should it take—in analogy with the Church model—mosques as institutional basis, or should it rather focus on the representativeness of all Muslims, irrespective of their affili- ation or participation to particular mosques? A second important point of contestation concerns the position of the minorities such as the Shi’i or the converts. Consequently, two scenarios have been competing for the renewal of the representative body. A first scenario, upheld by a majority of the General Assembly, proposes a renewal through the appointment of delegate members from existing mosques. A second scenario, defended by some dissident EMB members who have organised themselves as the Democratic Alternative of Muslims in Belgium (Association Democratique des Musulmans de Belgique—ADMB), calls for a general and democratic election which they see as the only guarantee to avoid the interventions by Moroccan and Turkish authorities in the existing GA.17 Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, the EMB, ethnic socio- cultural associations and federations of all sizes make up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.18 These associations are organised mainly along ethnic lines. Among the Turks there are a number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) expressing com- peting ideological and religious tendencies from Turkey. Moroccan civil society is, in turn, composed of a number of federations, and a myriad of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denomi- national associations that cater, for example, for young people or Islamic teachers of religion. The best organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement is the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet.19 Today, Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turkish Islamic group is the religious political movement Millî Görüs (lit. ‘national vision’)

17 In 2012, the conflicts between these two tendencies escalated after one of the leading figures of the ADMB, who was put aside in January 2012, filed a lawsuit in May 2012. 18 For an overview of the different (Islamist) networks, movements and organisations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fondamentalistes en Belgique” (Fundamentalist tendencies in Belgium), Middle East Review of Interna- tional Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/2008/issue1/ jv3no1a5.html, accessed March 2012. 19 www.diyanet.be/. 106 nadia fadil

­represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federa- syonu), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973.20 Millî Görüs maintains ties with non-Turkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium belong to this group. There are some other Turkish Islamic com- munities, but they are markedly smaller. The Islamic reform movement known as the Gülen Movement is the third important group. Its vision centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic.’ A number of its affiliated organisations are organised through the platform FEDACTIO, which regroups different kinds of community-based organisations that work on issues of employment, education, welfare, etc.21 The Movement also runs six primary or secondary schools (the Dutch-language Lucerna Colleges and French-language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres.22 A last important platform of the Gülen Move- ment is the Intercultural Dialogue Platform,23 which largely targets Muslim and non-Muslim elites (often linked to the EU and Belgian establish- ments) and which has also played a key role in the creation of a Fethullah Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies in 2011 at the KULeuven (the GCIS).24 A final group are the Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations (Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu), which forms the heterodox Shi’i variant of Turkish Islam in Belgium and presents a humanist culture.25 Moroccan Muslims in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. A large part of Belgium’s Moroccan migrant population adheres to the traditional Maliki rite, which is also close to the Moroc- can monarchy and is followed by most traditional mosque leaders. Reli- gious-political groupings, like the Moroccan Al Adl wal Ihsane, are also represented among mostly higher educated segments of the community. The same also applies to spiritual Sufi traditions such as the Moroccan tariqa Boutchichiyya. Pietistic movements like the Tabligh are mostly rep- resented among the lower educated segments of the Moroccans, although their popularity seems to be decreasing. Middle-Eastern tendencies are also well represented within the Moroccan community. Reformist tenden-

20 www.fibif.be/. 21 www.fedactio.be/. 22 www.lucernacollege.be/ and www.ecoledesetoiles.be/. 23 www.dialogueplatform.eu. 24 http://soc.kuleuven.be/web/staticpage/3/7/eng/560. 25 www.babf.be/. belgium 107 cies that are close to the Muslim Brotherhood are well-represented in the Maghrebi community, especially amongst its higher educated segments.26 Secular and more liberal-progressive composites of the Moroccan com- munity are equally present, but are less formally organised or at least in a non-ideological manner.27 Since the summer 2011, there exists a move- ment called the Collectif Musulmans Progressistes, which seeks to defend a more liberal agenda on questions of citizenship and holds an explicit critical stand towards what they consider extremist tendencies within the Maghrebi-Muslim community. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques are organised in pro- vincial federations in the Flemish region. The Antwerp union, Unie van de Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA), for the Dutch-speaking part and the Brussels-Brabant union, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles-Brabant Wallon (UMBB) for the French-speaking part of the country, are the oldest.28 Other provincial unions are the Union of Islamic Mosques and Organisations in the provinces of Limburg (UMIVEL) and Eastern-Flanders (UMIVOW). In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (FUM) and imams were repre- sented in the Liga of Imams (Rabitat al-Ulama). These federations figure as main representatives of locally based mosques and act as interlocu- tors with local authorities. In 2009, Belgian converts to Islam created the Belgian Islamic centre “De Koepel.” This centre is both a mosque and a socio-cultural organisation. It was first established to guide new Muslims in their conversion process but is now known as a mosque in which the sermon language is Dutch. The Belgian Islamic centre is both visited by converts and other Muslims.29

26 The designation ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ is a controversial one within the Muslim com- munity, as only few intellectuals and activists actually declare themselves as part of this movement. When referring to the term ‘Muslim brotherhood tendency’, we draw on the work of Brigitte Maréchal who understands the latter as an intellectual school of thought and loose network rather than an organisation in the strict sense of the word (comparable to the school of thought of socialism or Marxism). See in this respect Maréchal, B., The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 27 The socio-cultural center Espace Magh (www.espacemagh.be/) in Brussels figures, for instance as an illustration of an attempt to create a secular forum within the Maghrebi community, yet without explicitly framing it in those terms. 28 For an account of the socio-cultural activities of the youth group of the UMIVA see Fadil, N. “We have to be walking Qur’ans.’ The making of an Islamic political subject” in Amiraux, V. & Jonker, G. (eds.) The Politics of Visibility. Young Muslims in European Public Spaces (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2006), pp. 53–78. 29 www.belgisch-islamitisch-centrum.be/. 108 nadia fadil

In the Flemish part of the country, the Moroccan community is also organised in Federations such as the Federatie van Marokkaanse ­Verenigingen30 (FMV), which has its main activities in Antwerp, or the Federatie voor Marokkaanse Democratische organisaties31 (FMDO), with its main activities in Brussels and the province of Limburg. The associa- tion Vereniging voor Ontwikkeling en Emancipatie van Moslims32 (VOEM) adopts a mid-way position, profiling itself both as an Islamic and socio-cul- tural organisation. These ethno-cultural federations fulfil similar functions to the Islamic federations, yet with a focus on organisations organised on an ethno-cultural basis rather than a religious basis. The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique (ICC)), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brussels since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’s Arab Islamic stage.33 It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. The ICC continues to have religious authority within certain parts of the North African population, and also for the majority of converts. The Centre provides religious advice ( fatwa), grants conversion certificates and organises Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology. Besides mosque-based initiatives, there are also a number of Islamic socio-cultural organisations that are not necessarily linked to mosques but provide for cultural initiatives from an Islamic perspective and organise conferences on questions of Muslim identity and citizenship on a more local basis. In the context of Antwerp, the organisations Al Mawada (www.almawada) and Assakina sisters play an important role in this regard. Other organisations, which have emerged in recent years, are ‘The arrivalists’ and Freehands.34 In the context of Brussels, platforms such as Horizons570—which organised throughout 2012 conferences on the Prophet—and the European Muslim Network hold a similar position. A final set of organisations are those that are more focused on bringing together Muslim professionals. Examples include ABPM (Association Belge

30 Federation of Moroccan Organisations.—www.fmv-vzw.be/. 31 Federation of Moroccan Democratic Organisations.—www.fmdo.be/. 32 Association for the development and emancipation of Muslims.—www.voem-vzw.be/. 33 www.centreislamique.be/. 34 www.facebook.com/home.php#!/Arrivalists/info, and www.facebook.com/home.php#!/ pages/Free-Hands/142442292484429. belgium 109 des Professionels Musulmans) on the francophone side (www.abpm.be), or Niya (www.niya.be) on the Flemish side.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to recent estimates there are 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium, all self-financed and with the formal legal status of non-profit associations.35 Flanders accounts for half of the houses of worship, with 167 mosques or prayer houses. There are 89 in Wallonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half of the mosques are attended and man- aged by Moroccans. The Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other national and ethnic Muslim groups. Mosques are generally prayer houses converted from schools, shops or industrial premises. Only four Islamic places of worship in Belgium are purpose-built according to the classical architecture of a mosque, with one or two minarets and a . Twelve other mosques have a minaret added to their renovated buildings. This possibility depends on building regulations and the political will of local authorities.36 The amplified broadcasting of calls to prayers is generally prohibited in most municipalities, yet some exceptions exist.37 The official recognition and financial support of mosques turned into a regional competence in 2001. Stipulations on conditions to be recognised and financed are fixed by the regional authorities and mostly apply to the size of the building, number of members and the administrative struc- ture. Candidate mosques must furthermore declare that they will observe the Belgian constitution and human rights, and a positive report by the Belgian security services of the activities of the house of worship is a con- dition for their recognition. The Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flanders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’

35 Kanmaz, M. & El Battiui (2004) “Report on Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium”, Report of the King Baudouin Foundation (KBS), Brussels—in www.kbs-frb.be/ publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033, accessed March 2012. 36 For some example of local tensions around mosques, see Allievi, S., Conflicts over mosques in Europe—Policy issues and trends, NEF, 2009 (available to download at www.nefic.org). 37 In the small francophone town of Visé, the Turkish mosque Mimar Sinan at ­Cheratte-Bas has been calling to prayers three times a day since its establishment in 1981. See Dorzée, Hughes “Le Chant du muezzin au pied des terrils” (The song of Muezzin at the region of Terrils), Le Soir, 19 December 2009, p. 19. 110 nadia fadil

(inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the official language of the mosque’s administration. Recognition by the regions entails the regional authorities’ commit- ment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for paying salaries of the imams who officiate regularly in those mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). According to our survey amongst the different regional administrations, there are 39 mosques recognised by the Walloon regional government, 24 by the Flemish government (and four in the process of being recog- nised), and 10 by the Brussels Regional government.38 Forty imams are recognised by the federal authorities (27 first rank imams, 3 second rank imams and 10 third rank imams).39

5 Children’s Education

The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer the possibility of taking two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions or non-denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and French-speaking public education since 1975. Teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training (they did not have the requisite training) and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutch-speaking and three French-speaking inspectors) were appointed in 2003 yet close to 700 Islamic religion teach- ers do not have a clear occupational status. One can thus assume that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments and pensions compared with other teachers within the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools. These courses are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body).

38 Data from the Regional Authorities of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Regional Capital, January 2013. 39 Data from the Federal Government, Department of Justice and Internal affairs, Jan- uary 2013 (the differences in rank are derived from the Protestant denomination which draws a distinction between the first minister, second minister and the curate and indicate a difference in salary). belgium 111

Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools that are eligible for public financing provided that they meet cer- tain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School run by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels, founded in 1989. At the time, its creation triggered major political and media reactions. A second initiative was taken in September 2007 with the opening of the Islamic Secondary School for only a score or so of pupils in a borough of Brussels (Molenbeek) with a large Mus- lim population. Also noteworthy, although they refuse the label ‘Muslim school’, are the six Lucerne Schools (run by the Gülen Movement) estab- lished across the country and which are quite successful. Besides the Islam classes given in public schools, some Flemish Catholic schools and the few Islamic schools in Brussels, Belgian mosques gener- ally provide Quranic study classes in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Dutch, mostly on Wednesday afternoons and during the weekends.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Almost all imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. The situation of the imams in the Moroc- can mosques is more complex. In the first years of the immigration, imams would be designated by the members of the community on the basis of their knowledge of the Qur’an and the Islamic tradition. These would often also consist of men from the same regions in Morocco, who often enjoyed a minimal training in religious institutions (al ma’ahid al-diniyya) or local mosques in the home country.40 Furthermore, the training of imams still remains a highly individualised endeavour by taking courses and working closely with more established imams or . Moroccan authorities also provided for imams, either on an occasional (especially during Eid festivi- ties) or permanent basis. Over time, however, the need for properly trained imams emerged as an important concern. While foreign-based institutes (from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Saudi-Arabia or Jordan) are home to important training centres, the need for locally based Belgian or European initiatives has been growing. At the time of our writing, there exist no formal training centres apart from the one organised by the CIC (Centre Islamique Culturel). Several institutes and programmes have,

40 Kanmaz & Battiui, Moskeeën, Imams en Islamleerkrachten in België (Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium) (Brussel: King Baudouin Fondation, 2004), p. 26. 112 nadia fadil however, been established in the recent years that seek to offer a minimal degree of training, yet one that is not restricted to aspiring imams. In the French-speaking part of the country, the CISMOC of the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) has been offering courses in Islamic Studies based in the social sciences open to all—Muslim and non-Muslim—since 2007.41 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organised Secularity and the State’42 organised training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.43 In Flan- ders, the University of Antwerp has started in the academic year 2009– 2010 a post-graduate programme for a specialisation in Islam for Islam teachers in collaboration with the EMB,44 and is studying the possibility of creating a new programme to train Muslim executives in the broadest sense (imams and other representatives).45 These university-based initia- tives exist besides a wide number of private initiatives that have been launched by Muslims organisations. Chief amongst those is the training offered by the Institut Islamique Européen d’Etudes (IIEES) organised by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Bruxelles) which is one of the oldest Belgian Islamic Theology Pro- grammes (taught in Arabic) for aspiring Islam teachers. A number of Islamic theological institutions have also been created in both Arabic and Turkish-speaking circles, yet none of these initiatives has so far received any official ­recognition.46

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are mostly sent back to their homelands

41 www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 42 http://oracle.cifop.be/. 43 http://oracle.cifop.be/#form, accessed 16 May 2009. 44 “Universiteit Antwerpen leidt Islamleerkrachten op”, De Standaard, 8 October 2009. 45 A study has been conducted by Jonathan Debeer, University of Antwerp, on the fea- sibility of such a programme. One of its central observations was that of a high demand for qualitative training centres of Imams (Debeer et al. 2011: 25). 46 For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: www.alkhayria.com/index.htm. belgium 113 for burial.47 In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine such Islamic plots in Flanders,48 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are of the Muslim faith) for years. The prison chaplains have enjoyed recognised legal status since 2005 and eighteen of them draw salaries for this work. There are currently 17 chaplains who are recognised and financed by the Belgian authorities.49 The hospital counsellors are not paid by the state. No information is avail- able on the presence or otherwise of Muslims in the small Belgian army.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious holidays are not granted any official status by the Bel- gian authorities but are individually observed by Muslims. While most of these holidays generally pass unnoticed, some do become visible and require a minimum of support by the local authorities. This is especially the case for the sacrifice on ‘Id al-Adha. Slaughtering animals at home is illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Muslims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of ‘Id al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where EMB-approved halal butchers offi- ciate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ carcasses to be collected,

47 There exist no exact data on this question, yet it is fair to say that the largest majority of the bodies of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims of the first generation are transferred to the country of origin. The picture is however less clear regarding the younger generations considering their young age, and it remains an open question to which extent the forth- coming generations will be buried in Belgium rather than in the country of their parents (or grandparents). 48 www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. 49 Figures from the study by Jonathan Debeer, Patrick Loobuyck and Petra Meier (2011) Imams & Islamconsulenten in Vlaanderen, hoe zijn ze georganiseerd?, Universiteit Antwer- pen & Universiteit Hasselt: Steunpunt Gelijke Kansen Beleid. 114 nadia fadil but organisational setbacks emerge in certain municipalities each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The Executive of the Muslims in Belgium pro- vides for slaughtering certificates during ‘Id al-Adha, provided that certain conditions are met. A large absence of Muslims from school or work is also generally felt during the two main holidays of ‘Id Al-Adha and ‘Id Al-Fitr. This has led some to advocate the recognition of those religious festivities as national holidays. Yet this idea has not been seriously considered and was met with resistance. There exist therefore no official or uniform regulations on these issues. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, and which is authorised by the authorities.50 Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of these two main . The 2010 report for intercul- tural dialogues (sect. 14 in ‘Belgium’, vol. 3), proposed to reform the cur- rent calendar by replacing three fixed national Christian holidays (Easter, Ascension and All Saints) by three, flexible, holidays, which could be used by the citizens at the moment of their choice.51

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal butcheries and halal products are widely available in the main Belgian towns where most Muslims live. Yet these halal labels for food only partially reflect the reality. While the EMB has the capacity to grant halal certificates to Muslim butchers who request them, it has neither the resources nor the authority to issue a halal label for food products (meat and others), or to control the supply chains or the production pro- cesses. This issue is currently being examined by a working group set up by the EMB.52 The question of halal meat has, however, also been at the source of a number of controversies for some years. In 2006, a small uproar was caused after the announcement that all municipal schools in Molenbeek (Brussels) would provide halal dishes to their pupils, and in 2007 a similar

50 The Flemish government explicitly grants the rights to religious minorities of rec- ognised cults to remain absent on specific holidays, for Muslims being the Id Al Fitr and the Id Al Adha. 51 Martine Vandemeulenbroucke “Les Assises de l‘Interculutralité pour un calendrier de congés moins chrétien”, Le Soir, 9 November 2010. 52 Data: Executive of Muslims in Belgium. belgium 115 controversy erupted in Antwerp after the discovery that halal meat was served as standard meat during school trips.53

11 Dress Codes

The issue of wearing headscarves in schools has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and discussions continue to be passionate. Until 2009, the wearing of a head scarf or hijab at schools was not regulated, and the education authorities left school principals free to decide on this mat- ter. Yet in September 2009, the GO! or Gemeenschapsonderwijs (the public schools of the Flemish community) adopted a general and controversial regulation for all its schools (25% of the Flemish schools), which prohib- its the wearing of visible religious signs with effect from September 2010. The measure was, however, suspended in April 2010 due to a successful legal charge against it at the Belgian State Council (Conseil d’Etat/Raad van State) which questioned its constitutional grounds. In March 2011, the Constitutional Court advised that the Administrative Board of Flemish Education was procedurally entitled to adopt such sanctioning measures, yet transferred the substantial evaluation of such a measure to the Belgian State Council. On 26 July 2012, the Belgian State Council stated that an evaluation of the proposed ban was no longer necessary considering the fact that the plaintiff was no longer a student in these schools and thus, no longer bore the burden of such a ban, and GO! had de facto given up upon the idea of a general ban. On 3 February 2012, the board of the GO! issued a statement in which it stated that those schools which had not adopted a ban were entitled to maintain their own regulations.54 There exist no exact figures about the number of schools that have adopted a head scarf ban. Estimates are that in the Flemish part of the country about 70% of the schools prohibit the head scarf, while these figures revolve around 90% in the Francophone part of the country.

53 See “Viande Halale a l’ecole” (Halal meat at schools) in La Libre Belgique, 26 Janu- ary 2006, URL: www.lalibre.be/actu/bruxelles/article/265024/viande-hallal-a-l-ecole.html and “Halal vlees op school zorgt voor politieke rel” (Halal meat in schools unleashes a political turmoil) in Gazet Van Antwerpen, 13 February 2007, URL: http://gva.typepad.com/ standpuntantwerpen/2007/02/halal_vlees_op_.html (both links accessed January 2013). 54 See press release of BOEH of the 27 July 2012: “Raad van State: ‘hoofddoekenverbod’ dan toch geen verbod”, www.baasovereigenhoofd.be/site/content/persbericht-25072012 (Accessed January 2013). 116 nadia fadil

At the level of the job market, there are no regulations concerning the hijab, and employers are free to decide, both in the public and the private sector, on this matter although there is an increasing tendency to disallow women from doing so. In the public sector, the picture is similar. Four major towns in Flanders (Antwerp, Ghent, Ninove and Lier) explicitly banned the wearing of the head scarf in 2007 and 2008 by female civil ser- vants working in contact with the public. Wearing hijab for photographs for identity documents is allowed by the Belgian authorities if the face is visible between the forehead and the chin. While no systematic regulations exist concerning the hijab, the niqaab (also known as the ‘burqa’) has been the object of a sanctioning law that was voted on by the Federal Parliament on 23 April 2011 and which makes Belgium the second country to prohibit face veiling. This law, which had been voted a first time in April 2010 yet not been enforced due to the res- ignation of the federal government and the election of a new parliament, sanctions face veiling with one week of jail and a fine of €137,5. The law was passed with a large majority (with only one dissident vote and two abstentions) and put in place in July 2011. Two women filed a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court in July 2011 to demand for its suspension and annulment, yet the Court rejected these claims and confirmed the consti- tutional grounds of this law in November 2011.55

12 Publications and Media

There are several Islamic publishing houses and bookstores in Belgium which sell mostly traditionalist or Salafi publications. They include Al- Imen (Brussels), Editions al-, Iqra, etc. In addition, some French publishers also distribute publications such as Editions le Savoir, Editions or Maison d’Ennour, in French-speaking areas or the Dutch pub- lishing house Al Bulaaq. A quota of time for broadcasting in the public media is granted to all recognised faiths. Islam is, however, the only religion that does not fully benefit from this right. The Brussels Radio Midi 1 has started allocating two hours on a weekly basis to the EMB. In December 2010, the Flemish Government approved the allocation of a time slot for Muslims at the

55 John De Wit “Kamer keurt boerkaverbod goed” in Gazet Van Antwerpen, 2 April 2010; “Belgisch boerkaverbod goedgekeurd” in Knack, 28/04/11; “Grondwettelijk hof schorst boerkaverbod niet” in De Morgen, 17 November 2011. belgium 117

Flemish Radio and TV channel (VRT), which is organised as the MTRO (Moslim Televisie- en Radio Omroep).56 Since September 2011, the chan- nel is given one hour per month on the national channel to air its pro- grammes. Most of the programmes deal with current affairs that pertain to the Muslim community and also offer a glimpse on the rich Islamic socio-cultural landscape of Flanders. The French-speaking broadcast‑ ing service, on the other hand, is still to grant the Muslim faith broadcast- ing time.

13 Family Law

There is no system of local arbitration by Muslim courts in Belgium. Mus- lim legal systems do, however, regularly intersect with Belgian national regulations, mostly because of the foreign or dual nationality of most Muslim citizens (usually Moroccan or Turkish). In the case of the Moroc- can community, the regulations of the Mudawwana (Moroccan personal and family law) have an effect upon the Moroccan-Belgian community, since a large part of Muslims of Moroccan origin, also from the second or third generations, contract their marriages in Morocco or at the Moroccan consulate in Belgium. While this dual legal binding does not necessarily pose problems, there are some cases, which are not recognised by the Belgian law system. This is especially so for matters like repudiation or polygamy, or matters of inheritance or guardianship in cases of divorce, where important differences exist between the Moroccan and Belgian legal systems. While Belgian and Moroccan authorities have been working on bilateral agreements to settle these problematic points,57 the absence of concrete guidelines and regulations on these issues have resulted in a situation where there is no consistency in the way these different legal sys- tems are administered by the judges. The latter is mostly left to the indi- vidual judges’ appraisal and their knowledge of the International Private Law regulations. Some studies show that most judges limit themselves to the Belgian law. Those few who engage with the Moroccan law refrain from doing so in cases that are seen to conflict with the Belgian order (especially equality between men and women which is seen to ­disagree

56 www.mtro.be/, accessed January 2013. 57 For an elaborate account of this problematic issue see the work of the Belgian legal scholar Marie-Claire Foblets. 118 nadia fadil with practices such as polygamy or repudiation).58 There are some cases, however, where judges simply follow the foreign regulations, even when conflicts arise with Belgian principles.59 Besides the institutionally recognised and visible intersections, Islamic normative principles also impact on more invisible or informal ways upon Muslims’ daily lives. Pious Muslims often seek fatwas or religious advice by highly respected religious scholars or imams before contracting a house mortgage, and there are some cases where civil arrangements are even left aside, such as for instance in the case of Islamic marriages ( jaw- waz ‘urfi or shar’i).

14 Interreligious Relations

There exist a countless number of interreligious initiatives which aim at fostering the ties between Muslims and Christians and strive towards a better mutual understanding. Some examples are the working group Relatieopbouw Christenen en Moslims (Construction of mutual relation- ship between Christians and Muslims) of the Flemish organisation Kerk- werk Multicultureel. On the Francophone side, the organisation El Kalima (www.elkalima.be) regularly organises conferences and seminars to foster Christian-Muslim ties. Another important actor in the field of intercul- tural dialogue and exchange is the Islamic Relief, which organises on an annual basis a large Iftar in Brussels and which has turned into an impor- tant space of interreligious exchange.

58 See Verhellen, Jinske, “Entretiens avec des Juristes Practiciens et Travailleurs Sociaux” in Foblets, M.C. (ed.) Femmes marocaines et conflits familiaux en immigration: quelles solutions juridiques appropriées (Moroccan women and migration or domestic conflicts: which proper juridical solutions?) (Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 1998), pp. 149–211. 59 A concrete case can be found in a decision by the legal court of Brussels in 1986 where a woman of Moroccan nationality sued her ex-husband for moral harm caused by the fact that he repudiated her and remarried under the Moroccan law. The judge decided against the female plaintiff, arguing that her ex-husband’s actions ware in concordance with the Morocco law and didn’t have any injurious objective. Marie-Claire Foblets has questioned this decision, arguing that by simply recognising the effects of the repudiation the judge fails to question the unequal status between men and women undergirding this decision see Foblets, Marie-Claire, Familles—Islam—Europe. Le droit confronté au change- ment (Family, Islam, Europe. Law confronted with change) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), pp. 141–142. belgium 119

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Since the end of the 1990s, and especially after 2000, a new turn has been adopted in the multicultural debate, particularly in Flanders, which is largely centred on the presence and integration of Muslim minorities. The electoral successes of the right wing as well as the explosion of the debate in the Netherlands,60 has largely influenced the Flemish public debate. Several journalists and commentators, as well as politicians, called for an acknowledgment of the problematic facets of the multicultural soci- ety and to “call the problems by their names”. These discussions are also fed by the growing visibility of Muslims in the public sphere and their increasing claims, such as the right to wear hijab or niqab or the increas- ing assertiveness of a number of minority organisations. This is illustrated through the emergence of, and controversy around, Islamic political organisations. The most recent example was the political party ISLAM during the local elections in Brussels in October 2012. This political party emerged as a newcomer in the political arena after succeeding in electing three of its members into the local municipalities. While it campaigned around the right to veil or the presence of halal food at schools, it did stir controversy after one of its members defended the possibility of installing elements of shari’a in Belgium. The latter provoked a public outcry and 10,000 people signed a petition calling for a ban on this political party.61 The celebrations of ‘Id Al-Adha every year has traditionally also been a source of protest by the animal rights movement and the far right. The Antwerp alderman of animal affairs Luc Bungeneers caused turmoil in the wake of the ‘Id al-Adha of November 2010 after announcing his plans to open a spot where sheep would be rendered unconscious before being slaughtered, which would also be 10 euro cheaper than the regular 25 euros. The Executive of the Muslims in Belgium and other Muslim actors reacted sharply against this proposal, viewing it as an illegitimate intrusion of the local government into Muslim affairs. While plans did not take effect due to an administrative error in 2010, the city of Antwerp proceeded with its plans for the ‘Id al-Adha of 2011 and installed a machine where sheep

60 The end of the nineties signals the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic politi- cian who denounced the non-integration of Muslims and linked it with the backwardness of Islam. In that same period, left intellectuals like Paul Scheffer denounced what they considered as a ‘multicultural drama’, which was attributed to unwillingness to confront the socio-economic deprivation as well as the cultural particularity of Muslims. 61 “10.000 handtekeningen tegen de partij Islam” in Brusselnieuws.be, 2 November 2012. 120 nadia fadil could be rendered unconscious before being slaughtered. Attempts by the city of Antwerp to encourage Muslims to anaesthetise their animals proved unsuccessful however as the installation was not used in 2011 or in 2012.62 International events like the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the London or Madrid attacks, the Danish cartoon crisis in 2005, the French head scarf affair or the Swiss vote against minarets, also impacted upon the tone of the debate, which is often passionate and polarised with little room for nuance. More locally, the involvement of some Belgian ­Muslims (such as Abdessatar Dahmane or Muriel Degauque) in suicide operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, has also fed fears and suspicions of existing ter- rorist networks within the capital. In the last two years, the grouping ‘Sharia4Belgium’ has been at the centre of the public ­attention—especially in Flanders. This small Salafi group that calls for a restoration of the Caliphate and the introduction of the Shari’a in Belgium started receiv- ing a large amount of media attention, after it sabotaged a public lecture by an Islamophobic public intellectual, and this despite its insignificance within the Muslim community. The controversy around the movement reached a peak in May 2012 after the violent arrest of a niqabi woman in which two police officers and the woman wearing the niqab were hurt. Once the news spread of the arrest of the woman, streets filled with Muslim youngsters challenging what they saw as police brutality and Sharia4Belgium posted a video in which its leaders, Fouad Belkacem and Abou Imraan, denounced the events and called for civil disobedi- ence. Lawsuits had been running against the movement for charges of hate speech and Belkacem had been sentenced to two years on charges of hate speech that he was challenging.63 Some state officials even suggested the possibility of stripping Belkacem of his Belgian nationality.64 Yet the events in Molenbeek resulted in an immediate arrest of the leader of

62 Sascha Van Wiele “Wie schaap voor slachting offerfeest verdooft krijgt 10€ korting” (Where sheep stunned before festival slaughter get 10€ off ), Gazet Van Antwerpen, 16/09/10 and “Geen enkel schaap geslacht na verdoving” (No sheep stunned before slaughter) in De Morgen, 6 November 2011, and “Moslims houden offerfeest”, 26 October 2012, ATV: www.atv.be/item/moslims-houden-offerfeest. 63 “Woordvoerder Sharia4Belgium veroordeeld” in Nieuwsblad, 10 February 2012. 64 “Woordvoerder Sharia4Belgium riskeert uitlevering” in De Morgen online, 16 Feb- ruary 2012 www.demorgen.be/dm/nl/989/Binnenland/article/detail/1395450/2012/02/16/ Woordvoerder-Sharia4Belgium-riskeert-uitlevering.dhtml, accessed January 2013. belgium 121

Sharia4Belgium who was accused of instigating the riots and put in jail.65 In October 2012, the group posted a short message on its website in which it announced its dissolution.66 Such polarised discourses, which have the ‘integration’ of Muslims as main target, also have an effect upon the ways non-Muslims view their fellow Muslim citizens. According to a survey carried out by the Institute for Social and Political Research (ISPO) of the Catholic University of Leu- ven (KUL) and published in January 2008, 48% of the Flemish population then believed that the values of Islam constitute a threat to Europe, and 37% believed that the majority of Muslims do not respect the European culture and lifestyle.

16 Major Cultural Events

Over the past few years, a number of large scale cultural activities have also been organised by Islamic organisations. One of the most important in 2012 was the organisation of a Muslim Fair during the last weekend Sep- tember in Brussels. The event was an initiative of the Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique (LMB) and was organised with the support of le GEDIS, the French organisation that is in charge of its French equivalent, the Muslim Fair at Le Bourget. While the event was partially overshadowed by the public outcry of a Francophone laic politician who denounced what he considered to be a meeting of Muslim fundamentalists, the fair was quite successful and attracted more than 20,000 visitors.67 Muslim artistic events have also been gaining new ground in recent years. Belgium has witnessed several Islamic cultural festivals with the performance of internationally acclaimed artists such as Sami .68 Such performances are structured according to specific Islamic ethical rationales both in their message as

65 “Turtelboom: “Belkacem restera minimum six mois en prison” in Le Soir en Ligne, 10th June 2012, www.lesoir.be/archives?url=/actualite/belgique/2012-06-10/turtelboom- belkacem-restera-au-minimum-6-mois-en-prison-920723.php, accessed January 2013. 66 “Sharia4Belgium stopt ermee” in De Standaard online, 8 October 2012 www.standaard .be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=DMF20121008_00326293, accessed January 2013. 67 “Plus de 20.000 se sont rendues a la première Foire Musulmane de Bruxelles” in Le- Vif Express, 1 October 12 www.levif.be/info/actualite/belgique/plus-de-20-000-personnes- se-sont-rendues-a-la-1ere-foire-musulmane-de-bruxelles/article-4000186689580.htm. 68 The Consortium is an ensemble of Muslim organisations from various European countries which are linked to the Moroccan Al Adl Wa al movement. 122 nadia fadil well as in their format (such as the restriction on percussion).69 In recent years, not only Muslim organisations but also private Muslim entrepre- neurs have been organising similar cultural festivals. An example is the annual Cultural and Islamic meeting (Rencontre Culturelle et Islamique) organised since 2007 by the Brussels collective ‘Les disciples du style’ and which mostly gathers young Muslim women.70 Other cultural activities are organised by Espace Magh (Maghrebi Cul- tural Centre in Brussels) and Moussem with its annual festival with art- ists from all over the Arab world. Theatre has also emerged as a popular medium. One of the most popular productions last year was ‘La Vie c’est comme un Arbre’, a piece directed by a community worker (Mohamed Allouch) based in Brussels and which was such a tremendous success that it was also performed at the Flemish Royal Theatre (KVS) in November 2011. A newcomer on the scene since 2012 is the Flemish website al-arte magazine, an online magazine that tries to offer a perspective on the wide variety of the artistic expressions in the Muslim world and Muslim com- munities in the West.71

69 For a further account see El Asri, Farid, “Au croisement des mondialisations. Le cas de Sami Yusuf ” (At the crossroad of globalisation. The case of Sami Yusuf ) in Recherches Sociologiques et Anthropologiques, (Louvain-La-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain), 2006/2, pp. 79–91. 70 I am grateful to Farid El Asri, member of the CISMOC at the UCL, for this information. 71 www.alartemag.be/. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aid Smajić 1

1 Muslim Populations

According to the last official census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BH or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves as ‘Muslims’ by nationality.2 Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent in the case of all three constituent ethnic communities in Bosnia, this figure is usu- ally taken as indicative of the number of adherents of Islam, just as most are usually considered Roman Catholic and most Serbs are con- sidered Orthodox Christians. ‘Muslims’ were recognised as one of the Yugoslav nationalities in the late 1960s. In 1993, the term ‘Muslims’ was replaced by ‘’ as the national name for Bosnian Muslims. Before the 1992–95 war, a significant number of Muslims declared themselves to be ‘Yugoslavs’.3 Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within BH have significantly changed.4 A new census planned for October 2013 is expected to include questions on religion. According to estimates by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the current population of the country is 3,839,737,5 while the CIA World Factbook estimates the total number of Bosnian citizens in

1 Dr. Aid Smajić is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. He holds BA degrees in Islamic Studies and Psychology, a MA in Islamic Civilization, and a PhD in Social Psychology of Religion. He has published several articles on interreligious relations and religious education in public schools. 2 See details at www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm, accessed 21 January 2013. 3 For more about the history behind and debates surrounding the question of national identity of Bosniaks see Kamberović, Husnija (Ed.), Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka: Zbornik radova (Debates about National Identity of Bosniaks: Collection of Papers), (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2009). 4 Cigar, Norman, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995). 5 Estimated data as of 30 June 2011. For details see www.bhas.ba/index.php, accessed 21 January 2013. 124 aid smajić

2012 at 3,879,296, of whom 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others,6 including more than 1.3 million living abroad.7 It is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies in the fifteenth century. Bosnian Muslims are mainly descendants of Christians (Catholics, Orthodox, or adherents of the extinct Medieval Bosnian Church) who converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman rule from the middle of the fifteenth century until 1878, when Bosnia became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and remained so until 1918. From 1918 to 1992, the territory that makes up today’s Bosnian state was successively part of three different states, including the King- dom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45), and Communist Yugoslavia (1945–92).8 A referendum on independence from Yugoslavia, held in February 1992, was boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs, whose forces, assisted by , initiated a military campaign against the new state of BH. After the war atrocities culminated in the Srebrenica genocide against Bosniaks commit- ted by the Army and Police of Republika Srpska9 in July 1995, in November of the same year a peace agreement was made in Dayton (USA).10 The total number of direct victims of war has been estimated at 97,207, of whom 64,036 were Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims. More than 83% of civilian deaths were Bosniaks, rising to nearly 95% in Eastern Bosnia, and that more than two million people fled their homes during the war,

6 Estimated data as of July 2012. For details, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 7 See Svjetski Savez dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine (World Association of the Diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina), www.bihdijaspora.com/, accessed 21 January 2013. 8 See Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi, 2007); Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999) and Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996). More detailed accounts of the history of the Bosniaks and the could be found in Imamović, Mustafa, Istorija Bošnjaka (History of the Bos- niaks) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998) and Filipović, Nedim, Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini (Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2005). 9 In 2007, the International Court of Justice explicitly labelled the crime committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 as genocide. See: ICJ, Press Release 2007/8, 27 February 2008, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno- cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, available at www.icj-cij.org/ presscom/index.php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1, accessed 21 January 2013. Two other inter- national courts have determined that genocide took place in BH 1992–95. See Marko Attila Hoare, “Bosnia-Hercegovina and International Justice: Past Failures and Future Solutions”, in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 24 No. 2 (May 2010), 191–205. 10 For the history and socio-political forces behind the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, see Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). bosnia and herzegovina 125 including over one million to neighbouring states and the West.11 Accord- ing to the latest estimates, around 170,000 Bosnians still have the status of refugees and internally displaced persons.12 Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunnis who follow the Hanafi School of Islamic law and School of Islamic doctrine. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known as ‘Wahha- bis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known and, contrary to general belief, they control no proper mosques and their initial public presence has been steadily weakening. There are a few Shi’i Muslims and several pro-Shi’i associations.13 For many Bosniaks, however, their Muslim iden- tity very often has much more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. Reliable data on the extent of active religious practice of Muslims are scarce and mostly could be found in post-war empirical studies of reli- giosity of different Bosnian and Muslims peoples, including Bosniaks.14

11 Rezultati istraživanja ‘Ljudski gubici 91–95’ (Results of the Research on Human Losses in 91–95) (Sarajevo: Research and Documentation Centre, 2007) used to be available at www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang =bs, while at the moment the page is under maintenance, accessed 21 January 2013. But for similar estimation see both the 2005 ICTY estimate by Tabeau and Bijak and the 2010 esti- mate by Zwierzchowski and Tabeau at www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demograph- ics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. For an excellent analysis of these figures see: Marko atilla Hoare, “What do the figures for the Bosnian war-dead tell us?” available at http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/04/ what-do-the-figures-for-the-bosnian-war-dead-tell-us/, accessed 21 January 2013. 12 See www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766, accessed 21 January, 2013. 13 For some modern changes in the landscape of Islamic religiosity in BH, see Alibašić, Ahmet, “Globalisation and its impact on Bosnian Muslims practices”, available at www. bosanskialim.com/rubrike/tekstovi/000355R021.PDF, accessed 21 January 2013; Karčić, Harun, “Globalisation and Islam in Bosnia: Foreign Influences and their Effects”, in Totali- tarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 11, No. 2 (2010), 151–166; and Islamska tradic- ija Bošnjaka (Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u BiH, 2008). 14 See for example Smajić, Aid, Psihosocijalni aspekti religioznosti kao determinante međunacionalne tolerancije (Psychosocial aspects of religiosity as a determinant of ethnic tolerance), unpublished PhD dissertation (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2010) , and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012) available at www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/ Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf, accessed 3 March 2013. Study by Abazović, Dino, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između sekularizacije i deseku- larizacije (Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina between secularisation and de-secularisa tion), (SYNOPSIS, -Sarajevo, 2012) is a recent study specifically analysing religiosity of Bosniaks. 126 aid smajić

2 Islam and the State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state defined its relations with churches and religious organisations in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in BH passed in 2004.15 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. In 2006 the Catholic Church, and in 2008 the Serbian Orthodox Church, signed basic agreements with the state, while the Islamic Community in BH (hereafter ICBH) in January 2010 submitted its proposal of the agreement and is currently negotiating its contents. Individual religious communities, including the ICBH, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are also regularly supported by public funds. However, the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding for other expenses too. Apart from concerted but very often unsuccessful efforts by all religious communities to solve the issue of their property that was nationalised under Communist rule,16 the ICBH together with Catholic and Orthodox Churches is currently appealing to respective state ministries to take over paying for pension and health care insurance for their imams, priests and pastors.17 In post-war Bosnia, the increased presence of religion in the public arena is evident. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy asser- tion of identity after the decades long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state.

15 For the complete text of the law, see www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/bs/ ZAKON%20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. 16 In April 2012 Parliament of the Federation of BH failed to support an amendment to an earlier adopted law on nationalised waqf apartments that would give the IC right to replacement apartments, which altogether caused significant disappointment of the IC administration at the authorities. For reaction of the IC Waqf Directorate see biweekly Preporod, No. 9/971, p. 4. 17 See “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herze- govina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)” published in 2009 by the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at http://mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/Izvjestaj_stanje_prava .pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. bosnia and herzegovina 127

Increased public visibility has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the post-war period, the ICBH has been strongly and regularly criticised by the media, often in a manner it finds unacceptable (see section 15 below). Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the ICBH are regularly invited to attend official ceremonies and celebrations at all levels.18 How- ever, unlike Orthodox priests in Republika Srpska Muslim clergy never consecrate new public buildings and no Islamic symbols are present in public premises.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH—Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel: +387 33 533 000, fax: +387 33 441 800, ww.rijaset.ba). The ICBH is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own. The autonomy of ICBH is based on the reli- gious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”19 The ICBH is recognised by the state as the institution that has tradition- ally represented Islam in BH. It is independent in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publish- ing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly through waqfs, membership fees, zakat (alms duty), sadaqat al- fitr (charitable donation given at the end of Ramadan), the revenue of its profit-generating agencies, donations and legacies (waqf ).

18 For more on the status of Islam in BH as a secular state, see article by Dr Fikret Karčić, one of the leading Muslims thinkers in the country, “Secular State and Religion(s): Remarks on the Bosnian Experience in Regulating Religion and State Relations” in Religion and Secular State,: Role and Meaning of Religion in a Secular Society from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives (Zurich & Sarajevo, European Abrahamic Forum, 2008), pp. 15–25. Also see Kovačević, Emir, “The Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Reli- gious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 63–68. 19 The Constitution “Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini” (Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Arti- cles 1–4, is available at www.rijaset.ba/english/images/stories/Constitution.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. 128 aid smajić

The organisational structure of the ICBH consists of jama’as (commu- nity of at least 100 households), majlisas (usually a group of no less than seven jama’as in one municipality or city), nine muftiates (mufti offices, covering the area of a canton) in Bosnia, including a military one without territorial definition, and 5 mashihats, including mashihats in Slovenia, Croatia, Sandžak in Serbia, Germany and Australia, as well as many other umbrella organisations bringing together Bosnian Muslims on the basis of their ethno-religious identity in the USA and European countries. The Riyasat, as the highest religious and administrative organ, is the main executive body of the ICBH and is headed by Rais al-ulama (the President of the Riyasat and the or supreme authority in the ICBH), a position held by Husein Kavazović since November 2012. The Council of the ICBH (Sabor or the ICBH’s assembly) is the highest representative and legislative body of the ICBH.20 According to the IC constitution, the Rais al-ulama is elected by secret ballot by the electoral body consisting of the members of the IC Council and Riyasat, the muftis, the presidents of mashihats, the deans and principles of Islamic institutions, the grand imams and the presidents of the executive boards of majlises.21 Tradition- ally, the procedure of receiving the manshura (document of appointment) takes place in the central Husrev Bey mosque in the presence of the electoral body, local and international dignitaries and the public. Apart from the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, Office for Hajj and Office for Relations with Islamic World as departments of the Riyasat, the main institutions of the ICBH include the Waqf or Endowments Direc- torate (Vakufska direkcija), El-Kalem publishing centre, the Centre for , the Muslim News Agency (MINA), the Agency for Halal Quality Certification, the Library, the Association of Islamic Scholars (Ilmija), the Tariqa Centre and the recently established BIR Radio Station. Educational institutions managed by the ICBH include six Islamic high schools or madrasas, a secular high school (Bošnjačka Gimnazija—Bosniak Gymnasium) and three faculties (see below). Except for the Gymnasium, all contact details can be found on the ICBH website, www.rijaset.ba.

20 For more about the organisation of the ICBH, see Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561, and official webpage of the ICBH available at http://rijaset.ba/. 21 For other details concerning the election and jurisdictions of the Rais see the IC Constitution, articles 55–61. bosnia and herzegovina 129

Several Sufi orders, mainly Qadiris and Naqshabandis, are active in the country, while Tarikatski centar (the Tariqa Centre) in Sarajevo is an insti- tution of the ICBH and is responsible for coordinating Sufi orders as part of the ICBH. In addition to the ICBH, there are other relatively small faith-based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim Charitable Society ‘Merhamet’ (Muslimansko dobrotvorno društvo ‘Mer- hamet’, Azize Šaćirbegović 112, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 526 101, fax: +387 33 526 101), founded in 1913, banned in 1946 and re-established in 1990, which has been very active in collecting humanitarian aid, especially during the Bosnian war. Two of the main NGOs for Muslim women are the Women’s Education Centre ‘Nahla’ (Ženski edukacioni centar ‘Nahla’, www.nahla.ba), founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, and the Women’s Education Organisation ‘Kewser’ (Ženska edukaciona organizacija ‘Kewser’, www .kewser-zehra.com.ba), founded in 1994 in Zenica. The latter publishes a bi-monthly family magazine, Zehra.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are approximately 1,700 mosques and masjids22 in BH, all run by the ICBH. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslim com- munities have a mosque or masjid, either dating from the Ottoman times or constructed later by local residents. In larger towns, such as Sarajevo, Zenica and Bugojno, a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malay- sia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after having been destroyed or damaged during the war, while others are newly built. The ICBH reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs (teach- ing facilities), 4 zawiyas (Sufi lodges), 37 turbes () and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.23 Occasionally attempts to rebuild a mosque have been halted

22 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part- time service and in most cases without a minaret. 23 For more details see Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Addendum to Study of the Genocide against Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476. 130 aid smajić or delayed by protests or attacks by local communities. Following such a scenario, in 2011 Livno Municipality Council urged the local Majlis of the IC to stop the reconstruction of the famous Ćurčinica mosque, which was destroyed during the recent war by Croat forces. The Majlis, how- ever, declined to follow the Council request by referring to the previous decisions of higher legal instances and state institutions that allowed for reconstruction of this centuries-old national monument and master piece of architecture. In at least one case (Divič), an Orthodox church was con- structed on the site of a destroyed mosque. After years of negotiation, in 2008 the ICBH and Serbian Orthodox Church reached an agreement that the former would cover the cost of the ‘displacement’ of the church, which eventually took place in March 2009. The newly built mosque was formally opened in July 2011. Apart from in the military, it is difficult to find places built or allocated strictly for prayer in any public institution. The Bosna Bank International (BBI) shopping centre, located in the centre of Sarajevo, is a unique exam- ple of a shopping mall offering its visitors prayer rooms for both men and women.

5 Children’s Education

Although the status of confessional religious education (CRE) in Bosnian public schools, including Islamic religious education, has varied over time from canton to canton and from entity to entity, today generally it is an elective course taught one hour a week in the first two grades of secondary school and one or two hours a week in all grades of primary school. Islamic teachers are approved and usually trained by the ICBH but employed and paid by public schools. While the status of CRE in Bosnian public schools is no longer ques- tioned, the issue remains of how and in what form to introduce non- denominational religious studies, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, in schools.24 In 2008, a basic form of religious

24 For more on the status and challenges of religious education in Bosnian public schools, see Open Society Fund BH, Religija i školovanje u otvorenom društvu: Preispiti- vanje modela religijskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hecegovini (Religion and Education in Open Society: Assessing Religious Education Model in BH) (Sarajevo, 2009) available at www .skolegijum.ba/static/pdf/4ebbcae44dadd.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. bosnia and herzegovina 131 education was also introduced as an optional course in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo. The ICBH runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behram Bey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko, Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Karađoz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions for training imams and teachers of Islamic religious education into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10%–15% opt for Islamic studies in BH and abroad, usually in order to work as imams in jama’as and teachers of Islamic religious education in public schools, or possibly to go into other jobs at the ICBH and its institutions.25 Unlike in madrasas, the curricula of the Bosniak Gymnasium from its first days have focused exclusively on secular education, while implicitly nourishing traditional values of Bos- nian Muslims. There are no separate courses or specific emphasis on reli- gious education, beyond the Islamic religious education that is also taught in other public schools.26

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic Community has three major institutions of higher learning. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo (Ćemerlina 54, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 251 011, fax: +387 33 251 044, www.fin.ba), founded in 1977, today offers three different study programmes, including Islamic theology, religious education, and imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with Bosnian being the language of instruction. So

25 For more about the current educational profile of BH madrasas one should look at Machaček, Štepan, “European Islam and Islamic education in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Südost Europa: Herausgegebe von Südost-Institut, 55, 4 (2007), pp. 395–428. 26 For more about the curricula of the Bosniak Gymnasium see its webpage available at http://bosnjackagim.edu.ba, accessed 21 January 2013. 132 aid smajić far, some 778 male and female students have graduated from the faculty in addition to 52 Masters and 21 PhDs. The Faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic Studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic edu- cation academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools. Both acquired the status of university faculties in 2006. The Faculty in Zenica (Juraja N’idharta 15, 72000 Zenica, tel: +387 32 402 919, fax: +387 32 402 919, www.ipf.unze.ba) now offers three-year undergraduate and two-year postgraduate programmes in three different departments, leading to BA and MA degrees in Islamic education, social education and pre-school education. The Faculty in Bihać (Žegarska aleja, 77000 Bihać, tel: +387 37 220 162, fax: +387 37 228 160, www.ipf.unbi.ba) is the smallest of the three and currently offers only BA and MA degrees in Islamic education and, since 2012, an MA in Muslim Chaplaincy. So far, about 800 students have graduated from the Faculty in Zenica, while the Faculty in Bihać has produced around 380 graduates. The faculties in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać have recently become associate or full member institutions of the universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.27

7 Burial and Cemeteries

It has been traditional practice to have separate cemeteries for the differ- ent religious communities. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new shahid (martyr) graveyards have been designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. The Potočari

27 For more on current Islamic education in Bosnia, see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa (Islamic Education in Europe) (Vienna: Bِhlau, 2009). For a history of Islamic education, see Kasumović, Ismet, Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Schools and Education in Bosnian Eyalet during the Ottoman Administration) (Mostar: Islamski kulturni centar, 1999); Hasanović, Bilal, Islamske obra- zovne ustanove u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1850. do 1941. godine (Islamic Education Institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1850 until 1941) (Zenica: Islamski pedagoški fakultet u Zenici, 2008). bosnia and herzegovina 133

Memorial Complex in Srebrenica, where the victims of the genocide against Bosniak Muslims of July 1995 have been buried, is the biggest of all. The overwhelming majority of Bosnian Muslims perform burial of deceased relatives according to the Islamic law, while many of those liv- ing abroad insist on burying their deceased in the homeland. As a result, burial agencies offering clients burial services in line with Shari’a and transportation of those who passed away in EU countries have been flour- ishing in the last several years.28 In some instances these companies are attached to the local majlis like in case of Sarajevo and Tuzla majlises.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military ser- vice for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is managed by the Military Muftiate (established in 1999), headed by the military mufti, who is nominated by the Rais al-ulama. The military mufti appoints the 12 military imams and a chief imam, subject to the approval of the Rais al-ulama.29 While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly vis- its and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centres, mainly by the local branches of the ICBH. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available.

9 Religious Festivals

Irrespective of the fact that BH does not yet have a state level law pertain- ing to public holidays, two ‘id or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catholic and Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in BH. Both the religious and the secular media cover the celebrations of bayram, with state television broadcasting live from the Gazi Husrevbe- gova mosque in Sarajevo, where ‘id prayer is led and the khutba (sermon) is delivered by the Rais al-ulama or his deputy. Local television stations

28 As proof it suffices to have a glimpse at page no. 63 of the IC newspaper Preporod, which is usually reserved for burial services offers, that often enlists no less than six such local and international companies. 29 In 2009 the BH Ministry of Defence convened a round-table marking 10th anniver- sary of Military Muftiate and subsequently published the collection of research articles presented on this occasion. See Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola “Imamska služba u vojsci” (Memoir from the Round-Table “Imam Service in the Army”) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2009). 134 aid smajić also often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayrams and other traditional festivals. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram recep- tions for public and diplomatic dignitaries. The second day of Ramadan bayram is designated as the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion, martyrs’ cemeteries are visited and commemorative programmes are organised by the local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ‘id celebrations are famous for their bayram meals (Turkish: Bayram sofra). In order to per- form pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, prospective Muslim pilgrims usually take leave from their jobs. According to the IC Office for Hajj, 1384 pilgrims from Bosnia performed hajj in 2012.30

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

The social revitalisation of religion in the country has been followed by the establishment of various Islam-related businesses offering their Mus- lim clients finance-based services that would assist them in performing their religious duties and living in accordance with Islamic principles. Currently such services usually pertain to organisation of hajj, providing halal food, ritual preparing and transporting of the deceased and Islamic banking. At least two local tourist agencies are known for their cooperation with the IC Office for Hajj in organising hajj for Bosnian pilgrims. Merkez Oil d.o.o. (Mehmeda Spahe 1, tel: +387 30 525 457, web-page is under construc- tion) is a company based in Novi Travnik, while Biss Tours (tel: +387 32 246306, www.biss-tours.ba/v3/) operates from Zenica. According to the ICBH statistics, in 2012 the hajj of 127 pilgrims was arranged by Biss Tours, while Merkez Oil assisted 59 pilgrims in their hajj.31 Halal slaughter is permitted and many Muslims slaughter animals pri- vately following halal practice. There are also a number of halal abattoirs throughout BH. In February 2006, the ICBH established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turalibegova 39, 75000 Tuzla, tel: +387 33 258 427, fax: +387 35 258 427, www.halal.ba/site/), which certifies the compli- ance of food products and respective practices. Since its establishment in 2006, the IC Agency for Halal Quality Certification has been very active in

30 Chief of the Office Halilović, Nezim, “Izvještaj o organizaciji hadža u 2012” (Report about organisation of Hajj in 2012), unpublished material. 31 Halilović “Izvještaj o organizaciji hadža u 2012”, p. 1. bosnia and herzegovina 135 promoting the importance of halal quality for both devout Muslim cus- tomers and prospective food producers and sellers. Accordingly, in 2009 the agency established representative branches in other Balkan countries, while the state institutions in Bosnia agreed to partly subsidise the costs of issuing halal certification for local companies. In 2010 it issued the sec- ond version of the Rulebook (BAS 1049–2010) which was revised to be more in harmony with the standards of the Organisation of Islamic Coop- eration and broadened its activities to include the certification of catering services too. In October 2012 it organised first international halal forum in Sarajevo. As a result of the intensive marketing activities and increasing halal products market, more and more local and regional companies apply for the halal quality certificate in order to guarantee to Muslim customers in Bosnia and other countries in the region or around the world that food production processes in all its phases comply with Islamic principles.32 Finally, Islamic banking has been increasingly gaining in popularity in Bosnia in the last ten years. The main force behind it has been the establishment of Bosna Bank International (BBI) (Trg djece Sarajeva 1, tel: +387 33 275 177, http://bbibanka.com.ba/web/). The founders and main shareholders of the bank are Islamic Development Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, with the shared investment capital amounting to 23 million Euros at the time of establishment.

11 Dress Codes

There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, and covered women are not required to take off their scarves for the identification cards or passport photos. However, there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in some areas of employment.33 In July 2010 representatives of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, cur- rently the strongest Serb nationalist political party in BH, unsuccessfully

32 For an example of eagerness to obtain the halal certification in the case of some Croatian companies exporting food products to Bosnia see their interview for the IC biweekly newspaper Preporod, No. 9/971, p. 54. 33 For more on the issue as well as the current practice and perception of hijab in Bos- nia, see Šeta, Đermana, Zašto marama? Bosanskohercegovačke muslimanke o životu i radu pod maramom (Why Hijab? BH Muslim Women about Life and Work under Hijab) (Sara- jevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2011) available at http://cns.ba/images/tekstovi/zasto%20 marama-za%20web.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. 136 aid smajić proposed a bill at the state parliament for outlawing niqab. After the 1992– 95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who follow the Salafi interpreta- tion of Islam, wear niqab, although this has not been very common in Bosnia since it was banned by the Communists in 1949.

12 Publication and Media

El-Kalem is the publishing house of the ICBH established in 1973, soon after the ruling communist regime eased its restrictions on the activities of religious communities. The oldest printed periodical is Glasnik (the Her- ald), a bi-monthly official journal of the ICBH (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the ICBH biweekly Preporod (the Revival, founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www. preporod.com), which mostly covers current events within the ICBH, as well as more daily news concerning Islam and Muslims in BH and abroad. The ICBH publishes the annual Takvim, a hijri calendar with accompany- ing articles on current issues in religion, culture and society (circulation 50,000). The Association of Ulama publishes a quarterly education maga- zine Novi Muallim (New Muallim, circulation 2,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishes Zbornik FIN-a, an annual col- lection of scholarly papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Islamic faculties and madrasas also have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of 13,000 oriental manuscripts) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which include studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. Two independent Islamic magazines are published in Zenica: Novi Horizonti (New Horizons, founded in 1997 and ceased publication at the end of 2012, circulation around 3,000, www.novihorizonti.ba) and the pro- Salafi Saff (the Line, founded in 1998, www.saff.ba). There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (Healthy Speech, first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodi- cal, Šebi arus (Wedding Night, first published in 1982). In November 2006 the ICBH established a radio and television station BIR, which has been broadcasting 24 hours a day since March 2009. The station has been producing radio programmes and a website (www.bir.ba), bosnia and herzegovina 137 offering content and information about religious, educational, sporting and political issues. According to its administration, the radio station is one of the seven most listened to stations in BH, with their regional fre- quencies covering an area inhabited by 1.4 million people.

13 Family Law

Since the abolition of the Shari’a courts in 1946, only civil marriages are legally valid. However, it is very common to perform a so-called ‘Shari’a wedding’ after the civil ceremony and in the presence of local imam. This procedure is recommended by the ICBH authorities although Shari’a only weddings do happen. With regard to inheritance, only civil courts have jurisdiction over the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon an individual’s death.34 However, the courts do accept prior agreements between heirs in regard to the distribution of the property without investigating the funda- mental basis of such agreements.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations in the country suffered as a result of 1992–95 war. Consequently, BH has become a focal point for various interreligious activities and projects, generally initiated jointly by various local and international actors. On the occasion of 20th anniversary of its siege, the capital city of Sarajevo in September 2012 hosted an International Peace Conference, an event organised by the Community of Sant Egidio for the last 25 years, gathering religious, political and cultural dignitaries from more than 60 countries.35

34 Hasani, Mustafa, Tumačenje i primjena normi šerijatskog prava o mješovitim brako- vima u BiH u periodu 1930–1940 (Interpretation and application of norms of Shari’a law concerning mixed marriages in BH during 1930–1940 period) (unpublished PhD disserta- tion, Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo) offers a more detailed account and reference sources on the issue of applying Islamic law in family matters. For history of Islamic family law in Bosnia and Herzegovina see Džananović, Ibrahim, Primjena šerijatskog porodičnog prava kroz praksu Vrhovnog šerijatskog suda 1914–1946 (Application of Shari’a Family Law through the Practice of Supreme Shari’a Court from 1914 until 1946) (Sarajevo: Fakultet islamskih nauka u Sarajevu, 2004). 35 For more about the event see www.santegidio.org/pageID/2460/langID/en/SARA- JEVO_2012_Religioni_e_Culture_Dialogo_e_Pace.html, accessed 9 March 2013. 138 aid smajić

The ICBH is a co-founder and member of the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the IRC, Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 666 217, fax: +387 33 550 060, www.mrv.ba). It was established in 1997 with the joint participation of the representatives of the four traditional religious communities in BH, namely Catholics, Orthodox, Jews and Mus- lims, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and reconciliation as well as to represent the common interests and activities of religious communities in Bosnia vis-à-vis the state. The current representative of the ICBH in the assembly of the IRC is Sarajevo mufti Husejin Smajić. According to the Protocol of Cooperation signed between the IRC and the Council of Ministers of BH in 2008, the government committed to provide regular annual financial support for the activities of IRC.36 Representatives and members of the ICBH are also active at the Interre- ligious Institute in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel/fax: +387 33 666 776), established in 2007 with the main aim of facili- tating communication and cooperation between religious communities in the country and the wider society. The International Forum Bosna (Sime Milutinovića 10, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 217 665, fax: +387 33 206 484, www.ifbosna.org.ba) and other similar NGOs are organisations within which Muslims are active in rebuilding interreligious trust and relations. Apart from being active in various trans-national Muslim bodies,37 the contribution of the former Rais al-ulama Dr Mustafa Cerić, who led the IC until November 2012, to interreligious dialogue and understanding has been especially recognised. The Peace Award by Italian Ducci Founda- tion was added in 2012 to the number of awards presented to him over the years. At the level of daily life, the quality of Muslim relations with the other two constituent peoples, namely the Croats and the Serbs, generally depends on the locale. However, in most parts of Republika Srpska and the Federation where ethnic cleansing and mass crimes against Muslims took place they are generally tense and very often characterised by bla- tant discrimination against Bosniaks in public institutions, their demoni- sation by the local media and politicians, open attacks on their rights and

36 The Protocol is available at www.mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/Protokol.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. 37 Dr. Mustafa Cerić, for example, for years has been one of 34 members of the Euro- pean Council for Fatwa and Research (www.e-cfr.org/ar/index.php, accessed 21 January 2013). bosnia and herzegovina 139 property as well as on premises and personnel of the Islamic Community.38 Fata Orlović, a Muslim returnee to Konjević Polje in Republika Srpska, for example, has been unsuccessfully appealing to various courts for more than ten years for the removal of an Orthodox church built illegally in her courtyard after the war in 1997,39 while the Supreme Court of RS in Febru- ary 2012 rejected appeal of the IC that city of Banja Luka and RS reimburse money for damage caused through the destruction of 16 mosques in this town during the war.40 Nevertheless, in order to contribute to the protec- tion of religious freedoms, in November 2010 the Interreligious Council in BH ran the project “Monitoring of attacks on religious sites and other places significant for religious communities and churches in BH—protection of sacred sites.”41

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debates about Islam and the ICBH, often initiated through the pub- lications and media of the ICBH or the secular mass media, are noticeably present in Bosnian society. Instead of the presence and status of religious education in public schools that filled the media headlines during the pre- vious year, in 2012 it was election of new Ra’is al-ulama and reform of the IC constitution that attracted attention of the media and broader society (see sect. 3 above). But hate speech and discrimination against Muslims, emerging orientations in the understanding and practice of Islam and the attitude of the ICBH in this regard continued to be matters of discussion in 2012 as well.

38 For more details see the First and Second reports on Islamophobia, discrimina- tion and intolerance at the area under jurisdiction of the ICBH prepared by Riyasat for the period 2004–2010, and for 2011 available at http://rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=14627:izvjestaj-o-islamofobiji&catid=2:uncategorised, accessed 21 January 2013. For the recent reactions of the Riyasat against discrimination and molest- ing of Bosniak returnees to RS see www.vijesti.ba/vijesti/bih/77293-Rijaset-IZBiH-najostr ije-osudjuje-prijetece-poruke-uznemiravanja-Bosnjaka.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 39 For more on the obstacles often faced by Muslim returnees, see the previously men- tioned “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herze- govina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)”. 40 For this decision of the court see www.vijesti.ba/vijesti/bih/70935-nece-platiti- odstetu-dzamije.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 41 For the first report of the monitoring for the period between November 2011 and October 2012 see www.mrv.ba/images/stories/Monitoring/monitoring%20izvjetaj%20 2012_final.pdf, accessed 21 January 2013. 140 aid smajić

After openly Islamophobic statements made by the President of Repub- lic Srpska Milorad Dodik, Ra’is Mustafa Cerić early in 2012 invited Muslim countries to declare this politician persona non grata on their territories. The reaction attracted the attention of the media but also was denounced by the Orthodox Bishop Grigorije as going outside of the “decent, cul- tured and religious” behaviour, which in turn triggered a response from the IC.42 The presence of so-called “Wahhabis” and the perceived Islamisation of Bosniaks in Bosnia were points of discussion again in the media in 2012. This time it was initiated by remarks of Catholic Cardinal Vinko Puljić made early in January of 2012 during one of his trips abroad, where he warned about the allegedly discriminated against status of Catholics in Sarajevo in relation to increased construction of mosques in Sarajevo and the threatening presence of Wahhabis.43 Riyasat of the IC denounced such remarks as ill-intentioned representations of their Muslim neighbours.44 In a similar fashion, European Parliament rapporteur for Bosnia Doris Pack and MEP Bastiaan Belder pointed to a supposedly increased pres- ence of , identifying it with extremism and accusing the IC of a passive attitude in regard to the issue.45 The Riyasat of the Islamic Com- munity strongly denounced such statements of Pack and Belder, labelling them as “encouraging fallacious reports about Muslims” that invite to the persecution of Muslims in future.46

16 Major Cultural Events

Religious festivals held annually at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer, linked in local legends to miraculous events,

42 For details see biweekly Preporod, No. 1/963 and 3/965 (January and February 2012), p. 2 and p. 8 as well as www.vijesti.ba/kolumne-komentari/67534-Inteligentna-zapazanja- Rijaseta.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 43 For the explanation of the statement subsequently provided by the Bishops’ Con- ference in Bosnia and Cardinal Puljić see www.vijesti.ba/vijesti/bih/69780-Tomasevic- Vehabije-izazivaju-zabrinutost-kod-mnogih-katolika.html, and www.accessmylibrary.com/ article-1G1–279886219/bosnian-cardinal-responds-islamic.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 44 For the reaction of the Riyasat see www.vijesti.ba/vijesti/bih/70281-Rijaset-Kakvo- tesko-iskustvo-ima-kardinal-Puljic-vehabijama.html, accessed 21 January 2013. Also see biweekly newspaper Preporod, No. 3/965, p. 8. 45 For the statements of Members of the European Parliament see www.vijesti.ba/ vijesti/bih/72594-Stavovi-IZBiH-nemaju-veze-vjerom.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 46 See reaction of the Riyasat at Preporod, No. 4/966, p. 4 or www.vijesti.ba/vijesti/ bih/72750-Reakcije-BiH-stav-parlamentaraca-Doris-Pack-Bastiaana-Beldera.html, accessed 21 January 2013. bosnia and herzegovina 141 attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbour- ing countries. The most important of them is the centuries-old annual gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include: Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s Cave) near Kladanj where, according to the legend, a young girl let out her soul trying to get water from a scary place and thus proved her courage to local youngsters; Lastavica near Zenica in remem- brance of Bogumils who there used to praise God for rich harvests and where they eventually accepted Islam; and the plateu near San- ski Most where the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II el-Fatih led the jum‘a prayer after he conquered the area, thus announcing the arrival of Islam to the region. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and are organised throughout the country by the ICBH and other Muslim civic associations on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov is organised annually by the women’s associa- tion, Kewser, in memory of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muham- mad, who is revered by pious Bosnian Muslim women. Early in May of each year the Sufi orders have their own central gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj at the spring of the Buna River.47 Since the genocide of Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica, 11 July is com- memorated as Srebrenica Day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayer ( janaza) attended by tens of thousands is performed at the Memo- rial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.48

47 For more on the cultural particularities of Islamic life in Bosnian rural areas, see Bringa, Tone, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 48 As a sign of recognition of the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide target- ing Bosnian Muslims, on 7 January 2009 the European Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming 11 July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at www.europarl.europa. eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0027&language=EN, accessed 21 January 2013. The same resolution (M-416) was passed by the Canadian Parliament with unanimous consent on 19 October 2010. For details see www.bosniak.org/canadian-parlia ment-unanimously-adopts-the-srebrenica-genocide-resolution/, accessed 21 January 2013. US House of Representatives passed similar resolution (H. Res. 199) already in 2005 and its text is available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hres199/text, accessed 21 January 2013.

BULGARIA

Aziz Nazmi Shakir1

1 Muslim Populations

In 1396 the Second Bulgarian Kingdom,2 founded in 1185, became a core part of the recently conquered Balkan territories of the Ottoman State. Subsequently Islam spread mainly through a series of resettlement cam- paigns of Turcoman groups from Asia Minor, aimed at reducing Bulgar- ians’ demographic superiority and by means of gradual conversion of the local Christian population. According to some Turkish historians, Islamisation was helped by the fact that prior to the Ottoman invasion certain strategic regions like Rhodope and Dobrudja were already popu- lated by a considerable number of Turkic colonisers3 and act- ing as religious missionaries,4 who became natural mediators between the conquerors and the conquered. Another factor that possibly reduced the potential interreligious tensions between the two sides and accelerated the number of conversions was the fact that some of the so-called Chris- tian population belonged to Gnostic sects like Bogomilism,5 which denied the religious authority of the official church. A great many of their follow- ers adopted Islam, for its doctrine seemed much closer to their beliefs. It is also believed that a considerable part of the Bulgarian aristocracy preserved its ruling status by means of adopting the new rulers’ religion. As for the average non-Muslim subjects, adopting Islam meant certain tax

1 Dr Aziz Nazmi Shakir is currently working as an Arabic language instructor at the Fac- ulty of Arts and Social Sciences and School of Languages at Sabanci University, Istanbul. 2 Successor of the First Bulgarian Kingdom (681–1018) to be invaded by Emperor Basil II and subjected for a couple of centuries (1018–1185) to the Byzantine Empire before being re-established by the Asen dynasty laying the foundations of the mentioned Second Bul- garian Kingdom. 3 Memişoğlu, Hüseyin, Bulgaristan’da Türk Kültürü (Turkish Culture in Bulgaria) (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara 1995) pp. 9–24. 4 See: Ö. L. Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir iskân ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak vakıflar ve temlikler, I: İstila devrinin kolonizatör Türk dervişleri ve zaviyeler”, Vakıflar Dergisi, No. 2, Vakıflar Umum Müdürlüğü Neşriyatı, Ankara 1942, pp. 279–386. 5 A dualist religious sect that flourished in the Balkans between the 10th and 15th cen- turies; for more about Bogomolism see: D. Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism (Cambridge, 1948), reprint New York, 1978. 144 aziz nazmi shakir exemptions. In most of today’s Bulgarian lands the Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when as a result of the Russo-Turkish War and in accordance with the subsequent Treaty of Berlin, the greater part of the Ottoman Vilayet was transformed into a new autonomous region called Bulgarian Principality.6 The same treaty gave birth to the semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelian Vilayet, that later, in 1885, was incorporated by the Principality. As a result of the First Balkan War in 1912–1913, significant areas located in the Rhodope region and Western Thrace, populated over- whelmingly by Muslims7 were also attached to the Bulgarian State.8 This process was accompanied by acts of forcible Christianisation of several Pomak9 settlements.10 All these events led to mass exoduses of Muslims and changed the religious and ethnic map of the region. Prior to the Russo-Turkish War, the Muslim population (Turks, , Roma, Cir- cassians and Tatars) of the Danube Vilayet numbered 1,120,000 and that of Eastern Rumelia 681,000.11 According to the first official census held in 1887 (i.e. after Eastern Rumelia joined the autonomous Principality) an estimated 676,215 Muslims (comprising 21.44% of the total population) still lived in the country. A dozen years later, in 1900, we see this figure reduced to 643,300, or 17.18%. According to different estimations, the

6 For the history of Islam in Bulgaria in general, see: Желязкова, Антонина, Божидар Алексиев и Зорница Назърска (eds), Мюсюлманските общности на Балканите и в България (Muslim Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria) (: International Cen- tre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (Sofia: IMIR, 1997); Градева, Росица (ред.). История на мюсюлманската култура по българските земи (History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands) (Sofia: IMIR, 2007). 7 Namely the following settlements: Kırcali (Kardjali), Eğridere (Ardino), Koşukavak (Krumovgrad), Darıdere (Zlatograd), Mestanlı (Momchilgrad), Ortaköy (Ivaylovgrad), Döv- len (Devin), Paşmaklı (Smolyan) and Nevrokop. 8 Last but not least, in 1940, South Dobrudja was taken from Romania and given to Bulgaria. 9 Pomaks: referred by most Bulgarian historians as Българомохамедани (Bulgarian Muhammadans), are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope Mountains in southern Bulgaria; On Pomaks, see: Todorova, Maria, “Identity (trans)formation among the Pomaks in Bulgaria”. In: Kürt, Lásló and Juliet Langman (eds), Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 63–82; Memişoğlu, Hüseyin, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri (Pomak-Turks in the Balkans) (Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul 1999); Çavuşoğlu, Halim, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri-Tarih ve Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı (Pomak-Turks in the Balkans-History and Socio- cultural Structure) (Ankara: Köksav Yayınları, 1993); Georgieva, Tsvetana, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians”. In: Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), pp. 303–16. 10 For datails see: Стоянова, Пламена, “Покръстването на българите мюсюлмани” (The Baptizing of ), Анамнеза, Год. І, 2006, кн. 3, pp. 1–10. 11 Şimşir, Bilal N., Bulgaristan Türkleri 1878–1985, (The Turks of Bulgaria 1878–1985), Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986, p. 18. bulgaria 145 number of Muslims who emigrated from Bulgaria between 1878 and 1912 varies from 350,000 to 1,200,000. The apparent amplitude between these figures reflects the great uncertainties researchers face in terms of using rather inconclusive documentary sources about the mentioned events. In the period 1913–1934, under an agreement regulated by international law, some 10–12,000 Muslims emigrated each year; in the 1940–1944 war period, there were about 15,000 émigrés.12 A census held in 1946 shows that the number of Muslims had risen to 938,418, although in terms of percentage of the whole population, they were only 13.3%.13 The next emigrant wave coincided with the forcible collectivisation of the land in Socialist Bulgaria and swept away some 155,000 Muslims (predominantly ethnic Turks).14 Right after it, Muslims roughly numbered 1,000,000.15 In the period 1956–1985, in accordance with the ruling ide- ology supporting the idea that people in Bulgaria are nonreligious, the “confession” issue was excluded from the census surveys. Meanwhile, between 1968 and 1978, after a Bulgarian-Turkish agreement on the reunion of separated families had been signed, approximately 130,000 people left for Turkey. The last huge exodus took place right before the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, when nearly 360,000 individuals driven away by what came to be known as “the revival process” (or “the renaming”) left for the well-known destination of the Republic of Turkey. Some returned after the downfall of Zhivkov’s rule, but nearly 240,000 remained and, according to some expert estimates during the period 1990–1996 alone, were followed by nearly 400,000 others.16 In the last three censuses (in 1992, 2001 and the most recent in 2011), all realised, after Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, questions concerning the religious and ethnic affiliation of the population were rehabilitated in the monitoring programmes. However

12 Zhelyazkova, Antonina, “The Social and Cultural Adaptation of Bulgarian Immigrants in Turkey”, Between Adaptation and Nostalgia/ The Bulgarian Turks in Turkey, Sofia: IMIR, 1998, pp. 11–12. 13 www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm. 14 On Turks in Bulgaria, see Ялъмов, Ибрахим, История на турската общност в България (History of the Turkish Community in Bulgaria) (Sofia: IMIR, 2002) (History of the Turkish Community in Bulgaria) (Sofia: IMIR, 2002); Popovic, Alexandre, “The Turks of Bulgaria (1878–1985)”. In: Central Asia Survey, vol. 5, no. 2, (1986), pp. 1–32; Höpken, Wolf- gang, “From religious identity to ethnic mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under and since communism”, Poulton, Hugh and Suha Taji-Faruki (eds), In: Muslim Identity and the Balkan State. (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 54–82. 15 Şimşir, p. 19. 16 Zhelyazkova, A., p. 12. 146 aziz nazmi shakir

Pomaks were excluded from the target list of the census forms,17 and this fact influenced the calculation of the Muslim population negatively. According to a letter (from March 1993) sent by the National Statistical Institute to the Bulgarian President, in the census held in 1992, 70,251 Pomaks identified themselves as Bulgarians, 63,595 as ‘Bulgarian Muham- madans’ and 25,540 as Turks.18 Besides, it was stated that these figures are not accurate and are based on a limited poll. Nevertheless if we assume that the stated data is fair enough, we can calculate that the approximate number of Pomaks at that time was 160,000. Nowadays nobody knows the exact number of these people still undergoing an identity crisis (regarding both their ethnic and religious self-identification), who in the last cen- sus instead of the “Muslim” column preferred to join the 409,898 (7.1%) people who chose not to state their ethnic affiliation or the 272,264 (4.7%) persons marking the answer “no religion”.19 The last three censuses (1992–2001–2011) covering the democratic period, show a constant decrease in the number of Bulgarian Muslims; from 1,110,295 in 1991 to 966,978 in 2001, to 577,139 in 2011 (546,004 Sunni + 27,407 Shi‘i + 3,727 neutral) comprising 13.1, 12.2 and 7.8 % respectively of the total population (8,487,317 in 1991, 7,928,901 in 2001, and 7,364,570 in 2011).20 The obvious reason for this decline is again “migration.” However, this time the main driving factors are not political, but economic. Another explanation for the decrease is the fact that many Muslims rejected dis- playing their religious affiliation. This idea is strongly supported by the following figures: only 444,434 (of an estimated 588,318) Turks, 67,350 (of roughly 160,000 Pomaks establishing that they are ethnic Bulgarians and 42,201 (of 325,343) Roma declared themselves as Muslims.21 It is hard to believe, for example, that in 10 years the share of Muslims within the Roma community decreased from 40% to 18% (actually the real %

17 For details see: Ivanov, Mihail, “Преброяването стана заложник на ВМРО и старите им кавги” (The census became a hostage of VMRO and its old quarrels) in www .bghelsinki.org/index.php?module=pages&lg=bg&page=obektiv17927. 18 From the Report Submitted by Bulgaria Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Received on 9 April 2003) (Bulgarian version) www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_fcnmdocs/ PDF_1st_SR_Bulgaria_bg.pdf. 19 http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx. 20 www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm. 21 2011 Population Census in Bulgaria (Final Data), pp. 24 and 29 available on pdf at: www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf. bulgaria 147 is around 35.)22 Especially taking into account the fact that the Roma were not influenced so much by the common migration processes and they were the only ethnic group that did not decrease in number. As a strange matter of fact, for the first time in the history of censuses in Bul- garia the number of Turks (588,318) exceeds the total number of Muslims (577,139). Besides Turks, Pomaks and Roma, there is a tiny Tatar community with some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. Around 5,000 living mainly in the capital Sofia form the most recent local Muslim community. Since Arabs (most of whom came to the country in the 1970s and 1980s as students from Arab states or parties backed by the USSR) are excluded from the list of ethnic groups found in the Bulgarian cen- sus forms, their exact number remains unofficial. Few of the local Arabs are non-Muslims, others consider themselves atheists, but the major part belong to one of the four Sunni schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and .

2 Islam and the State

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion. However, the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion (Article 13, paragraph 3).23 In 2002, the National Assembly passed a new Law on Religion (State Gazette, No. 129, of December 29, 2002), introducing a completely new basis for State-religious communities rela- tions. According to this law, the registration of religious institutions has to be done by the judiciary, thus preventing any interference on the part of the executive in the internal organisational affairs of believers. However, the active Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish, considers the Law discriminatory, because unlike the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Muslim Denomina- tion is obliged to register its periodic conferences, by which Chief Muftis and members of the Supreme Muslim Council are elected by delegates representing the Muslim community, at the Sofia City Court. Therefore “this requirement gives rise to the legal and political manipulation of the

22 Zhelyazkova, Antonina. “Trial against 13 imams in Bulgaria”, In: www.imir-bg.org/ imir/reports/Trial%20against%2013%20imams%20in%20Bulgaria.pdf. 23 In the last census in 2011, 4,374,135 persons or 60% of the total population deter- mined themselves as Orthodox Christians; the number of Catholics was 48,945 (0.28%), of Protestants: 64,476 (0.87%). These figures reflect the number of people who responded to the religion question. Presumably the real percent of Christians in the common sense is much higher. See: http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx. 148 aziz nazmi shakir official authorities”.24 This legislation allowing a Muslim denomination to register and then re-register as a trading company, provides oppor- tunities for abuses of juridical nature. This leads to splits in the Muslim community: registrations of several administrations of Muslims and the unsatisfactory functioning of the Chief Mufti as an administrative spiritual- religious body.25 Every year, the Religious Confessions Directorate at the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to denomina- tions with a longer historic presence. In 2012, the Islamic community was granted a total of 105,000 BGN (around 53,700 €). The money was received in three tranches ( July: 81,000, October: 19,000 and November: 5,000) and was divided between 23 mosques to be spent for reconstruction purposes.26 Muslims are represented in the public arena by the Chief Muftiate. In December 2012, for the first time in its history, this institution was visited by the Bulgarian President. During his visit Rosen Plevneliev announced that he supports the construction of an Islamic educational centre in Sofia.27

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Bulgarian Muslim community, officially called the Muslim Denomina- tion (Мюсюлманско изповедание), owns a range of well-developed struc- tures. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Висш Духовен Съвет) consisting of 30 members, with its core institution, the Chief Muftiate (Главно Мюфтийство, Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel: +359 29816001, official site: www.grandmufti.bg; e-mail: press@grand- mufti.bg, [email protected]). The Chief Muftiate is staffed by a team of

24 This attitude is expressed in a letter of the Muftiate sent on 21 May 2010 to Krasimir Kanev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. 25 This problem is expressed in a letter of the Muftiate sent to the attn. of Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Chairman of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). In 2008, the court registered at the address of the Muftiate an administrative organisation headed by Nedim Gendzhev, a former chief mufti appointed in the end of the Communist era. Taking advantage of the situation he allegedly succeeded in unauthorised withdrawals from the bank accounts of the Muftiate in the amount of 850,000 BGN (€435,000). Hadji, Mustafa, “Glavno myuftiystvo sled demokratichnite promeni” (The Chief Mufti’s Office after the Democratic Changes), in Годишник на Висшия Ислямски Институт (Yearbook? of the Higher Islamic Institute), No. 2, Sofia 2010, p. 18. 26 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/component/content/article/3105.html. 27 www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2012/12/17/1971174_plevneliev_privetstva_ideiata_za_ isliamski/. bulgaria 149 nearly 20 employees working in the following departments: Waqfs, Hajj, Education, Publishing, Administration and Finances, International Proto- col and Public Relations, Irshad (Spiritual and ethic guidance) etc. The managing body of the Muslim Denomination also includes 21 regional muftiates incorporating councils with 5 to 11 members, representing the regional departments of the community, and under their ward there are 1,500 local units called boards or trusteeships. The current Chief Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji (since 2005). He has three deputies: Vedat Sabri Ahmed (since 2005), Birali Mümün Birali (since 2008) and Murad Pingov (since April 2012).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The estimated number of active mosques in Bulgaria is 1,260. There are also nearly 240 small prayer houses called mesjids, and some 50 tekkes and turbes, most of which date back to the Ottoman period. There are no prayer rooms in public institutions. Around 400 of the mosques have been constructed after the fall of the Communism. The Muftiate’s official website published the photographs of 25 mosques and prayer houses in construction,28 as well as of 93 that are not in use.29 Some of the latter, dating back to the Ottoman period, need serious restoration and some, against local Muslims’ will, are proclaimed museums or state property and thus deprived of their initial functions. Aimed at changing the prob- lematic status quo of these historical monuments and regaining them as waqfs for the religious needs of the Muslim community, the Chief Mufti- ate is engaged in a legal fight against the Ministry of Culture and several municipalities. On the long list of the “nationalised” Muslim shrines there are such mosques as Hamza Bey Mosque in Stara Zagora inaugurated as “Museum of Religions” in 2011, Grand Mosque in Sofia, currently used as National Archaeological Museum, Ibrahim Pasha Mosque in Razgrad, state property since 1996, the almost ruined Fatih Mehmed Mosque in Kiustendil, state property since 1996, Bayrakli Mosque in Samokov,30

28 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/djamii-v-stroej; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/djamii-v-stroej.html? start=20. 29 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history-no-function; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/ mosques-in-history-no-function.html?start=20; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history- no-function.html?start=40; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history-no-function.html? start=60; http://grandmufti.bg/bg/mosques-in-history-no-function.html?start=80. 30 Declared a cultural monument in 1928. 150 aziz nazmi shakir

Kurshunlu Mosque in Karlovo, Eski Mosque in Vratsa, a cultural monu- ment since 1972, the mosques in Dupnitsa, Ihtiman and Montana, Kurs- hunlu Mosque in Silistra, Ahmet Bey Mosque in Kiustendil, Karaja Pasha Mosque in Gotse Delchev, and Haji Huseyin Mosque in Belogradchik. There are several mosques that were expropriated by the state without any official act or legal basis. As a matter of fact, during the Communist era the estate property acts of most mosques vanished, due to the cleans- ing of this type of documents from the state and local muftiate archives. Some of the above-mentioned shrines are in poor condition and the Muslim community is willing to reconstruct them but is denied access to them. Despite worshipers’ protests, Tash Kopru Mosque in Plovdiv is currently used as a restaurant in which alcohol is served.

5 Children’s Education

Islam was introduced into the curriculum as an elective subject (called simply “Religion-Islam”) in a few public primary schools in regions where the majority of the population are Muslims in the academic year 1997/1998; a year later the subject officially entered the programme of the junior high schools. In 2001/2002 the number of students studying “Religion-Islam” reached its highest point so far.31 The same year, a team of authors directed by the Muftiate prepared a set of textbooks for grades 1–8. In 2003, the Ministry of Education and Science released an instruc- tion permitting a new 12-year curriculum allowing “Religion-Islam” to be taught in high schools. According to the instruction, students under the age of 14 who want to study the subject the coming academic year should apply in advance, before the end of the spring term (i.e. in June) with a declaration signed by their parents; if applicants were mature (aged 14–18), they have to sign the declaration themselves.32 Formally, the state allows children to study their religion and mother tongue but the sym- bolic number of those who could take the advantage of this otherwise democratic regulation clearly shows that in practice it has not developed any strategy towards supporting this type of educational activity. During

31 Хаджи, Мустафа, p. 16; More information about the content of the subject taught in the 2nd–7th grades can be found in: Фере, Мевлюде, “Анализ на урока по ‘Религия- ислям’ ”, In: Годишник на Висшия Ислямски Институт (Annual of the Higher Islamic Institute), vol. 1, София 2009, pp. 277–299. 32 Карамолла, Хюсеин, “Предметът ‘Религия-ислям’ в българското училище”, In: сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 9, София 2012, p. 16. bulgaria 151 the last decade (2002–2012), the number of children from Muslim families exercising their right to study Islam decreased in a geometrical progres- sion and in 2012 reached its minimum. As a result, in regions like Kardjali, Shumen, Aytos, Razgrad, Dobrich, Silistra, Targovishte, Plovdiv, Sliven and Veliko Tarnovo, where most of the Muslim population of the country lives, “Religion-Islam” could not enter the school curricula. In 2012 the subject was taught in only 29 state schools by 24 teachers to 3,271 pupils.33 In a similar manner, in 1992/93 nearly 110,000 students from Muslim fam- ilies studied Turkish as a mother tongue but by 2012 this number had decreased more than ten times and amounted to 10,659 pupils.34 The long list of objective and subjective reasons35 for this extraordinary situation can be broadly put down to lack of tutors, interest and financial support. There are three Islamic secondary schools, in Shumen, Russe and Mom- chilgrad. In 2012, the latter underwent a full reconstruction and opened doors for the 2012/13 academic year as a newly built school complex con- sisting of a huge three-storey building with a theatre hall, gym, a dozen of classroom, including four labs and a seminar room with an interactive whiteboard and a five-storey boarding house.36 The three religious high schools follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes in Islam. The more than 1,30037 grad- uates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any university discipline they choose. Founded in the first half of the 1990s, from 1998 onwards they became totally dependent on regular sub- sidies from the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı). Along with the school curriculum, the major unofficial institutions for dissemination of religious knowledge are the so-called Qur’an courses. In 2012, approximately 650 summer courses were held in more than 500 towns and villages, attended by nearly 10,000 children and adoles- cents aged 6–18.38 A chart published by the Muftiate showing the num- ber of these two-month long courses from 2005 on, illustrates that they

33 The data is obtained from the Educational department of the Chief Muftiate. 34 Emin, Hayri. “Written statement in the exercise of the right of reply to the statement of the Bulgarian delegation regarding education in mother language in public schools in Bulgaria”, 2012 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Working session 13, (Warsaw, October 2, 2012). 35 For detailed information see: Zhelyazkova, A—Orlin Avramov, Maya Kosseva, Lubomir Petkashev. Educational Problems of Turkish Children in Bulgarian Schools, Citi- zens for Human Rights, IMIR, Sofia, 2012. 36 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 6/ 2012, pp. 2–3. 37 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. 38 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 10/ 2012, p. 1. 152 aziz nazmi shakir increased steadily from 250 in 2005 to 671 in 2011. The most active regions in the last couple of years were Aytos, Gotse Delchev, Pazarjik, Shumen, Smolyan and Kardjali.39 Besides the numerous Qur’an courses there is one course for hafizes (memorisers of the Qur’an) in Madan. In Sofia, there are two private Arab schools (a Lebanese elementary school “Gibran Kahlil Gibran” founded in 1999 and a Palestinian high school “Avicenna” opened in 2006)40 in which most of the students are children from Muslim or mixed (Muslim-Christian) families.

6 Higher and Professional Education

About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no official reli- gious training was available during the Communist era. Nearly 100 younger imams are graduates from various Islamic universities in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt.41 Few are trained in the Qur’an courses mentioned above. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education at the only Islamic higher educational institution so far in Bulgaria, the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia42 (kv. Vrazhdebna, St. 57, No. 6, tel: +359 29456298, fax: +359 28406366; e-mail: info@islamicinsti- tute-bg.org, web: www.islamicinstitute-bg.org). The Institute was founded in 1990 by a decision of the Council of Ministers signed by the Prime Minister43 as a semi-higher institution and started to function with a two year programme, but after a reform in the country’s educational system held in 1998, it transformed into its present “higher” status and consequently the new curricula were based on a new four year plan. Students who com- plete their studies at the Institute (250 so far)44 acquire the qualification “Islamic theologian” and get a teaching certificate giving them the right to become imams, vaizes (preachers) and (pulpit orators), as well as “Religion-Islam” teachers in elementary schools. However, the diplomas issued by the Institute are not recognised by the Ministry of Education

39 Информационен бюлетин 2011, p. 16; Annual Report 2010, p. 14. 40 For details visit: www.avicenabg.com , http://arabwives.wordpress.com and www .goldenpages.bg/bg/b/740E23FF-B203-DC11-B6C5-00145E9525E4. 41 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. 42 For the history of the Higher Islamic Institute see: Cambazov, İsmail, Sofya İslam Enstitüsü: Anılar-Belgeler (Sofia Islamic Institute: Memories and Documents), Sofia: Davudoğlu Yayınları, 2005. 43 A facsimile of the decision is published in: Cambazov, p. 27. 44 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 8/ 2012, p. 7. bulgaria 153 and Sciences, as the programme does not meet the requirement of “sufficient number of qualified staff ” for state accreditation. The lack of staff is due to the lack of Islamic theologians in the country and this is one of the most serious long-term problems local higher Islamic education faces. For the last dozen years, the Higher Islamic Institute has depended fully on the financial aid provided by the Turkish Diyanet. Thanks to the latter, the Institute offers free education, board and lodging to its students and usually two or three of the faculty members are visiting professors from Turkey. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Mid- dle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies of Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims are free to perform traditional funeral rites. In regions with large Muslim population there are separate cemeteries and separate burial plots. Recently the municipality in Kardjali developed a unique project aimed at providing mobile pre-burial services to Muslims living in iso- lated villages, or urban places without local imams, experiencing difficulty organising ceremonies for their dead. A specially equipped truck, with an imam on board, goes to the address of the deceased and the imam per- forms the washing and shrouding of the corpse inside the truck. During a meeting of the National Council of Religious Communities in Bulgaria (NCRCB) with the Mayor of Sofia, Yordanka Fandakova, on 13 January 2012, the representatives of the Muslim Denomination, the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün and the Secretary General of the Muftiate, Hussein Hafizov, discussed with her the problems due to the lack of a Muslim cemetery in the capital and the chances of founding one.45

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have access to prisons and may visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulation concerning the issue exists. Imams are not allowed in the armed forces as military law bans religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces. This has provoked the

45 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/news-from-bulgaria/1994-2012-01-13-15-22-34.html. 154 aziz nazmi shakir

Muftiate’s objections regarding the fact that priests representing the Orthodox Church regularly inaugurate flags of the Bulgarian Army and perform religious rites at official ceremonies such as opening of schools and other institutions.

9 Religious Festivals

In 2012, Bulgarian Muslims celebrated their religious holidays freely and, in accordance with Art. 173, Para. 4 of the Labour Code, were officially entitled by a decision of the Council of Ministers (on a meeting held 21 Dec 2011) to a day’s holiday (3 Feb) for the Mawlid Night, two days (20–21 Aug) for ‘Id al-fitr called Ramadan Bayram and three days holi- day (24–26 Oct) for ‘Id al-adha, or Qurban Bayram.46 The Chief Mufti announces the beginning of the fasting month Ramadan and greets the believers at its end followed by the Ramadan Bayram, as well as on the occasion of Qurban Bayram on national TV channel “Kanal 1”. The annual hajj organised by the Chief Muftiate was attended by 350 pilgrims (the number of men and women being equal) in 2012. In a press release sent prior to the hajj campaign to the Bulgarian News Agency, the Deputy Chief Mufti Vedat Ahmed mentioned that in the last 20 years (1991–2011) nearly 5,500 Bulgarian Muslims have become hajjis.47

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

During the Socialist period (1944–1989), most Muslims (and especially those living in the cities) did not have the chance to obtain halal food. Nowadays the halal food notion is only slowly re-appearing and only a few Muslims in Bulgaria (mainly Arabs) strictly adhere to halal food regula- tions. Currently, Muslims have a very limited access to halal food through the few local shops, which are supplied by a couple of local firms that perform the ritual slaughter. In supermarkets, there are no special signs indicating whether a certain meat product is halal. Nevertheless, pri- vate slaughter is not forbidden. Perhaps as a consequence of the lack of demand, halal food is not available in public institutions. In April 2012,

46 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/news-from-bulgaria/1954---6-----2012-.html. 47 http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=982024. bulgaria 155 the Supreme Muslim Council accepted “A Regulation Concerning the Basis for the Issuing of Halal Certificates” and formed a commission (with members Beyhan Mehmed and Halil Hojov)48 empowered to deal with the matters related to the granting of certificates to companies apply- ing for such. From the Chief Muftiate’s website, we understand that it has issued certificates to “Gradus”, “Kostinbrod” and “Hrenat-Sevlievo” companies exporting chicken to Muslim countries and a couple of other producers for the domestic market: “Musan” and “Merkez”.49 On 15 June 2012, businessmen from Dubai visited the Chief Muftiate and met with the members of the Halal Commission, who informed them about the procedure concerning the issuing of halal certificates. A similar meet- ing with representatives of more than 40 Bulgarian food companies was organised by the Muftiate and “Halal Cargo” a month later, on 11 July. During the event a couple of lectures dedicated to the tendencies in the world market of halal products (Balazs Garamvölgyi, Hungarian honorary consul in Bahrain) and the notion of halal in Islamic tradition (Dr. Sefer Hasanov, faculty member of the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia) were presented. In 2012, the arrangements for the hajj travel were organised jointly by the Deputy Chief Mufti Vedat Ahmed and the Head of the Hajj Director- ate at the Muftiate, Orhan Osman. Within four days, two senior officials seconded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia issued visas for the Bulgarian hajj candidates.50 A team of 15 religious guides took care of the pilgrim groups, which were offered special seminars and lectures prior to and during the hajj itself. The accommodation of the pilgrims was supported by the Turkish Diyanet.51 In Bulgaria there is no access to Islamic banking due to the lack of local banks offering or applying this type of financial services.

11 Dress Codes

There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, (headscarf ) in public places. There have been occasional

48 The muftis in whose region act the companies applying for a halal product certificate are also considered members of the commission. 49 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/faq/30-fetvi/646-2010-01-16-17-38-18.html. 50 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 10/ 2012, p. 16 51 сп. Мюсюлмани, бр. 11/ 2012, p. 16. 156 aziz nazmi shakir bans in state schools that require school uniform. Niqab (face covering) is not part of the dress code of the local Muslim community. As a matter of fact, only a few of its representatives (mainly women living in rural environment and worshippers attending religious ceremonies, such as the prayers performed in mosques) wear traditional Muslim dress. There is no special regulation prohibiting the wearing of hijab in ID card and passport photos. Nevertheless the ears of their holders should be seen. As a result, there are many cases of photos in which headscarves are put on in a way that ears are left uncovered.

12 Publication and Media

In the post-Communist period (from 1990 onwards) the most active insti- tution publishing Islamic religious texts is undoubtedly the Chief Mufti’s Office. The long list of printed materials includes a few books by Bulgarian authors and several translations (mainly from Turkish and Arabic, and less so from English) the most important being an academic translation of the Qur’an from 199752 that was approved as “official” and the hadith collection “Gardens of the Righteous” by Al-Nawawi, both carried out by a prominent Arabist Prof. Tsvetan Teofanov.53 Advertisement and cir- culation of religious knowledge is achieved through the regional muftis’ offices and the community’s website (www.grandmufti.bg). Most of the Muftiate’s publications are very practical and concern the observance of religious rituals. There are also a number of school textbooks and didac- tic texts such as the series called Religion-Islam and classical guides for religious guidance. The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal (in Turkish and Bulgarian) Müslümanlar/Мюсюлмани (“Muslims”) with children’s enclo- sure Hilal (Crescent), available as pdf files that can be downloaded free of charge.54 As of the end of 2012, on the official website of the Chief Muftiate

52 Теофанов, Цветан, Превод на Свещения Коран (Translation of the Holy Qur’an) Главно Мюфтийство на Мюсюлманите в Република България, София, 1997). A second edition was launched in 2006. 53 Имам ан-Науауи, Градините на праведниците (Рияду-с-Салихин) (Gardens of the Righteous). vol. 1 Translation from the Arabic: Teofanov, Tvetan. Главно Мюфтийство на Мюсюлманите в Република България, София, 2008). 54 See: www.grandmufti.bg/bg/library/downloads/category/1-spisanie-myusyulmani .html. bulgaria 157 there were also six e-books,55 57 video-lectures,56 five films57 and 138 fatwas.58 Since 1992, the Fethullah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman-Bulgaristan (“Time-Bulgaria”) and the monthly magazine dedicated to the Muslim family called Ümit/Nadezhda, both being bilingual.59 In 2009, the Higher Islamic Institute started to publish the Annual, the only Muslim scholarly magazine launched in the post-Socialist era. In 2012, the Institute issued a bibliographic monograph including more than 800 items called “Islam in the Literature Published in Bulgaria till 2010” by Efrosina Angelova-Penkova and Ilona Kaloyanova, both employees at the National Library “St. Cyril and St. Methodius”. There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. National radio broadcasts a three-hour program on Islam every Friday. Recently these programs are maintained by one of the deputy Chief Muftis, namely, Vedat Ahmed.

13 Family Law

During the Communist period (1944–1989), Muslims could only hold religious weddings privately, usually without a certificate being issued. Islamic marriage is practiced mainly in villages, after the couples have been married according to civil law. Imams issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage but the state recognises only marriages con- tracted in a civil registry office.

14 Interreligious relations60

Since 1989, and especially in the last few years, the Muftiate has made significant progress in the sphere of interreligious relations. Generally,

55 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/library/downloads/category/2-izdaniq-na-glavno-muftiistvo .html. 56 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=17&sl=categories&la yout=listview. 57 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=16&sl=categories&la yout=listview. 58 www.grandmufti.bg/en/faqs/30-fetvi.html. 59 http://www.zaman.bg; http://www.umitdergisi.com. 60 For a general overview, see Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Nielsen, Jorgen and Kepel, Gilles (eds), Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bul- garia: A Collection of Articles (in English and in Bulgarian) (Sofia: IMIR, 1995). 158 aziz nazmi shakir the Muslim and other religious communities remain relatively closed and focused on their internal problems, preserving the boundaries between them and interacting mostly peripherally.61 However, in terms of inter- institutional and personal contacts everything seems more than optimis- tic. It is not surprising, for instance, to hear on the news that in a town or village with “mixed” population, Muslims have helped in the construction of a new church. Teachers and pupils from Muslim religious schools meet with their Christian counterparts etc. The relations between the local Muslim and Jewish communities are also rather positive. The long list of interreligious events for 2012 form a rich spectrum of activities: during Ramadan the regional mufti of Plovdiv Osman Hilmi and the imam of Jumaya Mosque in the city Kemal Rashid welcomed representatives of the Catholic Church from the Order of Assumptionist Fathers. On 9 January 2012, the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün received a pastor of the German-speaking Evangelical-Lutheran community at the German Embassy in Sofia and minister of the Evangelical German Church.62 In Kardjali, the Orthodox Priest Petar and the regional mufti Beyhan Mehmed used all religious festivals to exchange visits and demonstrate the perfect relations between the Christian and Muslim communities in the city. The same model relations have been observed in Vidin, where the mufti of Montana region Nejati Ali, Bishop Sioniy and Metropolitan of Vidin Dometian often met and discussed their shared concerns. For example, on 17 January 2012, Bishop Sioniy and his associates drank tea in the library of the muftiate.63 In June and September, Christians and Muslims initiated a charity bazaar on the square behind Banya Bashi Mosque and in front of Sveta Nede- lia Church aimed at providing financial support for children with mental illness.64 In recent years the Students’ Council at the Higher Islamic Institute and the Chief Muftiate, in cooperation with Central Israeli Spiritual Coun- cil, the Theological Faculty at Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”, the organisation of the Jews in Bulgaria ‘Shalom’ and ‘Ethnopalitra’ Founda- tion have organised interreligious discussions and public lectures dedi- cated to the philosophical, historical and political relations between the monotheistic religions, hosted by the Media Cultural Centre of the Chief

61 See Merdjanova, Ina. “Uneasy tolerance: Interreligious relations in Bulgaria after the fall of Communism”, In: Religion, State and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (2007), pp. 95–103. 62 www.grandmufti.bg/en/bulgaria/1979-2012-01-10-07-26-12.html. 63 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/news-from-bulgaria/2009-2012-01-19-07-45-41.html. 64 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/news-from-bulgaria/1998-2012-01-16-08-19-03.html. bulgaria 159

Muftiate (Pirotska Str. Nr. 3, 2nd floor) currently headed by the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün. In 2012, a series of nine discussions took place in the Centre: “The Creation of the World/ Noah/ / Abraham/ Prophecy Notion/ Repentance/ First Crime in the Monotheistic Religions” etc. In a separate meeting open to the media (titled “The Events in front of the Banya Bashi Mosque: Thoughts On Tolerence and Democracy”) the clashes between Ataka Party activists and Muslim worshippers in front of the central mosque in Sofia in May 201165 were discussed. Video materials from all discussions can be found and watched online on the website of the Muftiate.66 On 5–10 November 2012, the National Council of Religious Communities in Bulgaria (NCRCB), led by its Chairman Prof. Rupen Krikorian, visited the Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church Karekin II in Arme- nia. The Muslim community was represented by the Deputy Chief Mufti Birali Mümün and the newly appointed Secretary General of the Mufti- ate, Ahmed Ahmedov. A month later (11–13 December), the NCRCB was hosted by the Mufti of Istanbul Rahmi Yaran. As part of the programme of the visit initiated by the Bulgarian Chief Muftiate, the delegation met with the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community and the Patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In September 2012, the District Court in Pazarjik began a trial against 13 imams, including regional muftis, Qur’an teachers and lecturers. The defendants are accused of preaching “anti-democratic ideology, expressed in opposition to the principles of democracy, separation of powers, liber- alism, a rule-of-law state, basic human rights such as gender equality and religious freedom, spreading Salafism and imposing of Shari’a law.”67 One of the defendants is also charged with leading Al Waqf al-Islami organi- sation (a branch of a Saudi foundation of the same name), which is not officially registered in Bulgaria. Others are charged with membership in this organisation.68 During the court sessions some of the prosecution

65 For details see: Shakir, A. “Bulgaria”, Yearbook of Muslims vol. 4, Ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen, Brill: Leiden-Boston 2012, pp. 128–9. 66 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/2011-07-15-16-00-35.html?task=cats&cat=20&sl=categories&l ayout=listview. 67 Articles 108, Par. 1; Art. 109, Par. 2 and Art. 164, Par. 1. of the Bulgarian Penal Code. 68 Indictment No. 9/2009. 160 aziz nazmi shakir witnesses renounced their own testimonies given in the pre-trial proceed- ings. One of the witnesses even asked for the court’s protection, claiming to be under pressure from agents of the State Agency for National Security (SANS). Independent observers believe that some of the testimonies were actually prepared by SANS agents and prosecutors, as several of the wit- nesses are either poorly educated or do not speak Bulgarian well, and con- sequently could not produce such testimonies on their own. NGOs like the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations claim that the court has turned into a place where theological debates are held in an attempt to provide answers to religious questions which Muslim theologians have been debating for centuries. The main paradox is that no one in the court is competent on these issues, with the exception of the highly educated imams, who stand accused.69 All defendants but one (who is a Roma) are Pomaks. Most of them have caught the attention of security services because they have obtained their higher religious education at universities in Saudi Arabia. By presumption, they are suspected of returning from their studies as Salafists or Wahhabis. The current trial has awakened very bad memories among the Muslims in Bulgaria. They again feel repressed, insulted and humiliated. Especially disturbing is the hate speech, heard in front of the courthouse, where nationalist organisations and parties staged meetings during the court sessions.70 The Chief Muftiate came out with two declarations: in June71 and Sep- tember72 saying that “the allegations are exaggerated, do not correspond with the truth, that “the claims are highly manipulative” and “undermine the authority of the religious institution of Muslims.”73 In October 2012, a representative of the Chief Muftiate brought the case to a session of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw and noted that some of the defendants are employees of the Muslim Denomination in Bulgaria and they would not preach any ideology beyond the control of the governing bodies of the latter.74 The trial will continue in 2013.

69 Zhelyazkova, Antonina. “Trial against 13 imams in Bulgaria”, In: www.imir-bg.org/ imir/reports/Trial%20against%2013%20imams%20in%20Bulgaria.pdf. 70 Ibid. 71 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/news-worldwide/2506-2012-06-19-09-38-45.html. 72 www.grandmufti.bg/bg/news-worldwide/2803-deklaratziya-na-glavno-myuftiist vo-na-myusyulmansko-izpovedanie-v-republika-balgariya-po-povod-povdignatite-obvi neniya-sreshtu-13-te-balgarski-grazhdani-izpovyadvashti-islyama-ot-okrazhna-proku ratura-pazardzhik.html. 73 http://grandmufti.bg/bg/component/content/article/3166.html. 74 Emin, Hayri. “Legal proceeding against Muslim clerics and citizens accused of radi- calism and negative attitudes of the public opinion against the Muslim community”, 2012 bulgaria 161

On the list of Islamophobic crimes for 2012 reported to the Muftiate, there are 11 incidents (11 less than in 2011) including: breaking into places of worship (the iron front door and donated money being stolen from the masjid in Yambol), smashed windows (Velingrad, Blagoevgrad, Sul- tan Bayazid Veli Mosque in Aytos and Haji Osman Mosque in Dobrich), shooting with fire-works during the evening prayer (and destroying the loudspeakers of the mosque in Osenovo, Stara Zagora district), trying to cause a fire (throwing two burning Molotov cocktails through the win- dows of the Regional Muftiate at Aziziye Mosque in Varna), broken burial monuments and tombstones (in the Muslim cemetery in Velingrad); and seriously injuring individuals believed to be Muslims (on 6 October 2012, two Afgani refugees were attacked and brutally beaten in Sofia by twelve skinheads and subsequently hospitalised in the Military Medical Acad- emy, one of them being in a state of coma).75 In most of these cases local Muslim communities were unable to receive consideration and profes- sional commitment from the Ministry of Interior whose investigations, despite being provided with video materials and eyewitnesses’ statements, proved inconclusive with all the cases closed with the clichéd expression “offender unknown and unrevealed.”

16 Major Cultural Events

In the last decade, the Week of the Prophet’s Birthday entered Bulgaria’s Muslims’ calendar of celebrations. In 2012, all regional muftiates organised different activities dedicated to the “praised week”. There is also an annual Islamic Education Week held in the last week of Ramadan. Most of the activities related to these relatively new traditions (such as religious ser- mons, various musical performances, plays and conferences, competi- tions) are organised nation-wide by the Chief Muftiate and the Higher Islamic Institute and are financially supported by the Turkish Diyanet. On 9 September 2012, the “6th National Competition in Knowing the Basis of the Islamic Religion” was held in Hall 11 of the National Palace of Culture in Sofia. The participants were students from the Qur’an courses who have won the competitions organised by all regional muftiates. The event was attended by politicians, diplomats and high ranking officials.

OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Working session 10: Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, (Warsaw, October 1, 2012). 75 The data concerning the anti-Muslim incidents in 2012 was provided by the PR of the Chief Muftiate: Hayri Emin.

CROATIA

Dino Mujadžević 1

1 Muslim Populations

The last national census from 2011 for the Republic of Croatia provides very reliable data on the number and dispersion of Muslim population and other religions, as well as ethnic groups, in this country. There are 62,977 persons in Croatia who identified themselves as Muslims, which is 1.47% of the total population of 4,284,889. This is a fairly significant increase from 54,814 persons according to 1991 census and 56,777 (1.28% of total population) according to 2001 census.2 According to administra- tive division the largest part of Muslim population resides in the city of Zagreb (18,044; 2,28%) and the following counties (županije):3 Primorsko- goranska (; 10,667; 3.60%), Istarska (Pula; 9,965; 4.79%), Sisačko- moslavačka (; 4,140; 2.40%), Dubrovačko-neretvanska (Dubrovnik, 2,927, 2.39%), Vukovarsko-srijemska (Vukovar; 2,619; 1.46%), Karlovačka (; 2,163; 1.68%). Muslims are largely concentrated in urban areas, most notably in the capital and the largest industrial centre Zagreb and other major towns and industrial centres in mainland Croatia: Sisak (2,442; 5.11%), Slavonski Brod (1,173; 1.98%) and Karlovac (705; 1.27%). Muslims are significantly present in ports, industrial and tourist centers of Northern Adriatic: Rijeka (5,820; 4.52%), Pula (3.275; 5.70%), Labin (1,243; 10.68%), Vodnjan (858; 14.02%), Poreč (710; 4.25%), Umag (669; 4.97%), Raša (569; 17.88%), Rovinj (507, 3.55%), Buzet (240; 3.91%) and Buje (207; 3.99%). The historical city of Dubrovnik in the Southern Adriatic also has relatively large Muslim population (2,310; 5.28%). Relatively large popu- lation of Muslims live in rural communities situated right next to state

1 Dino Mujadžević, Ph. D., works as research fellow at Croatian Institute for History in Slavonski Brod. 2 Popis stanovništva, kućanstava i stanova 2011 (Census of the population, households and apartements 2011). The new, as well the previous censuses, are published on the offi- cial web site of State Statistical Institute (www.dzs.hr), accessed 31 December 2012. 3 Županija (pl. županije) is Croatian term for administrative region, sometimes trans- lated as district or county. City of Zagreb is administratively and statistically independent from županije system. 164 dino mujadžević border of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gunja (1,295; 34.70%) and Drenovci (376; 7.27%) in Vukovarsko-srijemska, and Vojnić (742; 15.58%) and Cetingrad (418; 20.62%) in Karlovačka županija.4 The largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia is Bosniaks (31,479; 0.73% of the total Croatian population), also the second largest ethnic minority. Among Bosniaks in Croatia 88% (27,959) identified themselves as Mus- lims. This traditionally exclusively Muslim ethnic group is composed of immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, who came largely in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. The number of Bosniaks has increased sharply when compared to only 20,755 Bosniaks according to the 2001 census. This change is not the result of migrations and/or high birth rate, but the product of the transformation of ethnic (narodnost according to Croatian classification) self-perception among the population of Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin Muslim roots in Croatia. The relatively high number of persons who identified themselves as ethnically “Muslim” (according to 2001 census 19,677) decreased in a decade dramatically (according to 2011 census only 7,558). The ethnonym “Muslim” was used until 1993 as the official term for Bosniaks in Bosnia and elsewhere and, sometimes, for other Slavic Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo. The 1991 census lists 43 thousands “Muslims” in Croatia. It is fair to assume that almost all of “Muslims” of the 2001 census were of Bosniak origin, but due to different factors—such as ignorance about the changed terminology or desire to assimilate into Croatian society by accepting more neutral ethnic identification—they did not identify themselves as Bosniaks.5 This situation has changed drastically due to the propagation of Bosniak ethnic identification, which was one of the main activities of Bosniak minority organisations during the 2001–2011 period. The second largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia are Croats, ethnic majority of over- all Croatian population (3,874,321; 90.42%). In the 2011 census 9,647 Croats (0,002% of their total number) identified themselves as Muslims. The rela- tively large number of is the result of ethnic and cultural assimilation of non-Croat Muslim immigrants, and their descendants, from other parts of former Yugoslavia during the 20th century. A large number of Muslims in Croatia are to be found among Albanians (17,513; 0.41% of the total population), a community mainly consisting of immigrants

4 Popis stanovništva 2011 (www.dzs.hr), accessed on 31 December 2012. 5 ŠemsoTanković, Bošnjaci u Republici Hrvatskoj. Bosniaks in Republic of Croatia. (Sara- jevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 1997). croatia 165 from Kosovo and Macedonia, who settled in Croatia in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. 54% (9,594) of Albanians in Croatia identified themselves as Muslims, the rest being mainly Roman Catholics. A significant part of Roma population in Croatia (16,975 in total or 0.40% of the overall population) has Muslim roots (5,039; 29% of their total population). The Muslim part of the Roma population in Croatia are immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants, who like others came in the second half of the 20th century. According to census data there are also 367 ethnic Turks, immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants.6 Muslims in Croatia are almost exclusively Sunni and belong to the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, with very small numbers of adher- ents of Naqshbandi, Qadiri and Bektashi Sufi orders. The history of Muslims and Islam in Croatia is very old, but without continuity. The settlement of Ismaeliti—a Muslim population of unclear, but probably largely Central Asian, origin (and not to be confused with Isma’ilis as we know them today)—is documented in 1196 in . This population, as well as Ismaeliti and similar groups of Muslim origin in neighbouring Hungary, was religiously and ethnically assimilated under pressure from the Catholic Church in the 13th and 14th centuries.7 During the 16th century Ottomans established their rule in eastern parts of country (Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, inner Dalmatia), over roughly half of territory of contemporary Croatia. According to reliable estimates, during the 16th century around one fourth of the population in Slavonia, the largest and most populous province under Ottoman rule, were Muslims, living mostly in towns. Among them, the cities of Osijek (1500, mostly Muslim, households in the late 17th century) and Požega (1150 Muslim and 200 Christian households in the late 17th century) were the largest Muslim settlements. The Muslim population in Slavonia mainly originated from other parts of the Ottoman realm, chiefly Bosnia, and the number of indigenous converts to Islam was relatively small. There are no reliable estimates about the Muslim population for other parts of Croatia. Islamic religious infrastructure, such as mosques, tekkes and waqfs, was fairly developed in towns and some villages, especially in Slavonia and inner Dalmatia during the 16th and 17th centuries. For example just in

6 Popis stanovništva 2011 (www.dzs.hr), accessed 31 December 2012. 7 Ive Mažuran, Srednjovjekovni i turski Osijek. Mediaeval and Turkish Osijek. (Osijek: Zavod za znanstveni rad u Osijeku HAZU, 1994) p. 50. 166 dino mujadžević

Požega there were 14 mosques.8 Ottoman rule in Croatia was terminated after the Habsburg and Venetian conquest at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century. All Muslim population left these areas or was expelled, killed or enslaved. Certain smaller number of Muslims in Lika under these circumstances converted to Catholicism. All Islamic reli- gious infrastructure, including graveyards, was destroyed or changed for other purposes.9 Muslims started to return to Croatia only two centuries later, from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy occupied present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this new modern environment Muslims of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Bosniaks, were able to travel, study and settle in other parts of the monarchy. According to the 1910 census only 204 Muslims lived in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. The Austrian part of the monarchy recognised Islam as an official religion in 1912 while the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments did the same in 1916. In addition to this, it is impor- tant to stress that the Croatian political elite and, especially, nationalist opposition, in the first half of the 20th century considered Bosniaks as part of the Croat nation and were accepting of Islam as part of the national heritage. This enabled the Muslim community in Zagreb to work in a rela- tively friendly environment and to establish themselves socially. After the establishment of the South Slavic state (later Yugoslavia) in 1918, Muslims of different professions and social strata, mostly Bosniaks, began to settle permanently in larger numbers in Zagreb. According to the census of 1931 there were 4,750 Muslims in Croatia, around 3,000 of them in Zagreb. In 1919 a Muslim religious community (džemat) headed by an imam was offi- cially founded in Zagreb; in 1922 the imam of Zagreb was given the title of Mufti, but this title was soon revoked. Previously independent, this com- munity officially became part of Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjerska zajednica) in 1934. A Shari’a Court was established in Zagreb in 1935 adjudicating legal issues relating to Muslim marriage, fam- ily and inheritance.

8 Nenad Moačanin, Slavonija i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine. Slavonija and Srijem in the Age of Ottoman Rule. (Slavonsti Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest 2005), p. 43; Nenad Moačanin, Turska Hrvatska. Turkish Croatia, (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska 1999), pp. 146–147, 178–179. 9 For the contemporary plight of Muslim population in lands reconquered by Habsburgs, including Croatia, see autobiografical accounts of Ottoman prisoners in Habsburg captiv- ity, Osman-aga of Temisoara: Der Gefangene der Giauren. Die abenteuerlichen Schicksale des Dolmetschers Osman Ağa aus Temeschwar, von ihm selbst erzählt. The Captive of Infi- dels. The Adventurous Fate of the Translator Osman Ağa of Temişoara, told by himself. (Graz, Wien, Köln: Verlag Styria, 1962). croatia 167

The mosque in Zagreb was built in 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime, which used it for propaganda purposes. The Ustaša regime was given control of Croatia and Bosnia by the Axis powers, and in order to assimilate Bosniaks into the greater Croatian nation Ustašas sought to attract Muslim leaders in Croatia and Bosnia. Some imams in Croatia collaborated with the regime and in 1945, when the communists came to power, were severely punished by execution or imprisonment. Most prominently, the Mufti of Zagreb Ismet Muftić was arrested and executed. After legal reform in Yugoslavia in 1946 the Shari’a court in Zagreb stopped working. Communist Zagreb City authorities in 1948 closed the mosque built in 1944, destroyed the minarets and demolished the interior. Under the socialist regime (1945–1990) Muslims in Croatia continued to operate in a renewed Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community, with the community in Zagreb as the centre of religious life. Nevertheless, Muslim communi- ties in other Croatian towns were founded in this period. Croatia achieved independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and by 1993 the Yugoslav Islamic religious community was officially dismantled and the Islamic Religious Community in Croatia, later Islamic Community in Croatia (ICC, Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj), started to operate de facto independently. In 1999 Chief Imam of Zagreb, Ševko Omerbašić, became the first Mufti of ICC, and in 2012 Aziz Hasanović the second one.10

2 Islam and the State

Croatia is a parliamentary democracy. According to the Constitution all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41).11 The legal status of religious communities is regulated by a law promulgated by parliament in 2002.12 According to this law the government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the ICC, which is currently the only

10 For the history of the modern Muslim community see: Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj. Islam and Muslims in Croatia (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajed- nice u Hrvatskoj), 1999; 2010 (second edition); Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878–1945. Doba utemeljenja. Muslims in Zagreb, 1878–1945. The Foundation Age. (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), p. 31; Ankica Marinović Bobinac—Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Vjerske zajednice u Hrvat- skoj. Religious communities in Croatia.(Zagreb: Prometej, 2008), pp. 285–286. 11 The latest version of the Constitution of Republic of Croatia is available at web site of Croatian parliament www.sabor.hr, accessed 31 December 2012. 12 Text of this law is published online: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/ 309118.html, accessed 31 December 2012. 168 dino mujadžević existing Islamic community in Croatia, was signed in 2002. It stipulates the rights of the ICC in terms of mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financing, chaplaincy in prisons, armed forces, police, etc. It also gives the ICC the right to regis- ter marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pension charges are fully paid by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Community in Croatia—ICC (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj) is the only existing and officially registered Islamic religious community in the country. ICC has established cooperation with government, city and municipal authorities and relations with other religious communities. It consists of an Assembly (Sabor), an executive body called Mešihat, the Mufti of Zagreb and his office, local Muslim communities in various towns (medžlisi) and the Zagreb Islamic high school (Islamska gimnazija). The current mufti of Zagreb and president of the Mešihat is Aziz Hasanović. (Islamic Community in Croatia, Gavellina street 40, 10000 Zagreb. Web- page: www.islamska-zajednica.hr). The ICC is in practice an independent religious institution despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby the ICC recognises its leader (Reisu-l-ulema) in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader while the Reisu-l-ulema confirms the mufti as the head of the ICC.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are two purpose-built mosques in Croatia, one in Zagreb and another one in the village of Gunja in Vukovarsko-srijemska županija. The Muslims of Zagreb made a decision in 1961 to build a new mosque and began construction twenty years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia. It is part of an Islamic centre which comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for Imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. In fifteen other cities there are prayer facilities—masjids. Construction of a new mosque and Islamic centre in the city of Rijeka started in September of 2009. The first collective prayer in this mosque was performed on 16th November 2010, the first day of ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban bayram), but the building still remains unfinished. croatia 169

5 Children’s Education

Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school (madrasa) “Dr. Ahmed Smajlović” since 1992. In 2006, due to low enrol- ment of new pupils, it was converted to a general Islamic high school. The school’s programme is harmonised with that of the state high schools. It includes Islamic subjects, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.13 In 2008, ICC in cooperation with authorities of the City of Zagreb opened kindergarten “Jasmin”, the first Islamic kindergarten in Croatia, which has been operating ever since in the Islamic centre in Zagreb.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Faculty as part of the Islamic Centre in Zagreb have been initiated, but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia, but also to Turkey and Arab countries.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rite. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section at the . In other cities burial places are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayer in all public institutions including the police, armed forces, prisons as well as hospitals (Article 17 of the Agreement). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food, and to be taken to the near- est mosque on Fridays to perform the prayer.

13 See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Marinović Bobinac, Ankica, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in: Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa / Islamic Education in Europe, Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009, pp. 239–258; www .zg-medresa.hr, accessed 31 December 2012. 170 dino mujadžević

9 Religious Festivals

Muslims have the right to a free day on both major festivals. In practice, private companies are less likely to grant this right. Both ‘id prayers are broadcast live on the national TV and radio stations. On ‘id day a promi- nent politician (President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Mayor of Zagreb) will usually visit the Zagreb mosque to greet Muslims and their leaders.

10 Halal Food And Islamic Services

Since 2010 the Centre for Halal Quality Certification of the ICC has been operating in Zagreb (Tomašićeva 12/2). Certified companies are obliged to label their Halal certified products with the logo. Since 2011, several Croa- tian restaurants and hotels were awarded Halal certificates by this Centre, but they also offer other types of food and drinks (the full list of certified companies, restaurants and hotels can be obtained at the webpage of the Centre: www.halal.hr). Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited by Croa- tian laws, while qurban slaughter is organised by the ICC together with a local meat processing company. There are no specialised halal food stores or restaurants, as well as other Islamic services companies in Croatia. Hajj is organised exclusively by ICC.

11 Dress Codes

Civil law does not prohibit women from wearing hijab, though only a few Muslim women wear it. Wearing hijab is allowed on document photographs.

12 Publication and Media

The ICC is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to the Muslim heritage in Croatia, but also publishes occasionally its almanac (Takvim) and monthly magazine (Bilten, www.islamska-zajednica.hr/ bilten/bilten_pocetna.php). News about the ICC is published on its website www.islamska-zajednica.hr. Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams have regular preaching sessions on national TV and radio stations. croatia 171

13 Family Law

All family legal issues except registration of marriages are referred to the civil courts. According to the agreement between the government and the ICC (2002), Muslim religious marriages administered by the ICC are recog- nised by the state and have the same legal status as civil marriage.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Mufti and other leaders of the ICC participate regularly in interreli- gious conferences of high representatives of religious communities in Cro- atia. Representatives of the ICC also participate regularly at Interreligious Prayer Meetings organised in Croatia. ICC has very good and continuous cooperation with Council for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Croatian Bishops’ Conference.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Due to the cultural proximity of Croatian Muslims and the Christian majority there are no social tensions and Muslims live integrated in Croa- tian society. Nevertheless, negative prejudices towards Muslims, increased by ethnic warfare between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia in 1993–1994, still influence part of public opinion, which was visible in resistance by part of the local population to the building of the Islamic Centre in Rijeka. On the other hand, major political factions and relevant media tend to be supportive and open to ICC and Muslims.

16 Major Cultural Events

The ICC organises an annual European competition in Qur’an recitation in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque in September of 1987 as well as occasional scholarly conferences on topics concerning Islam and Muslims in Croatia. In April 2012, the ICC organised the international conference “Islam in Europe, cur- rent situation and perspectives” in Zagreb, attended by numerous Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from Europe.

CYPRUS

Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay1

1 Muslim Populations

The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised in the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was formed. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and Greeks of the island, each com- munity dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypri- ots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek- sponsored coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. By 1979, there were only around 1,000 Greek Cypriots remain- ing in the north (out of an original 142,000) and only 150 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south (out of an original 55,000).2 After the division of the island, the RoC, under Greek-Cypriot control, in the south, became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains to this day unrecognised by any country other than Turkey. Although the RoC is constitutionally a bi-communal state, in 2004 it became a member of the

1 Ali Dayıoğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bul- garia and Greece, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and minorities in Cyprus. Mete Hatay is Senior Research Consultant at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. 2 Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, PRIO Report 3/2006 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2006), pp. 3–4. 174 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

European Union (EU) without its Turkish Cypriot part. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the EU’s acquis communautaire. According to the 2011 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Ser- vice Department, the current population in the south, under the RoC- controlled area, is 838,897.3 Of these, 179,547 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 3,394 refugees and more than 5,396 asylum seekers are currently living in Cyprus, the majority of whom are Muslims.4 Cyprus is also home to a number of pri- vate universities and colleges which attract international students, many from Bangladesh and Pakistan.5 Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 EU accession.6 However, according to a study, the Muslim population of Turkish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.7 According to the 2011 census results, the total population in the island’s north is 294, 3968 although the census does not include the rotating pop- ulation of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. Because the details of the census results have not been made public yet, detailed demographic distribution remains unknown. How- ever, according to previous census results from 2006, of the total recorded population (265,100), 178,031 were citizens of the TRNC, although 27,333 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey.9 While religion was not listed

3 www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/732265957BAC953AC225798300406903? OpenDocument&sub=2&sel=1&e=&print, accessed 12 May 2012. 4 www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48dba6, accessed 12 May 2012. 5 Statistical Service of Republic of Cyprus, Statistics of Education 2005/2006, Nicosia 2007, available at www.mof.gov.cy. 6 It is known, however, that around 300 Roma had already crossed the Green Line, sought asylum, and settled in the RoC controlled areas in the late 1990’s (see further infor- mation regarding the Roma population movement at www.domresearchcenter.com/news/ cyprus/index.html. 7 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, IP/B/CULT/IC/2006_061. 8 www.devplan.org/Nufus-2011/nufus%20son_.pdf, accessed 12 February 2013. 9 http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Census%202006.pdf, accessed 10 May 2012. cyprus 175 on the census, and even though the majority of the population is funda- mentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially considered to be Muslims. According to the 2010 U.S. State Department Report on Religious Freedom, approximately 8% of the population in the island’s north attend weekly religious services, and 1.3% attend more than once a week.10 According to a survey carried out in Cyprus in 2011, the percentage of children who had never been to a church in south Cyprus was 1% and the percentage of children who had never been to a mosque in north Cyprus was 38%.11 The 2011 U.S. State Department Report on Religious Freedom indicated that rather than the Turkish Cypriots, it is foreign students, residents, immigrants, and workers of Turkish, Kurdish or Arab origin who celebrate and practise most of the spiritual and traditional aspects of their religions through mosque services.12 According to the 2006 census results, at the time of the census, there were also 70,525 non-TRNC citizen immigrants residing in north Cyprus, who were all nationals of the Republic of Turkey, almost all of whom are Muslims. The majority of this group were either studying in the univer- sities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group there were many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, with most following the Shafi’i School. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, consisting of Turkish nationals from both ethnic Turkish and Kurdish backgrounds. According to some sources, the total population of Alevis in north Cyprus is around 10,000.13 The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, but there is also a small population of or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining foreign residents are citizens of other countries, including the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, Russia, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslim.14 Recently, there has also been an influx of migrants from Central Asian

10 www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 11 Yenidüzen, 21 May 2011. 12 U.S. Department of State, The International Religious Freedom Report for 2011—Cyprus- The Area Administrated by Turkish Cypriots. www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/ index.htm?dynamic_load_id=192799#wrapper, accessed 8 March 2013. 13 Ibid. 14 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno- Demography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census, PRIO Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007). 176 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay countries, especially , the majority of whom are women coming to the island to work as domestic labourers.

2 Islam and the State

Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of waqf and the Laws and Principles of Waqfs (Ahkamül Evkaf ). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically the Waqfs was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institu- tions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belongs solely to the Waqfs, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turk- ish Cypriot deputies. Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no con- fiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Waqfs and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government sub- sidies. However, after 1974, the Waqfs lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Waqfs property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974, following the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution by referendum in 1985. Article 1 of the TRNC Con- stitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guar- antees freedom of religion and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating cyprus 177 to waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relat- ing to acquisitions and requisitions of waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Principles of Waqfs. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of waqf or any Muslim reli- gious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Waqfs and the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are the Waqfs (Kıbrıs Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, PO Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey, www.evkaf.org), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and the Müftü (or Mufti) (KKTC Din İşleri Başkanlığı, Din Sitesi, Hamitköy, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, www.kktcdinisleri.com) who is the official spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as representative of Muslims in Cyprus, the Waqfs Administration, currently called Waqfs and Religious Affairs Office (Vakıflar Örgütü ve Din İşleri Dairesi), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). As previously mentioned above, fol- lowing the 1974 division of the island, the Waqfs lost control of all hold- ings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the Mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974 his office moved to the north, and he is effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, has mainly been met by the World Islamic Call Soci- ety, an organisation based in Libya. In 2011, the current mufti appointed two imams to mosques in the island’s south. These imams are members of the island’s Nakshibendi (Naqshabandi) Sufi order and had already been conducting services in these mosques, but the mufti made their appoint- ment official and gave them a salary. In addition, the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus, Chrysostomos II, when asked about these appoint- ments, gave his tacit approval by remarking that Turkish Cypriots may 178 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay appoint imams in any of the mosques in the south.15 It should be noted, however, that because the current Mufti and the majority of the imams are of non-Cypriot origin, they are not allowed to cross to the south, even though eight mosques functioning in the south are technically under the Mufti’s control. As explained above, the Waqfs was the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. The Mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community was increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the Mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), although he is still known to Turkish Cypriots as the Mufti. His office is under the control of the Waqfs Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the Prime Minister. In addition, the DRA has authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and non- recognition of the north, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel, and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, two important associations, the Association of Universal Love and Brotherhood (Evrensel Sevgi ve Kardeşlik Derneği—www.eskad.org) and the Turkish Islam Culture Association (Kıbrıs Türk İslam Kültür Cemiyeti—http://turkislamkulturcemiyeti.com), sponsor various activities and programmes, especially for students from Turkey studying in the island. The former organisation was founded by a previous Mufti, who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a par- ticular interpretation of Islam that emphasises universal peace. The lat- ter association was influenced by the Turkish-Islam synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam. Certain Sufi tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbandi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers in Europe, Asia and the Americas. His main centre (dergah) is based in the small town of Lefke, where he regularly receives disciples visiting from abroad. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associa- tions, whose members are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, the TRNC Alevi Cultural Centre (KKTC Centre (Alevi Kültür Merkezi—

15 Kıbrıs, 18 August 2011. cyprus 179 www.kktcalevileri.org), has recently acquired land from the government in 2006 when the name of this association was TRNC Society for Research and Recognition of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (KKTC Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Derneği) to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gather- ings. Another significant Alevi organisation is the Kıbrıs Pir Sultan Cultural Society (http://kibrispirsultan.org).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either dur- ing the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. Since the island’s division, these properties have been under the con- trol of the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management. Although there has been an interest in the restoration and upkeep of mosques in the past sev- eral years, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. During the RoC’s EU accession process between 2000 and 2003, RoC spent approximately €100,000 per year. The amount then increased significantly in 2004, fol- lowing the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the EU. From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties. In 2008, one UNDP-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were in good condition after repairs.16 The 2011 Ministry of Interior budget for restoration activities was €814,300. Today, only eight of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol have been maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limassol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam trav- els from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. However, this mosque was set on fire by several young Greek Cypriot fanatics in April 2012.17 In Larnaca, the Hala Sultan

16 See www.cyprustemples.com. 17 www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1085105, accessed 12 July 2012. 180 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Tekke and Mosque is under the dual management of the Department of Antiquities and the Custodian of Turkish Cypriot Properties. During 2009, the Naqshibandi tariqa, based in the town of Lefke in north Cyprus, received permission to conduct services in the Hala Sultan Mosque on Fridays and during religious holidays. Receiving encouragement from this success, the tariqa proceeded to establish an association in the island’s south with the intent of pressuring the RoC to give control of the mosque to this order. Their application was rejected by the Ministry of the Inte- rior on the grounds that the mosque is now a cultural heritage site and used as a museum.18 The dervish who conducts services in the Hala Sultan Mosque was one of the two imams recently officially appointed by the Mufti and mentioned above. It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque. Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. Only the Bayraktar Mosque is now open on Thurs- day evenings for the Naqshbandi order to perform zikr and Friday prayers despite the fact that the mosque is not open for regular prayers. In addi- tion, the authors observed that the two operational mosques are not suf- ficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially during Friday prayers. In the north, according to data provided by the former head of the DRA, Yusuf Suiçmez, in 2009 there were 182 functioning mosques. Of these, 84 existed before the island’s division, while 48 were churches that had been converted to mosques after 1974. In addition, four buildings previously used as cinemas or schools had been converted into mosques. Suiçmez also stated that between 1974 and 2009, 39 new mosques have been built, and of these 31 were financed by the Directorate of Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy.19 In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and interna- tional reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. In those villages and neighbourhoods where new mosques have been built, churches that had been used as mosques ceased to be utilised in this way. According to the DRA, as of 8 June 2012, there were 196 mosques and masjids in Northern Cyprus.20

18 Kıbrıs, 6 January 2011. 19 Ernur, Ergül, “16 Yeni Cami için 13 Trilyon” (13 Trillion for New Mosques), Kıbrıs, 7 May 2009. 20 www.kktcdinisleri.com/node/694, accessed 25 July 2012. cyprus 181

Mosques in Northern Cyprus belong by law to the Waqfs Administra- tion. Although the Waqfs collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 5% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 95% come from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Turkey, so the cost of mosque maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastruc- ture in the north, is provided for by Turkey.21 For instance, in 2011, Turkey granted 7,208,000 TL (approximately €3,087,000) to the TRNC to be spent in the following areas: 1) construction of 12 new mosques; 2) organisa- tion of summer [religion] courses and social and cultural activities for students; 3) organisation of in-service training and cultural activities for religious officials; 4) donations to mosques for libraries; and 5) repair and maintenance of mosques and purchase of equipment.22 The total amount spent was 1,825,005 TL (approximately €786,000). The amount allocated to municipalities for the construction of mosques was raised to 4,000,000 TL (approximately €1,723,000).23 While these are the current provisions for mosques, there are no other facilities available for worship, such as rooms allocated to worship in pub- lic offices. The reason for this is that the majority of the public servants are Turkish Cypriots, who are fundamentally secular. Nevertheless, there are masjids at the country’s only airport and universities for foreign Muslims to pray. Claiming that the existing masjids could not meet the demand, in April 2012, Near East University (NEU), and in August 2012, Eastern Medi- terranean University (EMU) announced that they were going to build mosques on their campuses. Also, the armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. While the Turkish Embassy Aid Committee provided financial aid for the construction of mosques, no funds were provided to the Alevis for the construction of a cemevi (Alevi house of worship) because they were not recognised as a religious community. In order to correct this situation, in 2006, the coalition government under the leadership of left wing Republican Turkish Party-United Forces (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi- Birleşik Güçler/CTP-BG) allocated a piece of land to the Alevi community

21 Suiçmez, Yusuf, “Din İşleri ve Vakıflar” (Religious Affairs and Waqfs), Havadis, 1 April 2012. 22 www.yhb.gov.tr/download/anlasmalar/2010-2012/2011-Mali-yili-Hibe-Protokolu.pdf, accessed 14 July 2012. 23 Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, Directorate of Aid Committee, Aid from Republic of Turkey to TRNC: 2011 Annual Activity Report, (no date), pp. 96–97. 182 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay to build a cemevi. Even though the Waqfs Foundation and the DRA made an 80,000 TL (approximately €34,450) contribution for the cemevi in 2008,24 this amount was not enough to complete the construction. The Alevi spokespersons stated that after the change in government in 2009, they never received any aid from the state, and that although they had applied to the prime ministry and the Turkish Embassy, their requests had fallen on deaf ears as of April 2012.25 As a result, the Alevi community has tried to finance the construction of the cemevi through donations or proceeds that came from various events that they organised. However, this was not enough to complete the construction of the cemevi, either. Therefore, as of December 2012, there was no cemevi in north Cyprus.

5 Children’s Education

There are no state-supported Islamic schools in south Cyprus, while instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a writ- ten request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turkish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must, however, be noted that despite the provisions of the Consti- tution of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.26 According to the TRNC Constitution, “Religious education and instruc- tion shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Since 2005, new regulations put religious instruction at the secondary level of pri- mary education under the control of school management committees. As a result, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curricula. However, in 2009 compulsory instruction in “religious culture and morality” was put into effect one hour per week, but so far the lack

24 Yenidüzen, 6 September 2010. 25 Konuralp, Tanju, “196 Cami Var, 1 Cemevi Yok” (There are 196 Mosques, not 1 Cemevi), Yenidüzen, 23 April 2012. 26 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Okullar Sorunu II: Limasol Türk İlkokulu” (The School Problem in Cyprus II: The Limassol Turkish Primary School), Kıbrıs Yazıları, No. 2, (Bahar 2006), pp. 56–69. cyprus 183 of teachers has hampered its implementation in many schools. Therefore, religion and ethics teachers started to be recruited from Turkey. Despite the reactions of teachers’ trade unions, as of December 2012 there was no change in this policy. On the other hand, as mentioned below, the most important development in 2012 was the opening of a religious vocational high school under the name of “Hala Sultan Divinity College.” Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of controversy, twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach. Nevertheless, in the summer of 2011 religion courses were given five days a week; three days at schools and two days in mosques. The applied courses at mosques were given by religion teachers rather than imams.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, the DRA, (under the control of Waqfs), which is an institution of the TRNC, and the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. Following the opening of the Faculty of Religious Studies at NEU and of a divinity branch at Haspolat Vocational High School in 2011, the most significant development in 2012, as mentioned above, was the inaugura- tion of the Hala Sultan Divinity College, the first religious vocational high school in Northern Cyprus, in the 2012–2013 academic year. Although the divinity branch opened at the Haspolat Vocational High School in November 2011 was also intended to educate religious officials, this branch maintained a vocational school status. The subject of opening the Hala Sultan Divinity College first came up when, in accordance with the TRNC Council of Ministers decision dated 25 January 2012, 200 acres of land belonging to the Waqfs Foundation, in Nicosia’s Haspolat area, were leased to the Cyprus Science, Ethics and Social Assistance Foundation (Kıbrıs İlim, Ahlak ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı-KİSAV) for 30 years at an annual cost of 100 TL (approximately €43) with the purpose of building an “Education Complex”. The fact that the construction of a divinity high school was mentioned in the project was a sign that the College was going to be opened. The fact that buildings 184 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay for accommodation, halls for social gatherings and sports events, religious facilities and a large mosque were going to be constructed in addition to the high school as part of the project, resulted in opposition to the project from the majority of society, including the Alevis, on the grounds that what was intended was not an “Education Complex” but a Külliye (complex of buildings around a mosque).27 Many political parties, trade unions and non-governmental organisations claimed that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), which is in power in Turkey, was behind KİSAV, and that the project was approved under pressure from the AKP.28 Despite the reactions, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi-UBP) government announced that the project would go ahead and that the entrance exam for the College would be adminis- tered on 23 June 2012. Claims emerged that the Waqfs Foundation land had been leased in an irregular way, and this resulted in the issue being brought to Parliament. An investigation committee was formed, and the Attorney General’s Office and the Judicial Office were consulted. However, in its judgment dated 15 June 2012, the Judicial Office did not address the issue of the land lease and instead declared that under the current laws and directives, a private divinity branch or college, i.e., one not regulated by the state, could not be opened in the TRNC. Moreover, it asked the government to put an end to its efforts to open the college as the necessary laws were not in place, and to prioritise making the necessary laws if there was a need for and it planned to open a divinity college or any other type of school that was not mentioned in the laws.29 The government ignored the judgment and on 23 June, before the investigation committee finalised its work, the College entrance exam was administered. Furthermore, it was announced that the divinity branch of the Haspolat Vocational High School would operate under the Divinity College. Following the exam, the ground-breaking ceremony for the college was held on 20 July 2012. As the building could not be completed in time for the 2012–2013 academic year, the Hala Sultan Divinity College opened in

27 According to a nationwide survey carried out on the issue by Public Opinion Research and Consultancy Company (KADEM), 57,5% of the Turkish Cypriots over the age of 18 were against the Külliye and the percentage of those in favour of the project remained at 24.2%. Yenidüzen, 16 June 2012. 28 For more detailed information on the issue of the Külliye see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Külliye Tartışmaları: Siyasi Bir Proje mi? Toplumsal Bir İhtiyaç mı?” (Külliye Debate in Cyprus: A Political Project? A Societal Need?), Gaile, No. 170, (7 July 2012), pp. 2–3. 29 Güler, Ayşe, “İlahiyat Koleji’ni İptal Edin” (Revoke the Divinity College), Halkın Sesi, 16 June 2012; Kişi, Fayka, “Yasal Değil!” (It’s Not Legal!), Yenidüzen, 16 June 2012. cyprus 185

September 2012 in a building belonging to the Turkish Education Associa- tion (TED) North Cyprus College. With the arrival of students from the Haspolat Vocational High School, the number of students at the Divinity College reached 173. The teachers for the courses related to religion were appointed from Turkey.30 It was announced that the Divinity College would continue education here until its own building was completed. Apart from these schools, the Anadolu University, a Turkish university, which also has a campus in north Cyprus, has an Open Faculty, where there is a theology department at the undergraduate level.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good con- dition. In the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Waqfs Administration, which also provides for services con- ducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, pris- ons or the armed forces in either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. In 2010, the U.S. State Department Religious Freedom Report noted that the Ombudsman’s Office in the RoC had investigated a Muslim prisoner’s complaints regard- ing the lack of prayer facilities in the prison. While the Central Prison has both a mosque and an Orthodox church, the Ombudsman’s Office found that these were not open regularly but only weekly and on religious holi- days. In addition, in response to the complaint of a prisoner in the state’s “open prison,” the same office found that the opportunity for religious practice in these facilities was limited but that the state had promised to correct the problem by the end of 2011.31 However, no improvement in these conditions has since been observed. Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. As mentioned above, the armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia

30 Menteş, Didem, “İlahiyat Öğretmenleri Türkiye’den!” (Divinity Teachers from Turkey!), Yenidüzen, 27 September 2012. 31 www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 186 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, espe- cially during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

While no Islamic festivals are recognised in the south, all Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals at the end of Ramadan and ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turk- ish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with the bayrams. Beginning approximately ten years ago, Turkish Cypriots began to cel- ebrate the Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as the Week of the Holy Birth (Kutlu Doğum Haftası), or Mevlid-i Nebi, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated before, under the influence of trends coming from Turkey, this one-day event became a week-long festi- val, with religious educational activities, including conferences and semi- nars. In addition, clergy employed by the DRA are requested to visit the homes of people within their communities and to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad. In 2012, north Cyprus celebrated the Week of the Holy Birth with an increased number of events that included the presence of more govern- ment officials and higher public attendance than in the past. During the celebrations, held between 14–20 April under the theme of “Brotherhood,” officials inaugurated new mosques and fountains, and the week’s pro- gramme contained conferences, along with sacred song and poetry reci- tations. The programme also included philanthropic activities, such as blood donations. For some observers of these events, the high attendance of primary school children was especially striking.32 Left-wing teachers’

32 For more on the events see Havadis, 6 April 2012; Yenidüzen, 12 April 2012; Havadis, 13 April 2012; Havadis, 15 April 2012; Havadis, 16 April 2012; Kıbrıs, 23 April 2012; Havadis, 23 April 2012; Yenidüzen, 24 April 2012. cyprus 187 trade unions reacted to this situation, objecting that it was a new attempt to indoctrinate children in religious teaching. Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s concep- tion, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent into Heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. In addition, Ramadan celebrations increased in size and visibility in 2012. The Red Crescent organised iftar tents in 17 different locations, and organisation officials announced that they intended to offer fast-breaking meals to 145,000 people.33 Besides the fast-breaking meals, which govern- ment officials attended in large numbers, some municipalities and private organisations organised Ramadan festivals. Alevis also freely celebrate their own festivals, such as Ashura and qur- ban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or min- strels, are brought from Turkey. In this context, the Alevi Cultural Centre organised the Ashura day on 25 November 2012.34 On the same day a similar event was organised at the Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca. Approxi- mately 600 Turkish Cypriots from north Cyprus attended the event.35 In 2012 the DRA also arranged for 69 people from north Cyprus to par- ticipate in the pilgrimage to Mecca, accompanied by two DRA officials.36

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim pop- ulation. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat in this government-monitored area. He esti- mates that he slaughters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is halal. In North Cyprus, the DRA organises travel for the pilgrimage to Mecca.

33 Havadis, 11 August 2012. 34 Kıbrıs, 26 November 2012. 35 Kıbrıs, 28 November 2012. 36 Havadis, 8 October 2012. 188 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

There is only one Islamic bank in north Cyprus, Faisal Islamic Bank of Kıbrıs Ltd (www.faisalislambank.com).

11 Dress Codes

There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibitions on the hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about headscarves in private schools. However, in May 2010 the Minister of Education and the teachers union confirmed the government’s policy that all students have the equal right to use religious symbols, including wearing a headscarf, at school. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear headscarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the headscarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified starting in 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the headscarf began at that time to come to north Cyprus to study. However, after the ban on wearing headscarves was lifted in many universities in Turkey after 2010, there has been a decrease in the number of students with headscarves coming from Turkey to north Cyprus. Another issue which merits mentioning occurred in July 2011, when the Union of Religious Officials (Din Görevlileri Sendikası-Din-Gör-Sen) expressed that some citizens were facing difficulties obtaining identity cards with photos in which they wore headscarves. The Union officials applied to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding that citizens apply- ing for identity cards not be required to submit additional photographs in which they were not wearing the headscarf. In its statement, the Ministry stated that people were under the obligation to submit clearly recognis- able photos when applying for identity cards.37

12 Publications and Media

The media operate freely in the south, though the local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to radio

37 Kıbrıs, 27 July 2011. cyprus 189 stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fri- days for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programmes. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available on sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. In addition to all these, many religious associations can freely distribute the Qur’an and other books with religious content.

13 Family Law

Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Muslims. With the RoC’s accession to the EU, however, this law has been changed, and inter-faith marriage is allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Muslims in the north do choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recogn- ised. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conju- gal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents.

14 Interreligious Relations

One of the most striking developments with respect to this issue was the establishment of the bi-communal “Technical Committee on Cul- tural Heritage” at the inter-communal talks that resumed in 2008, with the aim of the protection and restoration of monuments that are part of the immovable cultural heritage in the north and south of Cyprus. Finan- cially supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and EU, the Committee started working in 2009. In a short period of time general cleaning and strengthening work was carried out on some of the mosques in the south, and some of the churches in the north. Prelimi- nary work necessary for the restoration of these monuments was also 190 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay carried out. The Committee continued its activities in 2012. The statement made by the Committee in August 2012 with regard to the work to be carried out throughout the year and afterwards indicated that the Com- mittee intended to carry out repairs on 140 mosques and churches; that there were 40 monuments in need of urgent repair; and that work on 10 of these monuments would start without further delay.38 In this respect, in November 2012, the Committee announced restoration work on one church in the north and one mosque in the south was about to start, and that the work would be completed by March 2013.39 Immediately after the announcement repairs on the monuments began. The most important development in interreligious relations during 2012 was that after a 100-year interlude, bayram greetings were again exchanged at the Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca on October 28, the last day of the Kurban Bayramı. Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, American, Swedish, Egyptian and Lebanese officials attended the event. The Archbishop of the Maronite Catholic Church and special envoys of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Church of Armenia also attended the event.40

15 Public Opinion And Debate

In the north, the UBP government’s programme of 2009 proposed sum- mer religious courses, which included Qur’an lessons. Although this new proposal also produced vehement reactions amongst some fundamentally secularist Cypriots, religious courses were nevertheless implemented. Stu- dents who had finished grade three were allowed to attend the courses, and the former head of the DRA (Mufti) Yusuf Suiçmez stated that in 2009 around 2,000 applications were received for the courses, most coming from Turkish immigrants living in Cyprus.41 The same number again applied in 2011, according to a statement by the new president of the DRA, Talip Atalay.42 In 2012, the number of participants remained at around 2,000.43

38 Kıbrıs, 20 August 2012. 39 Yenidüzen, 16 November 2012; Kıbrıs, 14 December 2012. 40 Tokay, Elmas, “Farklı Dinlerin Buluşması” (The Meeting of Different Religions), Kıbrıs, 31 October 2012. 41 Aral Moral, Aral, “Kur’an Kursu için Kuyruk” (Queue for Qur’an Courses), Havadis, 17 June 2009. 42 In his statement, Talip Atalay noted that 523 people from Famagusta and 504 people from İskele had applied to attend the courses. The fact that these two districts are areas densely populated by people from Turkey was an indication that the majority of the chil- dren attending the courses were from these families. Yenidüzen, 5 July 2011. 43 Yenidüzen, 7 July 2012. cyprus 191

However, teachers’ unions, leftist political parties and some associations, primarily Alevis, continued to protest against these courses, arguing that these state-sponsored classes perpetuated the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine and therefore violated the principle of laicism. As a result of these reactions, some families that wished to give their children religious and Qur’an edu- cation continued to apply to the DRA for summer courses, in this case asking that their children be sent to Turkey. According to the DRA, the number of applications for summer religious courses in Turkey rose from 200 in 2008 to 300 in 200944 and to 600 in 2010.45 In a report he pre- sented to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 24 June 2009, the Chairman of the Association of Religious Studies and Higher Islam Institute Graduates (Tüm İlahiyat ve Yüksek İslam Enstitüleri Mezunları Derneği-TİYEMDER), Selahattin Yazıcı, stated that they had been carry- ing out various activities in north Cyprus for nine years and that during this time they had given 45 to 60 daylong religion courses to 720 students from north Cyprus in Istanbul, Turkey.46 Students continued to attend religious courses in Turkey in 2012. One newspaper claimed that imams in villages populated by immigrants from Turkey were especially involved in promoting such courses.47 In addition to public reaction against the summer religious courses, leftist opposition parties, teachers’ unions and many NGOs, led by Alevi associations, opposed the opening of the divinity branch at Haspolat Voca- tional High School in November 2011. They argued that pressure from the AKP ruling party in Turkey was responsible for the opening of the divinity branch, and they demanded the branch’s closure. The strongest reaction to the opening of the divinity branch came from the Cyprus Turkish Sec- ondary Education Teachers’ Union (Kıbrıs Türk Orta Eğitim Öğretmenler Sendikası-KTOEÖS), which declared an indefinite strike at the school in question. The strike began in November 2011 and continued until Febru- ary 2012. Although the strike was located at the Haspolat Vocational High School, the trade union also announced that as a reaction to the divinity branch’s opening, there would be a general boycott on issuing end-of- term grades in the north Cyprus secondary schools. School reports would not be given on 31 January 2012, as was mandated, but at a later date.48

44 Yenidüzen, 31 May 2009; see also Günalp, Çağıl, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Kursu” (Qur’an Courses in Turkey), Yenidüzen, 13 August 2009. 45 Yenidüzen, 10 July 2010. 46 Havadis, 30 June 2011. 47 Moreket, Mehmet, “İmamların Görevi Ne?” (What Are the Imam’s Duties?), Havadis, 16 June 2012. 48 Yenidüzen, 19 January 2012; Kıbrıs, 29 January 2012. 192 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Parent-teacher associations, as well as various associations and organi- sations comprised of immigrants from Turkey, criticised this action. The union stated that the action, which ended on 25 February 2012, achieved 100% teacher participation.49 Although it was announced in 2010 that a Külliye was to be built in the area where the Nicosia Bus Terminal is situated, the plan had to be abandoned following negative reactions. As mentioned above, the Kül- liye issue came on the agenda again when, in accordance with the TRNC Council of Ministers decision dated 25 January 2012, 200 acres of land, which belonged to the Waqfs Foundation in Nicosia’s Haspolat area was leased to KİSAV. Many circles in the society reacted to the Council of Ministers’ decision. The circles in question claimed that Turkey had put pressure on the TRNC government with regard to the matter, and asserted that the ruling AKP in Turkey was trying to destroy the Turkish Cypriot community’s secular nature and to create an Islamist community. The fact that in a speech he made in Turkey on 31 January 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “we want to raise a religious youth” 50 was presented as evidence for these claims. Led by the Union of Religious Officials, various associations and organisations established by immigrants from Turkey supported the Külliye project.51

16 Major Cultural Events

The usual religious holidays were celebrated in both sides of the island in 2012. Mawlana Jalal al-Din was commemorated in various activities in 2012. The NEU Rumi Institute organised a variety of events on 17 and 18 December due to the Mawlana Week. A concert and sema ritual were also held at the Girne American University (GAU). Also, the Cyprus Cultural Association organised the “Alevi Culture Festival” on 17 June 2012.52 In April 2012, various events were also organised to mark the 56th anniversary of the handover of the Waqfs from British colonial adminis- tration to the Turkish Cypriot society. In that respect, in eight mosques

49 Yenidüzen, 25 February 2012; Havadis, 26 February 2012. 50 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=19819372, accessed 12 Janu- ary 2013. 51 Kıbrıs, 3 February 2012; Havadis, 12 February 2012; Kıbrıs, 18 June 2012. 52 www.brtk.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46039:geln-canlar- br-olalim&catid=1:kktc&Itemid=3, accessed 14 December 2012. cyprus 193 religious memorial services were held in honour of the souls of those who had made contributions to the Waqfs. Various celebrations also were held during this period.53 Another striking issue in 2012 was the sheer number of events empha- sising the importance of Islam, the importance of Islam in Cyprus and Islamic works. For example, on 3–4 May, the NEU held a symposium enti- tled, “Cyprus in Islamic-Turkish History.”54 On 22 July, a photo exhibition titled, “Islamic Masterpieces of Istanbul” was opened in Nicosia.55 As part of the “Mosques and Religious Officials Week” various events and confer- ences were held in October.56 The was celebrated at an event organised by ESKAD on 29 December in Nicosia.57 Apart from these observances and holidays, several municipalities carried out religious events. For example, as part of the senior citizens week, the Municipality of Lapta organised a trip on 24 March 2012, to the Hazreti Ömer Tekke in the Kyrenia area.58

53 Yenidüzen, 13 April 2012; Havadis, 16 April 2012. 54 Kıbrıs, 3 May 2012. 55 Kıbrıs, 23 July 2012. 56 Havadis, 6 October 2012. 57 Kıbrıs, 1 January 2013. 58 Yenidüzen, 25 March 2012.

CZECH REPUBLIC

Štěpán Macháček1

1 Muslim Populations

In the 2011 Czech census, 3,385 people indicated Islam as their religious affiliation. Out of that number, 1,442 mentioned Ústředí muslimských obcí v ČR (the Headquarters of the Muslim Communities in the Czech Republic, UMO) as the “church” they belong to.2 The difference between the two figures reflects the fact that Czech official Islamic organisations do not enjoy much authority in the Muslim community. The figures show a slight decrease if compared to the previous census of 2001 where some 3,700 inhabitants of the Czech Republic put Islam as their religion.3 However, the actual number of Muslims is higher, for the declaration of the faith in the census was optional and many Muslims feel uncomfortable identify- ing themselves with their faith in official documents or just do not feel the need to declare their religion.4 The real number of Muslims in the Czech Republic is estimated at around 10,000 or about 0.1% of the total popula- tion of the country.5

1 Štěpán Macháček is a former research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now working as a Czech Radio correspondent in the Middle East. He is a graduate in Arabic Philology and Islamic History. His research was focused on contemporary Islam in the Balkans, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 2 2011 census results for religious affiliation are available at official census website www.scitani.cz/sldb2011/redakce.nsf/i/obyvatelstvo_podle_nabozenske_viry_podle_kraju_ podrobne_udaje/$File/sldb_podrobna_vira.xls, accessed 27 March 2013. 3 A figure given by the Czech Department for Statistics (Český statistický úřad), available at www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110-03--obyvatelstvo_hlasici_se_k_ jednotlivym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 27 March 2013. 4 It is worth mentioning that out of the total Czech population of 10,562,214 in 2011 census, 4,774,323 or about 45% did not indicate any religion while another 3,612,804 or about 34% indicated they don’t have any religious affiliation. Also not without interest is the fact that 15 070 Czechs declared themselves as Jediists, followers of the fictional religion from the Star Wars films, a number that almost five times exceeds that of the Muslims in 2011 census. 5 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Holger Daun and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ostřanský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in 196 štěpán macháček

The territory of today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim com- munity. Within the current community, three categories of Muslims can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic on the basis of permanent or temporary residency permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, who are nevertheless very active in Muslim organisations.6 As Emily Jane O’Dell in her report notes, holiday journeys to Muslim countries can be found behind many cases of native Czechs’ conversions to Islam.7 The second group consists of former students who came from then Social- ist oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation and married and obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries, Syria, Libya, , Iraq and Sudan being at the forefront. This category explains the fact that a large part of the Czech Muslim community consists of educated people and professionals, contrary to some West European countries. Muslims of the third category came mostly after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs. Arab countries (especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kos- ovo or Macedonia) are typically their regions of origin, followed by other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan, etc.). According to the latest statistics published by the Czech Ministry of Interior, it appears to be obvious that Muslims represent only a relatively small share of the total number of foreigners living in the Czech Repub- lic. Since the statistics do not mention the religion of the foreigners, the only way to come to an approximate number of Muslims is to total the numbers of foreigners coming from the predominantly Muslim countries, i.e. the countries where Muslims constitute at least 50 per cent of the population. The most recent data available at the time of writing was for 31 October 2012. The total of foreigners originating from predominantly

the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007, p. 408). Lukáš Lhoťan cites the Czech Min- istry of Interior estimate of 11,235 Muslims in the country in 2006 (see Lhoťan, Lukáš, Islám a islamizmus v České republice (Islam And In The Czech Republic) (Pstruží: LH 2011), p. 10). 6 This figure is also a mere estimate, put by Mohamed Alí Šilhavý, the late head of Czech Muslim community, in late 1990s. Since then, this number has been often taken as the closest approximation. However, Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of UMO, claimed in a personal interview I had with him 3 January 2011, that annually, there are tens of conversions of Czechs to Islam. Thus the number of Czech converts is supposed to be increasing. 7 O’Dell, Emily Jane, Islam in the Czech and Slovak Republics: an Invisible Minority Becomes Visible. The report is available at www.irex.org/sites/default/files/ODell%20 Scholar%20Research%20Brief%202010-2011.pdf, accessed 27 March 2013. czech republic 197

Muslim countries, with temporary or permanent residency permit, was 18,521. Out of that number, 8,387 were permanent residents.8 Of course, it is not possible to claim that these figures mean the real numbers of Mus- lims. Many foreigners coming from the predominantly Muslim countries may not be Muslims and many foreigners coming from non-Muslim coun- tries may be Muslims.9 However, taking into account these imperfections, we can assume that some eight to nine thousand foreigners from largely Muslim countries live permanently in the Czech Republic. Anything between 18 and 20 thousand foreigners can be more or less exact estima- tion of the total number of foreigners from those countries living tempo- rarily or permanently in the Czech Republic. Anyway, they represent only a small share of the total of 439,223 foreigners living in the Czech Republic on 31 October 2012.10 The figures for citizenship granted to foreigners were less than 10 per individual Muslim country in 2010 and we can expect sim- ilar numbers for previous years too.11 The numbers of asylum granted to the people from Muslim countries between 1990 and 2010 are as follows: Afghanistan 294, Iraq 141, Kazakhstan 104, and Iran 52. Number of asylum granted people from other Muslim states was less than 50.12 Generally, the number of asylum seekers fell considerably following the implementation the Schengen Agreement in the Czech Republic in 2007. To conclude, the accessible statistics confirm the estimation of roughly ten thousand Mus- lims permanently living in the Czech Republic added to by another eight to ten thousand Muslims with a temporary residence in the country.

2 Islam and the State

Today the Czech Republic has no state religion and the constitution pro- vides for freedom of religion.

8 Statistics of the Czech Ministry of Interior, available at www.mvcr.cz/clanek/cizinci- s-povolenym-pobytem.aspx, last accessed 1 April 2013. 9 For methodological reasons, I could not include the foreigners from Bosnian- Herzegovina with probably slightly less than 50% of population being Muslims, although I personally believe that most of the total of 2259 foreigners of Bosnian origin in the Czech Republic are Muslims. On the other hand, for the same reason I had to include 4944 foreigners from Kazakhstan in the total although I suspect that many of them are non- Muslim ethnic Russians. 10 Statistics of the Czech Ministry of Interior, available at: www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ cizinci-s-povolenym-pobytem.aspx, last accessed 1 April 2013. 11 The data are accessible at the Czech Ministry of Interior site available at: www .mvcr.cz/soubor/tabulkova-cast-pdf.aspx, p. 39, accessed 1 April 2013. 12 Ibid., pp. 50–51, accessed 1 April 2013. 198 štěpán macháček

Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Ministry of Culture as cultural or social organisations. As such, they are not granted any public funding. In 2004, the umbrella organisation UMO succeeded in registration as a religious community. For the first time since the end of , Czech Muslims were officially recognised by the state. For more privileges, such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, there are requirements that UMO is unlikely ever to be able to fulfil (for instance, believers of the community must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,500 for the Czech Republic, which corresponds to the actual number of nominal Muslims in the country, but most of them are not organised and are not in touch with any Muslim organi- sation). UMO has asked the authorities for an exception from that rule since 2002, but the request was turned down.13 UMO and other Muslim activities are funded by local believers’ contributions and donations and by foreign organisations.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

UMO was formed as a Muslim umbrella organisation (www.umocr.cz) in 1991.14 The UMO chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and a symbol of Czech Muslims. Since March 2009, the organisation has been led by Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin), while another important person in the organisation is a Czech convert Vladimír Sáňka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community). The core of UMO is an executive council in which every Czech Muslim organisation is meant to have a representative. Geographically, UMO consists today of four communities: Prague, Brno, Teplice, and Hradec Králové. However, since the end of the 1990s, the importance of UMO has been decreas- ing at the expense of Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno, and UMO

13 According to the words of Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of the UMO, published on the internet news site Novinky.cz on 23 February 2009, www.novinky.cz/domaci/162064-musli move-a-krisnovci-se-zlobi-nedosahnou-na-miliony-od-statu.html, accessed 1 April 2013. From 2002 to 2007, there was an option for religious communities to request this excep- tion called Special Rights (zvláštní práva) and intended for the “historically established world religions” (as opposed to large number of modern sects) with insufficient number of believers in the Czech Republic. In the case of Muslim community, Czech authorities gave a negative response in 2006. 14 Until recently, the name of this organisation was Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí (The Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities). czech republic 199 became only a formal umbrella organisation and it continues to be the only Islamic organisation registered as a “church” by the state. Otherwise, UMO is not very active and in fact it personally merged with the Islamic Foundations. Officially, UMO is headquartered in the mosque of Prague (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, [email protected]), having moved there from Šilhavý’s hometown of Třebíč. Before UMO was ­registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as “cul- tural” or “social” organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and have become members of UMO. Islámská nadace v Praze (The Islamic Foundation in Prague, INP) has developed since 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room from 1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in Prague in 1999. Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an informa- tion office in the centre of Prague (Politických vězňů 14, 110 00 Praha 1, www.praha.muslim.cz, [email protected]) with a prayer room, and since 2004 has been managing an Islamic centre, also with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. Since 1993, its chairman has been Lazhar Maamri, of Algerian origin. The above mentioned Vladimír Sáňka also plays an important role in the organisation. The INP is closely connected with Muslimská obec v Praze (Muslim Community in Prague). While the latter is an association of believers, the INP that is in the hands of a few leading persons, holds all the property. The INP faces a com- plaint for long standing accounting frauds. The complaint was filed by a Czech former Muslim activist Lukáš Lhoťan who expressed his concerns that the INP tries to hide suspicious Saudi donors. Since 2004, the INP has not submitted any annual accounting reports to the registration court, as required by law.15 The percentage of Muslims in Prague who are active in or in a contact with any Muslim organisation is estimated at 15 to 20%.16 Islámská nadace v Brně (The Islamic Foundation in Brno, INB) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city and the main centre of Islamic activity in the Czech Republic. An Islamic centre, with a mosque, was opened in 1998 and this was the first mosque to be built in the country.

15 A report by Czech newsweb Regiony24 available at http://praha5.regiony24.cz/14- 112000-islamska-nadace-v-praze-celi-trestnimu-oznameni-kvuli-podezreni-z-rozsahlych- ucetnich-podvodu, accessed 1 April 2013. 16 Lhoťan, Islám a islamizmus v České republice, p. 58. 200 štěpán macháček

The Islamic Foundation is based at the mosque (Vídeňská 38a, 693 00 Brno, brno.muslim.cz, [email protected]). There is a believers’ association Muslimská obec v Brně (The Muslim Community in Brno) that is closely connected to INB. But all property including the mosque belongs to the INB which is led by a few persons. In 2011, the INB also had a problem with reporting its accounting to the court. Here too, maximum 15 to 20% of Brno Muslims are estimated to take part in community activities.17 Muslimský svaz student a mládeže (Muslim Union of Students and Youth, MSSM) or also Svaz muslimských studentů v ČR (Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic) was founded in 1991 by foreign students studying in the Czech Republic, the most visible being a Sudanese student of architecture, Muhammad Abbas al-Mu’tasim (www.svazmuslim.cz). It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories. In the 1990s, al-Mu’tasim and his Muslimská unie (Muslim Union) was a competitor of INP for becoming a leading organisation of Muslims in Prague. Now the MSSM organises summer and winter Islamic congresses and gatherings for Czech Muslims and also runs a course on Islam by correspondence. Mainly due to discontent with the mainstream Muslim organisations mentioned above, a few other groups appeared. In Prague, mostly Turk- ish speaking Muslims split from the main community and established their own prayer room (Prag Merkez Cami, Pivovarnická 3, Praha 8, tel: +420 606 141 858, [email protected]). It is supported by Turkish and German financial sources. In Brno, many members of local Muslim community became dis- appointed with the undemocratic way Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi was appointed to the UMO chairmanship in 2009 and as the chairman of INB in 2010. These Muslims have joined a recently established platform around Jazyková škola Alfirdaus (Alfirdaus Language School), led by Bader Mea Eknaifith (Masarykova 23, 602 00 Brno, tel: +420 773 943 164, www.alfirdaus.cz, [email protected]). Alfirdaus offers courses in Ara- bic and other languages as well as courses on Qur’an and Islam. There is a prayer room at the school. There are indications that this group is mostly Shi’i Muslims, unlike most of those connected with the INB and Al Rawi.18

17 Ibid., p. 56. 18 A report on this split was published in the local daily Brněnský deník on 18 April 2009, http://brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/sef-muslimu-novodoby-diktator-z-brna20090418. html, accessed 1 April 2013. czech republic 201

Since 2005, there is also a civic association Mozaiky in Prague (Žitná 49, Praha 1, tel: +420 222 544 145, www.platformdialog.cz, info@platform dialog.cz) that popularises the thoughts of Fethullah Gülen and supports translations and publication of his work. In 2007, an association Libertas Independent Agency was established in Brno. It unites mostly Czech Muslim converts as well as some non- Muslims and among its main goals is to fight Islamophobia and to present Islam to the Czech public. One of the founders, a former Czech convert Lukáš Lhoťan, is a vocal critic of the representatives of the Czech Muslim community. The main target of his critical statements is the alleged con- nection of those representatives to international Islamist organisations and their moral support to movements such as and the Muslim Brotherhood. Generally speaking, except for the Turkish Prag Merkez Cami, the above mentioned organisations do not have a specific ethnic, national or religious character. Their members include both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Since 1989, Czech Muslims have come up with several purpose-built mosque building projects, but most have been rejected by local authori- ties who ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants (on the basis of pro- test petitions against a mosque in a neighbourhood or city and supported in some cases by local church representatives). Such was the fate of two projects of mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates—there are always tens or hundreds of patients from Arab coun- tries staying in Teplice for treatment. Another mosque project in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although it was regarded as doubtful by members of Czech Muslim community themselves, was rejected by the local authorities in 2004. In the Eastern Bohemian city of Hradec Králové, there was a campaign and petition led by some local politicians against construction of a mosque or Islamic centre in 2010 and the beginning of 2011. Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed in 1996 to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic and it was inaugurated in 1998. One year 202 štěpán macháček later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar Uni- versity and the Islamic University in . From 2006 to early 2011, the imam has been a Bosnian, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in Amman), and since 2006 also Sheikh Ahmad Al Khadhmi (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in San‘a). The question of building a mosque is sometimes a play with words. Even in those cities where “a mosque” was refused by local authorities, the Muslim communities established a sort of “Islamic centre” in older build- ings adapted to Muslims’ needs. It is the case in Teplice, where since 2009 a prayer hall originally used as offices has been adapted, and in Hradec Králové, where the local Muslim community in 2011 bought a former hotel building with the aim to adapt it to religious purposes.19 We have to add the above mentioned Turkish mosque in Prague and a prayer hall of Alfir- daus Language School in Brno. In addition, there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construc- tion of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but also in consideration of opposition by local people. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications, for ‘aesthetic reasons’ for example. The approval of the Brno mosque project, for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architec- ture”, i.e. a minaret.

5 Children’s Education

There are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. Accord- ing to the 2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which UMO was finally registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to

19 See the news by Czech newsweb Parlamentní listy available at www.parlament- nilisty.cz/arena/nazory-a-petice/Petice-proti-vystavbe-mesity-v-lazenskem-meste- Teplice-199932, accessed 1 April 2013; see also the blog of Jiří Novotný available at http:// novotnyjiri.blog.idnes.cz/c/154347/Muslimove-lzou-o-vystavbe-nove-mesity-v-Hradci- Kralove.html, accessed 1 April 2013. czech republic 203 establish their own state-recognised schools ten years after their registra- tion, but only if they can prove they have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. UMO does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in pri- mary and secondary schools. In one public primary school in Prague, there are Arabic language les- sons available, attended mostly by the pupils from families of foreign ori- gin (Základní škola Písnice, L. Coňka 40, 140 00 Praha 4; www.zspisnice .info). Courses in Arabic and some basic Islam are organised by the Islamic Foundation in Prague in the Prague mosque and by the language school Alfirdaus ( Jazyková škola Alfirdaus, Masarykova 30, 602 00 Brno; www .alfirdaus.cz). Courses in Islam (similar to catechism) are attended by sev- eral dozen children on weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). The Arabic courses are open to the non-Muslim public. Arabic as a language is offered by several language schools in the Czech Republic with no connection to the Muslim Community.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifica- tions abroad. Arabic and Islamic studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the reli- gious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish, and Persian language courses are also available there. There are Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Arts at Western Bohemian University (Západočeská univerzita) in Plzeň and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programmes at several other Czech universities.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town of Třebíč, where UMO formerly had its headquarters. Ten years later, another Mus- lim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places was established in Prague in a section of the large cemetery in the suburb Olšany. The ritual washing of the deceased is organised by the Islamic Foundations 204 štěpán macháček in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the rela- tives and prayers for the deceased person are performed. No other spe- cial burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer room in the Ruzyně prison in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clientele of the spas.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their cel- ebrations are limited to private homes, embassies, and mosques in Prague and Brno. Since 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague has been hiring a sports hall for the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha, because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attend. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to celebrations to greet Muslims. On average, every year 30 to 50 Muslims from the Czech Republic carry out the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialised travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. Since 2008, a few Czech Muslims enjoy the offer of the Saudi king to travel to the pilgrimage at his expense. For example in 2008, 50 Czech Muslims and in 2010, 25 travelled to Mecca at Saudi invitation.20

10 Halal Products And Islamic Services

There are not many opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. However, the number of halal grocery shops and butcheries

20 See the article in a daily Brněnský deník available at http://brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_ region/brnane-putuji-do-mekky-za-penize-20081209.html, accessed 1 April 2013. czech republic 205 is increasing, especially in Prague and Brno. There is a list of Czech halal shops on www.al-islam.cz. Since its registration in 2004, UMO has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is particularly exercised at ‘Id al-Adha.

11 Dress Codes

No rules limit Muslim dress in public or in schools. Dress code incidents because of wearing the hijab are still rare but they do occur. One might mention two cases of Muslim women (Czech converts) being fired in 2007 and 2008 respectively from their jobs because of the hijab. Both of them worked in government hospitals and one of them won the lawsuit so that the hospital had to allow her to continue her job wearing the scarf. Nei- ther case was publicised, however. On the other hand, there have been at least two teachers (again, Czech converts) who teach at primary school and at faculty, wearing hijab freely. No Muslim women wearing niqab have been observed yet.

12 Publications and Media

The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is Hlas (The Voice) in the Czech language, the magazine of UMO. Three to four issues are published per year. Hlas was renewed in 1991 after being published initially between 1937 and 1945. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque and members of the editorial board are Vladimír Sáňka, Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi, Jalal Atassi and Lazhar Maamri. The magazine is available on-line at www .al-islam.cz, however, the last issue available on-line is from 2009. There are several Czech Islamic websites. UMO has its informative site www.islamweb.cz with practical information for believers. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.al-islam.cz and www.infomuslim.euweb.cz, both offering useful information and world news seen from the Islamic standpoint and both run by individual believers. Czech Muslim women run a forum on a website at www.proislam.org. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets aimed to bring more information on the faith to Czech Muslim believers. There are three translations of the Qur’an to Czech. Translations of works by Bosnian Muslim intellectual Alija Izetbegović, as well as a few booklets promoting Islam in Czech have also been published by Czech Muslims in 206 štěpán macháček recent years. Several books by Islamic authors like Yusuf al-Qaradawi or were translated and published by Czech Islamic organisations. In 2011, two publications mapping the situation of the Czech Muslim community appeared. Islám a islamismus v České republice (Islam and Islamism in the Czech Republic) by Lukáš Lhoťan is an interesting insight in inter-personal relations and other details of the Czech Muslim com- munity thanks to the fact that Lhoťan has been a member of it. The other one, Islám v Brně. Muslimská komunita očima médií a Brňanů (Islam in Brno. The Muslim Community in the Eyes of Media and Brno Inhabit- ants) by Tomáš Melichárek offers a detailed survey of Islamic activities in Brno.

13 Family Law

Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage in order for it to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranges and registers about fifteen Islamic marriages annually and keeps copies of all Shari’a marriage contracts in its archive.

14 Interreligious Relations

Relations between Czech churches and Czech Islamic organisations, as well as between believers of other faiths, are generally very good. UMO and the Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno organise ‘dialogue meet- ings’ with representatives of churches and Christian believers, where it is usual for there to be an atmosphere of mutual recognition and under- standing.21 Czech Islamic organisations and the Czech Muslim commu- nity as a whole try to maintain amicable relations with Czech churches and Christian believers. The Islamic Foundation in Brno, for example, sent a gift to Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion of his visit to the Czech

21 For example, Czech Muslim community representatives took part in the European Christian Youth Meeting in Jičín on 16 August 2009 (for details, see www.mesita.cz/ node/48, last accessed 1 April 2013). Another discussion meeting took place on 17 October 2009, in Nosislav (see www.mesita.cz/node/68, accessed 1 April 2013). czech republic 207

Republic in September 2009.22 The approach of Christian churches towards Czech Muslims is usually polite, with some local exceptions when there are plans to build a mosque. On the occasion of his retirement, the former highest Czech Catholic authority, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk, said that Europe was open to Islamisation because Christians were weak in their faith. His words were largely understood as a critique of European (and particularly Czech) Christianity and a compliment to the current situation of Muslim religious life.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In November 2012, a major Czech daily Dnes (Today) published photo- graphs of young Czech Muslims playing with airsoft machine gun models inside the Brno mosque.23 This was probably the main 2012 event sparking a wave of media attention to Islam in the Czech Republic. It started dis- cussions on violent nature of Czech Muslims.24 Several anti-Islamic web sites continued to be active on the Czech scene throughout 2012, the most prominent of them being www.eurabia.cz and a little less active www .pravdaoislamu.cz which regard Islam as a danger to Europe. In recent years, several Muslims, all of them Czech converts, ran as candidates in local and regional elections, one of them succeeded and became a councillor of the city council of Kralupy nad Vltavou in central Bohemia. One of these candidates was a woman wearing hijab. None of these cases caused any noticeable public attention. It was a paradoxical situation that one of these candidates ran for the Suverenita party that uses the theme of the ‘Islamic threat to Europe’ as part of its election topics.25 Another politician of Muslim faith, Hassan Mezian (of Syrian origin), was elected as a member of Upper Chamber (Senát) of the Czech

22 See www.mesita.cz/node/63, accessed 1 April 2013. 23 http://zpravy.idnes.cz/muslimove-v-brnenske-mesite-strileli-a-fotili-se-u-toho-piq-/ domaci.aspx?c=A121127_1859592_brno-zpravy_taz, accessed 1 April 2013. 24 For example the main Czech National Radio station Radiožurnál broadcasted a 20 minutes long interview with a former Muslim and now a critic of Czech Muslims Lukáš Lhoťan on 28 November 2012, 17:10, available at www.rozhlas.cz/radiozurnal/dvacet minut/_zprava/lukas-lhotan-autor-knihy-islam-a-islamismus-v-ceske-republice--1142975, accessed 1 April 2013. 25 Lhot’an, Islám a islamizmus v České republice, pp. 67–69. 208 štěpán macháček

Parliament in October 2012.26 He appears to be the first Muslim member of the Czech Parliament. His election campaign had, however, totally civil character.

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

26 Mezian’s website is www.mezian.cz. Contact details are available at the Parliament site www.senat.cz/senatori/index.php?lng=cz&ke_dni=2.4.2013&O=9&par_3=262, accessed 1 April 2013. An interview with Mezian is available at the website of a major Czech daily Hospodářské noviny http://zpravy.ihned.cz/politika/c1-58019840-take-se-desim-komunismu- rika-levicovy-senator-hassan-mezian-narodil-se-v-syrii, accessed 1 April 2013. DENMARK

Brian Arly Jacobsen1

1 Muslim Populations

There were few Muslims in Denmark until the end of the 1960s. One of the earliest known Muslims in Denmark was the journalist Knud Holmboe (1902–1931) who converted to Islam in 1929 and took the name Ali Ahmed Knud Holmboe.2 In 1956, Svend Aage Madsen (1928–2007), a teacher, con- verted to the Muslim reform movement Ahmadiyya and took the name Abdus Salam Madsen. Through active mission in Denmark, Abdus Salam Madsen succeeded in establishing an Ahmadiyya community, which in 1966–67 built the first proper purpose-built mosque in Denmark, the Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre—suburban Copenhagen. The present Ahmadiyya community in Denmark consists mainly of Pakistani immi- grants and their descendants. From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark became more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. The migration of Mus- lims to Denmark can be divided into two periods: the first, covering the years from the end of the 1960s to the early 1970s, was the period when people came to Denmark as labour migrants from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey. The second period, running from the mid-1970s to date, saw the immigration of refugees and families of former labour migrants. The waves of refugees have had various causes: the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the wars in the

1 Brian Arly Jacobsen has a PhD in Sociology of Religion and is an Assistant Profes- sor in the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. His publications include “Muslims in Denmark: A Critical Evaluation of Estimations”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity. Lexington Books (2012) and “Myths and Facts on the Future Number of Muslims—a Dan- ish Case Study.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 2.1. (2013) 1–18. 2 Aoude, Safia 2002. Hjulspor i sandet. Historien om Ali Ahmed Knud Holmboe 1902–1931 (Wheel tracks in the sand. The history of Ali Ahmed Knud Holmboe 1902–1931). Køben- havn: Underskoven. 210 brian arly jacobsen former Yugoslavia (1991–1999), the war in Afghanistan (2001–present) and the Iraq wars (1991 and 2003–present).3 The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980—from 29,400 (0.6% of the total population) in 1980, to an estimated 242,300 (4.3%) in January 2013.4 The Danish authorities do not register individuals’ religious beliefs, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research con- ducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 84% of Iraqi immigrants and their descendants regarded themselves as Muslims in 2008.5 The largest ethnic group is Turks (23.43% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (10.7%), Lebanese (9.9%), Pakistanis (8.9%), Somalis (7.3%) and the fastest growing ethnic group in the last decade, Afghanis (6.2%). The cal- culation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Mus- lim immigrants (approx. 9,600 as of January 2013). Estimates published in 2011 of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, and can be reasonably put at 2,500–3,000.6 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shi’is and Sunnis. A survey from 2008 distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as fol- lows: 45% Sunnis, 11% Shi’is, and 23% ‘Islam, other’, which may include , Alevis and heterodox Sufis (though most Sufis consider

3 Østergaard, Bent, Indvandrerne i Danmarks Historie. Kultur- og religionsmøder (Immi- grants in History. Meetings of Culture and Religion) (Odense: Syddansk Uni- versitetsforlag, 2007). 4 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both immigrants and their descendants (Statistics Denmark 2013, www.dst.dk). 5 For background data, see IntegrationsStatus 2009: 6 (The status of integration 2009) (Catinét 2009. IntegrationsStatus 10 års fremgang—og hvad nu?. Copenhagen: Catinét Research.) and “Muslims in Denmark: A Critical Evaluation of Estimations”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity. (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2012) pp. 165–180. 6 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omvendelser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f.; Jensen, Tina, “Omvendelse til islam i Danmark. Kulturelle forestillinger om (u)renhed og fare” (Conversion to Islam in Denmark. Cultural notions of (un) purity and danger) in: Marianne Holm Pedersen and Mikkel Rytter, Islam og muslimer i Danmark. Religion, iden- titet og sikkerhed efter 11. September 2001. København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2011, p. 151. denmark 211 themselves to be Sunnis).7 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%–25% of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 48,000–60,600 people) are associated with a mosque association, although formal mem- bership numbers are much lower.8 There are no statistics on the geograph- ical distribution of Muslims in Denmark but if they follow the pattern of immigrants and their descendants in general, most Muslims live near the large cities in Denmark (Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense).

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privi- leges not available to other religious groups. The national church is the only religious organisation that receives state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but the government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of 11 religious communities were ‘recognised’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ 244 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (since 3 October 2011) can authorise clergy within non-recognised religious communities to conduct marriages, and have a number of tax benefits and other rights. As of the end of 2012, 23 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious com- munities’.9 In 2010, the Centre-Right government passed legislation that required all foreign religious workers (missionaries, imams, etc.) to pass a Danish language test within six months of entering the country.10 The intention of the law was to restrict further the entry of Muslim clerics, whose number had already been restricted under a 2004 ‘Imam Law’ that

7 IntegrationsStatus 2009: 163. 8 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Den- mark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006) pp. 39, 47. 9 Alevis are not included in this category. The eight current Alevi associations are cat- egorised as ‘other congregations’ by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Diyanet in Denmark)) is acknowledged as one religious community with 29 congregations, Minhaj ul Quran Inter- national Denmark has four congregations and Islams Ahmadiyya Djamâ’at has two congre- gations (see www.familiestyrelsen.dk/samliv/trossamfund, accessed 4 February 2013). 10 Cf. “Lov om ændring af udlændingeloven § 9” (Act amending the Danish immigra- tion law), May 2010. 212 brian arly jacobsen requires the number of religious residence visas to be reasonably propor- tionate to the size of the religious community in question.11 According to information from the Danish Immigration Service, the change has only affected Christian and Mormon missionaries. Of the 80 foreign religious leaders who have taken the test since 2010, approximately a half were Christians and the other half were Mormons. Religious affiliation is not official but according to several Christian denominations only two per- sons of the 80 could have been Muslims.12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of membership numbers. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often related to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and, finally, there is a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade, some Mus- lim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as establishing burial grounds or mosques. Eth- nic religious associations include the following: Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse, Poul Bergsøesvej 14, 2600 Glostrup), which is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.danimar katurkdiyanetvakfi.org/). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organi- sation in Denmark and almost half of all Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 28,500 members).13 It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s local mosque associations were acknowledged as religious communi- ties in 2006. In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations (Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Teşkilatı, DMGT, www.dmgt.dk). The DMGT runs six Turkish

11 See “Integration: Omstridt danskprøve til præster og imamer skaber splid i Venstre” (Disputed Danish test of imams and priests create conflicts in Venstre), Politiken, 8 January 2007. 12 Cf. “Langballe: Danskprøve for forkyndere virker ikke efter hensigten” (Langballe: Danish test for preachers do not work as intended), Kristeligt Dagblad, February 13th 2013. 13 Cf. Annual Report of the funeral fund 2011 (http://danimarkatdv.org/dansk/sayfa- Årsregnskab-af-begravelse-fonden-135.html). denmark 213 mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The DMGT website says that 42 differ- ent associations are members of the union. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement.14 Idara Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International Denmark (Bispevej 25, 2200 Copen- hagen NV, tel: +45 88429595, www.minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,500 members, including children. It was acknowledged as a religious commu- nity by the state in 1999. The present spokesperson in Denmark is Qaisar Najeeb. Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj- ul-Qur’an movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities. Islamic Association of Bosniaks in Denmark (Den Islamiske Forening af Bosniakker i Danmark) has five congregations in Denmark (c/o Chairman Abdullah Fejzic, Vesterbrogade 11 C/2, 7100 Vejle). It was acknowledged as a religious community in 2001 and has around 1,900 members. The Albanian Religious Community (Det Albanske Trossamfund) has around 1,000 members and on an average Fri- day 210 people visits the mosque for the Friday prayer (Vodroffsvej 8, 1900 Frederiksberg, Efet Redzepi is its current chairman). It has status as an acknowledged religious community. Non-ethnic religious associations include the following: Islamic Cul- tural Centre in Copenhagen (Islamisk Kulturcenter, Horsebakken 2, 2400 Copenhagen, tel.: +45 38606856), which is one of the largest mosques. It was established in the mid-1970s under the leadership of Imam Sib- ghatullah Mojaddedi, who was later to become the first president of Afghanistan after the Soviet troops left in the late 1980s.15 It is an open mosque without membership. Around 80 people visit the mosque on a daily basis for prayer and 600–1,000 people visit the mosque for the Friday prayer. The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its current Chairman is Başkan Feramuz Acar and as of 2012, there were eight local associations and a national youth asso- ciation. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at

14 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. 15 See Abdul Wahid Pedersen “Towards a european understanding of Islam”, p. 246 in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Denmark. The Challenge of Diversity, (Lanham: Lexington Books 2012). 214 brian arly jacobsen about 6,500.16 Six local Alevi associations were approved as religious communities by the state in 2007.17 Besides the six approved associations, there exist two other local Alevi associations and one youth organisation for the entire country.18 Islamic Religious Community in Denmark (Det Islamiske Trossamfund i Danmark) or Wakf (Dortheavej 45–47, 2400 Copenhagen NV, tel: +45 38112225, fax +45 38112226, www.wakf.com) was founded in 1996, when Palestinians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its present chairman is Hassan Neffaa and the associa- tion is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various coun- tries. It has approximately 3,400 paying members and around 1,000 people attend the Friday prayer, of whom up to 300 are women.19 Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Young Muslims in Denmark (Muslimske Unge i Danmark, MUNIDA, www. munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members. Its present chairman is Waseem Rana. The first Shi’is in Denmark were and Isma’ilis of Pakistani descent. The Isma’ilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque in 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaffariya (Rådmands- gade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. It has around 110 members today (plus children). The massive migration of refugees with Shi’i backgrounds fleeing the civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid-1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. The Shi’i association Ahlul Bait in Denmark (Foreningen Ahlul Bait i Danmark, Vibevej 25–29, 2400 Copen- hagen NV) is the largest Shi’i organisation with around 2,000 members. It was acknowledged as a religious community in 2005. The organisation currently has a mosque under construction named the Imam Ali mosque with two 32 meter high minarets and a blue dome at their current address.

16 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 138. The Alevi’s own estimation is around 10.000 Alevis in Denmark, cf. www.alevi.dk/. 17 See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organ- ising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, (PhD disserta- tion: Aalborg University, 2006) pp. 195–218. 18 Cf. www.alevi.dk. 19 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 118. denmark 215

The Shi’i Islamic Religious Community in Denmark (Shiamuslimsk Tros- samfund i Danmark, Sturlasgade 14 C. 1, 2300 Copenhagen S) was acknowl- edged in 2003 and has around 650–700 members. Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing growth, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. However, they largely keep to themselves. Examples are Tariqa Burhaniyya (Damhus Boulevard 65, 2610 Rødovre), Al-Murabitun and Sufi-oriented Turkish groups such as Nurcu groups and Dialog Forum (Vesterbrogade 52, 1, 1620 Copenhagen V, tel.: +45 32175060), established in 2002, which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement and has around 100 members. Politically oriented associations include the following: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk), which is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. The organisation receives a lot of media coverage but it is difficult for outsiders to make contact with it. Its spokesperson in Scandinavia is Chadi Freigeh. Estimates of its membership numbers are between 50 and 500.20 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted crowds of about 1,000.21 There is also a number of Muslim networking organisations. The United Council of Muslims (Muslimernes Fællesråd, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006, born of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisa- tions in Denmark. Its chairman is Asmat Mojaddedi and its spokesper- son is Mustafa Gezen. It currently acts as an umbrella organisation for thirteen assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 35,000. The Danish Muslim Union (Dansk Muslimsk Union, Valde- marsgade 17, 1, 1665 Copenhagen V—tel: +45 50565908; www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of five national Muslim organisations and a number of local Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokesperson is Abdulhamid Sørensen. Muslims in Dialogue (Muslimer i Dialog, Nørrebrogade 32, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, http://muslimeridialog.dk) was formed by a Min- haj ul-Qur’an breakaway group in 2003 and organises dialogue activities

20 Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003 and Grøndahl, Malene, Torben Rugberg Rasmussen and Kirstine Sinclair, Hizb ut- Tahrir i Danmark: Farlig fundamentalisme eller uskyldigt ungdomsoprør? (Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark: Dangerous Fundamentalism or Innocent Youth Rebellion) (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003) pp. 16, 29, 31. 21 Cf. their latest demonstration against the Youtube amateur movie “Innocence of Mus- lims” in front of the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen attracted approx. 1,000 September 16th 2012. 216 brian arly jacobsen between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its spokesperson is Nihad Hodzic. It is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures and with four local groups in Aarhus, Copenhagen, Esbjerg and Roskilde. The Danish Islamic Council (Dansk Islamisk Råd, Hermodsgade 28, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, www.disr.com) is an independent charitable institution, which is co-founder of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to jointly lobby on Islamic issues. Its initiator was a politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. Its chairman is Abdelhamid Hamdi.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Denmark, eleven of them being Shi’i.22 The Shi’i Isma’ilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamic Cultural Centre (Islamisk Kulturcenter) in Brønshøj (Copenhagen) in 1972.23 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose- built, namely the mosque built by the Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svend- borg in 2000.24 Several local groups are planning to build mosques. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that of a grand mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Hon- ourable Islamic Committee (Ærværdige islamiske komité). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)— a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from

22 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 23 Ibid. 24 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. denmark 217 various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement with the Committee for the Islamic Cul- tural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.25 In June 2009, the Municipality of Copenhagen accepted the United Council of Muslims as the organisation in charge of the finances and operation of a grand mosque in Copenhagen. In August 2009, the Shi’i association Ahl ul-Bait in Denmark was also granted permission by the Municipality of Copenhagen to build a mosque at the existing premises of the Imam Ali Islamic Centre on Vibevej in Copenhagen’s Nordvest district. The mosque is still under construction. In October 2009, the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation presented plans for a new purpose-built mosque in Aarhus and most of the parties in the municipality of Aarhus have until now backed the plan.26 The project is still in the planning phase but, accord- ing to a spokesperson from the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation, they are already funded.27 The Danish Islamic Council is currently building a mosque in Copenhagen with a budget of approximately 15 million EUR financed by a Qatari fund.28 The mosque is due to open in the spring of 2013 and will have Denmark’s first minaret and dome. The mosque and adjoining culture centre will accommodate 900 people. The mosque was designed by the Aarhus architect Metin Aydin who says the construc- tion is a synthesis between Nordic minimalism and the traditional white Middle Eastern style.29 Previous plans to build mosques have drawn a lot of reaction in Denmark, but the building of this particular mosque has caused relatively little public attention.30 According to the architect, it is because of the model chosen in this case that makes the building rela- tively discreet.31 In 2006 the first hospital prayer room in Denmark was established at Rigshospitalet—Copenhagen University Hospital, similar to the hospital

25 Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 26 “Bred støtte til moské-planer i Århus (Broad support for the mosque plans in Aarhus)”, Jyllands-Posten, 5 November 2009. 27 Cf. “Folk bag Århus-moské har pengene klar (People behind the Aarhus mosque have the money ready)”, Denmarks Radio, 10 September 2010. 28 Cf. “Endelig får vi en moské, vi kan være bekendt at vise frem” (Finally we get a mosque, we need not be ashamed of ), Christian Daily, 23 February 2013. 29 Ibid. 30 Cf. “Endelig får vi en moské, vi kan være bekendt at vise frem” (Finally we get a mosque, we need not be ashamed of ) , Christian Daily, 23 February 2013. 31 Cf. “Mosque with minaret for Nørrebro”, Denmarks Radio, www.dr.dk, 20 March 2012. 218 brian arly jacobsen church, where Muslims too could pray. The construction of the prayer room was an extensive media story which major newspapers and TV news channels covered in Denmark.32 By 2012, eight hospitals, five universi- ties, some colleges and a few high schools had established neutral prayer rooms. The local institution’s management may decide for themselves whether or not they want to establish a prayer room (for Muslims).

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is called ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions, including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. There are no national statistics or surveys that can inform about the number of Muslims who do not participate in Christian studies, but local surveys show that it is often only a few Muslim pupils who are withdrawn from classes.33 Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’, which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.34 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. There are approximately 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of 3,967 pupils in January 2012, according to the Ministry of Children and Education—an increase of 25% over three years.35 This means that

32 Eg. “Rigshospitalet indretter bederum” (Rigshospitalet etablish a prayingroom), Ber- lingske, 10 May 2006. 33 Cf. “Næsten alle muslimer er med til kristendoms-undervisning” (Almost all Muslims participate in Christianity studies), JydskeVestkysten, 23 June 2012. 34 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserk- læringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. Some of these schools have since closed again. 35 Cf. “Nydanskere fravælger folkeskolen”, Politiken, 31 January 2012; Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Traditioner, idealer og politikker (Power, citizenship and Muslim free schools in Denmark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross- Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. In a feature in Jyllands-Posten (5 August 2009) the former Minister of Educational Affairs, Bertel Haarder, stated that the number of Muslim free schools now was 20. denmark 219 the majority of Muslim pupils go to public school. The Ministry of Edu- cation carried out a study in 2006 which showed that 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school, whereas the national average was only 26%.36 Immigrants with Turkish backgrounds opened the first private Turkish-Danish high school in 2011.37 They applied for teaching in the high school but were first turned down by the Ministry of Children and Education in January 2012. After a public discussion on the need for Turkish language teach- ing in Danish high schools, the Minister of Education Christine Antorini accepted Turkish language teaching in the school.38 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours. In the survey on ethnic groups’ values in Denmark from 2006, 82% of Muslim parents thought that religion was an important or very important issue in the upbringing of children. By comparison, 67% of all parents in the survey answered the same.39

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universi- ties of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark (Odense). Discussions about possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years, but have not yet led to any formal proposals.40

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Sections within sixteen existing municipal or church cemeteries (all Chris- tian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. In 2012,

36 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school)”, Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007. 37 Cf. “Københavns Private Gymnasium” (Copenhagens Private High School), www .kpgym.dk. 38 Cf. “Elever kan nu lære tyrkisk i gymnasiet” (Students can now learn Turkish in high school), Ritzaus Bureau, 21 June 2012. 39 Cf. Etniske gruppers værdier (Ethnic Groups Values), Ministry for Refugees, Immi- grants and Integration of Denmark 2007. 40 Eg. “Muslimer vil ligestilles via religionslov” (Muslims want equal opportunities through law on religion), Christian Daily, 19 November 2012; “S-politiker: Regeringens udspil mangler imamuddannelse” (Social Democrat: The government’s proposal lacks imam training), Ritzaus Bureau, 27 November 2012. 220 brian arly jacobsen a section reserved for Muslims was opened in the south of Jutland and two new ones will be established in 2013, also in Jutland.41 Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Religious groups also have the right to acquire land for burials. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesi- astical Affairs gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after some years of lobbying. Today the Muslim cemetery in Brøndby—a suburb of Copenhagen—has more than 400 graves and 6,000 members of the burial support association.42 According to a committee member, about 200 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.43

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.44 A survey from 2006 showed that approximately 20% of the inmates in Danish prisons have a Muslim background.45 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was established at Rigshospitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first imam began to provide

41 Cf. “Gråsten Kirkegård indretter 40 gravsteder til muslimer” (Gråsten Cemetery etab- lish 40 graves for Muslims), JydskeVestkysten, 17 September 2012; “Planer om stor mus- limsk gravplads i Ulkebøl” (Plans for large Muslim cemetery in Ulkebøl), JydskeVestkysten, 18 September 2012; “Muslimer får deres egen afdeling på kirkegård” (Muslims gets their own section on cemetery), Denmarks Radio/dr.dk, 26 March 2013. 42 Cf. “Muslimsk gravplads lever sit eget stille liv” (Muslim cemetery lives its own quiet life), Folkebladet Glostrup-Brøndby-Vallensbæk, 2 February 2011. 43 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis” (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice), Jyllands- Posten, 22 September 2006. 44 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting (Imam Hansen from Hatting)”, Nyt fra Kriminalforsorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no.3 (2002). 45 Hansen, Helene “Kirken i fængslet”, Kriminalforsorgen.dk, (2012). denmark 221 pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated to hos- pitals in major cities in Denmark.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities with a large number of pupils with Muslim background either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. Since the middle of the last decade, Shi’is have organised parades through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ‘Ashura, with 500 to 1,000 people taking part. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against disease and war. Finally, the Danish Muslim Union, Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and other Muslim organisations organise since 2011 an annual Peace March in Copenhagen in celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday with 500 to 700 people taking part. The number of pilgrims on the annual hajj is estimated at around 1,300 to 1,500.46

10 Halal products and Islamic services

Halal slaughter is permitted and halal food is widely available. Denmark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world.47 The permit to per- form halal slaughter within certain regulations has also opened a labour market for halal butchers with halal certifications.48 However, there have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.49 Public institutions decide on a local

46 Cf. “Saml rigeligt med sten, man kunne jo tabe nogen, før man skal kaste dem” (Collect plenty of stone, one may well lose someone before you throw them), Politiken, 13 Novem- ber 2011; “Lufthavn hjælper pilgrimme til Mekka” (Airport helps pilgrims to Mecca), Chri- stian Daily, 15 November 2010. 47 Cf. Jønsson, Signe, “Mod på eksport til Mellemøsten” (Minding export to Middle East) i: Eksport Fokus, no. 1, 14 May 2007, Udenrigsministeriet Danmark (Ministry of For- eign Affairs of Denmark). 48 Kühle, Lene, “Mosques and Organizations” in Jørgen S. Nielsen (ed.), Islam in Den- mark. The Challenge of Diversity. Lexington Books, p. 90 (2012). 49 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesættelser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 222 brian arly jacobsen administrative level whether halal food is to be made available and in many schools, hospitals, prisons, nursing home, and other public insti- tutions management has decided to offer halal food in their menus, but often it involves a public debate.50 In Denmark, five hajj travel agents have been authorised by the Saudi Ministry of Hajj to arrange travels to umrah and hajj.51 The Islamic banking and finance institute Amanah has existed for a few years (Kongens Nytorv 15, Copenhagen, www.amanah.dk). They give Muslims in Denmark (and Scandinavia) the opportunity of banking activ- ity that is consistent with the principles of shari’a.

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retail- ers and others to insist on uniform codes without the female head scarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the headscarf in the Parliament in the spring of 2007 but failed. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority figures should be allowed to wear the head scarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘head scarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban wearing of headscarves by Muslim women when acting as judges or jurors. The former centre- right government and Danish People’s Party passed the act in May 2009, although the proposal has been met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. Danish citizens are not required by law to carry an identity card but since 2006 photos in driver’s license and passports are required to show

respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206. 50 Cf. “Hver tredje vil forbyde halalslagtning” (One third of the population will ban halal slaughter), Christian Daily, 21. March 2011; The Danish Peoples Party: “Legislative package for the protection of Danish values”. In the package the party demand that halal meat shall not replace Danish pork in institutions, www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Lovpakke_til_værn_for_ danske_værdier.asp (2007). 51 Cf. Saudi Ministry of Hajj list on www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=10 (2011). denmark 223 the face of the individual.52 Some educational institutions decided in 2012 to ban niqab on their premises. The argument for the ban of niqab at educational institutions has been justified on the grounds of necessary face-to-face communication and eye contact.53 Consequently, the Dan- ish People’s Party called for a general ban on the niqab in educational institutions.54

12 Publications and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites where Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Denmark’s Cyber Muslims, related to United Cyber Muslims (Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer, http://uk.dir.groups.yahoo.com/group/dfc/), formed in 1998, which had over 500 members as of the end of 2012. Due to the increase in social media websites, communication via email groups has declined rapidly and groups such as the abovementioned have lost their significance. Den- mark’s United to one of the oldest websites established to inform Mus- lims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There are also Muslim publishing firms, of which the oldest is Alif Bogforlag, which began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.

13 Family Law

Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shari’a is practised in some Muslim com- munities in Denmark, for example in matters of family law, divorce and

52 Cf. “Foto, pas og kørekort” (Photo, passport and drive’s license), http://www.politi.dk/ NR/rdonlyres/8E37DFDF-9B14-48E9-A9E2-5F1D171393EC/0/1058_pasplakat_A4_web.pdf. 53 Cf. “Niqab skaber røre på Aarhus Akademi” (Niqab creates conflicts at Aarhus Aca- demy), Ritzaus Bureau, 29 November 2012. 54 Cf. “Skoleforbud mod niqab breder sig” (School ban on the niqab spreads), Berling- ske, 1 December 2012. 224 brian arly jacobsen child custody. There are no official Shari’a courts in Denmark.55 However, three imams from three larger mosques in Copenhagen formed a coun- cil that can mediate in family disputes and give religious divorces. The imams are Mostafa Chendid from the Malik Institute, Khalil Jaffar from the Islamic Cultural Centre and Mohye-Eddine Ouwainat from the Islamic Religious Community in Denmark. The former Liberal-Conservative government began in 2011 an analysis of the spread of parallel court systems in Denmark—especially among Muslim immigrants. The report from 2011 concluded that the Muslim tra- ditional marriage practice of nikah is widespread and of great significance among Muslim minority groups.56 The reasons for practising nikah are of social, religious and cultural significance. Of importance also is that a nikah relationship may have greater legal force than marriages under Danish law when travelling to certain Muslim countries. Either before or after nikah, many couples also marry under Danish law. Other couples are only married in accordance with nikah and thus unmarried in relation to Danish legislation. In December 2011, various organisations in Aarhus arranged some dialogue meetings on Shari’a, Dan- ish law, marriage and divorce. The meetings drew public attention when the imam Abdul Wahid Pedersen suggested the organisation of a Danish Shari’a quasi-Islamic court that should provide legal rulings and advice to Muslims in accordance with Islamic Shari’a, financed by public funding. It was to primarily handle cases of marriage and divorce. Politicians from the Danish Peoples Party and the Liberal Party (Venstre) turned down the proposal.57 The Danish Peoples Party promised a legislative proposal that would ban practising of Shari’a in Denmark and the bill was introduced in January 2012 but was rejected in the Parliament by all other parties.58 The Minister of Justice (Morten Bødskov, Social Democrat) strongly con- demned “parallel societies based on suppression of basic democratic

55 Cf. “The executioners of ” (editorial), Jyllands-Posten, 31 October 2008, and “Religion and law: The legal system must move with the community”, interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 56 Cf. Parallelle retsopfattelser i Danmark. Et kvalitativt studie af privatretlige praksisser blandt etniske minoriteter (Parallel legal systems in Denmark. A qualitative study of pri- vate law practices among ethnic minorities), SFI, The Danish National Centre for Social Research, 2011, p. 14. 57 Cf. “Politikere tager afstand fra islamiske råd” (Politicians denounce Islamic Council), Århus Stiftstidende, 8 December 2011. 58 Cf. B 34 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om kriminalisering af parallelle retssamfund (B 34 Proposal for a parliamentary resolution on criminalization of parallel legal commu- nities). Folketinget.dk, 26 January 2012. denmark 225 principles of equality, freedom and the right to self-determination,” but at the same time he recognised that “there are plural conceptions of law which implies that some religious minority groups in certain areas have different norms and traditions than those associated with the usual prac- tice in Denmark.”59 Finally, in December 2012, the government announced a package aimed at curbing forced Muslim marriages. The government will increase pun- ishments for forced marriages although it was reported earlier in 2012 that there had not been a single conviction for forced marriages since the former centre-right government increased the punishment in 2008, and the incidences do seem to be increasing. LOKK, the association of women’s crisis centres in Denmark, said that the number of women seeking help— either because of honour-related conflicts, a pending forced marriage or the threat of one—rose from 101 in 2005 to 1,038 in 2011.60

14 Interreligious Relations

In 1996 the Islamic-Christian Study Centre was established by a group of Christians and Muslims.61 It has an equal number of Christian and Mus- lim board members and is currently supported by a number of Christian and Muslim organisations and societies. Its current chairman is Revd Lissi Rasmussen. The purpose of Islamic-Christian Study Centre is to build, through cooperation, positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim backgrounds and to work for equal citizenship. The organi- sation’s members cooperate on various projects such as courses on coun- selling for clergymen and imams, conferences, lectures, study groups, excursions and publications. The centre works together with a number of research and educational institutions, Christian and Muslim organisations and other NGOs on activities in Denmark and internationally. In 1998, the bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church appointed a committee whose task was to write a report on the relationship between

59 Ibid. 60 Cf. L 143 Forslag til lov om ændring af straffeloven, udlændingeloven og lov om tilhold, opholdsforbud og bortvisning (L 143 Bill to amend the Criminal Code, Aliens Act and the restraining order, prohibiting, residence and expulsion), Folketinget.dk, 6 February 2013; National strategi mod æresrelaterede konflikter (National strategy against honor-related conflicts), The Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, 2012; “Nye love skal bekæmpe tvangsægteskaber” (New laws to combat forced marriages), BT, 25 January 2012. 61 Cf. Islamisk-Kristent Studiecenter (IKS) (Islamic-Christian Study Centre), www.ikstu diecenter.dk/. 226 brian arly jacobsen the church and Islam. The report, Conversation Promotes Understanding, was submitted in 2000 and there was particular emphasis on the need for the state church to increase dialogue with Islam on all levels, and that this would require more resources, including diocese priests to strengthen dialogue. The then Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs Margrethe Vestager (the Danish Social-Liberal Party) supported the report and the demand for more resources. One of the lasting results of the committee’s work is the Evangelical Lutheran Church’s sub-organisation Church and Religious Encounter which promotes interreligious dialogue between Lutherans and other religions, especially Muslims.62 Some of its main activities are annual meetings between church leaders, including bishops from the state church, and imams from Muslim communities in Denmark in the Chris- tian Muslim Conversation Forum; and friendship dinners at Ramadan and Christmas that Christians and Muslims in Denmark invite each other to. In 2012, the theme of the conference was on the need for a Law on Reli- gion in Denmark. In December 2009, Muslims and Jews in Denmark founded The Jewish Muslim Cooperation Platform in Denmark (http://jodiskmuslimsk.word press.com/). Among the initiators were the former Rabbi in Denmark Bent Melchior and the Imam Naveed .63 Its chairman is Nadia Stonall. It is part of the European Platform for Jewish Muslim Co-operation. The organisation facilitates co-operation, dialogue and partnership between the Jewish and Muslim communities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Questions about the Muslim presence in Denmark are frequently and hotly debated in the Danish media. A series of studies show a Danish population that is very sceptical about the prospects for peaceful coexist- ence with Muslims. Some opinion polls from 2008 showed that only 38% of Danes would have a positive attitude towards their children marrying Muslims, while 48% of Muslim parents would welcome their children mar- rying Danes. A report published in January 2008 by the World Economic

62 Cf. Folkekirke og religionsmøde (Church and Religious Meeting), www.folkekirken. dk/folkekirkens-arbejde/folkekirke-og-religionsmoede/. 63 Naveed Baig is project manager for Ethnic Resource Team at Rigshospitalet— Copenhagen University Hospital—and Herlev Hospital. He is affiliated with both institu- tions as an Imam. denmark 227

Forum (WEF) showed that 79% of Danes saw greater interaction with the Muslim world as a threat. The Danes were the most sceptical of the nations surveyed. However, the year of 2011 showed a decrease in public attention on Muslim affairs in Denmark.64 According to researchers from Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) at Aarhus Uni- versity, Danes have become more tolerant. Their study shows that only 30% of the Danes agree or very much agree with the assertion that “Islam is a threat”. Among young people 87% do not care if their neighbour is a Muslim or not.65 According to the researchers, it shows that Danes are becoming capable of discerning Muslims and Islam from Islamism and therefore they are more tolerant towards Muslims as such.66 In the summer of 2012, a debate on male circumcision caused concern among Danish Muslims and Jews because of the possibility it would lead to a ban on male circumcision. Figures from Patientforsikringen, a patient insurance group, revealed however that between 1996 and 2012 there were 65 claims of injuries related to male promised circumcision. Danish Mus- lims and Jews are concerned that Denmark may ban male circumcision after a German court decided that the practice amounts to violence against male children and should not be performed until boys are old enough to decide on their own whether to have the operation performed. The Dan- ish Parliament is divided on the question, with most parties calling for a debate on the health, social and legal consequences of a ban on circumci- sion before any decisions are made. The Government has consequently to give an account on male circumcision before a possible ban.67 Finally, in November 2012, a housing association in Kokkedal voted to cancel its annual 7,000 kroner Christmas tree and celebration. It resulted in a massive national debate over multiculturalism and religious intol- erance. Most media stories reported that the majority on the housing association’s board were Muslims and they were therefore blamed for the cancellation of the Christmas celebrations as a result of religious

64 Cf. “Islamdebatten er dampet af ” (The debate on Islam has steamed off ), Kristel- igt Dagblad (Christian Daily) 23 January 2012 and “Kristendom vender tilbage i debatten” (Christianity is returning to the debate), Kristeligt Dagblad (Christian Daily) 29 December 2011. 65 Cf. http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/ Opinionsunders%C3%B8gelse_om_danskerne__islam_muslimer_og_islamofobi.pdf. 66 Cf. “Flertal: Islam som religion er ingen trussel mod Danmark” (Majority: Islam as a Religion is not a threat against Denmark), Kristeligt Dagblad (Christian Daily) 3 January 2011. 67 Cf. “Muslimer og jøder frygter omskæringsforbud” (Muslims and Jews fear ban of circumcision), Ritzaus Bureau, 18 July 2012. 228 brian arly jacobsen intolerance. Some of the board members later explained that the Christ- mas tree and celebration was cancelled because no one wanted to take responsibility for the organisation of the activity.68 The story brought up value issues once more and the supposed threat that the Muslim minority represents to Danish traditions.69 The Christmas tree debate showed a tension between conservative and liberal opinions in Denmark, the former arguing that Danish traditions should be privi- leged while the latter argued that democratic votes should be respected regardless of the outcome. These two positions were represented in opin- ion articulated in the public in the wake of the story. The debate over Danish values was essential for the former government but has been latent for some time. The speed at which this story revitalised anti-Muslim rhetoric demonstrates that value politics are far from a closed chapter in the Danish public.

16 Major Cultural Events

No information available.

68 Cf. Jacobsen, Brian Arly, “Julgranskonflikt i Danmark—religionsfrihet, media och anti-muslimsk mobilisering” (Christmas tree Conflict in Denmark—religion, the media and anti-Muslim mobilization), Religionsvetenskapliga kommentarer, 3 December 2012, http:// religionsvetenskapligakommentarer.blogspot.se/2012/12/julgranskonflikt-i-danmark.html. 69 Warburg, Margit, “Fællesskab. Hvad lærte vi af juletræet i Kokkedal?” (Community. What did we learn from the Christmas tree in Kokkedal?), Politiken 24 December 2012. ESTONIA

Ringo Ringvee1

1 Muslim Populations

The official census in 2000 counted 1,387 Estonian residents as Muslims, of whom 754 identified themselves as Tatars, 83 as Estonians and 79 as Rus- sians, while 455 Muslims came under the category ‘other ethnic nationali- ties’. Though in the official census only 30% of the Tatars and none of the Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, indicated that they were Muslims, many if not most of them potentially could be considered at least nominally so.2 By 2012, the number of Muslims in Estonia should have somewhat increased due to the immigration of people of Muslim background and conversions. In recent years there has been a trend of ethnic Estonians and ethnic Rus- sians converting to Islam. According to Chief Mufti Ildar Muhhamedshin in 2012 each month there were approximately 2 to 3 persons who would convert to Islam.3 According to the prison chaplains conversion to Islam among inmates has been an increasing trend. Although the total number of the converts remains relatively small, their role in translating religious materials as well as their presence on the Internet has been growing. The total number of nominal Muslims in Estonia in 2012 could be as high as 4,500, but regularly practising Muslims would hardly exceed several hun- dred. The average number of participants at Friday prayers in 2012 has been around one hundred. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are located in and around the capital city Tallinn. According to the census from 2000, Mus- lims are the most urban religious group in Estonia with 90 % of Muslims

1 Ringo Ringvee is an adviser at the Religious Affairs Department at the Estonian Minis- try of the Interior. He is also member of the research group of the Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory at the University of Tartu. His research interests encompass the relations between the State and religious institutions in contemporary Europe. 2 The data from the official census from 2011 concerning religious identity were not published by the time of writing this article. The data become available during 2013 at the Estonian Statistics Office Website www.stat.ee. 3 “Eestlannadele õpetati hidžaabi sidumist” (Estonian women were taught to wrap hijab), Eesti Ekspress 15 November 2012, www.ekspress.ee/archive/article.php?id=65265616, accessed 20 January 2013. 230 ringo ringvee living in urban areas.4 Over the years several public sources have provided ungrounded estimates of 10,0005 or even 20,0006 Muslims in Estonia, but these are evident exaggerations. A more likely figure of 4,000 is indicated in Islam in Estonia published with the active participation of Estonia’s Muslims in 2008.7 The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of set- tlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. There was also a nascent Muslim community around 170 strong, according to a 1934 census, in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia. It was composed mainly of Tatar immi- grants from Russia.

2 Islam and the State

Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion or dominant faith. Tra- ditionally, Estonians were Lutherans, but today only approximately 14% of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal (there is no for- mal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ faiths) in the eyes of the state. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts. Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as it does not violate public mor- als and/or disturb public order, but have neither the status nor the rights of a legally registered religion. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, possibility to apply for the right to their clergy to con- duct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions and there is no public funding for their activities

4 2000 Population and Housing Census. Education. Religion (Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2002). 5 Huang, Mel, “A mosque with a view”, Central Europe Review, 2001, www.ce-review .org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 12 November 2009. 6 Muslims in Estonia, Muslim American Society, 2003, www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=687, accessed 12 November 2009. 7 Abiline, Toomas (comp.), Islam Eestis. Islam in Estonia. Ислам в Эстонии (Tallinn: Huma 2008). estonia 231

(the state may only fund cultural activities of ethnic minority groups, such as Tatars and Azeris).

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Muslim congregation officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 by the Soviets. The Estonian Islamic Congregation (Eesti islami kogudus), then comprised mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was registered with the Soviet authorities as Tallinn Islamic Congregation (Tallinna islami kogudus) while the name of Estonian Islamic Congregation was used simultaneously. In 1994, after the adoption of Churches and Congregations Act in the Esto- nian Parliament, the official name of the Congregation was changed to the Estonian Islamic Congregation. In spring 2009, it moved to its perma- nent headquarters in Tallinn (9 Keevise Street, Ülemiste, Tallinn) where a 1,000m2 former office building purchased with a Saudi sponsor’s (reputedly al-Waqf al-Islami) money houses the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”. It has rooms for lectures, a tiny library and a reading room, the office of the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, and a prayer hall that is open daily. The Centre is headed by the imam Ildar Muhhamedshin (tel: +372 55947689, www.islam.pri.ee) who was recognised as the Chief Mufti of the Estonian Muslim community in 2002. In 2012 Turkey ( i.e., Diyanet) sent an imam to work in Estonia. The imam, whose salary is paid by Turkish government, has been assisting a local imam in religious services. The activities of Muslim women in Estonia have been the focus of Makhmutova, the wife of Imam Ildar Muhhamedshin, and in 2012 an asso- ciation for Muslim women was established. The Association of Muslim Women in the Baltics (Baltimaade Mosleminaiste Ühendus) is closely connected with the Estonian Islamic Congregation and with the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath” and provides lectures and courses on Islamic subjects for women. In 2012 a women’s camp organised by the Associa- tion of Muslim Women in the Baltics took place in Estonia. In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Estonian Muslim Sunni Congre- gation (Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus) was formed. This con- gregation is also Tatar dominated and operates in Maardu town not far from Tallinn. In December 2012 a new Muslim association with a cultural centre “Iqra” (www.keskus.islam.pri.ee) was founded in a university town Tartu 232 ringo ringvee in Southern Estonia. The centre is operating in rented facilities where the daily morning and evening prayers as well as Friday prayers are con- ducted. The active membership is formed by Estonian converts who have been previously actively involved in the functions of the Estonian Islamic Congregation and university students from Muslim countries. The Association Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in Estonia that was regis- tered in Estonia in 2009 seems to be rather inactive.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Between the World Wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the con- gregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Since the summer of 2009, the Muslims of Tallinn have had a prayer hall on the premises of the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, which serves as the main Tallinn mosque. Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. Currently the Friday prayers are held also in Kohtla-Järve. The Islamic Cultural Centre “Iqra” in Tartu that was established in 2012 provides space for morning and evening prayers and holds Friday prayers as well. It was announced in 2008 that the Emirate of Sharjah had communicated its intention to finance the building of an Islamic religious and cultural centre (housing a mosque) in Tallinn, but with the movement of the Estonian Islamic Con- gregation to its current headquarters the need for such a space appears to have been at least temporarily alleviated.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general con- text is Christian due to the country’s historical and cultural background. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. Confessional religious education is not provided in public schools. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, the teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular and offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn and Maardu). At the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, a dozen or so children attend Arabic language and Islam classes on Saturdays. Materials for reli- gious education of children are published on the website of the Estonian estonia 233

Islamic Congregation and in 2012 an online journal Iqrake for Muslim chil- dren was launched.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are continuously offered at the University of Tartu (Arabic language, Introduction to Islamic stud- ies, both in the Department of Theology). Recently Tallinn University has started offering some instruction in Arabic and Turkish languages as well as an introduction to Turkish culture. There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the four active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the remaining two are self-taught. Currently four Estonian-born Muslims are studying Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia. It is unlikely that a need for local imam training will arise in the foreseeable future.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

During the Tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Rus- sia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the first years of the Soviet occupation in 1940 they were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries for burial, where they have a separate section. No request for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet arisen.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as a chap- lain in reserve in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons and hospitals to perform rites. Although there is need for more spiritual guidance in the prisons, the main obstacle is a lack of competent personnel.

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva, which are open to the public. The ‘Id al-Fitr communal prayer 234 ringo ringvee is said to be attended by several hundred Muslims and ‘Id al-Adha is attended by up to 400 persons. In 2012 the Estonian Islamic Congregation organised hajj for 15 local Muslims.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

No specialised halal butchers have opened in Estonia, and the Ministry of Agriculture has expressed its negative attitude to any such plans. In 2012 the Ministry of Agriculture drafted an amendment to the Animal Protec- tion Act that intended to outlaw all ritual slaughtering in Estonia.8 Due to reactions from the Jewish community, the Ministry proposed a solution introducing post-cut stunning. This was accepted by both the Jewish and the Muslim communities. However, according to the amendment all rit- ual slaughtering is now limited to regular licensed slaughterhouses only.9 Although halal meat is not available on the menu of prisons and defence forces there is a possibility for meat-free diet. Some imported halal food (frozen meat and meat products, along with canned vegetables and sweets from Middle Eastern producers) is available in the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath.” Halal meat has also been available at one market in Tallinn and there are restaurants and kebab places in Tallinn and Tartu where halal meat is available.10 The arrangements for hajj are managed by the Estonian Islamic Congregation.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. No niqab-wearing Muslim women have been observed. Since 2005 a government regulation allows people to submit personal photos wearing the head scarf for official docu- ments, these principles are also in the Identity Documents Act.

8 “Estonia To Change Law On Religious Slaughter.” The Jewish Week, 5 August 2012. www.thejewishweek.com/news/breaking-news/estonia-change-law-religious-slaughter, accessed 12 August 2012. 9 Loomakaitseseaduse muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste seaduste muutmise seadus (Act to Amend the Animal Protection Act and Associated Acts), Riigi Teataja I, 18.12.2012, 2. 10 For the list of places with halal food see Halal Food in Tallinn & Tartu, www.islam .pri.ee/index.php?id=918, accessed 23 January 2013. estonia 235

12 Publications and Media

In recent years the Estonian Islamic Congregation has been publishing books and booklets about Islam in the Estonian language. In 2012 the first original account of being a practising Muslim written by an Estonian con- vert was published.11 There are websites (www.islam.pri.ee/ in Estonian, Russian, Finnish and English, www.turath.ee/ in Russian, http://keskus.pri.islam.ee/ in Estonian, Finnish, and German) which are run by Estonian Muslims. A multilingual website run by the Azerbaijan Cultural Centre of Estonia (Eesti Aserbaidžaani kultuurikeskus) (http://azeri.ee) is only indirectly related to Islamic issues (mainly through the history of the Muslim pres- ence in Estonia). The website www.islam.pri.ee has a number of downloadable materi- als on Islam mostly for children and women as well as lectures on Islam for schools, and other translated materials in Estonian. In August 2009, it started posting a monthly on-line Islamic magazine, Iqra, in Estonian (though prospective authors are also encouraged to submit texts in Rus- sian) and by December 2012 had produced 39 issues. In 2012 a download- able journal Iqrake. A Magazine for Estonian Muslim Children (Iqrake. Eesti Moslemilaste ajakiri) was launched. The journal is in Estonian and published four times a year. In 2009 the Estonian Islamic Congregation started to publish a news- letter in Russian, As-Salam—Балтийский Мусульманский Вестник (As-Salam—Baltic Muslim Newsletter) produced for the Muslims living in the Baltic region in general. The newsletter is both downloadable from the website as well as available as a paper version. While Iqra is focusing more on ideas and practices of religion, As-Salam has been focusing more on the news of Muslim communities.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques, and the marriage is then registered with a municipal civil registry office. An imam wishing to serve as a state registrar has to obtain official certification after attending special training. No Estonian imam is yet certified to serve as a

11 Nele Siplane, Mina olen moslem (I am Muslim.) (Tallinn: Randvelt, 2012). 236 ringo ringvee state registrar. In 2012 twelve marriage contracts (nikah) were signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheritance can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations provided it is accepted by all parties involved. Oth- erwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in litigation.

14 Interreligious Relations

In an overwhelmingly secular society, it is extremely rare for Estonian imams to be invited to multi-religious events and they themselves are not eager to organise such functions. There seems to be virtually no interreli- gious dialogue in Estonia, and the occasional interreligious meetings are usually initiated by governmental institutions.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally, local Muslim leaders are approached by media to comment on events and processes involving Muslims abroad or Esto- nia itself. In 2012, as in previous years, several local newspapers ran small articles on the presumed concern of the Estonian security services about a possible rise of Islamic radicalism among Estonian Muslims. was identified as the organisation whose activities in Estonia are under close scrutiny of security services.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual gathering of Tatars and . It takes place over several days with various festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious occasion, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered. From Sep- tember to October 2012 Tallinn University of Technology with the Esto- nian Islamic Congregation and the Sultanate of Oman had an exhibition “Tolerance of Religions: Islam in the Sultanate of Oman” at the University. FINLAND

Tuomas Martikainen1

1 Muslim Populations

The annexation of Finland by imperial Russia in 1808 gradually led to the permanent settlement of Muslims on its territory. From at least the 1830s there were Muslim soldiers, including and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons stationed on the territory of today’s Finland. They practised their religion and were served by garrison imams. Since the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Russian Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migra- tion ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.2 Muslim migra- tion remained low, but their numbers gradually grew due to marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post-World War II period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of migration. Currently, the larg- est groups are Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Somalis, Kurds, Turks, Kosovo Albanians, Persians and Bosnians. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth is Shi’i.3 By 2011, an estimated 60,000–65,000 Mus- lims were living in Finland, that is, just above 1% of the total population of

1 Tuomas Martikainen is a professor in ethnic relations in the Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Religion, Migration, Settle- ment: Reflections on Post-1990 Immigration to Finland (Leiden: Brill, 2013). The chapter has been written in association with the Post-Secular Culture and a Changing Religious Land- scape in Finland Project (Åbo Akademi University). 2 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimiyhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Community Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books Helsinki, 2006). 3 Martikainen, Tuomas, “Finland”, in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 76–89. 238 tuomas martikainen

5.4 million.4 The Muslim average age is very young and about half are under the age of twenty. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts. (1) The majority (about 50,000) of Finnish Muslims are first genera- tion migrants.5 (2) The second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number 10,000–15,000. This figure is based on parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (migrant- migrant parents) or half (migrant-native parents) deducted from the number (data from Statistics Finland).6 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be around 1,500.7 (4) The two Tatar congregations have 649 members, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as a Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communi- ties. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Muslims, but it has been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the capital (Helsinki) region and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different.

2 Islam and the State

Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) provides more

4 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of state- recognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). Such Muslim organisations had 9,393 registered members in 2010. These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Muslims, and there is no survey or census data (the last census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation migrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehensive statistical data on the second generation are only emerging. See Martikainen, Tuomas, “Maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastol- linen arvioiminen Suomessa” (The Making of Statistical Estimates of Immigrants’ Religious Background in Finland), Teologinen Aikakauskirja, vol. 116, no. 3 (2011), pp. 40–54. 5 The basis of calculation of the estimate is presented in detail in Martikainen, “Maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa”, pp. 40–54. For this chapter, the calculations were redone to cover the time until 2011. 6 These reductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 4) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 7 Isra Lehtinen, personal communication, 19 January 2012. finland 239 detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church of Finland enjoy a special status as religious organi- sations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bod- ies or under the Associations Act as voluntary associations.8 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there also are informally organised groups. In January 2010, there were 29 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active.9 Altogether, there are about 40–50 mosque associations and 20–30 other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Local organisa- tions have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education and Culture started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria from 2008 onwards. The Muslim Umbrella Organi- sation Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland, SINE, www.sine.fi, [email protected]) receives its funding from the Ministry of Educa- tion and Culture and member organisations. Muslim organisations have little national public visibility, although they are often consulted by public authorities on many issues.10

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Until the early 2000s, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. SINE was estab- lished in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In December 2012, SINE had twenty-five member organisations and it is currently funded by the Finn- ish state with 52,000 Euros annually to cover its basic running costs.11 The activities of SINE are still developing, but the society is working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, aspects of Shari’a, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main

8 Muslim groups organised under the Freedom of Religion Act gain recognition as a ‘religion’, and may apply for certain rights, including the right to provide legally approved marriage. Muslim groups organised under the Associations Act are considered as any other voluntary associations, and cannot gain religion-specific rights. Heikkilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Scheinin, Martin, “State and Church in Finland”, in Robbers, Gerhard (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 9 National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland. 10 Martikainen, Tuomas, “The Governance of Islam in Finland”, Temenos, vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265. 11 Personal information, Islamic Council of Finland, 19 March 2013. 240 tuomas martikainen mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shi’i, and the Sunnis are further divided between Tatars and newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities, but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is prominent in some mosques. In 2007, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (Finnish Islamic Party, www.suome nislamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded, but by the end of 2012, it had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. The party represents mainly Salafi Muslims.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are 40–50 mosques in Finland, of which two are purpose-built and owned by the Tatar community. A wooden mosque was built in Järven- pää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque in down- town Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). The Islamic Society of Finland was registered in 1987, and it was the first non-Tatar Islamic organisation in the country. Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New Sunni mosques exist in Espoo, Helsinki, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Järven- pää, Kajaani, Kotka, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lahti, Lohja, Oulu, Pori, Salo, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Vantaa. New Shi’i mosques are to be found in Helsinki, Lempäälä, Tampere and Turku. Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communi- ties have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations, but so far these have failed because of the lack of funding.

5 Children’s Education

Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In general, Tatars have participated in regular school educa- tion. In religious education (RE) in Finnish schools instruction is given in the religion of the pupils in a non-confessional manner. This means that RE is focused on providing information about religion. Religious practice finland 241 in RE is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic RE in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise RE in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic RE is already well established in all the larger cities. The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Helsinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some private Muslim kindergartens. Issues related to the ritual practices of Islam have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and this is only gradually becoming more systematic, but diverse local guidelines have been created. The City of Helsinki guidelines are the most comprehensive, and provide detailed recommendations on how to deal with many issues.12

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic theology and law cannot be formally studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found in several disciplines in Finnish universi- ties, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No official discussions about imam training in higher education have taken place, but the issue has been taken up by the Culture and Religion FOKUS association, which has arranged seminars on the topic. Training of minority faith RE teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, has been on-going since 2007. This consists of both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an RE teacher in Finland.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Fin- land. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and

12 Lehtinen, Isra, “Miten viranomaiset huomioivat muslimit” (How the Authorities take into Account the Needs of Muslims), in Uskonnontutkija 1/2007, available at www.uskon nontutkija.fi/. The website does not currently publish previous issues, but it is expected to be republished during 2013. 242 tuomas martikainen

Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion of the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s but no long-term solution has been found. Practices have varied between municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which also has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. In addition, the Orthodox Church of Finland and other minority Christian religions have been active. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systemati- cally in these institutions. Several state institutions, including the police, the armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are fol- lowed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable.

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Typically, the larger communities hire a locale for this purpose. Time off to celebrate the main festivals is not a legal entitlement.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Hel- sinki, where some halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultane- ously with the slaughter. There are currently plans to renew the law and finland 243 a committee has been set up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in September 2012.13 There are ethnic shops as well as many mosques around the country that sell products targeted to Muslims. Also some specialist shops for Muslim attire as well as beauty shops can be found in Helsinki.

11 Dress Codes

So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers increasingly have to deal with the issue and some have provided guidelines regard- ing acceptable clothing at work, for instance in public health care. Head covering can be worn on public documents (e.g., driver’s licence, identity card, passport), but there are regulations on how much of the face should be visible.14

12 Publications and Media

Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics relating to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times (1942, 1957 and 1995). Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. In 2011, a collection summarising much of the Tatar Mus- lim history in the country was published.15

13 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, ‘Tietoa eläinsuojelulain uudistamisesta’ avail- able at www.mmm.fi/fi/index/etusivu/elaimet/elainsuojelulaki.html, accessed 20 March 2012. 14 See, Finnish Police, ’Passport photo guidelines’, available at www.police.fi/poliisi/ home.nsf/files/Passikuvaohje_07-02-2007_EN/$file/Passikuvaohje_07-02-2007_EN.pdf, accessed 24 April 2013. 15 Kadriye Bedretin (ed.), Tugal tel: Kirjoituksia Suomen tataareista (Helsinki: Suomen Itämäinen Seura, 2011). 244 tuomas martikainen

There are three Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni jour- nal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Finland since 1994 and a Shi’i journal, Salam, by Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta (the Resalat Islamic Community) since 2007. The periodicals contain theologi- cal articles and discuss current affairs. A new journal for young Muslims, Umma, was launched in 2010 by SINE, but its future remains uncertain due to funding issues. Tatars have published a newspaper called Mähallä Habärläre (News from the Community) in the Tatar language since 2004. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals including reli- gious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and dis- cussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including Sunnapolku (The Path of Sunna, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam Suomessa (Islam in Finland, www .tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. A much publicised, global Muslims life-style social media, Muxlim—Enhancing the Muslim Lifestyle (www.muxlim.com), was closed due to financial difficulties.16

13 Family Law

The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. The legal committee of SINE, mosques and imams provide consultation and settlements in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. There have been reports of clashes between civil divorce processes and informal Islamic practice. In 2007, the Finnish League for Human Rights published a survey of the relation- ship between Finnish and Islamic laws,17 according to which the majority of Finnish Muslims view Shari’a as a general moral guideline but follow national legislation in practice. Only a small minority view Shari’a as the primary normative code. Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish NGOs as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural rea- sons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social

16 David J. Cord, Mohamed 2.0: Disruption Manifesto (Helsinki: Söderströms, 2012). 17 Kouros, Kristiina, Suomessa asuvien muslimien suhtautumisesta perhearvoihin ja per- helainsäädäntöön (The Relationship of Muslims Living in Finland to Family Values and Family Law) (Helsinki: Ihmisoikeusliitto, 2007). finland 245

Affairs (2003), the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out in private homes, with consequent medical complications.18 In October 2010, the Minister of Health and Social Services announced that a long planned law on male circumcision will not be brought to the Parliament. Hence, the ambivalence of the situation continues, and the issue has also been debated in public during 2012.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim-Christian dialogue has been taking place since the 1990s. Sporadic one-off events are gradually being replaced by more organised forums. The longest standing activity has been the biannual dialogue between the Church and Islam Committee of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and several Muslims organisations that was established in 1997. The events focus on religious questions and have gathered 20–50 participants on a regular basis. The Islamic Council of Finland is represented in the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Finland, which is an evolving high-level interfaith network. Also, Muslim organisations, including SINE, are and have been represented on Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, ETNO), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. Interreligious relations have been moving in a more proactive direction in the 2000s. Since 2001, the President of Finland has initiated meetings between leaders of the Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities on a regular basis. This was one of the background factors leading to the foundation of the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Fin- land in 2011, which is a high-level Christian, Jewish and Muslim discussion forum promoting societal peace and freedom of religion in Finland.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives a violent and aggressive impression of Islam, as has been noted in many studies over

18 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Alitolppa-Niitamo, Anne, Martikainen, Tuomas and Tiilikainen, Marja, “Religion in Migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Vesa Puuronen, Antti Häkkinen, Anu Pylkkänen, Tom Sandlund, and Reetta Toivanen (eds), New Challenges for the Welfare Society (Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139. 246 tuomas martikainen the years. This applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented more positively. Finnish public opin- ion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to attitudes towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Scientol- ogy. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seems to have stabilised over the years. The latest opinion poll was con- ducted in 2008 and found that 52% of Finns view Islam negatively and only 6% positively.19 Islam in Finland continues to be an on-going part of public debate, but there were no major public controversies related to Muslims in 2012. Some debate was aroused due to news of a handful of Finnish Muslims taking part in the Syrian conflict in late 2012.

16 Major Cultural Events

Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major national cultural event on Islam, the Minareetin kutsu (Call of the Minaret), was organised with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004–2005. It was part of a campaign called Tuhat ja yksi askelta (A Thousand and One Steps) that aimed to inform Finns about Islam around the world. The first major event organised solely by Finnish Mus- lims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland in Helsinki put on a two-day “Islam-Expo” attracting 200 participants. The second Islam-Expo was arranged in March 2011 and it had 800–900 partici- pants. Both of the Expos have included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products.

19 Ketola, Kimmo, “Uskontotilanteen muutos ja suomalaisten suhtautuminen eri uskontoihin” (Changes in the Religious Situation and Finns’ Views of Different Religions), in Martikainen, Tuomas and Jalovaara, Ville (eds), Uskonnon ylösnousemus: Kirkon, uskon- non and kulttuurin murros (The Resurrection of Religion: Changes in Church, Religion and Culture) (Helsinki: Magma, 2010), pp. 40–51. FRANCE

Franck Frégosi1

1 Muslim Populations

Islam is the second largest religion in France after Catholicism. The figures usually put forward indicate, at the highest estimates, more than five mil- lion people of Muslim cultural background,2 at the lowest between three and four million.3 A recent study, conducted in 2008–2009 on the basis of a sample of 220,000 respondents, counted some 2.1 million Muslims in France.4 The Pew Research Centre in its latest report in 2011 estimated 4,704,000 Muslims in France (7.5% of the total population) and, according to their statistical projections, this percentage will reach 10.3% by 2030.5 While a broad majority of Muslims in France are Sunnis and belong to the Maliki School which is dominant in the area, the Turkish speaking population as well as Pakistanis belong to the Hanafi School. We also find the Alevi group among the Turkish speaking population (estimated at 30% of that group). Ahmadi Muslims are about 1 000 peo- ple. Islam in France is a heterogeneous social and religious reality which includes the private Islam of the simple believers, the visible Islam of the strong believers, and the more “virtual” Islam of persons of Muslim culture.

1 Franck Frégosi is a senior research fellow at the research centre PRISME-Société, Droit et Religion en Europe (Societies, Law and Religion in Europe), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) University of Strasbourg. 2 Bernard, Godard and Sylvie, Taussig, Les musulmans en France. Courants, institutions, communautés : un état des lieux, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2007. 3 Michèle, Tribalat, “Le nombre de musulmans en France : qu’en sait-on ?”, in Cités, Hors série, L’islam en France, PUF, 2004, pp. 21–31. 4 Interview Patrick Simon in saphir.news, Hana Ben Rouhma, “Mosquées : à 2,1 ou 5 millions, les musulmans manquent toujours de places,” www.saphirnews.com/Mosquees- a-21-ou-5-millions-les-musulmans-manquent-toujours-de-places_a12337.html, accessed 21 March 2011. 5 See: Pew Research Center, The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2011). 248 franck frégosi

There are no new available data on how Muslim populations see them- selves except the IFOP poll for the daily La Croix published in July 20116 which shows a significant development (in percentage terms) of trends among the different modes of Islamic belonging in France. If, over the past ten years, there has been a steady increase in religiosity indicators—such as daily prayer (39%), attendance at mosques (23%) especially by young people—a practice such as the observance of fasting (on the increase) must be considered a behaviour more identity-related than the expression of a high religiosity. This is why 71% of Muslims state that they observe fasting. Those who practise regularly, non-practising believers and simply people of Muslim origin tend to comply fully or partially (fasting for a few days). According to the latest survey, 39% of Muslims perform the five daily prayers which, in a short period, between 2001 and 2007, represents a significant increase of six points. As for communal prayer on Fridays (at the mosque), it is currently around 25%. Unlike the daily prayer, its growth is spread over time: in about twenty years it has only increased by nine points.

2 Islam and the State

In the French secular republic there is no official status for any religion, no public funds for religious activities and no religious education in pub- lic school. Religious groups are private organisations. Separate from this system, in the Rhine and Moselle departments (Alsace and Moselle), only Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism are recognised religious denomi- nations and organised within the framework of public law, and they are officially supported and financed by state and public local authorities (towns, regions, departments). Although Islam does not appear in this part of France among the recognised religions, the Muslim communities based in the area can benefit from public grants for their associations and for the construction of new mosques. At the national level, the French Council of Muslim Worship (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM, 270 Rue Lecourbe 75015 Paris, tel.: ++33 145580573, fax: ++33 145582406, www.lecfcm.fr) composed of 200 members is the official body which represents the religious part of the

6 See IFOP for La Croix, Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam en France, July 2011. france 249 community facing the secular state. The General Assembly of this Council is partly elected by the leaders and delegates of 1,600 incorporated mosques and partly appointed by the main Muslim organisations and mosques. On the local level, there are 25 regional Councils of Muslim Worship (Conseils Régionaux du Culte Musulman, CRCM) which are elected the same day as the National Council. These Councils are in charge of questions related to worship, such as building of mosques, cemeteries, slaughter, nomination of Muslim chaplains in the army, hospitals and jails, and pilgrimage. The current president of the CFCM is Mohamed Moussaoui, a French Moroccan, professor of mathematics and former imam of a mosque located in Avignon. The Muslim Institute of the Paris Mosque and the Union of Islamic Organisations of France both officially boycotted the last Council elections in order to denounce the lack of reform of the Council. They finally resumed discussions with the CFCM after their expectations were met, namely a rotating collective chair of the organisation and an increase in the number of appointed members.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are mainly four major influential Muslims federations involved in religious affairs:

– UOIF (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, Union of Islamic Organisations of France UOIF, 20, Rue de la Prévôté 93120 La Courneuve, tel./fax: ++33 143111060/61, www.uoif-online.com) has a background in the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. This organisation tries to pro- mote both a conservative and a pragmatic Islam adapted to western and secularised societies. About two hundred Muslims associations are connected with this federation, not only religious associations in charge of places of worship, but also cultural associations, students and women’s organisations. – L’Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris (Muslim Institute of the Paris Mosque, 2 bis Place du puits de l’Ermite 75005 Paris, tel./fax : ++33 145359733/1626, www.mosquee-de-paris.org) represents official Alge- rian Islam in France, a traditional Sunni Islam. This mosque officially promotes a so called “moderate and republican Islam” and strongly supported the banning of ‘burqa’ from public spaces. – The Rassemblement des musulmans de France (Assembly of the Mus- lims of France, Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, www.lermf 250 franck frégosi

.com), a break-away of the former Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (National Federation of the Muslims of France, FNMF), repre- sents the main channel of expression of Moroccan Islam and currently controls the presidency of the French Council of Muslim Worship. It promotes a traditional, pietistic and devotional Islam. – The Tabligh movement is divided into two organisations: the older one is named Faith and Practice (Foi et Pratique)7 and the new one Dawah Lillah (Calling to God).

The great majority of Muslims related to these federations are of Maghrib- ian origin. Other Muslims have their own federations such as the Turks with the Millî Görüs (orthodox and Turkish nationalist Muslim community),8 or the Diyanet (official Islam of the Turkish State) and other minor groups like Süleymanci community, or more nationalist organisations.9 Beside these national federations, there are numerous organisations of lesser importance because they are related to specific ethnic minorities or national groups such as African Muslims or smaller in size, such as Sufi organisations (Alawiyya,10 Naqshibandiyya,11 Shadhliyya, Bouchichiya),12 Islamic youth (Union des Jeunes Musulmans/ Union of Young Muslims,13 Jeunes Musulmans de France/ Young Muslims of France, Collectif des Musul- mans de France/ Joint Muslims of France)14 or heterodox Muslims such as Ahmadiyya.15 There are also a few emerging organisations such as Salafi-

7 Foi et Pratique, email/webaddress www.foietpratique.org. 8 Communauté Islamique du Millï Görüs de France, 64 Rue Faubourg Saint Denis 75010 Paris, tel.: ++33 145234150, fax: ++33 147703496, email [email protected], www.mil- ligorus.cimgfrance.com. 9 Jean Paul, Touzane, L’islamisme turc, coll. Comprendre le Moyen Orient (Paris: L’Harmattan 2001); Birol, Caymaz, Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002) and Samim, Akgönül, “Millî Görüs: institution religieuse minoritaire et mouvement politique transnational (France et Allemagne)”, in Samir, Amghar (ed.), Islam- ismes d’Occident. Etat des lieux et perspectives (Paris: Editions Lignes de repères, 2006), pp. 63–84. 10 www.aisa-net.com. 11 Centre Soufi Naqshbandi 12, Rue Jean Perrin 93400 Saint Ouen, tel.: ++33 665415208 www.naqshbandi.fr. 12 Boutchcichiya, www.saveurs-soufies.com. 13 Union des Jeunes Musulmans de France Centre Islamique Tawhid, 8, Rue Notre Dame 69006 Lyon, tel.: ++33 472741869, email: [email protected], www.ujm.fr/contact.php. 14 Collectif des Musulmans de France, email: www. lecmf.org/index.php/contactez- nous, www.lecmf.org. 15 Association Musulmane Ahmadiyya France, 54, Rue Louis et Gerald Donzelle Saint Prix 95390, tel.: ++33 134160042, email: [email protected], www.ahmadiyya.fr. france 251 yya (twenty-thirty mosques)16 or Habachiyya17 (twenty two associations) which have their own mosques. Beside these organisations involved in religious matters, there are also a few associations with lower influence bringing together secular Muslims18 more interested in public affairs than in religion. In denouncing Islamic fundamentalism, these organisations try to be a political alternative to religious radicalism. They act as if they were the well-grounded French Muslims, the rightful modern Muslims, because they are both born Mus- lims and secular as the majority of French people are born Catholics but deeply secularised in their daily life.19 We can also mention the creation in 2010 of the first Muslim Homosex- ual Association in France (Homosexuels Musulmans de France, HM2F).20 This Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual association fights against homophobia in general and especially religious (Islamic) homophobia and tries to promote an inclusive Islam. This particular organisation is member of the Confederation of Associations LGBTQI European and Muslim (www.calem.eu). Together with the famous Afro-American Mus- lim scholar Amina Wadud this association organised the ‘Umra (lesser pilgrimage) to Mecca and Medina in November 2012. The Shi’i Federation of France (Fédération Chiite de France)21 founded in 2007 by the centre Az Zahra,22 which promotes Shi’i version of Islam, engages in a systematic defence of the regimes of Tehran and The centre Az Zahra gave rise to a radical anti-Zionist Party (Parti Anti Sioniste) which has its own news channel named P.A.S L’info. According to the French Shi’i website Ahl al Beyt (www.ahlelbeyt.blogspot.fr), apart from the centre Az Zahra, three other Shi’i centres exist around Paris: one

16 Samir, Amghar. “Les salafistes français : une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse ?” in Maghreb Machrek, Printemps 2005, no 183, pp. 13–32 and, Le salafisme d’aujourd’hui. Mou- vements sectaires en Occident (Paris: Michalon, 2011). 17 Association des Projets de Bienfaisance Islamiques en France (APBIF), 52, Boulevard Ornano 75018 Paris, tel./fax : ++33 142627997, www.apbif.org. 18 See Fédération Mosaïc, 102 Avenue des Champs Elysées 75008 Paris, www.federation mosaic.com/. 19 Franck, Frégosi, “Les musulmans laïques en France: une mouvance plurielle et para- doxale,” in Maghreb Machrek, Printemps 2005, no 183, pp. 33–44. 20 Homosexuels Musulmans de France, Centre LGBT de Paris, 63, Rue de Beaubourg 75003 Paris, tel.: ++33 659919012 email: [email protected], www.homosexuels- musulmans.org. 21 www.federationchiitedefrance.com. 22 Centre Zahra France, 1 Impasse Jean Baptiste Lebas 59760 Grande Synthe, tel.: ++33 328589214/fax : ++33 328252678, email: [email protected], www.centre-zahra.com. 252 franck frégosi in la Courneuve (Centre Mehfide Zeînab),23 another in Montreuil (Centre Al Ghadir)24 and one in Neuilly-sur-Seine (Centre Fatima Zahra).25 In 2011, a new Muslim association named Fils de France (Sons of France),26 appeared. This association intends to promote a French patri- otic current within Muslims in France and a French Islam. Rather than boost immigration, this association defends a project of acculturation of Islam in the French character while opening the history of France to the reality of Islam. This association has been deeply against the proposed law on same-sex marriages. We can also mention the Association Musulmane Ahmadiyya de France (Ahmadiyya Muslim Association in France).27

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The improvement in the general conditions of the Muslim faith, par- ticularly in terms of the number of places of worship, and confirmed by the development of many collaborative projects between municipalities and groups of Muslims to build mosques throughout France, justifies the impression that the building of places of Muslim worship in France has become a relatively trivial matter. Many cities have also decided to sup- port the building of mosques in local areas, with public funding in Alsace- Moselle and indirectly in the rest of France. In 2012, the Muslim Homosexual Association in France (H2MF) opened its first mosque in France, At Tawhid, in which all believers are welcome without any limitation of sexual orientation. The prayer is open to “all those who know or do not know how to pray.” The mosque is located in temporary premises in the Paris region. The communal Friday prayer with khutba takes place in the evening, continues with a Sufi dhikr session and ends with meal. The main Ahmadiyya mosque named Moubarak Mosque, opened October 2008 and is located in the city of Saint Prix.

23 www.mehfide-zaïnab.com. 24 www.alghadir.org. 25 wwwfr-beytolzahra-paris.blogfa.com. 26 www.filsdefrance.fr. 27 Association Musulmane Ahmadiyya de France, 54 Rue Louis et Gérarld Donzelle 95390 Saint Prix, tel.: ++33 134160042, www.ahmadiyya.fr. france 253

Although the question of the construction of mosques seems to have become commonplace, a poll of the IFOP of October 201228 for the conser- vative newspaper Le Figaro saw that 43% of people surveyed were against the construction of mosques, mainly among the voters of the right-wing parties (60%) and of the extreme right party (84%) and only 29% favour- able among the left-wing voters.

5 Children’s Education

Several projects for secondary schools of Islamic character have started to appear in France in recent years with or without state recognition. Four private Muslim secondary schools work regularly. The first establishment, founded in 2003, belongs to the contractual system, is recognised and receives partial public funding; it is the Averroès secondary school in Lille, which serves one hundred pupils. The second establishment, Al Kindi sec- ondary school of Décines, founded in 2008, is located in a district of Lyon and is not yet under state contract. The third establishment, the Ibn Khal- dun secondary school, opened its doors in Marseille in 2009 and is under a contract with the state. These schools are considered closely related to the UOIF. The fourth, the oldest one, La Réussite, is located near Paris. It is totally private and has never obtained a contract with the state.29 The ranking of French high schools, established according to objective criteria by the Ministry of Education, placed Averroès School of Lille in the 2nd position of its Academy (Regional education authority) and in the 34th position at the national level in 2008.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Muslim higher education and imam training is organised in France only by private institutions more or less connected with the main Muslim fed- erations.30 A specific programme for imams opened in September 2008 at the Institut Catholique de Paris (private institution) with public funding

28 IFOP pour le Figaro L’image de l’Islam en France, October 2012, www.ifop.com/ media/poll/2028-1-study_file.pdf. 29 See John, R. Bowen, L’islam à la française. Enquête, (Paris: Steinkis, 2010). 30 Francis, Messner and Anne Laure, Zwilling, Formation des cadres religieux en France. Une affaire d’Etat ? (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010). 254 franck frégosi

(a two year study programme) received by imams from the Grand Mosque of Paris (Ghazali Intitute) for training in secular matters (French law, French history, sociology of religion). Other Islamic federations have so far ignored this initiative. In order to promote public training for imams, the State University of Strasbourg opened in 2012 a specific programme for religious and associa- tive leaders named “Droit, Société, Pluralité des religions”. As in Paris, it is a Diplôme Universitaire course, based on a one year programme centred on Religion and Law, History and Sociology. All the courses are taught by scholars and researchers involved in public institutions and university faculties. At the same University, a Masters in Law and Religious Studies specialised in Islamic Studies started already in September 2009. The Diyanet is still intending to open its own private Faculty of Islamic Theology in Strasbourg. This private institution aims first at training theo- logians, imams and chaplains intended for Turkish speaking communities living in France (a five-year study programme). It is in search of partner- ship with French universities and would like to be recognised as the Mus- lim equivalent of both Faculties of Theology (Catholic and Protestant).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Like other public services, that of funerals and burials is legally governed by the principle of neutrality. The communal cemeteries in France (except for Alsace-Moselle) cannot then include any material, physical separation between the faiths; the creation and extension of confessional cemeter- ies is not authorised. Raising or affixing any religious symbols or emblem in the communal parts of the cemeteries is strictly forbidden. Dealing with the increasing religious diversity and the strict impossibility of allow- ing the creation of new burial spaces dedicated to religious groups, pub- lic authorities have until today managed the problem by way of circulars and interpreted the letter of the law in pragmatic ways. A circular dated 19 February 2008 responded to problems encountered by Muslim families. In order to favour the burial on French territory of people without the means of financing the repatriation of their deceased relatives to their countries of origin, the circular specifies that the mayor has the possibility of gathering together graves of people of the same confession in commu- nal cemeteries, while taking care to respect the neutrality of the public sections and freedom of choice of burial of the families. In 2010, around 70 Muslim sections have been opened in major cities. france 255

Strasbourg was the first French city to open (in February 2012) a Mus- lim public cemetery. It remains the only one of its kind in France.31

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

It is the duty of the state to monitor the rules guaranteeing the public prac- tice of worship, as the first article of the Law of Separation of 9 December 1905 states: “The Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of the faiths subject to only the restrictions published hereafter in the interest of public order”. So, the provision of chaplains for students in secondary schools as well for soldiers in the army, for patients in hospitals or prisoners in jails is permitted in the French secular system of laïcité. Currently Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Muslim chaplains have legal status in the army and are salaried by the state. The CFCM has nominated head chaplains for armed forces (2005),32 prisons (2005) and hospitals (2006).33 In the army, since 2005, a Muslim head chaplain has been appointed by the Minister of Defence. He man- ages 30 military chaplains. The Muslim Head Chaplain for Prisons man- ages around 147 Muslim chaplains, among them ten Muslim women.34 For hospitals, each hospital can nominate Muslim chaplains and is free to assign him (her) financing.

9 Religious Festivals

Even if the state is strongly secular, and religious festivals are never organised by the state, the main Christian and Roman Catholic feasts are included in the official calendar and recognised as public holidays. In public administration, companies or agencies, state schools, the employ- ers wishing to attend specific Muslim religious feasts such as ‘Id al-Adha, ‘Id al-Fitr and Mawlid can be allowed leave of absence.

31 www.saphirnews.com/Strasbourg-donne-le-jour-a-un-cimetiere-public-musulman_ a10608.html, accessed 8 October 2009. 32 http://amdp.exprimetoi.net. 33 http://aumonerie-musulmane.over-blog.com. 34 www.saphirnews.com/Aumonier-musulman-On-ne-veut-pas-non-plus-d-imam-au- rabais_a12578.html, accessed 10 May 2011. 256 franck frégosi

10 Halal Products and Islamic services

Three main mosques in France (Grand Mosque of Paris, Lyon and Evry- Courcouronnes) have official consent (given by the Ministry of Agriculture) to name official ritual slaughters and are allowed to slaughter animals in public slaughterhouses. Finding halal food is nowadays easy: you can find it in supermarkets or in specialised butcher’s shops. Since 2004, once a year, a halal expo takes place in Paris, where multinational and national companies specialised in halal goods present their products. Alongside requests for places of worship, the pluralisation of the French religious landscape has also occasionally resulted in the emergence of par- ticular religious requests, such as the issue of pork-free meals in public schools and, more recently, halal menus. The former conservative Minis- ter of the Interior Claude Guéant, as a result of different events, defined “the applicable legal status as regards mass catering in public services” in a circular, dated 16 August 2011.35 In this text, the Minister reiterates that, because of the neutrality of public services with regard to any belief or religious practice arising from the rule of the secularity of the State, “particular requests, based on religious reasons, cannot therefore justify an adaptation of the public service (. . .); however, the service endeavours to take into account the convictions of users in the respect to which it is subject and in its sound operation. These rules also apply to mass catering provided to users in such public services as educational establishments or hospitals.”36 So, in the state education system, under the Law of 13 August 2004 relating to local freedoms and responsibilities, which transferred respon- sibility for school meals to local communities, the canteen is “an optional public service.” In the absence of national regulation, it depends on each competent authority (town council for primary education, General Coun- cil (Conseil général) for secondary schools, the regional council (Conseil régional) for high schools for 15–18 year olds) to decide on the rules in the matter. So, local communities have, for example, (Circular of 10 September 2004) the freedom to vary pricing according to the service provided

35 Secularity and religious freedom. Compilation of texts and case law, 2011. 36 Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’outre mer, des collectivités territoriales, et de l’immigration, Laïcité et liberté religieuse. Recueil de textes et de jurisprudence, Paris, Les éditions des journaux officiels, 2011, p. 44. france 257

(organic food, specific meals for particular diets, diets conforming to the requirements of the various religions included). What’s more, the Circular of August 2011 specifies that “the very great freedom in establishing menus and the fact of planning menus around confessional practices constitutes neither a right for users nor an obli- gation for communities.”37 Equally, cases of parents who provide packed lunches must be examined on a case-by-case basis, without “the religious beliefs of the pupils and their families being used to justify provision of a packed lunch.”38 As for hospitals, the Circular recalls that “patients can have the possibil- ity of obtaining meals complying with their dietary regimes in coordina- tion with the chaplain of their faith.”39 Lastly, the circular specifies “that in practice the majority of canteens have been proposing substitutes for pork for a long time, and serve fish on Fridays, thereby allowing for certain regulations or religious recom- mendations to be respected.”40 Islamic banking and finance is still at an embryonic stage. In 2006, BNP Paribas banking group (Banque Nationale de Paris) created the first Islamic Fund (BNP Paribas Islamic Fund).41 Three years after, Christine Lagarde, then the Minister of Economy and Finance, decided to facili- tate the development of the Islamic finance in the country. For that pur- pose, two fiscal instructions were decided at the beginning of year 2009 to create more incentives in the tax system for Islamic products. The Authority of Financial Markets (AMF) had to create a category of pay- ments facilitating the recording investment funds in France compatible with Islamic law. Several banking groups equipped with Shari’a Boards proposed Shari’a-compliant products (musharaka, mudaraba, murabaha, sukuk) designed to meet a set of fundamental and ethical principles based on the Qur’an. A French Institute of Islamic finance (Institut Français de la Finance Islamique, IFFI) was established in December 2009. It signed two agreements of cooperation with the Islamic Development Bank of (IBD) and nowadays works as a think tank. In August 2010, the tax authorities published two instructions more precisely clarifying the

37 Ibid., p. 45. 38 Ibid., p. 45. 39 Ibid., p. 46. 40 Ibid., p. 45. 41 http://services.bnpparibas-ip.com/doc/pros/FR_Islamic_PS_Equity_Optimiser_ VMF_1112_Pour_Visa.pdf. 258 franck frégosi fiscal nature of Islamic financial operations and more instructions are being prepared. In 2010 and 2011, Chaabi Bank (French subsidiary of the Popular Bank group in Morocco) granted the first real-estate loans in compliance with Islamic principles and the first current account compatible with the prin- ciples of Shari‘a. Since 2012 there has been a Shari’a compliant life insur- ance policy called Salam Epargne and Investment sold by Swiss Life.42 BNP Paribas group sells also its own life insurance.43 There are three official Shari’a boards in France. The first was created in 2008 and is connected with ACERFI (Audit, Conformité, Ethique et Recherche en Finance Islamique www.acerfi.org). Its Shari’a board is a committee of six French Muslim scholars (shaykhs and muftis) who are graduates of different Islamic universities (Al Azhar, Bagdad). They work closely with AIDIMM (Association d’Innovation pour le Développement économique et Immobilier, www.aidimm.org, mail [email protected], 12 Rue Sadi Carnot 93170 Bagnolet, tel.: ++33 695071270). This structure consists of jurists and a tax expert specialised in the management of savings, and it promotes Islamic finance. The second board appeared in 2009 and is connected with the Conseil Français de la Finance Islamique (French Council for Islamic Finance, COFFIS www.coffis.fr). Its president is a Mauritanian sheikh, who is a member of the European Council for Jurisprudence, Fatwa and Research in Europe, and the Vice President is the leader of the UOIF. The third board is linked with the Comité Indépen- dant de la Finance Islamique en Europe (CIFIE, Independent Committee for Islamic Finance in Europe, www.cifie.fr) and has mainly Moroccan connections.

11 Dress Codes

Since the law of 15 March 2004 head scarfs and are now prohib- ited in public schools, and since the new law of 11 October 2010 full niqab is also strictly prohibited in all public buildings and spaces. The text of the Law of 11 October 2010 states in Article 2 that, “Public space consists of public rights of way, as well as places open to the public or assigned to a public service.” Its implementing circular of April 2011 develops

42 www.swisslife.fr/Le-Groupe/Swiss-Life-France/Communiques/Swiss-Life-lance- Salam-Epargne-Placement-le-premier-contrat-d-assurance-vie-conforme-aux-principes- de-la-finance-islamique. 43 www.salamepargne.fr. france 259 further the extent of public space in these terms: “(. . .) By public space, one understands the public highways, public transportation, trade and shopping centres, school establishments, post offices, hospital, courts, administration . . .”. The law provides fines of up to 150 Euros against any person refusing to comply with the ban on concealing one’s face, pos- sibly combined with the obligation to follow a training course in citizen- ship. Any adult having imposed on another the wearing of such dress is liable to one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 Euros (the amount is doubled if the person forced is a minor).

12 Publications and Media

State support for religions can be measured by the place for religious expression made available within the framework of the public service of audio-visual communication. Under Article 56 of the amended Law of 30 September 1986, France Télévisions (a public broadcaster) is obliged to schedule programmes of a religious nature on Sunday mornings, reflect- ing the principal faiths exercised in France. These programmes (Roads of the faith/Chemins de la Foi) are placed under the responsibility of the representatives of the faiths and the production costs are directly paid for by France Télévisions, up to a ceiling whose amount is fixed each year in the contract specifications. A 30-minute programme on Islam named “Islam” is broadcast every Sunday morning by the association Vivre l’Islam (Live Islam). Apart from this programme, many Muslim television channels are accessible by satel- lite or by internet like Oumma Tv, a French Muslim TV. The only Muslim print publication worth mentioning is the monthly free magazine Salam news. To find information on Islamic issues in France and all over the world, Muslims in France can go to several French Muslim websites like Oumma. com (www.oumma.com), Saphir.news (www.saphirnews.com) or Mejliss (www.mejliss.com).

13 Family Law

In France, everyone is completely free to marry with the person of their choice, independent of any religious consideration. Within the marriage, each spouse preserves total freedom of conscience and religion, which implies the right to have and practise a religion, as well as to not have one. Civil law does not recognise any of the obstacles usually highlighted by 260 franck frégosi religious groups (interfaith marriage, religious restrictions in the choice of spouse according to their religious membership or gender). Engagement ( fiançailles), which can sometimes give rise to forms of religious celebra- tions (such as presence of an imam), is not covered by any specific provi- sion. They are simple commitments able to be broken freely without the courts being brought in to recognise any legal consequence and without involving civil liability on the part of the partner causing the split. Apart from marriage, couples have also the choice between two alterna- tive forms of life together—free cohabitation or the Civil Pact of Solidarity (PACS). The issue of religion does not seem to have a role to play in these two types of union, apart from problems relating to children who may be the result of these unions (medically assisted procreation or adoption). Mohammed Moussaoui, President of CFCM as well as the Mufti Tariq Oubrou from Bordeaux consider that from the perspective of Islamic law the religious ceremony is not absolutely essential in the light of the fact that Islamic law intervenes after the civil marriage. Tariq Oubrou consid- ers that the great flexibility of Shari’a in terms of personal status does not enter into major contradiction with French civil law. According to him, resorting to civil law in matrimonial matters by Muslims living in France conforms to the purposes of Islamic law. Several presidents of Muslim associations and Muslim academics signed a manifesto entitled “A debate for all” (http://oumma.com/15340/un- debat) asking President François Holland to organise a national debate on the family, marriage and child custody rather than to support a law allow- ing homosexuals to marry. Individual Muslims and Muslim associations participated in the various street protests against the project. The UOIF in particular called its sympathisers to join processions of demonstrators, and the Deputy Rector of the great mosque of Lyon also participated.

14 Interreligious Relations

Many initiatives of religious dialogue exist, of national or local interest. There are far too many to provide a list here. On the national level, one can, for instance, name the Islamic-Christian research group (www.gric .asso.fr), or the journal Chemins de dialogue (paths of dialogue).44 We have to mention the very active Department of Relations with Islam of the Catholic Episcopal Conference (Service national des Relations avec

44 http://istr-marseille.cef.fr/pages/chemins-de-dialogue.htm, accessed 13 December 2010. france 261 l’Islam, SRI, www.relations-catholiques-musulmans.cef.fr/) which regu- larly broadcasts news bulletins on Islam and Islamic-Christian relations. An irrational fear of Islam affects more and more Catholic communities, and the SRI wants to answer this new challenge and does not intend to give in to the ambient Islamophobia. A similar structure exists within the Fédération Protestante de France (www.protestants.org/index.php?id=32711) which represents the main churches and the associations of Protestant affiliation (Lutheran, Reformed, Evangelical, Baptist and Pentecostal). An official Iftar supper is organised every year by the CFCM during Ramadan together with leaders of other religious communities and many public authorities. In many French cities one can find local interreligious committees. Most of them are private and informal structures allowing dialogue between all religions and local public authorities. Finally, the leaders of the main religious groups in France (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Orthodox) have joined together in the Conference of Religious Leaders in France. They hold meetings on a regular basis with a view to issuing common statements on matters of social and ethical importance such as denouncing religious discrimina- tion, and political stigmatisation of religious minorities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Most of the recent controversies and debates around Islam that take cen- tre stage in public in France have revolved around the greater social vis- ibility of symbols or practices related to an orthodox understanding of religious practice (wearing the hijab, meals without pork, timeslots for Muslim women in public swimming pools, etc.) and more or less isolated incidents (niqab, Muslims praying in the street and the like). The impor- tance of such issues tends to be overstated; they are supposedly calling into question the legal and political progress achieved by the process of secularisation on the one hand, and to highlight a disintegration of France’s cultural identity, on the other. The development during the 1990s of cases of wearing head scarves fuelled various public debates about the head scarf in state schools, then in public, but also some litigation in the world of private enterprise.45

45 Dounia and Lydia Bouzar, a-t-il sa place dans l’entreprise? (Paris: Albin Michel, 2009). 262 franck frégosi

Reacting to the judgement of Court of Cassation on 19 March 2013 about the Baby Loup affair, MPs and the government decided to vote on a new law which extends early childhood religious neutrality to private institutions (receiving public funding). That means the total prohibition of religious symbols and public expressions in these private institutions. A conservative MP went as far as wishing to enforce the management of religious freedom in all private companies. As suggested by the last report of September 2011 of the HCI this MP proposed to insert in the Labour Code an additional article to promote religious neutrality by completely prohibiting any religious expression.

16 Major Cultural Events

The major event for Muslims living in France, both religiously and cul- turally, is the annual meeting of French Muslims organised by the UOIF around April. In April 2012, few weeks after the murder of three French soldiers in Montauban and of a number of pupils and a teacher in a Jew- ish school of Toulouse, several conservative MPs and editorial writers demanded a ban on the UOIF gathering on the grounds that some of the invited Muslim speakers (such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi) were considered too fundamentalist and suspected to be anti-Semitic because they are opposed to the Israeli state. In the end, these foreign Muslim preachers were not granted entrance visas. In several cities, during the time of Ramadan, many Muslim asso- ciations organise iftar dinners open to civil authorities and non-Muslim communities. GEORGIA

Satenik Mkrtchyan1

1 Muslim Populations

Georgia has been a majority Christian country for centuries and has remained so through periods of Muslim rule and longer periods of hav- ing immediate Muslim neighbours. Nevertheless, Georgia has long had a significant Muslim population.2 The first Muslims appeared in Tiflis as far back as the second half of the 7th century, at the time of the Arab conquests. For centuries (especially during the 8th to early 12th) Muslims played a leading political and economic role in the life of the city.3 In the Middle Ages and early modern period, due to intensive contacts between Georgia and the Islamic world Islam was widely introduced in Georgia. In addition, Turkic speaking Muslims began to move into the country, migrants who became known as ‘Tatars’ in the Tsarist era and would then be reclassified as ‘Azerbaijanis’ during the Soviet era.4 By the end of the imperial period (i.e., 1910s), the population of Geor- gia was 20% Muslim. While the Russian imperial authorities were usu- ally tolerant of Georgia’s Muslims, Soviet authorities were considerably less so. Of the four Muslim Religious Boards to oversee Muslim affairs in the USSR, one for the entire South Caucasus region was based in Baku (Azerbaijan).5 Georgia, like other parts of the Soviet Union, witnessed a notable ‘Islamic revival’ in the Gorbachev era and the early post-Soviet period6 mainly through a renewal of ties with foreign, especially Turkish and Iranian Islamic organisations.7

1 Satenik Mkrtchyan is a PhD student at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and works as a researcher at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. 2 Sanikidze, G., and Walker, W. (Ed.), ‘Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia’, BPS Working Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, p. 3. 3 G. Asatrian, and H. Margarian, “The Muslim Community of Tiflis (8th–9th centuries)”, Iran and The Caucasus, N 8.1; 2004; 29–52, p. 29. 4 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 3. 5 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 46. 6 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 46. 7 B. Balci and R. Motika, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (September 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 335. 264 satenik mkrtchyan

Georgian scholars have estimated that the number of ‘Muslims’ in the republic in 1989 was as high as 640,000, or 12 % of the total population at the time (5.4 million). However, the 1989 Soviet census did not inquire into religious identity or practices, and the number of Muslims used to be deduced with reference to traditionally Muslim nationalities in the repub- lic. There are also other Muslims, particularly in the Autono- mous Republic of Ajara in Georgia’s southwest. The reliability of the census conducted in 2002, which included a question on religion, remains questionable given the extent of the disorder in the country at the time.8 According to this census9 the number of Muslims in Georgia was 433,784, which constituted 9.9% out of the total population. Apart from the census data, different estimates are given by the mass media, Muslim community and academic circles. According to one of the estimates, the total number of Muslims in Georgia is only 300,000.10 The European Stability Initiative gives the number of 430,000 Muslims living in Georgia,11 while Azerbai- jani mass media provide the number of 500,000 Muslims in Georgia,12 the same number given by the Tbilisi mosque representative.13 In Georgia, there are strong correlations between ethnic groups and religious affiliations, and often, geographic areas,14 which is significant in terms of defining the main characteristics of Islamic practices. This is most clearly the case with the Azerbaijanis, the biggest among the Muslim communities (approximately 284,761, or 6.1% of the population according to the 2002 census), comprising the largest ethnic minority group.15 They

8 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 5., Balci, B., and Motika, R., ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (September 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 338. 9 The 2002 census did not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. 10 Х. Баиндурашвили, Ислам в посткоммунистическом Тбилиси, Человек постсоветсткого пространства: Сборник материалов конференции. Выпуск 3 / Под ред. В.В. Парцвания.—СПб.: Санкт-Петербургское философское общество, 2005.—С.85–91 (Kh. Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi” in V. Partsvania (ed.), The Human-being of the post-Soviet Space. (St. Petersburg: Philosophical Union of St. Petersburg, 2005) pp. 85–91 (87). 11 www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=321&country_ID=1&slide_ID=1, (note: the source is no longer available). 12 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 20 January 2013. 13 n. popuaSvili, “islami”, z. kiknaZe (red.). “religiebi saqarTveloSi” (Tbilisi: saqarTvelos saxalxo damcvelis ofisi, 2008), pp. 336–364. (N. Popuashvili, “Islam” in Z. Kiknadze (ed.), Religions in Georgia. (Tbilisi: Public Defender’s Office,2008). pp. 336–364. 14 US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2011: Georgia, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192811, accessed 20 January 2013. 15 Azerbaijanian sources often speak about 500,000 Azerbaijani population in Georgia based on the “unofficial” sources. (http://en.trend.az/news/society/diaspora/1613337.html, georgia 265 are largely Muslim and most of them live in the south of Kvemo Kartli, constituting there a majority. Some 15,65416 live in Tbilisi, and 33,600 reside in the eastern region of Kakhetia. The majority of Azer- baijanis in Georgia belong to the Shi’i branch of Islam, although in the Kvemo Kartli religion is rather weak.17 The other major Muslim group consists of the ethnic Georgian Muslims of Ajara. According to the 2006 estimates by the Department of Statis- tics, 63% of the Ajara population are Georgian Orthodox Christians and 30% Muslim, predominantly Sunnis. Another source, based on the results of the 2002 census, mentions the number of 131,536 for Muslim popula- tion in Western Georgia, which include Ajara, Chokhatauri, Ozurgeti, Khobi regions of the country.18 Besides the two major groups mentioned there are other small Muslim ethnic groups: a portion of the Abkhaz population,19 Kists,20 Avars, Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kurds. accessed 20 January 2013.) 16 Sanikidze, though, mentions this number equal to 18 000. (see in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 21.) 17 J. Weattley, Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Kvemo Kartli Region of Georgia, ECMI Working Paper #23, February 2005, p. 5. 18 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარა- შვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Baramidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the con- text of modernity” (Batumi: Niko Berdzenishvili Institute, 2010)), p. 9. 19 were in part converted to Islam throughout the 17th and 18th centuries under the Ottoman domination. Islam has been weak and also mixed with Christian and pre-Christian elements there, though connections with Muslim communities in the North Caucasus, as well as the return of the descendants of the muhajirs (Muslim population who had massively left Georgia during the Tsarist period and later during the Soviet period) from Turkey, appear to have resulted in a modest increase in the role of Islam among the Abkhaz. (See in B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Geor- gia[1/3]”, www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 8 November 2010 (note: the source is not available any more), Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 21.) Currently Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain outside the con- trol of the central Government, and reliable information from those regions was difficult to obtain, however according to a survey in 2003 16% of the respondents reported to be Mus- lim. There is no mosque in Abkhazia, awareness in Islam is low and Muslim practices are held modestly. (See in Ал. Крылов, Единая вера Абхазских “Христиан” и “Мусульман”. Особенности религиозного сознания в современной Абхазии, Н. Лежава (ред.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (Тбилиси: Генрих Белл Фонд, 2004), стр. 104–121 (106) (A. Krylov, Common Face of Abkhazian “Christian” and “Muslim”. Specifications of Religious Consciousness in Modern Abkhazia in N. Lejava (ed.) Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia, Materials of Georgian- Russian Conference. (Tbilisi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004) pp. 238–249 (238–241). 20 They live mostly in and around the Pankisi Gorge villages in Georgia’s northeast: Jokolo, Birkiani, Omalo, Middle and Upper Xalatsani, Duisi. The 2002 census gives 7,110 as the number of Kists living in Georgia, while the 1989 census suggests the number 5,455. (See in N. Sardjveladze, N. Shushania, l. Melikishvili, and M. Baliashvili, Tolerance in 266 satenik mkrtchyan

A population of some 100,000 Meskhets were deported by Stalin from the south-west during the Second World War. The 2002 census counted about 1000 Meskhets. As of November 2012, 870 persons out of the total 9.500 persons who applied for repatriation status had already been granted it.21 There are also Muslims, citizens of other countries such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, etc., who are in Georgia, mainly in the capital Tbilisi, working in diplomatic missions, for business, study or other purposes. A 45-day visa-free travel rule between Iran and Georgia has apparently facilitated the increase in the number of citizens of Iran coming to Georgia. 37,287 entries into Georgia by citizens of Iran were recorded in the first eight months of 201122 reaching the total of 60,000 by the end of the year.23 As of the May 2012, the frequency of Tehran-Tbilisi flights had also increased up to nine flights weekly (instead of the earlier six). Some of the visitors from Iran are said not to have only touristic interests, they are also interested in business and trade activities.24

2 Islam and the State

The Georgian Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, thought, conscience, belief and religion, and prohibits persecution on the basis of the expression of opinions or thoughts and on the basis of religion or belief (Article 19, paragraph 2). These freedoms are also protected by Georgia’s Criminal Code (Articles 115, 155 and 156), which also penalises unlawful interference through violence, the threat of violence or misuse of author- ity in the setting up for activities of political, social or religious organisa- tions (Article 166). However, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has a dominant position and enjoys particular relations between it and the State. Article 9 of the Constitution states that, “The state recognises the

Multiethnic Georgia: Training Methodology Manual for Educators, (Tbilisi: Mtsignobari, 2009), p. 33.) 21 ECMI Caucasus ensures continuity of the Meskhetian repatriation process, www. repatriation.ge/index.php?m=6&news_id=39, accessed 20 January 2012. 22 Georgia Reports 1.79 m Visits by Foreign Citizens, www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=23038, accessed 20 January, 2013. 23 საქართველო ირანელ ტურისტებს იზიდავს (Georgia attracts Iranian tourists), http://georgian.irib.ir/%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83% 98-%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/%E1% 83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1%E1%83%98% E1%83%90/item/4702. 24 Ibid. georgia 267 special importance of the GOC in Georgian history but simultaneously announces complete freedom of religious belief and the independence of the church from the state.” The 2002 concordat between the govern- ment and the GOC gives the patriarch immunity, provides GOC clergy with the exemption from military service, allows only the GOC the right to staff the military chaplaincy, and grants the GOC a consultative role in government, as well as other privileges which are denied to other religious denominations and groups. Registration of religious organisations became possible—for the first time in 15 years—after the Parliament on 6 April 2005 approved amend- ments to the Civil Code, allowing religious communities to register with the Ministry of Justice, although they could only register as non-governmental organisations or non-profit private-law associations, a status that some religious communities—among them the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church and the Muslims—regarded as demeaning. However, one Muslim organisation, the Congress of Georgian Muslims received reg- istration on 2 September 2005.25 In July 2011 amendments to the civil code were adopted by the Parliament of Georgia,26 according to which religious groups which have ‘historic ties to Georgia’ or are defined as religions by legislation in Council of Europe member states can be registered as legal entities of public law. Public demonstrations were launched by the GOC in Tbilisi to protest the law and to halt its ratification.27

3 Main Muslim Organisations

During Soviet times the Muslim Religious Board (Dukhovnoe upravlenie) of Transcaucasia (with its centre in Baku) was the only organisation in Georgia representing Muslims, within existing laws and state regulations. The situation has changed in the post-Soviet period. In the 1990s, in paral- lel with the existing Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia (Caucasus Board of Muslims), the Muslim Religious Board of the Ajara-Muftiate was created, situated in the only mosque in Batumi, to be independent from the mentioned Board of Transcaucasia. However, officially the Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia has not been abolished, and currently

25 F. Corley, Georgia: Religious minorities still second-class faiths?, November 2005, Forum 18 News Service, www.forum18.org. 26 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23711, accessed 20 January 2013. 27 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23707, accessed 20 January 2013. 268 satenik mkrtchyan

Tbilisi is the residency of the official representative of the Board. Since 2004, the Muftiate has been working on the legal basis of a new charter, which establishes a hierarchical structure of central, regional, and local muftis with their personnel and councils (majlis).28 In Tbilisi, the Iman (Faith) foundation has an office right in front of the Tbilisi Jumma mosque (35, Botanikuri str., Tbilisi 0105, tel: +99532 721786).29 It organises Islamic courses, houses a library of Shi’i literature translated from Persian and a conference room, where religious events take place. The director follows the instructions of a marji’ al-taqlid, in this case the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.30 Ahl ul-Beyt, based in Marneuli, is one of the largest and most active organisations. It was founded in 2001 and is officially independent though with informal links to Iran.31 It has been teaching courses on Qur’an, as well as other religious courses related to Shi’i theology, and has been organising religious holidays and events on other important religious days since 2003. The Al ul-Bayt, an organisation with a similar name but officially separate, has an office in Tbilisi (10, Kalandadze, Tbilisi 0114, tel: +99558 618653, +99593 966966) is said to be officially a separate organi- sation, however with similar activities: a small madrasa is in operation, a library of Islamic books, classes in English, a conference hall, etc.32 It belongs to the international network of another marji’ at-taqlid, namely the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hoseyni as-Sistani of Najaf.33 A Fund for Muslim Revival has been operating in Tbilisi with the aim of fundraising for restoration activities of the mosque and addressing various needs of believers.34 Another Shi’i scholar with growing influence is the late Fadil

28 Р. Барамидзе. “Ислам в Аджарии” Азербаиджан в Мире 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93, (87–88) (R. Baramidze, Islam in Ajara“ Azerbaijan in the World 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93 (87–88)). 29 During the personal interview, the director declared that the organisation acts inde- pendently, though he emphasised the close connections with Iman Foundation and its great support while setting up the local organisation. (Interview conducted by Irakli Pipia, 27 March, 2010). 30 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 31 C. Prasad, Georgia’s Muslim Community: A Self-fulfilling Prophecy?, European Centre for Minority Issues Working paper # 58, p. 6, www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/Working_ Paper_58_En.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 32 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 7. 33 www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=13865&lang=geo, accessed 20 January 2013. 34 Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi”, p. 90. georgia 269

Lankarani,35 Grand Ayatollah, scholar and teacher in Islamic Seminary of Qum for many years. In the paper published by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in 2012, Salafi part of Georgia’s Muslim is also presented, accord- ing to which two separate types of Salafi groups can be observed in Geor- gia: those amongst Azeri population and the Pankisi Gorge Salafis (among Kists). Neither appears to be politicised, both have generally good rela- tions with the State and don’t have political objectives; nor is either asso- ciated with terrorism. The report also refers to a diverse number of Salafis in Georgia (estimated at up to 400), however it mentions that it is very dependent on how they are defined and what the underlying perception for the basis of the estimation is. The report also mentions the observed trend for Salafi ideology to gain ground among unemployed young males deprived of opportunities, mentioning that about 60–80% of young males in Pankisi villages have turned to Salafism based on estimations of local observers. According to the same report, three main centres for Salafi activity have been observed: Tbilisi suburb Ponichala (some 50 people), within mosques in the city of Keshalo (Marneluli district) and in Karajala (Telavi).36 In September 2011 All-Georgia Muslim Administration, another organi- sation, gained official registration under the new legal provisions passed two months earlier. The foundation of this organisation is viewed in terms of the Georgian government’s response to the situation with multiple reli- gious influences from outside the country.37 The organisation is officially independent and the founders are former government officials who are ethnic Azeris from the Kvemo Kartli region.38 Since the late 1980s, in Ajara as in other parts of the former Soviet Union and South-Eastern Europe, Turkish transnational religious movements mixing trade, business and mission, have encouraged the re-Islamisation of the formerly Muslim peoples.39 Currently, most of these Turkish move- ments and Islamic institutions operate without registration either with the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus based in Baku, or

35 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia?[2/3]”, www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=179, accessed 12 December 2009(note: the source is no longer available). 36 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, pp. 11–17. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–348. 270 satenik mkrtchyan with the Georgian Ministry of Justice, and have an uncertain status prefer- ring to work with their local partners in small madrasas (locally known as medresses).40

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to a recent publication by the Public Defender’s Office of Geor- gia (2008), there were 286 mosques and prayer houses in Georgia; another five were under construction. However, some mosques (prayer houses) have been functioning with uncertain status and without registration, a fact which makes it difficult to give an accurate figure. Recently, with a decree by the Minister of Culture and Monument Protection of Geor- gia, a list of monuments have been recognised as monuments of abso- lute cultural heritage out of which there were 24 mosques in different regions of Georgia (Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Adigeni, Dmanisi, Marneuli, and Bolnisi).41 Moreover, in some parts of the Muslim communities (e.g. mountainous parts of Ajara) there are also local religious schools, madra- sas, which also serve as prayer houses (see details in section 5). Similarly, in Ajaran Muslim communities various buildings and places serve as prayer houses, amounting to possibly more than 100.42 A recent research published in a bi-lingual book presents 44 mosques functioning in Ajara which are said to have historical and cultural significance, and which serve for worship and study purposes.43 According to the chief editor of the Azerbaijani magazine Gurjistan, during the years of independence, more than 30 mosques have been built in Georgia and many others have been renovated counting up to around 160 operating mosques currently.44

40 For the description of the movements called Süleymancıs with their Qur’anic schools, Nurcus with their madrasas active in Tbilisis, Batumi, Kutaisi, see in Balci, “Islam in Post- Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–349. 41 მ. მეცყვირაშვილი, მეჩეთებს კულტურული მემკვიდრეობის ძეგლის სტატუსი მიენიჭა, (M. Metskhvirashvili, Mosques have been given the status of cultural heritage), http://netgazeti.ge/GE/98/News/9024/.htm, accessed 20 January 2013. For the full list of the monuments, see the decree N 3/86 of the Minister, 20 March 2012, www. culture.gov.ge/text-21.html, accessed 20 January 2013. 42 Р. Барамидзе, “Ислам и его особенности в Аджарии”, Идентичность, власть и город в работах молодых ученых Южного Кавказа. Сборник статей. Ред. Н. Лежава. Тбилиси.: Фонд им. Генрича Белля, 2005, pp. 39–70 (48) (R. Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara” in N. Lejava (ed.), Identity, Power and City in the works of the Young scholars of The South Caucasus (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2005) pp. 39–70, (48)). 43 R. Baramidze, The Muslim Monuments of Worship (Ajara), Batumi 2010. 44 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. georgia 271

In Tbilisi there is one mosque called Jumma, where Shi’i and Sunni Muslims of Georgia as well as Muslim guests of the capital attend Fri- day worship.45 A Shi’i mosque was opened in Ponichala, a Tbilisi suburb, on 17 July 2011, construction of which had been completed with financial assistance from an Ayatollah from Iraq.46 In Batumi (the regional cen- tre of Ajara), there is one operating mosque with a minaret built in the beginning of the 2000s, which is open every day. The exact number of mosques in Ajara or Western Georgia varies from source to source. The website of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara men- tions about eleven mosques in the Ajara, Khulo, Shuakhveri, and Kobu- leti regions.47 According to a recent publication, the Muftiate of Ajara has 95 mosque schools, 41 mosques, 18 colleges (uchilishcha), and two others with uncertain status.48 According to another recent Georgian publica- tion, 128 mosques, 17 prayer houses and 25 seasonal mosques operate in Western Georgia.49 The mosque in the southern city of Marneuli, which opened a few years ago, is now the biggest in Georgia. There are mosques in other cities of eastern Georgia as well, including Mskhaldidi, Dmanisi and Bolnisi. Sev- eral mosques operate in Pankisi Gorge in the five villages mostly popu- lated by Kists.50 Many Azerbaijani villages are also home to holy shrines and pilgrimage sites, and the worship of saints (or holy persons) is widespread.

5 Children’s Education

All citizens of Georgia, Muslim or Christian, go to the general, private or public schools, where the curriculum does not include a compulsory course on religion. There are Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian

45 By 1996 Shi’is and Sunnis used to pray in the mosque separated by a curtain, but upon the arrival of a new Imam, Shi’i Ali Aliev, the curtain was removed. 46 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 11. 47 www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=about, accessed 14 January 2012 (since closed). 48 www.islam.ge/rf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11:2009-12-01-14- 13-08&catid=9:2009-09-30-07-11-30&Itemid=11&lang=ka, accessed 20 January 2013. 49 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარაშვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Baramidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the context of modernity” (Batumi: Niko berdzenishvili Institute, 2010)), p. 467. 50 www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=5968, accessed 14 January 2012 (since closed). 272 satenik mkrtchyan schools based on the language of instruction. Azerbaijanis traditionally have been more included in Russian and Azerbaijani schools than in Georgian schools. According to Article 13 (2) of the Law on General Education 2005, religious indoctrination, proselytising and enforced assimilation are not allowed to be part of the education process in schools. The Ministry of Education has decided to prepare new textbooks describing the different religions in neutral terms, and to arrange to carry out regular monitoring of the work of the teachers concerned51 to ensure full respect for the right to freedom of religion of persons belonging to minorities. Georgian law has no provision for regulating Muslim religious educa- tional establishments and does not recognise documents and certificates issued by them. However as mentioned in the previous section, several educational units, so-called madrasas, have been formed where people, mostly children, can get some elementary Islamic education through informal mosque courses. A Shi’i madrasa has been working in Marneuli since 1997 on the initia- tive of local educated Muslims and the Muslim Religious Board of Tran- scaucasia (Caucasus Board of Muslims). With the leadership of Hajji A. Nabiev, three year education is offered to the students after their gradu- ation from ninth or twelfth grades, which includes studying traditional Muslim disciplines, Persian, Arabic and Georgian languages, as well as PC literacy. Upon the graduation, the students receive a certificate which is said to be relevant for continuing religious education abroad. As of 2010 the madrasa had 30 students from all over Georgia.52 A Sunni madrasa in the village of Meore Kesalo was opened in 2000 under the patronage of Turkey. As of the year of 2010 the madrasa had 60 students, Georgians and Azerbaijanis of Georgian origin, in three major groups: a) graduates spending three years in theological disciplines; b) students who are getting prepared for entrance exams in higher education institutions in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia (here the theology discipline part of the pro- gramme constitutes only 10%); c) students in the 5th and 6th grade com- ing to the madrasa and doing their homework there while also receiving

51 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Commit- tee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009. 52 А. Ганич, Мусульманская община Грузии: К вопросу управления и религиозной практики. (A. Ganich. Muslim Community of Georgia: administration and religious policy.) http://kavpolit.com/musulmanskaya-obshhina-gruzii-k-voprosu-upravleniya-i- religioznoj-praktiki/, accessed 20 January 2013. georgia 273 elementary knowledge in Islam.53 Three more organisations have been mentioned above which, along with other activities, have training and teaching functions. In the town of Batumi and the surrounding area, six small madrasas controlled by Georgians have been tuned into the Süleymanci tradition.54

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Soviet Georgia, Muslims had two options to get Islamic schooling: they could either go to the Bukhara College or to the Tashkent College in Cen- tral Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, students from Georgia (as well as from all over the Caucasus) could get their education at Turkish faculties of theology and an Islamic university with Iranian Shiite leanings in Azerbaijan.55 Some young Shi’is of Georgia headed for Qom or Mash- had or to a lesser extent to Tehran or Qazwin to study theology. According to some estimates (as of July 2011), the number of the Azeri students in Iran from Georgia is between 16 and 20.56 The Islamic University of Baku, which is under the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus and follows the interpretations of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, has Azerbaijani students from Georgia.57 The Tbilisi Jumma mosque also has an operating madrasa teaching courses for all ages.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Burial rituals are one of those few Islamic practices, somehow preserved during the Soviet period of ‘religious ignorance’, which had led to mod- est or low religiosity.58 All rural areas and those towns with significant Muslim population, either now or historically, have Muslim cemeteries. There are two Muslims cemeteries in Tbilisi. Very often in Ajara near the

53 Ibid. 54 The movement of the Turkish Islamist leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959), promotes “everything by the Qur’an, all for the Qur’an” and has actively campaigned for more Qur’anic schools across Georgia as well. 55 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam?” in Mikheil Saakashvili Christian Georgia[1/3] at www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 8 November 2010 (note; the source is no longer available). 56 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 7. 57 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 58 About religiosity issues regarding Muslims of Georgia see Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, pp. 6, 24. Saroyan, Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 12., Balci and Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 346. 274 satenik mkrtchyan mosque, which is generally situated in the central inhabited areas, a local family cemetery or a famous individual’s tomb is to be found.59

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Currently, the law does not permit the activities of Muslim clergy in the armed forces, hospitals or prisons. However, the Order 187 of the Minis- ter of the Correction and Legal Assistance of Georgia (30 December 2010) made it possible for the accused/convicted to meet with the representa- tive of the registered religious organisation or/and traditional confessions upon the prior agreement with the establishment of the respective reli- gious organisation.60 The Hajj quota for Azerbaijan and Georgia is 2,500.61

9 Religious Festivals

After the “Rose Revolution” in 2003 it has become a common practice for the President of Georgia or other members of Government to visit mosques and meet with Muslims on the celebrations of ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban-Bairam), the most popular and widely celebrated festival for the Muslim population of Georgia. In 2012 also the president has publicly congratulated the Muslims living in Georgia on the occasion of Kurban Bayram.62 In Ajara, the Chairman of the Government of Ajara, members of the Cabinet and other officials pay a visit either to the Batumi mosque or to other mosques. Such celebra- tions are usually marked by the ceremonial slaughter of animals. But none of the Muslim holidays have been declared national holidays or officially recognised as non-working days. Other religious festivals and holidays are

59 Details for burial ceremonies see in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Prac- tices in Georgia, pp. 14, 20, 24. Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara”, p. 49. 60 Second Report Submitted by Georgia pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 2 of the Frame- work Convention for the Protection of National Minirities, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_2nd_SR_Georgia_en.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 61 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 15. 62 Mikheil Saakashvili congratulated the Muslims living in Georgia on the Kurban Bay- ram holiday, www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=7942&i=1. accessed 20 January 2013. georgia 275 celebrated locally with different participation rates and publicity, either in mosques or separately in the families.63

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The already mentioned modest religiosity of Georgian Muslims (see sec- tions 7, 8 and 9), has had its impact on halal food norms among the wider part of the Muslim population, and there are no formal procedures for halal certification. However, in cases when a family wants to obtain halal meat they would rather go to the open or indoor markets, where they would know traditionally who sells halal food. As for the rural popula- tion, they conduct their own slaughter. Additionally, in Tbilisi there are several restaurants and food shops owned by Muslims, chiefly by Turks, who offer halal food. A small shop and a restaurant with a sign Halal has been operating since the beginning of 2011 on Leselidze Street, one of the central and touristic places of Tbilisi as well as on Marjanishvili Street, another popular and ‘shopping’ street in Tbilisi.64 “The Spiritual Administration of Caucasian Muslims” has been dealing with organisation of pilgrimage tours to Mecca and Medina while other Muslim organisations are taking people to the Shi’i places of worship.65 The recently registered organisation Administration of Georgian Muslims intends to obtain separate quotas for Georgia’s Muslims to undertake sub- sidised pilgrimage.66

11 Dress Codes

No Muslim dress code is practised and women in hijab are not seen on the streets of Tbilisi or other towns, unless they are guests or representa- tives of diplomatic missions. Very few women can be seen wearing head scarves on the streets of Marneuli (Kvem Kartli) either.67 In the villages, women, especially the older ones, usually have the habit of covering the head with a scarf.

63 See details in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 14. 64 Based on personal observations of the author. 65 Report “Muslim Community of Georgia 2010–2011”, Human Rights Monitoring Group of Ethnic minorities “MRMG”, Tbilisi, December 2011, p. 5. http://en.hrmrmg.info/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/MUSUULMANEBI-ENG.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 66 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 21. 67 Ibid., p. 9. 276 satenik mkrtchyan

12 Publication and Media

Islamic Publication and Media sources have been founded and developed mostly in the post-Soviet period. For the most part these sources are for the Azerbaijani minority and a daily magazine is published by the Mufti- ate of Ajara. There are also several online sources. Recently eight ‘public boards’ with an advisory role were set up, one of them to deal with religious issues.68 The local media for the Azerbaijani population include religion in the broad range of themes. The Muftiate of Ajara publishes a daily magazine “Faith” (Rtsmena).69 The organisa- tion Ahl ul-Bayt, based in Marneuli, publishes a newspaper of the same name.70 There is one newspaper in Georgia published in Azerbaijani and financed by the state (along with the Armenian and Russian ones), Gur- jistan, which is a continuation of the Soviet tradition. This is the most popular among the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and now has circulation of 2,000 copies.71 In an interview with the editor-in-chief, seven other pub- lications were mentioned, predominantly local and with minor circula- tion with changing permanence. Though they are not purely religious they include religious issues. Gurjistan covers all the Muslim holidays and events, as well as including a special section of ‘questions and answers.’72 In 2007 a website (www.muslimgeorgia.org) was started by a group of Georgian Muslims living or studying in Turkey. According to a media pub- lication, this was the first website about Islam in Georgian. The website has also English, Turkish and Arabic versions. The other website about Islam is www.islam.ge which, according to the information posted on it, is for ‘not only to preach the religion, but also to give information about Islam’.73 It has Georgian, Turkish and English versions. A ‘Tolerance Cen- tre’, under the auspices of Public Defender has started a website (www. tolerantoba.ge). The aims of the website are to create a culture of tol- erance by providing information, cognitive, educational and legal sup- port; and promote activities of the agencies under the Public Defender’s

68 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009, p. 29. 69 Popualishvili, “Islam”, p. 360 70 Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community”, p. 6. 71 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 20 January 2013. 72 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. 73 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 20 January 2013. georgia 277

Office, namely, Tolerance Centre, Council of Minorities and Council of Religions.74 On 5 December 2012 a Facebook group was created as a reac- tion to the incidents of intolerance targeting Muslims praying practices in two villages in Georgia. The group has the name ‘Solidarity with the Muslim of Georgia’ (სოლიდარობა საქართველოს მუსლიმებს), and has become a ‘portal’ for Muslim-related news and opinions.

13 Family Law

The religious marriage ritual of the Muslims is not recognised by the State. Legitimacy is given only to the civil marriage documents.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Imam of the Tbilisi mosque regards relations with other religious communities as well established and friendly.75 The synagogue, mosque, Georgian and Armenian churches situated side by side on one of the central streets in Tbilisi, are very often cited as an indication of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Georgian society. Currently, two interreligious councils operate, one at the initiative of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, the other by the Public Defender of Geor- gia. The Council attached to Public Defender’s Office, consisting of vari- ous religious groups, is a specific discussion forum for religious minorities to consider issues of preservation of identity, defining their needs and structuring their communication with the state.76 Two of the 22 member- organisations of the Council of religion are Muslim Organisations, Admin- istration of Muslims of All Georgia, and Georgian Muslim Union.77 At the end of 2012, two incidents occurred that are relevant to men- tion in regard to relations between the Muslim and Christian popula- tions in Georgia. Both of them were between the local population of

74 www.tolerantoba.ge/index.php?id=1317642755, accessed 20 January 2013. 75 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 20 January 2013. Interview con- ducted by the author, December 2009. 76 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009. 77 Address of the Council of Religions under the Public Defender of Georgia to the Government of Georgia, www.tolerantoba.ge/index.php?news_id=320, accessed 20 January 2013. 278 satenik mkrtchyan

Orthodox Christians and Muslim Georgians, the latter settled in these new villages from Ajara region in early 1990s. In the village of Nigvziani (Guria region) and Tsintskaro (Kvemo Kartli region) they were confronted and prevented from performing prayer in a house converted into a place of worship.78 Later, the Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, said in a written statement on December 7 that there were “obvious signs of provocation” in the recent cases of “confrontation on religious grounds” and vowed that “our government will not allow anyone to breach” the principle of free- dom of religion.79

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The 2007 Data Initiative of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre showed that 72.1% referred to the importance of religion in life.80 The Muslim community in the country is considered one of the “traditional” confessions (together with the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholics and Jews) as compared to the other Christian groups who are regarded as “sects”.81 Similarly, the survey showed more tolerance towards Muslims and Jews than towards other groups of Christianity. Specifically, 49.1% of respondents reported their positive attitude towards Muslims, 40.8% of the respondents were familiar with or had contacts with Muslims.82 The National Democratic Institute and the Caucasus Research Resource Centre have been conducting public opinion polls, nationally representa- tive surveys over multiple waves (2010–2012). The November 2012 survey refers to the incident in the village Nigvziani in Guria “where Georgian Muslims are being prevented from holding religious services in a privately owned building.” According to the results of the survey 73% of the respon- dents were aware of the incident, and 51% out of those being aware were in favour of allowing the local Muslim population “to hold their services in a privately owned building.”83

78 Parliament Confirms New Public Defender, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25524, accessed 20 January 2013. 79 Ibid. 80 R. Charles, Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions: Tales from the South Cau- casus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Summer 2009, p. 9 at http://iseees.berkeley.edu/ sites/default/files/u4/2009-08-Charles.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013. 81 G. Nizharadze, “Urban population”, pp. 115–119. 82 Ibid., pp. 108–109. 83 Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a November 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC www.civil.ge/files/files/2012/NDI-Poll-November2012.pdf. georgia 279

16 Major Cultural Events

Nawruz Bayram, which is celebrated by the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, is not a religious holiday in itself, however, this holiday is perceived by the pub- lic as mostly a Muslim holiday. On 23 March 2010, President Saakashvili signed a decree declaring Nawruz (21 March) a holiday. Since then, the president has been usually visiting the region populated with Azerbaijani citizens to congratulate with the holiday.84

84 www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News?p=6253&i=1, accessed 20 January 2013.

GERMANY

Mathias Rohe1

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of considerable numbers of Muslims in Germany is a rel- atively new phenomenon, as compared to the UK or France. Since the 1960s, thousands of so-called “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers) were attracted to work in Germany with many of them being Turkish nationals, followed by people from the Balkan region (mainly Yugoslavia and Albania). There- fore, in sum, Islamic life in Germany is very much of a Turkish and also Balkan character. Besides that, there was a continuous immigration of often well-educated people from the Middle East and beyond (physicians, engineers etc. mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan), but of a limited number. A third motivation of Muslim immigration to the country was the search for asylum. Their countries of origin are mainly to be found in the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent and Northern Africa. In addi- tion to that, there are Muslim merchants, students and scientists living in the country for a shorter or longer period. The majority of the Muslims in Germany belong to the Sunni denomi- nation (74.1%), but there are also significant groups of Twelver Shi‛is (7.1% of Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi origins) which may reach 200,000 persons as well as an estimated number of 500,000 Alevis (12.7% of total number of Muslims) mostly from Turkey and some 30,000 Ahmadis (1.7%) from Pakistan, the oldest organised Muslim group in Germany.2 As everywhere

1 Mathias Rohe has studied Law and Islamic Studies. He holds the chair for Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the University Erlangen-Nuremberg and is the founding director of the Erlangen Centre for Islam and Law in Europe. He has been a judge at the Court of Appeals of Nuremberg and a member of the first Deutsche Islam Konferenz (working group on constitutional issues) in 2006–2009 and has contrib- uted to most of the project groups of the second Deutsche Islam Konferenz which started work in 2009. 2 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, p. 92; cf. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publika- tionen/Forschungsberichte/fb06-muslimisches-leben.pdf;jsessionid=E0074CE0D683280 FCFFD1381A94057E0.1_cid286?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 23 December 2012. This study is by far the most reliable one in Germany, based on 6,004 interviewed persons. For methodological issues cf. ibid., p. 34. 282 mathias rohe in the world, their opinions and beliefs range from a very devout attitude to a mere cultural link to Islam; Sufism is widespread especially among ethnic Turks. Most immigrants initially planned to stay in Germany only for a few years, to earn some money for a better existence in their home country or to find a temporary refuge until the political situation in the coun- try of origin improved. German legislation and administration tended to share these expectations. Therefore Muslims—except for the relatively small number of German converts to Islam—behaved and were treated as temporary guests. After half a century, Muslims realised that their initial intention to return to the country of origin sooner or later turned out to be a mere illusion. The same is true for German society as a whole: legisla- tion and government now have to cope with a stable and significant group of Muslims as a part of German society. There are no official statistics regarding the religious affiliation of the German population. According to figures based on representative polls published in June 2009 by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees and the German Islam Conference, there are between 3.8 and 4.3 mil- lion Muslims living in the country; 29% of them were born in Germany. About 2 million Muslims in the country are German citizens. Most of the Muslims—German and foreign citizens—are of Turkish origin (c. 2.5 million),3 more than half a million from former Yugoslavia, over 300,000 from the Middle East (mainly from Iraq and Lebanon), around 300,000 from North Africa, 60,000 from other parts of Africa, around 180,000 from South/Southeast Asia and 70,000 from Iran.4 The number of German converts is unknown; according to a rough estimate it can be anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000. As a result of the migration history of many Muslims in Germany, there is a concentration in the main industrial areas in Western Germany (Northrhine-Westphalia, Rhine-Main-region, regions of Stuttgart, Munich, Nuremberg, Hamburg) and in Berlin.

3 The figure was recently changed to 2.9 million due to a new statistical approach: Chil- dren born in Germany from two parents of the same foreign nationality are now attrib- uted to this nationality; cf. the statistics of the 2011 census published by the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden 2011, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, p. 56, https://www.destatis. de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshinter- grund2010220117004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 10 January 2013. 4 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, pp. 54–76 cf. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publika- tionen/Forschungsberichte/fb06-muslimisches-leben.pdf;jsessionid=E0074CE0D683280FC FFD1381A94057E0.1_cid286?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 23 December 2012. germany 283

2 Islam and the State

Secularity is the leading principle regulating the relationship between the state and religion, which means individual and collective freedom of reli- gion, religious neutrality of the state and the separation between state and religion. In Germany a system of secularity accepting of religions prevails. All religious communities enjoy far-reaching rights to act in the public space and to participate in and cooperate with the state on various levels. The underlying idea is that the secular state alone is unable to guar- antee the principles it is based on, and that religion may positively con- tribute to this basis. These principles are common in Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Germany being a federal state consisting of 16 states (Län- der), the role of religion in the public sphere is slightly different from state to state. While the most important legislative competence lies at the fed- eral level, the states are in general responsible for administrative affairs. In addition to that, they have prime legislative responsibility in educational, cultural and police issues. Thus, in daily practice the states are usually the key actors in cooperating with Muslim communities on the ground. Some laws do differentiate between legally recognised/registered reli- gious communities, others do not. In many cases it is sufficient to be reg- istered as an association under private law, which is easily achieved and this is the case for most of the Muslim organisations, in particular those running mosques and Islamic cultural centres. The prerequisites for being recognised as a religious community according to the laws regulating the cooperation between the state and such communities vary greatly. They are linked to the respective importance of the issue at stake for the state. Article 140 of the Federal Constitution regulates the conditions for religious societies (communities) to apply for the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). Those communi- ties holding this status when the constitution came into force kept their status. Others may apply for it and shall be granted the same rights, if their by-laws and the number of their members give assurances of perma- nency. The state administrations would usually grant status in cases when an organisation has already existed for 30 years and represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (membership has to be clearly regulated), but exceptions and reduced requirements can be applied for from case to case. This status grants far-reaching rights and privileges, e.g. tax exemp- tions and access to state institutions for collecting taxes (against pay- ment), rights to have members appointed to broadcast advisory boards and to cooperate in matters of youth, social care, the right of refusing 284 mathias rohe testimony in court for those carrying out pastoral care, rights to regulate labour relations and the relations to members including internal jurisdic- tion, and more. No Muslim organisation has obtained this status so far. On the federal level, in 2006 the Ministry of the Interior established the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK, German Islam Conference) to bring forward a more structured dialogue between Muslims and the state on crucial issues.5 There was a plenum consisting of 15 representatives of the state (federal, state and communal level) and of 15 Muslim representa- tives. The latter were chosen by the Ministry; five of them represented the major organisations, the rest were prominent individuals covering differ- ent sectors of society. Since the beginning, this choice has (naturally) been disputed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. After the 2009 elections, the Ministry decided to continue the DIK in a somewhat different setting. The main objectives defined by the Ministry are integration, social cohesion and resolving security problems through long-term dialogue and cooperation.6 Only three out of five major Mus- lim organisations are still members of the new DIK: DITIB, VIKZ and the AABF, in addition to the Bosnian (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bos- niaken in Deutschland, Islamic Community of the Bosniaks in Germany, IGBD, www.igbd.eu) and the Moroccan (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland, Central Council of the Moroccans in Germany)7 communi- ties. The Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Community in Ger- many, TGD, www.tgd.de/), was invited to participate in spite of being an immigrant rather than a religious organisation. Ten prominent Muslim individuals, who are not identical with those having participated in the first DIK, were chosen to represent Muslim plurality. The former fixed working groups were replaced by more flexible and concentrated project groups preparing the work of the “plenary”. The first group working on imam training8 finished its work in early 2011. Other groups have contin- ued their work on anti-Muslim prejudice, Islamist extremism and anti- Semitism, understanding of gender roles in Muslim milieus and on better integration of Muslims into the labour market.9

5 Information in English is available from the DIK website at www.deutsche-islam- konferenz.de/DIK/EN/Startseite/startseite-node.html, accessed 23 December 2012. 6 Cf. the description on the website, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/ DIK/EN/Startseite/startseite-node.html, accessed 23 December 2012. 7 No website could be found. 8 The author was the only external member from German universities. 9 The brochure “Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den Arbeits- markt” is available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/ germany 285

At the state level, several “round tables” have been established in Baden- Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate to promote concrete projects, in particular regarding pilot projects of Islamic instruction in public schools and Muslim burials.10 In most of the states, only some of the existing major organisations are involved; in some cases, local Muslim initiatives are accepted as preliminary partners for cooperation. In 2012, for the first time, a Muslim (Ilhan Ilkilic) was appointed as a member of the Deutscher Ethikrat, an ethical advisory council for the Fed- eral Parliament and Government.11

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The vast majority of Muslim organisations act at a local level, running mosques in particular. Usually they are organised as associations under civil law.12 In some states, regional organisations have emerged in recent years. On the federal level, the major (umbrella) organisations are the following:

– Diyanet Işleri Türk İslam Birliği DITIB (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Reli- gious Affairs) (Subbelrather Strasse 17, 50823 Köln; Internet: www.ditib. de, E-Mail: [email protected]). At the moment DITIB is establishing sub- organisations on the state level. It is by far the largest organisation, run- ning nearly 900 mosques all over the country. – Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren VIKZ (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres) (Vogelsanger Strasse 290, 50825 Köln; Internet: www.vikz.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). The VIKZ has 300 local member communities with more than half of them owning their premises.

Downloads/DokumentePlenum/dik-broschuere-pg-a-download.pdf?__blob=publication File, accessed 30 January 2013. 10 Cf. Ministerium für Integration Baden-Württemberg, “Zweiter Runder Tisch Islam kommt in Stuttgart zusammen”, report 03. May 2012, available at www.integrationsminis- terium-bw.de/servlet/PB/menu/1276512/index.html?ROOT=1268673; Ministerium für Inte- gration, Familie, Kinder, Jugend und Frauen Rheinland-Pfalz, report spring 2012, available at http://mifkjf.rlp.de/integration/landesbeauftragter-fuer-migration-und-integration/ runder-tisch-islam/, both accessed 30 January 2013. 11 Cf. the website of the Deutscher Ethikrat, available at www.ethikrat.org/ueber-uns/ auftrag. 12 Cf. Rohe, “On the recognition and institutionalization of Islam in Germany”, in Marie- Claire Foblets/Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens/Alison Dundes Renteln (eds.), Cultural Diversity and Law. State Responses from around the World (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010). 286 mathias rohe

– Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) (Osterather Strasse 7, 50739 Köln, Inter- net: www.islamrat.de; E-Mail: via the “contact” icon on the website). Its most important member is Milli Görüş, which is under surveillance by several German services for the protection of the Constitution. – Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland ZMD (Central Council of Mus- lims in Germany) (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, Internet: www. zentralrat.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). This is an umbrella organisation of 19 other umbrella organisations, most of them hav- ing relatively few members. Some significant member organisations, like the Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland (IGD Islamic Community of Germany) which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically, are under surveillance by services for the protection of the Constitution. In 2002, the ZMD published an Islamic Charta defining its positions towards the German state and society (an English version is available at http://zentralrat.de/3037.php).

These four organisations are loosely united in the Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM, Coordination Council of Muslims in Ger- many). It was created parallel to the establishment of the German Islam Conference, attempting to create a unified cooperation partner for the German administration. Nevertheless, the member organisations are far from being united in their interests and goals. DITIB enjoys a veto right within the Council. The KRM does not have any infrastructure like a website etc. News is usually published by the websites of the member organisations. The KRM is also split regarding the participation in the DIK (cf. 2. above). The extent to which these organisations are representative of Muslims in Germany is highly disputed. Whereas the government usually would count 15–20% of Muslims to be represented by them, they claim to repre- sent the vast majority of practising Muslims. The Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschlands, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfed- erasyonu, (Alevi Community of Germany), AABF (Stolberger Strasse 317, 50933 Köln; www.alevi.com; [email protected]) is a federal umbrella organi- sation for local and regional Alevi communities. The AABF is the only organisation within the spectrum of Islam so far which has been recog- nised by the state as meeting the legal requirements of a religious com- munity in the sense of article 7 section 3 of the German Constitution. It is thus able to co-operate with the state in establishing religious instruction in public schools according to the legal system prevailing in most of the states except Berlin and Bremen. germany 287

In March 2009, 110 Shi’i communities created an umbrella organi- sation called Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinschaften Deutschlands (Islamic Community of the German Shi’i communities; www.igs-de.de; [email protected]). For the Ahmadis, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is a federal umbrella organisation based in Frankfurt/Main (Zentrale der AJM, Genfer Strasse 11, 60437 Frankfurt am Main; www.ahmadiyya.de; [email protected]). In 2012, the Liberal-Islamischer Bund (Liberal Islamic Union; www.lib- ev.de; info@lib-ev.) was founded by mostly Muslim intellectuals. As a first attempt in Germany, an openly Muslim political party (Mus- limisch Demokratische Union) has participated in municipal elections in Osnabrück, in September 2011, but failed to win seats in the city council.13 No such group was successful in 2012 either.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Approximately 2,700 buildings are used as mosques, in addition to an unknown number of Alevi cem houses, probably amounting to several hundred.14 While most of them are established in buildings not originally intended for that purpose, such as former factory buildings etc., some 200 are shaped in more or less traditional mosque architecture, and another estimated 150 of this type are under construction.15 Muslim religious infra- structure is now widespread, but still concentrated in the major industrial settlement areas linked to immigration processes in the past (see section 1 above). Many of them still follow ethnic attributions (e.g. the “Turkish,” “Arab”/”Moroccan,” “Bosnian,” “Albanian,” or “Pakistani” mosque) and are run and visited mainly only by those familiar with the respective language. But there are remarkable changes indicating increasing “domestication” in the sense of de-nationalisation of Muslim community life among the

13 For the results cf. the official announcement, available at http://wahlen.itebo.de/ komw2011/STOS_Kommunalwahl2011/404000_000017/, accessed 30 April 2012; the MDU won 0.84% of the total vote. 14 Cf. the vague allusion on the AABF website, available at www.alevitische-bestattun- gen.de/aabf-alevitische-kulturzentren.php, accessed 29 April 2012. No more precise data are available at present. 15 Cf. Beinhauer-Köhler, Bärbel/Leggewie, Claus, Moscheen in Deutschland, München 2009 (C.H. Beck); Kraft, Sabine, Islamische Sakralarchitektur in Deutschland, Münster u.a. 2002 (LIT Verlag); Schmitt, Thomas, Moscheen in Deutschland. Konflikte um ihre Errichtung und Nutzung, Flensburg 2003 (Deutsche Akademie für Landeskunde, Selbstverlag); Som- merfeld, Franz (Hrsg.), Der Moscheestreit. Eine exemplarische Debatte über Einwanderung und Integration, Köln 2008 (Kiepenheuer & Witsch). 288 mathias rohe third or even fourth generation of former immigrants. The establishment of mosques and prayer houses is one of the elements of religious freedom guaranteed by Article 4 of the Constitution and implemented by court decisions as the need arises.16 Unlike in Switzerland, it would be impos- sible in Germany to suppress the constitutional rights of a minority by a democratic majority decision. Contrary to the legal situation, the heated debate on “Muslim integration” in Germany (see section 15 below) has shown that according to representative polls in 2010,17 58.4% of the Ger- man population agrees to considerably restrict the religious freedom of Muslims in the country, whatever that exactly might mean. Generally, in the public debate the mosque has replaced the head scarf as a core issue of potential conflict between Muslims and parts of the broader society.18 Particularly projects of major mosques in Cologne, Ber- lin, Frankfurt and Munich have triggered protests by strange coalitions of extreme right-wing enemies of Islam, small groups of Christian funda- mentalists and (former) left-wing personalities like Ralph Giordano, all of them denouncing “Islam as such” to be a problem for German society. In some places (e.g. in the northern town of Rendsburg), initiatives to use loudspeakers for the prayer call have created tensions in the neighbour- hoods. Nevertheless, there is a very broad political majority supporting strongly and publicly the constitutional rights of Muslims. The Deutsche Islam Konferenz (see section 2) issued a paper on the relevant legal frame- work including advice on how practically to solve potential conflicts on mosque building.19

16 Cf. Administrative Court of Appeals of Koblenz, Judgement of 2 September 2009, 8 A 10291/09.OVG www3.justiz.rlp.de/rechtspr/DisplayUrteil.asp?rowguid={A622926D-CE2F- 427E-B8D9-CC3D12BF5D0A}, accessed 30 April 2012 cf. also the similar judgement of the Administrative Court of Berlin (19 A 355.04) from 18 February 2009 (www.gerichtsentsc- heidungen.berlin-brandenburg.de/jportal/portal/t/2398/bs/10/page/sammlung.psml?pid =Dokumentanzeige&showdoccase=1&js_peid=Trefferliste&documentnumber=1&numbe rofresults=1&fromdoctodoc=yes&doc.id=JURE090030918%3Ajuris-r02&doc.part=L&doc. price=0.0&doc.hl=1#focuspoint, accessed 30 April 2012. 17 Cf. Oliver Decker et al., Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010 (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2010). Available at: http://library.fes.de/ pdf-files/do/07504-20120321.pdf, accessed 30 April 2012. p. 134; DIK, Moscheekonflikte als Lehrstücke, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/Magazin/Gemeindel- eben/MoscheekonflikteLeggewie/moscheekonflikte-leggewie-node.html 18 Cf. Bärbel Beinhauer-Köhler/Claus Leggewie, Moscheen in Deutschland (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009). 19 Cf. DIK, Empfehlungen der DIK zum Moscheebau, available at www.deutsche-islam- konferenz.de/DIK/DE/Magazin/Gemeindeleben/AG2Moscheebau/ag2-moscheebau-node. html, accessed 30 January 2013. germany 289

Prayer or meditation rooms are available in a number of public insti- tutions, e.g. in state parliament buildings or public hospitals. Due to the religious neutrality of the state, they are not confined to particular reli- gions or confessions and usually called “room of silence.” In most public buildings, however, there are no such facilities available.

5 Children’s Education

Article 7, Section 3 of the German Constitution, which is valid in all fed- eral states except Bremen and Berlin (for historical reasons, cf. Article 141 “Bremen clause”), declares confessional religious instruction to be a regu- lar subject in public schools.20 It has to be taught in cooperation between the state and the respective religious community. Since 2008–9, the Alevi community has been recognised by several federal states (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, Bavaria) to have a structure which enables it to cooper- ate with the state in this manner.21 In the state of Berlin, Islamic religious instruction, including Alevi, has been established since the beginning of this decade. The state of Hamburg has introduced an inter-confessional model of “religion for all” under the oversight of the Protestant Church. Attaining recognition as a religious community in terms of school law is a major goal of the main existing Muslim organisations on both the fed- eral and the regional levels. Since 2003, a number of federal states (North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) have introduced pilot projects of Islamic instruc- tion. The nature of such cooperation is very dependent on the particular state’s practices and expectations, but in all cases Muslims are intensely involved in elaborating the curricula and appointing the teachers. In 2008 the Deutsche Islam Konferenz published a detailed paper22 identifying

20 Cf. the thorough study of Dietrich, Myriam, Islamischer Religionsunterricht (Frankfurt: Lang, 2006) and more recently Irka-Christin Mohr/ Kiefer, Michael (eds.), Islamunterricht— Islamischer Religionsunterricht—Islamkunde. Viele Titel—ein Fach? (Bielefeld: transcript 2009); Kuld, Lothar /Schmid, Bruno (eds.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht in Baden- Württemberg (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2009); Kiefer, Michael /Gottwald, Eckart /Ucar, Bülent (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum Islamischen Religionsunterricht. Sachstand und Perspektiven in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2008). 21 Cf. Kaplan, Ismail, Alevitischer Religionsunterricht an den Schulen, Die Stimme der Aleviten, July 2009, pp. 28–32. 22 Available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/ Downloads/Sonstiges/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 30 January 2013. 290 mathias rohe these topics and suggesting solutions. In 2009, the state of Bavaria estab- lished Islamic instruction on a state-wide level according to the model developed in the city of Erlangen in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the Islamic Community of Erlangen and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.23 This model includes now more than 270 schools of all educational levels, reaching around 13% of all Muslim pupils within the state. In late 2011, Northrhine-Westphalia has introduced a new tem- porary law operating until 2019, according to which confessional Islamic instruction is introduced in ca. 130 public schools in cooperation with the KRM (cf. section 3 above). The KRM is entitled to send four represen- tatives to the relevant advisory board (Beirat), whereas the Ministry of Education nominated another four in accordance with the KRM.24 Lower Saxony. has equally established a model of cooperation with a Muslim council consisting of DITIB and the Schura Niedersachsen in 2012; new classes are planned to start in 2013. Applications of Muslim pupils for exemption from obligatory classes in swimming where these have been mixed sex have gone to court. According to a landmark decision of 1994 by the Federal Administrative Court,25 they are entitled to such exemption if they have reached the age of puberty and the school is unable to arrange unisex classes. Now, more and more courts tend to give superior weight to the educational purposes of the school over possibly conflicting religious needs. This is particularly the case concerning younger pupils.26 Equally, two older pupils (one male and one female) failed to obtain exemptions based on religious conflicts if they were confronted with other swimmers of the opposite or same sex

23 Cf. the official announcement by the School Ministry of 15 January 2010, available at https://www.verkuendung-bayern.de/kwmbl/jahrgang:2010/heftnummer:4/seite:38, accessed 30 January 2013, and the report by the DIK “Engagement muslimischer Eltern in Erlangen für islamischen Religionsunterricht, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz. de/DIK/DE/Magazin/IslamSchule/Engagement/engagement-node.html, accessed 30 Janu- ary 2013. 24 Information is provided at the website of the Schulministerium Nordrehein-West- falen, available at www.schulministerium.nrw.de/BP/Islamischer_Religionsunterricht/Die_ rechtlichen_Bedingungen/Anliegen_Vertretung.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 25 Bundesverwaltungsgericht DVBl. 1994, p. 168. 26 Cf. Administrative Court of Appeals Bremen, decision from 13.06.2013, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2012, p. 842; Court of Appeals Münster (19 B 1362/08), decision from 20.05.2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtsprechungsreport 2009, p. 923. See also the recommendations of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, available at www.deutsche- islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/Downloads/DokumentePlenum/2008- anhang-zwischenresumee-schulpraktische-fragen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 19 January 2013. germany 291 in light bath dresses. The Administrative Court of Appeals of Hessen27 and the Administrative Court of Cologne28 held that this kind of interaction is an inevitable part of life in Germany inside and outside swimming halls. The courts affirmed the right to gender-segregated rooms for changing clothes and pointed to the possibility for the girl to wear a “burkini,” but held that the state’s duty to grant education prevails over the claimant’s objections. Regarding ritual prayer, the protection of religious freedom includes public schools, and that there is no objection in principle to perform the prayers the way the appellant wanted to. Nevertheless, these rights are limited by the equally legitimate goal to preserve school peace. Mean- while, the administration has issued instructions on how to handle the situation by minimising possible conflicts.29 The establishment of private religious schools is granted under Article 7, Sections 4 and 530 of the Constitution. Several such schools have been established in recent years by organisations close to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Münster and Osnabrück have established programmes to train Muslim teachers and appointed Muslim professors as core staff members since 2003. Some first teaching materials have been developed and published,31 triggering a vivid debate on mod- ern Muslim religious pedagogy among traditionalist Muslims. The legal issues involved are similar to those mentioned above (see section 5).

27 Judgment from 28.09.2012, NVwZ 013, 159. 28 Decision from 20.11.2012 (Az 10 L 1400/12), BeckRS 2012, 60246, accessed 30 January 2013. 29 Decision from 30 November 2011, available at www.bverwg.de/enid/8997196639d1d 22f01a06d558875f91f,151e10655f76696577092d0964657461696c093a096d6574615f6e72092d0 932383039093a095f7472636964092d093133333431/Entscheidungen/Entscheidung_8n.html, accessed 30 April 2012. In the case at stake the Court of Appeal’s factual findings stating considerable conflicts were binding for the Federal Administrative Court, thus the pupil lost his case. 30 The Administrative Court of Stuttgart has rejected an application in 2003 mainly for formal reasons; cf. http://vgstuttgart.de/servlet/PB/menu/1198637/index.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 31 Lamya Kaddor/Rabeya Müller/Harun Behr (eds.), Saphir 5/6, Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime (Munich: Kösel, 2008); Serap Erkan et al. (eds.), Mein Islambuch (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009). 292 mathias rohe

In a broader academic perspective, Islamic theology (called “Islamic studies,” “Islamic religious studies” or “Islamic theology”) aiming at a con- fession-orientated education and research are established in a small num- ber of universities. In Frankfurt/Main, the Turkish Republic has started financing three professorships for such purposes. Following the recom- mendations published by the German Wissenschaftsrat (German Coun- cil of Science and Humanities),32 the universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg,33 Frankfurt34 and Giessen35 (joint planning), Münster36 and Osnabrück37 (joint planning) and Tübingen38 have established departments for such studies in close cooperation with existing theology faculties and with Muslim representatives gathered in advisory boards according to the Ger- man legal system of cooperation in such fields. Tübingen started its study programme in Fall 2011, whereas Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt/Giessen and Münster/Osnabrück started in 2012 by appointing professors, estab- lishing post-doc research groups and courses (BA/MA). Some more or less anti-Muslim movements are heavily criticising these developments,39 but the programmes enjoy broad political support. Concerning imam training, the University of Osnabrück started a residential programme for 30 imams in 2010; the University of Erlangen- Nuremberg has developed teaching programs in a more decentralised way in cooperation with the local levels. Some Muslim organisations train their imams in internal programmes. State-funded political organisations and a number of bigger cities like Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin have offered programmes for imams as well, in particular concerning citizenship issues, which have been evaluated and used in the new DIK project group (see section 2 above). There is a widespread desire among Muslims to pro-

32 Cf. www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/9678-10.pdf, accessed 30 April 2012. 33 Cf. the website www.dirs.phil.uni-erlangen.de/, accessed 19 January 2013. 34 Cf. The website www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb09/islam/index.html, accessed 19 January 2013. 35 Cf. The website www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/fb04/institute/isltheol, accessed 19 January 2013. 36 Cf. the website www.uni-muenster.de/ZIT/Zentrum/index.html, accessed 19 January 2013. 37 Cf. the website www.uni-tuebingen.de/einrichtungen/verwaltung-dezernate/ i-forschung-strategie-und-recht/zentrum-fuer-islamische-theologie.html, accessed 19 January 2013. 38 Cf. the website www.uni-tuebingen.de/einrichtungen/verwaltung-dezernate/ i-forschung-strategie-und-recht/zentrum-fuer-islamische-theologie.html, accessed 19 January 2013. 39 Cf. e.g. statements of the so-called Central council of ex-Muslims in Germany, at www.bild.de/BILD/politik/2010/10/14/imam-ausbildung-ein-skandal/sagt-der-zentral-rat- der-ex-muslime.html. germany 293 fessionalise the training of imams, since their role in majority societies as well as broad political support is increasing; but in terms of organisation and particularly financing, no solutions are in sight for the near future. The VIKZ40 has offered imam training courses since the 1980s. DITIB has run several training programmes in cooperation with German state institutions related to language skills and integration issues.41 The Ahmadi- yya Muslim Jamaat opened an institute for imam education (Institute for Islamic Theology and Languages) in Riedstadt/Hessen in December 2012. Approximately half of the Ahmadiyya community members in Germany live in the Rhine-Main region close to this institution (ca. 15,000).42

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Many Muslims still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. This is due to sentiments of “feeling home” there more than in Germany, particularly within the first generation of immigrants, but also due to relatively high costs for burials in Germany and the lack of appropriate facilities for Mus- lim burials in their neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Muslims are buried in Germany. There are only a few Muslim cemeter- ies, but many cemeteries run by the state or by churches have established special Muslim burial areas. Facilities for washing the deceased’s body have been built, and the possibilities of maintaining a grave for more than the usually permitted period of 10–20 years are broadened (while costly). In addition, there is an increasing consensus that graves could be re-used, provided that the still existing mortal remains are buried in a lower stratum of the grave, like in many heavily populated regions in the Muslim world. From a legal point of view, most states require the status of a corpora- tion under public law (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, see section 2) as a prerequisite for establishing a religious cemetery, which is difficult to obtain. Northrhine-Westphalia has lowered these very strict and thus potentially unconstitutional prerequisites. Other legislation has abolished the duty to bury bodies in a coffin, thus allowing the traditional burial in white linen. A debate on reform suggestions submitted by two opposition

40 Cf. The information on the official website (www.vikz.de/index.php/Imamausbil- dung.html), accessed 29 January 2013. 41 Cf. the report “Imame für Integration”, www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/ DIK/StandpunkteErgebnisse/ReligPersonal/ImameTheologie/ImameIntegration/imamint- egration-node.html, accessed 29 January 2013. 42 Cf. the report “Die muslimischen Pioniere. Islamisches Theologie-Institut in Hessen”, taz 17 December 2012, available at www.taz.de/!107557/, accessed 10 January 2013. 294 mathias rohe parties took place in the Parliament of Hessen on 8 November 2012.43 On 4 December 2012 the governing parties proposed a legal amendment44 allowing burials without a coffin according to Islamic tradition, which is likely to come into force in March 2013. In Baden-Württemberg, all politi- cal parties represented in the State Parliament agreed on a similar initia- tive in the aftermath of a parliamentarian hearing in October 2012.45

8 “Chaplaincy” in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions is run in cooperation between the state and the recognised religious communities to fulfil the necessary organisa- tional conditions. No Muslim organisation has achieved this status so far. Until now, there are only provisional solutions on a local level, particularly in hospitals. The city of Wiesbaden has started a model project funded by the EU on offering spiritual care and educating suitable volunteers in the main hospital and in the local prison with considerable success. The legal basis for that is an “integration agreement” between the municipality and most of the local Muslim organisations (the local DITIB branch was pre- vented from doing so by the central administration in Cologne for unclear reasons). Other cities like Augsburg and Nürnberg will follow. Regarding Muslim chaplaincy in the German army, the Ministry of Defence has responded to a letter by the Intercultural Council (Interkul- tureler Rat)46 that two prerequisites would have to be met for a Mus- lim chaplain to be appointed: first, a minimum number of 1,500 Muslim soldiers has to be registered, and, second, a Muslim cooperation partner recognised by a concordate (Staatsvertrag) has to be found; both require- ments have not been met yet, while alternative solutions have been rejected.

43 Cf. the written expert opinions submitted to the parliament, available at www. hessischer-landtag.de/icc/Internet/med/fd9/fd930c3e-d990-0931-d3d1-17052184e373, 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.pdf, accessed 10. January 2013, and the report of the hearing “Muslimische Begräbnisse—‘Gräber nicht antasten’”, Frankfurter Rundschau 09.11.2012, available at www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/muslimische-begraebnisse-graeber-nicht-antas- ten,1472796,20830198.html, accessed 12 November 2012. 44 Hessischer Landtag Drucksache 18/6734 neu, available at http://starweb.hessen.de/ cache/DRS/18/4/06734.pdf, accessed 10 January 2013. 45 Cf. the report “Grünes Licht für bestattungsformen anderer Religionen und Kulturen”, available at www.migazin.de/2012/10/23/grunes-licht-fur-bestattungsformen-anderer- kulturen-und-religionen/, accessed 10 January 2013. 46 Cf. Protocol of the DIF (Deutsches Islamforum), session of 13.11.2012, lit. f). germany 295

9 Religious Festivals

Political authorities increasingly take notice of Muslim religious festivals, sending messages of congratulation or inviting them/accepting invita- tions, e.g. in the month of Ramadan. Muslim holidays are not legally rec- ognised as state holidays like the major Christian holidays but are legally protected to a certain extent. Employees are in general entitled to apply for leave during the major festivals, pupils may stay away from school for a number of days (during the ‘Id al-Adha and following the end of the month of Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr). The numbers of pilgrims on the annual hajj are unknown. A Shi’i ‘Ashura procession was held in 2012 in the town of Vechta in Lower Saxony with 300 participants, seemingly without objections by the overwhelming Catholic majority.47

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food can be imported to Germany, which regularly occurs. Accord- ing to a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002,48 Muslims are entitled to apply for an exemption from the general prohibition of slaughtering without pre-stunning according to the Animal Protection Act (Para. 4a Sect. 2). Since then, some Muslim butchers have applied for such exceptions, which were often refused by administrations or only granted under very restrictive conditions. The Federal Administrative Court has repeatedly decided in favour of Muslim applicants49 but administra- tive and lower court resistance has not totally ceased yet. In September 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court50 in an unusually clear judge- ment quashed decisions by the Administrative Court of Giessen51 and the

47 Cf. the report “Muslimische ‘Wallfahrt’ nach Vechta”, Radio Bremen 27 Novem- ber 2012, available at www.radiobremen.de/nachrichten/land_und_leute/laleashurafest- vechta100.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 48 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 104, pp. 337. 49 Federal Administrative Court judgement from 23.11.2006, Neue Zeitschrift für Ver- waltungsrecht 2007, p. 461. 50 Decision from 28 September 2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht— Rechtsprechungsreport 2009, p. 945. 51 Decision from 25 February 2009 (10 L 80/09.GI), available at www.kostenlose-urteile.de/ Verwaltungsgericht-erlaubt-Schaechten-unter-Auflagen.news7501.htm, accessed 30 April 2012. 296 mathias rohe

Administrative Court of Appeals of Hessen52 which were unfavourable for the Muslim applicant. Nevertheless, in a questionable decision of Novem- ber 2009, the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeals53 stated that the claim of a Muslim applicant to slaughter animals for ‘Id al-Adha was taken to be merely culturally based, thus not coming under freedom of religion. Repeated reports confirm that local administrations are handling exemp- tion applications in a very restrictive manner.54 DITIB has called on believers to avoid unnecessary pain for the animals to be slaughtered at ‘Id al-Adha, declaring that there is no objection to using electric stunning methods before slaughtering the animal.55 In public and social care institutions food not containing pork or alco- hol is usually offered. In some cases (e.g. kindergartens with high numbers of Muslim children) there are complaints that no traditional pork meals are offered any more.56 Access to halal food is widespread, since more and more shops, restau- rants and supermarkets offer it mainly in the regions with dense Muslim population. Regarding Islamic banking and finance, there are no institu- tions specialised on this sector. Instead, a number of banks and finance services offer sukuk and other forms of Islamic investments, or interest- free accounts. Only in Mannheim (Baden-Württemberg), the Kuveyt Türk bank opened a branch in 2010 and applied for a full banking licence in 2012.57 The market for such activities in Germany is considered to be marginal. In Berlin, a “Muslimtaxi” company was set up in December 2011 offering transport by same-sex drivers, and a Muslim auction company was opened.58

52 Decision from 26 May 2009 (unpublished). 53 Decision from 26 November 2009 (9 CE 09.2917), not yet published. Cf. e.g. www. vgh.bayern.de/BayVGH/documents/PM-20091127_000.pdf, and www.kostenlose-urteile.de/ Tuerkischer-Metzger-erhaelt-keine-Erlaubnis-zum-Schaechten.news8836.htm, accessed 30 April 2012. 54 Cf. e.g. “Streit ums Schächten. Schlachten mit der Stoppuhr”, Frankfurter Rundschau 02.08.2012, available at www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/streit-ums-schaechten-schlachten- mit-stoppuhr,1472796,16779062.html. 55 Cf. the message of the Secretary General Sadi Arslan (25 November 2009), available at www.ditib.de/detail1.php?id=180&lang=de, accessed 30 April 2012. 56 Cf. “Keine Currywurt in Kieler Kitas”, Schleswig-Holsteinischer Zeitungsverlag report from 10 November 2012, available at www.shz.de/artikel/keine-currywurst-in-kieler-kitas. html, accessed 10 January 2013. 57 Cf. the report “Islamic banking ist in Deurtschland Stückwerk”, FTD 29. August 2012, www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/:mangelnde-nachfrage-islamic-banking-ist- in-deutschland-stueckwerk/70082884.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 58 Cf. the interview with the founder of both companies Selim Reid “Wir dürfen nicht betrügen”, taz 20 November 2012, available at www.taz.de/!105873/, accessed 30 January 2013, and the website http://muslimtaxi.de/index.php. germany 297

In addition, some mosques and organisations are offering services rang- ing from hajj performance to the organisation of Muslim burials. Internet offers for sales and services seem to cover a considerable part of supply from books, DVDs etc. up to religious garment etc.

11 Dress Codes

Male Muslim dress codes are practically unnoticed by law and by public debate. The contrary is true for the female head scarf. There is a wide- spread rejection of the head scarf in German society, perceiving it simply as an instrument to oppress women and demonstrate male supremacy. Extremists including anti-Islam feminists like Alice Schwarzer declared it to be “the flag of Islamism”, not distinguishing between actual cases of oppression59 and women wearing the head scarf voluntarily. Legally, wearing the head scarf is allowed in public space includ- ing schools and universities, except for school teachers according to newer legislation in eight federal states which have banned the wear- ing of “religious symbols” in public office. Such regulations are neutral in their wording but are clearly aimed at the Muslim head scarf only. In Baden-Württemberg, nursery staff is also targeted.60 The states of Hessen and Berlin61 have gone even further including practically all state offi- cers. Berlin has banned all kinds of religious symbols (including Chris- tian and Jewish ones). The Federal Constitutional Court62 has opened for two ways of legislation: either a general ban of religious symbols or a general permission. It has stressed that in any case all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast to that, the respective laws of some states include exceptions of the ban for culturally accepted (Christian or Jewish) symbols, which is a clear contradiction of the Constitutional Court’s verdict which enjoys legal status according to German law. The

59 Cf. for such cases the judgement of the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe (Az. 9 K 4270/07) from 30 April 2009 (residence permit for a shortly married Serbian woman who was forced to wear a headscarf by her Turkish husband who had unofficially entered into a polygamous marriage besides that). 60 Cf. the judgement of the Labour Court of Appeals Baden-Württemberg from 19 June 2009 (7 Sa 84/08), available at http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/ document.py?Gericht=bw&GerichtAuswahl=Arbeitsgerichte&Art=en&Datum=2009- 6&nr=11917&pos=5&anz=10, accessed 30 April 2012. 61 Cf. the critical expertise by Susanne Baer, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz. de/DIK/EN/Magazin/magazin-node.html, accessed 23 December 2013 (no longer active). 62 Judgement from 24 December 2003 (2 BvR 1436/02), available at www.bundesverfas- sungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 298 mathias rohe

Federal Administrative Court63 has declared the respective law of Baden- Württemberg to meet the constitutional requirements, but stressed that symbols of other religions have then to be equally banned. In the states having banned head scarves, the courts have now to enter into bizarre reflections on whether caps or wigs are to be considered as headscarves or not in a legal sense.64 The Constitutional Court will have to decide again following the Baden-Württemberg teacher’s appeal against the judgement of the Federal Administrative Court. Since 2010 the debate on the “burqa ban” in France, Belgium and else- where had certain repercussions in the German public debate, includ- ing an expert hearing on the freedom of religion65 in the Committee on Human Rights of the Federal Parliament in October 2010. Nevertheless, except for some single voices, a broad political majority from left to right, including the President and the Federal Government, refuse to take spe- cific measures for a ban of the burka or the niqab worn voluntarily. The existing laws relating to security measures (controls etc.) and to work in public institutions like schools are taken to be sufficient. A total ban with- out any specific reasons is held unconstitutional by the vast majority in the Parliament and broader politics. Photos of women wearing a headscarf for ID cards or passports are permitted,66 as opposed to the niqab or other forms of garment hinder- ing efficient procedures of identification.

12 Publications and Media

Some Muslim organisations are issuing magazines and brochures on reli- gious issues and are maintaining websites (see section 3 above). Most of them only reach a rather limited number of readers. The Islamische Zeitung is the only monthly journal. Besides that, some newspapers address the Turkish Muslim community, in particular Zaman, which regularly deals with religious topics and is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

63 Judgement from 16 December 2008, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, p. 1289. 64 Cf. Federal Labour Court, judgement from 20.08.2009 (2 AZR 499/08); Administrative Court of Cologne, decision from 17.11.2008 (3 K 2630/07). 65 The author was one of the six experts invited; cf. www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/ 2010_10/2010_349/03.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 66 Cf. Administrative Courts Wiesbaden 10.07.1984, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltung- srecht 1985, pp. 137; Kassel 20 January 2004 (3 G 1916/03) and Administrative Court of Appeals Hessen (7 TG 448/04), report available at www.jurblog.de/2006/06/12/passfoto-mit- kopftuch-im-lichtbildausweis/, acessed 30 January 2013. germany 299

Besides that, there is an increasingly lively scene of publications and internet fora developing, aimed particularly at youths and their culture (e.g. ufuq.de) or women, like the magazines Gazelle (ed. Sineb El Masrar)67 or Imra’ah (ed. Sandra Adeoye).68 In German public TV and broadcast, fora like the Wort zum Freitag (“word for Friday”, as a parallel to the Christian “word for Sunday”), the Forum am Freitag and the Das islamische Wort were established to enable authentic Muslim voices to be heard by a broader public. There are no specific Muslim-run TV or broadcast offers. Many Muslims would still use media of the countries of origin besides German media or alone, particu- larly Arab and Turkish sources.69 The German Islam Conference provides some information in English in its magazine Muslims in Germany.70 On a scientific level, new journals have been issued by Muslim scholars at some of the universities specialised in Islamic religious studies. The University of Erlangen-Nürnberg has had an internet publication called Zeitschrift für die Religionslehre des Islam (ZRLI) since 2007.71 At the Uni- versity of Osnabrück, a print journal called Hikma—Journal of Islamic The- ology and Religious Education has been published since 2010.72

13 Family Law73

Islamic norms (as formulated in the laws of Islamic states) are primarily applicable according to the rules of private international law (PIL) within

67 Website available at www.gazelle-magazin.de/, accessed 29 April 2012. 68 Cf. the interview “Die Cosmopolitan mit Kopftuch”, available at http://wissen.dra- dio.de/imra-ah-die-cosmoplitan-mit-kopftuch.36.de.html?dram:article_id=8221, accessed 29 April 2012. The website www.imraah.de/ is still under construction. 69 Representative data are available for migrants of Turkish background, but not spe- cifically regarding the religious affiliation of the users or the media contents; cf. the work- ing paper of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Mediennutzung von Migranten in Deutschland, Nürnberg August 2010, pp. 24 s., available at www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp34-mediennutzung-von-migranten.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile, accessed 9 January 2013. 70 Available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/Magazin/magazin-node .html, accessed 23 December 2012. 71 Cf. the website www.izir.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 52&Itemid=5, accessed 10 January 2013. 72 Cf. the website www.hikma-online.com/cms/en/node/44, accessed 10 January 2013. 73 An overview in English on the application of Islamic norms in Germany is given by the author on the website of the German Islam Conference, available at www.deutsche- islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/Magazin/Recht/islam-recht-node.html, accessed 23 December 2012. 300 mathias rohe the limits set by public policy (Art. 6 EGBGB).74 In family matters, German PIL still uses citizenship as the main connecting factor, obliging courts and administrations to apply foreign law to “foreigners” living in Germany even after several generations. Thus, in Germany it is much more often necessary to apply foreign norms than in other European states following the principles of immigration countries, which usually prefer residence as the main connecting factor. This is fundamentally changing for impor- tant aspects of PIL: in 2012, the EU regulations on divorce (Regulation No 1259/2010) and on succession (Regulation No 650/2012) came into force, which declare residence to be the prime connecting factor. In practice, public policy would lead to the non-application of Islamic legal norms in a considerable number of cases to the extent that they preserve tradi- tional gender inequality and the inequality of religions. According to the German system, these norms are not considered in the abstract, and it is only the result of their application in the concrete case which is taken into consideration.75 Thus, if this result were similar to the legal solution the German substantive law provides, the foreign norm can be applied. In addition to that, the application of public policy requires strong factual relations of the case to be decided in Germany. Little information is available on the informal sector. Some mosques offer mediation in family conflicts. The Islamic centre of Munich seems to offer further (semi-legal) services concerning marriage and divorce.76 In a couple of cases Muslim refugees from Iraq who were unable to procure the necessary documents for an official marriage from their home country resorted to merely religious marriages concluded by imams. These mar- riages are without any legal standing in Germany, but can cause prob- lems if they are socially binding within a marginalised community. Thus, some improvisation is required in cases where such “wives” seek a divorce which cannot be granted by courts due to the lack of a legally valid mar- riage. In 2012, the Bavarian Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection set up a working group dealing with the scope and limits of informal and formal Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) outside state courts.77 It was

74 Cf. Rohe Mathias, Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), pp. 353. 75 Court of Appeals München FamRZ 2013, 36 concerning an Iranian-German inheri- tance case. 76 Cf. the information given at www.islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de/html/services_-_ eheschliessungen.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 77 Two units were working on monitoring/practical administrative measures and pre- ventive measures, the latter chaired by the author. germany 301 not specifically aimed at Muslim ADR, which seems to be rare outside some specific milieus, but at all kinds of groups who are keeping their dis- tance from state institutions for various reasons (sometimes the motives are to be found among these groups, while at other times from within state institutions themselves). Results will be published in 2013. In 2010, a broad and often very simplifying debate on “Shari’a and the German Constitution” started as a consequence of the then President Wulff’s statement on Islam “belonging to Germany.” It has shown that vast parts of the population, including legally trained politicians, obvi- ously do not know the existing framework dealing with these issues in nearly the same manner for more than 100 years.78 In May 2012, the German regional court of Cologne79 ruled that male circumcision in a particular case concerning a Muslim boy is punishable under German penal law, even if performed by medical standards of care. This decision went against a unanimous opinion in the judiciary80 so far, which held this procedure to be lawful. It was based on a short and poorly balanced reasoning, simply stating that the parents cannot validly consent to the harm caused to the child. The court made no attempt whatsoever to weigh up the parents’ motivation of integrating the child into a religious community according to their definition of the best welfare of the child with the (relatively minor) violation of the integrity of the child’s body. This decision was not binding beyond the specific case before them but nevertheless caused uproar in the Jewish and Muslim communities. It was rejected by most of the political parties and by leading politicians includ- ing the Chancellor who said that the country will certainly not turn into a “nation of comedians.”81 Legislation aimed at clarifying the permission for male circumcision to be performed according to medical standards

78 It is bizarre that people like the well-known feminist Alice Schwarzer accuse German lawyers (including the author) for applying and explaining the existing law of “replacing German law by Sharia”; cf. Schwarzer, Schwarzer, Alice: “Die Realitäten in Deutschland.” In: Schwarzer, Alice (ed.): Die große Verschleierung. Für Integration, gegen Islamismus 5th ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2010) pp. 18–28, here p. 26. A study of her Islamopho- bic campains and those of other “panicers” like Sarrazin has appeared in Bahners, Patrick, Die Panikmacher (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011). 79 LG Köln decision of 7 May 2012 (151 Ns 169/11), available at www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/ lgs/koeln/lg_koeln/j2012/151_Ns_169_11_Urteil_20120507.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 80 According to German law of social welfare, the state even has to finance the costs of a decent celebration of the circumcision in case of need, cf. Administrative Court of Appeal Lüneburg FEVS 44, p. 465. 81 Cf. the report “Unstrittene Rechtslage: Kanzlerin warnt vor Beschneidungsverbot”, Spiegel online 16 July 2012, available at www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeskan- zlerin-merkel-warnt-vor-beschneidungsverbot-a-844671.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 302 mathias rohe of care and without unnecessary harm under German family law passed the German Parliament on 12 December 2012.82 The on-going debate shows an increasingly aggressive secularist tone condemning any religious rites to be backward and irrelevant in a secular society.83 Federal President Gauck criticised in his New Year’s speech the mixture of real care for the best welfare of the child with arguments based on a “vulgar ” mixed with anti-Semitic and Islamophobic undertones.84

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations between Muslims and the major churches are well established and intense. The Catholic and Protestant Churches have appointed commissioners for Islamic affairs on the federal level and within their regional entities; their academies regularly organise conferences and meetings for interreligious dialogue. The Roman Catholic Church has issued a paper supporting the establishment of mosques in general, which caused some opposition and even departures by members rejecting Islam. Interreligious festivals and mutual invitations are very common— but usually Muslims would invite Christians more often to their festivals than vice versa. In some parts of the churches there are anti- Islamic ten- dencies, in which Islam is perceived to be incompatible with the structure of a secular democratic state. Others would still feel more solidarity with Muslims in view of broad common convictions and interests and preser- vation of freedom of religion for everybody. Several organisations on the federal, state and local level are involved in interreligious activities on a regular basis. The Koordinierungsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e.V. (KCID, Auf der Weißburg 44, 35418 Buseck, Internet: www.kcid.de; E-Mail: [email protected]) is an umbrella organisation on the federal level; the Christlich-islamische Gesellschaft (CIG, Alte Wippenfürther Strasse 53, 51065 Köln, Internet: www.chrislages.

82 Cf. Entwurf eines Gesetzes über den Umfang der Personensorge bei einer Beschnei- dung des männlichen Kindes from 05.11.2012, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/11295, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/112/1711295.pdf 83 Cf. the lucid essay of Heiner Bielefeldt, UN special rapporteur for freedom of religion and belief teaching an the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg “Marginalisierung der Reli- gionsfreiheit?”, available at www.polwiss.uni-erlangen.de/professuren/menschenrechte/ UN%20Sonderberichterstatter/bielefeldt_beschneidungsurteil_vorabfassung.pdf (31 July 12), to be published. 84 Cf. e.g. the report “Gefährliche Untertöne”, Nürnberger Nachrichten 31 December 2012, p. 4. germany 303 de; E-Mail: [email protected]) is its oldest member. The Interkultureller Rat organises the Deutsches Islamforum und Islamforen in den Ländern (Internet: www.interkultureller-rat.de/projekte/deutsches-islamforum- und-islamforen-in-den-laendern/, containing also contact information for the seven state fora; E-mail: [email protected]) on a federal and state levels. There are only very few inter-religious activities including Muslims and Jews bilaterally or multilaterally, e.g. in the remarkable Frankfurt Coun- cil of Religions (Rat der Religionen) established in 2009.85 Obviously, the Palestine conflict largely overshadows attempts to come to terms in Ger- many. Nevertheless, some prominent Jewish voices defended Muslims against attacks on their rights to freedom of religion.86

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There are significant differences between official statements and wide- spread public opinion concerning Islam. Apart from some small right- wing and fundamentalist Christian extremist groups, all non-extremist political parties and state officials still stress the necessity of distinguish- ing between Islam as a religion and its political abuse. No anti-Muslim party of any political importance has emerged yet. Some of the right- wing parties openly declare to “safeguard” the rightist political spectrum against extremism.87 In this sense, Chancellor Merkel stressed in a public statement shortly after the former President’s remarks on Islam being part of Germany now (supra n. 13) that “in Germany the Basic Law (sc.: the German Constitution) is dominant, not Shari’a.”88 Factually, this is abso- lutely correct on the level of legal hierarchies. Nevertheless, the very same

85 Cf. www.rat-der-religionen.de/. 86 Cf. e.g. www.zentralratdjuden.de/de/article/2773.html and www.faz.net/s/Rub- 594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E9660F440C5784B5694417D4BB090538E~ATpl ~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 30 April 2012. But see also the extreme anti-Muslim propaganda of Ralph Giordano www.nytimes.com/2007/07/05/world/europe/05cologne. html?_r=2&pagewanted=2&oref=slogin, www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ giordano-moschee-bau-ist-kriegserklaerung/1016290.html, and www.ksta.de/html/artikel/ 1191475994461.shtml, accessed 30 April 2012, or the former porn-writer Broder, Henryk, Hurra, wir kapitulieren—Von der Lust am Einknicken (Berlin: wjs Verlag, 2006). 87 Cf. e.g. Alexander Dobrindt, Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in www.faz.net/s/ Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E2E5F9ACFEB264FA8BC09CD06708FA7 FC~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 88 Cf. only the report in www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/merkel-in-deutsch land-gilt-das-grundgesetz-und-nicht-die-scharia_aid_559638.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 304 mathias rohe

Constitution allows and even demands to grant Muslims their religious rights defined by Shari’a rules; in addition, German Private international law leads to the application of Shari’a-based law to a certain extent.89 Thus, to a large extent German law and Shari’a rules are compatible rather than mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the constitutional principles of equal rights and duties, including the protection of religious freedom, seem to be unknown or misunderstood among the broad public. Besides that, in the course of a broader debate on the integration of migrants, Muslims are often perceived to be the “most problematic” group. In many cases social, cultural and religious issues are simply mixed up. Thus, access to the labour market can be infringed by prejudice, par- ticularly regarding women wearing a head scarf.90 In general, the debate on Muslims is very often linked to security matters. Thus, a broad majority in Germany would perceive Islam as such to be backward, ill-prepared for the necessities of the 21st century and potentially violent. After the “Sar- razin debate” in 2010/2011 (see Yearbook 2011), the and the criminal activities of some members, namely in Bonn and Solingen, has been in the focus of the debate in 2012. The Salafi organisation Mil- latu Ibrahim was banned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior; others are under scrutiny.91 On the other hand, there is still a lot of respect and mutual understanding between most Muslims and non-Muslims in daily life. Obviously the fear of Islam is much more abstract than related to con- crete experiences. This is underlined by the fact that in Eastern Germany, where (except in the state of Berlin) only few Muslims live, the rejection is considerably more widespread than in regions of dense Muslim popu- lation. In 2011, a lucid work written by a prominent journalist (Patrick Bahners, Die Panikmacher. Die deutsche Angst vor dem Islam, München 2011, C.H. Beck) dealt intensely with some leading Islamophobic voices and their ideology. In Baden-Württemberg representative polls among Germans (including those of migrant backgrounds) were conducted by the Ministry of Integra-

89 Cf. the reaction of some scientists including the author in www.spiegel.de/politik/ deutschland/0,1518,722220,00.html, accessed 30 April 2012. 90 Cf. the brochure by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Bessere Integration von Muslimin- nen und Muslimen in den Arbeitsmarkt, 2. ed. Nürnberg April 2012, pp. 9, 15 ss. available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/Downloads/Dokument- ePlenum/dik-broschuere-pg-a-download.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 30 January 2013. 91 Cf. only the report “Islamismus in Deutschland: Innenminister Friedrich verbi- etet Salafistenverein”, Spiegel online 14 June 2012, available at www.spiegel.de/politik/ deutschland/salafisten-verbot-friedrich-verbietet-millatu-ibrahim-a-838592.html, accessed 30 December 2012. germany 305 tion in 2012.92 Only a few questions referred to issues relating to Islam. Concerning the establishment of mosques (which is legal and even privi- leged under German construction law due to freedom of religion), 35% of the respondents with the lowest education level (Hauptschulabschluss) felt bothered by that, as compared to 21% of those having obtained a uni- versity degree. Regarding the Muslim head scarf, 42% of the non-religious respondents felt bothered by it (57% did not), compared with only 34/35% of Catholics and Protestants and 7% of Muslims who were bothered by it (65% of Catholics and Protestants and 93% of Muslims were not).93 According to representative polls among Germans on the federal level in 2012,94 around 70% of the respondents attributed “fanaticism and radi- calism” to Islam, and only 7% “openness and tolerance.” The formulation of these questions is equally popular and problematic, since it remains totally unclear whether they refer to concrete or abstract experiences and information concerning Islam worldwide or only in Germany. In a way, this reflects the broad vague feeling of unease towards Islam and the still widespread phenomenon of the “othering” of Muslims in German soci- ety as one of the major results of these polls, whereas concrete problems related to religious issues concerning Germany are rarely formulated.

16 Major Cultural Events

There is a rich religious and cultural Muslim life in several parts of Ger- many now. Many mosques use the holiday of 3 October (Unification day) as a “day of the open mosque” inviting the public for information about Islam. In the month of Ramadan and during ‘Id al-Adha, Muslim organi- sations often invite political and social representatives to join their cel- ebrations. In recent years, senior political officials have started to send congratulation messages to Muslims for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha and sometimes organise receptions for them. In some cities Muslims and rep- resentatives of other minority religions are invited together with their Christian colleagues to participate in celebrations on the occasion of the inauguration of public buildings.

92 Ministerium für Integration Baden-Württemberg, Gelebte Vielfalt, 2. Ed. Stuttgart October 2012 (for methodology cf. p. 6 s.). 93 Ibid., p. 24 s. 94 Cf. the report “Die Furcht vor dem Morgenland im Abendland”, FAZ 22. Novem- ber 2012, available at www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/allensbach-studie-die-furcht-vor- dem-morgenland-im-abendland-11966471.html, accessed 30 January 2013.

GREECE

Konstantinos Tsitselikis1

1 Muslim Populations

At the establishment of Greece as an independent state (1830), Muslims constituted a very small group within the then borders of Greece with almost no institutional special protection. By 1881 and with the annexa- tion of Thessalia, Muslim communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of . In effect, the Ottoman millet system (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved and the local muftis acquired quasi-judicial authority in personal status matters. Muslim schools and religious foun- dations (waqfs) were recognised in Greek law and were administered by local Muslim Community Councils. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who opted to stay and become Greek citizens. The legal status of the Muslim communi- ties was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey. 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish-speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus.2 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) became Greek citizens. Today, Muslims with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly

1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in inter- national law and human rights and is co-director of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre of Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402). 308 konstantinos tsitselikis concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and on Rodos and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each island. Another 15,000 have emigrated from Thrace for economic reasons to or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of Greek-Turkish confronta- tions in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated from Thrace to Turkey and Germany (more than 120,000 are estimated to live abroad).3 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and express Turkish national feelings. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (a Bulgar- ian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace has remained controversial insofar as Turkish nationalism, backed by Turkey, attempts to absorb the Muslim minority into a Turkish iden- tity, and Greek policies attempt to foster internal divisions. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in the national census after 1951, all the above figures are rough estimates. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since 1990 as part of the general flow of migration.4 Muslim immigrants come from African and Asian countries, and from Albania. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Ban- gladesh, Pakistan and the Arab countries. Shi’ism is far less widespread, existing mainly among Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. In the 2001 census, immigrants exceeded 820,000, or 8% of the over- all population. Around 200,000 of them were Muslims, not including Albanians, the majority of whom are of Muslim background, but with- out expressed affinities with Islam.5 The estimated Muslim population in

3 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Alle- magne, Turquie) (Political motivations, co-governance and ethnic building: Sociology of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Germany, Turkey), PhD thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007. 4 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001). See comment above; Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006). 5 13% of the immigrant population of metropolitan Athens come from Muslim Asian and African countries (Kavounidou, Tz. and A. Hatzaki, Αλλοδαποί που αιτήθηκαν προσωρινής άδειας παραμονής (Aliens who applied for temporary stay permit) (Athens: Ethniko Insti- touto Ergasias, 1999). greece 309

2012 (Greek and non-Greek citizens) would be 350,000, making 3.1% of the total population of 11,000,000. By 2009, according to Muslim leaders, among the immigrants with an Islamic affiliation, the Afghani community numbers 20,000, the Pakistani 70,000, the Bangladeshi 25,000, Palestin- ians and Jordanians 12,000, Syrians 15,000 and Egyptians, Iraqis and others more than 40,000.6 Such figures are highly unreliable, as there is a large number of clandestine immigrants and constant population mobility, and leaders of Muslim bodies are tempted to exaggerate community figures in support of political and social claims.

2 Islam and the State

According to the Greek constitution (Article 3), the ‘dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy’. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political con- frontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.7 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace are sup- posed to be contracted by the government under Act 3536/2007. So far the imams (hired in each mosque of Thrace) are appointed and paid (out of the waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis who are granted financial support from Turkey. After the Ministry launched a call for the imam posts (Min. D. 106535/A3/12.8.2008, FEK G of 14.8.2008), the muftiates should have made their own selection and sent the list to the Ministry for approval, a process which had not been resolved by the end of 2012.8 The Ministry of National Education and Religion had also launched a call for appointment to the secretariats of the three muftiates (Min. Dec. 29424/A3 of 16.3.2009). As the muftiates refused to comply with the requirements for the selection, the Ministry recalled it after a month (Min. Dec. of 16.4.2009). In effect the selection

6 Data according to leaders of the Muslim communities, To Vima, 31.5.2009. 7 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols, PhD dissertation, Univer- sity of Bergen, 2000. Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www.muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www.iskecemuftu- lugu.org). 8 Announcement of the Mufti of Komotini in: www.muftikomotini.com/index.php?m= art&c=18&n=224, accessed 15 November 2010. 310 konstantinos tsitselikis of the imams continues to be done in parallel by the ‘official’ muftis and ‘elected’ muftis and no law is applied. The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by man- agement committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for elections of these committees, has not so far been imple- mented. When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented. Members of the minority of Thrace participate actively in political life and they get elected to the national parliament through the main political parties. In the elections of June 2012 three deputies were elected, two with the opposition left party SYRIZA and one with PASOK. After long discussions on challenging racial references in the content of Greek-ness, the government of PASOK (elected in October 2009), passed a series of new regulations and amended the Code of Citizenship (Act 3838/2010, FEK A 49) that rendered naturalisation far simpler to acquire for those immigrants with sustainable ties to the country (requiring legal residence of seven years). Thus the Greek citizenship law was brought closer to a paradigm favouring inclusive policies. The law of citizenship for the first time introduced jus soli elements and thus triggered reactions from the nationalist political circles asserting that the pure character of the nation is under threat with special references to Islam. The new regulations on the acquisition of Greek citizenship by immi- grants’ children and the right to vote in local elections were challenged before the High Administrative Court which in a notorious decision ruled that both regulations do not comply with the Constitution (StE 350/2011, Section D and then decision by the Plenary).9 Nea Dimocratia, which won the elections of June 2012 and formed a coalition government with PASOK and DIMAR, committed to curtailing the law drastically, so that immigrant children would have restricted access to Greek citizenship. The Parliament is expected to accordingly amend citizenship law in 2013.

9 The Court said that jus sanguinis would ensure the continuity of the Greek nation. greece 311

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations of Muslims of Greek citizenship as well as of immigrant Mus- lims. Very limited contacts are observed between minority and immigrant associations and these occur only in Athens. In Thrace, there is a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in charac- ter, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and one Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi or Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are:

– Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği (Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace); president: Ecevit Emin (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel.: ++ 30 25310 29705). – Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği (Turkish Union of Xanthi), not yet registered, president: Ahmet Kara (P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel.: ++ 30 25410 23614, email: [email protected], www.iskeceturkbirligi .org).

Minority associations bearing in their title the appellation ‘Turkish’ face a ban by the Greek courts which since 1983 have upheld that such asso- ciations should have a clear definition on a religious and not national basis. The Turkish Union of Xanthi is one of these associations that have brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights (Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, No. 26698/05). Although the Court ruled it a violation of the right to set up an association without such a limitation, the Greek courts still do not implement the judgments issued by the court in Strasbourg. In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immi- grant communities. Most noteworthy are the Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο (Arab-Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilisation) (Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel.: ++ 30 2106910492, www.ahccc.gr, email: [email protected]) and the Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας (Mus- lims Association of Greece); president: Naim Elghandour (9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel.: ++ 30 2106916055, http://equalsociety.com, email: [email protected]). The latter has a supra-national character and a high position as an interlocutor with the Greek authorities. 312 konstantinos tsitselikis

Intra-Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear discourse is articu- lated, but they are all united by concerns about practical problems regard- ing places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideol- ogy, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) char- acter of the minority. Internal divisions regarding interpretation of Islam, the application of Shari’a, Sunni and Shi’i Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 September 2001 event. With regard to Islam in Thrace, religious dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shari’a, or other subjects, are very weak. Religion is entrapped in Greek- Turkish politics.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rodos are officially open and more than 80 unofficial prayer houses function in greater Ath- ens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities) run by immigrant Muslims.10 According to Act 2833/2000 (Art. 7), a mosque should have been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this law was not implemented, the new Act 3512/2006 provided for the construc- tion of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state) through state funding, but this has still not been implemented. The issue has become of major importance for Muslim communities, especially in Athens. Although the government adopted a law on the technicalities for building a mosque (Act 4014/2011, Art. 29.5, FEK A 209), no progress was noticed in 2012. A group of radical nationalists including Bishop Serafeim of Pireaus filed an appeal against this law at the High Adminis- trative Court.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. In 2012

10 Tsitselikis, K., Old and New Islam in Greece. From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 259–265. greece 313 there were 179 elementary and two high schools as well as two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and are funded primarily by the state and also partially out of waqf income for about 7,500 Muslim students. These minority schools (governed by a spe- cial legal regime of a semi-private/semi-public character), as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.11 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups in Thrace and in Kos (Platani). A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 (the ‘7th April School’) caters exclusively for pupils from Arab countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace: about 700 Muslim students were granted the right to enrol in technical or university schools in 2011. An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught. The Special Pedagogical School of Thessaloniki (EPATH), the Mus- lim teachers’ school, was finally abrogated in 2011. Article 59 para. 10, Act 3988/2011 (FEK A 118) foresees the abolition of EPATH by 31 August 2013, thus putting an end to a difficult itinerary of 45 years of contro- versy and ambivalent results that marked minority education. After 2013 teachers for the Turkish curriculum of the minority schools will be

11 Baltsiotis, L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status, problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds), Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι Διαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Inter- vention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87. 314 konstantinos tsitselikis graduates of the Pedagogical School of Elementary Education of the Aris- totle University of Thessaloniki. This institutional change meets funda- mental pedagogical requirements that were lacking for decades in policy making regarding minority education.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rodos, and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship for Muslims who have to pay large amount of money so their relatives can be buried in Thrace. The construction of an Islamic cemetery is planned on the out- skirts of Athens following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. However, for bureaucratic reasons and underlying political reluc- tance, work to establish the cemetery has not commenced up the time of writing (end of 2012).

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Voluntary initiatives are permitted.

9 Religious Festivals

In Thrace, the two main Islamic religious festivals (şeker and kurban bay- ram), and the five blessed nights (kandils: ragayip, mevlut, berat, miraç and kadir) are celebrated and led by official and elected muftis. Minor- ity schools also officially mark these Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right to free time for prayer and religious festivals, but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslim immigrants face practical restrictions in the celebration of reli- gious festivals, as there are not sufficient mosques but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can using their own resources. In 2012, immigrant Muslims celebrated ‘Id al-Adha in a stadium in Athens made available by the government. greece 315

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make qurban (the slaughtering of animals for ‘Id al-Adha) socially accept- able. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food depends on per- sonal networking. Some wealthy Muslims import halal food from their homelands. Small supermarkets provide halal food in Athens. These small busi- nesses are owned by Asian and Arab Muslim immigrants who prepare halal meat themselves under the supervision of the state slaughterhouses. Six travel agencies from Greece (mostly based in Athens) are approved by Saudi Arabia for organising hajj pilgrimage for a quota of 600 people.12 Because of the economic crisis and the lack of legal travel documentation for many immigrants only 250 people managed to travel for hajj in 2012. Islamic banking is not offered in Greece.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic dress, especially as far as the wearing of the head scarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population is very limited, cases of intolerance have not been reported. Greek authori- ties accept photos for official purposes of women with their hair covered as a token gesture to religious freedom.

12 Publication and Media

There are about seventeen Turkish newspapers and magazines and about seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish which are run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such as Akide, edited by the Muftiate of

12 Argo Tours, Kristia Travel, Marine Tours, Grecian Travel, Mid East International Tours, and Green Dome www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=93. The latter, which is the only travel agency based in Thrace (Xanthi) was deprived of its licence. 316 konstantinos tsitselikis

Komotini,13 have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem,14 have a pro-Turkish orientation. There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish magazine, Azinlikca.15 Paratiritis, a Greek newspaper, contains some pages in Turk- ish. Local state radio broadcasts a limited news report in Turkish. In Athens, five daily and weekly newspapers are published in Arabic and one in . Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters) cir- culate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. A few websites promote the discussion of issues related to Islam in Greece. The most important among them is available in three languages (Greek, Arabic and English) run by the Muslim Association of Greece.16 Since 2012 www. alyunaniya.com is also operating as a source of information on Greece and the Arab world for a global audience and the Muslim communities in Greece. Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation into Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets.

13 Family Law

In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s interna- tional commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotyho) to Muslim Greek citizens covered by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law dis- putes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa) and custody,17 and their decisions are automatically ratified by the Greek courts. Although Mus- lims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic

13 www.muftikomotini.com. 14 www.gundemgazetesi.org. Among others: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet.gr, www.batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info. 15 www.azinlikca.net. 16 www.equalsociety.com. 17 Ktistakis, Y, Το ιερό Δίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens. Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leu- ven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132. greece 317 courts, the overwhelming majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Women rarely apply to the Greek courts while men overwhelm- ingly opt for the Mufti. There are no rules to deal with conflict of jurisdic- tion. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims from an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far.

14 Interreligious Relations

No data available.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indif- ferent if not hostile to Islam, which is strongly linked with Turkey. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immi- grants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity, while the latter occasionally appears in debates around Greece and its Orthodox character.18 Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ comes up, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices regarding celebration held by Muslim immigrants in Ath- ens, for example. The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek-Turkish relations. The position of the Muslim immigrants in Greece has gradually attracted publicity and brought to light a series of crucial issues which were absent from the public agenda. On the other hand, state authori- ties did not take any immediate action to respond to Muslims’ (and other immigrants’) complaints. After a period of almost twenty years in which Muslim immigrants have remained in the shadow of public debate,

18 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Polit- ical and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Prodromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 318 konstantinos tsitselikis gradually new voices in favour of the rights of Muslims were reflect- ing social and legal problems while a fierce anti-Muslim discourse was endorsed by ultra-right political forces, such as LAOS and the rising neo- Nazi Hrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn). Islamophobic discourses centred on the issue of citizenship, voting in local elections and the mosque in Athens. After the neo-Nazi party entered the Greek parliament in the elections of May and June 2012, anti-Muslim hate speech and violence has increased considerably. Since then, public debate focused on political violence which often is correlated to racism and Islamophobia. In 2012, groups of neo-Nazis attacked immigrants, mostly Muslims, almost every day. Espe- cially during Ramadan such attacks targeted masjids in Athens19 and even mosques in Thrace.

16 Major Cultural Events

Events are mostly related to traditional religious festivals. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include wrestling contests in the northern mountain areas, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar.

19 www.newsit.gr/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=157084&catid=3. HUNGARY

Norbert Pap and Éva Ladányi1

1 Muslim Populations

Muslims have never formed a significant part of the Hungarian popula- tion. In the 9th and 10th centuries there were a few Muslims, particu- larly so called Kaliz people, who originated from Khorezm and joined the wandering with the Kabar Muslims.2 Buzurman or “Böször- mény” was the comprehensive name for the Muslims in the early Middle Ages and these terms survive in place names. In the era of the kings of the Árpád dynasty, 11th-13th centuries, the so-called Ismaelita immigrants had an outstanding status due to their financial expertise and both their tax-collecting and minting work in the service of the state/king. Their assimilation was completed in the 14th century. In the 15th century the Hungarian state came into conflicts with the neighbouring and continu- ously expanding Ottoman Empire.3 From the beginning of the 16th century, with the defeat of the Hungar- ian army at Mohács in 1526, Hungarian territory, including parts of today’s Croatia and Serbia, became a part of the Muslim world for 150 years. All the Muslim religious sites in Hungary, such as mosques, minarets and tombs date from that time. Similar ethnic and cultural conditions devel- oped in the southern and in one third of the central areas of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. There was no significant Islamisation of the Hungar- ian people: it was the Bosnian, Albanian and Vlach population mixed with a few who formed the Islamic community. In the first decades of the 18th century, the wars of independence con- tinued so all the historical territories of Hungary were freed from Ottoman

1 Dr Norbert Pap, PhD is Associate Professor at the Institute of Geography, University of Pécs, Hungary. Ms Éva Ladányi, theologian and canon lawyer, is a PhD candidate at the University of Pécs, Hungary. 2 Kabars (or kovars) are mixed oriental people who joined to the Hungarians in the early 9th century, alongside the Dneper river. Originally they had three tribes. Later they are organised by the Hungarians into one tribe. A minority of them were Muslims. 3 Dávid, Géza and Fodor, Pál (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 320 norbert pap and éva ladányi rule, and a relatively peaceful relationship lasting two centuries developed with those neighbouring territories that remained under Ottoman domina- tion. However, in the territories which the Ottomans abandoned, Muslims were pressured into either converting to Christianity or escaping from the territories. The Ottoman Empire became a refuge for soldiers and free- dom fighters (e.g. Rákóczi, General Bem etc.) during the wars in the region until the 20th century. A new dimension was opened by the alliance with Turkey during World War I and it also contributed to the legal recognition of Islam (Act XVII of 1916). Between the two World Wars it was mainly Bosnian migrants and a few representatives of the turkophile Hungarian intellectual class who formed the Hungarian Muslim community. Nowadays, the Muslim community is made up of Arab, Turkish, Afri- can, Afghan and Iranian immigrants and a growing number of Hungarian converts.4 According to the census in 2001 the number of Muslims was 3,201. This number is regarded as an underestimate, and some suggest Muslims amount to between 20 to 30 thousands, although this is difficult to document. They are concentrated in Budapest and some other cities (Pécs, Szeged, and Miskolc). According to other estimates,5 the number of Muslims reached 32,000 in 2010.

2 Islam and the State

The Hungarian Parliament passed a controversial, new law on religion at the end of 2011 (Act CCVI/2011, Act VII./2012), which reflects significant changes compared to earlier legislation. Liberal control has been followed by rigour. The new law has acknowledged fourteen religious communities only, different Christian, Jewish and Unitarian denominations, as congre- gations. There were no Muslims among them and the Parliament only allows the acknowledgement of new congregations by law if they have a two-third majority support in the Parliament. Critics of the law con- demned this as a gratuitously high threshold and as a restriction of reli- gious freedom by the state, which gave rise to international indignation

4 Csicsmann, László—Vékony, Dániel, ‘Muslims in Hungary: A Bridge between East and West?’ In: Jaroslav Bures(szerk): Muslims in Visegrad. (Institute of International Rela- tions Prague, Prague 2011), pp. 53–67. 5 Sulok Zoltán, ‘Muslim minority in Hungary’. Paper for the Warsaw Symposium on Muslim minorities in Eastern and Central Europe, 8–10 December 2010, Budapest: no publ., pp. 76–85. hungary 321 and incomprehension on behalf of some acknowledged congregations. In February 2012 the two most significant Hungarian Muslim organisa- tions (HIC and OMH—see next section) founded the Hungarian Islamic Council. The Hungarian state considers the Council as the official repre- sentative of the Muslim faithful of the country, but the two Islamic organi- sations remained separate legal entities. It is the State Secretary for Religious, Ethnic and Civil Society Relations that is responsible for the connection between the heads of the religious communities and the state. Contacts with some Islamic organisations used to be regular. The main issues include questions related to refugees, establishing and maintaining cultural institutions and mosques.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are two registered Islamic communities in Hungary. The Hungar- ian Islamic Community (HIC, 104 Károly Róbert Street, Budapest www. magyariszlam.hu) is the oldest one which was established in 1988 and its first leader was Balázs Mihálffy. The current leader is a Hungarian, Zoltán Bolek, and its members are mainly ethnic Hungarians. Beside religious commitment, nationalism and patriotism are also characteristics of the community. They regularly organise national and international charitable activities; moreover, they maintain Muslim missions in refugee camps and they do missionary work in prisons, too. The HIC has been in close cor- respondence with the Hanif Cultural Foundation (www.hanif.hu/English/ index.htm). For unknown reasons the Hanif Foundation was closed by the attorney general in the end of 2012. The Organisation of Muslims in Hungary (OMH, Budapest Mosque at 41 Fehérvári Street, Budapest, www.iszlamweb.hu) was established in 2000. The OMH also has missions in refugee camps as well as in prisons and is very active in interreligious dialogue (a founding member of the Co-operation Forum of World Religions in Hungary that was set up in 2009). The OMH has three branches, in Szeged, Pécs and Salgótarján. It is a member of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. The leader of OMH, which has many foreign members as well, is an ethnic Hungarian, Zoltán Sulok. There are other Muslim groups in Hungary as well that are not registered. The most significant was led by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim who left Hungary leaving debts. Therefore, since July 2011 the group belongs to the OMH (Al-Huda Mosque, at 21 Dobozi Street, Budapest). 322 norbert pap and éva ladányi

There are two functioning Sufi tariqas. One of them is the Süleymanci (6 Makk Street, Budapest) while the other one is the Fethüllahci (7 Nagy- diófa Street, Budapest, www.dialogusplatform.hu/index.php?lang=en). The Dialogue Platform organisation was established in 2005 with both Turkish and Hungarian members. The Aluakf Foundation (31 Huba Street, Miskolc) maintains a prayer hall. Now defunct, the Islamic Community (IC) was established in 2003. Its religious leader was Dr. Tayseer (Dar as-Salam Mosque, Bartók Béla Street 29, Budapest, www.iszlam.hu) until the dissolution of this community in the end of 2011. Now the organi- sation exists as a foundation. The group follows the neo-Salafiya tenets. The Ansar Ahl Ul-Bajt Carpathian Basin Association is the only Shi’i organisation in Hungary (http://www.sia.eoldal.hu) founded by an Iranian citizen.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques and prayer halls are obliged to be registered when they are estab- lished and start to function. Dozens of these can be found in the country. However, there are no penalties attached to failure to register a place of regular worship. The most important registered ones are:

– Mosque: 104 Károly Róbert Boulevard, Budapest – Budapest Mosque: 41 Fehérvári Street, 1119 Budapest – The of Pasha Jakovali Hassan: 2 Rákóczi Street, 7623 Pécs – Mekka Mosque: 23 Gogol Street, 6722 Szeged – Dar as-Salam Mosque: 29. Bartók Béla Street, 1114 Budapest – Al-Huda Mosque: 21 Dobozi Street, Budapest – Prayer hall in Miskolc: 30 Huba Street, 3526 – The Jami of Malkocs Bej: 15 Kossuth Square, Siklós – Oratory: Turkish lorry parking place in Kecskemét

But the overall number of Muslim places of worship is two or three times more than this.

5 Children’s Education

Religious instruction for adults and children is freely available in mosques. There is a primary school at 2 Kavics Street, XV district, Budapest, which is maintained by the Libyan state and allows children to study in Arabic. The OMH has its weekend school for Muslim children teaching Qur’an hungary 323 and Islamic subjects with the participation of about 150 children. The OMH also provides religious education in a state school in the 8th district of Budapest. Apart from this, Islamic religious education is not available for children in state schools. Although the HIC is trying hard to establish an Islamic nursery school, its efforts so far seem unsuccessful. There is a Turkish primary school in Budapest, founded by the Government of Tur- key (IX distr. Kőbánya-Kispest, Cserkesz st.).

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no Muslim institution for higher education in Hungary. Hungarian Muslims pursue their religious studies mainly in Turkey and in the Middle East, at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, or in France at Chateau-Chinon, for example. Education in the Islamic Online University (IOU) is also avail- able in English which gives BA in Islamic Studies. Both OMH and HIC are registered exam centres. Studies in connection with Islam are available in the following forms: a Master’s Degree programme in Islamic Studies at the Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest, BA and MA programmes in Arabic Studies and canon law at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Altaic Studies and Mediterranean Studies Doctoral programme at the Uni- versity of Szeged, Modern Islamic specialisation related to Balkan Studies and Shari’a law in the Department of Adult Education and Development of Human Resources at the University of Pécs, and some related courses or lectures within the framework of Security Policy Studies at the Uni- versity of National Public Service, and the BA and MA Programmes in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is a burial ground on Kozma Street, Budapest, next to the renovated cemetery for Turkish soldiers who died in World War I. Besides, there is a well-known Muslim burial place in Sopron and one can find smaller, separate Muslim areas in other public cemeteries in the significant Mus- lim centres of the country (E.g. Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen).

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

It is primarily the HIC that organises visits to prisons and refugee camps in the context of formal agreements. Apart from that the OMH also 324 norbert pap and éva ladányi organises visits to the same places at regular intervals. Chairman Bolek of the HIC has been invited to explain Islam to Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and other African Muslim countries).

9 Religious Festivals

In Hungary the Muslim communities celebrate the common Islamic festi- vals. They do not differ either in ceremonies or celebration from customs in any Arab or Muslim countries (Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr, Muslim New Year, ‘Ashura, ‘Id al-Adha, etc.). These occasions, however, are not recognised as “official” holidays by the state. Hungary has been allocated a significant quota of Saudi pilgrim visas for the annual Hajj, and these were shared between the three communi- ties (including the former Islamic Community in Dar al-Salam Mosque).

10 Halal Food

There are many specialist restaurants and shops. Cities like Szeged or Pécs also have shops that offer halal food products. Halal slaughtering is done mostly in slaughterhouses but sometimes occurs in the rural areas of the country. Those who live in the countryside inform each other about the occasional opportunity on the internet or organise the distribution of halal products among each other.

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and “Muslim” beards are not everyday phenomena in Hungary because of the low number of believers but those who decide to wear them are freely allowed to do that—however, in Hungary one never sees a woman with full face covering (niqab or burqa). Harassment due to Mus- lim dress practices is very rare but sometimes occurs and is instigated, for example, by anti-Islamic groups and individuals.

12 Publication and Media

The magazines Hívó Szó (Calling Word) and the Új Gondolat (New Thought) are published irregularly. Due to financial problems the Új Gon- dolat was not issued in 2012. hungary 325

Mosques, Islamic foundations and private persons maintain websites like: www.iszlam.com, www.dialogusplatform.hu/index.php?lang=en, www .iszlam.hu, www.iszlamweb.hu, www.hanif.hu/English/index.htm, www .magyariszlam.hu. www.mohamed.hu Communities and foundations publish good-quality, educational, reli- gious books and booklets. The Hanif Cultural Foundation was the most active in its publishing activity. A substantial number of published works are available in the translation of Halima Zsuzsanna Kiss. News related to Hungarian Muslims is rare.

13 Family Law

State laws do not recognise marriage conducted by a religious author- ity (only). However, mosque leaders give advice based on the Shari’a for those who take part in preparations for marriage. It is possible to have a pre-nuptial agreement but it has no effect outside the mosque. At the same time, Muslims can get married on the basis of Shari’a, and those marriage contracts may be accepted in some Muslim countries, although not in Hungary.

14 Interreligious Relations

Cultural and religious diversity in Hungary has been present since the Middle Ages. There has been a good deal of religious conversions and numbers of converts have grown in the last twenty years due to a grow- ing number of international contacts. The Muslims’ connections with historical churches are regular, though the impact of their conversation is limited due to the huge difference in size. The smaller Eastern Catho- lic Churches are more comparable in size. There is no contact with the Coptic Orthodox Church of Hungary, who opened their first church in late 2010 in Budapest. Relationships with the members of the Hungarian Jewish community exist but are rather irregular and are quite sensitive concerning some topics. An interesting event of 2012 was the Hungarian-Turkish Conference on Geopolitics in December. Another conference on the “Cultural diver- sity, the Geopolitics of Minorities” was organised at Pécs between 14–16 November, discussed cultural politics, including more specifically the situ- ation of Muslim communities of the area. 326 norbert pap and éva ladányi

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Islam does not have a high profile in public opinion. In political discus- sions the issue of Islam usually comes up in relation with terrorism, the film “Innocence of Muslims,” Hungarian military participation in Afghani- stan, and the Palestinian-Israel conflict. Works of reputable scholars contribute to the process of introducing the Middle East or the culture of the Islamic world and help increase understanding of them. Such scholars and their works have influenced the Hungarian perception of the Islamic culture and art in a positive way.6 In the last few years, mainly in smaller towns, a mild antipathy towards Muslims is noticeable. The opposite is true in university towns where Muslims are visibly present and experiences in coexistence are good. The Hungarian Government identifies Middle Eastern countries as a foreign policy priority. Year by year more and more students are studying in Hun- gary from those countries. Lots of them settle down here after finishing their studies and establish their families.

16 Major Cultural Events

Muslim communities organise lectures on religious themes and summer camps for believers and for children on a regular basis. From time to time they invite international Muslim scholars to visit Hungary and to give lec- tures. There is an interest in Hungary in Muslim arts, too. In 2012 a travelling exhibition was opened in Esztergom and Bratislava (Slovakia) to display the findings of the excavations in the crusader castle in Margat, Syria. It had previously been shown in 2010 in Pécs and at the beginning of 2011 moved to Budapest (Hungarian National Museum), after that to Szentendre and then to Visegrád. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in 2012 sent several delegations to Hungary, to prepare the restora- tion of Ottoman historical monuments located mainly in Baranya County. There has been significant press coverage of the historical and archaeo- logical research of the lost tomb of in Szigetvár. The burial monument of the emperor was an important spiritual centre in the region in the 17th century.

6 Gyula Germanus, Róbert Simon, Géza Dávid, Pál Fodor, Géza Fehérvári etc. ICELAND

Göran Larsson1

1 Muslim Populations2

According to available historical records and folklore traditions, the first contact Iceland had with Muslims goes back to the summer of 1627, when a group of so-called ‘Turkish pirates’, who had actually travelled from North Africa, raided settlements on the south-west coast, the Westman Islands and the eastern fjords. This episode is of no importance for the composi- tion of the Muslim community in Iceland today, but is significant because it is the first recorded Icelandic contact with Islam and Muslims. According to information provided by the International Religious Free- dom Report 2011,3 commissioned by the US Department of State, the great majority of Icelanders (79%) are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and 5,2% are members of the so-called free churches, out of a total population of about 318,000. The number of Muslims is estimated at approximately 1,000 to 1,500 individuals. The Muslim community is made up of immigrants of diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, “Muslims are concen- trated in the capital area (although there are a number of Kosovar Muslim refugees in the small northern town of Dalvik).”

1 Göran Larsson is Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Muslims and the New Media: Historical and Contemporary Debates (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), and the edi- tor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). The data for this country report are primarily based on official statistics, online information published by the Association of Muslims in Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi) and media reports. There are hardly any academic studies on Islam and Muslims in Iceland, the main reason being that very few Muslims live in this geographically remote part of Europe. 2 A more detailed overview is found in Larsson, G. and I. Svanberg, “The and Iceland”, in G. Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Rout- ledge, 2009). Unless otherwise mentioned, the data for this entry are based on this book or the International Religious Freedom Report 2011 issued by the US Department of State. 3 US Department of State, “Iceland”, International Religious Freedom Report 2011, www. state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168316.htm, accessed 12 February 2012. 328 göran larsson

2 Islam and the State

Even though the state provides for and guarantees freedom of religion, the official religion of Iceland is Lutheranism.4 It is, however, possible to start religious associations as long as they do not involve proselytising or prac- tices that are “prejudicial to good morals or public order” (Article 63 of the ). According to Article 62 of the Constitution, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church. Consequently, the state pays the salaries of the church’s clergy, who are employed as public ser- vants under the Ministry of Judicial and Ecclesiastical Affairs. All taxpayers over the age of 16 must pay a tax to the Evangelical Lutheran Church or to another officially recognised religious organisation (for example, to one of the two Muslim organisations). If this is not possible or not desired by the taxpayer, the ‘religious tax’ is paid to the secular university of Iceland (Article 64). Even though the judicial and economic systems favour the Christian traditions (for example, by observing the days of the Christian calendar as national holidays) and grant the Lutheran Church a privileged position, most Icelanders are generally not that interested in participat- ing in organised religion. Most children are baptised and people usually marry and hold funerals in church, but it seems as if the Lutheran religion is primarily seen as an expression of Icelandic culture.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

According to online information provided by Statistics Iceland (see www. statice.is/) there are two recognised organisations that promote Muslim interests. The Muslim Association of Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi, Ármúli 38, 3 hæd, 108 Reykjavík; www.islam.is/) was established in 1997 by a Palestinian immigrant, Salmann Tamimi, and as of 2012 had 419 mem- bers. The Association has been in contact with Muslims in , Swe- den and Saudi Arabia.5 The other organisation, the Muslim Cultural Centre in Iceland (Men- ningarsetur múslima á Íslandi, Gardastræti 11, 121 Reykjavík, no online

4 The Constitution of the Republic of Iceland (No. 33, 17 June 1944, as amended 30 May 1984, 31 May 1991, 28 June 1995 and 24 June 1999), http://government.is/constitution/; see especially Articles 62, 63 and 64. 5 This information was retrieved from the homepage of the organisation and its annual report for 2003, at www.islam.is/. iceland 329 homepage was found for this organisation) was registered in 2009 and as of 2012 had 275 members.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The Muslim Association of Iceland and the Muslim Cultural Centre in Iceland have their own houses of worship, with regular evening prayer meetings and weekly Friday prayers that attract a core group of approxi- mately 30–50 and 60–70 individuals, respectively. There are no purpose- built mosques, and the two organisations use rooms for both prayers and meetings. The Muslim Association of Iceland has not been allowed to erect a purpose-built mosque in Reykjavík, which some Muslims interpret as indicating that Muslims are treated differently from followers of other religions. According to media reports in 2010, a private group of foreign Muslims tried to buy a house in order to use it as a mosque. This proj- ect was, however, criticised by Salmann Tamimi, chairman of the Mus- lim Association of Iceland as it was perceived as an attempt by so-called foreign and radical Muslims to take control over the Muslim community in Iceland.6 According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, more than 1,700 individuals have also joined a Facebook protest group against the building of mosques in Iceland believing them to be a security risk for the country. For the month of Ramadan (2009), a prayer room was opened for Mus- lims at the University of Iceland.7

5 Children’s Education

The teaching of religion is obligatory in public schools. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, teaching for grades 1–10 (ages 6–15) should be based on “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human values”. The instruction is, however, open and there have been complaints that

6 “House purchased for private Reykjavik mosque”, IceNews 9 October, 2010, www .icenews.is/index.php/2010/10/09/house-purchased-for-private-reykjavik-mosque/ #more-18495, accessed 11 November 2010. 7 “Multi-faith prayer room at the University of Iceland”, IceNews 12 August 2009, www. icenews.is/index.php/2009/08/12/multi-faith-prayer-room-at-the-university-of-iceland/, accessed 11 November 2010. 330 göran larsson teachers have been indoctrinating pupils by overemphasising Christian traditions, even though non-Christian traditions, pluralism and multicul- turalism all form part of the curriculum. In response to a report published in 2010, the Minister of Education Katrin Jakobsdottir stressed that the school system should be more neutral when it comes to confessions. For example, it is recommended that there should be a general ban for reli- gious representatives from visiting schools and after school clubs in their official capacity.8 It is possible for students to be exempted from so-called Christian classes, but there are no alternatives for Muslim pupils within the school system. Most schools are public institutions, and there are no independent or free Muslim schools.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Theology Department of the University of Reykjavík has religious studies programmes with modules on the history or sociology of religions, but not on Islam as a separate subject. The Department has organised open lectures on Islam together with the US Embassy in Iceland.9 There is no training programme for imams in Iceland.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland operates and cares for all cemeteries, to which all the recognised religious organisations and tradi- tions have access.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The prison department does not keep religious data, and there are no arrangements for Muslim pastoral services.

8 “Icelandic church and schools discuss relationship”, IceNews, 29 October 2010, www. icenews.is/index.php/2010/10/29/icelandic-church-and-schools-discuss-relationship/, accessed 12 November 2010. 9 “Imam holds open lecture on Islam in Iceland”, Iceland Review, 27 February 2008, www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16539&ew_0_a_id=301632, accessed 18 April 2010. iceland 331

9 Religious Festivals

There is no detailed information about religious festivals, but the webpage of the Muslim Association of Iceland contains basic information about the celebration of Islamic religious festivals.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There is no specific information about the availability of halal food in Ice- land but, according to Salmann Tamimi, the chairperson of the Muslim Association of Iceland, there is one Pakistani restaurant in Reykjavík that serves halal food.10

11 Dress Codes

Although there are no legal restrictions, there have been some earlier reports about discrimination against Muslim women wearing hijab but, according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2011, there were no reports on this for the year 2011. No information is available for 2012.

12 Publications and Media

The website of Muslim Association of Iceland (www.islam.is) contains general information about Islam, the Qur’an and activities organised by the group. While activity on the homepage is low, the online discussion group for Muslim women (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/kvennafundir/) linked to the webpage is more active. The language used for communica- tion is either Icelandic or English. Because there are so few Muslims in Iceland and most of them are of foreign origins (with other languages than Icelandic as their mother- tongues), there is no market for translations of Islamic books, and the whole Qur’an is not available in Icelandic, and most Islamic publica- tions are therefore limited to online forums, especially those referred to above.

10 Iceland Review, 29 July 2008, www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/search/news/ Default.asp?ew_0_a_id=309477, accessed 6 January 2010. 332 göran larsson

13 Family Law

No data available.

14 Interreligious Relations

The state in Iceland does not directly support any interfaith programmes, but according to the International Freedom Report 2011 a number of churches and religious groups are involved in interfaith and dialogue groups. There are no national interreligious councils, but in 2006 the Forum for Interfaith Dialogue was set up to work for peaceful coexistence and tolerance in Icelandic society. The Evangelic Lutheran Church of Ice- land supports this endeavour. The Forum consists of thirteen religious groups registered with the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs.11

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate about Islam and Muslims is informed by global and inter- national events rather than by local Muslim affairs. Nonetheless, there are indications that there are more negative opinions about Muslims than about immigrants in general.12

16 Major Cultural Events

No data available.

11 “Forum for interfaith dialogue created in Iceland”, The Lutheran World Federation, www.lutheranworld.org/News/LWI/EN/1969.EN.html, accessed 6 January 2010. 12 Strabac, Z. and O. Listhaug, “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries”, Social Science Research 37 (2008), pp. 268–286, especially p. 278. IRELAND

Victoria Montgomery1

1 Muslim Populations

Ireland’s most recent census was carried out on 10 April 2011. The census showed that there were 49,204 Muslims in Ireland, a 51% increase on the 2002 census.2 This figure is in keeping with estimates by the Muslim com- munity in Ireland. This means that Muslims now make up 1.1% of the total population, which is a significant growth from 0.1% just twenty years ago. The census shows that Muslims in Ireland are highly concentrated in urban areas with only 2.1% to be found in rural areas. 51.8% of Mus- lims are in Co. Dublin with almost half (49.2%) located in Greater Dublin. 4.6% are to be found in Co. Cork and 3.2% in Galway City. There are no exclusively Muslim residential areas in Ireland. Irish nationals represent the largest national group (37.1% or 18,223 persons) and the next most numerous national groups are Pakistani (14%), Bangladeshi and Nigerian (both 4%). In terms of ethnic and cultural background, those claiming an Asian ethnic and cultural background are the most numerous (40.4%), fol- lowed by black African at 21.4%. 7.2% have a white Irish ethnicity. Almost 28% were born in Ireland. The census also shows that in terms of age, this is a young community with one third under 15 years of age and almost half (48.3%) under 25 years old. In terms of economic activity and back- ground, 28.5% would be in the top two social classes (professional work- ers and managerial and technical) and only 1.8% in the unskilled social class. However, 18% of Muslim men in Ireland are unemployed. Women’s economic activity is much less than the general population with 21.9% of Muslim women at work compared to 46.4% of all women in Ireland. Mus- lims in Ireland are more likely to be married than the general population

1 Victoria Montgomery is a research fellow within the School of Politics at Queen’s Uni- versity, Belfast. She has recently completed her PhD entitled “Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland”, and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catho- lic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland”, in Rehman, J. and S. Breau (eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 489–519. 2 Central Statistics Office. The 2011 Census, available at: www.cso.ie. 334 victoria montgomery and much less likely to be divorced. The vast majority of Muslims in Ire- land are Sunni. Ireland has also witnessed growing numbers of conver- sions to Islam, with converts now estimated in the hundreds.3 As the census shows, Muslim communities in Ireland are comparatively well-off financially, which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland. Sustained Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or those wishing to set up businesses. Thus, they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Foundation of Ire- land (IFI) for example, estimates that there are more than 4,000 medical doctors of Muslim background in Ireland. However, Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversified the face of Muslim immigration. The early 1990s saw groups of Muslim refu- gees arrive from Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Growing numbers of Mus- lim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.4 Therefore, it is likely that the socio-economic make-up of the community may alter in the coming years.

2 Islam and the State

Although the Irish Constitution originally contained a clause (Article 44) which made explicit mention of the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, this was removed by referendum in 1973. The Constitution now guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and morality) to every citizen. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any religion or impose any penal- ties for religious belief.5 The Constitution also makes blasphemy a crimi- nal offence. However, until 2009 there was no exact legal formulation of this offence. Despite the Law Reform Commission arguing in 1991 that blasphemy had no place in Irish law, the government decided that a ref- erendum to change the Constitution would be too costly. Consequently, in July 2009, the blasphemy law was passed in the Daíl as part of the

3 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘The Future of Islamic Ireland’, The Irish Times, 12 February 2011, available at: www.irishtimes.com.newspaper/weekend/2011/0212/1224289614194_pf.html, accessed 21 August 2011. 4 Flynn, K, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 223–238 (231). 5 Irish Parliament: http://oireachtas.ie. ireland 335

Defamation Act.6 This makes it an offence to utter or publish matter that is grossly abusive or insulting thereby causing outrage among substantial adherents of a religion. Muslims are therefore protected under this law. However, due to substantial anger about the Blasphemy Law among sec- tions of Irish society, the Justice Minister Dermot Ahern announced in March 2010 that a referendum may take place to repeal the legislation. After the general election in 2011, the Fine Gael-Labour coalition’s pro- gramme for government promised a constitutional convention to consider certain aspects of the Constitution including the removal of the offence of blasphemy from the Constitution and thus, law. The Constitutional Con- vention was established in 2012 and will sit for one year. As yet there has been no decision made on the offence of blasphemy.7 Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland with the exception that the state will fund denominational schools. How- ever, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. Several Islamic organisations such as the IFI, for example, have been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious (and other) grounds and aim to promote equality, while incitement to hatred legislation also applies to religious communities. In addition to these laws there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equality Authority and the Gardái (police) Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO). Indeed, the GRIO holds an annual Diversity Consultation Day in order to meet with the rep- resentative organisations, personnel and leaders of minority communities in Ireland. This allows for discussion of issues affecting these communities and for the communities to help shape and influence Garda policy and strategy relating to diversity.8 However, despite such legislative and initia- tives, James Carr from the University of Limerick has recently argued that there are no means to actually measure and thus combat Islamophobia.9 Between 2001 and 2008, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) documented instances of discrimination

6 Ibid. 7 The Constitutional Convention: https://www.constitution.ie/Default.aspx. 8 An Garda Síochána: www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=154&Lang=1. 9 Carr, James. ‘Regulating Islamophobia: The Need for Collecting Disaggregated Data on Racism in Ireland’. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31(4), 2011, pp. 574–593. 336 victoria montgomery against Muslims on the basis of their religion. However, budget cuts led to the dissolution of the NCCRI in 2008 and, as Carr points out, with it went the ‘only systematic method that identified Muslims as targets of racism and discrimination.’10 He was also critical of the Gardái, pointing out that the failure of the police to use its Pulse electronic system to monitor crimes against ethnic and religious minorities facilitates Islamophobia.11

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Society, was established in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Founda- tion of Ireland (IFI) (163 South Circular Road, Dublin, Dublin 8, tel.: ++353 14533242, www.islaminireland.com, email: [email protected]). The IFI established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and other branches of the IFI have been established throughout Ireland. The IFI has a written constitu- tion and an elected council. Membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Muslim is an honorary member. The IFI, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) (19 Roebuck Road, Clon- skeagh, Dublin 14, tel.: ++353 12080000, www.islamireland.ie, email contact via a contact form on the website, www.twitter.com/islamireland) with a large purpose-built Mosque and Islamic Centre, which regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland.12 The ICCI was established in 1996 with funding from Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Hereditary Prince of Dubai. It per- forms a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, and maintains a library, a gymna- sium and a women’s section. A community welfare office was established in 2005, which facilitates conferences and workshops for service provid- ers. In 2011, it also opened a hairdressers/barbers and crèche. There are reportedly loose links between the ICCI and the Muslim Brotherhood. The ICCI has institutional ties with the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, an umbrella organisation of various branches and affiliates of the

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Flynn, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, p. 226. ireland 337

Muslim Brotherhood.13 There are no significant differences between the ways in which the IFI and the ICCI publicly represent Islam in Ireland, and while clearly the leadership of the two organisations differs, many Mus- lims tend to pray at both centres, depending on which is most convenient on a particular day.14 Representing Shi’i Muslims in Ireland is the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre (Milltown Bridge, Dundrum, Dublin 14, tel.: ++00353 12604491, http://homepage.eircom.net/~ahlulbyteassociation/). As well as being a mosque, the centre runs social activities, lectures and acts as the main point of contact for the Shi’i community in Ireland. In addition, the -ul- Society (86 Beach Park, Easton Road, Leixlip, Co. Kildare, tel.: ++353 878547439, www.babulilm.ie, email: babulilm.ireland@gmail. com) is another group, formed to help meet the needs of Shi’i Muslims in Ireland. Other Muslim organisations include the Galway Islamic Society, now known as the Galway Islamic Cultural Centre, established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel.: ++353 91751621, www.gicc.ie), the Cork Muslim society, established in 1984 (tel.: ++353 214320301, www. corkmosque.org, email: [email protected]),15 and the Limer- ick Islamic Society (Old Dooraday Road, Limerick, tel.: ++353 61635151). Like the IFI and ICCI, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. All of these societies can also be contacted via the IFI. The Al-Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre (31 Coolmine Industrial Estate, Blanchardstown, Dublin, 15, tel.: ++353 18200786, email: [email protected], http://islamiccentre.ie) also provides religious and social functions and participates in building interfaith dialogue. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (6–7 Well Park Grove, Galway, tel.: ++353 9168832, www.islamahmadiyya.ie) is a vibrant organisation with a women’s and youth branch, which has gained more attention in light of the new Ahmadiyya Mosque being built in Galway. A religious body called the Irish Council of Imams was set up in September 2006, with the aim of representing both Sunni and Shi’i imams. The Coun- cil can be contacted via its secretary Ali Selim at the ICCI. The Council recently spoke out against attempts to ban the niqab in Europe.16 During

13 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘The Future of Islamic Ireland’, The Irish Times, 12 February 2011, available at: www.irishtimes.com.newspaper/weekend/2011/0212/1224289614194_pf.html, accessed 17 August 2011. 14 Interviews with members of the Muslim community in Ireland, 2006–2007. 15 The Cork Muslim Society is linked the mosque in Cork. The community are currently praying at a community centre until the new mosque is ready in June. Therefore, there is currently no address for the Cork Muslim Society. 16 Taylor, C. ‘Muslim group urges acceptance of niqab’. 338 victoria montgomery a meeting in December 2011, the Council resolved to increase awareness of its functions among Muslims in Ireland and to create a website over the coming months. It has also decided to award five scholarships annu- ally to attend the Al-Azhar University, but these scholarships will only be given to those with Irish citizenship.17 The Muslim Association Forum (tel.: ++353 871828697, www.muslafireland.org; email: info@muslafireland. org), which is based at the IFI premises, was originally formed by Nige- rian immigrants but is now made up of Muslims from various African countries. MAF runs its own Qur’anic classes and children’s programme and has charity status. Discover Islam Ireland (163 South Circular Road, Dublin 8, tel.: ++353 1890253330; email: [email protected]) is a non- profit organisation established in 2011, which is dedicated to promoting a better understanding of Islam and Muslims and clearing the common misconceptions through the provision of education materials and events. Another organisation is the Irish Sufi Foundation (8–9 Talbot Street, Dub- lin 1; [email protected]) which is linked to the Anwar-e-Madina Islamic Centre. For young Muslims, the various universities in Ireland have vibrant Islamic societies and another group called Muslim Youth Ireland (www. muslimyouthireland.wordpress.com) established its website (although its main means of communication appears to be via Facebook) in May 2009, and has been active in organising activities for Muslim teenagers includ- ing a summer camp. A new organisation called the Irish Islamic Chamber of Commerce (17 Synge Street, Dublin 8; tel.: ++353 14372305; http://islamic-chamber.org; email: [email protected]) was established in 2011 to promote eco- nomic ties between Ireland and the Muslim world and to enhance the contribution of Muslims in Ireland to the Irish economy.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques. The first, the Ballyhau- nis Mosque in Co. Mayo was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman. The ICCI in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque, which was opened in 1996. Both the ICCI and the Ballyhaunis are Sunni mosques. Also in 1996, a Shi’i Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Commonly referred to as Husseiniyya, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for the Shi’i

17 ICCI: www.islamireland.ie. ireland 339 community and is the only Shi’i mosque in Ireland. Shi’i Muslims outside Dublin tend to pray in private or rented houses or apartments. In addition to these, there is also the large Dublin Mosque and Islamic Centre which is run by the IFI and is currently raising money for an extension, for which planning permission has been granted. Fundraising for new mosques is also taking place in Galway and in Cork; the new mosque is due to be ready in June 2013. In 2010, the foundation stone for the first purpose built mosque in County Galway was laid and building is underway. This mosque is associated with the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Ireland. Plans to develop a €40 million large purpose-built mosque and Islamic Centre in Clongriffin in the north of Dublin were submitted in 2012 and discussions are thought to be at an advanced stage.18 The Islamic centre will be capa- ble of accommodating up to five thousand people and will have schools and a swimming pool. Funding for the project has been promised by ten wealthy individuals and charitable organisations in the Middle East.19 There are also rented or purchased houses and premises on business or industrial estates used as mosques throughout Ireland.20 Other mosques include the Tallaght Mosque, Blackpitts Mosque, the Lucan Mosque and Anwar ul Madina, all in Dublin and there are also mosques in Galway, Limerick, Tralee, Ennis, Cavan, Carlow, Dundalk, Kilkenny, Cork, Kerry, Clare and Wateford, Portlaoise and Mullingar. A list of mosques can be found on the IFI and ICCI websites. There has been some opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork for example, the mosque was forced to shut in 2001 over a lack of planning permission for it to be used as a mosque. Outside of Dublin, the key issue is a lack of finances to build or acquire a suitable space to accommodate the growing numbers of Muslims.21 In addition to the mosques, there are also prayer rooms or halls in many hospitals and universities such as the Royal College of Surgeons and Roscommon County Hospital. It is quite difficult to quantify the number of prayer rooms in Ireland, as the number is continually increasing and the locations may change according to circumstance. While the main

18 Fagan, Jack. ‘€40 million Islamic Centre for Clongriffin’. The Irish Times, 16 May 2012, available at: www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/commercial-property-and- construction/40m-islamic-centre-for-clongriffin-1.520766 accessed 10 December 2012. 19 Ibid. 20 The IFI website contains a list of mosques and prayer halls throughout Ireland. 21 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland (Leiden: Brill, 2006) p. 307. 340 victoria montgomery mosques, particularly in Dublin, are attended by Muslims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there are growing numbers of prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language.22 The Blackpitts Mosque in Dublin is a mosque with preaching in Urdu while the Tablighi Jamaat group are based around a mosque in Lucan (Dublin), and the Nigerian community worship in a business park in Dublin preaching what they term ‘African Sufism.’23

5 Children’s Education

There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin, which are funded by the Department of Education. The Muslim National School was set up by the IFI in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Qur’anic studies. Both schools have large waiting lists and consequently both plan to expand.24 However, while plans by the Muslim National School have been put on hold for now due to economic considerations, the North Dublin Muslim School is expected to lodge an application with Dublin City Council to tempo- rarily move while new facilities are built at its current location.25 Plans have also been put forward to the New Schools Advisory Committee to establish five new Muslim schools in Lucan, Clonee, Tallaght (Dublin), Tralee and Sligo, where Muslim populations have been growing rapidly.26 There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland, so most Muslim chil- dren in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. In 2011, the ICCI highlighted complaints from Muslim parents who allege that children who attend the Muslim primary school in Clonskeagh are finding it hard to get into secondary schools in the area,

22 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, The Irish Times, 10 October 2006, available at www.irishtimes.com/focus/gageby/underthecrescent/identity.htm, accessed 2 November 2009. 23 Ibid. 24 Campos, Adelina. ‘City’s Muslim school is eyeing up new site as waiting list swells’, The Irish Herald, 25 August 2010, available at: www.herald.ie/national-news/city-news/ citys-muslim-school-is-eyeing-up-new-site-as-waiting-list-swells-2310756.html, accessed 1 September 2010. 25 Ibid. 26 Department of Education and Science: www.education.ie. ireland 341 and that some schools are only accepting Catholics, an allegation denied by the schools in question.27 Religious education is a part of the school curriculum in Ireland, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for com- munion. However, in recent years there have been initiatives to organise Islamic instruction in some primary schools, or in a number of schools with large numbers of Muslim pupils, the school has invited someone from a nearby mosque to visit on Fridays and give Khutba to the children.28 Moreover, parents do have the legal right to exempt their children from religious education. In the 58 ‘Educate Together’ primary schools in Ire- land, where an ethics curriculum is taught instead of religious educa- tion, the school facilities are made available for religious instruction after school.29 New legislation, the Education (Amendment) Bill 2010, has also been published, which will allow for a new type of primary school run by Vocational Educational Committees (VEC). These schools may be considered multidenominational but, unlike Educate Together schools, religious education is part of the curriculum. Ideas from all religious tra- ditions are taught, although the children are separated into their separate religious traditions for some of the time. It is not yet clear how this will impact on Muslim pupils and certainly a programme by RTE (Ireland’s National Television and Radio Broadcaster) shown in April 2010, criticised these new VEC schools for giving primacy to the Catholic religion among other things.30 There are also many weekend schools for Muslim children run by mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The ICCI established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and have since extended it to two areas out- side Dublin. There is currently a waiting list to attend the school. It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum recognised throughout the Arab world. The IFI runs the Al-Falah Weekend Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa and the Children’s Qur’anic School where classes are held in the evenings. The Al-Falah school currently has

27 McGarry, Patsy. ‘Muslims say they cannot get into schools’, The Irish Times, 28 Septem- ber 2012, available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2011/0928/1224304858170_ pf.html, accessed 9 January 2012. 28 Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam, pp. 404–405. 29 Educate Together: www.educatetogether.ie. 30 Primetime, ‘Problems with the new state schools’ RTE, 8 April 2010, available at: www.rte.ie/news/2010/0408/primetime_av.html?2733098,null,230. 342 victoria montgomery

94 children attending.31 There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The main universities in Ireland offer a variety of courses where issues related to Islam are part of the module. These are taught mainly in the disciplines of Politics, Theology and History and include modules which focus on topics such as Middle Eastern politics, political Islam, Islam and gender and the Crusades. There is no institution offering imam training in Ireland. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin is appointed by the Department of Education. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the school, and whose salaries are not met by the state.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1976 the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. Outside of Dublin, a designated area in St. James Cemetery in Cork has been set aside for Muslims. In Dundalk, Co. Louth, in April 2011, permission was granted for a designated Muslim burial ground with the potential for another plot in Drogheda. However, the fact that it took six years from when local Muslims first approached the Dundalk Joint Burial Boards has given rise to criticism from local Muslims.32

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are currently no Muslim chaplains within the state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim

31 The Islamic Foundation of Ireland: www.islaminireland.com/alfalah_weekend_ school.html. 32 Metro Eireann, 15 April 2011, available at: http://metroeireann.com/print-article,2659, accessed 19 September 2011. ireland 343 representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains in the universities in Ireland, although many universities do have Muslim prayer rooms.

9 Religious Festivals

The main mosques in Ireland organise their ‘Id celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The ICCI, for example, has a large hall which is used for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside of Dublin, the largest ‘Id al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where several thousand people attend. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers.33 Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools or adults working for the Muslim organisations, Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be nego- tiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached. There is no information available on the number of pilgrims from Ireland going on hajj.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland and there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities. Frozen and tinned halal meat is also widely available. Indeed, in the recent past Ireland had a thriving halal industry which exported halal meat and dairy products to Muslims countries outside Ireland.34 However, the foot and mouth epidemic has negatively impacted the halal slaughter industry in Ireland, although lamb and increasing amounts of halal dairy produce, which are certified by the IFI, are still exported from Ireland. Halal certification is also carried out by the Department of Halal Certification Ireland (DHCI).35 In May 2010, the DHCI started halal certification for bakery products and has approved and certified more than 150 bakery products of bakeries in Ireland, UK,

33 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, in The Irish Times, 10 October 2006, www.irishtimes.com/focus/gageby/underthecrescent/identity.htm, accessed 6 June 2011. 34 Halal Certification Information is available on the Islamic Foundation of Ireland website, www.islaminireland.com. 35 Department of Halal Certification Ireland: www.halalcertification.ie/history_ department_of_halal_certification_IE.html. 344 victoria montgomery

Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Germany, Portugal, France, Norway, Poland, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherland and the US. The DHCI has recently awarded halal certification to the Clarion Hotel Liffey Valley, making it the first hotel in Ireland to be awarded the Certificate.36 The Finance Bill, published in February 2010, proposed new measures and tax changes which would comply with Shari’a law and thus not only attract business from the Muslim world but make it possible for religious Muslims in Ireland to conduct their business as Shari’a law requires.37 In October 2011, the Irish Islamic finance industry was given a boost, when Goldman Sachs listed a $2 billion sukuk bond—compliant with Shari’a law—on the Irish stock exchange.38 However, while Ireland has emerged as a major global centre for Islamic finance, there are no specific Shari’a compliant products available in Ireland. The Irish Banking Federation has said that such products are constrained by a lack of demand, and that to facilitate an Islamic mortgage product, legislative changes would be required in relation to stamp duty, for example.39 In terms of religious ritual, the IFI and ICCI both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. While many of the smaller Islamic organisa- tions do not have the resources of the IFI and ICCI, they will advise on funeral arrangements and perform the religious rituals. The Saudi Ministry of Hajj approved hajj agents in Ireland are the IFI and Manasik Tours (Dundrum Road, Dublin 4, tel.: ++353 12079618, www. gohajj.ie).

11 Dress Codes

Following public debate in 2008, the Minister for Integration issued guide- lines which essentially confirmed that individual schools should decide their own uniform policy but that it should not act to exclude students of a particular religious background. In practice, therefore, this allows for

36 Ibid. 37 Irish Parliament: www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2010/ 0910/document1.htm. 38 Reddan, Fiona, ‘Goldman Sachs to list $2bn bond’, The Irish Times, 20 October 2011, available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2011/1020/1224306126560_pf.html, accessed 5 January 2012. 39 Reddan, Fiona. ‘West looks to the East for growth as Islamic finance comes centre stage’. The Irish Times, 27 February 2012, available at: www.irishtimes.com/business/ west-looks-to-the-east-for-growth-as-islamic-finance-comes-centre-stage-1.512131 accessed 10 December 2012 ireland 345 the hijab in Irish schools, although it did not recommend clothing which obscured the face (i.e. burqa and niqab) which was deemed a barrier to communication.40 In September 2010, Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools were circulated around more than 450 Catholic schools in Ireland. The Guidelines pro- hibit the niqab on the grounds that a teacher would not be able to engage properly with the student.41 Indeed, the Guidelines also state that it is reasonable for a female teacher to ask a pupil’s mother to uncover her face for a meeting, on the understanding that no man will come into the room.42 There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in other public institutions although in organisations such as the Garda (police) which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly the hijab and jilbab; women wearing the niqab on Ireland’s streets are still quite rare. In a report by Mary Fitzgerald on ‘the veil’ in Ireland, it is estimated that fewer than 80 women wear the niqab in Ireland.43 The issue of Muslim women’s dress was raised in 2012. A Lithuanian convert immigrant Dunnes Stores employee (a major department store) opened a case for unfair dismissal as she was not permitted to wear hijab at work. The store argued that since they had a uniform for all employees, they could not allow any deviation from this. Eventually, the woman set- tled her case out of court.44 In addition, although head coverings worn for religious reasons are acceptable in photographs for passport and driv- ing licences,45 a number of Muslim women were asked to remove their

40 A summary of the guidelines and other documents relating to this issue can be found on the IFI website: www.islaminireland.com. 41 Mulally, Aiveen. (2010) “Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools” JMB [online], available at: www.jmb.ie/, accessed 30 Septem- ber 2010. 42 Ibid. 43 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘Beyond the veil’, The Irish Times, 7 August 2010, available at: www. irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0807/1224276368541_pf.html, accessed 10 March 2012. 44 The Irish Times. ‘Ex shop worker takes case over hijab’. The Irish Times, Available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/ex-shop-worker-takes-case-over-hijab-1.528718 accessed 15 December 2012. 45 Information on acceptable photographs stated on the Department of Foreign Affairs website: www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=257. 346 victoria montgomery head scarves to comply with new identification procedures at the Garda (police) National Immigration Bureau in Dublin. After the ICCI had dis- cussions with senior Garda representatives, it was confirmed that Muslim women would not be asked to remove hijab.46

12 Publications and Media

The women’s section of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Ireland is currently planning a magazine for Muslim women and girls in Ireland called Maryam.47 It also has a quarterly online publication called Al- Noor.48 Another publication is called The Irish Muslim Magazine, which is a monthly publication presenting issues about and opinions of Muslims in Ireland. It is available in halal shops and selected newsagents.49 Foreign newspapers, including some in Urdu and Arabic, are also widely avail- able. In addition, the main organisations each have their own websites which contain extensive articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. There is also a website dedi- cated to the Shi’i community in Ireland, Shi’i Muslims in Ireland (www. shiamuslimsinireland.com). In addition, Muslims in Ireland are utilising more mainstream media. Organisations such as Muslim Youth Ireland, the Cork Muslim Society and the Royal College of Surgeons Islamic Soci- ety, are using resources such as Facebook, Bebo and YouTube to network and highlight their organisation. Muslim Ireland (http://muslimireland. wordpress.com/about-3/) is a new website which was launched in April 2012 and is dedicated to news and opinion on matters concerning Mus- lims in the Republic of Ireland.

13 Family Law

Marriages can be conducted by an imam at a mosque which has been registered with the state; the married couple sign the official marriage register which the mosque returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area.

46 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘Muslims asked to remove headscarves for new garda card’. The Irish Times, 21 March 2012, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/muslims-asked-to- remove-headscarves-for-new-garda-card-1.485394 accessed 10 December 2012. 47 Women’s Auxiliary of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Ireland: www.islamah- madiyya.ie/publications.html. 48 Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Ireland: www.ahmadiyya.ie. 49 Irish Muslim Magazine: www.irishmuslim.com. ireland 347

However, beyond marriage, the legal system in Ireland is almost entirely secular. Catholicism did play a central role in the identity and politics of post-independence Ireland and Catholic teachings became enshrined in law.

14 Interreligious Relations

While there is no national interreligious council in Ireland, Muslims do participate in interfaith organisations and events and have good links with the Irish state. An important interreligious organisation is the Three Faiths Forum of Ireland which was launched in 1999 and aims to increase dialogue and break down prejudices. It has had some impact, for example, in issuing a statement in 2003 concerning the war in Iraq which helped to minimise hostility towards Irish Muslims.50 However, this organisation does not have links outside the three and therefore Muslims in Ireland have no official relations with other religions. A multicultural organisation, Cois Tine, which works primarily with immigrant commu- nities (www.coistine.ie), has sought to find a vision for Muslim-Christian relations. The Dublin City Interfaith Forum (Clonliffe, Dublin 3, tel.: ++353 18087579; email: [email protected]) regularly organises events to promote integration in Dublin City and members of the Muslim community are a part of this. Some Muslim organisations have also developed interfaith links, pri- marily through conferences. The Al Mustafa Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre (www.islamiccentre.ie) held a peace conference in Dublin on 19 February 2012, which was attended by leaders of other faiths who also gave presentations. Another form of interfaith dialogue has been through organised visits to mosques by religious leaders and school children. Indeed, many of the mosques in Ireland organise local multicultural days or events.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In spite of the Police’s denial that Islamist extremism is rife in Ireland, there have been several negative newspaper articles in recent years link- ing the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with

50 Skuce, Stephen, The Faiths of Ireland, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2006) p. 168. 348 victoria montgomery extremism.51 While the issue of Islamist extremism in Ireland was of sig- nificant public interest in June 2011 in relation to the cables from the US embassy in Ireland released by Wikileaks, which revealed how the US government monitors Ireland’s mosques and raised concerns over alleged extremism in Ireland, the issue of extremism was not significantly raised in 2012. However, Ibrahim Michael Noonan, the first Irish man to become an imam, did cause at least some interest when he told the Belfast Tel- egraph that he is aware of a small militant element of Islam creeping into the country and called for increased vigilance.52 There has been much public attention given to young men from Ireland going to fight with the rebels in Syria including interviews and commentary about numbers and motives. This attention increased towards the end of 2012 with the news that Hudhaifa ElSayed, a 22 year old man from Drogheda, died fighting in December 2012.53 The mainstream media have also shown some interest in issues to do with the Muslim community in Ireland over recent years. During 2011, balanced newspaper articles looking at Islam in Ireland generally (Fitz- gerald) interviewing converts (Carragher) and writing about Ramadan (Ingle) appeared in the mainstream Irish press.54 In 2012, there was media attention surrounding The Hijabi Monologues which took place in Dublin in March 2012 and Metro Eireann newspaper regularly has inter- views with members of the Muslim community on various topics (www .metroeireann.com).

51 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (2006), “Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland”, available at www.nccri.ie/pdf/ ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 30 August 2007. 52 Blair, Dan and O’Connell, Edel.‘Osama bin Laden was told Ireland was ready for Islam’. The Belfast Telegraph, 4 May 2012, available at: www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/ news/local-national/republic-of-ireland/osama-bin-laden-was-told-ireland-was-ready-for- islam-28745359.html accessed 10 December 2012. 53 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘Drogheda man dies fighting in Syria’. The Irish Times, 20 December 2012, available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/drogheda-man-dies-fighting-in-syria-1.756085 accessed 22 December 2012. 54 Fitzgerald, Mary. ‘The Future of Islamic Ireland’, The Irish Times, 12 February 2011, available at: www.irishtimes.com.newspaper/weekend/2011/0212/1224289614194_pf.html, accessed 17 August 2011; Carragher, Margaret, ‘Why we gave up our catholic faith to become devout Muslims’, The Irish Independent, 21 May 2011, available at: www.independent .ie/lifestyle/why-we-gave-up-our-catholic-faith-to-become-devout-muslims-2653825.html, accessed 10 August 2011 and Ingle, Roisin, ‘Ramadan balances my mind; it keeps me level’, The Irish Times, 6 August 2011, available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/ 2011/0806/1224301922746_pf.html, accessed 9 January 2012. ireland 349

The only poll taken with Irish Muslims was in 2006. While a minority of young Irish Muslims took a more negative view of Ireland, the poll found that overall more than two thirds of Muslims felt Islam to be compatible with Irish life and 77% felt accepted.55 A more recent poll of the Irish population taken in September 2010, and dealing with issues of religion and morality, found that 57% of Irish people aged 45 or over believed that wearing the burqa in public should be banned, compared to 42% of those aged under 45 years expressing the same opinion.56 Perhaps of sig- nificance to such beliefs is that in an interview with the media the imam of the Shi’a Mosque in Dublin argued that in Ireland the niqab and burqa means extremism and radicalism and their presence in Ireland is a sign that extremism has not been defeated.57

16 Major Cultural Events

The ICCI hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hun- dred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. It also hosts an annual conference with a different theme each year which is attended by Mus- lims from all around Ireland including Northern Ireland,58 and hosts an annual women’s conference.

55 Lansdowne Market Research (2006), “RTE Primetime investigates Muslims in Ireland” available at www.lansdownemarketresearch.ie/archives.html#2006, accessed 2 November 2009. 56 McShane, I., ‘Public morality of more concern’ The Irish Times, 16 September 2010, available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0916/1224278995046_pf.html, accessed 17 September 2010. 57 Tighe, M., ‘An enemy within Irish Society?’, The Sunday Times, 14 March 2010, avail- able at: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7061014.ece, accessed 17 March 2010. 58 The 2009 conference was advertised on the websites of the two main Muslim organi- sations in Northern Ireland: the Belfast Islamic Centre (www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk) and the Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (www.nimfa.org).

Italy

Stella Coglievina1

1 Muslim Populations

The history of dates back to the seventh and eighth centuries, when the general expansion of Islam in Europe took place. In the ninth century, Muslim Arabs invaded Sicily and some regions in Peninsular Italy. Arab dynasties ruled Sicily until the Norman Conquest (eleventh century). Arabic and and science continued to be influential in Sicily and some Arabic-speaking communities have survived in Sicily from that time. Thereafter, Islam was almost absent in Italy until the 1970s. By the 1970s and 1980s, Italy had begun to attract migrant workers, among them Mus- lims from North Africa and Albania. Today, Islam is the second largest religion in Italy, after Catholicism.2 There is no official census of religious communities, and little reliable data on the Muslim population in Italy is available. According to latest estimates, the number of Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, is around 1.5 million (2% of the total population of over 60 million).3 Muslims in Italy are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship and they make up about 33% of foreign residents in the country. Italy’s Muslim community is significantly ethnically diverse; the main countries of origin are: Morocco, Albania, Tunisia, Senegal,

1 Stella Coglievina is a PhD Fellow in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law in the Faculty of Law of University of Insubria (Como) where she is also a research assistant. Her research activity is focused on antidiscrimination law in the EU and legal regulation of religious diversities. She is the editor of Le Conferenze episcopali in Europa (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010) and author of various papers about religious freedom and non-discrimination in Europe. 2 An estimated 87% of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic. See US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2011. Italy, at www.state. gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192823, accessed 13 March 2013. 3 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2011 (Immigration Statistical Dos- sier 2011) indicates about 1,505,000 Muslims (data available at www.caritasitaliana.it/ materiali/Pubblicazioni/libri_2011/dossier_immigrazione2011/scheda_religioni.pdf, accessed 22 November 2012). According to the Pew Forum, in 2010 Muslims in Italy are estimated to be 1,583,000 (see The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 2011, at http:// features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/, accessed 22 November 2012). 352 stella coglievina

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Macedonia, and Algeria.4 There is no reliable data about how many Muslims have Italian citizenship.5 Italian citizenship laws are very strict, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier, so many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years cannot obtain Ital- ian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society. As immigration is a quite recent phenomenon in Italy, many foreign Mus- lims are still first-generation immigrants, living in poor socio-economic conditions. However, the rising number of family reunifications and the growing number of young Muslims (second generation and new families) are changing the picture of the Islamic community living in Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy but tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Muslims have begun to make a place for themselves in Italian poli- tics, mostly at the local level, while there are two Muslim members of the Parliament.6

2 Islam and the State

Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese)

4 See Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2011, op. cit. 5 Data from 2002 indicate about 40,000–50,000 Muslims with Italian citizenship and among them about 10,000 converts from Christianity: see Open Society Institute, “Rap- porto di monitoraggio della protezione delle minoranze nell’Unione Europea: la situazione dei musulmani in Italia (Monitoring report on the protection of minorities in the Euro- pean Union: the situation of Muslims in Italy),” (2002), available at www.abuondiritto.it/ liberta/religiosa/pdf/rapporto_osi_italia.pdf; Spreafico A., “La presenza islamica in Italia”, in “Instrumenta”, Scuola Superiore dell’Amministrazione dell’Interno-SSAI, IX, 2005, p. 186, available at http://ssai.interno.it/download/allegati1/instrumenta_25_09_-_spreafico_(da_ pag._1_a_40).pdf (both accessed 9 January 2013). According to the UCOII, in 2012 Italians converted to Islam were about 70,000 (see http://islamineurope.blogspot.it/2012/05/italy- 70-000-converted-to-islam.html, accessed 15 January 2013). 6 See www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/, accessed 9 January 2013 (Euro-Islam is a Research Network Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University). It should be noted that immigrants who do not have Italian citizenship have no voting rights. italy 353 with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a reli- gious group’s right to worship freely, but religious communities without an accord do not have access to direct financial support (system of the otto per mille, a tax of 0.8% on income paid to the Catholic Church and to religious confessions that have reached an intesa), or to certain specific rights (e.g. automatic access by clergy to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on Recognised Religions. Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities, but the political approach has not been coherent and there have been many different solutions fol- lowing the changes of government. For example, in 2005 a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)7 was established at the Ministry of Interior; some documents were prepared in 2007 and 2008, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and religious freedom8 and encouraging the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an intesa,9 but that prospect continues to be illusory. In 2010 a new Consultative Committee (Comitato per l’Islam Italiano), made up of 19 members (representatives of Islamic organisa- tions, scholars, professors and journalists who are experts in Islam), was established at the Ministry of Interior.10 The committee has been perform- ing consultative functions and the Ministry has been listening to their views on some of the current topics.11 After the change of government

7 Established with decree of 10 September 2005; see www.interno.it/mininterno/ export/sites/default/it/temi/religioni/sottotema003.html, accessed 1 December 2012. 8 ‘Charter of shared values for citizenship and integration’, published by the Government and presented to the members of the Consultative Council (Decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007, English translation available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration .pdf, accessed 1 December 2012). 9 Declaration of Intent of 2008 (Dichiarazione di intenti per la federazione dell’Islam italiano), text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/15/0679_DICHIARAZIONE_DI_INTENTI.pdf, accessed 1 December 2012. 10 See OLIR.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose (Observatory for Reli- gious Freedoms and Institutions) law research database, headed by professor Antonio Chizzoniti, Catholic University of Piacenza www.olir.it/news.php?notizia=2459, accessed 1 December 2012. 11 In 2010 and 2011 the Committee published some opinion reports, about the burka ban (www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/19/00036_Comitato_ 354 stella coglievina

(November 2011) it was the Ministry for Cooperation and Integration which created, in March 2012, a permanent conference on “Religions, Culture and Integration,” with Muslim organisations and experts in Islam among the participants, but open to all religions. This conference is essentially a space for meeting and discussion rather than a consultative or decision- making body. On the local level, in 2011 the municipality of Milan established a con- sultative forum with representatives of the local Muslim community and experts in law and religion.12 Despite the absence of an accord with the state, all religious com- munities are eligible for public funds for the construction of places of worship. According to Italian legislation, it is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as to make publicly owned land available for their construction. At the local level many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding because of political concerns (mistrust of some Muslim organisations; concerns about the improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship, etc.; see section 4 below). Sometimes, funds for building mosques come from the governments of Muslim countries.13

3 Main Muslim Organisations

As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous and scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The level of organisation and cooperation between them is low, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. Moreover, the majority of Muslims often participate only in the cultural and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house,

Islam_-_relazione_Burqa_07_10.pdf) and mosques (www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/20/0457_Luoghi_di_culto_islamici_-_Parere_del_Comitato_per_ lxIslam_Italiano.pdf, both accessed 1 December 2012). 12 Other consultative meetings have been held, for example, in Rome between the municipality and the Islamic Centre of the Great Mosque, www.paesesera.it/Politica/ La-comunita-islamica-da-Alemanno-Vogliamo-anche-noi-l-8-per-mille, accessed 9 January 2013. 13 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States (2007), p. 41, available at www.csis. org/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf, accessed 1 December 2012. italy 355 and participation in the activities of the various organisations is not so widespread. The main Muslim organisations are:

– Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organisations in Italy, UCOII, via Quattro Fontane 109, 00184 Roma, www.ucoii.org), established in 1990 and pro- moted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, USMI), created in 1971 by the first Muslim Sunni groups in Italy. UCOII is one of the best known Mus- lim organisations in Italy, connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate). Its leadership includes poli- ticians, professionals and other well-integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian) is often different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. – Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel.: ++39 68082167), the Cultural Cen- tre of the Mosque of Rome (website www.moscheadiroma.com), con- nected with embassies of Muslim states and with the (Italian branch). It is the only Muslim body officially recognised according to the legislation of 1929. – Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Islamic Religious Community, Co.Re.Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel.: ++39 28393340, fax: ++39 28393350, email: [email protected], www.coreis.it) is mostly made up of Italian converts to Islam and is active in public debate. – Unione Islamica in Occidente (Islamic Union in the West, UIO—Italian Branch of the (Libyan) World Islamic Call Society, WICS, via del Giorgione 18, 00147 Roma, tel.: ++39 659606683/685, fax: ++39 659601150, email: [email protected], www.wics-it.org), one of the first Muslims associa- tions in Italy. It is connected with the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia and it organises some cultural initiatives (such as Arabic courses). – Unione dei Musulmani in Italia (Union of Muslims in Italy, U.M.I., corso Giulio Cesare 6, 10152 Torino, email: [email protected], http:// umislaminitalia.blogspot.com/), founded in 2007 by Moroccan religious leaders in Turin. The aim of the group is to represent moderate Islam and to develop interreligious dialogue; it has a good relationship with Co.Re.Is. and with the Moroccan Government. – Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, Young Muslims in Italy, GMI (at Torino Youth Centre, Via Faà di Bruno, 2—Torino tel.: ++39 1119703145, e-mail: [email protected], www.giovanimusulmani.it/home/), associa- tion of Young Muslims. 356 stella coglievina

There are also many other smaller associations at the local level, often connected with the main mosque of the town. Among the more significant is ‘Partecipazione Spiritualità Musulmana—PSM’ (Muslim Participation and Spirituality), an umbrella-association joined by many local mosques and Islamic centres, whose purpose is to promote spiritual activities rather than to have a social and public role. There are also ‘federations’ of Islamic centres, often defined by nationality14 and an Association of Imams and Religious Leaders (Associazione Islamica Italiana degli Imam e Guide Religiose).15 In March 2012 the Italian Islamic Confederation (Confederazione Islam- ica Italiana) was established, unifying around 250 mosques and Muslim associations.16 Shi’a Muslims, who are a minority in Italy, have two main associations: Comunità Ismailita in Italia (Isma’ili Community) and Associazione Imam .17 At the local level, in July 2012 the city of Milan established a “register” of Islamic associations, in order to encourage dialogue and relations between local Muslim and public authorities.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only a few ‘proper’ mosques, with a minaret and purpose-built buildings: in Catania (a historical building, no longer in use), Rome, Segrate (Milan) and Brescia. In December 2012 two new mosques were opened, one in Ravenna and another in Catania.18 Another one is in Colle Val d’Elsa

14 Especially at regional level, e.g. the Islamic Regional Federation of Lombardia, a sort of coordinating body for the Moroccan mosques of the area of Lombardia; the CAIM— coordinamento associazioni islamiche di Milano, a coordination body of Muslim associa- tions in Milan. 15 www.islam-online.it/2011/12/nasce-lassociazione-degli-imam-in-italia/, accessed 1 December 2012. 16 See www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_21.htm, accessed 2 December 2012. The Confederation is born after a long planning period (the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy and the Great mosque of Rome have worked on this project since 2009) but it is still not clear what will its role be in the relations with the Italian State. 17 The Isma’ili Community in Italy is not numerically significant but is one of the organisations appointed by Italian government to consultative bodies (see section 2); they don’t have any website. Contact details of the Association “Imam Mahdi” are: Associazione Islamica Imam Mahdi, Via Gualdo Tadino 17, 00181 Roma; tel.: ++39 3394968095; website www.islamshia.org/, accessed 1 December 2012. 18 http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/12/15/foto/catania_inaugurata_nuova_ moschea_la_pi_grande_del_sud_italia-48837560/1/, “La Repubblica” online, daily, accessed 8 January 2013. italy 357

(Siena), where the construction is finished but a lawsuit (following criti- cism and opposition by local inhabitants) has delayed the opening, which is planned for early 2013. Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls, in many cases basements, garages, and disused warehouses. Prayer halls are frequently inadequate, small and with low standards of hygiene and safety. There are over 700 places of Islamic worship (including prayer houses, Sufi prayer halls, etc.) mostly in the Northern and Central Italy: 774 according to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security—AISI;19 769 according to research conducted in 2008–2010.20 With regard to future construction, there are problems with funding and planning, often due to the lack of representation of Islamic commu- nities and opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrustworthy. In some cities a mosque is under construction or a building plan has been approved or land granted for a new construc- tion (e.g. in Ravenna, Lodi, Padua, Genoa, Turin, Livorno), but opposition by political parties21 and the population, as well as the difficulty of raising funds, have often hindered the beginning or completion of works. Some- times municipalities impose questionable conditions for the construction of a mosque, and the proposed plans for building or enlargement of places of worship are suspended (e.g. in Bologna); questionable conditions are often imposed also for granting permits for the use of existing buildings (such as disused gyms, warehouses or garages) as places of worship.22

5 Children’s Education

As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during those les- sons. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons

19 www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/033/004_RS/ INTERO_COM.pdf, p. 69, accessed 13 March 2013 (data of 2007). 20 Bombardieri, M., Moschee d’Italia, (Bologna: EMI 2011), p. 57 ff. 21 Many right-wing Italian politicians, especially those of the Northern League (Lega Nord, a party of the government coalition, widespread in the North of the country) often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. 22 See further S. Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, Network of European Foun- dations, London 2009, at www.alliancemagazine.org/books/MOSQUES.pdf, accessed 2 December 2012. 358 stella coglievina

(around 10%, varying between regions and schools),23 but there are no data about their religious affiliation. Neither are data available on the school attendance of Muslim pupils.24 All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (Art. 23 of Decree No. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are paid by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this option has never been taken up by Muslims. Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state fund- ing. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of for- eign states, including Libya (in Rome and Milan), Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).25 These schools are autho- rised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may hinder the integration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.26 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported in past years.27

23 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops for the year 2010/2011, available at www. chiesacattolica.it/pls/cci_new_v3/v3_s2ew_consultazione.redir_allegati_doc?p_id_ pagina=28262&p_id_allegato=36075, accessed 2 December 2012. 24 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007, p. 201 indicates that in 2006/ 2007 Muslim pupils were 184,861. In 2001/2012 foreign pupils were 755,939, and according to estimates about the Muslim population in Italy (see par. 1), around 33% of them are Muslim. 25 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R. and Zincone G. (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146. 26 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian school confronting multiculturalism)”, in Ferrari, A. (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bolo- gna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff. 27 In 2007 the Ministry of Interior has reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Vimi- nale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, available at http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88-scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 2 December 2012. italy 359

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Italian universities there is an increasing interest in the study of religion and Islamic culture and society. Several faculties of law provide courses or seminars on Islamic Law. As for imam training, there is no special legal provision and little is known about courses and lessons organised by the various Islamic groups. In 1996 the League of Islamic Universities approved a project to run a school to prepare imams and female social workers. The UCOII had also planned the establishment of an educational centre in Bologna to train imams, community leaders and teachers of Islam. However, none of these initiatives has come to fruition. In 2010 a number of Italian universities, associated in the International Forum Democracy and Religion (FIDR), organised a course for religious guides and representatives of Italian Muslim communities—Nuove presenze religiose in Italia (New religious communities in Italy)—with the support of the Ministry of the Interior.28 In 2012 the course was in its third year. Participants (about 20 per year) attend lessons during a weekend per month, in the period from May to December.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Special and separate sections of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Flor- ence, Ragusa, Turin and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Similarly to what happens for the building of mosques, in some cases the establishment of Muslim sec- tions in municipal cemeteries has faced opposition from local inhabitants (e.g. in May 2008 in Arezzo, Tuscany, where Muslim burial plans were approved, despite strong opposition by some residents).

28 The course is intended to give useful knowledge about the religious framework of Italian society and about laws and current problems relating to Islam. Workshops are scheduled in order to discuss how to manage the practical problems of Muslim com- munities in their relationship with the public authorities. See the website http://fidr.it/ progetto1.asp, accessed 2 December 2012. 360 stella coglievina

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Clergy of religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, in theory have access to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to military bases to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Religions that have an agreement with the state can benefit from an easier system of access to state institutions (their clergy are recognised by the state and they can freely access public institutions), while Islamic representatives need authorisation to access the facilities. Moreover, as Islam does not have religious ‘ministers’ recognised by Ital- ian legislation, representatives who intend to give religious assistance in public institutions often need a certificate issued by a relevant Islamic organisation. In practice, the situation differs depending on legislation at the local level or on the decisions of each institution. In prisons for example, Islamic ‘clergy’ normally have to obtain the director’s permission to access and give spiritual care, and sometimes they have had trouble.29 Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provi- sions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Florence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community to cater to the needs of Muslim patients;30 in other cities, Muslim rep- resentatives can access hospitals according to the time and rules of the ordinary visits, or they can be authorised by the manager.

9 Religious Festivals

Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals and Sunday as a day of rest. The agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic con- fessions (e.g. the Jewish community, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Orthodox Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for reli- gious observance, with the provision that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allows pupils to be absent from school. Because there is no accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the spe- cific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions

29 Source: personal contact with Muslims representatives in Milan. 30 Text at www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=2226, accessed 9 January 2013. italy 361

(mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.31 In recent years Ramadan fell in summer, when high tempera- tures can be reached. The national confederation of agricultural employ- ers (Coldiretti) highlighted the risks for health of Muslim farm workers who were .

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by the Muslim and Jewish communities. With regard to halal food, there is a growing interest in so-called “ethnic marketing,” even though there is no formal regulation about production and certification of halal products. In 2010 a pilot project was launched by the Milan Chamber of Commerce and the Co.Re.Is., with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to create an Italian Halal stamp of certification; the Co.Re.Is., after signing a convention with the competent Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Economy, Health, Agriculture), set up a special body with its own registered brand that is issuing Halal certification for food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical products compliant with Islamic law and with Italian and European health laws.32 Other certification bodies exist, sometimes connected with foreign and international halal authorities, or set up by local Muslim communities, but not officially recognised at the State level.33 There is little data on the availability of halal food in schools, hospitals, prisons or at work, but normally religious needs are taken into account and an alternative meal for Muslims is offered on request. With regard to other services, there is an Italian branch of the interna- tional charity Islamic Relief,34 which provides an online tool for calculating

31 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=4357, accessed 2 December 2012. 32 See the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at www.esteri.it/MAE/ EN/Sala_Stampa/AreaGiornalisti/NoteStampa/2010/06/20100625_firma_Halal_Italia. htm?LANG=EN, accessed 9 January 2013. 33 For example, the Halal Italy Authority (branch of the Halal International Authority HIA), Website at www.halalitaly.org, accessed 9 January 2013. 34 Islamic Relief Italia, website at www.islamic-relief.it/index.php, accessed 10 January 2013. 362 stella coglievina the zakat. It also raises funds for international projects (e.g. international aid for children or Muslim populations in hunger, conflicts, etc.); in 2012 this charity and other Muslim associations encouraged fundraising for the victims of the earthquake in Emilia-Romagna. Islamic banking is not developed in Italy. Some agencies for business support services have begun to investigate the issue35 but at the moment there is no Islamic Bank in Italy, nor are Islamic finance tools offered by Italian banks. In Milan, there is a branch of the Arabian Bank Corporation, but it does not offer Shari’a-compliant products, since there is no specific legislation on this.36

11 Dress Codes

There is no ban on wearing head scarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their head scarves in identity docu- ment photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti- terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as a burqa, that can hide a person’s identity. In 2009 some MPs from the gov- ernment coalition presented a proposal to amend again the 1995 law and make wearing a burqa or a niqab explicitly illegal37 but no final approval has been given until now. In recent years, despite the lack of a general prohibition on wearing burqa, a number of municipalities have been tak- ing measures against such garments in their police regulations, adopted on the basis of 2008–2009 laws on public security. Some incidents have been reported, especially in northern cities, where women wearing burqas have been asked to remove at least the face veil or fined for wearing niqab

35 E.g. the dossier of Deloitte at www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Italy/Local%20Assets/ Documents/Consulting/Ricerche%20e%20pubblicazioni/finanza-islamica.pdf, accessed 10 January 2013. 36 See “Perchè la finanza islamica non sfonda in Italia? (Why Islamic Finance does not have success in Italy?)”, on Yalla Italia blog, at www.yallaitalia.it/2012/05/perche-la- finanza-islamica-non-sfonda-in-italia/; see also the 2010 report of the Bank of Italy, Finanza islamica e sistemi finanziari convenzionali (Islamic Finance and Conventional Finance), at www.olir.it/areetematiche/news/documents/news_2978_qef_73.pdf (both accessed 10 January 2013). 37 The text of the proposal is available at www.camera.it/126?action=submit&leg=16& pdl=2422&stralcio=&navette=&cerca=cerca (website of the Parliament), accessed 9 Janu- ary 2013. italy 363 in public places.38 In 2012 the Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSM) stated that Muslim women can wear the hijab in courtrooms.39

12 Publication and Media

There are several publications about Islam: for the most part studies con- ducted by Italian scholars or writers. Some Muslim organisations pub- lish books and journals about Islam in Italy (for example Co.Re.Is.: www .coreis.it/pubblicazioni); the Centro Islamico di Milano has a publishing house (Edizioni del Calamo, www.edizionidelcalamo.com), which has been publishing books and the series Quaderni Islamici; in 2011 and 2012 a news- letter, Al Wafaa, has been issued. The Shi’i association Ahl al Bait (Naples) has published a series of books and brochures.40 There is little data on the availability and circulation of these publications. A periodical with quite good visibility and circulation is Yalla Italia, a monthly supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-for-profit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims. There is also a related blog: www.yallaitalia.it.41 Other journals about Islam are published by Catholic centres, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and mutual knowledge: the most known and widespread are Oasis (edited by the “Oasis” Foundation in Venice) and Il dialogo—Al hiwâr (by Centre “Federico Peirone,” diocese of Turin).42 Online publications and websites are undoubtedly the most important and widespread resources on Islam. Main websites and blogs are:

• Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by UCOII); • Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy);

38 “Italian police fine Muslim woman for wearing veil”, The Guardian, 4 May 2010, at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/04/italian-police-fine-muslim-woman, accessed 9 January 2013. 39 The decision of the CSM (available at www.csm.it/circolari/120222b_6.pdf, accessed 9 January 2013) followed the exclusion of a Muslim woman wearing the hijab from the Tribunal of Turin, where she was working as interpreter. 40 Catalogue and information at http://digilander.libero.it/ahlalbait/lista%20libri.htm, accessed 9 January 2013. 41 Accessed 2 January 2013. 42 Information at www.oasiscenter.eu/it/archivio-rivista and www.diocesi.torino.it/pls/ diocesitorino/v3_s2ew_CONSULTAZIONE.mostra_pagina?id_pagina=24880 respectively, both accessed 2 January 2013. 364 stella coglievina

• www.sufi.it, website on Sufism, with documents and news; • Islamicità—La rivista dell’Islam italiano, www.islamicita.it.

13 Family Law

Religious marriages, recorded in the civil status registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (Art. 8 of the Agree- ment of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a clergy person of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by clergy autho- rised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (Articles 7–12 of Law No. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. How- ever, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under pri- vate international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in cases concerning inheritance.43 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (INPS) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.44 In some cases Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognised by tribunals as a form of adoption. The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages.45

43 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Mus- lim minority in Italy”, pp. 150–155. 44 See www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=3927, accessed 2 January 2013. 45 The official position of the Conference of Bishops on this point is described in I matrimoni tra cattolici e musulmani in Italia. Indicazioni della Presidenza della Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (“Marriages between Catholics and Muslims in Italy. Recommenda- tions by the Presidency of the Italian Conference of Bishops”), April 2005, available at www.chiesacattolica.it/pls/cci_new/bd_edit_doc.edit_documento?p_id=10759, accessed 2 January 2013. italy 365

14 Interreligious Relations

Most interreligious events in Italy take place between Muslim communi- ties and the majority religion of the country, the Catholic Church; this is also due to the presence of the Vatican in Rome, where many interfaith meetings at international level are hosted. For example, the World Islamic Call Society has organised meetings with the Vatican (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue), and some of these took place in Rome.46 Reli- gious associations, such as the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, promote meet- ings and try to spread a “culture of dialogue”, for example with the World Day of Prayer for Peace, proposed for the first time by Pope John Paul II in 1986. This initiative gathers leaders of various religions and has been often held in Italy.47 On 27 October of each year, a “Day of Christian- Islamic Dialogue” takes place, organised by ildialogo.org, a Christian web magazine, and supported by dozens of groups and associations from both faiths. There are various events, held in different Italian cities; in October 2012 the initiative was in its eleventh year. At the national level, Italian Muslim organisations often participate in meetings and debates with the Catholic and other Christian churches, and with Jewish communities. The Italian Federation of Protestant Churches (FCEI) also established a special commission in order to promote mutual relations between Protestants and Muslims in Italy (“Churches’ Commis- sion on Dialogue with Islam”).48 At the local level, many events are organised, mainly between Catholic groups or dioceses and local Muslim communities.49 The Oasis Founda- tion (based in Venice and established by Archbishop Angelo Scola), also organises meetings and workshops on intercultural and interreligious dia- logue between Christianity and Islam. Despite all these initiatives, relations between Muslims and Catholics (or other faiths) are not always easy. For example, disputes have arisen

46 For example an interfaith dialogue conference held in Rome in December 2008, see www.wics-it.org/cms/view.php?cms_pk=48&dir_pk=2, accessed 2 January 2013. 47 Normally the initiative takes place on the 27th of October, the date of the first international meeting of Assisi in 1986. See www.santegidio.org/pageID/47/idLng/1064/ International_Meetings_of_Prayer_for_Peace.html, accessed 2 January 2013. 48 Website at www.fedevangelica.it/en/comm/ccedi02.php, accessed 2 January 2013. 49 Among others, the diocese of Padua and Turin have established centers devoted to interreligious dialogue (see respectively: www.padovaislam.it and www.diocesi.torino. it/peirone/, accessed 2 January 2013); in Milan an interreligious forum exists (website at www.forumreligionimilano.org). 366 stella coglievina between certain groups of Muslims and Catholic leaders over the building of mosques while, on some occasions, Catholic leaders have been support- ing the Muslim community requests for a place of worship.50

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is wide coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy and related issues (building of mosques, religious symbols, etc.) in newspapers and other media. However, the media have often created erroneous impres- sions and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists, and leading sometimes to a widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Negative feelings towards Islam are also fuelled by certain political dis- course: often initiative and debates on the situation of Islam are focused only on controversial practices, not necessarily ascribable to religious laws (such as the burqa, the status of women, incidents of violence in Muslim families, female circumcision, etc.) or the linkage between Islam and international terrorism, contributing to the stereotype of the for- eign Muslims as a danger to national security or national identity. As the majority of Muslims are indeed foreign nationals, they are often seen as a group without ties to Italy; the media and political discourse have often fuelled the idea that immigration would result in growth of the Muslim population and the loss of the Italian identity. In 2012, mainly during the electoral campaign for the primaries of the centre-left Democratic Party (PD) some proposals were made about the opportunity to grant citizen- ship to foreign children born in Italy and to make it easier to obtain it for long-term residents (including Muslims). These proposals are strongly opposed by some political parties (a rightist Northern League), while Ital- ians in general hold a more favourable view of the issue.51

50 In 2011 some members of Italy’s Bishops’ Conference spoke in support of the con- struction of official places of worship for Muslims, receiving appreciation remarks from the UCOII (see www.ucoii.org/comunicati-stampa/70-messaggio-ucoii-al-cardinale-bagnasco. html, accessed 2 January 2013). 51 Caritas/Migrantes, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2011, Executive summary, at www. dossierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file/pres2011_inglese.pdf, accessed 9 January 2013. italy 367

In the 2009 EU-MIDIS—Minorities and Discrimination Survey (issued by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency) it is said that Muslims of North African origin in Italy experienced the highest levels of discrimination. Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim respondents in Italy consider racial discrimination to be more widespread than discrimination on the basis of religion or belief.52

16 Major Cultural Events

Muslim representatives are sometimes invited (mostly at the local level) to meetings about cultures and religions in multicultural society, or about immigration. Most events are mainly of academic interest and participa- tion is still small. Festivals about Islamic culture are sometimes organised. One example is the Settimana della cultura islamica, 2nd edition in 2012 in Rome.53

52 Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in Focus Report—Muslims, 2009, at http://fra. europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/448-EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf, accessed 2 January 2013. 53 www.comune.roma.it/wps/portal/pcr?contentId=NEW326464&jp_ pagecode=newsview.wp&ahew=contentId:jp_pagecode, accessed 9 January 2013).

KOSOVO

Besa Ismaili1

1 Muslim Populations

Kosovo, with its 10,877 km² of territory2 and 1,733,872 inhabitants,3 cel- ebrated the fourth anniversary of its supervised4 independence on the 17 February 2012. Due to the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia and five other EU countries,5 Kosovo stagnated in terms of its representation and participation in international forums and organisa- tions. In 2012, the Footnote Agreement6 mediated by the EU was reached, enabling Kosovo authorities to sit together with Serbia and the five other non-recognising states in the same venues and international bodies. One of the first three agreements that were reached during the talks between Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels on 2 July 2012 was the agreement about the civil registry book copies7 received from Serbia.

1 Besa Ismaili holds an MA in English Literature and has been working as an interpreter with international missions in Kosovo since 2003. She also lectures English in the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtina and University College “Dardania.” She is active in issues related to women and religion. 2 http://kosova.org/post/Geographical-Data-on-Kosovo.aspx, accessed 12 February 2013. 3 REKOS 2011, http://esk.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=1,40, accessed 24 February 2012. 4 Following the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo on 17 Febru- ary 2008, upon the request of Kosovo’s leaders, a group of States formed the International Steering Group (ISG) on 28 February 2008ICO in Kosovo, www.ico-kos.org/?id=10, accessed 28 February 2012. 5 A thorough analysis on reasons behind lack of recognition is available at: http://kfos .org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Kosovo-Calling-ENG.pdf, accessed 7 March 2013. 6 The Footnote Agreement contains the following text “This label [“Kosovo”] does not prejudge the status of Kosovo and is in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.” This Agreement was signed Feb- ruary 2012 in an effort to lift Serbia’s obstructions against Kosovo’s international repre- sentations in various organisations and forums. There was strong opposition against this Agreement by Kosovo opposition political parties who organised a protest in the capital Prishtina (more on this perspective see www.demotix.com/news/1078873/kosovars-pro- tests-against-footnote-agreement-pristina). About the Government position on the benefit of this Agreement, see Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ editorial article at: www.mfa-ks .net/?page=2,132,1149, accessed 20 March 2013. 7 Press Statement: EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo: three agree- ments www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11181_en.htm; last accessed on 01.03.2013. 370 besa ismaili

Preliminary census results were released in February 2012, showing that a vast majority of the population are ethnic Albanian (93%), with 95.6% of the overall population identifying as Muslim.8 The Muslim community also includes other ethnic groups such as Bosniaks, Turks, Gorans, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians.9 This is the census data of religious affiliations of Kosovo residents published by Kosovo Agency of Statistics:

Muslims 1,663,412 95.60801% Orthodox 25,837 1.485034 Catholics 38,438 2.209303 Others 1,188 0.068283 Belongs to no religion 1,242 0.071386 Prefers not to respond 7,213 0.414582 Not available 2,495 0.143405 Total 1,739,825 100

The majority of Kosovo Muslims are Sunnis, but small communities of Sufi orders and one community of Bektashis are also present. Bektashis reside in Municipality of Gjakova and gathered in the Teqja e Madhe (Grand Tekah). The number of Bektashi believers is not made known, but this community enjoys recognition and respect by the society in Gjako- va.10 Its leader (Baba Mumim Lama) described the relationships with the Islamic Council of Gjakova to be excellent. He complained about the non- recognition by the state authorities, because as he said “Bektashis are the fourth recognised religious community in Albania, but in Kosovo they are not recognised as a separate community.” Bektashis in Gjakova have good cooperation with the Kaderi and Saadi Sufi Orders in Gjakova. Other Sufi orders are more present in Municipality of Rahovec and Prizren. Malami Sufi Order in Mitrovica currently counts a symbolic number of followers, and the custody over the three takas in the city have remained with the elders of the families in their family properties. Islam in Kosovo dates back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Otto- man Empire in the late fourteenth century, when the majority of the urban population, particularly the Albanians, became Muslims between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries (though there are traces of Islam

8 www.lajmeshqip.com/kombetare/kosove-popullisa-me-96-muslimane; accessed 28 April 2012. 9 http://esk.rks-gov.net/mbikosoven/popullsia, accessed 3 January 2012. 10 Interview with Baba Mumin Lama, 20 May 2013. kosovo 371 even earlier than that).11 After five hundred years of Shari’a, fifty years of Communism, ten years of repression under Milosevic, and more than a decade of democratic transition.12

2 Islam and the State

Kosovo has been declared secular and neutral in terms of religion. This neutrality in matters of religious belief is associated with significant pro- tection and guarantees of religious rights and freedoms.13 Legally, it repre- sents an environment accommodating human rights, taking into account the fact that the Kosovo Constitution has incorporated explicitly interna- tional human rights norms which are directly applicable in Kosovo apart from its local legislation. This includes: Law on Religious Freedom, Law on Freedom of Expression and the Anti-Discrimination Law.14 Kosovo is a secular republic with no official state religion.15 The Kosovo government observes the following religious holidays:16 ‘Id al-Fitr, ‘Id al- Adha, Easter, Orthodox Easter Monday, and Orthodox and Western Christ- mas. The International Missions also observe the first day of Ramadan.17 The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) as well as the Catholic Church of Kosovo continued their activities as NGOs in 2012 due to the lack of clearance of their legal status.18 The law on religious freedoms adopted

11 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998). Data on this mosque and other information related to Dragas region communities are available at: www.ecoi.net/file_upload/225_tmpphpYGorBl.pdf, accessed 28 April 2012. 12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kosovo#Ottoman_Empire_.281455_ to_1912.29, accessed 2 February 2012. 13 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Community Rights Assessment Report at www.osce.org/ kosovo/74597, accessed 28 April 2012. 14 More on the implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law in Kosovo is available at: http:// ks.yihr.org/public/fck_files/ksfile/Executive%20Summary%20of%20the%20report% 20-%20Anti%20Discrimination%20Law%20in%20Kosovo,%20Seven%20years%20on.pdf, accessed 13 March 2012. 15 “The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs.” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 8). 16 State Holiday Days available at: www.rks-gov.net. 17 EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 18 State Department Report on Religious Rights in Kosovo, 2011 states “Religious leaders stated the lack of a mechanism for religious groups to register and obtain legal status cre- ated a number of practical challenges. Although many groupsfound alternative methods, a number of them reported challenges in owning and registering property and vehicles, opening bank accounts, and paying taxes on employees’ salaries”—available at: www .state.gov/documents/organization/193037.pdf, accessed 4 March 2013. 372 besa ismaili in 2005 (whose implementation has been limited) is still going through a review process.19 Apart from the ICK, very few Islam-based NGOs are currently operating in Kosovo. This is mainly because Islam-based organisations have been severely scrutinised by authorities and the Kosovo media portrays them rather negatively.20 The Party of Justice,21 which is one of the coalition parties in the government and currently controls Kosovo’s Ministry of Health, issued a statement asking for extra medical staff for Muslim patients (both with and without hijab) during examinations and recognition of female patients’ right to be examined by a female staff-member if they request it.22 The Director of the Kosovo University Clinical Centre23 confirmed and supported this initiative by stating that this already exists in Kosovo legislation.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main national Muslim organisation is the Islamic Community of Kosova (Bashkësia Islame e Republikës së Kosovës, ICK, Bajram Kelmendi St., No. 84, 10000 Prishtina, tel.: ++381 38224024, fax: ++381 38245700, www .bislame.net), which has been headed by the Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava for a second period. The ICK has 27 branches around the country (called Regional Islamic Councils).24 The ICK is the only independent religious

19 Assembly of Kosovo, Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Gender Equal- ity, Missing Persons and Petitions—Annual Working Plan for 2012—First trimester 2012—Review of the Law on Religious Freedoms, Public Hearings and the proposed amend- ments, available at: www.votaime.org/komisionet/plani2012/K_DrejtatNjeriut_pp2012.pdf, accessed 13 March 2013. 20 Në emër të Zotit (In the Name of the God) article available at: www.telegrafi.com/ lajme/ne-emer-te-zotit-26-5405.html lists the names of journalists and media houses in Kosovo constantly appearing hostile against Islam, imams, faith-based organisations, Islamic Community of Kosovo, head scarves, etc. The article also states some of the com- mon stereotypes and stigmas they use in labelling Islam and Muslims in general in Kosovo. 21 Partia e Drejtësisë (Party of Justice): www.drejtesia.org/voto2010/. 22 Covered ladies may choose (a female) doctor, article available at www.koha .net/?page=1,13,105498, accessed 18 March 2013. 23 Statement by dr. Nijazi Gashi, director of Kosovo Clinical University Center Prishtina, also available at www.kosovahaber.net/index.php?page=1,14,13544, accessed 18 March 2013. 24 Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ICK, 2003). kosovo 373 community for all Kosovo Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks and RAE25 communities), whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad. On 14 July 2012, Mufti Tërnava visited the Valley of Preshevo and met with local political and religious leadership. Talks were held about the new religious institutional organisation of the Islamic Community in the Valley, with the purpose of having them attached to the ICK.26 For the Islamic Community of Kosovo, 2012 has been a year of con- tinued tense relations with both state authorities and its congregation. Elections27 of local representatives in the Islamic Councils28 were held in 2012. A total of 27 Islamic Councils have elected their presidents, secretar- ies and other staff. This process was marked by an incident; namely the Head of Kosovo Imams, Sabri Bajgora, who was monitoring the election process in the Municipality of Kacanik (Islamic Council of Kacanik) was attacked by one of the Islamic Council representatives in Kacanik who lost his position in the elections.29 The incident was followed by mutual accusations. Among the faith-based organisations, the Movement “Bashkohu”30 has been gaining ground in terms of its further consolidation and organisa- tion. In the Municipality of Peja, with the initiative of the Movement “Bashkohu,” one street has been named after an internationally recog- nised Islamic scholar with Albanian origin, Abdulkader Arnauti,31 who migrated to Syria.

25 Collective term for Roma, Ashkalis and ‘Egyptians’. 26 More about this visit at: www.preshevajone.com/kryetari-bik-myftiu-ternava-priti- perfaqesuesit-e-bi-te-lugines-se-presheves/, accessed 18 March 2013. 27 Elections in ICK are held every four years, This year they were organised during January and February 2012. The debate on these elections is available at: www.jetaneko- sove.com/sq/Reportazhe-Hulumtuese/Zgjedhjet-ne-Bashkesine-Islame-875; last accessed on: 24.03.2012. 28 Islamic Councils are the 27 branches of ICK in Kosovo municipalities/regions. More on ICK organisation and structure is available in English at: http://bislame.net/aboutus/ en/index.html; last accessed 28.03.2013. 29 Kosovo Head of Imams gets attacked by an Imam of Kacanik on his doorstep— article available at: www.kosovapress.com/?cid=1,92,144123. 30 www.bashkohu.org. 31 More on the Municipal Assembly of Peja’s unanimous voting pro this initiative is available at: http://forumi.kurandhesunet.net/lajme-nga-bota-islame(24)/nje-rruge-ne- peje-do-te-mbaje-emrin-e-dijetarit-abdul-kader-arnautit(77404).html; last accessed on 23.03.2013. 374 besa ismaili

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

A number of Kosovo’s 218 mosques32 destroyed during the 1997–1999 conflict by the Serbian paramilitary and military forces are slowly being re-constructed into larger, more modern mosques. In the Mitrovica Muni- cipality the laying of a foundation for a larger mosque replacing the old one33 took place on 14 September 2012. Also, in Gjilan Municipality the foundation ceremony on 6 July 2012 for the construction of new madrasa was attended by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey along with other some representatives of the Parliament of Kosovo, and some Albanian and Turkish MPs.34 The project was funded by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).35 Restoration activities continued throughout 2012. Mufti Naim Tërnava met with the Minister of Culture Memli Krasniqi at the beginning of the year (13 January 2012) to discuss the list of Islamic heritage monuments.36 Finally, the ICK’s request for a location to construct a grand mosque in the capital was fulfilled.37 The foundation ceremony took place on 8 October 201238 with the participation of the Prime Minister, President, and representatives of all other religious communities, including repre- sentatives of the Orthodox Church. The latter are rarely seen at public events39 in Kosovo, but their presence drew positive media attention and was another argument for recognising the power of religious communities in coexistence and reconciliation.

32 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) factography published by the Presidency of Islamic Com- munity of Kosovo, 2000. 33 Në Mitrovicë turqit ndërtojnë xhaminë më të madhe në Kosovë (Turks to build the biggest mosque in Kosov in the city of Mitrovica) the article available at: www.telegrafi .com/lajme/ne-mitrovice-turqit-ndertojne-xhamine-me-te-madhe-ne-kosove-2-14635 .html; last accessed on 29.03.2012. 34 U përurua themeli i medresesë në Gjilan (foundation ceremony in Gjilan for the new medresah) available at: www.preshevajone.com/u-peruruar-godina-e-re-e-medresese- ne-gjilan/; last accessed on 29.03.2013. 35 Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), address and contact details published at Kosovo ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website under Foreign Missions in Kosovo link: www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,50,387#box387. 36 Mufti Ternava met with the Minister of Culture Mr. Memli Krasniqi—http://bislame .net/web/content/view/623/9/; last accessed on 29.03.2012. 37 ICK has been asking for a location for construction of a grand central mosque since 2000-Statements available at: www.bislame.net. 38 The Mosque in Prishtina-it brought all together, video of the ceremony available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhvbqnaW4Qg. 39 News by Voice of America in Albanian: www.zeriamerikes.com/content/prishtine- xhamia-presidentja-jahjaga/1522672.html. kosovo 375

5 Children’s Education

The Islamic high school Alaud-din Madrasa (established in 1952 in the capital of Prishtina with one branch in Prizren and another in Gjilan) con- tinued its work in providing education for both boys and girls and a total of 2,900 students had completed their studies by the end of 2012.40 The curriculum combines religious and secular courses. The Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) continues to pay the salaries of its teaching staff. The Institute of Hifz (memorising the Qur’an) which was established in Gjakova/Djakovica in 2005 with the support of the International Istanbul Humanitarian and Cultural Organisation (IIARC— known as the Istanbul Association), continued functioning throughout 2012 with an increased number of students from the previous year. A new, larger dormitory for female41 students is being constructed in the capital. This facility is greatly appreciated by female students, who, unlike their male counterparts, had to pay rent while studying in Prishtina. On-going religious education programmes and Qur’an courses are run at almost all of Kosovo’s mosques. Faith-based knowledge competitions on the national level were held with the initiative of the Department of Women and implemented in partnership with the Department of Youth, in the Madrasa Alaudin in Prishtina on 15 September 2012.42

6 Higher and Professional Education

Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtina (FIS, www.fsi-ks.org) celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2012. The Faculty of Islamic Studies is the Bachelor Degree (equal to university level) earned in Islamic Theology and Studies, training students who have completed madrasa or a similar level of education. The gala ceremony was held in the new building on 21 December 2012 with a large number of guests.43 The Faculty of Islamic Studies was finally accredited on 6 July 2012 for a period of three years. Another decision that reached the administration of FSI was one from

40 www.medreseja.org. 41 Interview with Mufti Ternava on 15.03.2013 in Prishtina. 42 More on the event available at: http://bislame.net/web/content/view/728/1/; last accessed on 16.03.2013. 43 More on this event available at: www.fsi92.net/njoft/205-akademia; last accessed on 30.03.2013. 376 besa ismaili the University of Prishtina informing FSI that it is accepted as its 18th faculty.44

7 Burial and Cemeteries

All cemeteries in Kosovo are religious and they are under the control of the municipalities. There are separate cemeteries for Muslims, Catholic and Orthodox. There are no separate Protestant cemeteries.45 The Mayor of Mitrovica proposed that all burial and funeral-related expenditures be covered by the municipality as of 2010.46 This has set a precedent that has been widely appreciated and taken as a good model for other municipali- ties that have legislated procedures to cover burial and funeral expenses. But this has not been the case with Prishtina Municipality, which claims to have financial burdens and is thus unable to afford such measures.47

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The law on religious freedoms48 guarantees the availability of spiritual counselling in hospitals, custody facilities, prisons, and social care insti- tutions. However, officially, ‘chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, police, prisons or hospitals. On the premises of the Kosovo Security Forces HQ in Pristina there is an occasional engagement of the

44 Faculty of Islamic Studies is incorporated to the University of Prishtina, news avail- able at www.fsi92.net/njoft/192-inkorporimi; last accessed on 24.03.2013. An attachment of the original document issued by the University of Prishtina is also available in the same link. 45 The Evangelical Protestant Community in Kosovo has been complaining and asking for a separate cemetery for its members. This request has not been realised yet. The same concern was reflected in the last two State Department Report (2010,2011) on Religious Freedoms. State Department’s Report 2012 states that: ‘Municipalities reportedly regularly ignored Protestant requests for dedicated cemetery space, which resulted in Muslim clerics performing funeral services for Protestants in Muslim-controlled municipal cemeteries’. See more at: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/#wrapper, accessed on 2305.2013. 46 http://kk.rks-gov.net/mitrovice/News/Lajmet/Nis-mbulimi-i-shpenzimeve-nga- komuna-per-ceremonit.aspx; last accessed on 25.03.2013. 47 http://prishtina.com/komuna-e-prishtines/prishtina-s-i-p-rballon-shpenzimet-p-r- varrimin-e-qytetar-ve-t-saj. 48 Law No.02/L-31, www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/hrgi/docs/RE2006_48_ALE02_L31 .pdf, accessed 23 May 2010. kosovo 377 local President of the Islamic Council of Prishtina in the form of leading the Friday prayers for its officers.49

9 Religious Festivals

‘ ‘Id al-Fitr’ and ‘ ‘Id al-Adha’ celebrations are organised every year. Both are recognised as official holidays by the state and all public institutions are closed. Representatives of state authorities and international and dip- lomatic missions, and the heads of other religious communities attend the reception organised by the Grand Mufti on the day of ‘Id. The visits are broadcast, along with other ‘ ‘Id’ activities. During Ramadan, representa- tives of the government and the ICK visit each other for iftar, and the ICK organises a traditional Qur’an recitation competition, with an inter- national guests.50 In 2012, there was one iftar organised by the Prime Minister of Kosovo, and another by the US Embassy in Kosovo. In both cases, representatives from the Department of Women in the ICK received special invitations.51 Besides the two main festivals, the Tariqas also celebrate two annual festivals: Sultan Nawruz at the vernal equinox, and the Day of ‘ ‘Ashura.’ In 2012, the Prime Minister Hashim Thaci sent a congratulation letter to Dervishes on 20 March.52 No distinctions between Bektashis or Sufis are made. The traditional Mevlud (mawlid) Evening has been organised on several occasions in Kosovo.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Hajj has been organised by the Islamic Community of Kosovo only since 2011. Having the ICK as the sole authority in charge of hajj organisation has also been supported by the government, because, according to the ICK and government officials, the private providers are ‘deemed to lack the proper capacities for such a big activity as hajj.’53 A total of 880 pilgrims

49 Interview with the President of Islamic Council in Prishtina, who serves as Khatib at KSF, Mr. Bahri Sejdiu, 24 December 2011. 50 www.bislame.net. 51 Interview with Hanife Jahiri official at Department of Women ICK 2 March 2013. 52 www.kosovahaber.net/?page=1,11,11567. 53 Interview with Mufti Naim Ternava on 23 March 2013. 378 besa ismaili went on hajj in 2012.54 On the other hand, there were several private agen- cies organising Umrah visits.55 The Institute of Halal food in the Islamic Community of Kosovo (estab- lished in 2011) had its first activities in 2012. Dr. Islam Hasani, Head of the Institute, reported that there were four requests for certification submit- ted by private food producers/processors.56 Halal slaughter is performed mostly in private butchers’ establishments. Madrasas collect money for collective Halal slaughter for ‘Id-Al-Adha and distribute the meat to stu- dents in student hostels and to poor families.57

11 Dress Codes

The controversy around the Administrative Instruction by MEST (Minis- try of Education Science and Technology of Kosovo) continued in 2012 as well, as Kosovo’s regular courts ruled in favour of the right to wear head scarves;58 as those decisions remain only on paper and are not enforced, however, no new cases were brought to the courts in 2012. The frustration on the part of the Muslim community, clergy, civil society, and ordinary citizens grew. As the general perception is that religious rights and liber- ties are secondary to the personal and political convictions of persons who hold power within institutions and are not implemented according to the rule of law, citizens and the families of the victims have self-organised to defend the rights of their daughters and relatives. Mitrovica recorded a civic action that led to a peaceful resolution of these tensions at schools, at least for the time being. As one of the parents59 of two of the girls

54 Ibid. 55 Travel Agency Royal Travel, more info at www.royaltravel-ks.com/umra.html. 56 Interview with Dr Islam Hasani at his office in ICK HQ on 23 March 2013. 57 “Dituria islame” no. 231, advertisement in the back cover page. 58 On 24 July 2006 Qefsere Fazliu wins her right to her job by the Decision of Kosovo Independent Oversight Board; Arjeta Halimi has legally confirmed her right to attend school with headscarf, CN. Nr. 24/09 of District Court of Gjilan/Gnjilane on 17 November 2009 etc. Ombudsman Institution has filed notes on several times to the authorities claim- ing that prohibition of headscarves has no legal basis in Kosovo, Ombudsman Novicki www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/A4040604a.pdf; Ombudsman Kurteshi statement in the Conference organised by Youth Department of ICK, on 18 June 2010 in the premises of Grand Hotel in Prishtina, stated: Non Implementation of Court Decisions ruling in favor of ladies wearing headscarves points to anarchy in judicial and justice sys- tem in Kosovo. None of the decisions have been enforced. 59 Ubejd Gashi, a lawyer from Mitrovica whose daughters were banned from entering the school because they were wearing headscarves was interviewed on 21.01.2013. kosovo 379 expelled from the Middle School in Mitrovica is a lawyer himself, he has personally protested and complained to the municipal authorities about this action. The parent was active in communication with the Ombuds- person60 as well, who promised to appear with a statement asking MEST to remove the Administrative Instruction (AI) banning religious uniforms in Kosovo schools. The Mayor of the Municipality established a work- ing group of legal professionals61 from all legal offices to interpret this AI and eventually to reach some conclusion in interpreting it. The legal experts concluded that the schools have the right to suspend the girls from the school for only three days. As a result, all the girls returned to the school after three days.62 The initiative was largely appreciated by the Mitrovica citizens, including the Islamic Council of Mitrovica, students of the school, and other intellectuals.63 These girls, along with a dozen other girls, returned to the school. This example was then followed by the Municipality of Gjilan. Namely, the Mayor of Gjilan issued a decision64 to return the girls to school, citing the case of Mitrovica. But one interesting point raised in this decision is that the “girls will be wearing the uniforms along with covering their heads, provided that their head scarves are mod- ern, colourfully designed headscarves, as are traditional in Balkans, and not the black, Iranian type ones.”65

12 Publications and Media

The Presidency of the Islamic Community continues with the publication of the monthly religious, cultural, and scientific review Dituria Islame (Islamic Knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic Education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Tak- vim, since 1970.

60 During the interview with Ubejd Gashi. 61 Documents provided by Ubejd Gashi on the working group proceedings 62 Interview with Sumeja Gashi, one of the girls suspended from the school in Mitrovica, held on 21 February 2013. 63 Mitrovicë:Nxënëset me shami kthehen në shkollë (Students with headscarves are back to school), article available at: www.botasot.info/aktuale/156445/qwer90q/, accessed 3 March 2013. 64 Decision from the Office of the Mayor of Municipality no. 235, 13 April 2012 sent to the Municipal School Directors and to the Director of Directorate in the Municipality of Gjilan (copy of the Decision available in hardcopy). 65 Ibid. 380 besa ismaili

Apart from Paqja (Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), magazines such as Vepra (The Deed), Shenja (The Sign), Vlera (The Value), Lumturia (Happiness) have been added to the number of Islamic-based magazines during 2011, along with Revista Familja from Tirana and Albislam from Skopje. The Women’s Department of the ICK facilitated a book launch event in the National Library of the University of Prishtina. This was organised by Gender Centre Kosovo in cooperation with the CIPS of the Univer- sity of Sarajevo. The released book was “Contesting Female, Feminist and Muslim Identities, Post-Socialist contexts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.”66

13 Family Law

Muslims have continued concluding marriage contracts in mosques and obtaining certificates of marriage from the local Islamic Councils (which are not recognised by authorities since 2003). Couples pay an amount of 25 Euros67 for the certificate. However, there is no Islamic court function- ing within the Islamic Community of Kosovo.

14 Interreligious Relations

The traditional meetings of the religious communities in Kosovo recon- vened in 2011, facilitated by a former KFOR commander, and continued as was promised. In January 2012 in Prizren, the Orthodox community hosted two other communities, the ICK and the Catholic Church. The guests had the opportunity to visit the seminary in Prizren.68 Preparations for a major interfaith and international conference to be held in May 201369 are being continued under the auspices of the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, the ICK’s Department of Youth participated in a conference organised by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on the topic of “Relations between the religious communities and the state” held on 16–17 November 2012 in Prizren.70

66 Event details available at www.cps.edu.ba/?q=node/315, and the book is available in PDF format at www.rrpp-westernbalkans.net. 67 Interview with Bahri Sejdiu, President of IC Prishtina, on 23.02.2013. 68 Interview with Mufti Naim Ternava, 23.02.2013 in Prishtina. 69 Ibid. 70 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/758/1/; last accessed on 04.03.2013. kosovo 381

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The public media in Kosovo during 2012 devoted a considerable amount of attention to matters related to the Islamic community in Kosovo. The issue of changing history and literature schoolbooks continued through- out 2012; respectively, the working groups established have furthered their work on the texts.71 The media devoted quite a lot of attention to the war in Syria especially since a considerable number of Albanians72 live there. One of the families’ representatives also appeared on TV73 asking for support from the Kosovo government. On the other side, some students who happen to be study- ing in Damascus joined the anti-government resistance movements there, and one of them, Naman Demolli,74 was even killed in a fight with gov- ernment forces. Another minor incident that drew considerable attention occurred during one of President Jahjaga’s speeches, when a small group of young people from Bashkohu appeared with placards and shouted “Our President offended Muslims, she should apologise!”—in reference to the President’s speech in Has/Prizren last year.75

16 Major Cultural Events

In 2012 no major cultural event/concert was held on the occasion of ‘Id. The Presidency of ICK claimed it lacked funds for such an event.76

71 ‘Kosovo may revise its history’, www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/ features/setimes/features/2011/09/09/feature-03, accessed 3 April 2012. 72 Albanians migrated to Syria during the regime of King Zogu I, facing the reprisals based on religion. The descendants of these Albanians living mainly in Damascus have com- plained that no one is taking care about their situation under the current siege of Bashar Al Asad, more on this is available: www.indeksonline.net/?FaqeID=2&LajmID=25297, accessed 29 March 2013. 73 Video available at www.klankosova.tv, accessed 23 March 2013. 74 Naman Demolli, a former KLA fighter dies in Syria in a battle with Asad’s forces, news available at: www.indeksonline.net/?FaqeID=2&LajmID=25297, accessed 29 March 2013. 75 On 15 October, 2011 in Zym/Has region near Prizren, The President Mrs. Jahjaga had a speech whereby glorifying the Medieval Cannon of Leke Dugagjini, she referred to it as fol- lows: ‘. . . it (The Canon) protected human and national dignity of Albanians by disabling the implementation of Shari’a for 500 years.’ The reactions against this statement are available at: www.mesazhi.com/artikuj/levizja-bashkohu-presidentja-ofendoi-popullin- musliman, accessed 3 April 2012. 76 Interview with Ahmet Rama, member of the Presidency of ICK, on 23 March 2013.

LATVIA

Valters Ščerbinskis1

1 Muslim Populations

Though Muslims (mainly Volga Tatar immigrants and other Muslims decommissioned from the Russian tsarist army) started arriving and settling in the then Russian ruled Latvia in the second part of the nine- teenth century, the first Muslim congregation in Riga was established only in 1902. By World War I it had grown to around 1,000 members, but during and immediately after the war (by 1920) the Muslim community in the now independent Latvia had shrunk to a mere 150 and further declined to about 60 by 1935. Today, most Latvian Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of peo- ple from the then Soviet Central Asian and Caucasus republics, as well as the Volga region moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although most of them did not practise Islam. Quite a number of them chose to leave Latvia after it regained independence in the early 1990s. A small Muslim congregation (less than 70 members) was re-established in Riga in 1993. In 1994, a con- gregation in Daugavpils founded the Daugavpils islāma centrs (Daugavpils Islamic Centre). These were soon followed by other (among them splinter) congregations.2 Official censuses do not include a question on religious identity, so no official figures for the size of the Muslim community in Latvia are avail- able. Unfounded estimates ranged between 500 and 10,000,3 but none of

1 Valters Ščerbinskis is an Associate Professor at the European Studies Faculty of the Riga’s Stradiņš’ University, where he heads MA programme. His research interests include political history of Latvia, history of educated elites and also history of Muslim community in Latvia. 2 For more detailed information on the history of Muslim community in Latvia, see: Ščerbinskis, Valters, Ienācēji no tālienes. Austrumu un Dienvidu tautu pārstāvji Latvijā no 19. gadsimta beigām līdz mūsdienām. (Newcomers from Remoteness. representatives of the Eastern and Southern Nations in Latvia from the End of the 19th century till our days) Rīga: Nordik, 1998. 3 Banks, Elena, “Latvia’s Muslim community reaches out”, The Baltic Times, 29 July 2004, www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9385/, accessed 4 March 2009. 384 valters ščerbinskis them distinguish between nominal (‘of Muslim background’) and practis- ing Muslims. Islam in the European Union4 gives a figure of 5,000. In 2012, the chairman of the Association of Latvian Islamic Communities esti- mated the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 10,000 but added that only 10–20% were practising. Among them approximately 200 are converts (most of them Russian speakers). However, the overall esti- mation seems to be exaggerated as according to the latest statistics, there were some 2,164 Tatars, 1,657 Azerbaijanis, 339 Uzbeks and 241 Kazakhs living in Latvia at the time of the 2011 Census.5 Therefore, the number of approximately 5,000 nominal Muslims looks closer to reality. The over- whelming majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around the capi- tal city Riga, with the much smaller communities in Daugavpils (probably, about 200), Ventspils (probably, about 100–200) and Liepāja.

2 Islam and the State

Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Methodist) and the ‘new;’ Islam falls into the latter category. Under the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organ- isations, nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in governing of the state. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organi- sations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and certain rights and privileges not available to those that chose to remain unregistered, but there is no compulsion for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisa- tions of ‘non-traditional’ denominations are required to re-register annu- ally for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association can register per

4 Felice Dassetto, Silvio Ferrari and Brigitte Marechal, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the future”, 23 July 2007, European Parliament, www.libertysecurity.org/ article1582.html, accessed 6 April 2011. 5 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2012) Population and Housing Census 2011, http:// data.csb.gov.lv/dialog/Saveshow.asp, accessed August 28, 2012. latvia 385 religion. Currently Muslims in Latvia are in the process of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia records 15 registered independent Muslim religious congregations as of 2012. The Association of Latvian Islamic Communities (Latvijas islama kopienas, Brivibas Street 104-22, Riga, tel.: ++371 28298292, fax: ++371 29212512, http://www.islam.lv/, dir@ triz.lv) includes the Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall and is headed by Zufars Zainuļļins. It is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian and Caucasus republics). It has several affiliate (friendly) congregations established with the purpose of forming a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least 20 mem- bers. There are several rival congregations with minuscule memberships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community. The largest congregation outside Riga is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre (Daugavpils musulmanu draudze “Idel”, Imantas iela 25, Daugavpils) which is also dominated by Russian speak- ers. There are more or less organised smaller groups of Muslims also in Liepāja and Ventspils.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. After 1920 a new prayer hall was opened, most probably on Marijas Street, in a large residence owned by Kirimov, a Tatar immigrant. It ceased to function after 1940 when Soviets occu- pied Latvia. In the 1990s, when resurgence of religious life took place, a main prayer hall was opened on Brīvības Street, in the rented premises. A prayer hall in purchased premises in an apartment at Brīvības Street 104-22 was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. In Octo- ber 2009, a new prayer hall on Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16-5 was opened by the former imam of the Brivibas Street prayer hall; however it was soon closed. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. 386 valters ščerbinskis

The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls, with Muslims in Daugavpils renting apartments of local Tatar society. Since the early 1990s there has been much talk of constructing a purpose- built mosque in Riga, and some practical steps have been taken towards achieving this goal.

5 Children’s Education

Optional religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the state schooling system. Islamic education (Islam being formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in state schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils pro- vide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal irregular weekend ‘schools,’ where 10–20 children aged between three and 16 learn basics of Arabic, Islam and Qur’an reading. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Lan- guage). Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and/or religious dogmas have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates but not specifically Islamic education. There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams in Riga and elsewhere are self-taught.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have a separate cemetery (historically together with Karaims) in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still maintained by the Latvian Islamic Community as the probably only visible evidence of the pre-WWII Muslim community in Latvia. Another historical Muslim cemetery exists near Cēsis where Turk- ish POWs of Russo-Turkish wars in the 19th century are buried. Muslims have been assigned a separate section in cemetery in Riga—Jaunciema kapi and also a separate section in the Daugavpils cemetery. So far no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery. latvia 387

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams because there are so few Muslims in need of their services. Currently (in 2012) there are negotiations with the Prison Board regarding necessity to organise Mus- lim religious services in prisons.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. They are open to the public and are attended by between 300 and 500 people. During ‘Id al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Back in 2009, at least three halal cafes opened in Riga: two, the Halal and the Taj Mahal on Brivibas Street are run by the same company, and an Noor on Kalēju Street, run by several Latvian converts to Islam. The last, however, was forced to vacate the rented premises and close down the business in October of the same year. In September 2009, the Latvian Parliament passed amendments to the Animal Rights Protection Law granting religious communities the right to slaughter animals according to their religious rites. Several Latvian meat processing companies have started practising halal slaughter (primarily for export to Sweden). Due to low local demand, two companies—SIA Baltic Meat and SIA Biomeat—were recently (according to 2011 data) established for produc- ing halal meat for export. However it was not possible to verify if these companies indeed produce halal meat.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photos on official documents when certified by the local Muslim community. How- ever, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab (and a few wear niqab); mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. 388 valters ščerbinskis

12 Publications and Media

There are no regular Muslim print media in Latvia, though ethnic minori- ties, among them those of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris), do occa- sionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam.lv (in Rus- sian). Since October 2009 Russian translations of the weekly khutba given at Brivibas Street prayer hall have been posted there (since July 2010 regu- larly), with other practical information added as needed. The website has an on-line forum (also in Russian). Another website is http://www.islam- muslim.lv/ (in Latvian run by Latvian converts to Islam) with an online forum in the Latvian language. www.islammuslim.lv is a virtual place for Latvian speaking converts to Islam and is providing information and to some extent is an organisational tool for the small and dispersed Latvian speaking Muslim community. A third site with limited material on Islam in Latvian at http://www.islamlv.netfirms.com/. In late 2009 a new Rus- sian language female-focused website “Muslima—zhenshchina v nikabe” (Muslima—a woman in niqab) at www.muslima.lv, with a proselytising tone, was set up with the aim of providing guidance (in the form of ques- tion-answer) for (presumably converted) female Muslims.

13 Family Law

Muslims, like others, have to register marriage at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. A number of marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of imams in Riga. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic norms if that is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in any litigation.

14 Interreligious Relations

According to the chairman of the Association of Latvian Muslim Commu- nities Zufars Zainuļļins, relations between different confessional groups are good. There are no conflicts of any kind reported in national media dealing with the Muslims and other religious groups. latvia 389

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is generally very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Latvia. Throughout 2012 a few interviews and articles on Islam in Latvia were aired and published in local media, some with a focus on international and security issues.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious festival, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lec- tures on religious issues may be offered.

LIECHTENStEIN

Thomas Schmidinger1

1 Muslim Populations

Islam in the Principality of Liechtenstein is a very recent phenomenon. Muslims immigrated in the last 20 years predominately from Turkey, Bos- nia, Serbia and Kosovo. While in 1990 only 2.4% of the population were Muslims, in 2000 it doubled to 4.8% or 1,593 persons.2 The census of 2010 found 1,960 Muslims, which is an increase of 23%.3 This number also includes heterodox Muslims and the small number of about 30 Baha’i.4 According to that number the present Muslim population of Liechten- stein would be about 5.4% of the population of Liechtenstein. The large majority of Muslims in Liechtenstein are Sunnis. There is no reference to Shi’i Muslims in Liechtenstein. There are some Alevis, but their numbers are uncertain.

2 Islam and the State

Until recently the legal situation concerning relations between state and religion in Liechtenstein was still based on the laws set up by Prince Johann II in the 19th century, when Liechtenstein was nearly entirely Roman Catholic. Until December 2012 the Principality and the Catholic Church were closely related. Article 37 of the constitution defined the Roman Catholic Church as the official religion (“Landeskirche”) of the Principality, but also guarantees freedom of religion to other religious denominations. Since the 1990s, debates about the separation between church and state have been going on, but it took until 20 December 2012 for the Principality to establish a new secular legal order by changing the

1 Thomas Schmidinger is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna, the University for Applied Science Vorarlberg and secretary general of the Aus- trian Association for Kurdish Studies. 2 Liechtensteinische Volkszählung 2000. Religion und Hauptsprache. Band 2; p. 12. 3 www.llv.li/pdf-llv-as-erste_ergebnisse_vz2010, accessed 31 December 2012. 4 www.bahai.li/index.php?src=gendocs&link=GeschichteFL&category=Unsere%20 Gemeinde, accessed 31 December 2012. 392 thomas schmidinger constitution and passing a new law on religion (“Gesetz über die Religions- gemeinschaften”). However, this process is not finished yet and the munic- ipalities still have to decide about the separation of their municipality and the Catholic churches in their municipalities. If the new law gets fully implemented only the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Protestant (Calvin- ist) Church are recognised as official religions. Islam, Christian-orthodox and the Baha’i community are not recognised by the new law. While the Catholic and the Protestant churches are financially sup- ported by the state, Islam is not regularly financed. The government has announced that it would be willing to support an Islamic religious com- munity if the two Muslim organisations would unite.5 Until now it has not been possible to realise this. In 2004 the European Institute for Intercul- tural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung) was established by the government. Since then the Muslim communities also receive some minor funding. The gov- ernment issues a residence permit for one imam. During Ramadan a sec- ond visiting imam is permitted.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Com- munity in the Principality of Liechtenstein, Alleestraße 8, 9495 Triesen) is affiliated to the Dachverband islamischer Gemeinden der Ostschweiz und des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, DIGO (Umbrella association of Islamic Com- munities in the East of Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein). The Liechtenstein Türk Birliği,6 that runs the Yeşil Camii (Industriestraße 32, 9495 Triesen), is affiliated to the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Despite the fact that a significant minority of the Muslims of Turkish origin in Liechtenstein are Alevis, there is no Alevi organisation in the Principality. Some Alevis from Liechtenstein participate in Alevi activi- ties in nearby regions of Austria and Switzerland. The activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, which calls its Swiss branch Ahmadiyya Bewe- gung des Islams in der Schweiz und in Liechtenstein (Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein), that happened in 2009 did not continue since 2010.

5 www.state.gov/documents/organization/132836.pdf, accessed 31 December 2012. 6 www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/, accessed 31 December 2012. liechtenstein 393

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only two prayer houses in Liechtenstein. The Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque) and the Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Community in the Principality of Liechtenstein) run both prayer rooms in the village of Triesen.

5 Children’s Education

In the 2007/08 school year Islamic religious education started in five elementary schools. The curriculum was developed by the Institute for Interreligious Pedagogics and Didactics in Cologne (Germany). The gov- ernment agreed to establish such a pilot project on condition that the teachers will be trained educationalists, the language of education would be German, the curriculum would be supervised by experts, and classes would be controlled by the Schulamt (Department of Education) in accor- dance with the laws and constitution of Liechtenstein.7 An evaluation in 2008 demonstrated that these conditions were fulfilled and the project continued. Until now it is not a regular school subject, but a voluntary project that is taught in the afternoons after regular school lessons. According to the Schulamt, 30 children attended the classes in the first year and 80 in the school years 2008/09 and 2009/10, which means that 45% of the Muslim school-children attend the Islamic religion classes.8 For the year 2010/11 the number decreased to 75,9 in 2011/12 to 70 attendees.10 In 2012/13 this number continued to decrease. Due to the pregnancy of one of the two teachers some schools could offer Islamic reli- gious education only for half of the year.11 The two teachers were trained in Turkey and Austria and serve the schools in Liechtenstein from nearby Austria.

7 http://linewsletter.typo3web.net/fileadmin/newsletter/files/04_07/Islamischer_ Religionsunterricht.pdf, accessed 31 December 2012. 8 E-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 2 March 2010. 9 E-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 29 November 2010. 10 E-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 30 November 2011. 11 E-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 30 October 2012. 394 thomas schmidinger

6 Higher and Professional Education

As a small country with only one small town Liechtenstein has no long tradition of higher education. The first private university12 opened only in 2000, but until now it has no field of study with specific relevance for Muslims. Neither has the state-run Hochschule Liechtenstein13 any sections that deal with Islam.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no Muslim cemetery in Liechtenstein. But since the construc- tion of a Muslim cemetery in nearby Vorarlberg (Austria) was initiated, a debate has also started in Liechtenstein about the construction of a Muslim cemetery. Already in 2007 vicar-general Dr. Markus Walser from the Catholic Archdiocese of Liechtenstein14 and Prince Hans-Adam II issued statements in favour of a Muslim cemetery. In 2008 an opinion poll showed that more than half of the population of Liechtenstein favours the opening of Christian cemeteries to Muslims, while only 35 % would like to see a separate Muslim cemetery in the Principality.15 Until now only few Muslims are buried at Christian cemeteries, though the municipalities of Gamprin, Eschen, Mauren and Ruggell opened their cemetery chapel for Muslim burials.16 In the capital Vaduz a section of the cemetery with space for 45 graves adjusted to Mecca is reserved for Muslims.17

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service in the hospital and the prison in Vaduz is offered by the Yeşil Camii, if requested. As Liechtenstein abolished its army in 1868, there is also no military chaplaincy.

12 www.ufl.li, accessed 31 December 2012. 13 www.hochschule.li, accessed 31 December 2012. 14 www.erzbistum-vaduz.li/medien/20071105.htm, accessed 31 December 2012. 15 Marxer, Wilfried, “Religion in Liechtenstein. Umfrage im Auftrag der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein über Glauben, Religiosität, religiöse Toleranz und das Verhältnis von Staat und Religionsgemeinschaften,” in Beiträge, 40/2008, p. 59, at www.liechtenstein- institut.li/Portals/11/pdf/lib/LIB_40_Religion.pdf, accessed 31 December 2012. 16 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?id=15510&source=lv&ressort=home, accessed 31 Decem- ber 2012. 17 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?id=15521&source=lv&ressort=liechtenstein, accessed 31 December 2012. liechtenstein 395

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Liechtenstein, but they are cel- ebrated by Muslim families and in prayer houses.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

As a very small country Liechtenstein has no infrastructure for ritual slaughter. Halal food has to be imported from abroad. Officially Liechtenstein has two Islamic banks, the Liechtenstein Arinco Arab Investment Company and the Islamic Banking System Finance S.A. The both have their registered offices in the capital Vaduz.18 However, both banks serve the international ‘Islamic’ banking sector rather than the Muslim communities of Liechtenstein. Internationally known as a tax heaven, Liechtenstein also serves as a repository for ‘Islamic’ money as it does for the traditional banking system.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal dress codes that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic head scarf. However, only a very limited number of Muslim women wear any form of head scarf.

12 Publication and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Liechtenstein. Only the Liechtenstein Türk Birliği,19 its Yeşil Camii20 and its Parents Association21 run Muslim websites.

13 Family Law

Polygamy and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law are prohibited. Muslims are permitted to conduct marriage ceremo- nies in prayer houses, but only after a civil marriage is registered.

18 www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/fiqh/bank_research.htm, accessed 31 December 2012. 19 www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/, accessed 31 December 2012. 20 http://camii.turkbirligi.li/, accessed 31 December 2012. 21 http://oab.turkbirligi.li/, accessed 31 December 2012. 396 thomas schmidinger

14 Interreligious Relations

There are few interreligious activities carried out by Catholic and Prot- estant parishes and the Catholic Archdiocese, the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung), the Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Liechtenstein-Institut. The Catholic Opus Dei-affiliated International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein22 has been active in some interreligious dialogue with Islamic organisations, like the Islamic Educational, Scien- tific and Cultural Organisation, ISESCO23 but it does not offer any studies related to Islam itself.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

As in many European states, debates in Liechtenstein on and the role of Islam in public life have also increased since 2001. A survey by the Liechtenstein-Institut demonstrated an overall climate of tolerance. However Islam is viewed more negatively than Christianity or Judaism.24 Prince Hans-Adam II has publicly supported the equal treatment of Islam and the right to erect mosques.25 European debates like the ban on mina- rets in Switzerland or the debates on banning the burqa were also fol- lowed in Liechtenstein, but no similar suggestions were made. Contrary to other European countries, there is no right wing populist or right-extremist political party that mobilises against Muslims, but there are adoles- cent Nazi skinhead activities, connected with networks in neighbouring Germany, Switzerland and Austria.26 In February 2010 a Turkish restaurant in the village of Nendeln was destroyed with Molotov cocktails. Security officials and newspapers spoke about the increase of racist attacks and

22 www.iap.li, accessed 31 December 2012. 23 www.iap.li/files/Dialogue%20among%20Civilisations%20and%20Cultures_IAP_ Oct_2002.pdf, accessed 31 December 2012. 24 Marxer, Wilfried, ‘Religion in Liechtenstein’, p. 26. 25 www.llv.li/llv-portal-informationen/aktuelles.htm?reference=105520&checkSum=5E 6381E59871ADC55DBF1B511DD6A00D, accessed 31 December 2012. 26 See Davolio, Miryam Eser Davolio and Matthias Drilling, Rechtsextremismus im Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Eine qualitative Studie zu Hintergründen und Herangehensweisen im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Eine Studie im Auf- trag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Basel: Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, 2009. liechtenstein 397 estimated that the number of violent right-extremist skinheads could be about 30 to 40.27 Some of these neo-Nazis also issued pamphlets and distributed them in the post-boxes of villages in Liechtenstein. However, most of their propaganda is anti-Semitic or generally directed against for- eigners. Islam does not play a central role in their propaganda. The debate on male circumcision caused by a decision of a German in court in June 2012 was also covered in the media of Liechtenstein. How- ever, other than in Germany and Austria there was no significant mobili- sation against male circumcision by so called ‘new Atheists.’

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no typically Muslim festivals and cultural events specific to Liechtenstein.

27 www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?ressort=vermischtes&source=lv&id=8028, accessed 31 December 2011.

LITHUANIA

Egdūnas Račius1

1 Muslim Populations

Lithuanian official censuses routinely include a question on religious identity/affiliation. In 2001, 2,860 residents of Lithuania, or less than 0.1% of the total population of over three million, identified themselves as Sunni Muslims (no data on Shi’is available), of whom 1,679 (or 58.7%) were ethnic Tatars, 362 (12.6%) Azerbaijanis, 185 Lithuanians and 74 ­Russians.2 According to preliminary results of the 2011 Census, the num- ber of Muslims has dropped to 2,700.3 The 2011 Census showed that the biggest ethnic groups traditionally associated with Muslim background have also shrunk: Tatars to 2,793, from 3,235 (a 13.7% decrease) and Azer- baijanis to 648 from 788 (even a bigger decrease of 17.8%).4 Around two- thirds of Lithuania’s Muslims are concentrated in the capital city Vilnius, the second largest city Kaunas and the districts surrounding these cities. Tatars, known as “Lithuanian Tatars” have been living in Lithuania (especially the eastern part of today’s Republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily as mercenaries and refu- gees. They were given land by the Lithuanian rulers whom they served. Although over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethno-cultural yet well integrated group. Most of the other Muslims in Lithuania are descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics

1 Egdūnas Račius is a Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Vytautas Mag- nus University in Kaunas, Lithuania. 2 Gyventojai pagal lytį, amžių, tikėjimą (Population by Sex, Age and Religion) (Vilnius: Department of Statistics, 2002), pp. 204–205. 3 Personal e-mail communication from Vanda Vaitekūnienė, Head of the Population Census and Survey Organisation Division, Department of Statistics of the Republic of Lithuania, 3 October 2012. 4 Statistics Lithuania (2012) Lithuanian 2011 Population Census in Brief, p. 20, www .stat.gov.lt/uploads/Lietuvos_gyventojai_2011.pdf?PHPSESSID=2d182ca298cf2190e69e0 680d700470d, accessed 14 January 2013. 400 egdūnas račius who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period, immigrants of recent years and an ever-growing segment of local converts to Islam and their progeny.

2 Islam and the State

Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority (over 77% according to the results of the 2011 Census)5 of the population. Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognised by law (adopted in 1995) as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths in Lithuania, and the Muslim community, through its official representative institution the Muftiate (first established in Viln- ius in the inter-war period by the Polish authorities, who then controlled eastern Lithuania, including Vilnius, disbanded in the Soviet years, and re- established in 1998), is entitled to a modest annual state subsidy (around four thousand Euros, on average) which is used for the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. The Mufti, in his capacity as an officially recognised ecclesiastical head of the Lithuanian Muslim commu- nity, is habitually invited to official meetings and celebrations at the Presi- dential Palace and the Parliament. Other Muslim denominations (such as Shi’is) have the right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Religious organisations affiliated to non-traditional denominations may seek official state recog- nition 25 years after registration. Apart from an early aborted attempt by Ahmadis, no other heterodox or non-Sunni Muslim religious organisation has been officially registered so far.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are almost a dozen registered (Sunni) Muslim organisations all around Lithuania. The main one (which serves as an umbrella organisa- tion) is the Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate (Lietuvos Musulmonų Sunitų Dvasinis Centras—Muftiatas, Vivulskio Street 3, Vilnius, www.islamas.org, headed by the Mufti Romas Jakubauskas,

5 Statistics Lithuania (2012) Lithuanian 2011 Population Census in Brief, p. 26, www .stat.gov.lt/uploads/Lietuvos_gyventojai_2011.pdf?PHPSESSID=2d182ca298cf2190e69e0 680d700470d, accessed 14 January 2013. lithuania 401 tel.: ++370 67417710, [email protected]), (re)established in 1998 and domi- nated by Lithuanian Tatars. The Mufti is elected for a term of five years by representatives of local Muslim congregations, which so far have been dominated by Lithuanian Tatars, though more and more immigrants and converts get drawn into running of the communal affairs. Most other Muslim organisations are formally or informally subordinate to the Muf- tiate. For several past years the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam has been trying to re-establish its presence in Lithuania by sending missionaries from Germany but so far has had little success. There is as yet no specifi- cally Shi’i religious congregation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Though a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, there are currently four (three wooden, built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,6 and one brick, built in the early 1930s), of which only the mosque in Kaunas (Totorių Street 6) is regularly used for Friday prayers by both local Tatar and foreign (mainly Arab) Muslims. Since 2012, it has a Turkish Imam supplied by the Turkish State (Diyanet). The other mosques, in the villages of Raižiai, Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių, are open mainly during religious festivals, although during warm seasons occasional Friday prayers also take place. In addition, in Vilnius there is a prayer hall adjacent to the Muftiate, which is used by Tatars, Turks and others for Friday and occasional evening prayers. Lately it has become crowded and a decision was made by the Muftiate to look for a new space to be rented for the offices of the Muftiate and the prayer hall. Though the Vilnius City Municipality over the past several decades has been offering various plots of land for the purpose of building a mosque in Vilnius, in 2012 the negotiations between the Muslim community and the city authorities remained stalled with the Muftiate unwilling to accept the latest offer of a plot on the outskirts of the city. It is known that some Muslim groups (presumably ethnically/nationally orientated) gather for prayer in private apartments and other improvised prayer halls (in Vilnius, Klaipėda, Panevėžys). Though a plan to build a mosque in Klaipėda, the third largest city and a sea port, was publicly announced back in 2009, until the end of 2012 no construction work took place.

6 The interior of these mosques can be viewed at www.panoramas.lt/index.php?page_ id=132&pan_type=242&show=yes&search_katalog=mecete. 402 egdūnas račius

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Catholic (or, in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox), non-religious pupils and those of other faiths as a rule are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’, unless there is a demand for instruction in faith of one of the officially recogn- ised religions (among them, Islam). Instruction in Islam to a dozen or so Tatar pupils of different ages is provided by the Mufti in public schools in Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių villages, which still have a significant presence of Tatars. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious education elsewhere is extra-curricular, occasionally offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools, with converts increasingly taking an active role in organising classes and teaching. Additionally, history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the state school history curriculum.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Centre of Oriental Studies of Vilnius University offers a BA program in Arabic Studies. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are regu- larly offered at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas and the Lithuanian Military Academy in Vilnius. Elsewhere (Vilnius University, Pedagogical University) teaching on Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. As of 2012, three of the seven local acting imams had received their formal education abroad (one in Lebanon, two in Russia) while the remaining four were self-taught. Additionally, Friday prayers at the Muftiate’s prayer hall in Vil- nius and Kaunas mosque (since 2012) are led by Turkish imams, provided by the Turkish Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Tatars have had separate cemeteries since they first settled in Lithuania. Most Muslim cemeteries were located next to mosques. A dozen cem- eteries (in the villages of Nemėžis, Raižiai, Keturiasdešimt totorių, and on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the present and some still serve as burial sites for the community. A fair number of non- religious Tatars and Soviet-era immigrants use general public cemeteries for burial. Recently Muslims of the western port-city Klaipėda approached lithuania 403 local authorities with a request to allocate space for Muslim burials in one of the city’s cemeteries, which the authorities granted in 2011.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals, as there is virtually no need for their services, though occasionally the Department of Prisons requests the Mufti’s services. Otherwise, many of such institu- tions have a separate room allocated for prayer and contemplation and Muslims can use these spaces for private prayer.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas, and village mosques are open to the public, with up to several hundred worshipers attending in each location. As slaughtering of animals is not allowed in the cities, sacrificial slaughtering of up to a dozen of animals on ‘Id al-Adha takes place in Raižiai, with several other animals slaughtered in the villages of Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Though there are half a dozen certified (by either Mufti or foreign ulama) halal slaughter houses and meat processing companies (like local giants Biovela, Agrovet), there still are as yet no specialised halal butcher shops in Lithuania. Frozen halal meat (usually chicken) is available in several supermarkets, one of which is run by Turks in Vilnius. Some individual Muslims (among them the Mufti) privately purchase halal meat directly from certified slaughter houses. Several kebab serving cafes around the country have halal meat imported from Germany and sold at whole-sale supermarkets in major cities. Apart from certified slaughter houses and meat processing companies producing halal meat for export, no other Islamic services were being offered on an organised business level as of 2012. The Mufti personally supervises annual hajj arrangements and usually heads the delegation of the Lithuanian pilgrims. Local communities take care of the preparation of the deceased for burial and undertake the burying themselves. No Islamic charities, financial, travelling, publishing or educational institutions 404 egdūnas račius or organisations have yet been established in Lithuania as, due to min- iscule numbers of practising Muslims, there is very little demand for their services.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Quite to the contrary, by law, Muslim women wishing to be photographed in hijab for official documents only need to supply the state authorities with certification from the Muftiate confirming that they belong to the Islamic faith.7 However, only a handful of Muslim women (chiefly con- verts) wear hijab in public, and mainly on Fridays while attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim women (mostly Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public on a daily basis. There is no record of women being observed wearing niqab in public.

12 Publications and Media

The sole printed periodical (back issues of which can be found at http:// www.tbn.lt/id-laikrasciu_archyvas.html) is Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars), formally a monthly, though lately published on a bi-monthly basis, which has a circulation of 800. It is in Lithuanian with inserts (with trans- lations and original texts) in Polish and Russian and is published by the Union of Lithuanian Tatars’ Communities (Lietuvos totorių bendruomenių sąjunga). The periodical is ethnically focused with occasional articles and information on religion. As of 2012, the main website (in Lithuanian) run by Muslims for Muslims and people wishing to get acquainted with Islam was http://islam-ummah. lt/index.html/ (opened in October 2010), which had an extensive on-line forum with over 34 thousand posts by over 270 users. This website has taken over an earlier website (http://www.islamas.lt, closed in May 2010, and its later interim reincarnation http://islam.tai.lt, which survived for just several months in 2010) and is administered by the same Lithuanian

7 Lietuvos Respublikos Vidaus reikalų ministro įsakymas dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vidaus reikalų ministro 2002 m. gruodžio 6 d. įsakymo nr. 569 „Dėl nuotraukų asmens dokumentams reikalavimų patvirtinimo“ pakeitimo, 2006 m. rugpjūčio 24 d. Nr. 1V-340, www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=281999&p_query=&p_tr2=, accessed 14 January 2013. lithuania 405 converts to Islam residing abroad. The Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society, based in Kaunas, had published a range of translated books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice, which were available at mosques. However, with the relocation of most of its members and the Mufti to other cities or abroad, the organisation was finally dissolved in 2011. For several years there was a separate Shi’i site in Lithuanian at http://www.shia.visiems.lt/ but it ceased to exist in 2012.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage in mosques.8 Such marriages are recognised (and should be promptly registered) by a munic- ipal civil registry office. Every year a couple of dozen marriage contracts are signed under the supervision of the Mufti and other imams. Inherit- ance, if accepted by all the parties involved, can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant.

14 Interreligious Relations

There were no interreligious dialogue events in 2012.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Local Muslim leaders are occasionally approached to com- ment on events and processes involving Muslims elsewhere in the world, but otherwise Muslims avoid publicity. Sometimes media articles reflect on “exotic” traditions of Lithuanian Tatars, like fasting during the month of Ramadan or burial rituals. But more often local media publishes trans- lated articles on what is regarded as oddities of Muslim cultural traditions in Muslim societies. No opinion poll of relevance was conducted in 2012.

8 Lietuvos Respublikos Teisingumo ministro įsakymas Dėl Teisingumo ministro 2006 m. gegužės 19 d. įsakymo Nr. 1R-160 „Dėl civilinės metrikacijos taisyklių patvirtinimo“ pakeitimo, 2012 m. kovo 26 d. nr. 1R-92, www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_ id=421142&p_query=&p_tr2=2, accessed January 14, 2013. 406 egdūnas račius

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantujus is an annual Tatar gathering, lasting several days, featuring singing, dancing, games and sports. In 2012, like in 2011, for a second year in a row it took place in Trakai, one of historic capitals of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and, as always, was open to general public. There is an annual Tatar youth summer camp with a certain amount of religious instruction. LUXEMBOURG

Sylvain Besch1

1 Muslim Populations

As it is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since the registration of religious affiliation is prohibited,2 the follow- ing estimate is based on the nationalities of people from predominantly Muslim countries (source: Répertoire Général des Personnes Physiques RGPP/The civil register). As of 1 January 2012, on the basis of national- ity alone, the largest groups of Muslim background were as follows: Bosnians—2,248; Moroccans—554; Turks—519; Albanians—389; Irani- ans—349; Algerians—334; Tunisians—322 (source RGPP). The ‘nationali- ties’ Montenegro, Serbian-Montenegrin, Yugoslav, Kosovo (6.692 people) include many of Muslim background, particularly people from Sandjak and Kosovo. Muslims are concentrated in urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups3 live in the city of Luxembourg, and 43% live in the four biggest cities (RGPP). The municipality of Wiltz, in the north of the country, has a significant Bosniak community (5.4% of the total population). The majority of Muslims arrived in Luxembourg in the 1990s as war refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosniaks from Bosnia, Albanians and other Muslims from Kosovo, Serbian and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By 2011, 25% of the Montenegrians and 18% of the Bosnians aged 18 years or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote in the municipal elections that year. Currently about 900 adults attend Fri- day prayer regularly in the mosques.

1 Sylvain Besch is director at the CEFIS (Centre d’Etude et de Formation Interculturelles et Sociales) and a member of the Consultative Commission on Human Rights in Luxem- bourg. 2 Article 15 in the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning individuals’ activities and opinions in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 3 Concerns the seven nationalities mentioned above. During 2010 and 2011, 1200 persons from these communities as well as individuals originating from Montenegro and Kosovo were granted Luxembourg citizenship (source: Statec). 408 sylvain besch

2 Islam and the State

There is no state church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catho- lic Church is the most important. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, freedom to exercise one’s religion in public and freedom to express religious opinions (Art. 19). The Constitution allows the state to enter into agreements with the various religions4 (Art. 22), which regulate the relationship between the state and the religions. The various agree- ments confer the status of legal personality on the religious communities. On 6 July 2007, the government approved a proposal for an agreement that will regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community.5 In order to come into force, the agreement must be passed into law. Before this can take place, the Muslim community must adopt a satisfactory form of association, and this must be approved by the Minister of Religion on the recommendation of the government. The government’s political programme, issued in 2009, confirmed its continuing support for the principal of entering into such agreements with religious communities that have a significant presence in the country and commit themselves to respecting the Constitution, the rule of law and public order.6 Following a resolution of the Chamber of Deputies,7 the government in March 2012 appointed a group of experts to study the relationship between public authorities and religious communities.8 In their report9 the experts

4 On 31 October 1997, agreements were made between the state and the Roman Catho- lic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece, and these came into force on 10 July 1998. Later, agreements were made with the Romanian and the Serbian Orthodox Churches and the Anglican Church of Lux- embourg and these came into force on 11 June 2004. 5 www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/conseils_de_gouvernement/2007/07/06conseil/ index.html#9. 6 www.gouvernement.lu/gouvernement/programme-2009/programme-2009/index .html, p. 3. 7 Motion adopted by the Chambre des Députés 7 June 2011. 8 The questions posed to the group were: “Do the conventions currently governed by article 22 of the Constitution still reflect the socio-cultural realities of Luxembourg and the principles of equal treatment and respect for human rights as laid down by the Council of Europe? If not, what might be alternative ways of developing relations between the public authorities and the religious communities, taking note, especially, of the experiences and practices of other members states of the Council of Europe?” 9 Rapport du groupe d’experts chargé de réfléchir sur l’évolution future des relations entre les pouvoirs publics et les communautés religieuses ou philosophiques au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/communiques/2012/10-octobre/ 03-rapport/index.html. luxembourg 409 proposed a reform of the system of recognition and financing of religious organisations regarding the equal treatment of religions.10 On 30 Novem- ber, the Minister of Religious Affairs, François Biltgen, presented the sub- missions of the parties interested in the report.11 Muslim representatives associated themselves with the recognised communities demanding the continuation of the existing conventional system foreseen in the Constitu- tion. The existing recognised communities asked for participation in the working out of a standard agreement granting equality of treatment to all communities and access to the benefits which the Catholic Church cur- rently enjoys. The Shoura (see section 3 below) should also be associated to the development of this agreement.12 Religions—whether recognised or not—are permitted to create profit and non-profit associations, which can obtain subsidies from the state and the municipality. Some of these associations have already benefited from this opportunity for the organisation of public events, particularly through grants from the state (Ministry of Family—Office Luxembourgeois de l’Accueil et de l’Intégration) or by national and local joint funding in the framework of the European (EU) integration fund for third country nationals. The proposed agreement envisages that employed clergy, in this case a mufti, would have the status of a civil servant as in other rec- ognised religions. The mufti’s nomination would be approved by the Min- ister of Religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him, five imams, and a secretary.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg, CCIL, 2 rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel.: ++352 310060, fax: ++352 26310426, http://www.islam.lu/, e-mail: info@ islam.lu) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was estab- lished on 1 February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 600 paying members of

10 Ibid., pp. 119–120. 11 www.gouvernement.lu/functions/search/index.php?q=cultes&imageField22 .x=0&imageField22.y=0. 12 www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/communiques/2012/.../shoura.pdf. Voir aussi : Quotidien, 13 August 2012; 16 August 2012. 410 sylvain besch

30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,500 people, including their families). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (44 rue de Luxem- bourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel./fax: ++352 26540788, e-mail: aicsud@ pt.lu,) was established on 1 March 2002, and its members are mainly Mus- lims from Sandjak region in Montenegro and Serbia. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North was created on 26 September 2000 and was initially named the Cultural Centre of Sandjak. Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rue de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel.: 26950680, fax: 26950681, http://www. ccin.lu) and it is mainly frequented by Muslims from Serbian Sandjak. The Association Islamique de Luxembourg (17–19, rue Nicolas Martha, L-2133 Luxembourg e-mail: [email protected]) emerged out of the former Islamic Religious and Cultural Center in the West which was mainly composed of Bosniaks from Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegrin part of Sandjak. An Islamic association called the Middle Way (Le Juste Milieu, LJM, Al Wassat, 32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel.: ++352 26 48 11 53, www.ljm.lu, e-mail: [email protected]) was established on 1 February 2008; its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. Two other centres, both affirming their collaboration in the national Muslim structures in Luxembourg are the Islamic Cultural Centre “Nord- stad”, (Centre Culturel Islamique « Nordstad », 7, rue Pierre Wieser L-9092 Ettelbruck e-mail: [email protected]), founded on 18 October 2008, with members mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandjak, and the Luxembourg Islamic Centre (Centre Islamique au Luxembourg, 6, bvd. D’Avranches, L-1160 Luxembourg e-mail: [email protected]), established on 22 December 2008, with mostly Bosnian members. The Shoura, the Council of the Muslim Religion (Boîte postale 3054, L-1030 Luxembourg, www.shoura.lu, e-mail: [email protected]) was estab- lished in 2003. New bylaws were adopted by the Shoura on 12 June 2011. The first elections took place on 3 July 2011 among Muslims registered in the six Muslim associations mentioned above with the exception of the Islamic Cultural Centre in the North. The number of votes cast was 649 out of the registered 2,364 (27%), and there were nineteen candidates for twelve places. luxembourg 411

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are nine mosques/prayer houses associated with the above- mentioned associations, in buildings in Mamer (1), Esch/Alzette (2), Diekirch13 (1), Luxembourg- Bonnevoie (2), Luxembourg-Gare (1) and Wiltz (2). Two imams are currently employed (by the associations in Mamer and Esch/Alzette) and they are paid by the community. Other imams work as volunteers. They are organised in the Assemblée des Imams du Luxembourg (www.shoura.lu).

5 Children’s Education

The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.14 In elementary schools, the Catholic Church organises religious education and the archbishop is the employer of the religious education teachers and responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in post-elementary schools. Pupils can choose at both levels to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third option. The religion and ethics sylla- bus in primary schools assumes the inclusion of intercultural and inter- religious topics.15 The major religions are also covered in the syllabus for ethics and civics in primary16 and post-elementary schools and, in history in post-elementary schools. All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults in mosques. As of 2012, 570 children participated in such Islamic education courses. The expert group (sect. 2 above) also included comments on education.17

13 Hall made available to the Centre Culturel Islamique « Nordstad ». 14 Memorial A No. 67, 21 August 1998. 15 Erzbischöflisches Ordinariat, Bildungsplan für den Religionsunterricht in der Grund- schule, p. 14, 15, 20; Praxisteil Zyklus 2, p. 21; Praxisteil Zyklus 3, p. 30, 31.; Praxisteil Zyklus 4, p. 30, 31.; p. 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, www.religionsunterricht.lu/dok/bildungsplang. html. 16 Memorial A No. 178, 22 August 2011. 17 Rapport du groupe d’experts chargé de réfléchir sur l’évolution future des relations entre les pouvoirs publics et les communautés religieuses ou philosophiques au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, pp. 113–118. 412 sylvain besch

6 Higher and Professional Education

Education in Islam is part of the basic education offered by the Institute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (basic theology and history). In 2012/2013 the programme of further education for teachers of religion provides, among other things, a workshop on similarities and differences among Muslims, Christians, and Jews.18 Both of the imams in the principality were educated abroad.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim commu- nity has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxem- bourg City and another in the Esch-Lallange cemetery in Esch-Alzette, so that they can bury their dead according to the Islamic rite. In 2001, the CCIL established a mutual insurance company19 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of the funeral ser- vice, which is carried out with the assistance of the imam from CCIL. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased can also be met.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell-rooms’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff tries to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. Some hospitals provide train- ing and support to make staff aware of different religious backgrounds.20 In Schrassig prison and in the detention centre, Islamic prayers can be organised and the imam visits regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre21 for people without a residence per- mit specifically stipulates that the religious convictions of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities.

18 http://ipr.cathol.lu/fortbildung.htm. 19 Memorial B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 20 The Emile Mayrisch hospital in Esch/Alzette has produced guidelines for staff on meeting religious expectations related to death. 21 See articles 3(1) and 12(3) in the law of 28 May 2009 on the creation and organisation of the detention centre, cf. Memorial A No. 119, 29 May 2009. luxembourg 413

9 Religious Festivals

Before ‘Id al-Adha, the Minister of Education informs teachers of the date of the holiday, and asks them to accept parents’ letters asking permission for their children to take a day off school. Employment legislation does not provide for any specific arrangements, and employees need to book a day’s leave to participate in the religious holidays. A study of discrimination in the workplace shows that in some cases employers respect the religious diversity of the workforce and have taken account of employees’ religious practices and established facilities for them to practise their religion.22 In the public sector, flexible working hours give a better opportunity to combine work with religious practices, such as the fast.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In principle halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg,23 although an exception is made for slaughter without prior stunning according to cer- tain religious rites.24 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has stated that it will not in future approve slaughter without stunning and that it ‘intends to insert a clause to the effect that ritual slaughter is subject to the authorisation of the competent authority’ in a national regulation. There are four Muslim butchers’ shops and about ten Balkan grocery stores that sell halal meat, which is also available in the Auchan super- market in the city of Luxembourg. Muslims also buy halal meat in Bel- gium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition of ritual slaughter, some Muslims send money to their home country so that people there who are less well-off can make the sacrifice on their behalf, especially at ‘Id al-Adha. The authorities do not intend to enforce the labelling of meat from halal slaughter houses, preferring to reach an agreed solution with the European Union.

22 Besch et al., Discrimination à l’emploi, p. 99. 23 Article 8 in the law of 15 March 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without stunning, cf. Mémorial A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 24 Article 5(2) in the grand-ducal regulation of 19 January 1995, cf. Mémorial A No. 8, 6 February 1995. 414 sylvain besch

A new European Association of Hajj and Travel was established in 2012 (28 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie). Its purpose is to arrange cultural and spiritual travel in cooperation with Shoura.

11 Dress Code

The law on compulsory education25 stipulates that, with the exception of teachers of religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by means of conspicuous dress or symbols. Pupils’ dress is governed by regulations which require that stu- dents should dress “correctly” and that “special clothes can be required for lessons in gymnastics, art, and manual and practical classes.”26

12 Publications and Media

Al-Qalam (The Pen), the journal of the Muslims in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg edited by the CCIL and published six times a year since 1990 ceased in 2011 due to lack of funding. A number of centres disseminate information on Islam through the electronic social media. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North produces the magazine Diwan in Bosnian, French and German.27

13 Family Law

Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Polygamy is forbidden. Luxembourg law provides a legal basis for the annulment of forced mar- riages. The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an EU directive are subject to a formal process of recogni- tion before they can be legally accepted in Luxembourg. Divorce by repu- diation is considered to be in violation of public order. It is possible for

25 Article 5 of the law of 6 February 2009, in Memorial A No. 20, 16 February 2009. 26 Article 6 in the regulation of 23 December 2004, on ‘order and discipline in secondary and secondary professional schools’, in Memorial A No. 207, 30 December 2004 Article 3 in the regulation of 7 May 2009 Concernant les règles de conduite et l’ordre intérieur com- muns à toutes les écoles in Memorial A No. 98, 14 May 2009. 27 www.olai.public.lu/fr/fonds-programmes/fei/projets-cofinances/index.html. luxembourg 415 partial legal recognition to be given; for example, an Islamic divorce may be recognised, but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children.

14 Interreligious Relations

An informal interreligious group called Action Groupe Inter-religions (AGIR) (c/o SESOPI, 5 avenue Marie-Thérèse, L-2132 Luxembourg, tel.: ++352 44743517, fax: ++352 44743-515) has existed for seventeen years. Every year it arranges meetings, debates and interreligious prayers.28 Since 2008, the Luxembourg Council of Christian Churches (Conseil des Églises Chrétiennes au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg) has organised, in collabora- tion with ING-Europe Marathon Luxembourg and AGIR, the Interfaith- Marathon for a United World in Luxembourg.29 The Shoura took part in an ecumenical ceremony of mourning at the synagogue following the atrocity in Toulouse.30 The admission of a Muslim group into the Catholic scout federation was accepted by a large majority of the existing members.31

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The question of financial support for the Muslim faith was raised in a parliamentary question and provoked a deal of media attention.32 The media covered the debate on relations between the state and religions, particularly statements from the various interested parties regarding the expert report (sect. 2 above).

28 Especially the third interreligious concert held on 25 March 2012 and organised by AGIR, Cercle interreligieux de Trèves et la ErwuesseBildung. www.mywort.lu/centre/ agenda/16942548.html. 29 4th Interfaith Marathon, see: interfaith.lu/flyer12_d.pdf. 30 www.shoura.lu/. . ./2012/. . ./Rapport-dactivités-de-la-Shoura-2011-2012-final- v.13.06.2012.pdf-. 31 ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/news/newsdetail.cfm?ID_ITEMS=30160. Luxemburger Wort 22 September 2012. 32 Réponse à la question parlementaire No 2237 de M. le Député Fernand Kartheiser, 30 November 2012, www.chd.lu; Luxemburger Wort, Quotidien 13 August 2012, Woxx 17 August 2012, Journal 19 August 2012. 416 sylvain besch

The media paid a good deal of attention to the development of Islamic finance in the banking sector.33 Otherwise the media frequently com- mented on developments in neighbouring countries including ritual slaughter and circumcision, both of which led to parliamentary ques- tions.34 According to a study on integration conducted by CEFIS, 46% of the population mistrust Muslims.35 Some media sources covered Ramadan.36

16 Major Cultural Events

Various Muslim organisations have arranged events. Archbishop Agir and representatives of the parishes Kayl-Tétange and Wiltz were invited to the mosque in Mamer to take part in the breaking of the fast at the end of Ramadan.37 Different centres (Le Juste Milieu, Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord) have organised open conferences or participated in local events. The Islamic Cultural Centre in Mamer organised celebrations at the end of the school year.

33 www.luxembourgforfinance.lu/fr/place-financiere/produits-services/finance- islamique/prestataires-services, www.paperjam.lu/article/fr/les-defis-de-la-finance- islamique, http://5minutes.rtl.lu/fr/actualite/luxembourg/358657.html. 34 Question faisant référence à un reportage sur France 2, Réponse à la question parle- mentaire No 1996 de M. le Député Fernand Kartheiser, 14 May 2012, www.chd.lu; see also Journal, 19 April 2012, 19 April 2012, Woxx 20 April 2012. Questions posées suite à un juge- ment du Landgericht Köln. Réponses aux questions parlementaires No 2171 (de Mme la Députée Nancy Arendt, réponse 30 juillet 2012), No 2224 (de M. le Député Jean Colombera, réponse 27 September 2012), No 2215 (de M. le Député Eugène Berger, réponse 15 October 2012); see also Tageblatt, 2 October 2012. 35 Jacobs, Annick, Legrand, Michel, Mertz, Frédéric, L’intégration au Luxembourg. Focus sur les réseaux sociaux, la confiance et les stéréotypes sur les frontaliers, RED no. 15, Lux- embourg, 2011. 36 RTL5 minutes, 18 July 2012, L’Essentiel, 18 July 2012. 37 Luxemburger Wort, 17 August 2012, Quotidien, 16 August 2012. MACEDONIA

Muharem Jahja1

1 Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.2 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started converting to Islam with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from the Ottoman times. Today conversions to Islam are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.3 In the official census, Macedonian-speaking Muslims, as they are officially labelled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to self-identify as Turks or Albanians), are classified in the census under the category of ‘other’ and are not included among the country’s Muslims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2012 was probably over 700,000. Since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims of Macedonia have undergone three main periods of transformation. The initial one, between 1911 and 1991, can be categorised as decline. It saw a decrease in religious freedom for Muslims. The second period, between 1991 and 2001, can be characterised as stagnation due to difficulties for the Muslims to find their place in society and in their relations with the state. The third period,

1 Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje, and a lecturer in the Department for Oriental Studies at the State University of Tetovo. He holds a BA in Islamic Law and an MA in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia. He is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Vienna. 2 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, House- holds and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). A new census was conducted in October 2011. However, a few days before the end of the process, it was cancelled because of different interpretations of the legislation and methodology by the government partners. 3 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 418 muharem jahja post-2001, has all the features of post-conflict with a number of important reforms in the religious sector, including equalisation of the position of the minority Muslims with that of the majority Orthodox Christians. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000, rising to 300,000 on Fridays and fasting in Ramadan.4 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities.

2 Islam and the State

Macedonia’s Constitution describes it as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the popu- lation, 66% according to the 2002 census,. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. The Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups (Komisija za odnosi so verskite zaednici i religiozni grupi, http://www.kovz.gov.mk), with a direc- tor appointed by the government, regulates the legal aspects of the sta- tus of the religious communities and religious groups, as well as relations between the state and the religious communities and groups. The Com- mission has the status of an autonomous state institution. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Make- donija, IRCM).5 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal build- ings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid from private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are rou- tinely invited to official meetings and celebrations by the Parliament and the government and at the Presidential palace, but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastruc- ture or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and

4 Interview with representatives of the IRCM in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009. 5 The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. macedonia 419

Shi’is, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis, there are other Sufi tariqas, such as the Khalwatis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, , Qadiris and Rifa’is (mainly in the capital Skopje).6 The IRCM and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation is the Skopje-based Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, IRCM, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, tel.: ++389 23117410, fax: ++389 23117883, http://www.bim.org.mk), (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The IRCM, which follows the Hanafi legal school,7 is organised into thirteen separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the IRCM is known as Rais al-ulama (the current Rais al-ulama is Sulejman Rexhepi). Other active organisations, including the Skopje-based Logos-A (http://www.logos-a .com.mk), are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, generally on Islamic thought and Islamic jurisprudence. The main Mus- lim charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal. There are tens of political parties affiliated to Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the Parliament by more than 30 MPs out of total of 123 MPs. Their politics, however, are ethnic rather than religious. The Bektashis are organised in a separate religious entity although they are not registered yet. It is based in Tetovo. Besides Tetovo, Bektashis also live in Gostivar, Kichevo, Ohrid, Struga, Kanatlartsi, Bitola and Resen. Ethnically, most of the Bektashis are Albanians. There are also some Turks and Torbeshi, but no Bosniaks. There are about 5,000 Bektashis in Mace- donia, but there are no official statistics on them. Unlike the religious ser- vices of the other tariqas in Macedonia, the Bektashis are closed to the public, but open to the women within their order. Women can participate in the religious ceremonies together with men. This is not the case with

6 The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 55. 7 The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 1. 420 muharem jahja the Sunni Muslims and the Sunni Sufi orders, where men and women are separated during the prayers in different parts of the mosque or in dif- ferent rooms. In Macedonia, there is a pronounced conflict between the Bektashi and Sunni communities represented by IRCM, particularly over the right to use real estate (i.e. brotherhood lodges). Following the 1991 independence and particularly following the Kosovo war of 1999, Saudi Arabia and Gulf-based organisations, some of them with links to Salafi groups, have increased their presence in the country. This has come as a result of the close interactions of Muslims in Macedonia with those in Kosovo, the channel through which the external influence of Muslim organisations—particularly those that can be affiliated to Wahhabism— reached Macedonia. With imams educated in Saudi universities who chose to orient themselves towards the religious institutions of the Arab world and the study of Arabic, several Saudi-funded organisations and mosques have been established. As a result, a power struggle emerged between the IRCM and Wahhabi imams and organisations. The leaders of the IRCM have recently officially recognised the presence of the Wahhabis in the country and have conceded that the Wahhabis now control mosques around the country, particularly in the Muslim parts of Skopje. Their influ- ence, however, has remained marginal and is now waning. Turkey is the most recent external actor, and allegedly, has become a key actor in the Muslim landscape of Macedonia. Turkish-based organisations have gradu- ally increased their presence in Macedonia in the realms of religion, cul- ture and education. The majority of Muslims view Turkey as an ally and have shown sympathy to Turkey’s engagement as a counterbalance to Arab influence in Macedonia. There is a presence of Turkish-based reli- gious organisations in Macedonia (mainly those close to faith-based organ- isations such as Nurcu, Naqshabandi, Suleymanci, and Milli Görüş) as well as state-related institutions (such as Diyanet and TIKA). Macedonia-based Muslim organisations generally hold Turkish Islam in high esteem and consider their own practice of Islam as very Ottoman or Turkish.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

It is estimated that there are roughly 600 purpose-built mosques, some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Yahya Pasha, Isa Bey, Mustafa Pasha, Murat Pasha, macedonia 421 and Sultan Murat. Other famous mosques include, the Aladja (painted) Mosque and the Saat (clock) Mosque in Tetovo; the Isaac Mosque, Haydar Kadi Pasha and New Mosque in Bitola; the Charshi Mosque in Prilep; the Saat Mosque in Gostivar; the Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha Mosque in Ohrid. Prayer rooms, called masjids by local Muslims, continue to be con- structed in a number of places, including in hospitals and penitentiary institutions. A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the IRCM were nationalised with the advent of Communism after World War II. Despite the de-nationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. There are also tekes that are used for prayer. The languages used for preaching include Albanian, Macedonian, Turk- ish, Bosnian and Roma.

5 Children’s Education

The 2008 measure to introduce religious education as an optional course in public schools offered classes in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only, but was annulled in 2009 by the Constitutional Court. The constitutional judges decided that religious edu- cation in schools was contrary to Article 19 and the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which provide for the separation of state and church. According to the Court, the Constitution guarantees the right to practise religion, but citizens should not be influenced as to whether or how they should do so. Classes in ‘history of religions’ continue to be offered to 11-year-old pupils and some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum.8 There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa), established in 1984 and run by the IRCM.9 It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the IRCM, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of

8 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 9 Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe—Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), Minorities in Southeast Europe: Muslims of Macedonia (Athens: CEDIME-SE, 2000). 422 muharem jahja

Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the IRCM. Graduating students receive diplomas that are equivalent to a secondary school diploma. Graduates go on to enrol at theological faculties as well as at other faculties and departments. Around 60 students graduate each year. However, the Ministry of Educa- tion and Science decided in 2009 that Isa Bey Madrasa would become a publicly funded school under the Ministry of Education. The school will receive funding from the state budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes will also entail alterations to the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. The changes planned are yet to occur in practice. No public information is available on the reasons of the delay. In addition, Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or mak- tabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teachings as an extra-curricular voluntary activity.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The main higher Islamic educational institution is the Skopje-based Fac- ulty of Islamic Sciences (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, http://www .fshi.edu.mk), established in 1997 by the IRCM. In 2008, the Parliament enacted a law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be changed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Fac- ulty is expected to receive funding from the state in the future, in addition to donations from other sources. However, the changes have been delayed for unknown reasons. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological uni- versities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. In the 2009–2010 academic year, the State University of Tetovo launched a degree course in ‘’, with courses offered on the history, culture and literature of Islam as well as on Arab and Turkish language and literature. With the current number of students of more than 100, its first graduates are expected to complete their studies in the 2012–2013 academic year.10

10 Interview with Adnan Ismaili, Head of Orientalism department at the State Univer- sity of Tetovo, 12 June 2012. macedonia 423

Imams receive their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Fac- ulty of Islamic Sciences and/or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jor- dan, Saudi Arabia and Syria).11

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cem- eteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no permanent imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. However, as purpose-built mosques (masjid) continue to be constructed in a number of places, including in hospitals and penitentiary institutions, imams are appointed on an ad-hoc basis. Though provided for by legisla- tion, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the reli- gions in the country.12

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in towns with significant Muslim presence, such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo, with the main celebra- tion event happening in the capital Skopje. The first day of ‘Id al-Fitr is an official public holiday and the first day of ‘Id al-Adha is an official holi- day for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the President or the Prime Minister (who are as a rule Ortho- dox Christians), a practice launched following 2001. ‘Id al-Adha is cele- brated around the country with thousands of Muslims attending qurban

11 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 12 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 424 muharem jahja rites. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, the Mi’raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra.13 1,750 people travelled for Hajj in 2012. 621 travelled by plane and 1,129 by ground transportation (buses).14

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Bra- zil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of res- taurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using the meat of animals they slaughter themselves. In 2009, the IRCM signed an agreement with the Bosnian Agency for Certification of Halal Quality (http://www.halal.ba) for the establishment of a unit within the IRCM that will issue halal cer- tificates to companies producing halal food. Halal certificates started to be issued in 2010.15 Only those companies that have implemented HACCP (Hazard analysis and critical control point) system in their chain of pro- duction are certified by the new system. So far, only three Macedonian companies have been awarded a Halal certificate. Companies are imple- menting the Halal standard voluntarily, being driven exclusively by their commercial interest. Generally speaking, consumer awareness of halal obligations is low, however awareness on the part of the producers has been increasing and as a result consultancy companies have emerged that offer services to producers on how to set up production systems that meet halal requirements. Travelling to Makkah and Madina for Hajj is common practice among Muslims, but mainly among the older part of the population. Travel for Hajj is organised by the IRCM through air and ground transportation, the latter of which is organised by local travel agencies with visas facilitated by the IRCM. There is no Islamic banking or Islamic financial institutions in the country.

13 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 14 Interview with Qufli Osmani, IRCM, Skopje, January 2013. 15 Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, December 2010. macedonia 425

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Neither are there rules against the wearing of hijab for photographs for ID cards. Approximately half of Muslim women, mainly the older generation, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab.16

12 Publications and Media

The main Islamic periodical is the monthly El Hilal (Hena e re in Alba- nian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the IRCM. Its main focus is on Islamic religion. The mainstream Alba- nian-language print media (such as Koha, Fakti, Lajm) and electronic media occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or at the time of other Muslim festivals. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey and associated with the Gülen movement, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. The Asr publish- ing house previously produced Dritarja (Window), a children’s magazine with Islamic religious content. Its publication has been discontinued for financial reasons. Websites such as http://www.bim.org.mk (administered by the IRCM), http://www.fri.org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and http://www.makislam.info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for the Muslim public and for interested non- Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM TV, ERA TV and TV2 Macedonian National Television, the state-owned public service broadcaster. These and other outlets do produce religious programmes, particularly during the holidays. The public service broadcaster transmits live the annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations.

16 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 426 muharem jahja

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or mufti- ates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Mus- lims continue to conduct nikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance practices among Macedonia’s Muslims favour men over women. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recogn- ised by the courts. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters.17

14 Inter-religious Relations

The Macedonian Parliament has a Committee for Inter-Community Rela- tions consisting of nineteen MPs, of whom seven members are from the ranks of the Macedonian (Orthodox Christians), and another seven from the Albanian (Muslims) MPs, and one member each from the Turks (Mus- lims), Vlachs (Orthodox Christians), Roma (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and Bosniaks (Muslims). The Parliament elects the members of the Committee, which considers and assesses issues in inter-commu- nity relations in the Republic and makes proposals for their solution. The Parliament is obliged to take the Committee’s assessments and proposals into consideration and to make decisions regarding them. Similar com- mittees also exist at the municipal assembly level. A ‘Map of Religious Facilities in Macedonia’ was published as well as a book ‘Religion and Culture—inextricable tie between peoples’. The edition comprises the most important speeches from the Second World Conference on Inter- Religious and Inter-Civilisation Dialogue held in Ohrid in 2010.

17 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. macedonia 427

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Citizens of Macedonia are the most religious nation in Europe, according to a global survey conducted by Gallup with 90% of the respondents say- ing they are religious.18 On 13 April 2012, a quintuple murder occurred near Smiljkovci Lake in Skopje. The police action, labelled “Monster”, undertaken following the murder, led to the arrest of Muslim men charged for allegedly being responsible for the murders. The defendants have denied the allegations. The Ministry of Interior has characterised the arrested men as Islamic fun- damentalists. The suspects themselves and the wider public have assessed the police action as arbitrary and lacking any evidence linking defendants with the murders in Smiljkovci. Muslim and Orthodox Christian parties making up the coalition govern- ment reached a political agreement on the Skopje Fortress issue, which foresees building of a museum of medieval period on the foundations of a church from the Byzantine period and an Ottoman-era museum on the foundations of an old mosque. In 2011 the government initiated construc- tion of a church-museum in Skopje (Kale) fortress; this was seen by IRCM as disturbing for the Muslim population in the neighbourhood. IRCM demanded a halt to the construction and it demanded that a mosque that was located at the fortress in the past be reconstructed as well. The construction activities were temporarily put on hold until an agreement could be reached between communities. The statement of the head of IRCM of 28 November 2012 that “unit- ing Albanian territories is God’s wish” caused media controversy and it was interpreted by the majority Christians as indicating that the IRCM is closely connected to the political situation in the country.

16 Major Cultural Events

There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cul- tural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated by the Bektashis. Another major cultural event is Hidrelez, a celebration of spring on 6 May by various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims.

18 MINA, Gallup International: Macedonians most religious in Europe?, 30 July 2012.

MALTA

Martin R. Zammit1

1 Muslim Populations

The National Statistics Office (NSO) of Malta has never conducted a cen- sus that records the numbers of Muslims in Malta.2 Malta’s main Imam, Sheikh Muhammad el-Sadi estimates that there are about 6,000 Muslims in Malta, which is 1.44% of the total population of 417,617.3 The majority are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Mid- dle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’is worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Islamic Centre (Corradino Hill, Paola). Around 2,500 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. Imam el-Sadi reports that about 350 native Maltese have converted to Islam. Islam reached Malta in 870 CE with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. Under Norman rule (1091–1194), Muslims co-existed peacefully with the other inhabitants. According to the report of the Royal Administrator Giliberto Abate (c. 1241 CE), out of a total of 1,119 households in the Mal- tese archipelago, made up, most probably, of crown serfs, 836 (75%) were Muslim (681 in Malta, and 155 in Gozo).4 The Muslims were expelled by the Hohenstaufen King Frederick II of Sicily sometime before 1250. Dur- ing the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam returned to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close politi- cal and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Mus- lims from various Arab countries settled in Malta and in 1984 the Islamic Centre at Corradino Hill, Paola was established. The 1992 United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie issue led to Malta being Libya’s

1 Dr Martin R. Zammit is a senior lecturer in the Department of Oriental Studies, Uni- versity of Malta. 2 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (315.2km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. Source: National Statistics Office, Valletta, Malta. 3 NSO figures from the Demographic Review 2010. Valletta, National Statistics Office, 2011. See: www.nso.gov.mt/statdoc/document_file.aspx?id=3173, page 4, accessed 21 Janu- ary 2013. 4 Dalli, Charles, Malta. The Medieval Millennium, Malta: Midsea Books Ltd, p. 111. 430 martin r. zammit only gateway to the world, and the number of Libyans in Malta increased substantially. Since Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the number of Libyan visitors has fallen dramatically as a result of visa restric- tions. In general, Arab Muslims in Malta retain Arabic as the language of communication among themselves, but switch to Maltese or English with other members of Maltese society. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims generally integrate well into the Maltese social context. They live in various towns and cities on the island of Malta, with a minority of about 80, mainly foreign Muslims, living on the smaller, second island, Gozo.

2 Islam and the State

Malta’s Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.5 The main Imam of the Islamic Centre is appointed by the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) (see below, section 3) and his appointment is endorsed by the Maltese state. He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community, and he is the official point of contact between the Muslim community and the Mal- tese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the WICS and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy dip- lomatic immunity. The Imam maintains good relations with state and religious authorities, and has regular access to them. Nevertheless, Islam is not recognised by law, and so the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, nor do Muslims enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) in Tripoli, Libya, estab- lished the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola PLA 9037, Malta, tel.: ++356 21697203, fax: ++356 21697574). The Centre aims at pro- viding services for the Muslim community, acquainting the Maltese public with Islam, and fostering interfaith dialogue. It provides religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for about 500 wor- shippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers

5 About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics. malta 431

Arabic and courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, the Centre includes a conference hall, a library, offices, a playground, and the Imam’s residence. The Centre is responsible for the translation and publication of religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the Hajj, and promotes a number of cul- tural and social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School (www.mariamalbatoolschool.com) was established within the Islamic Centre’s precincts. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. The presi- dent of the Malta branch is Mr Laiq Ahmad Atif ([email protected]; www.ahmadija.org.mt).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Apart from the official mosque at Paola, which is regularly frequented by both local and foreign Muslims, including students, Muslims use other, unofficial, places of worship in the following localities: San Ġwann, Buġibba, Il-Marsa, Tal-Pieta’, Ħal Far and l-Imsida. The Mater Dei General Hospital, apart from a chapel for Catholic services, also includes a space for interfaith prayer.

5 Children’s Education

Whereas Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is guaran- teed, neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students are given the option of attending religious education classes or taking alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. It was opened in 1997 and is situated within the precincts of the Islamic Centre, Corradino Hill, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which oper- ates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese national curriculum, the school also offers Islamic courses. The school accepts stu- dents from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds and during the scholastic year 2011–2012 the number of registered students reached 300, mostly Maltese nationals. The school employs 30 members of staff, mostly Maltese Catholics and operates on a strictly charitable basis, with fees kept to a minimum. During 2012, the school received no government 432 martin r. zammit funding and faced serious financial difficulties. Until the year 2010, the school used to receive some funds from Libya. However, as a result of the momentous events in Libya, the school received no financial assistance from that country. The situation was partly remedied following the allo- cation of a loan of 250,000 Euros by the Maltese government. The school is constantly expanding and the WICS has requested the Maltese govern- ment to allocate additional land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. This mat- ter is under government consideration. In addition, the Libyan Education authorities are responsible for the Al-Fateh Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students, all of whom are Muslims, and follows the Libyan educa- tional curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Department of Oriental Studies in the Faculty of Arts at the Univer- sity of Malta runs academic courses on Islam and the Near East, including, among others, undergraduate, Masters and PhD programmes in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies. Courses covering are also offered at the Faculty of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the University library. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Pal- estinian students, and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. The official imam serving at the Islamic Centre (Corradino Hill, Paola) has received his for- mal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish ceme- tery’. It replaced an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any mosque, the Turkish cemetery was also used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006 a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile, the Maltese government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in malta 433

Paola to the WICS for burial purposes. The land belongs to the Maltese state. The first burials took place there in 2007.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. Maltese prisons and ille- gal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim worship, and a space has been allocated for interfaith worship at the Mater Dei hospital. The Imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Maltese prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar.

9 Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese govern- ment, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ‘Id al-Adha is also attended by a substantial proportion of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered at the Maltese Civil Abattoir in Marsa. Around 40 pilgrims from Malta performed the Hajj in 2012.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Private halal slaughter is not allowed, and all slaughter of livestock takes place at the official Civil Abattoir. Slaughter at the Abattoir is in line with halal standards, but members of the Muslim community are given access to the Abattoir to ascertain that these standards are maintained. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are available in most supermarkets and shops. There are at least four halal butchers in Malta catering primar- ily to the Muslim community, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. A local travel agent specialises in Hajj travel. Islamic banking and finance are not yet available in Malta.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and private schools. The hijab is worn quite 434 martin r. zammit commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab. For identity pur- poses, in connection with the issue of identity cards and passports, women are required to uncover their hair, and the niqab is not permitted.

12 Publication and Media

The Centre regularly publishes books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an.6 Moreover, it has regularly participated in the annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Mariam Albatool School maintains its own internet website (www .mariamalbatoolschool.com), and so does the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Malta (http://ahmadiyyamalta.org/). The Imam, members of his community, and the President of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues.

13 Family Law

On the basis of a special agreement between Malta and the WICS, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre, although such marriages are not legally recognised. Subsequently, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises such civil marriage. Islamic divorce documents are not recognised either. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved, and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular law of the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

No interreligious events with Muslim participation were held during 2012.

6 Zammit, M.R. and M. el-Sadi, Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008). malta 435

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media sporadically cover the situation of Muslims in Malta. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim commu- nity is, in general, unproblematic. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune to some degree of negative prejudice and racism.7 Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are arraigned in court on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands on dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention cen- tres on the island.8 In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situa- tion, believing it to have potential negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of Malta’s limited size and resources.

16 Major Cultural Events

During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are usually organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night, including talks on various topics given by local and for- eign guest speakers, as well as poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the members of the Muslim community.

7 According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS): Data in Focus Report 2: Muslims, published on 28 May 2009, 71% of young North and Sub- Saharan African Muslims in Malta feel discriminated against. The report states: “The high levels of experienced discrimination should be nuanced as they affect primarily asylum seekers, who enter the country in disproportionate numbers to those in other Member States and to the size of the country’s population, as UNHCR figures show” (p. 6). The survey can be accessed at: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/eu-midis/eumidis_muslims_en.htm. 8 Apart from the illegal migrants held at two detention centres, as of 31 December 2012, a total of 2156 other migrants reside in five open centres and other institutional households. The majority of these migrants are from Somalia (55%) and Eritrea (18%) (Information supplied by the Information Office of the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers—Malta).

MOLDOVA

Aurelia Felea1

1 Muslim Populations

The first encounters with exogenous Islamic factors probably took place as early as the 13th–14th centuries. While the encounters took place for a number of centuries with variable intensity and in various forms,2 there are no historic Muslim communities and continuous Islamic traditions on the territory of the modern Republic of Moldova. The census carried out in Moldova 5–12 October 2004 recorded 3,383,332 inhabitants.3 Regarding religion, 3,158,015 people (over 93% of the total population) declared themselves Orthodox Christians and 1,667 people (0.05%) declared that they were Muslims, of whom 1,075 were male, 592 female and 339 children under 15. Most Muslims (1,353 people) live in urban areas, the majority in the country’s capital, Chişinău (995) and in the city of Bălţi (106); 314 live in rural areas.4 The census recorded 259 Arabs, 891 Azeris, 108 Chechens, 256 Kazakhs, 211 Tajiks, 974 Tatars, 269 Turks, 220 Turkmen and 416 Uzbeks.5 The presence of these citizens

1 Aurelia Felea is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, State Uni- versity of Tiraspol, Chişinău, Moldova. 2 Nesterov, Tamara, “Monumente de arhitectură musulmană la Orheiul Vechi (Monu- ments of Muslim architecture in the Orheiul Vechi area), Sud-Est. Revistă de artă, religie, cultură şi civilizaţie, vol. 2, no. 48 (2002), pp. 118–122; Maxim, Mihai, “Principatele Romane şi Imperiul Otoman (1400–1878) (The Romanian principalities and the Ottoman Empire [1400–1878]), in Stephen Fischer-Galaţi, Dinu C. Giurescu and Ioan-Aurel Pop (eds.), O isto- rie a românilor (A History of the Romanians) (Cluj-Napoca: Fundaţia Culturală Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1998), pp. 128–147; Chirtoagă, Ion, Sud-Estul Moldovei şi stânga Nistrului (1484–1699). Expansiunea şi dominaţia turco-tătară (The South-East of Moldova and the Left Bank of the Nistru (1484–1699): The Turkish-Tatar Expansion and Domination) (Bucharest: Fundaţia Culturală Română, 1999), pp. 89–103. 3 This report only contains information on the territories effectively controlled by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and does not refer to the situation in the separat- ist region of Transnistria, including the city of Bender, unless specifically stated. 4 Recensământul populaţiei 2004, vol. I Caracteristici demografice, naţionale, lingvistice, culturale (Population Census. Demographic, National, Linguistic, Cultural Characteristics) (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrală, 2006), pp. 476–485. 5 Recensământul populaţiei 2004, vol. I Caracteristici demografice, naţionale, lingvistice, culturale (Population Census. Demographic, National, Linguistic, Cultural Characteristics) (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrală, 2006), pp. 301–302. 438 aurelia felea is particularly the result of the ethno-social mobility process promoted by the Soviet regime (1944–1991). Although they are representatives of ethnicities that traditionally claim an Islamic cultural background, this does not necessarily mean that they are practitioners of Islam. Voluntarist policies carried out by the government in the period from 2001 to 2009 in the sphere of identity building (in its ethnic, linguistic and religious aspects), as well as the involvement of the ideological factor in the pro- cess of accomplishing the census, has led to the increased questionability of the data published. The leadership of the Islamic community in Mol- dova states that there are 17,000—20,000 Muslims in the country, 4,000 of whom are Moldovan citizens.6 Muslims temporarily established in the country perform economical, commercial, cultural, diplomatic activities. People coming from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yemen and other places study in Chişinău universities. The State University of Medicine and Pharmacy “Nicolae Testemiţanu,” whose classes are attended by most foreign citizens, has special representative offices for Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Moldova hosts refugees from Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kyr- gyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia (Chechnya), Syria, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. A considerable influx of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Syria and Bangladesh was registered in 2012, sometimes transiting Russia and Ukraine.7 Some of them expressed their intention to depart to other European countries since the local labour market offers them few chances of employment.8

6 The information on the Islamic community is preponderantly based on data of foreign diplomats on the citizens of their countries residing in the Republic of Moldova together with their families: personal interviews conducted by the author. 7 See http://societateapentrurefugiati.blogspot.com/2012/05/refugees-in-moldova-need- more.html, accessed 7 February 2013; Jurnal de Chişinău, no. 48 (1059), 1 July 2011; no. 51 (1062), 12 July 2011. 8 Obreja, Diana, “Salim ar vrea să rămână în Moldova, dar crede că nu prea are aici perspective. El spune că doreşte să plece cât mai degrabă în altă ţară din Europa” (Salim would like to stay in Moldova, but he doesn’t think he has many prospects here. He says he wishes to depart to another country in Europe as soon as possible): available at http:// societateapentrurefugiati.blogspot.com/2012/03/salim-ar-vrea-sa-ramina-in-moldova-dar .html, accessed 7 February 2013. moldova 439

2 Islam and the State

The Republic of Moldova is a secular state with no state religion. The most important laws regarding religion and confessional liberty are the follow- ing: the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted by the Parlia- ment on 29 July 1994;9 the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova;10 the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations;11 the Law on the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion.12 According to the Constitution, the state recognises and guarantees the rights of all citizens to preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cul- tural, linguistic and religious identity (Art. 10.2); citizens are equal before the law and public authorities, regardless of race, nationality, ethnic ori- gin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social status (Art. 16.2); freedom of conscience is guaranteed (Art. 31.1); reli- gions are autonomous and separate from the state (Art. 31.4). The Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizen- ship in the Republic of Moldova guarantees to the people indicated in the title of the document freedom of conscience, opinion and expression (Art. 14). The Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minori- ties and the Legal Status of their Organisations states that people belong- ing to national minorities have the right to choose their confession, to carry out, individually, or together with their coreligionists, educational religious activities in their native language or in other languages that they choose, to perform rituals, to maintain places of worship, to use religious

9 “Constituţia Republicii Moldova” (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova”), Moni- torul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 1, 18 August 1994, pp. 5–32. 10 “Lege nr. 275-XIII din 10.11.94 cu privire la statutul juridic al cetăţenilor străini şi al apatrizilor în Republica Moldova”, modificată în 1998–2008 (Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova No. 275- XIII of 10 November 1994, with amendments adopted in the 1998–2008 period), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 20, 29 December 1994, pp. 13–14. 11 “Lege nr. 382-XV din 19.07.2001 cu privire la drepturile persoanelor aparţinând minorităţilor naţionale şi la statutul juridic al organizaţiilor lor” (Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations No. 382-XV of 19 July 2001), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 107 (831), 4 September 2001, pp. 16–18. 12 “Lege nr. 125-XVI din 11.05.2007 privind libertatea de conştiinţă, de gândire şi de reli- gie“, modificată la 27.12.11 (Law regarding the liberty of conscience, thought and religion, no. 125 of 11 May 2007 modified on 27 December 2011), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Mol- dova, no. 127–130 (3014–3017), 17 August 2007, pp. 8–12. 440 aurelia felea literature and objects of worship. According to the same law, persons belonging to national minorities can exercise their rights both individu- ally as well as in association with others, within the limits of the law, in organisations (associations, communes, communities, societies etc.) of an educational, religious and charitable character (Art. 18). A state body, the Bureau for Interethnic Relations is responsible for the promotion of state policy in the area of interethnic relations, including the granting and coor- dination of state funding (Art. 20.1–3; Art. 25). The Law Regarding Religions and their Component Parts, promulgated on 2 August 2007, was amended by Parliament on 27 December 2011 and renamed the Law on the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion. In the new edition the procedure to register the religions and their com- ponent parts, warning procedures and suspension of their activities was clarified. Registration provides confessional groups with equal status, including permission to: acquire property; open bank accounts; receive, as legal entities, donations from physical and legal entities from within the country and from abroad; hire employees; and obtain authorisations for the building of religious institutions and places of worship. Since Octo- ber 2007, the registration of religious organisations is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. Confessions were requested to refrain from publicly expressing or manifesting their political preferences (Art. 15.2); campaigning for the elections and/or financial or material support for electoral competitors may lead to the suspension of the group’s activity (Art. 24.2f). The law maintained the provision that “the state admits the particular importance and primordial role of the Christian-Orthodox reli- gion and respectively the Orthodox Church of Moldova in the life, history and culture of the Republic of Moldova” (Art. 15.5). National religious lead- ers must be citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Although the legislation confirms equal rights before the law and pub- lic authorities as well as the forbidding of confessional discrimination, in practice deviations from these provisions are noted. Most religious com- munities are integrated in the Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC), which reports to the Russian Orthodox Church. During the recent Communist period (2001–2009), the MOC enjoyed a privileged status. Government contributed heavily to renovation of the churches of the MOC. Between 2000 and 2009, the executive authorities rejected all requests from Islamic communities in the country regarding the registration of the Muslim faith. In this period, the law enforcement bodies subjected Mus- lims to extensive harassment and intimidation. Muslim meetings in pub- lic, and sometimes even in private, were restricted by states authorities. moldova 441

Occasionally, pressure and abuse were documented on video.13 Dispersal by police of a group of Muslims praying in a private space and the harass- ment to which they were subjected by the authorities was the basis of the ECHR decision on Moldova, issued on 12 May 2009.14 No other religious community from the country was treated in a similar way, except the Metropolitan of Bessarabia and a group originating from China. On 14 March 2011, the Ministry of Justice officially registered the first Muslim organisation—the Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova.15 On this occasion, the League held a festive meeting in the Palace of the Republic on 17 April 2011.16 Founders and leaders of this organisation stated, on different occasions, that the League’s mission is to provide Muslims with favourable conditions to practice their religion, to spread “correct” knowledge concerning it, “based on unique beliefs” that reject extremism, to coordinate the development of Islam in Moldova, to inter- act with current or future Muslim associations, regardless of their ethnic composition, therefore representing the interests of these communities both inside and outside the country.17

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova (Mufti: Sergiu Sochirca) is the only organisation recognised by the state as a Muslim confessional entity (Mesager street 9, Chişinău MD-2009, tel.: ++373 22922755, email: [email protected], www.ligaislam.md). Another Muslim community named “Gradinile linistii” (The Gardens of Peace) (leader: Talgat Masaev), has public organisation status (Rezeni 1, Ialoveni MD-7727, tel.: ++373 79156707, www.islamvmoldove.com). A number of requests for recognition by the state as a religious organisation,

13 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrHdYC0rxIg&feature=related, accessed 9 March 2013; www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kfn7PUyFOI&feature=related accessed 9 March 2013. 14 “The ECHR ruled that the state should not have punished members of an unregis- tered religious denomination for praying or otherwise manifesting their religious beliefs. Such actions by the state, the court ruled, amount to the exclusion of minority beliefs not formally registered by the state, and a dictation by the state regarding what persons could believe.” www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127325.htm; www.menneskeret.dk/files/Doeker PDF/CASE_OF_MASAEV_v._MOLDOVA.pdf, accessed 7 May 2013. 15 See http://rson.justice.md/organization/view/5928, accessed 9 March 2013. 16 See http://politik.md/?view=articlefull&viewarticle=5983, accessed 9 March 2013. 17 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aDZfl8Flt8&feature=related; www.youtube.com/ watch?v=IrHdYC0rxIg&feature=related; www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMBNcCyWlBw&fea ture=related, accessed 9 March 2013. 442 aurelia felea submitted by this group beginning 29 August 2000, have failed. Talks have taken place in recent years between the leaders of the Islamic League and the “Gardens of Peace” organisation regarding the merger of the two com- munities. It seems, however, that due to some diverging approaches to the teachings of Islam, the unification will not take place. On 29 November 2010, the Ministry of Justice registered a public asso- ciation “Liga Femeilor Musulmane din Moldova” (the League of Muslim Women in the Republic of Moldova) (led by Natalia Tcacenco, Nicolae Sulac street 4/18, Chişinău MD 2075). Azeris, Tajiks, Tatars, Turks, Turkmens, Uzbeks have established ethno- cultural communities which claim a common background of Islamic cultural traditions. Most of these organisations are small and have no web- sites, but many can be contacted via the Bureau for Interethnic Relations (Alexei Mateevici street 109/1, Chişinău MD-2009, tel.: ++373 22235040, email: [email protected], www.bri.gov.md).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Before the official registration of Islam, it was known that there were a number of Muslim places of worship in which religious service was per- formed. As the community did not have legal status, the activity of these places was not transparent. The mosques were located in former com- mercial-industrial units which had not functioned for a long time, with poorly heated and precariously equipped spaces. After the registration, the Islamic League started building a mosque. The building, whose construc- tion is almost finished, is well lit and spacious. It is equipped with technical equipment, a small library and separate rooms for men and women. The Gardens of Peace organisation has a more modest location, rented in the area of the Chişinău railway station. Both places host numerous religious activities. Religious service is carried out in them, including the collective prayer on Friday, while on Saturday and Sunday, women take classes of Arabic and teachings of Islam. The mosques are attended by Moldovan and foreign citizens. In the capital and outside Chişinău (particularly in Bender) there are a few prayer houses. A group of Turkish citizens have their own centre of religious communication and socialisation. moldova 443

5 Children’s Education

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, state education is secular (Art. 35.8). The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion stipulates: “Moral-religious education in state schools of all levels is optional except for the cases stipulated in agreements and con- ventions on cooperation between the state and religions” (Art. 32.7). The primary level school programme includes “Moral-spiritual education” as a compulsory subject. In this class, children are taught the notions of truth, kindness, peace, patriotism, wisdom, tolerance, justice and others. The study is aimed toward contributing to the formation of a humanistic vision of the pupil concerning the natural and social environment. These classes are attended by children of various confessions, including Islam. The learning process takes place apparently without conflicts. The text- books and the materials used for this subject are mostly based on the Christian religion, though there are references to other religious systems, including Islam. Some teachers encourage Muslim children during the classes to tell their classmates about Islamic religious holidays and about important personalities of the Muslim civilisation.18 There were also cases in which teachers of a Christian confession have unofficially transformed the “Moral-spiritual education” subject into a course on Christianity, although the classes are also attended by children of other confessions, including Islam.19 During the first decade of the Republic of Moldova’s existence as a state, religion was taught during a number of non-compulsory courses— “History of religions”, “Christian Orthodox education”20—organised by

18 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 19 “Tineretul degradează pe zi ce trece, neavând un fundament religios. Interviu cu Andrei Cociug, profesor de educaţie moral-spirituală la liceul „George Meniuc“ din muni- cipiul Chişinău” (Youth degrades by the day in lack of a religious foundation. Interview with Andrei Cociug, Teacher of moral-spiritual education at the „George Meniuc“ Lyceum in Chisinau), Flux. Cotidian Naţional, no. 44 (729), 4 December 2009, available at www .flux.md/articole/8359/, accessed 6 February 2013; personal interviews conducted by the author. 20 The following textbooks and methodical materials were published for this sub- ject: Educaţie creştin-ortodoxă. Explicarea celor zece porunci. Manual pentru clasa a III-a (Christian-orthodox education. Explanation of the ten commandments. Textbook, 3rd grade) (Chişinău: F.E.P. “Tipografia Centrală”, 2006); Educaţie creştin-ortodoxă. Explicarea Sfintelor Taine. Manual pentru clasa a IV-a (Christian-orthodox education. Explanation of the Holly Sacraments. Textbook, 4th grade) (Chişinău: F.E.P. “Tipografia Centrală”, 2007); Educaţie creştin-ortodoxă. Manual pentru clasa a II-a (Christian-orthodox education. Textbook, 2nd grade) (Chişinău: Bons Offices SRL, 2010). 444 aurelia felea a few secondary education institutions. In the 2001/2002 academic year, religion was only studied in a few dozen schools.21 Initiatives by politi- cal parties, groups of clerics and public organisations to introduce a com- pulsory subject dedicated to the majority religion in the school curricula were rejected every time by the authorities. Officials from Parliament, the Ministry of Education and other institutions argued, among other things, that this innovation may restrict the freedom of conscience of certain cat- egories of citizens. On 2 July 2010, following some months of discussion, the Government issued Decision Nr. 596, stipulating the inclusion of the subject Religion (not Basis of Orthodoxy, as the Metropolitan of Moldova had earlier requested), in the school schedule of primary and secondary education institutions (grades 1 to 9), beginning on 1 September 2010. The course is taught optionally, based on the request of parents or legal guardians of the children if the students wish to study religion. The Metropolitan was unsatisfied with the solution adopted by the Ministry.22 “The study groups are formed based on the requests from the parents. According to the Min- istry of Education, the course is taught an hour per week by teachers or priests.”23 Most of these people are teachers that have attended training seminars in the field of teaching religion. Persons who teach the respec- tive subject must be accredited by a special commission created by the Ministry of Education. Two curricular documents were approved by the Ministry: “Religion—the orthodox religion for grades 1 to 9” and “Religion for the teaching of evangelist rite and seventh day Adventist rite Christi- anity for grades 1 to 9.”24 In the 2010/2011 school year, the respective sub-

21 Praporşcic, Sergiu, “Dezbateri în Parlament asupra introducerii studiului religiei în școli (Debates in Parliament on introduction of Religion Studies in schools), available at www.europalibera.org/content/article/24392893.html, accessed 9 March 2013. 22 See www.jurnal.md/ro/news/mitropolia-moldovei-nemul-umita-de-introducerea-religiei- in-coala-192750/, accessed 9 March 2013. 23 Moşin, Octavian, “Tendințe ale implementării Religiei în învățământul preuniversi- tar din Republica Moldova” (Tendencies of implementing Religion in the preuniversitary education of the Republic of Moldova), available at http://mitropolia.md/tendinte-ale- implementarii-religiei-in-invatamantul-preuniversitar-din-republica-moldova/, accessed 6 February 2013. 24 Să ne cunoaştem credinţa. Ghidul profesorului. Clasele a V-a–a IX-a (Let’s know our faith. Teacher’s guide, Grades 5th to 9th); Religia pentru predarea creștinismului de rit evanghelic și adventist de ziua a șaptea pentru clasele I–IX (Religion for the teachings of evanghelist rite and seven day adventist rite christianism for grades 1st to 9th), available at http://edu.gov.md/ro/invatamint-preuniversitar/, accessed 9 March 2013. moldova 445 ject was studied by 76,000 students while in the 2011/2012 school year by 69,000 (of the total 360,000 students nationwide by 7 September 2012).25 The children of Muslim families can acquire basic knowledge of Islam at special meetings organised every Saturday and Sunday, on the prem- ises of certain Muslim religious and public organisations. In recent years, Muslim children have, together with the adults, attended summer camps organised in the country and abroad (in Ukraine), for recreation and to study the teachings of Islam.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion dedi- cates a special chapter to moral-religious and theological education (Chap- ter VI). According to this document, religions and their components are free to organise the education for the training of their own staff (Art. 32.1). Religious groups and communities may found theological institutions of any level, with a distinct statute or with a statute of extension for spe- cialised institutions from the country and from abroad (Art. 32.2). Theo- logical institutions have the right to request the accreditation of the state (Art. 32.3). Students of these institutions benefit from all the rights and facilities provided for students of the state education (Art. 32.5). There are no Islamic theological institutes in Moldova. History, foreign languages, political science and international relations departments of universities offer courses on the Arab civilisation, the past and the pres- ent of countries located in the cultural perimeter of Islam. From time to time, these institutions organise courses of modern Arabic and Turkish languages. Scientific research carried out for a number of decades by archaeologist historians in the Orheiul Vechi site, which have also stud- ied the medieval Islamic relics in the area must also be mentioned. The Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova is also interested in training spiritual leaders outside the country. A delegation of the Islamic League was invited to the “Islam and Islamic Studies in Ukraine” conference which took place in Donetsk, on 27 Sep- tember 2012. The event was attended by scientists, religious leaders and

25 Barbăroșie, Liliana, “Interviul dimineții cu vice-ministrul Tatiana Potâng despre stu- diul religiei în școli” (Interviu with deputy Minister Tatiana Potang on the study of religion in schools), available at www.europalibera.org/content/article/24700569.html; www.euro palibera.org/audio/audio/369612.html, accessed 18 February 2013. 446 aurelia felea public persons from Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. After the conference, the leaders of the “” Muslim organisation of Ukraine and the Islamic League of the Republic of Moldova signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation.26

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The procedures for creating, maintaining and closing cemeteries are laid out in the government’s Regulation on Cemeteries.27 The regulation on cemeteries stipulates the right of every citizen of the Republic of Moldova to burial and preservation of the grave, according to the traditions of their people. The legislature decided, on 27 December 2011, to supplement the Law Regarding the Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion with the following provision: “Religious groups and their component parts have the right to carry out their funerary ceremonies according to characteris- tic teachings” (Art. 14.3). There are no separate Islamic cemeteries in the country. The Muslim dead are usually buried in Orthodox Christian cemeteries. There is a sec- tor in the biggest cemetery of the country’s capital in which Muslims are buried. Following official registration, the Islamic League has the right to manage this sector in its own name.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion estab- lishes the right of religious communities to perform religious service in orphanages, placement centres for children, boarding homes, homes for the elderly and the disabled persons, penitentiaries, military institutions, medical institutions, education institutions, police stations and other insti- tutions, at the request of the people located there and with authorisation from the administration of the respective institutions (Art. 26.2). In the last decade, the placement of Orthodox religious objects in public places:

26 See http://islam.com.ua/news/10607/; http://islam.in.ua/3/rus/full_news/12039/visible type/1/index.html, accessed 7 February 2013. 27 “Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 1072 din 22.10.1998 despre aprobarea Regulamentului cu privire la cimitire” (Government Decision no. 1072 of 22 October 1998 regarding the approval of the Regulations on cemeteries), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 100–102 (373–375), 12 November 1998, pp. 47–50. moldova 447 schools, clinics and hospitals, police stations, etc. has been observed with increasing frequency. Public sources have reported that Orthodox spiri- tual confessors provide services in prison, to the Armed Forces, in the Border Guard College of Ungheni, etc.28 In some military units there are even chapels. Several times, inmates have contacted Muslim organisa- tions, through friends or family, for books and worship-dedicated objects such as carpets.29

9 Religious Festivals

The list of Moldovan official holidays celebrated at the state level does not include any Muslim festival. Islamic religious celebrations are organised in private or by Muslim communities. Muslims and non-Muslims who are close to the hosts are invited to participate. Last year, Ramazan Bay- ram (‘Id al-Fitr) and iftar dinner were both widely attended at the Islamic League’s headquarter. Animal sacrifices take place on the annually cel- ebration of ‘Id al-Adha by various Muslim groups and some of the meat is donated. Especially in the period of the Christian and Islamic holidays when two or three generations of relatives gather, intercultural and inter- religious communication requests specific attention and much empathy. The line of religious differences starts passing increasingly clearly through families, through social groups are characterised by family solidarities that are still very strong, especially in the rural environment.30 Sometimes, cel- ebrations by Muslims from inside the country are presented in the mass media.31

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Supermarkets have been offering halal meat for a few years now. Lately, halal products have been sold in a couple of small meat shops. Halal food is also sold in the Chişinău Central Market, the largest of its kind in the city. A recent phenomenon is the delivery of halal meat from the big local

28 Jurnal de Chişinău, no. 83 (1094), 4 November 2011; no. 89 (1100), 25 November 2011; Timpul, no. 219 (1662), 24 November 2011. 29 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 30 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 31 “Ramadanul în lume și în Republica Moldova” (Ramadan in the world and in the Republic of Moldova), available at www.europalibera.org/content/article/24287630.html, accessed 9 March 2013. 448 aurelia felea producers to the shops of the country. They also started contemplating export activities, possibly oriented toward the former Soviet area.32

11 Dress Codes

Women wearing the hijab can sometimes be observed in public places. These are often Moldovan women married to foreign Muslims or women who have come to Moldova from Muslim-majority countries with their husbands. The law does not stipulate special photographs for the docu- mentation of women who do not want to remove the Islamic veil. Muslim women also have the option of being photographed at the office for the documentation of the population by a female photographer. There are no legal restrictions referring to religious clothing in public places. Wearing the Islamic head scarf at the place of work does not cause controversy. However, banks appear to be strongly opposed to the wearing of hijab, although it is allowed to women working in other places, even if they teach in universities.33

12 Publications and Media

The Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion gives religious groups the exclusive right to create mass media for their adher- ents, to publish, purchase, import, export and spread religious literature (Art. 29.a). The state practises a preferential fiscal policy for religions (Art. 43.1). Although the legal framework allows registered religions access to public broadcasting of the essentials of their beliefs, the Islamic League does not for the moment have the means necessary to launch such activi- ties. Nonetheless, the Muslim Women’s League of Moldova has initiated the publishing of a magazine for women. During almost two decades, printed materials for the propagation of the Islamic religion were brought to the Republic of Moldova, including to the National Library as purchases or donations from Romania, Ukraine and Russia. The Qur’an, translated into Romanian by Silvestru Octavian Isopescu in 1910, has been repub- lished in Chişinău a number of times since 1999 by the Cartier publishing house.

32 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 33 Personal interviews conducted by the author. moldova 449

13 Family Law

The Family Code, adopted by Parliament on 26 October 2000,34 includes monogamy in the range of principles on which family relations are based (Art. 2.3). To be legal, a marriage has to be performed according to the civil regulations (Art. 2.2). Religious weddings have no legal standing. Foreign citizens and people without citizenship enjoy the same rights and respon- sibilities in family relations as Moldovan citizens (Family Code, Art. 154; Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizen- ship in the Republic of Moldova, Art. 15). Muslim men, most often foreign students, officially marry local women. Yet, there are also couples that are in open relationships limited to the period of studies or residence of the men in the Moldova. Legally married couples and their children usually leave for the men’s countries of origin. Unofficial data indicate that some marital arrangements take place inside the Islamic communities, yet their essence remains opaque to the outside observer.

14 Interreligious Relations

The first law on religions of the independent Republic of Moldova, adopted on 24 March 1992, established, as part of the Ministry of Culture and Reli- gions, a body with consultative functions attended by representatives of every religion in the country; members of this council worked on a volun- tary basis (Art. 17).35 The act concerning religion which has been in force since 2007 does not stipulate the activity of a similar structure. According to the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations (Art. 25.2), there is a coordination council operating in the Bureau for Interethnic Relations as a consulta- tive body, among whose members there are also leaders of ethno-cultural associations. Generally, discussions between confessions take place in exceptional situations. Occasionally, exponents of Islam have met in recent years with some religious leaders of Moldova at meetings organised by the

34 “Codul familiei nr. 1316-XIV din 26.10.2000” (The Family Code no. 1316-XIV of 26 October 2000), Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, no. 47–48 (771–772), 26 April 2001, pp. 4–25. 35 “Legea despre culte nr. 979-XII din 24.03.1992” (Law on cults, no. 979-XII of 24 March 1992), Monitor, no. 3 (1992), pp. 32–38, here: p. 34. 450 aurelia felea

Chişinău Embassies of the US (4 July), France (14 July) and Romania (1 December).36

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The years 2011–2012 saw street protests obviously encouraged and guided by prominent figures of the majority religion.37 A church campaign calling on the Government to re-examine the decision to register the Islamic League, to modify the Law on Religions and to involve Moldovan Orthodox Church members into the decision-making process had started in 2011.38 Accusing the governing parties of not keeping their promises to the Church, Marchel, Bishop of Bălţi and Făleşti, called for renewal of the pro- tests at the end of 2011.39 In February 2012, he endorsed the street actions organised at the time in the centre of Chişinău by an opposition party.40 During the actions, the “legalisation of homosexuality and Islam” were criticised and the resignation of the Government was demanded.41

36 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 37 See the details at http://unimedia.info/stiri/foto-mitropolia-moldovei-condamna- oficializarea-islamului-in-tara-noastra-32871.html; www.teologie.net/2011/05/18/ortodocsii- din-moldova-legea-cultelor/, accessed 5 February 2013; www.publika.md/retrospectiva-2011-- legalizarea-islamului-si-adoptarea-legii-antidiscriminare_641001.html, accessed 18 Febru- ary 2013. 38 See www.teologie.net/2011/05/25/legea-cultelor-dezbateri/, accessed 5 February 2013. 39 See www.publika.md/episcopul-de-balti--marchel--ameninta-cu-proteste_600791.html; www.publika.md/indemn-bisericesc-episcopul-marchel-cheama-la-proteste_779681.html, accessed 18 February 2013. 40 Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 5 (833), 10 February 2012, available at www.flux.md/arti- cole/12907/, accessed 6 February 2013. 41 “Our people doesn’t want a or an intifada. We are Christians, we are Ortho- dox Christians. For this we are ready to even give our lives”, one of the protesters said: Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 8 (836), 2 March 2012, available at www.flux.md/articole/13053/, accessed 6 February 2013. In the same time a tendency to place, in a contestable fashion, certain information on the Islamic world which suggests associations with the agenda of the respective political party: “Comunismul—‘Islamul secolului XX’. Convorbire cu dr. Dan Dungaciu, expert în sociologia religiilor” (“Communism—‘The Islam of the 20th Century’. Discussion with dr. Dan Dungaciu, expert in the sociology of religions”), Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 45 (626), 9 November 2007, available at www.flux.md/articole/970/, accessed 7 February 2013; “CNN: Ahmadinejad despre homosexuali şi Holocaust” (CNN: Ahmadinejad on homosexuals and the Holocaust), Flux, Ediţia de Vineri, no. 35 (863), 28 September 2012, available at www.flux.md/articole/13940/, accessed 6 February 2013; Roşca, Iurie, “Proiectul ‘Rusia–Belarus–Kazahstan’—mai degrabă o intenţie, decât o elab- orare definitivată” (The “Russia-Belarus-Kazahstan” project—more of an intention than a well-defined plan”), Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 46 (874), 14 December 2012, available at www.flux.md/articole/14247/, accessed 6 February 2013; Roşca, Iurie, “În căutarea timpului moldova 451

The majority of the Bălţi Municipal Council members supported the actions of Bishop Marchel. On 23 February 2012 the local authori- ties declared the Bălţi municipality an “area of special support for the Orthodox Church of Moldova.”42 A decision by Anenii-Noi local council- men also banned public manifestations of homosexuals on the territory located under their administration.43 On 3 April 2012, clerics and parish- ioners of the eparchy led by Marchel gathered in Bălţi and demanded that newly elected president of the country Nicolae Timofti intervene to stop the adoption of the anti-discrimination law. Signatures were collected and annexed to the text of a letter sent to Nicolae Timofti and Metropoli- tan Vladimir.44 Bishop Marchel claimed that he will inform the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia on the legislative initiatives referring to dis- crimination and related debates.45 The law was heavily criticised by Neo- Protestant (Baptist) believers, themselves a minority confession.46 The adoption of the legislation on non-discrimination is part of the package of the conditions that should open the path for Moldova to enter the EU association agreements, towards the creation of a free trade area and, possibly, the liberalisation of the circulation regime for the Moldovan citizens in Europe. The Moldovan media have shown extensive interest in developments in the Middle East: the continuing instability following the Arab uprisings, the internet posting of an anti-Islamic film by a US citizen, and the fate of Moldovans caught in the fighting in Syria, as well as high-profile events regarding Muslims in Europe.

pierdut sau Ce uneşte popoarele fostei URSS?” (In search of the lost time or What unites the people of the former USSR), Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 47 (875), 21 December 2012, avail- able at www.flux.md/articole/14267/, accessed 6 February 2013. 42 See http://savatie.wordpress.com/?s=islam, accessed 5 February 2013. 43 Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 8 (836), 2 March 2012. 44 See www.publika.md/preotii-nu-se-lasa--vor-cere-astazi-de-la-nicolae-timofti-renun- tarea-la-legea-antidiscriminare_779111.html, accessed 18 February 2013; www.publika.md/ mai-multi-preoti-si-enoriasi-au-adunat-semnaturi-impotriva-adoptarii-legii-antidiscriminare_ 782571.html; www.publika.md/episcopul-de-balti-si-falesti--sustinut-de-deputatii-consiliului- municipal-balti_785941.html, accessed 9 March 2013. 45 On 14 March 2012, an important person from the Russian Patryarchi required the political class from the Republic of Moldova to abstain from adopting the law: “В Русской Церкви предостерегают власти Молдавии от принятия закона «о недискриминации»” (Russian Church cautions Moldovan authorities on adopting the “non-discrimination law), available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2073433.html, accessed 9 March 2013. 46 See www.publika.md/o-biserica-din-moldova-vrea-modificarea-manualelor-in-confor mitate-cu-dogmele-bisericesti_1215051.html, accessed 19 February 2013. 452 aurelia felea

By comparison, a much less notice is given to cultural perspectives on Islam, to the direct, immediate contacts of the Republic of Moldova with this field.47 The yearly pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca and Medina and the feast of the Sacrifice were reflected in the newscasts, especially on television. Short but informative clips, in relevant terms, were presented on the number of participants, religious rituals, and security measures taken by the authorities of Saudi Arabia etc.48 Debates and comments on websites of printed publications, television stations and social networks, regarding certain topics on Islam have been on the increase in recent years. The more and more elaborate level of speeches, the extensive area of subjects discussed and the massive involve- ment of youth is worth noticing. Portals affiliated to religious organisa- tions in the Republic of Moldova,49 blogs and forums of priests, spiritual leaders, believers, have recently been launched in the virtual space, being dedicated to the Christianity-Islam debates. In such cases, the debates carry a heavily polemic character.50

16 Major Cultural Events

In 2012, ethno-cultural associations representing minority ethnic groups in Moldova participated in a number of important public holidays: the 12th

47 “Istanbul—oraşul de pe Bosfor” (Istanbul—City on the Bosphorus), Flux. Ediţia de Vineri, no. 17 (845), 11 May 2012, available at www.flux.md/articole/13312/, accessed 7 Feb- ruary 2013. 48 See, for example, www.jurnaltv.md/ro/news/a-inceput-pelerinajul-la-mecca-403682/#; www.jurnaltv.md/ro/news/milioane-de-pelerini-la-mecca-406691/#, www.publika.md/milioane- de-credinciosi-musulmani-au-venit-la-mecca-pentru-pelerinajul-anual_1089531.html; www.publika.md/parada-militara-la-mecca-in-ajunul-festivalului-sacrificiului_1087411 .html, accessed on 7 February 2013. 49 The portal http://crestinism-islam.com/ founded on 1 June 2008 as part of the www .moldovacrestina.net/ neo-protestant (baptist) page; the www.moldovacrestina.info/ despre-portalul-moldova-crestina/ portal, with a section on Islam: www.moldovacrestina .info/category/cultul-islamic/, accessed on 5 February 2013. 50 The blog of Petru Pruteanu, hieromonk of the majority church: www.teologie.net/ ieromonah-petru-pruteanu/, as part of the www.teologie.net/ page, with a compartment dedicated to Islam, especially the relations of Christians with muslims: www.teologie.net/ tag/islam/ and the Teologie.net—Orthodox forum: http://forum.teologie.net/; the blog of Savatie Bastovoi, hieromonk, man of letters and publisher: http://savatie.wordpress.com/, with information on Islam and discussions: http://savatie.wordpress.com/?s=islam; the http://aishahdinmoldova.wordpress.com/ blog and discussions about Islam: http://aishah- dinmoldova.wordpress.com/2009/08/19/pe-cine-iubeste-si-pe-cine-nu-iubeste-dumnezeu- partea-ii/#comments, accessed 7 February 2013. moldova 453

Festival of Ethnicities of Moldova (15 September),51 the annual celebration of the symbolic date of Chişinău’s Founding, organised on 14 October, on the occasion of a major Orthodox Christian Festival,52 National Day of Wine (6–7 October, marking the grape harvest).53 At the same time, the ethno-cultural associations of Azeris, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens etc. organ- ise impressive annual spring festivals.

51 Jurnal de Chişinău, no. 71 (1181), 21 September 2012. 52 Timpul, no. 185 (1869), 15 October 2012; no. 186 (1870), 16 October 2012. 53 Timpul, no. 180 (1864), 8 October 2012; Moldova Suverană, no. 137 (1345), 9 October 2012.

MONTENEGRO

Sabina Pacariz1

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census2 of the population of Montenegro conducted between 1 and 15 April 2011, provoked many reactions among the Muslims of Montenegro and resulted in alteration of the official data in 2012. Namely, according to the data published in 2011, in the total popu- lation of Montenegro (620,029) there were 99,038 (15.97%) inhabitants of the ‘Islamic religion’ and 19,439 (3.14%) inhabitants of the ‘Muslim religion.’3 The Islamic Community of Montenegro has officially reacted, considering this situation as ‘a step forward in humiliating the followers of Islam by dividing them into two different groups.’4 The Reis (head) of the Islamic Community of Montenegro, Rifat Fejzic, who met with the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Igor Luksic on this occasion, warned that unless this error is corrected, “the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Montenegro will be forced to call the followers of Islam in Montene- gro for public denial of the results of this year’s census. Afterwards the Meshihat will inform all the relevant international institutions concerned with human rights.” In a short period of time an official letter from the director of MONSTAT (Montenegrin Statictics Agency), Mrs. Gordana Radojevic was forwarded to the address of the Meshihat5 In which she

1 Sabina Pacariz has graduated at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia, Department of Interpreting of English and . She did her M.A. studies at the Marmara University in Istanbul and is about to finish her Master’s thesis in the field of Migrations of Bosnians from Former Yugoslavia to Turkey in the period 1945–1974. She researches migrations, identity and society. 2 www.monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=534&pageid=322, official web page of the Statisti- cal Office of the Republic of Montenegro. See Popisi/Popis stanovništva 2011/Tabela CG1. Stanovništvo prema starosti i nacionalnoj odnosno etničkoj pripadnosti, accessed 1 March 2012. 3 www.monstat.org/userfiles/file/popis2011/saopstenje/saopstenje%281%29.pdf, official web page of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Montenegro, accessed 12 July 2011. 4 www.monteislam.com/novosti/reagovanje-mesihata-islamske-zajednice-u-crnoj-gori- povodom-rezultata-popisa-stanovnistva-2011, official web page of the Islamic Community in Montenegro, accessed 13 July 2011. 5 www.monteislam.com/novosti/nakon-reagovanja-islamske-zajednice-monstat- ispravio-pogresku-u-rezultatima-popisa, official web page of the Islamic Community in Montenegro, accessed 24 February 2012. 456 sabina pacariz stated that the Statistics Agency has published “more detailed and final results on the 7th of February 2012, and that certain modalities according to which data was interpreted, are now represented as one total modality (the modalities of religion—‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ are now united in a single modality—‘Islamic’).” Therefore, the results published in 2011 were considered as ‘preliminary,’ and the ones from 2012 are treated as ‘official.’ According to those, there were 118,477 (19.11%) people of Islamic religion in Montenegro at the time of the Census. In terms of ethnicity, Muslims self-identify, somewhat confusingly, as: Bosniaks (8.65%), Albanians (4.9%), Muslim6 (3.31%), Bosnians (0.068%), Bosniak Muslims (0.029%), Montenegrin Muslims (0.028%), Gorani (0.031%), Muslim Bosniaks (0,029%), Muslim (0,041%) and Turks (0,016%). The Bosniak population is mostly concentrated in the north of the country, in the so-called Sandzak region, even though lately it has been gravitating towards the capital. The Albanians of Montenegro mostly live in the south-eastern part, neighbouring Albania, and around the capital Podgorica. The “Muslims” by nationality are present in the central and south-eastern part of the country. The concept of “Muslim” by nationality was created in the times of Communist Yugoslavia to refer to all Muslims by religion who were living in the federal Yugoslav republics and recogn- ised the Serbo- of the time as their mother tongue. Muslims of Montenegro accepted Islam mostly during Ottoman rule, although the earliest contact with Islam took place during the eighth and ninth centuries, with the arrival of Arab sailors trading on the Monte- negrin coast. Islamisation reached its peak in the sixteenth century, in the period of the Ottoman Empire, when local people were converting to Islam in large numbers. The conversion of the son of the Montenegrin ruling dynasty Crnojevic to Islam is thought to have especially contrib- uted towards mass conversions.7 After the 1878 Berlin Congress,8 followed

6 Here national belonging differs from religion. In Montenegrin practice Muslims (with capital M) stands for nationality and “Muslims” for religion, a relic of Yugoslav practice. 7 Ivan I Crnojevic sent his youngest son Staniša to Sultan Bayazid II in Istanbul, in year 1485, as a guarantee for his loyalty. Ivan I Crnojevic remained to rule Zeta as an Ottoman vassal until 1490, while his son Stanisa, who through conversion became Skenderbeg, ruled as Sanjakbey of Skadar (part of Montenegro and neighbouring Skadar) from 1513 till 1528. See more in Andrijašević, Živko M. and Rastoder, Šerbo, Istorija Crne Gore (History of Mon- tenegro), (CICG: Podgorica, 2006), p. 40. 8 After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Montenegro had much smaller territory than it does today. With the Balkan war of 1912 one part of the Novi Pazar Sandzak was included montenegro 457 by the withdrawal of the Ottoman Turks, local Muslims faced serious pressure from the new Montenegrin state, including forced assimilation, exodus and even persecution. After the Second World War, Montenegro became one of the six federal republics of Communist Yugoslavia. Taking the Communist ideology into consideration, it may be said that officially none of the represented religions was especially privileged. Still, in this period Muslims migrated out of the country in much larger numbers than other religious groups. Another very important period was the collapse of federal Yugoslavia, between 1991 and 1995, followed by much sharp- ened relations between the various religious and ethnic groups, as well as nationalistic political propaganda. The Independence Day of Montenegro, 21 May 2006, bears a special significance for the Muslim community of the country, marking a ‘new era.’ It is well known that the majority of Muslims voted for independence and therefore significantly contributed towards gaining it.

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 14 of the Montenegrin Constitution, religious com- munities are separate from the state and all of them enjoy equal rights and freedoms. The state is secular. Under the jurisdiction of the Com- mission for Religious Issues, which starting from 2012 is a special depart- ment within the Montenegrin Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, finances are granted for specific projects of religious communities but they are insufficient to meet the needs of the Islamic community. There are also certain tax reliefs that the state provides to religious communities in general. In terms of regulating the relations between Islam and the state, the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Monte- negro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro, signed by the Prime Minister Igor Luksic and the Reis Rifat Fejzic on 31 January 2012 bears major importance.9 This document, apart from regulating the relations of mutual interest, also establishes the position of adherents of Islam in

in Montenegro (the cities of Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje. Berane, Mojkovac, Rozaje, Plav, Gusinje, Pec and Djakovica). See more in Istorija Crne Gore (History of Montenegro), p. 273. 9 www.monteislam.com/novosti/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori-i-vlada-crne-gore- potpisale-ugovor-kojim-se-definise-uredenje-medusobnih-odnosa, official web page of the Islamic Community in Montenegro, accessed 30 January 2012. 458 sabina pacariz

Montenegro on a formal legal level. Various aspects of the Memorandum will be examined in some of the following sections.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

All Muslims of Montenegro are organised in a single Islamic Community of Montenegro (Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori, Ul. Gojka Radonjica br 54, pf 42, 81 000 Podgorica, tel.: ++382 20622408, fax: ++382 20623812, www .islam.org.me and www.monteislam.com). The Islamic Community func- tions through its 14 regional branches. Its main administrative body is the Mashihat (Mešihat Islamske zajednice). The head of the Islamic Commu- nity is the Chief Mufti (Reis) elected every six years. The current Chief Mufti is Rifat Fejzic, elected to that position for the first time in 2003 and re-elected in 2009.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first mosque built on Montenegrin territory is the Mariner Mosque in Ulcinj, constructed by African Arab sailors in the 14th century. In 1931 it was fully devastated, and its reconstruction has been completed only recently. The reconstructed Mariner Mosque was officially opened in June 2012.10 Most of the 162 mosques,11 out of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century, were built during the Ottoman rule. In the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 61 mosques had been renovated or newly built by 2012. Nowadays there are 133 mosques and 4 masjids (mosques without min- aret) on the territory of Montenegro. Of noticeable beauty is the Hussein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja; while the biggest is the Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. In total, during 2012, four new mosques were opened: the Mariner Mosque in Ulcinj and three smaller mosques in the villages of Godusa (municipality of Bijelo Polje), Stegvasa (municipality of Ulcinj) and Bes (municipality of Bar).

10 www.monteislam.com/novosti/svecano-otvorena-dzamija-pomoraca-u-ulcinju and www .pobjeda.me/2012/06/02/dzamija-pomoraca-na-pristanu-u-ulcinju-otvorena-poslije-osam- decenija/. 11 Agović, Bajro, Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (Islamic Community in Montenegro), (Podgorica: Mešihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71. montenegro 459

An was agreement signed between the Islamic Community of Monte- negro and the Municipality of Bijelo Polje for the purchase of 3,074 square meters of land on the territory of Bijelo Polje for the purpose of building a mosque. Currently there is only one mosque in this city.

5 Children’s Education

The public education system of Montenegro does not allow for any reli- gious education within schools. As far as the Muslim community is con- cerned, primary Islamic education is organised within the mosques or mektebs12 where imams teach pupils who attend on a voluntary basis. Secondary Islamic education is offered at the Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in the Podgorica suburb of Tuzi, opened in 2008. It is the only Islamic secondary school in Montenegro. Similar to vocational schools, the cur- riculum of the Madrasa includes certain subjects taught in the state high schools, plus religious ones. Unlike in previous years, when secondary education was provided only for male students, in the school year 2012/2013 the first female students (seven in total) were enrolled for the first time in the Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in Podgorica. Significant in this respect would be the agreement signed on the 16 June 2012 between a Kuwaiti organisation “Mercy Inter- national” and the NGO “Horizonti,” established by representatives of the Islamic Community of Montenegro. It refers to the construction of the Madrasa for females in Podgorica and the construction of a Cultural Cen- tre. Another important development is the protocol signed on 5 Novem- ber 2012, between “Islam Kültür Eğitim ve Dostluk Derneği” from Turkey and the Meshihat of the Islamic Community. It regulates the construction of a Madrasa for females in Ulcinj. At the same time, the civil site works for the Madrasa for females and the Cultural Centre in Rozaje were com- pleted in 2012. In June 2012, the students from the first generation of the Madrasa grad- uated, which was celebrated with a gala ceremony on the 2 June 2012.13 Their high school diplomas were in principle recognised by the Monte- negrin State University, which allowed them to enrol in the higher state

12 Mektebs conduct various forms of educational activities, held within the mosque complex, which are aimed at teaching the religion of Islam. 13 More information in this respect will be presented in Part 16, Major Cultural Events. 460 sabina pacariz education. As of the end of 2012, however, the technical processing of the accreditation documents had not been completed. The Madrasa has become a very important symbol of identity for the Montenegrin Muslims.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher and professional Islamic education. Imams in Montenegro are not obliged to obtain higher education, and few of the Madrasa graduates become imams. The imams who have gained higher education acquired their diplomas abroad, mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Turkey, or Egypt.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims of Montenegro generally practise traditional Islamic burial. In villages and towns where a Muslim population is present separate Muslim cemeteries are usually to be found. Only in bigger cities, where the inter- action between the religious groups was much higher, and where religious identity was much less preserved, have Muslims been buried within the general city cemetery. Some graves have kept the traditional local fea- tures, typical for Muslim graves, while others have not.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no ‘chaplaincies’ in state institutions of Montenegro. Still, there are some exceptions, as in the case of the main state prison, where an imam nominated by the Mashihat has led the ‘Id (bayram) prayers.

9 Religious Festivals

The state of Montenegro officially recognises two Muslim holidays—the two ‘Ids/Bayrams. Muslim workers have the right to be absent from work for one day. On that occasion state officials usually publicly present con- gratulations to the Muslim population. In 2012, the ‘Id al-Fitr prayer from the Qazim Beg Mosque (Ćazim Begova Džamija) in Tuzi was broadcast live on the first channel of the montenegro 461

Montenegrin National Television. The ‘Id al-Adha prayer from the New Mosque (Nova Džamija) in Gusinje was broadcast in the same manner.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are two food companies in Montenegro which have officially acquired a halal food certificate, “Mesopromet Bijelo Polje,” being the first one to gain it, and “Gradina Company” from Rozaje, both are involved in meat production industry. The certificates are issued by the Agency for Certifying Halal Quality, located in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In August 2009, the Islamic Community of Montenegro signed an agree- ment with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina by which the Agency for Certifying Halal Quality expands its authority onto the ter- ritory of Montenegro. The concept of halal food was for the first time officially treated in state institutions in 2012, due to the signing of the Memorandum of Under- standing between the Government of Montenegro and the Islamic Com- munity in Montenegro. According to Article 18 of this Memorandum, “Montenegro recognises the right of the Islamic Community in Monte- negro to care for its believers who are serving in the military and police forces, and those who are in correctional facilities, hospitals and other health institutions and institutions for social care and assistance, whether private or public. Halal food, prepared with a composition of suitable items for Muslim believers, will be provided in the army, police, correc- tional facilities, hospitals and other health institutions and in institutions for care and social assistance, as well as in institutions that provide food for pupils and students.” Meetings with the army, police and health insti- tutions’ representatives were held to consider the implementation of the abovementioned article.

11 Dress Codes

Montenegrin laws are not restrictive in any sense in terms of female dress code. The Montenegrin law on ID documents allows citizens who wear a hat or a head scarf for national or religious reasons to have pictures in their ID documents in such manner.14

14 Official Gazette of Montenegro—Službeni list Crne Gore no. 12/07. 462 sabina pacariz

Article 14 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Govern- ment of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro is rel- evant here because it states: “A believer who by nationality, religion or custom wears a cap or head covering as part of a clothing can have his/ her picture taken with the cap or other head covering on and may not be discriminated against either directly or indirectly upon seeking employ- ment or as an employee, or in proceedings before state bodies and while part of the educational system as a pupil and a student.”

12 Publications and Media

The Islamic community of Montenegro issues a periodical named Elif. This is a bilingual magazine, with 19 pages written in Bosnian and five in Albanian. Apart from its monthly, the Islamic Community has also pub- lished several books with religious content—originals and translations. Its web site www.monteislam.com is of huge importance for the Muslim community, since it provides news and information on a regular basis. A novelty in terms of media is the establishment of the Islamic Radio “Radio Fatih” in 2012. With the support of the Turkish Agency TIKA, it was founded on behalf of the Meshihat of the Islamic Community. The programme is broadcasted in two languages, Montenegrin and Albanian, and it is soon expected to cover all the territories in Montenegro inhab- ited by Muslims.

13 Family Law

Family matters are under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The state recognises only civil marriages. However, Muslims practise religious mar- riage ceremonies whereby the mahr is fixed in the presence of an imam and relatives.

14 Interreligious Relations

No activities reported. montenegro 463

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Generally speaking there were no events of great importance that attracted significant attention from the media. Neither relevant opinion polls, nor debates concerning the Muslim community were organised.

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic Community of Montenegro usually organises religious con- certs (Ilahije i Kaside) in local cultural centres during the two ‘Ids and Mawlid as well as for the Muslim new year. The gala ceremony on the occasion of graduating of the first generation of students from the Madrasa “Mehmed Fatih” in Podgorica can be char- acterised as a major cultural event for 2012.15 The list of officials present on this occasion would best illustrate its significance: Prime Minister of Montenegro Igor Luksic, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Bekir Bozdag, Vice President of the Montenegrin Parliament Rifat Rastoder, Minister in the Government of Montenegro Rafet Husovic, Ambassador of the Repub- lic of Turkey Emine Birgen Kesoglu, Dean of the State University of Mon- tenegro Predrag Miranovic, the Mayor of Podgorica Miomir Mugosa, the Reis of the Islamic Community Rifat Fejzic, the President of the Turkish Agency TIKA, the Deputy Reisu-l-ulema of Turkey Dr. Ali Erbas, the Presi- dent of the Turkish diaspora Kemal Yurtnac and numerous other guests.

15 www.monteislam.com/novosti/odrzana-svecana-akademija-povodom-prve-generacije- maturanata-medrese-mehmed-fatih-u-podgorici, Official web page of the Islamic Commu- nity in Montenegro, accessed 4 June 2012. www.gov.me/vijesti/114310/Predsjednik-Vlade-Igor-Luksic.html Official web page of the Government of Montenegro, accessed 2 June 2012.

Netherlands

Martijn de Koning1

1 Muslim Populations

After the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam achieved independence, a large number of immigrants of Muslim background from these coun- tries came to the Netherlands, but today the largest groups of Muslims are migrants (and their descendants) who were recruited as labourers from Turkey and Morocco during the 1960s and 1970s; a significant number of the migrants from Turkey being ethnic Kurds. Other large Muslim groups from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia arrived later, most of them seek- ing asylum from persecution and/or escaping violence in their home coun- tries. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria. The Netherlands does not hold a census of its population but the government and various scientific institutions do have a long tradition of accumulating statistics. Early assessments made by ‘Statistics Nether- lands’ provided estimates of Muslim numbers based on ethnic origins2 but in 2005 and 2006 a new methodology was introduced based upon self-identification surveys3 which has led to a new assessment of the numbers. According to the 2007 figures, there were 825,000 Muslims in the Netherlands at the time, the majority of whom were of Turkish or Moroccan descent. Of the Turkish Dutch people, some 94% described themselves as Muslim and among the Moroccan Dutch the level was 97% with a large variety in religiosity being reported.4 It is estimated that there

1 Martijn de Koning is a post-doctoral researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen. His PhD thesis (2008) was entitled “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. He studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. See also http:// religionresearch.org/martijn. 2 Phalet, Karen and Jessica Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004). 3 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012). 4 Ibid. 466 martijn de koning are about 13,000 native Dutch convert Muslims.5 The Muslim statistics include Sunnis, Shi’is, Alevis and Ahmadis. Among the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, 89% identify themselves as ‘Sunni’ while 81% of Somali-Dutch 66% of Afghani-Dutch and 56% of Iraqi-Dutch identify themselves as Sunni (20% of the Iraqi-Dutch are Christians).6 This does not mean that the others identify themselves as Shi’i, Alevi or Ahmadi since all of these groups, in particular, the Turkish-Dutch, Moroccan-Dutch and Somali-Dutch, contain individuals who identify themselves only as Muslim without mentioning a specific branch. In the Turkish-Dutch group 7% identify themselves as Alevi. The Shi’i Muslims in the Nether- lands are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora (81% of the Iranian-Dutch), who often have a secular outlook and little sympathy for the Islamic regime in Iran.7 Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi- community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and a national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews, which pres- ent them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are divided along other lines: the Milli Görüş movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. The differences between the branches of Islam matter but Muslims are divided predominantly along ethnic lines when it comes to representation and (mosque-) organisations. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have rela- tively large Muslim populations (usually with either Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims holding the dominant position), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Unemployment among Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch Muslims is high compared with native Dutch people. The recent economic crisis has led to a sig-

5 Ibid. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam. A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuw­- kerk, K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120; Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Biography and choice: Female converts to Islam in the Netherlands,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 431–447. 6 Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers in this section are taken from Maliepaard and Gijsberts, (ibid.), pp. 71 and 87. 7 Hessels, Thomas, Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel (Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74–38879_tcm34–18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). netherlands 467 nificant growth in unemployment among non-Western migrants (includ- ing Muslims and their descendants), from around 11% in 2009 to 12.6% in 2010 and to 13% in 2012 compared with 11% in 2010 and 8% in 2011 for the native Dutch.8 Unemployment among the non-Western popu- lation in 2010 was highest in the age category 15–25 years: almost 23% in 2010 and 2011, with the highest rates found among Moroccan-Dutch (24%), Turkish-Dutch (22%) and Surinamese-Dutch (21%). Almost half of non-Westerners in this age category have temporary jobs.9 In 2012, 20% of the Moroccan-Dutch population was unemployed;10 of the women in 2010, 39% of the Moroccan-Dutch, 37% of Turkish-Dutch and 58% of the Surinamese-Dutch had a job of more than twelve hours a week (62% among native Dutch women). In general, the labour participation of women is increasing significantly as is their economic independence.11 The educational performance among migrants is improving; although the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch migrants have the lowest levels while younger people in the Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch categories are better educated (especially the girls).12

2 Islam and the State

The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relation- ship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by the state’s extensive involvement with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the ‘school funding controversy’ stimulated the passing of Article 23 into the Dutch Constitution, which established full state funding for religious (Christian) schools and safeguarded the free- dom of those schools to determine their own curricula. With this settle- ment, the foundation for what is known as ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.13 Society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually ­antagonistic

8 Gijsberts, Mérove, Willem Huijnk and Jaco Dagevos, Year Report Integration 2010, 2011, Netherlands Institute for Social Research, pp. 15–16; Year Report Integration 2011, Statistics Netherlands, pp. 96–104. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., pp. 87–88. 13 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in W.B.H.J. van de Donk et al. (eds), Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the Public 468 martijn de koning religious and ideological groups, but the overarching cooperation of ‘pillarisation’ at the elite level and the maximum autonomy allowed for each group made stable democracy possible.14 Although the country has gradually moved towards a more secular model since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have been able to use parts of the ‘pillar’ model in which reli- gious organisations were considered legitimate forms of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same rights as other reli- gious groups and, if they comply with the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition of their claims (although often after considerable struggle). The newly elected government of Social-Democrats (PvdA) and conservative Liberals (VVD) is working to ban women who wear the face veil from applying for minimum state benefits. A proposal to ban ritual slaughter was rejected by Dutch parliament (initially approved by the Tweede Kamer, the lower house, but rejected by the Eerste Kamer, the upper house, a body which always reconsiders proposals for new laws). An agreement between the Dutch state, Muslim organisations and Jewish organisations was estab- lished to ensure that the welfare conditions of animals are upheld during their ritual slaughter (a slaughter committed without first stunning the animal) without infringing religious freedom.

Ban on Face-veiling On Friday 16 September 2011, the Dutch Council of Ministers agreed to prohibit the covering of the face in public spaces.15 A general ban on face- coverings formed part of the policy of the coalition agreement between the Christian-Democrats (CDA) and conservative liberals (VVD), a minor- ity coalition supported by Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV). The Dutch gov- ernment wanted to prohibit covering the face in public from 1 January 2013 onward, describing it as a matter of public order as the face-veil would be against customs of public life in the Netherlands where people should be able to recognise each other’s faces. The practice of face-veiling

Domain: Explorations of a Double Transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338. 14 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Nether- lands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 15 Taken from Moors, A. (2011) Minister Donner as Mufti: New developments in the Dutch ‘burqa debates’. Closer—Anthropology of Muslims in Europe. http://religion research.org/martijn/2011/09/21/minister-donner-as-mufti-new-developments-in-the- dutch-‘burqa-debates’/, accessed 5 March 2012. netherlands 469 was also thought to go against the principle of equality between men and women as only women may be required to wear a face-veil. Due to the collapse of the government in 2012 over budget cuts, the newly elected government of Social-Democrats and conservative liberals has withdrawn the proposal and stated that it will draw up a new one outlawing face-covering in education, health care, public transport and public buildings. The police will be allowed to demand that people take off the face-veil for ID-checks and the government has stated that indi- viduals who do not conform to these regulations will lose their right to claim benefits.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There have been several attempts to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in the Netherlands made by both Muslims and the non- Muslim majority. Most of them have failed because of the internal reli- gious differences of the Sunni, Shi’i and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with the associations that have emerged from these groups, stating that they are not representative enough of the general Muslim population. After several incidents—for example, when imams expressed controversial opinions about homosex- uality and, in particular, after Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim—pressure from the Dutch state for Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella increased significantly. First, the Muslim Contact Agency (Contact Moslims Overheid, CMO, Koningin- negracht 63, 2514 AG Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 CE Den Haag, www .cmoweb.nl) was established, but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organi- sations excluded the Ahmadiyya organisations. The CMO unites five Turk- ish organisations: Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN, Javastraat 2, 2585 AM Den Haag, www.diyanet.nl), Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, TICF, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 EC Rotterdam, http://www.ticf.nl), both sec- tions of the Milli Görüş movement, and the Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, SICN Suley- manci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 AA Utrecht, www.sicn.nl). The CMO also includes the Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations The Netherlands (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties Nederland, UMMON, Wees- perzijde 74, 1091 EH Amsterdam, Postbus 94384), the Surinamese-Hindu- stani World Islamic Mission (WIM, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 CN 470 martijn de koning

Amsterdam, www.wimnet.org, http://www.worldislamicmission.nl), and the Shi’i Association (Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging, OSV, Postbus 1113, 3260 AC Oud-Beijerland, http://www.shiaparlement.com), which is mainly Iraqi Shi’i. These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later two other umbrella groups were established: the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam, CGI, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 HK’s-Gravenhage), which includes Sunni, Shi’i and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and the Dutch Muslim Council (­Nederlandse Moslim Raad, NMR), a national organisation of Muslims which includes Sunni, Ahmadiyya Muslims and Alevi Muslims. The CMO and the CGI now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Integration and Immigration where they are consulted by the Dutch government and information is shared. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ film Fitna, the CMO and CGI and their various member organisations played an important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and local and national authorities. However, the CMO, CGI and their member organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth, who regard them as cliques of first generation men and as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politi- cians.16 There are several other national organisations including Al Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 AA Utrecht, www.alnisa.nl), and the Association of Imams in The Netherlands (Vereniging van Imams in Nederland, VIN, Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 CG Den Haag, http://www.imamonline.nl), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent. Both are Sunni. Islam and Dialogue (Rochussenstr. 221–223, 3021 NT Rotterdam) and Dialogue Academy (Rochussenstraat 221, 3021 NT Rotterdam) are both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement. Ihsan (Dr. Cuyperslaan 51, 5622 MA Eindhoven www.ihsannet.nl) is a social work organisation active on the national level. The Islamic Women’s Network (Landelijk Islamitisch vrou- wennetwerk, LIVN, www.livn.nl) is particularly active in activities aimed at interreligious dialogue and the emancipation of women. The National

16 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteits- vorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Reli- gious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindingen en identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008). netherlands 471

Platform of New Muslims (Landelijk Platform Nieuwe Moslims, LPNM, www.lpnm.info) is a national organisation for Muslim converts (other Muslims are also welcome however) which (co-)organises lectures, often with other organisations, and hosts the annual National Converts Day—a one-day conference. Hizb ut Tahrir (www.kalifaat.org) aims to unite all Muslims in one state and revive the caliphate, but it does not seem to be a strong organisation, although it does get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ Fitna. The Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu (Stichting Islamitisch Comité van Ahlu-­Sunnah is a Salafi organisation which includes As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 KE Den Haag, www.al-.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 SV Amsterdam, http://www.eltawheed.nl). With other Salafi networks, these organisations have become the most important targets of official counter-radicalisation policies.17 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democrats (Islam-Democraten, ID, Spui 70, 2511 BT Den Haag, www.islamdemocraten.nl). It has one seat on the municipal council. In the aftermath of the debates about a ban on ritual slaughter, a group of Muslims established the Muslim Consumer Association (Moslim Consumenten Vereniging, Schuttersstraat 34 B 3034 RM Rotterdam, www .demoslimconsumentenvereniging.nl) in 2011 to raise awareness among Muslims about issues such as food, halal certificates and the quality of goods and services that cater specifically for Muslims. Several people involved with this organisation also work for Green Muslims (Groene Moslims www.groenemoslims.nl). Established in 2010, this association tries to raise awareness of environmental issues among ‘Muslim consum- ers and entrepreneurs’ in order to stimulate social and environmental responsibility among consumers and producers.

17 NCTb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding [National Coordinator Counter- terrorism]), Salafisme in Nederland (Salafism in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheids­ dienst [General Intelligence and Security Service]), Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Cur- rent Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372–392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home Grown Warriors: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 472 martijn de koning

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The general policy framework regarding mosques is usually set by the state, but its implementation is a local matter and this means that wide variations exist between municipalities. For example, some municipali- ties in the past have funded social and cultural activities run by mosques, while others receive no funds for similar activities.18 Plans to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate19 but resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.20 Currently there are over 450 mosques in the Netherlands; of these, some 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, the Milli Görüş with 35 mosques and the Süleymancis with 38 mosques), and 150 are run by Muslims of Moroccan descent. The Surinam- ese community has 25 mosques which are affiliated to the World Islamic Mission (headquartered in Bradford, UK) and have a Hanafi/ orientation. In the past they were hostile to the Ahmadiyya Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organi-

18 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1992); Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen: De hulpverlening van RCJ/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries: The social work of RCJ/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 19 Eric Roose, The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: ASSR, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam: Ayasofia, stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva ter- rein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofia, City Area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, ISIM [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23. 20 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. netherlands 473 sations and have 62 mosques.21 Of the 453 mosques about a hundred are purpose-built.22 A 2012 survey showed that while in 1998 9% of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims visited a mosque at least once a week by 2011 this had increased to 33% (and among Turkish-Dutch from 23% to 35%).23

5 Children’s Education

There are 41 Islamic schools in the Dutch public education system, two secondary and the rest primary. This represents 0.6% of all the primary schools in the Netherlands, and a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin). Like state run schools and all the other denominational schools established by religious groups, they are funded by the state and are subsumed under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between denominational and state schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in their Islamic ethos, but the school curriculum is the same as other denominational and state schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools related to the educational regime and, in some cases, problems about anti-integration syllabus content and suspicions of financial mis- management.24 State schools are not obliged to offer Islamic lessons to their pupils; however, if parents submit a request for Islamic lessons, state schools have to comply and offer these lessons within the regular cur- riculum. This applies to religious education for Christian children (and others) too. External teachers provide these lessons. Religious lessons in public schools are financed by religious institutions (designated by municipalities as religious outreach organisations) but can be subsidised by municipalities as well, although this often is not the case.

21 douwes, Dick, Martijn de Koning and Welmoet Boender, Nederlandse moslims: Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/ Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 22 stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, p. 30. 23 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012). 24 driessen, Geert and M.S. Merry, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or marginalisation”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and P. Valkenberg, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26. 474 martijn de koning

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (www.iur.nl) and the European Islamic University (www.iueurop e.com) (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as uni- versities. The private learning institute Dar al ‘Ilm (www.daralilm.nl) organises courses, lectures and conferences for Muslims who would like to develop their knowledge of the fiqh, the Qur’an and Sunna; they also organise the annual National Islam Congress. Although they are indepen- dent, they have a moderate/mild Salafi outlook. After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two academic centres for imam training were established in 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) Amsterdam (www.godgeleerdheid.vu.nl/en/organisation/ faculty-departments/center-for-islamic-theology/index.asp), and the Insti- tute of Religious Studies of the University of Leiden (www.hum.leiden.edu/ religion/).25 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in ­Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (HBO) programme for teacher, imam and chap- lain training, (www.inholland.nl/imamislamitischgeestelijkwerker.htm). All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, the CMO and CGI. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle East studies are offered at Utrecht University (www.uu.nl), Leiden University (www.leidenuniv .nl), the University of Amsterdam (www.uva.nl) and Radboud University Nijmegen (www.ru.nl).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1991, the Law on Burials and Cremation (Wet op de Lijkbezorging) was amended to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and with- out a coffin. The funeral rituals of Muslim migrants have changed since

25 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrap- portage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, European Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007). netherlands 475 the days of their immigration.26 Nowadays, parts of the ritual, such as the washing of the body, are performed in hospitals, the mosque or in the room where the funeral service takes place, rather than in people’s homes. In 2007, the National Organisation of Cemeteries (Landelijk Organisatie van Begraafplaatsen) published a handbook for Islamic burials.27 There are more than 80 Islamic burial sites (out of the total 3,500 in the Netherlands) all of them situated within municipal cemeteries. The first one was established in The Hague in 1932. In 2007 the city of Almere founded the first dedicated Islamic cemetery: Raza Ul Mawa in Almere. This cemetery is managed by the Foundation of Almere Muslims (Stichting Almeerse Moslims, Edvard Munchweg 2, 1328 MA Almere, www.alraza.nl). In 2012 a second one was established Neunen and is managed by an Islamic institution, the Islamic Burial Society (Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen Ibw www.stichtingibw.nl), but negotiations with local authorities for the founding of more dedicated Islamic cemeteries are still ongoing.28 In 2012, the Islamic Burial Society opened the first cemetery in Neunen, in the south of the Netherlands (near Eindhoven). Almere and Neunen wish to maintain an ‘eternal peace,’ meaning the graves will not be moved. The municipal cemeteries in Utrecht and Zwolle also maintain ‘eternal peace’ for the Islamic section.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are Muslim chaplains (geestelijk verzorgers) in several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly and several universities have prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. In 2009, the Dutch army recruited two Muslim (one Moroccan-Dutch and one Turkish-Dutch) clerics to give spiritual support to both Muslims and non-Muslims in the armed forces. They are civilian employees but are required to wear a uniform.

26 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Mus- lims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001). 27 Handboek Islamitisch Begraven (Handbook Islamic Burials), 2007 (see www.begra afplaats.nl/publicaties, accessed 1 May 2010). 28 Wojtkowiak, J. and G.A. Wiegers, “Moslims doen het helemaal zelf. Veranderende islamitische uitvaartrituelen in Nederland (Muslims do it all themselves. Changing Islamic burial rituals in the Netherlands)”, in H.J.M. Venbrux, M. Heessels and S.H. Bolt (eds), Ritu- ele Creativiteit (Ritual Creativity) (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), pp. 31–44. 476 martijn de koning

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are widely celebrated festivals in Muslim circles. In recent years, ‘Id al-Fitr has become a public event as most mosques have opened their doors to include non-Muslims in their celebration of the iftar meal. Several of these iftar events take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival, which offers a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, running alongside the iftar meal celebra- tion. The festival was founded by Mex-IT, a commercial organisation for intercultural management, but nowadays it is organised by the Ramadan Festival Foundation and sponsored by several municipalities, NGOs and commercial partners. In 2011, however, due to a combination of factors such as municipal cutbacks, difficulties in obtaining licenses for late eve- ning programmes and the fact that Ramadan fell in the middle of the sum- mer holidays, the Festival did not take place. The Festival did not return in 2012 as it is regarded by the organisation as not being as relevant as it used to be; whether these large events are still effective ways of building networks is also being currently questioned. There have been discussions about making ‘Id al-Fitr a national holiday but, as yet, there are no serious plans to implement this. The different dates that ‘Id falls on in different Muslim ethnic groups makes it difficult to set one date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, calling them the ‘(self-) Islamisation of Dutch ­society.’

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is important for many Muslims in the Netherlands. In par- ticular Moroccan-Dutch (94%), Somali-Dutch (83%) and Turkish-Dutch (80%) eat halal food every day. Among Iraqi-Dutch (69%), Afghani-Dutch (66%) and in particular among Iranian-Dutch (34%) the numbers are sig- nificantly lower.29 Under Dutch law, animals must be rendered uncon- scious before slaughter, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups.

29 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012), p. 14. netherlands 477

The EU Directive 93/119/EC30 requiring animals to be spared avoid- able excitement, pain or suffering during slaughter or killing and related operations, both inside and outside slaughterhouses, will be replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1099/200931 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. According to the old directive, poultry has to be stunned with 100Ma (mili-amperes) by submitting them into an electric water bath. This brings about the risk that the animal will die because of the high frequency while in some interpretations dhabiha animals (for ritual slaughter) can be stunned as long as it is reversible. The Dutch state until 2013 condones a lower amperes therefore in the case of Islamic ritual slaughter. The new EU regulation requires animals to be stunned with 150Ma and Islamic organisations fear this will make dhabiha impossible in the case of poultry. After a conference in 2012 they started negotiations with the Dutch government in order to work out a new agreement by which dhabiha will still be allowed.32 There have been attempts to produce a unified certification for halal food but so far these have not been successful resulting in a lack of trust among consumers. In many cases it is the local imams who decide whether the manner of slaughtering is halal or not and there are companies claim- ing to be halal without any recognition from Muslim organisations. There are currently a variety of certifications, such as the Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority (Halal Voeding en Voedsel, HVV/HFFIA, Postbus 16786, 2500 BT Den Haag, www.halal.nl) and Halal Correct Certification (HCC, P.B. 179, 2300 AD Leiden, www.halalcorrect.com), which is active in the Netherlands and France. The latter is a member of The World Halal Council (WHC) in Jakarta and both are members of The European Associ- ation of Halal Certifiers (AHC-Europe) in Brussels. This is an Islamic, inde- pendent, non-profit and non-governmental (NGO) institution which aims to create cooperation between, and facilitate activities among, organisa- tions in different European countries; it also strives to be the institution of reference for third parties regarding Halal affairs in Europe. A third organisation is the Control Office of Halal Slaughtering (COHS—Laan

30 Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing. http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/aw/aw_legislation/slaughter/93- 119-ec_en.pdf, accessed 13 February 2013. 31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 2009:303:0001:0030:EN:PDF, accessed 13 February 2013. 32 Statement Halal Conference, www.halalcorrect.com/images/upload/files/Statement_ Halal%20Conference2012_Engels.pdf, accessed 12 February 2013. 478 martijn de koning van Meerdervoort 53d, 2517 AE Den Haag, tel.: ++31 703469795, fax: ++31 703450033, www.halaloffice.com). COHS is also a member of the World Halal Council.33 In 2012, CMO initiated a plan to establish a unified and more compelling certification. Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butcher shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade asso- ciation estimates that there are about 3,500 butcher shops in the country, of which 10% are halal. Numerous shops and restaurants sell halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. The number of people who go on Hajj every year from the Nether- lands is estimated at around 5,000 pilgrims. This number depends on the capacity of agencies approved by the Saudi authorities for organising Hajj travels. The Saudi Embassy in the Hague granted 4,678 Hajj visas in 2012; around 85% for Dutch nationals and the rest for other nationals such as Turkish, Moroccan and Indonesians plus a small number of diplomats in the Netherlands. According to Hajj regulations, the Saudi Embassy in the Hague grants Hajj visas only for Dutch nationals or other nationals who have permanent residence in the Netherlands. There are 16 Dutch travel agents approved of by the Ministry of Hajj but there are many more active on this market although the Embassy of Saudi Arabia has stated repeat- edly that people who travel via unapproved travel agents will be refused a visa for Saudi Arabia.34 Islamic finance and mainly Islamic mortgages had been the topic of dis- cussion within the Dutch government, at conferences and also of research from 2004 to 2008.35 Different financial institutions were interested in the development of this kind of mortgage, such as the commercial banks Rabobank and ABN AMRO. After a few years of investigation, the finan- cial institutions stopped their explorations for different reasons, such as institutional obstacles. Bilaa-Riba, a financial institution which was set up

33 Bonne, K., and Verbeke, W., 2008. ‘Religious values informing Halal meat production and the control and delivery of Halal credence quality’. Agriculture and Human Values Vol. 25 (2008), pp. 35–47; Kijlstra, Aize and Bert Lambooij Ritueel slachten en het welzijn van dieren. Een literatuurstudie (Ritual slaughtering and animal welfare. A literature study) (Wageningen: Animal Sciences Group Wageningen University, 2008). 34 Ministry of Hajj Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Approved Hajj Travel Agents: Nether- lands. www.hajinformation.com/hajj_agents.php?id=13, accessed 20 February 2013. 35 The information on Islamic finance is provided by drs. Rachida Talal. She is a PhD student in Islamic finance at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands and researcher at International Macro Economic Research team of the private commercial bank Rabobank. netherlands 479 in 2006 as the first Islamic financial institution in the Netherlands, had the aim of introducing an Islamic mortgage, but ended its activities in 2008. Until now, there is no such thing as an Islamic financial market in the Netherlands but there have been some developments in recent years. In 2007, ABN AMRO launched an Islamic structured investment product, the LLB Top 20 Middle East Total Return Index Certificate. In that same year, the Minister of Finance, Wouter Bos, announced that the country would review its role in the Islamic finance industry and that the govern- ment would look into ways to attract Islamic finance to the Netherlands. A year later, Barclays launched three Amsterdam-listed Islamic invest- ment products, trackers that follow the movements on Islamic indices. On May 22, 2008, De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank—DNB) and the Nederlandse Autoriteit Financiële Markten (Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets—AFM) published a study on the potential regu- latory issues that would have to be addressed when introducing Islamic finance in the Netherlands.36 In that time the Holland Financial Centre started a working group to promote Islamic finance in the Netherlands and to attract investors from the international Islamic financial sector to the Dutch market. This initiative came to an end after a few years. Dur- ing the beginning of the global financial crisis, Islamic finance was not an important topic of discussion anymore in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, at the moment, attention to Islamic finance in the Netherlands is grow- ing again both in public debates as well as in the field of finance. Experts expect that the potential demand for Islamic finance in the Netherlands will rise in coming years as a result of a growth in population, the edu- cational and income level of Dutch Muslims, but also because there are non-Muslims who believe that Islamic financial products would be a bet- ter, and in some way a more sustainable, alternative to the conventional financial products that have failed, according to them. Several relevant conferences, such as OIKOS (February 9, 2012—“Islamic Development Finance”) and De Buren (October 9, 2012—“It’s the Economy, Stupid #5: over Gharar, Riba en Murabaha”) were organised in the last two years where the topic was discussed in depth. In particular, ending the mort- gage interest deduction (for income taxes), which is an important Dutch

36 Verhoef, Bastiaan, Somia Azahaf and Werner Bijkerk. Islamitisch financieren en toezicht: een verkennende analyse. De Nederlandsche Bank Occasional Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (2008). 480 martijn de koning political issue at this moment, is seen as a window of opportunity to intro- duce Islamic mortgages in the Netherlands.

11 Dress Codes

The head scarf is an important issue in public debate and for Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.37 Muslim girls and women (including lawyers) are allowed to wear hijab in public schools and in public institu- tions and companies, except for the police force and court of law officials. Under certain conditions, Christian schools may forbid pupils and staff to wear hijab and there are cases of women who have been refused jobs because they wear a head scarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usu- ally regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the Com- mission are, however, not binding and should be interpreted as advice based upon the Commission’s interpretation of the law. In recent years, the headscarf issue has been linked with concerns about social cohesion, integration and national identity.38 In 2003, the Ministry of Education prepared an optional dress guideline, but in 2005, the Parliament sup- ported a resolution to ban wearing the burqa in public. After legal prob- lems arose from the application of such a law, the minority government of Christian-Democrats (CDA) and Conservative-Liberals (VVD) which was condoned by the anti-Islam nativists of the Freedom Party (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, came up with a new proposal stating that burqa should be banned from 2013 onwards. The collapse of the government in 2012 led to

37 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: Re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicul- tural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit MI: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (‘One Daughter is Better than a Thousand Sons’: Arab Women, Symbols and Power Constellations between the Sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands) (Brabant) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf ”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61. 38 Saharso, Sawitri and Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480. netherlands 481 the development of a new plan regarding face-veiling (see public debates section below). The cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht have proposed cut- ting social benefits to unemployed women wearing a burqa on the grounds that it makes them unemployable in a non-Muslim country.39

12 Publication and Media

Before 2009, there were two Islamic broadcasting companies: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Moslimomroep, NMO, Post- bus 418, 1200 AK Hilversum, www.nmo.nl) and the Dutch Islamic Broad- casting Company (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep, NIO, Sumatralaan 45 1217GP Hilversum, www.nioweb.nl). The NMO and NIO decided not to renew their licences for 2010–2015 after years of antagonistic relations between them. After five organisations applied for the licence for this period, it was granted to the Netherlands Foundation for Muslim Broad- casting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, SMON) which was an initia- tive of several national Moroccan-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch Islamic organisations. One of the major conditions for successfully acquiring the licence was that they would cooperate with a second initiative: the Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim Association (Stichting Academ- ica Islamica/Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie (OUMA). A number of attempts to make this cooperation work were unsuccessful so the licence was withdrawn and, at the moment, there is still no broadcasting service in the Netherlands which focuses on Muslims and Islam. There are several small circulation magazines, such as the Al Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, www.alnisa.nl), produced by the Al Nisa women’s organisation, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over 16). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishers that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such as Boekhandel Nour and Islam Boeken (www.islam-boeken.nl), which sell books on the internet and are part of the Dutch Salafi networks; these also include internet television channels Islaam.tv and Dawah-tv.nl. Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Movement) publishes Zaman Nederland (www.zamanhollanda.nl), a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, ­universities,

39 For more on face-veil controversies, see Moors, Annelies, “The Dutch and the face- veil: The politics of discomfort,” Social Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 4 (2009), pp. 393–408. 482 martijn de koning

Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (www.ahmadiyya-islam.nl) and Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (www.expliciet.nl) four times a year. Since 2010, a new monthly newspaper, Muslim Today (Moslim Vandaag) has appeared with its associated website (www.moslimvandaag.nl) which was established by Muslim Media (Moslim-Media; a commercial busi- ness) and several Muslim organisations such as Islamic University Rotter- dam, CMO, CGI and Ontdekislam.nl (Discover Islam) and Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay). There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and mosque sites on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier, www .wijblijvenhier.nl); other important meeting places for discussions about Islam and Muslims include Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl) and Ontdek Islam (www.ontdekislam.nl).40 OntdekIslam and LPNM have organised several events together, some with Fadel Soliman, a preacher who is a former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2010, the Nieuwemoskee (New Mosque, wwwwww.nieuwemoskee.nl) has presented itself as an Islamic platform for contemporary critical thinkers. The web- site focuses on encouraging debate about Islam (in the West) and hav- ing dialogues with other religious and secular groups about Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands.

13 Family Law

There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic fam- ily law. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, often with Salafi imams officiating, which are not recognised by Dutch law and therefore have no legal effect. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although registering of polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands has occurred. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he or she must divorce all his or her husbands or wives but one. It is possible

40 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Jour- nal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Tran- sition. Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transfor- mations (ISET), 2008), available at www.londonmet.ac.uk/londonmet/library/c52116_3.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. For an overview of the most important Dutch blogs see: http:/ religionreserach.org/martijn/blogview. netherlands 483 for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. Inheritance can be dealt with in the same way, by registering a will.41 Following debates in the UK, a debate was launched in June 2009 about the presence of ‘Shari’a courts’ in the Netherlands. After a Dutch television programme reported that Shari’a law was practised in the Netherlands, with regard to informal marriages, for example, several politicians and opinion leaders took up the issue and called for zero tolerance towards ‘Shari’a courts’. Radboud University Nijmegen conducted research into the prevalence of Islamic arbitration and concluded that there were no formal courts applying Islamic arbitration. A practice of advice and con- sultation based upon Shari’a (or particular understandings of it) does, however, exist.42

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is a long-standing tradition in the Netherlands.43 The number of Islamic institutions specifically focused on interreligious dialogue has remained stable over recent years, but there is an increase in the number of general Islamic institutions that also engage in inter- religious dialogue (although they are not always labelled as such). More than 75% of the mosques in the Netherlands have been involved in small- scale dialogue activities—during an open day, for example. Many Islamic organisations are also involved in local interfaith councils which include

41 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands” (Sharia in the Neth- erlands is often neatly Dutch), Mens en Maatschappij (People and Society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of Birth; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, ISIM Newsletter, no. 31 (2002). 42 l. Bakker, e.a., Sharia in Nederland. Een studie naar islamitische advisering en geschil- beslechting bij moslims in Nederland (Sharia in the Netherlands. A study of Islamic counsel- ing and dispute resolution among Muslims in the Netherlands) (Nijmegen: Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie en Ontwikkelingsstudies Instituut voor Rechtssociologie Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2010). 43 this definition is derived from Greco Idema/Bureau Intermonde. Much of the infor- mation here is provided by G. Idema and J. Slomp. For the period before 2000, see also: Slomp, J., “Christians and religious pluralism in the Netherlands”, in Martin Forward, Stephen Plant and Susan White (eds), A Great Commission: Christian Hope and Religious Diversity. Papers in Honour of Kenneth Cracknell on his 65th Birthday (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 200–223. 484 martijn de koning

Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Baha’i and other organisations (depending on the local circumstances). Islamic student associations such as Mashriq in The Hague and Rotterdam, and the Muslim Student Association (Moslim Studenten Vereniging) also engage in dialogue activities. National organisations such as Islam and Dialogue, Dialogue Academy (both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement), Al Nisa, Ihsan, the Dutch Muslim Council and the Islamic Women’s Network are among the most important organisations sponsoring larger dialogue activities, which range from debates and iftars to publishing books. Several Islamic organi- sations take part in celebrating the anniversary of the Liberation (5 May, end of World War Two), the Day of Dialogue in November and the Char- ter of Compassion (www.charterofcompassion.org). Interreligious themes also feature prominently on Dutch Islamic web- sites: Wij blijven hier (www.wijblijvenhier.nl), IslamWijzer (www.islamwijzer .nl), Maroc.nl (www.maroc.nl), Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl) and Haba- bam (www.hababam.nl). Interreligious websites such as Nieuwwij.nl (www .nieuwwij.nl) and Bruggenbouwers (Bridgebuilders, www.bruggenbouwers .com) are also important in mediating and promoting interreligious dialogue. Notable publications of these dialogues by Islamic organisations include Erasmus and Gülen (published by Dialogue Academy and the House of Erasmus) and It’s the culture, I believe, as well as fifteen articles about mis- conceptions related to the Muslim faith and culture. The current Islam debate, in which anti-Islam politicians and opinion leaders feature prominently, has led to an increase in interreligious dia- logue activities which, unlike the past, are no longer restricted to highly educated people.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Ban on Ritual Slaughter On 28 June 2011 the Dutch Parliament voted to ban ritual animal slaugh- ter. In a proposal condemned by Muslim and Jewish organisations, the Party for Animals wanted a complete ban on dhabiha and shechita— the ritual slaughtering by Muslims and Jews—in cases where the animals netherlands 485 were not stunned before being killed.44 In order to get this bill passed through the Lower House of Parliament (a second vote is necessary in the Senate), a compromise was established: Jewish and Muslim commu- nities were given a year to provide evidence that animals slaughtered by shechita and dhabiha (thus without stunning them) do not experience more pain than animals that are stunned before killing. With this com- promise, the burden of proof was thus placed, not on the state, but on the religious communities. In 2012, the government tried to reach an agreement with Jewish and Islamic organisations proposing that the ritual slaughter be regulated by means of a contract which would improve the standard of animal welfare. The contract initially stated that the slaughtering process should be con- trolled by public servants but, in the final agreement, this was altered after strong opposition by Jewish and Islamic organisations. The agreement now states that public servants will not interfere with religious aspects of the slaughter. The text of the contract has to be approved by the Dutch Parliament; this is due in 2013.

Dutch Elections 2012 During negotiations over severe budget cutbacks the minority govern- ment fell and new elections were held on 12 September 2012. During the election campaign Islam, Muslims and several themes such as integration, radicalisation and veiling which had so frequently been the subjects of publicly debate were pushed to the background because of the focus on the socio-economic recovery from the financial crisis. In particular the Freedom Party linked the EU with the problem of so-called mass-migra- tion, claiming that it was the EU which had caused the huge waves of migrants to come to the Netherlands; a view that is heavily contested by migration experts.

16 Major Cultural Events

The Turkish-Dutch Süleymançi organisation SICN organises a large event every year called Multifestijn, a four day event in the old Market Halls

44 Information based upon: Koning, M. de (2011) Ritual slaughter ban reflects fights over food and faith in the Netherlands. Reuters Faithworld. http://blogs.reuters.com/ faithworld/2011/06/30/guestview-ritual-slaughter-ban-reflects-fights-over-food-and-faith- in-the-netherlands/, accessed 5 March 2012. 486 martijn de koning of Utrecht, with debates, markets for products, services and jobs, lec- tures and music. In 2009 and 2010, the Dar al Ilm institute organised the National Islam Congress, a one day event in Amsterdam with lectures, debates, music and markets. Speakers here vary from Salafi preachers (who make the congress somewhat controversial) to Muslim politicians, from the Netherlands as well as from abroad, and a range of artists. For unknown reasons the National Islam Congress was cancelled in 2011 but the meeting took place in 2012. NORWAY

Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik1

1 Muslim Populations

Immigrants from Muslim countries started arriving in Norway in the late 1960s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immi- grants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population in the country. In 1980, only 1,000 out of ca. 10,000 immigrants had registered themselves as members of a Muslim organisation (see sect. 2). By 1990, the number of registered Muslims had risen to 19,000 out of an estimated total of 36,000 immigrants with a Muslim background. An estimate from 2008 indicated that more than 160,000 residents had a Muslim background.2 The current number would probably be more than 190,000, which means that Muslims (according to the widest definition) constitute 3.5% of a total population of 5 million.3 In 2012, 112,000 people (i.e. around 60% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately 50,000 of these are resident in Oslo, which means that about 8% of Oslo’s population (600,000) are now mem- bers of a Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in 2012 among pupils in the 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 19.5%

1 Christine M. Jacobsen is a senior researcher at IMER (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) at Uni Rokkansenteret and a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen. She has researched and published on Muslims in France and Norway, including Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2011). Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theol- ogy, University of Oslo. He is a specialist in the field of Islam and Christian-Muslim rela- tions, and his publications include Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-Damir (London: Routledge, 2006). An updated bibliog- raphy on is available on Leirvik’s home page: http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/ tekster/IslamiNorge.html#bibliografi. 2 Gunnlaug Daugstad and Lars Østby, Det flerkulturelle Norge. Et mangfold av tro og livssyn (Multicultural Norway: Many faiths and life stances)”, Oslo: Statistics Norway 2008. 3 These figures are based on estimates that calculate immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration. 488 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.4 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunifi- cation and growth in Norway, by far the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2012 amounted to 32,700. In the same year, Turks numbered 16,700 and Moroccans 8,600. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Somalis (29,400) and Iraqis (28,900) were the most numerous, followed by Iranians (17,900), Bosnians (16,300), Kosovo-Albanians (13,700) and Afghans (13,200).5 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.6 An entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)7 and Turkish (Diya- net, Süleymanci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas Bosnians and Somalis represent radically different popular tra- ditions.8 Attendance of religious ceremonies and meetings organised by faith communities varies individually and between different Muslim groups. In a survey from 2005–2006 Pakistanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a year, whereas the corresponding figures reported by Iraqis were seven and for both Bosnians and Iranians only twice a year.9

2 Islam and the State

Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a National Church (the Lutheran Church of Norway) which is mentioned as such (literally,

4 Øia, Tormod, “Ung i Oslo 2012 (Youth in Oslo 2012),” NOVA Rapport7/12, p. 144. www .ungdata.no/id/25829.0 accessed 3 April 2013. 5 The cited figures refer to country background, not to citizenship. Statistics Norway includes both people who themselves migrated to Norway and their children, regardless of their actual citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394), accessed 5 January 2012. 6 No figures are available, but estimates indicate 1,000–1,500 persons. For an account of conversion to Islam in Scandinavia see Roald, Anne Sofie, New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004) and idem: “The con- version process in stages: new Muslims in the twenty-first century”. Islam and Christian- Muslim Relations 3: 2012, s. 347–362. 7 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges—Old Strategies: Themes of Variation and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropological Soci- ety, 1990). 8 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwe- gian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]); Jacobsen, Christine M., “Norway”, in Larsson, Göran (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009), pp. 18–40. 9 Statistics Norway (SSB), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living con- ditions among immigrants in Norway)”, SSB Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendants of immigrants. norway 489

“Norway’s people’s church”) in the revised Constitution from 2012. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, to which 77% of the population nominally belong, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for clergy and much of the running costs of par- ishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under compensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers is entitled to the same amount per member in public funding; this today includes registered Islamic organisations.10 The constitutional amendments from 2012 corroborate the established policy of public fund- ing of the National Church as well as of the other faith communities.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge, PO Box 9071 Grønland, 0133 Oslo, tel.: ++47 48486400, www.irn.no), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella organisation. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.11 The Council comprises the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communica- tion with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communi- ties and their umbrella organisations), and since 2007 the Council has also received a financial grant from the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general secretary. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Mus- lim Brotherhood, several different Shi’ite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. From the mid-1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organisations have been formed, largely independent of national background.12 In the last few years several

10 Registration is uncomplicated and does not require a minimum number of ­members. 11 Vogt, Islam på norsk, p. 167. 12 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Nor- way (Leiden: Brill, 2011), and idem, “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Cesari, Jocelyne, and McLoughlin, Sean (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 490 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik new youth and student organisations, with different theological orienta- tions, have appeared, some with a presence in major university towns such as Bergen, Stavanger and Tromsø in addition to Oslo.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2009, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 126. A list of mosques, including contact information, is available on the inter- net.13 The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.14 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but four mosques are purpose-built, all of them by Norwegian-Pakistani organisations (the most recent being an Ahmadiyya mosque). There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo, but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and Drammen). In 2010 a major contro- versy erupted over plans to build a mosque in Tromsø. The plans were abandoned after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to approve private Saudi donations that were meant to finance the mosque.15 Some schools and universities offer prayer rooms within their premises. This practice is, however, considered to be controversial as no national guidelines exist.

5 Children’s Education

Private schools are relatively few in Norway and took in only around 3% of primary school pupils in 2012, which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ (enhetsskolen) system. The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo, but there are currently no Muslim private schools. Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruc- tion.16 In public primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course on

13 See www.islam.no/islam_i_norge.aspx. 14 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag/The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 2001). 15 The private donor had explicitly asked for approval from the authorities. 16 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education, see for instance Østberg, Sis- sel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). norway 491 religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).17 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against the initial curriculum because of its strong emphasis on Christian- ity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics” in 2008) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper second- ary/high school, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate part of the curriculum. In addition, both the ability to engage in dialogue about religion and ethics and familiar- ity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims. Any qualified teacher of any background may teach religion and ethics.

6 Higher and Professional Education

No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the pos- sibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the University in 2007 by a committee which included rep- resentatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the University of Oslo’s Fac- ulty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society”. The Islamic Council is part of the reference group for this programme and while larg- est groups of participants in the courses have been imams, no imams have received their basic training in Norway.18

17 See, for example, articles by Geir Skeie, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krogstad in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003). 18 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamis- che Erziehung in Europa/Islamic and education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 492 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance to Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Muslim funerals in a large part of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau Al-­ Khidmat is a member of the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group to look into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. The conducting of burials in accordance with Mus- lim burial practices is still not entirely accommodated, however.19 Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of origin, but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.20

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

A study in 200321 concluded that, in spite of the fact that a growing num- ber of prisoners and military personnel either are not members of any religion, or belong to other faiths, the Church of Norway retained its dom- inant position in military and prison chaplaincies. Up till now, state insti- tutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy for minority religions too has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a vol- untary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams and personnel from other registered faith communities outside the Church of Norway in the Field Corps, but this has not been followed up politically. The possibility of employ-

19 Plesner, Inger and Cora Alexa Døving, Livsfaseriter. Religions- og livssynspolitiske utfordringer i Norge (Life cycle rituals: Challenges related to policies of religion and lifes- tances in Norway), (Rapport, Samarbeidsrådet for tros- og livssynssamfunn, 2009). 20 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: En migrasjonsstudie, (Nor- wegian-Pakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). 21 Furseth, Inger, “Secularization and the role of religion in state institutions”, Social Compass, vol. 50 no. 2 (2003), pp. 191–202. norway 493 ing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed, but not yet implemented.

9 Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Nor- way. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Norwegian Church two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. Sacrificing animals is not permitted, and some Muslims send their qurban to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughterhouses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Nor- wegian regulations have been developed, and halal meat (including beef, lamb and chicken), as well as a range of halal products such as pizzas, burgers, sausages, and cheese is now available on the Norwegian mar- ket. Norwegian rules say that the animal must be anaesthetised before slaughter, a practice that has been accepted by the Islamic Council. In 2007, a group of imams issued a declaration that chicken produced in Norway was not halal and advised Muslims against eating it. This decla- ration did not oppose the use of anaesthesia as such, but was based on information that a small percentage of the chicken slaughtered died from the anaesthesia given before the cutting of the carotid arteries. The issue of anaesthesia was also debated in 2009 in relation to the revision of the Norwegian law on animal welfare and new EU directives on animal wel- fare and religious slaughter. The Norwegian law on animal welfare that came into force in 2010 continued the prohibition on slaughtering without anaesthesia. The Jewish community has lobbied against this prohibition on the grounds that it limits religious freedom, followed, in principle, by the Islamic Council although the Muslim community has generally taken a more pragmatic stand. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (in state universities, for example), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons, etc. Access to halal food in shops has increased, 494 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik as a result of the Islamic Council’s pragmatic cooperation with Norwe- gian slaughter houses (cf. above). There are no Islamic banking or finance institutions. Hajj travels are facilitated by a bureau closely cooperating with the Islamic Council.

11 Dress Codes

Repeated calls have been made to ban religious headgear and the niqab from (parts of ) public space, but there are no general rules limiting Mus- lim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions decided against the need for a ban. A suggestion by repre- sentatives from the Progress Party to ban face-covering clothing in public space was debated in the Parliament in 2010, but not adopted. In 2012, controversies again arose in relation to face veiling in educational institu- tions. A student at the University of Tromsø was excluded from class by her professor, but the University administration did not adopt a general ban. Oslo City Council and County Board of Østfold have decided to ban the use of niqab in teaching situations at their high schools. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law, but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Working Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow reli- gious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system, and customs and excise, and in a few work places (notably IKEA, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) there is a hijab version of uniform. In 2008/2009 a debate occurred over whether religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force. After initially signalling amendments to the police uniform regulations in order to accommodate hijab, the Ministry of Justice and the Police Department decided not to revise the existing rules. On the basis of the debate about the hijab in the police, the Board of Directors of the National Courts Administration initiated a process to regulate the use of religious and political clothing in the court room. After consulting rel- evant institutions and organisations the National Courts Administration decided against introducing any changes, referring to existing principles of neutrality and disqualification provisions. A suggestion from represen- norway 495 tatives from the populist Progress Party to instruct the Court Administra- tion to revoke its decision and ban hijab, niqab, burqa and other religious and political symbols for employees at the courts was, in line with the recommendation from the Justice Committee, rejected by the majority in the Parliament in March 2011.

12 Publication and Media

Some Muslim organisations in Norway (including notably the Islamic Information Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran and the conservative youth organisation Islam Net) publish books and leaflets in Norwegian, most of which are trans- lations. The Muslim Students’ Association has published the magazine Salam (previously Tankevekkende) since 1997, as well as booklets on vari- ous aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice. There are a number of online forums, of which the most significant is www.islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times, etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Several mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. The web-portal www .imam.no is run by a network of imams and scholars calling themselves Jamiat Ulama Norway (JUN) and aims to provide information on Islam and advice in fiqh questions. Social media have become more important, and a number of individuals and organisations are active on Twitter and Facebook. YouTube is also increasingly used for distributing videotaped lectures and seminars. A number of individual Muslim blogs add to this digital landscape. With regard to state broadcasting, the issue of allowing other religions than Christianity access to broadcast devotional programmes was under discussion as of 2012.

13 Family Law

By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages, which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Office (byfogdembete) or the District Court (tingrett). The Nor- wegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce, but divorces obtained 496 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik under religious law or the law of other countries may not be recognised. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the prob- lem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,22 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move that upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility of establishing a Shari’a council or a Muslim divorce council has also been discussed as options for dealing with these issues, but has met with considerable resis- tance from many quarters. Currently, several non-governmental organi- sations offer counselling on family-related conflicts, including ‘limping marriages’. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inher- itance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves distribute the inheritance, but regulations covering minimum inheritance must be observed.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is commonly regarded as rather well-established in Norway.23 Since 1993, the Islamic Council in Norway has taken part in regular bi- and multilateral dialogues with other faith and life stance communities in Norway. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intra-Muslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn .no), in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters

22 This is when a civil divorce has been granted but one party refuses to recognise it with reference to religious principles and thereby limits the possibility of the other party to remarry. For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’, see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk tidsskrift for migrasjons- forskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and idem, “Shari’a-råd til diskusjon (Shari’a councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), pp. 58–72. 23 See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious Pluralism: Diversity, Conflict and Dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and inter- faith dialogue”, in Jamal Malik (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. norway 497 pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and vis- ible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway. A Contact Group for the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council Norway was formed in 1992–93.24 Central issues on the Contact Group’s agenda have been religion in school; Muslim minority concerns in Nor- way; Islamophobia; the precarious situation of Christians in some Mus- lim countries; religion and violence; issues related to gender equality and the situation of women; freedom of expression and moral responsibility; homosexuality; and the question of conversion. In connection with the cartoon crisis in 2005–6, joint Muslim-Christian delegations from Norway went to the Middle East and Pakistan, symbolising a more conciliatory approach than that seen in neighbouring Denmark. In 2007, the Contact Group published a “Joint declaration on the freedom of religion and the right of conversion”,25 which also received much attention internation- ally. In 2009, a “Joint Statement on Violence in the Family and in Close Relationships” was launched.26 The most recent joint statement from 2011, reflecting both a joint study trip to Bosnia and the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011, was titled “Opposing religious extremism”.27 Since 1996, the Islamic Council has also taken an active part in the mul- tilateral Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities,28 which coor- dinates the faith communities’ interests vis-à-vis the authorities, works for mutual respect between different faiths and life stances (the Humanist Association is part of this council), and jointly addresses social and ethi- cal issues of common concern. Muslim organisations also take part in a number of regional interfaith councils, for instance in the cities of Dram- men and Stavanger.29

24 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/Kontaktgruppa.htm, accessed 22 January 2013. Cf. Leir- vik, Oddbjørn, “15 år med kristen-muslimsk dialog i Norge (15 years of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Norway)”, Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon, no. 3 (2003), pp. 131–145 and Anne Hege Grung and Oddbjørn Leirvik: “Religionsdialog, identitetspolitikk og kompleksitet”, in Norsk Antropologisk Tidsskrift 1: 2012, pp. 76–84. 25 See www.kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=149142, accessed 22 January 2013. 26 See http://kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=265872, accessed 22 January 2013. 27 See http://kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=363357, accessed 22 January 2013. 28 See www.trooglivssyn.no/. 29 See www.trooglivssyn.no/index.cfm?id=136727, accessed 22 January 2013. 498 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical.30 From the mid-1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues, such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Muslim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the head scarf.31 A particularly controversial theme more recently has been the sit- uation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.32 Notwithstanding their continuing moral reservations against homosexual- ity), the Islamic Council has publicly denounced harassment of homosex- uals. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with anxiety in relation to Islam and Muslims. Figures from the so-called ‘Integration barometer’ (IMDi 2007),33 showed that eight out of ten respondents thought that the authorities should not further facilitate Muslim religious practices in Norwegian society. Half of the respondents opposed the building of mosques, and a clear majority the wearing of headscarves in public. The 2010 report showed a stable and widespread scepticism towards Muslims and public expressions of Muslim religiosity.34 In 2012, figures showed that attitudes towards Muslims and towards the building of mosques had become somewhat less negative.35 Four in ten, 11 percentage points less than in 2010, express scepticism of people of Muslim faith. Among the political parties, the populist right wing Prog-

30 Sindre Bangstad: “The morality police are coming! Muslims in Norway’s media dis- courses”. Anthropology Today Vol. 27, 2011: 5, s. 3–7. 31 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway, see for instance Roald, Anne Sofie, Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 32 Gressgård, Randi and. Jacobsen, Christine M., “Krevende tolerance: Islam og homo- seksualitet. (Demanding tolerance: Islam and homosexuality”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 2008, pp. 22–39. 33 Integreringsbarometeret 2006, Om befolkningens holdninger til integrerings-og mang- foldsspørsmål (Integration barometer 2006, On the population’s attitudes to questions con- cerning integration and diversity), IMDi Rapport/Report 7/2007. 34 Integreringsbarometeret 2010, Holdninger til innvandrere, innvandring og integrering (Integration barometer 2010, Attitudes to questions concerning immigrants, immigration and integration), IMDi Rapport/Report. 35 Integreringsbarometeret 2012, Holdninger til innvandrere, integrering og mangfold (Integration barometer 2012, Attitudes to questions concerning immigrants, integration and diversity)), IMDi Rapport/Report. norway 499 ress Party (which received 22% of the votes in the 2009 parliamentary elections) repeatedly warned against ‘Islamisation’ during their electoral campaigns, most recently in 2009, when the party suggested that new and covert forms of Islamisation (snikislamisering—creeping Islamisation) could be identified in Norway. Similar stands have been voiced by groups associated with the New Christian Right, although their warnings against Islamisation have regularly been countered by mainstream Christian leaders.36 Several smaller organisations such as Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) and Norwegian Defence League represent a more hostile discourse in public. In recent years, fear of ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim youth has become a recurrent topic in public debate, particularly after a 2010 demonstration against another offending Muhammad-cartoon, in which one of the speakers (later to be associated with The Prophet’s Ummah, see below) accused Norway of crusading against Islam and warned of a Norwegian 9/11.37 Public opinion and debate in the second half of 2011 was shaped by the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011. Although the nature of Anders Behring Breivik’s violence shocked everyone, including anti-Islamic activists, ideo- logically his so-called Manifesto borrows extensively from well-known anti-Islamic ideologues, in Europe and the US.38 Before it became clear that the perpetrator was a white ethnic majority Norwegian and a self- declared “cultural Christian”, the general tendency was to assume that radical Islamists were behind the violent attacks. As the terror attacks proved to be motivated by anti-Muslim, anti-immigration and anti- multiculturalist sentiments, however, some Muslims testified that they had never before felt so strongly embraced by popular solidarity. A joint Christian-Muslim funeral for one of the teenagers that were shot dead at Utøya, became a symbol of interreligious compassion. Nevertheless, in many Internet debates anti-Muslim sentiments remain unabated.39

36 Cf. Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “The cartoon controversy in Norway: The new Christian right and liberal fundamentalism confronting Islam?”, in Mårtensson, Ulrika et al. (eds.), I Ulrika Mårtensson m.fl. (red.): Fundamentalism in the Modern World, volume 2: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 125–146. 37 Cf. Lena Larsen: “Striden om Muhammad”, Dagbladet 19.02.10 and Andersson, Mette, Jacobsen, Christine M., Rogstad, Jon and Vestel, Viggo: Kritiske hendelser—Nye Stemmer. Politisk engasjement og transnasjonal orientering i det nye Norge. (Oslo: Universitetsfor- laget, 2012). 38 Cf. the report “Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America.” Center for American Progress, 2010. 39 Andersson, Mette ‘The debate about multicultural Norway before and after 22 July 2011’, in Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 19:4, 418–427; Eriksen, Thomas H. ‘The 500 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

In connection with the film “Innocence of Muslims”, in 2012 a new group of mainly young Muslims called “The Prophet’s Ummah” gained public attention for their fierce demonstration outside the American Embassy, rallying some 100 young people some of whom publicly invoked the example of Osama bin Laden. The Islamic Council, on the other hand, simultaneously held a meeting which could be seen as a counter- demonstration, with 6,000 participants including the Bishop of Oslo and the Mayor of Oslo.

16 Major Cultural Events

Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) in Oslo, which attracts around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popu- lar (Islam-oriented songs) artists. Several mosques and organisa- tions host iftar-dinners in Ramadan. In 2012 Ung Muslim (UM), the youth organisation of the Rabita mosque in Oslo, initiated two yearly events: the Umma Cup (a soccer tournament) and the Umma Conference (featuring a number of international speakers). In Oslo, there is also a yearly ‘mul- ticultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world. In the city of Stavanger, the regional Muslim Council stages an annual Ramadan festival with a broad spectrum of public events.

net of hatred: after Utøya’, Open Democracy Net www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hylland- eriksen/net-of-hatred-after-ut%C3%B8ya; Bangstad, Sindre (2011). ‘Whatever happened to Norway’s incitement laws?’ IRR Newsletter, www.irr.org.uk/news/whatever-happened- to-norways-incitement-laws/, both accessed 22 January 2013. POLAND

Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź1

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of the 14th/ 15th centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the 13th century)2 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).3 By the 16th cen- tury, they had lost their mother tongue but retained their religion and customs.4 In the second part of the 17th century, a new wave of Tatar set- tlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).5 When the Polish state regained independence after the World War I, only 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cem- eteries remained within its new borders. After World War II and the move of Polish state borders westwards, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the territories settled by Tatars remained within the new Polish state. Post- war migrations dispersed Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Szczecin or Wrocław, places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally revoke recognition

1 Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Dr Stanisław Grodź teaches in the Department of the History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Lublin. 2 Borawski, Piotr and Aleksander Dubiński, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrzędy, legendy, tra- dycje (Polish Tatars: History, Rituals, Legends, Traditions) (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 15. 3 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 4 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Common- wealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: LSW, 1986), pp. 199–202. 5 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania) (Warsaw- Poznań: PWN, 1984), pp. 34–38. 502 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.6 Muslim foreign students began arriving in Poland in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed. After the changes towards democ- racy of the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals from the Middle East and elsewhere in Asia.7 Some of the immigrants became Polish citizens and some got residence permits. They have been coming primarily from the Arab world (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in university cities (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, Łódź, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya,8 Afghanistan, ­Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iraq.9 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Con- stitution [sect. 7, art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates by various offices and organisations place the number within the range of 15,000 to 30,000 (0.04%–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muslim Religious Union (Muzułmański Związek Religijny, MZR) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123.10 The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM) claims about 180 reg- istered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are ­available.

6 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: The past and the present”, Islamochristiana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234. 7 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. 8 For more details see: Łukasiewicz, Karolina, “Strategies of reconstructing Islam in exile. A case of Chechens in Poland”, in K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Muslims in Eastern Europe. Widening the European discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2011), pp. 88–107; www.orient.uw.edu.pl/MSZ/teksty/8_lukasiewicz_MuslimsCEE.pdf. 9 Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/ present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 10 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: GUS, 2003), pp. 135–137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on MZR mem- bership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. poland 503

2 Islam and the State

The Republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of parliament11 regulate relations between the state and the main religions organisations.12 Other religious organisations must be registered in the government reg- ister of churches and religious associations. On the basis of the law of 21 April 1936, Islam gained official recognition by the Polish state with the MZR (established in 1925) as the only Muslim organisation representing Muslims in Poland.13 This law stated that the Mufti (elected by demo- cratic vote), imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.14 The act was not repealed by the government after World War II or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its regulations, relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of the MZR15 (until this point still formally located in Vilnius, Lithuania, and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it).16 The act still gives the MZR the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state.17 The state does not fund religious organisations, but they can obtain public funding for specific projects. For example, the MZR has reported on its webpage receiving national and local government funding for cultural projects (e.g. workshops, social events for the general public on Muslim feast days, Tatar Culture Days, printing of a Tatar periodical, and a booklet with an

11 For more details see: Nalborczyk, Agata S. and Paweł Borecki, “Relations between Islam and the state in Poland: the legal position of Polish Muslims”, Islam and Christian- Muslim Relations, vol. 22 (2011), no. 3, pp. 349–350. 12 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions). 13 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197. 14 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 15 For more details see: Nalborczyk and Borecki, pp. 349–351 and 355. 16 The Communist regime put an end to funding any religious body from the public purse. Vilnius, located within Polish state borders before World War II, was the official seat of the MZR. Compulsory membership of the MZR for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims vis-à-vis the state ­authorities. 17 For more details see: Nalborczyk Agata S., “Islamic religious education in Poland— curricula and textbooks”, in Aslan E. (ed.), Islamic textbooks and curricula in Europe, Frank- furt: Peter Lang, 2011, p. 183. 504 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź audio CD of Tatar music). The legal regulations created in consultations with Polish Muslims in 1936 made provision for only one official organi- sation to represent Muslims in Poland, i.e. the MZR. However, new legal regulations after 1989 made provision for the registration of new Muslim religious organisations; any religious group with at least 100 members can now register with the government. The MZR has thus ceased to have the monopoly but has retained its privileged position.18 Two small Shi’i groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni organisation called the Muslim League (Liga Muzułmańska, LM) was registered in 2004.19 A petition was submitted on 24 April 2007 by the MZR to the Polish gov- ernment requesting new legislation to regulate the relationship between the state and the MZR. The present government acknowledges that the 1936 Act, which is still in force, is anachronistic. On 24 January 2012 Mufti Tomasz Miśkiewicz and the MZR delegates were among the representatives of religious communities met by the Polish President during a New Year reception at the Presidential palace. The President also met the representatives of the Tatar community dur- ing a meeting with delegations of ethnic and national minorities on the same day. The Office of the President issued a directive (22 October 2012) declar- ing the mosques and cemeteries (mizars) in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany as integral monuments of the Polish culture (following a request from the presidents of Muslim communities in both locations) and putting their wider surroundings under state protection and preservation.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Registered religious communities (związki wyznaniowe):

– The Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland (Muzułmański Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, MZR, 15–052 Białystok, ul. Piastowska 13F, 42; tel: +48 85 732 4023, http://www.mzr.pl) is a

18 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal status of Mus- lims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 ( January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73). 19 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego (Legal status of Muslims in Poland and its influence on the organisation of their religious life)”, in A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. ­Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. poland 505

Sunni organisation established in 1925. The Mufti of the Republic of Poland and Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board of Muslim Reli- gious Union in Poland is Tomasz Miśkiewicz, who was elected by the council of imams on 20 March 2004 (the first council since World War II). Apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of the official representative of Muslims. During the 18th All-Polish Congress of the MZR on 17–18 November 2012, the participants voted in favour of separating the office of the Mufti from that of the Chair- man of the Highest Board. They also decided to hold elections for a new Mufti in 2013. However, the resolution taken during the Congress is at variance with the Act of 1936 (still in force) stating that the Mufti is simultaneously the Chairman of the Highest Board. In the effect of subsequent actions, the Department of Religious Affairs and Religious Minorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs confirmed the recognition of Tomasz Miśkiewicz as the Mufti of the MZR. Membership in the MZR is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.20 Some local MZR com- munities run their own websites (e.g. Bohoniki—www.bohoniki.eu; or Gdańsk—www.meczetgdansk.pl/) – The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM, 01–046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, www .islam.info.pl) is another Sunni organisation established in 2001 and registered on 6 January 2004. The Chairman of the General Council is Ali Abi Issa (elected on 10 November 2012). The Mufti of the LM, Nidal Abu Tabaq, elected in 2009, was also elected the president of the Council of Imams during the 3rd Ordinary Congress of the LM on 10 November 2012. Membership in the LM is open to Muslims with Pol- ish citizenship, as well as Muslims holding a permanent or ­temporary

20 The MZR has traditionally been regarded as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of members are non-Tatars (i.e. immi- grants from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Chechen Republic and converts). This fictitious exclusive- ness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including Muslim students’ cultural organisations. Formation of the new religious organi- sation, the Muslim League (LM), was a step further taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) around the turn of the century. Separate cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between the MZR and the LM is amicable. Some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities. 506 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

residence permit. Links to websites of local communities are to be found on the official website given above, apart from the LM Muslim Centre in Kraków—http://cmwk.wordpress.com/

Two quite small registered Shi’i organisations:

– The Association of Muslim Unity (Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułmańskiej, 02-679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91, www.al-islam.org.pl) was regis- tered on 31 January 1990 and is led by the chief imam Rafał Berger. – Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly (Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt, 05-840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a, contact address: skr.poczt.108, 05-800 Pruszków; [email protected]; www.abia.pl/) was registered on 17 December 1990 and its chief imam is Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak.

Muslim associations:

– The Muslim Students Society in Poland (Stowarzyszenie Studentów Muzułmańskich w Polsce, ul. Hetmańska 63, 15–727 Białystok, tel.: ++48 856514021, www.islam.org.pl) has branches in Białystok, Poznań, Wrocław and Katowice. – The Muslim Association for Cultural Formation (Muzułmańskie Stowarzyszenie Kształtowania Kulturalnego, ul. Kolejowa 15, skr.poczt. 109, Białystok, http://www.mskk-islam.8m.com). – The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland (Związek Tatarów Rzecz- pospolitej Polskiej, Bohoniki 23, 16–100 Sokółka, http://ztrp.pl) was established in 1992. Its president is Jan Adamowicz. – Institute for the Study of Islam (Instytut Studiów nad Islamem al. Kaspro- wicza 24; 51–137 Wrocław; tel.: ++48 713260026; www.isni.pl) was estab- lished in 2009. Its President is Tomasz Stefaniuk and the Administrative Director Ali Abi Issa.

Islamic foundations:

– Dunaj Instytut Dialogu (Fethullah Gülen movement), DID, ul. Wiejska 18/7a, 00-490 Warszawa, tel.: ++48 224152016, www.dialoginstytut.pl/; registered on 27 March 2009. – The Polish Sufi Jalaleddin Rumi Foundation (Polska Fundacja Sufich im. Dżelaladdina Rumiego), ul. Pogodna 5, 05–502 Wólka Kozodawska/ Piaseczno, tel.: ++48 512460440, www.sufi.org.pl; registered in June 2012. poland 507

These organisations are involved in various ways in organising religious instruction for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, and publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics). The Tatar Union of the Repub- lic of Poland concentrates on the cultural heritage of Polish Tatars.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses21

There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north-eastern Poland dating from the 18th–19th century, and one in Gdańsk that opened in 1990). In Poland Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic cen- tres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls) and small ‘prayer houses’ (places for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. There are Islamic centres in Białystok (Muslim Cultural Cen- tre, ul. Piastowska 13f and another under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań and Katowice. There are prayer houses in Białystok, Suchowola, Łódź, Katowice and Poznań,22 but the total number of them is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named on the official websites of the MZR and LM are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. A new Centre of Islamic Culture is being constructed by the LM in Warsaw (a consecutive open- ing date—after earlier postponements—scheduled for the beginning of Ramadan 2012 was not met, apparently due to problems with the con- struction company). Another new Islamic Centre was expected to open in Katowice in 2012, but did not.

5 Children’s Education

The MZR, as a religious organisation operating under an act of Parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education classes to be provided.

21 For more details see: A.S. Nalborczyk, “Mosques in Poland. Past and present”, in Górak-Sosnowska K. (ed.), Muslims in Eastern Europe. Widening the European discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2011), pp. 183–193; www.orient.uw.edu.pl/MSZ/ teksty/14_nalborczyk_MuslimsCEE.pdf. 22 www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16, accessed 2 February 2012. 508 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

In 2004, the Ministry of Education approved a school curriculum for Mus- lim religious instruction prepared by the MZR. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is provided for Muslim children in public schools. In Warsaw, the LM runs an interschool group for Muslim religious instruction at primary school level for pupils from Mazowsze district (Warsaw area).23 In other parts of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system (weekend classes). At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. There are no Muslim primary or secondary schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no facilities to train imams locally and no Muslim higher educa- tion institutions. Islam features in the academic curricula of several uni- versities but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language, and some aspects of Islamic doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad (formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). The LM established Instytut Studiów nad Islamem—ISNI in Wrocław in 2009. It is meant to provide a “forum for research and communication”. ISNI sets its goals as: disseminating knowledge about Islam, history and culture(s) of the Islamic world, Polish contacts with the Muslim world; dialogue with Christianity and other religions; building bridges of under- standing between representatives of various cultural, religious and ideo- logical traditions; building and sustaining academic links. Several new publications are being prepared, most of them translations. It is notable that some of them focus on the religious aspect of Muslim life, trying to fill a significant void in publications on Islam available in Polish (intro- duction to the study of the Qur’an; the role of the Qur’an in the life of Muslims. Details are available on the Institute website).

23 For more details see: Nalborczyk, “Islamic religious education in Poland”, pp. 183–184. poland 509

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (just outside Bohoniki, established in the second half of the 18th century; in Kruszyniany, estab- lished in the 17th/18th century; and on Tatarska street, Warsaw, opened in 1868). Another two that existed from the late 17th century have been closed (in Lebiedziew after World War I and in Studzianka after World War II). Two other disused cemeteries still exist in Bohoniki (from the late 17th century) and on Młynarska street, Warsaw (in use from 1838 to 1868).24 Separate sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk, Wrocław and Poznań.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies.’ This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met informally through the community.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can take a day off provided they make up the time missed. Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) is celebrated by MZR members in one of the locations in northeast of the country and is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though the LM has started a practice of organising a so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evening), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non-Muslims. MZR also organised Ramadan Bayram celebration called Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe—Bayram Days of Podlasie, open iftar for Muslims and non-Muslims guests in Warszawa and Białystok, and celebration of Miełlud (Mawlid) and Muslim New Year.

24 www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18, accessed 11 January 2013. 510 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

An Act of 17 May 1989 (art. 2, act 9) allowed recognised religious bodies to produce items necessary to practise their religious duties. That had been interpreted as permission for halal slaughter of animals. It was the Animal Preservation Act of 21 August 1997 (art. 34, sect. 5) that allowed officially recognised religious organisations exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughter (i.e. not stunning animals prior to slaughtering). How- ever, an amendment to the Act introduced on 6 June 2002 removed the clause, thus preventing religious organisations from claiming any exemp- tions. It seems that that step was not noticed by the religious bodies and somehow disregarded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop- ment because the ministerial directive on the qualifications of persons authorised to conduct professional animal slaughter and on conditions and methods of animal slaughter issued on 9 September 2004 allowed for exemptions from stunning animals before slaughtering according to “reli- gious customs of the registered religious organisations” (art. 8, sect 2). An agreement signed by the MZR with the Chief Veterinary Officer in 2006 was based on that ministerial directive and Act of 1936 (see www.halal- poland.pl—the site is still undergoing reconstruction.)25 This agreement was challenged by the LM as incompatible with freedom of religious prac- tice and was revoked. In 2007 the LM also gained the right to issue halal certificates.26 In October 2010, all Muslim religious organisations (and the Ahmadiyya) signed two documents at the Chief Veterinary Office—the first one concerning the procedure of issuing certificates on the qualifica- tion of a slaughterhouse for the halal slaughter of animals, and the sec- ond one describing the rules and conditions of halal meat production. The situation was challenged by animal preservation organisations that brought the case to the attention of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2012. The verdict of the Tribunal from 27 November 2012 declared that Art. 8, point 2 of the directive by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Devel- opment is incompatible with the Animal Preservation Act and with the Constitution. It results in banning the halal slaughter of animals in Poland from 1 January 2013.

25 At present the website refers the viewers to HP System Quality&Consulting, an offi- cial representative of MZR with regard to issues related to halal. 26 http://rada-imamow.pl/certyfikacja-halal/11-oferta-certyfikacji-halal, accessed 11 Jan- uary 2013. poland 511

Halal meat has mainly been exported. Only few shops and some restau- rants with Middle Eastern cuisine have offered it in the country. None of the Muslim religious organisations gives addresses of the shops or restau- rants with halal food. Some can be found on Internet fora where Muslims exchange opinions and give advice, Apparently in other cities where Muslims live, frozen chicken meat and beef from a farm in the city vicinity can be obtained occasionally at the Muslim centre.

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab or niqab. Some young Muslim women, mainly converts of Polish origin but more recently also young Tatar women, wear hijab in public. Historically, Tatar women usually wore hijab only during prayers, something many of them continue doing nowadays.27

12 Publication and Media

Muslim periodicals cover various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters. Those listed here are all in Polish:

– Rocznik Tatarów Polskich is published by the Tatar Union of the Repub- lic of Poland. It is academic in character and covers topics on Islam in general and particularly in East-Central Europe. – Życie Tatarskie is published by the Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland, Podlasie Section in Białystok. It is a socio-cultural periodical and covers ethnic topics. There have been 113 issues since 1934, includ- ing 36 of the new edition since 1998. None were published in 2012 due to a lack of funding. – Quarterly Przegląd Tatarski is similar in character and is published with financial support from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. Four issues were published in 2012 (accessible on the MZR webpage; in all 16 issues since 2009).

27 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Muslim women in Poland and Lithuania: Tatar tradition, reli- gious practice, hijab and marriage”, in Adamiak, E., et al. (eds), Gender and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe (Poznań: Wydział Teologiczny Uniwersytetu Adama Mickie- wicza, 2009), p. 66. 512 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

– Muzułmanie Rzeczypospolitej—published by the MZR; due to lack of funding no issue appeared in 2012. – As-Salam (www.as-salam.pl) is published by the LM and 26 issues have appeared between 2004 and 2012. It addresses general and local socio-political and religious issues and is aimed at the general reader. Al-Hikmah is older but is distributed mainly among Muslims. – Al Islam—published by the Shi’i Association of Muslim Unity since 1976 (No. 170 appeared in 2012). – Rocznik Muzułmański—published by the Association of Muslim Unity, one issue (No. 9) in 2012.

Internet sites include: Some official websites contain sections including past and current Muslim publications, like some of the above mentioned periodicals.

– www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by the members of the LM. – www.shiapoland.com/—the website of the Polish Shi’a community, run by the members of The Association of Muslim Unity – http://sites.google.com/site/oislamie—a private independent initiative by a group of Polish Muslim women providing information on Islam using high quality translations and sources; see also: http://muzul- manki.blogspot.com/.

Internet fora include www.islam.fora.pl (1864 registered users). It is clear that the LM and organisations associated with it, and the local LM ­sections, are much more active on Facebook than circles connected with MZR.

13 Family Law

Only marriages conducted in a civil ceremony at a state registry office are legally valid, so Muslims usually follow the civil ceremony with a Muslim ceremony on Muslim premises. Marriages of couples who are not Polish citizens are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal. poland 513

14 Interreligious Relations

The Common Council of Catholics and Muslims (Rada Wspólna Kato- lików i Muzułmanów, www.radawspolna.pl/) was established in 1997 with the aim of fostering friendly relations between Christians and Muslims, and disseminating reliable information about Christianity and Islam and their mutual contacts. The Council is headed by two co-chairpersons (a Christian and a Muslim). Its main achievement has been the introduc- tion of the Islam Day in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which is celebrated on 26 January. This initiative was met by a positive response from the Polish Bishops’ Conference and has been incorporated into the church calendar of events. It is celebrated locally, especially in places where there is a Muslim community.28 In 2012, the 12th Islam Day was marked with the main celebration held in Warsaw. “Assisi in Gdańsk,” an interreligious meeting organised by the Francis- cans (OFM) in cooperation with others and held to commemorate the original event of 1986, gathers representatives of various religions for prayer and discussion on an agreed theme. The 7th event was held on 30 September 2012, but the local press complained about dwindling public interest in the event.29 A conference “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Theory—Practice—Per- spectives”, was organised by the Mikołaj Kopernik University in Toruń together with the Turkish Dunaj Instytut Dialogu, 24–25 October 2012. There were two events organised by the Polish Sufi Jalaleddin Rumi Foundation under the auspices of the World Interfaith Harmony Week in the first week of February 2012—one in Warsaw, another in Kielce.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Usually coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce. Instances of local reporting on Islam in Poland are often linked to interreligious encounters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland on 26 January). The issue of ritual slaughtering of animals was brought to public attention with the animal rights organisations reporting the

28 Grodź, Stanisław, “Christian-Muslim Experiences in Poland”, Exchange, vol. 39, no. 3 (2010), pp. 270–284. 29 www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/artykul/667789,vii-spotkanie-asyz-w-gdansku-marsz-ktory- mial-polaczyc,id,t.html?cookie=1, accessed 19 January 2013. 514 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź discrepancies between the practice and its current legal status to the Pros- ecutor’s Office in Warsaw on 9 May 2012. The media gave wide coverage to the problem.30 The issue was referred to the Constitutional Court which gave its verdict on 27 November 2012 (section 10 above).

16 Major Cultural Events

“Muslim Culture Days” (Dni Kultury Muzułmańskiej)—a series of occa- sional cultural events were organised in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław, Poznań) in previous years.

– A Tatar ball was held in Białystok on 19 August 2012 on the first day of the Ramadan Bayram holiday as a part of the programme of the 8th Podlasie Bayram Days. – 4th Tatar Culture Days—organised by the MZR in Studzianka 7–8 July 2012. – Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (with songs, dance, games and sports) on 5 June 2012 in Kruszyniany. – XIV Letnia Akademia Wiedzy o Tatarach Polskich (14th Summer Acad- emy of Polish Tatar Lore) organised by the local action group Szlak Tatarski (Tatar Trail) together with local authorities in Sokółka and Bohoniki, 21–22 July 2012. – A number of events on aspects of Tatar culture were held in various locations:

An evening featuring Tatar poetry organised in the History Museum, a sec- tion of the Podlachia Museum in Białystok on 23 May 2012 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland; a talk on Tatar musical culture in the Historical Institute of Wrocław University on 26 September 2012; a public meeting on “Tatar traditions” where the recent issue of the periodical “Przegląd Tatarski” was presented together with the newest books about Tatars and by Tatars in the Music and Lit- erature Club in Wrocław on 9 October 2012, and an exhibition “Tatars in Upper Silesia” in the Public City Library of Katowice was launched on 15 October 2012. The “Tatar Day in the Independence Museum” in Warsaw 17 November 2012 featured documentaries and a lecture on Tatar history.

30 www.rp.pl/temat/960322.html. poland 515

The Muslim Religious Community in Białystok organised a celebration on the occasion of National Independence Day that included a commu- nal prayer for the welfare of the country, recitation of Qur’anic suras by youths, a talk on Tatar history and joining the city celebrations of the Independence Day. The Wrocław section of LM organised Muslim Culture Days in May/ June 2012.

PORTUGAL

José Mapril and Nina Clara Tiesler1

1 Muslim Populations

In past years the estimates of the size of Portugal’s Muslim population from institutional representatives as well as researchers indicate a popula- tion between 48,000 to 55,000 people. Among these 8,000 were Isma’ilis while the majority population was mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin from Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and a smaller part composed by Muslims coming from other countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal and India. According to the “official” figures, stem- ming from the immigration control/monitoring service (SEF, Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras), the number of residents from countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal and India were, in 2011, 12,429. This figure represents a slight increase when compared to 2010 but still very far from the 13,537 registered in 2009. As mentioned earlier,2 there are several explanations for these changes. The nationality law, approved in 2006, allowed some migrants to become naturalised and consequently disappear from the official statistics by

1 Nina Clara Tiesler is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Univer- sity of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-Afro-Brazilian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (MEL-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Studies of Religion and has researched Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is author of Muslime in Europa. Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Muslims in Europe. Religion and identity politics in new societal settings), (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006) (in Portuguese: A Morada de Ser. Europa, Muçulmanos e Políti- cas de Identidade, Lisbon: ICS, 2011), and is editor of Islam in Portuguese-Speaking Areas, Lusotopie, 2007. José Mapril is post-doctoral research fellow at CRIA, ISCTE-IUL and a visiting lecturer at the New University of Lisbon. He finished his PhD in Anthropology at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, in 2008, with a thesis on Trans- nationalism and Islam among Bangladeshis in Lisbon. In the past he worked on Islamic education in Portugal and is currently beginning a new research on national imaginaries and transnational political networks among Bangladeshis in Portugal. He is the author of the forthcoming (2012) book Transnacionalismo e Islão: uma etnografia entre Portugal e o Bangladeche, Lisbon, ICS and “The patron and the madman: migration, success and the (in)visibility of failure among Bangladeshis in Portugal”, Social Anthropology, 19(3), pp. 288–296. 2 Yearbook 2012. 518 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler becoming national citizens. The second possible explanation has to do with new migration processes related to the general economic climate and its impact on the economic structure. The austerity policies imple- mented by the Portuguese government in past years had a severe impact in several sectors of the economy, namely construction and services. This has caused an increasing unemployment—according to the Institute for National Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística), in 2011, 19.6% of the active migrant population were unemployed (23.5% among non-EU citi- zens), mostly in construction, cleaning services and retail and wholesale businesses—areas in which several migrant populations had participated in the past decades. In such an economic environment, many have decided to move on to other European counties—the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland, among many others—and non-European countries— Angola and Mozambique, for instance. A revealing example is the case of Luso-Bangladeshi (dual nationals) families—more than three hundred— that, in the past two years, have re-migrated to Southall and East Ham, in Greater London. In spite of this and unlike other young Portuguese, young Portuguese Muslims do not tend to seek employment and a future life course abroad, despite high unemployment rates among young people in the country.

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution, which recognises freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the State and religious denominations. However, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed privileges not granted to other religious groups.3 A decisive change came with the Religious Free- dom Act of 22 June 2001, with important improvements for religious minorities implemented from 2006 on. Before the implementation of the new law, the CIL (Islamic Community of Lisbon), as well as smaller Islamic communities and other religious minorities, could only be offi- cially recognised as “associations in private law.” In those days, the com- munity had once received financial support for a third of the (up to day) five phases of construction work of the Central Mosque which took place in 2002–2003. The State’s Commission for the Coordination of the Lisbon

3 Ibid., p. 291. portugal 519 and South Tagus Region (CCR, Commissão de Coordenação da Região Lisboa e Sul de Tejo) contributed to this phase of ongoing constructions/ improvements with 40% of the total costs. Later, in 2004, the CIL received minor funding from the City Hall of Lisbon (Câmara Municipal de Lis- boa) to support the daily costs of the Central Mosque. Various donors had made the first phase of construction of the Central Mosque possible, which was concluded in 1985 (the year of its inauguration, see Section 16 below about the 25th anniversary): the City Hall had offered the land (as it did later also for a cemetery in Lumiar, see Section 7), various Muslim majority countries had contributed with financial donations, as did the community members themselves.4 Once it was possible in 2006, the CIL converted to a registered reli- gious community. It meant obtaining a legal status substantially equal to the one of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the State with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary consignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax, but no gen- eral public funding. Several inequalities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of the religious groups and on the duration of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required (the CIL was founded already 40 years ago). In practice, the CIL can ben- efit from tax advantages, e.g. when spending on buildings. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Isma’ili) celebrate an anniversary or a special occasion, the Portuguese State is often represented at the highest level. Besides that, former Presidents of the Republic and also the present President have all been given the status of Honorary Members of the CIL, and the current CIL President was one of the consultants to the President of the Republic during his visits to India, Turkey and other countries. During the visit of the Dalai Lama to Portugal in 2007, the CIL which organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama being the guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been fac- ing the same problems as other governments regarding the impact on official relations with China.

4 For details see N.C. Tiesler 2001, “No Bad News from the European Margin: the New Islamic Presence in Portugal”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12(1), pp. 71–91, p. 79. 520 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, founded 1985, (Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul (à Praça de Espanha), 1070-283 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 213874142 / 213879184; fax: ++351 213872230; e-mail: [email protected]; www.comunidadeislamica.pt) has as its Imam Sheikh David Munir. This is the home of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL). Alongside com- mon religious, cultural and social infrastructures (including a bookstore, chat rooms or the community website), three types of associations were founded in the thirty year old Central Mosque in the heart of Lisbon: the Women’s Association, several groups of Guinean Muslims, and the Youth Association of the Islamic Community (CILJovem) which is organised and frequented mainly (if not only) by young people of South Asian origin, including some Isma’ili Muslims. The Central Mosque also provides space for meetings and projects of other associations of Muslims, such the one founded by Senegalese. The other main Muslim organisations are:

– Comunidade Islâmica de Palmela (Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel.: ++351 212110530, fax: ++351 212110539, email: [email protected]). – Centro Cultural Ismaili e Fundação (Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600–001 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 217 229 000, fax: ++351 217 229 045, email: [email protected]). The Aga Khan Foundation Portugal is currently running a quite efficient capacity development project, called K’Cidade,5 the first project which focuses on the improvement of individual (education, integration into the labour market, citizen- ship training programs) and community (child care, children’s educa- tion) capacities in urban environments of a developed country (www .kcidade.com and see 5). – Comunidade Shi’ta de Portugal (Ithna Ashari) (Avenida das Forças Armadas, 11 D, Almada, tel.: ++351 218106030; email: Bremtula_pnegra@ netcabo.pt). – The Baitul Mukarram Mosque (Rua do Benformoso, 119—1º/2º/3º, 1100-083 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 917385367). In 2004, Muslims from Bangladesh founded the Baitul Mukarram mosque (named after Central

5 In Portuguese pronunciation, this concept reads “capa-cidade”, as such including the term “city” in the term “capacity.” portugal 521

Mosque), also known informally as Mesquita do Martim Moniz, close to their work place,6 which caters to five hundred believers on a regular Friday prayer and organises three hundred and fifty iftars during the whole month of Ramadan. It was upgraded in 2006 and is currently the main mosque in downtown Lisbon. This mosque is managed by the Comunidade Islâmica do Bangladesh (CIB)—the Islamic Community of Bangladesh—which is responsible for its financial and ceremonial management. The main funding of CIB comes from donations of the members of the congregation. – A group of Senegalese migrants created the ADSTP, Association des Dis- ciples de Serigne Touba au Portugal (Rua de Macau, nº 4 R/C, 1170-136, Lisboa, tel.: ++351 932407559), an association linked to a cult and inaugurated a prayer hall in the downtown district Anjos in 2010. – In May 2010 the Associação Multicultural e Islâmica (Rua luis gomes nº 11, 2700-529, Mina, Amadora) was founded by Luso-Guineans from Con- acki and Bissau. Their main objective is not only to organise religious services, for which they created a mosque and organise classes for teaching Islam and Qur’anic Arabic for the younger generation, but also to teach Portuguese and prepare parents for nationality exams (manda- tory to access Portuguese nationality).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are three purpose-built mosques in the Lisbon metropolitan area: in Lisbon, in Odivelas and in Laranjeiro (the latter two were the first mosques to be built in Portugal). Oporto, Coimbra and, since 2010, Funchal (Madeira Island) have their own mosques. Altogether, one counts 36 cultural centres, mosques and prayer halls across the country, as well as the Jamatkhana of the Shi’i Isma’ili Muslim Community. There are cur- rent negotiations for the possible construction of a purpose-built mosque in downtown Lisbon, in close cooperation between the Lisbon City Coun- cil, the Islamic Community of Bangladesh and the Islamic Community of Lisbon. The main mosques/prayer halls in country are:

6 For a fuller account of the historical process behind the creation of this mosque see Mapril, José, “ ‘Bangla masdjid’: Islão e bengalidade entre bangladeshianos em Lisboa”, Análise Social, vol. XXXIX, no. 173 (Winter 2005), pp. 851–873. 522 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler

– The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul, 1070- 283 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 213874142 / 213879184; fax: ++351 213872230; e-mail: [email protected]; www.comunidadeislamica.pt. – The Mesquita Aicha Siddika de Odivelas, Rua Prof. Dr. Abreu, Lote 190 2675, Odivelas, tel.: ++351 219327474. – The Baitul Mukarram mosque otherwise known as Mesquita do Ben- formoso, rua do Benformoso, 119—1º/2º/3º, 1100-083 Lisboa, tel.: ++351 917385367. – The Mesquita da Tapada das Mercês, Praceta Francisco Ramos da Costa, garagem nº 6 A, Tapada das Mercês, email: acitmmm@gmail. com, telemóvel ++351 962644819. – The Mesquita de Coimbra, inaugurated in 1991, Rua Bernardo ­Santareno, Lote 201—Cave Quinta da Stª Apolónia, 3000, Coimbra, tel.: ++351 239492683, fax: ++351 239491345. – The Mesquita Central do Porto Hazrat Bilal, Rua do Heroísmo, 223, 4300- 259 Porto.

5 Children’s Education

Children’s education was institutionalised at the same time as the main Islamic institutions in Portugal gained visibility and importance. Until the 1980s the transmission of religious ideas was mainly a family responsibil- ity. They would be helped by private tutors who would organise informal collective classes to teach the recitation of the Qur’an, ethics, and ritual aspects (teaching how to pray, for instance). With the creation of the main mosques in Almada, Odivelas and Lis- bon, religious education became increasingly institutionalised. Currently, most mosques and prayer halls organise Islamic instruction classes (locally known as madrasas or madresas, which refers to religious instruction classes) and offer them to the public. These classes are taught in different languages, according the national and linguistic origin of the congrega- tion, and using different educational materials (e.g. in the Benformoso mosque, where the congregation is mainly from Bangladesh, the teaching materials are all in Bengali and brought from Bangladesh). During most of the year, these Qur’anic classes take place on weekends while in the summer they are organised on a daily basis. A recognised, private secondary Islamic school exists in Palmela (in Lis- bon metropolitan area). It has 200 pupils, with nearly 10% of them being non-Muslims and it runs both a secular and a religious curricula. In 2009, portugal 523 it achieved the status of being the best school in the national ranking of public and private secondary schools (see Section 12). Part of the tuition fees for this school can be deducted in taxes, depending on the family income, and, as of 2011, the school is part of the Cambridge International Curriculum. Another educational institution is the Darul’ulum Kadria-Ashrafia de Odivelas (Rua D. Nuno Álvares Pereira, 14-B, 2675, Odivelas, tel. & fax: ++351 218133282) which is part of the Association for the Islamic Educa- tion in Portugal. It was created in 1997 with three objectives: (i) preserve the values of Islamic culture and religion; (ii) cooperate closely with the Islamic communities in Portugal; and (iii) contribute to the active role of Muslims in Portugal and in Lusophone countries. It reproduces a South Asian Sufi inspired version of Islam, namely of Barelwi inspiration. One consequence of the recent family reunifications among Muslim groupings from South Asia and African countries is that the number of small, local community projects which focus on children’s education has increased over the past years. Some are initiatives of broader programmes, as is e.g. the project at the Amadora mosque which makes part of the K’Cidade programme of the Aga Khan Foundation.7 Religious curricula are increasingly combined with academic training, including alphabeti- sation, language classes (Portuguese or, in the case of children e.g. from Guinea Conakry, French) and general capacity training (computer courses etc.).8 This is also true in other mosques in the country where Portuguese language classes are taught to recently arrived migrants. The Law of Religious Freedom allows Islamic instruction in public schools, depending on the number of pupils/parents who require it (mini- mum ten). In practice, there is currently no public school in Portugal with enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age who could benefit from this offer. The parents do not complain about the lack of such ser- vice, as their children attend the instruction in the Qur’anic classes.

7 While this developmental project is an initiative of the (Isma’ili) Aga Khan Founda- tion, the majority of communities and groupings where it provides necessary support are Sunnis. 8 For a more comprehensive view see Mapril, José, (2010) ‘Bons muçulmanos’: Educação Islâmica e cidadania na área metropolitana de Lisboa in Vilaça, Helena e Pace, Enzo (eds.), Religião em Movimento. Imigrantes e diversidade religiosa em Portugal e Itália, Porto, Estra- tégias Criativas, pp. 37–54. 524 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Religious Freedom Act (No. 16/2001) regulates the figure of the imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.9 As a higher institution for the training of imams has not yet been founded, imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school of Palmela. 15–18 women were educated there as alimas. Some imams have received their education abroad (mostly in the UK, with only few excep- tions where Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been the preferred destination). According to main institutional representatives, currently hardly anybody goes abroad. Above all, only a few are pursuing higher Islamic education because the market for imams is very small indeed. In some cases, especially among recently arrived migrants, the imams are chosen among the group in question according to their knowledge of Islamic issues—a knowledge usually acquired in their countries of ­origin.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several munici- pal cemeteries reserve areas for Muslims and their communities (Odive- las, Feijó). Officially since 2005 (and since 1998 in practice), such an area exists at the cemetery of Lumiar (a district of Lisbon), donated by the Municipality of Lisbon and open to Muslims from all over Portugal. More than 500 graves carry Muslim names. It has become the most important cemetery for both Sunni and Shi’i (both Isma’ili and Ithna-Ashari) fam- ilies, being called “our cemetery”. The Islamic sections of Odivelas and Feijó cemeteries are designated for the local Muslim populations. In spite of this infrastructure, the burial place is a matter of conten- tion. For some, usually Portuguese citizens or with family attachments to the country, the burial is frequently in the Islamic sections of Portu- guese cemeteries. For others though, namely Bangladeshis and Guineans, there is a worry in burying the bodies in the country of origin. In order to do so, several informal associations or key figures collect money among other fellow countrymen. In the Guinean case, it is also common to send

9 Leitão, p. 300. portugal 525 luggage with part of the deceased belongings while in most cases the bod- ies are buried in the Islamic sections of the aforementioned cemeteries. Only the bodies of important figures of the Guinean community, so called big men, are sent back to be buried in Guinea-Bissau. Until today, only one Bangladeshi has been buried in Portugal. All the others were embalmed, sealed in a coffin and sent back to Bangladesh (the total expenses are close to five thousand Euros) where they were buried in public cemeteries or in family plots in their villages of origin.10 In spite of this, even among Luso-Bangladeshis the practice of sending the bodies back to Bangladesh has been questioned as non-Islamic.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Religious Freedom Act grants members of the Islamic and other com- munities the right to practise their religion in special situations (such as in military service, public hospitals, and places of imprisonment). In prac- tice, there are no imams working exclusively or on a regular basis in such institutions due to the lack of need. If the need arises in hospitals, the Commission of Social Affairs (Comissão de Assuntos Sociais) of the CIL provides special care and support for the individuals and their families which includes, of course, the visits of an imam. With regard to imprison- ment, imams made visits on an informal basis until the official protocol was registered in the Diário de República I/185 (23 September 2009), and took effect only from 13 November 2009 on. Since then, community mem- bers, for example, provide late night meals to prisoners during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

The State does not officially recognise Islamic festivals or holidays but permits absence from work and school on the main occasions on request. On these occasions, the CIL distributes information to the public, the Ministry of Justice, schools and employers and provides the respective forms for applying to the authorities for time off. Workers and employees

10 See Mapril, José e Saraiva, Clara (forthcoming), “Le lieu de la bonne mort: transna- tionalismes funéraires entre migrants du Bangladesh et de la Guinée-Bissao”, Revue Euro- péene des Migrations Internationales. 526 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler are expected to maintain a flexible schedule and to compensate working hours. Students may take their exams on alternative dates. The dates for the two main religious festivals—‘id al-Fitr and ‘id al-Adha—are usually established by the Comissão de Lua (Commission for moon observation), composed of several ulama and imams, which is a committee of the Islamic Community of Lisbon. The information is then passed on to other institutions in the country. In spite of this, among other Muslim populations it is also frequent to celebrate these two main occasions according to the calendar in their home countries. Since 2011, the Comunidade do Bangladesh em Portugal (CBP) (Bangla- desh Community in Portugal) an association created in April 2011, organ- ises, in close collaboration with the Baitul Mukarram mosque and Islamic Community of Bangladesh (ICB), the main prayers of ‘id al-Fitr and ‘id al-Adha in a Lisbon downtown square—Martim Moniz. On both occa- sions, more than two thousand Muslims of South Asian and African back- grounds gather to pray in the square.

10 Halal Food and Islamic Services

Ritual slaughter according to Islamic tradition is permitted, according to a spokesman of the CIL, since 1975. Nevertheless, most ritual slaughter for Muslims was performed by the Rabbi of the Lisbon Synagogue until first halal butcher shops were established in 1982. Today there are at least seven halal butcher shops in Lisbon, three in Odivelas, two in downtown square Martim Moniz, one in Laranjeiro, and another downtown in Alva- lade (owned by a non-Muslim), and two in Porto. Halal chicken is avail- able at the major shopping malls/supermarket chains (Continente, Jumbo and more recently Recheio). At least twelve halal restaurants exist in the main cities, nine of them in Lisbon. Muslims who are living in the South of Portugal complain about the lack of halal food supply, with only chicken being available twice a week in supermarkets located in Faro and Albu- feira. One can assume that this holds true for other places/regions outside Lisbon as well. A Muslim halal food supplier commented in an interview that this works according to the rules of the market, namely that if clients asked for more (regular) supply of halal chicken, the supermarkets would order more. Every year, more than 200 pilgrims travel for the Hajj. The programmes are either organised by individuals with connections to travel agencies in England who arrange for kind of all-inclusive packages or through a travel portugal 527 agency in Lisbon, “Fly Well” (Rua Fernandes da Fonseca, nº 1 5ª andar, sala 805—Centro Comercial da Mouraria—110–238, Lisboa, www.grupoflywell .com/contactospt.html), which sells packages for the occasion. This agency is also located in Amadora and Odivelas.

11 Dress Codes

A law which targets the banning of religious dress is neither discussed among political parties, nor in the public and press in Portugal. Accord- ingly to spokesmen of the CIL, the use of the head scarf or other special dress at school and workplaces has not caused any conflict or controver- sies. In the Portuguese context, the Qur’anic concept of the “modesty of the woman” does not translate into the use of specific dress codes. Conse- quently, the latter is not a very common practice, neither among women nor men, apart from the occasions of religious festivals and visits to the mosque.

12 Publications and Media

In 2012, Muslims continued to take part in two television programmes on the public channel RTP 2, namely the programs “A Fé dos Homens” and “Caminhos”. The length of these programmes continues to be seven min- utes for “Fé dos Homens” and twenty five minutes for “Caminhos.” In 2012, the Islamic community continues to organise two radio programmes, with the same names as the TV ones, at a public broadcasting station (Antena 1). In total, during 2012, the Islamic community was responsible for 226 minutes of TV programs and 109 minutes of Radio broadcasting, dedicated to several different themes such as Islamic education or Islamophobia. The CIL runs a website (www.comunidadeislamica.pt) and some younger community members have activated a chatroom (www.aliasoft. com/forumislam) where one can also submit questions to be answered by the imams. Several blogs are used by young Muslims (muculmana.blog .com; islamicchat.blogspot.com; Portugal-islamico.blogspot.com). Some of these virtual spaces are also frequented by Portuguese-speaking Muslims from outside Portugal (mainly from Brazil, but also from Mozambique or Portuguese Muslims who live in the UK). There is currently only one printed journal, Al-Furqan, which is also available online (www.alfurqan.pt). It has a long-standing tradition, is a 528 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler private initiative and not related to the CIL. During the last year, it even disappeared from the shelves of the book store at the Central mosque. The CIL publishes newsletters and other occasional grey literature and provides updated information on several matters on the above named community’s website.

13 Family Law

As noted above, since Islamic communities (and other religious minori- ties with long-standing tradition in the country) can register and be rec- ognised as religious communities (and not only as associations in private law, as used to be the case until 2006), they can perform religious mar- riages which, by submission of respective declarations, will be accepted by civil law. Like the Jewish and Evangelical communities, which have already solemnised a few of such marriages in 2008, the Islamic communi- ties were able to realise the first marriages in 2010. In spite of this, among several sectors of Muslims in Portugal, namely among migrant populations (e.g. Bangladeshis), marriage ceremonies are usually performed in their countries of origin and not in the main Portu- guese Islamic institutions.

14 Interreligious Relations

Portuguese Muslims look back at a long tradition of interreligious rela- tions, the latter having been informally established among leading per- sonalities of different religious minorities already under Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique. The closest “cooperation” partner during the early years in Portugal had been the Jewish Community. This relation- ship had been maintained during the negotiations about the new law of Religious Freedom which took place in the early 1990s and gained official character with the founding of the Abrahamic Forum (Forum Abraâmico de Portugal) in 2007 which joins Muslim, Jewish and Catholic represen- tatives and is linked to the Three Faiths Forum (www.threefaithsforum .org.uk) with links to groups worldwide. The Abrahamic Forum organises cultural events (including lectures and debates) and assistance to people in need (of any religion and also for “the ones who might not profess any religion at all”). Such assistance is mainly organised through a task force portugal 529 composed of young people from the three religions joining hands to work with a selected Portuguese NGO and making food available. On 1 February 2011, the Islamic Community of Lisbon participated in the 2011 World interfaith week held at Universidade Lusófona, in Lisbon. The programme included a debate on religious minorities in the world after 11 September with as an invited speaker. It also included the participation of Dr. Jorge Sampaio, former President of Portugal and current Representative of the United Nations for the Alliance of Civilizations. During 2012, the campaign entitled “Soup for everyone” (sopa para todos) continued. During thirteen Fridays (every two months), between 7.30 and 9 pm, the Lisbon central mosque served in its canteen a hot meal with freshly baked bread and soup to all those in need. The programme was organised in close cooperation with several civil society institutions.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The historically recent “new” Muslim presence (in distinction to the his- torical presence on the Iberian Peninsula before the 15th century) did not attract much attention before 9/11 which brought more curiosity and questions about Islam and Muslims. Besides the coverage of the main dates of the Islamic calendar, the media coverage of Muslim related issues in 2012 included international and national topics. The international topics included how young Mus- lims are less religious than their parents, according to a study presented by the American non-governmental organisation Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (“Jovens Muçulmanos Menos Religiosos que os Seus Pais”, Rádio Renascença, 10/08/2012). The national topic was how the main Portuguese Muslim “community” helps its members in several aspects including in the definition and planning of emigration projects in the current economic scenario (“Na comunidade muçulmana ajudar os fieis também é auxíliar à emigração, Diário de Noticias, 26 de Dezembro de 2012). Another significant topic was the condemnation, by the main institutional representatives of Islam in Portugal, of both the offenses on Prophet Muhammad (in the amateur video The Innocence of Muslims) and the ensuing violence. Subsequently, on the 5 October 2012, the doors of 530 josé mapril and nina clara tiesler the central mosque in Lisbon were opened to all those who would like to know more about Islam and Muslims.11

16 Major Cultural Events

On 5 January 2012, Tariq Ramadan gave a lecture at Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian entitled ‘Political and Religious Challenges Facing European Muslims’, in an event organised by Centro de Estudos Sociais (Coimbra) and the British Council. The event had a significant impact in the pub- lic space with a number of press releases in central newspapers, among them a long interview with Tariq Ramadan in one of the main weeklies in Portugal—Expresso (“Populismo é uma ameaça”, Expresso, 30 December 2011). During Ramadan 2012, participants in the Summer School of the Alli- ance of Civilizations, the Circle of Friends Portugal, visited the Central Mosque. The guests were invited to participate at the prayer and festivi- ties after sunset. A new monthly initiative in close collaboration with the Religious Studies Unit of Universidade Lusófona is the “Dinner Debates of the Al-Mutamid Philosophy Club.” Following a buffet, and counting on the expertise of guests from diverse areas of the Portuguese public sphere, political and social issues such as Religion and Power (on the occasion of the retirement of the Pope), the ‘Arab Spring’ or human trafficking were discussed.

11 “Muçulmanos em Lisboa condenam ofensas a Maomé mas rejeitam violência”, Rádio Renascença, 2 October 2012. ROMANIA

Irina Vainovski-Mihai1

1 Muslim Populations

The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in north- ern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-­Romanian- Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as part of Romanian territory. As a result of the economic and political conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey. While the census of 1879 recorded Muslims as representing 56% of the population in the Dobrudjan county of Constantza, the census of 1909 indicates that the percentage had dropped to 10.8%.2 Since its establish- ment as an independent state, the Constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denominations adopted in 1923 lists the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.3 The establishment of the Com- munist regime (1948) introduced many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds on society.

1 Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Associate Professor in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and a Ph.D. in Philology. She has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 2 Schmidt-Rösler, Andrea, “Dobrudscha”, in Weithmann, Michael (ed.), Der ruhelose Balkan. Die Konfliktregionen Südosteuropas (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993), pp. 94–106 (101), quoted in Bara, Maria, “Relaţii interetnice dintre creştinii ortodocşi şi musulmani în Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia şi Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassy- ensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (95). 3 Gillet, Oliver, Religie şi naţionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Compania, 2001), p. 6. 532 irina vainovski-mihai

After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed. Today, the majority of Muslim communities live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups. The census which took place in 2002 recorded 67,257 Muslims (0.3% of the total population of Romania), of whom 31,118 were ethnic Turks, 23,641 Tatars, and 3,310 Romanians.4 As regards levels of education, out of the total Muslim pop- ulation over the age of ten (i.e., 57,687 individuals), 2,637 were recorded by the census of 2002 as having a university degree.5 The data from the most recent census (October 2011) are still under review, but according to provisional interpretations, out of the total population (of 19,043 million) 28,226 persons declared themselves to be ethnic Turks and 20,464 to be Tatars.6 In light of the same data, 26,179 persons have Turkish as their mother tongue and 18,143 Tatar.7 The preliminary results of this last cen- sus include Muslims in the category of “other religions,” with a number of less than 85,000 adherents.8 The main Muslim ethnic groups, Turks and Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. In the census of 2002, a relatively small number of Turks and Tatars declared themselves to belong to religions other than Islam, to be athe- ists or to have no religion (980 Turks out of 32,098, and 294 Tatars out of 23,641).9 According to the same statistics, the total number of Mus- lim families was 16,807, out of which there were 12,584 families in which both spouses were Muslims.10 Although the total number of Muslims in Romania should have increased slightly due to immigration from Middle Eastern countries and conversion (mainly as a consequence of marriage),

4 National Institute of Statistics figures available at www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/ vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 5 National Institute of Statistics figures available at www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/ vol4/tabele/t13.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 6 Provisional census results available on the census webpage of the National Institute of Statistics at www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Comunicat_ DATE_PROVIZORII_RPL_2011_.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 7 Provisional census results available on the census webpage of the National Insti- tute of Statistics at www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/TS5.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 8 Provisional census results available on the census webpage of the National Insti- tute of Statistics at www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/TS7.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 9 National Institute of Statistics figures available at www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002 INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 10 National Institute of Statistics figures available at www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/ vol4/tabele/t30.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 533 probably the overall figures kept with the general trend of population decrease. The available updated estimates as of 2012 vary: 70,000 accord- ing to the Muftiate in Romania, with 85% living in the south-eastern county of Constantza11 and approximately 67,300 according to the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs (Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte).12 After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Muslim groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, and refu- gees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds (from northern Iraq and south- eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians. These new communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Romania, and the two groups live almost parallel lives,13 so discussion does not run around the question of who is a Muslim, but rather what kind of Muslim someone is and to which extent.14 After Romania’s accession to the EU (in 2007), the number of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa increased. According to the statistical bulletin of the General Inspectorate for Immigration (Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări), in the first quar- ter of 2012, there were 1,457 requests for asylum mainly from citizens of such countries as Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.15

2 Islam and the State

Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority (according to the 2011 census, 16,367 million out of the total population of 19,043 million).16 The Islamic faith, as one of the 18 religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is

11 Figures from the Muftiate in Romania, available at www.muftiyat.ro/comunitatea, accessed 4 February 2013. 12 Figures from the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs available at www.culte.gov.ro/ cultul-musulman, accessed 4 February 2013. 13 Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, ISIM Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34. 14 Kozák, Gyula, “Romániai muzulmán intézmények diskurzusa az identitásról és inte- grációról (The discourse of Muslim institutions from Romania on identity and integra- tion)”, Korunk, no. 5 (May 2009), pp. 54–61 (54). 15 Statistics available on the webpage of the General Inspectorate for Immigration at http://ori.mai.gov.ro/api/media/userfiles/analiza%20statistica%20sem%20I.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 16 Provisional census results available on the census webpage of the National Institute of Statistics at www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/TS7.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 534 irina vainovski-mihai considered a public-utility legal entity.17 Costs are covered primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recogn- ised national leadership and representative body (the Muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the Muftiate is the only religious institution that represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the Muftiate’s approval.18 The Synodal Council (Romanian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: Şura-i Islam), headed by the Mufti, takes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. According to the same Law of 2008, the Synodal Coun- cil is made up of the Mufti, four members nominated by the Democratic Union of the Turkish-Muslim Tatars in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România, UDTTMR), four members nomi- nated by the Turkish Democratic Union of Romania (Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România, UDTR), the principal of the Kemal Atatürk High School (Colegiul Naţional Kemal Atatürk) and 15 clerics.19 The UDTTMR and the UDTR are two of the eighteen political parties and cultural asso- ciations representing ethnic minorities in the Romanian Parliament. The Mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided his qualification is recognised by the Roma- nian state). Because the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the Mufti is confirmed by a decree of the President of the Republic.

17 “Hotărâre de guvern privind statutul cultului musulman (Goverment Decision regard- ing the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination)” on the website of the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs www.culte.wbd.ro/library/files/biserici/statutul_cultului_musulman. doc, accessed 4 February 2013. 18 Cf. Chapter III, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Government Decision regarding the Rec- ognition of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June 2008. 19 List of the present members available on the Muftiate’s website at www.muftiyat.ro/ muftiatul/organizare, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 535

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The traditional (Sunni) Muslim denomination engages in public activities mainly through the Muftiate (Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, Constantza, tel./fax: ++40 241611390, http://www.muftiyat.ro) together with the UDTTMR (Str. B. P. Haşdeu, nr. 53, Constantza, tel./fax: ++40 241616643; ++40 241520186, www.tatar.ro) and the UDTR (Constantza Str. Crişana nr. 44, tel./fax: ++40 241550903, www.udtr.ro). Although the Muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution repre- senting Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present Mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constantza), was first elected to this position in 2005 and was re-elected in June 2010.20 He studied in Romania and Turkey, holds an MA in Comparative Religion and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Constantza).21 In recent years, the Muftiate extended its international relations, includ- ing with the Saudi-based Muslim World League.22 Newly established associations and foundations23 dominated by immi- grants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in pub- lic activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are:

– Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation (Fundaţia Centrul Cultural Islamic Semiluna, Bucharest, sector 6, Str. Munţii Gurghiului, nr. 50–52, www.musulman.ro/); – Taiba Foundation (Fundaţia Taiba), which in 2011 changed its name to Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Center (Fundaţia Centrul Cultural “Islamul azi”, Bucharest, sector 2, Şos. Colentina, nr. 373; Constantza, Str. Maior Şofran, nr. 11, http://www.islamulazi.ro); – Association of Muslims of Romania (Asociaţia Musulmanilor din România, at the same address as the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Center in Constantza);

20 www.muftiyat.ro/muftiatul/organizare/muftiu (The Muftiate of Romania), accessed 4 February 2013. 21 http://teologie.univ-ovidius.ro// (Faculty of Theology, University of Constantza), accessed 4 February 2013. 22 State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, www.culte.gov.ro/cultul-musulman, accessed 4 February 2013. 23 See the National Registry of Foundations, the Ministry of Justice, available at www .just.ro/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mwqfL9%2fN2NU%3d&tabid=91, accessed 4 February 2013. 536 irina vainovski-mihai

– Muslim Sisters Association (Asociaţia Surori Musulmane) (at the same address as the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Center in Bucharest and Constantza, http://femeiamusulmana.blogspot.com/); – Tuna Foundation (Fundaţia Tuna, Bucharest, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, http://www.tuna.ro and www.tunaforum.ro/); – Islamic and Cultural League in Romania (Liga Islamică şi Culturală din România), with a branch in Bucharest (Bucharest, sector 2, Str. Fabrica de Gheaţă, nr.14, http://www.islam.ro) and another one in Cluj-Napoca (Cluj-Napoca, str. Pastorului, nr. 17, www.islamcluj.ro/); – Association of Romanian Converts to Islam (Asociaţia Românilor Convertiţi la Islam, 617036 Rediu—Bira, Jud. Neamţ, www.arci.ro/).

The most active of them appear to be the Islamic and Cultural League and the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, formerly Taiba Foun- dation. According to the spokesperson of the latter, the name has been changed to make it more meaningful for non-Muslims and to allow for more activities and departments.24 Both organisations have several websites—two dedicated to children, The Little Muslim (Micul musulman, www.miculmusulman.com) and Islam for Children (Islamul pentru copii, http://islamulpentrucopii.wordpress.com/)—as well as blogs and Inter- net discussion groups in Romanian, handbooks on Islam in Romanian, stands in book fairs, charitable activities, and Internet broadcasting (see Section 13 below).25 Most of the other organisations are offshoots of the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, apart from the Tuna Founda- tion, which is linked to the Gülen Movement. Under the Law of Denomi- nations (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic NGOs, associations and foundations need to be endorsed by the Mufti. However, in 2010, the mufti expressed his opinion that many of these associations are harmful to traditional Hanafi Islam in Romania because of their alleged persistent propaganda and conservative views, which come from Arab schools of Islam, and also that they have taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education

24 “Another name”, Radio Islam, available at www.radioislam.ro/en/news-archive/277- radio-islam-another-name-.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 25 See a report of activities for 1998–2010 at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sfu_EFtH5Zs, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 537 after the collapse of Communism.26 The Taiba Foundation rejected this opinion and accused the Mufti and the Synodal Council of libel.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In Romania, there are 77 purpose-built mosques. Ten of them are histori- cal monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. The Big Mosque Carol I in Constantza, com- missioned by King Carol I of Romania (ruled: 1866–1914) and erected in 1910, was the first reinforced concrete building in Romania.27 The Hun- chiar mosque of Constantza, built in 1869 and included as a category A monument on the list of the national cultural patrimony,28 is the issue of bitter declarations and legal battles between the Mufti, the mayor of the city, the prefect of Constantza County, and a private enterprise. On account that both aesthetically and structurally the mosque is put in dan- ger, the Mufti has asked for cancelation of the construction authorisation and for the demolishing of the neighbouring building just 1.2 meters from the place of worship.29 The issue was also followed abroad. On a visit to Constantza in November 2011, the Turkish Minister of Culture, Ertuğrul Günay, expressed his concern for the safety of the mosque30 and in Decem- ber Neue Zürcher Zeitung offered a detailed account of the problem.31

26 “Daca musulmanii ar respecta ceea ce scrie in Coran ar exista unitate (There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an)”, interview with the mufti, Ziua de Constanta, 25 November 2010, available at www.ziuaconstanta.ro/rubrici/ interviu/%22daca-musulmanii-ar-respecta-ceea-ce-scrie-in-coran-ar-exista-unitate%22 .html, accessed 4 February 2013. 27 See a detailed presentation on the site of the Muftiate at www.muftiyat.ro/ monumente/119-kral and post #2 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 28 Ranking available on the site of the Ministry of Culture at www.cultura.abt.ro/Files/ GenericFiles/LMI-2010.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 29 “Mazăre, cu spatele la patrimoniul naţional. Acuzaţii grave în cazul geamiei Hunchiar” (Mazăre turns his back to the national patrimony. Serious accusations in the case of Hun- chiar mosque), on-line interview with the mufti, 15 November 2011, Ziua de Constanta, www .ziuaconstanta.ro/rubrici/interviu-online/interviu-online-cu-muftiul-cultului-musulman- din-romania-iusuf-muurat-tema-este-mazare-cu-spatele-la-patrimoniul-national-acuzatii- grave-in-cazul-geamiei-hunchiar-12916.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 30 “Turcia cere salvarea Geamiei Hunchiar” (Turkey asks for the rescue of Hunchiar mosque), RL Romania libera.ro, 15 November 2011, available at www.romanialibera.ro/ actualitate/dobrogea/turcia-cere-salvarea-geamiei-hunchiar-244641.html, accessed 4 Feb- ruary 2013. 31 “Moschee in Bedrängnis. Streit um einen Neubau in Constanta” (Mosque in distress. Contention for a new building in Constantza), NZZOnline, 3 December 2011, available at www 538 irina vainovski-mihai

On 11 February 2012, the court gave its final decision for the cancelation of the construction authorisation.32 The consequent works of demolition did not start yet. The oldest mosque in Bucharest was initially built in 1900. In 1956 the Communist regime disassembled and rebuilt it in another loca- tion a year later.33 In Bucharest, in addition to the main mosque, it is esti- mated that there are fifteen other mosques funded by foreign residents,34 but these are in fact prayer halls adjacent to the buildings of associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns.35 In 2011, Aledin Ahmet, the representative of the UDTTMR in the Parliament, submitted an interpellation on behalf of the Muftiate addressed to the State Secretary for the Relation with the Parliament. The five line text signalled the fact that certain foundations had created in Romania, mainly in Bucharest, illegal “units of Islamic faith” and asked for clarifications. A month later, the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs sent its answer, which asserted that it did not receive any information or complaint regard- ing the creation of Islamic faith units by Muslim foundations and added that, according to the Law of Denominations any person has the right to practise his religion collectively and the State Secretariat cannot decide against the creation of units for the practice of religion as long as they do not violate public security and order or fundamental human rights.36

5 Children’s Education

The Law of Education adopted in 1995 introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in

.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/moschee_in_bedraengnis_1.13497933.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 32 “Autorizatiile de constructie a hotelului de langa Geamia Hunchiar raman anulate” (The construction authorisations for the hotel near Hunchiar Mosque remain cancelled), 14 February 2012, Observator de Constanta, http://observator.ro/131996/autorizatiile- constructie-hotelului-langa-geamia-hunchiar-raman-anulate-131996.html, accessed 4 Feb- ruary 2013. 33 For a presentation of the mosque see post #1 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html, 4 February 2013. 34 Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Par- liament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007), p. 155, available at www.euromedalex.org/sites/default/files/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 35 For a presentation of the Ar-Rahman Mosque (created in the building of the Cres- cent Islamic Cultural Centre) see post #3 on the website of the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam at http://forum.arci.ro/thread-1227.html., accessed 4 February 2013. 36 Both documents are available on the site of the Chamber of Deputies at www.cdep .ro/pls/parlam/interpelari.detalii?idi=27672&idl=1, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 539 a particular religion, those under 18 being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious. According to the new Law of Education (Law of National Education 2011/Ch. I, Art. 18.3), only per- sons authorised by the Ministry of Education and the heads of the legally recognised religions can teach religion in public schools. How many this applies to in practice is not recorded. Islam is also taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associa- tions on an extra-curricular and private basis. There are a number of pri- vate schools functioning under the auspices of such associations. Two that are worth mentioning are the Jerusalem School (Madrasat al-Quds www .jerusalemschool.ro/), under the patronage of the Islamic and Cultural League; the Crescent School and Kindergarten (Şcoala şi Grădiniţa Semi- luna, www.ourhappykids.ro), under the patronage of the Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre. In 1996, a Turkish high school (Colegiul Naţional Kemal Atatürk) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with the joint support of the Romanian and Turkish governments (for example, the pupils in the boarding school are financially sustained by Turkey; the courses of Turkish language and Islam are taught by visiting teachers from Turkey).37 The school comprises sev- eral sections, including Theology. A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at several universities and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation and history of Arab lit- erature. All holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas issued abroad are subject to the recognition by the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the Mufti. In 2007, disputes

37 Gülşen Ismail, “De vorbă cu noul director adjunct, despre Colegiul Naţional ‘Kemal Atatürk’ din Medgidia” (Speaking with the new vice-principal of the Kemal Atatürk High School in Medgidia), Interetnica, 28 October 2011, available at http://interetnica .ro/de-vorba-cu-noul-director-adjunct-despre-colegiul-national-%E2%80%9Ckemal- ataturk%E2%80%9D-din-medgidia, accessed 4 February 2013. 540 irina vainovski-mihai emerged after the Mufti refused to endorse diplomas obtained from Islamic theological institutions in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. The Mufti officially requested the Ministry of Education not to recognise diplomas obtained by seven Tatars on the ground that they had studied a radical form of Islam,38 and recognition of their diplomas was denied.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constantza, there is need for additional provision. The creation of a Muslim cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. At present, Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constantza (250 km away) for burial. The matter seemed to have been settled after the Mayor of Bucharest promised in 2008 to allot the Muslim community land for this purpose on the outskirts of the city, but until now the situation has been subject to delay. The implementation of the official decision taken in this regard by the Municipality Council in 2009 was stalled due to legal issues until 2010, when the Council decided on the relocation of the cem- etery. In 2011 the local administration earmarked a two-year budget for carrying out a feasibility study and for arranging the site. In March 2012, the Muslim Synodal Council voted for a document meant to legally regu- late the organisation and the functioning of the Muslim cemeteries.39 The initiative came after some lavish family vaults were erected in the Muslim cemetery of Constantza.40

38 “Plangere catre Sura-i Islam (Complaint to the Sura-i Islam)”, Clubul român-arab de presă şi cultură (Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture), 19 April 2007, available at www.ana-news.ro/index.php/limba-romana-i-156/stiri-i-171/440-plangere-catre-sura-i- islam, accessed 4 February 2013. 39 “Regulament de organizare şi funcţionare a cimitirelor musulmane din România” (Regulations for the organisation and functioning of the Muslim cemeteries in Romania), available on the Muftiate’s website at www.muftiyat.ro/anunturi/169-regulament-de-orga nizare-i-funcionare-a-cimitirelor-musulmane-din-romania, accessed 4 February 2013. 40 “Lux dincolo de moarte. Cavouri musulmane cu geam antiglont, in Cimitirul Musul- man din Constanta” (Luxury after death. Muslim vaults with bulletproof windows in the Muslim Cemetery of Constanta), Stirile ProTv.ro, 23 December 2011, available at http:// stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/lux-dincolo-de-moarte-desi-religia-le-cere-modestie- cavouri-musulmane-cu-geam-antiglont.html, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 541

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces. The Muftiate can assign an imam to visit a prison inmate at the inmate’s request and at the Mufti- ate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there is a significant number of Muslims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr (in Turkish: Şeker Bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (in Turkish: Kurban Bayram) celebrations take place in the main cities (with popular music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. In Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arab restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence (as in Dobrudja), they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Muslim, being wary of behaving inappropriately. Large- scale iftars are also organised in cities with a quite small Muslim popula- tion. The US Ambassador to Romania, Mark H. Gitenstein, organises an annual iftar dinner. Representatives of every religion in Romania were invited to the 2012 event meant as recognition of the common Abrahamic heritage.41 In 2012, Murat Yusuf reciprocated the invitation and Ambas- sador Gitenstein visited the Muftiate in Constanţa and participated in a traditional ­dinner. An estimated 150–200 Muslims perform the annual hajj, but there is no official data available. The pilgrims are supported financially by the Muftiate, as well as by the foundations Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre and “Islam Today” Cultural Centre. Most of them travel by bus to Bulgaria and Turkey, where they join other groups of pilgrims.

41 “U.S. Ambassador Mark H. Gitenstein’s Remarks on the Occasion of an Iftar Dinner at His Residence,” 24 July 2012, on the site of the US Embassy in Romania, http://romania. usembassy.gov/policy/remarks/amb-07242012.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 542 irina vainovski-mihai

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by halal slaughter houses functioning in Romania and certified by the Muftiate. Generally, halal food is not available either in public institutions or in the supermarkets. As the Orthodox Christian tradition has several annual fasting periods and two weekly fasting days (Wednesdays and Fridays), during which abstention includes animal and dairy products, Muslims may choose among the food labelled as “de post” (“for fasting”). Usually, Muslims do not buy meat from general stores and supermarkets but from the Arab and Turkish stores (see Section 11 below). Small Arab and Turkish food stores, most of them carrying the name of “măcelărie halal” (halal butchery), have been flourishing all around Romania. They cater both to Muslims in search of halal products and to non-Muslims looking for spices, special flavours and ingredients. In the cities with a sizeable Muslim population, fast food restaurants and pizze- rias started to accommodate their menus by including, for example, “Mus- lim Pizza” (which had as an ingredient traditional Turkish dried beef and mutton sausage). Some, but rather few, international companies present in Romania obtained halal certificates for their merchandise.42 Islamic banking and finance is present in Romania through the Bank of Lon- don and Middle East and the European Islamic Investment Bank, which have the right to provide services without the establishment of local branches.43 The Foundation for Islamic Services in Romania (Fundaţia de Servicii Islamice din România, Bucharest, sector 2, Şoseaua Fundeni, nr. 9, www.fsir.ro), with branches in seven towns, offers shelter and meals for those in need. Islamic clothes and head scarves (as well as other items) can be bought from ZamZam, an on-line shop in the Romanian language opened in February 2011 (http://islamic.host.org/shop/). There are numer- ous businesses run by Muslims, both Romanian and foreign citizens, but they are not strictly related to Islam.

42 “The Production of Non-Dairy Whipping Creams Was Halal Certified”, Eurocas Romania, www.eurocas.ro/en#, accessed 4 February 2013. 43 See the List of foreign banks exercising the freedom to provide services within the territory of Romania on cross-border basis on the website of the National Bank of Romania at ttp://www.bnro.ro/files/d/RegistreBNR/XLS/AlteIC_En.xls, accessed 4 February 2013. romania 543

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear head scarves. In recent years, many new converts adopted Islamic dress codes and the head scarf.44 No women have been observed wearing niqab. As there are no regulations restricting the head scarf in the photos attached to official documents, signals of the increasing num- ber of requests coming from women in Dobrudja to wear the hijab when photographed for their identity cards are evident in media coverage of the issue.45

12 Publications and Media

The main printed media are the monthly Hakses (The Authentic Voice, published by UDTR (Constantza 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. SO, ap. 3, tel./fax: ++40 241550903; on-line issues: www.udtr.ro/hakses/index.htm) and the periodicals published by the UDTTMR: Karadeniz (The ), Kadinlar Dunyasi (The World of Women) and Cas (The Youngster) all the three with the same address (Constantza 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel./fax: ++40 241616643). Back issues are also available on-line at: www.tatar.ro/publicatii.php?arhiva. The website http://www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers extended articles on Muslims in Romania in general. Zaman Romania (www.zaman.ro) is the on-line local edition of the Zaman newspaper. Published in Romanian and Turkish, it has a special section for news from Dobrudja. In March 2009, UDTR, UDTTMR and the Muftiate opened a broadcast- ing station, Radio T, in Constantza with programmes in Romanian, Turk- ish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Romanian Broadcasting Society (Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune, SRR). DDTV (a television

44 Daniela Stoica, “New Romanian Muslimas: Converted women sharing knowledge in online and offline communities”, in Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska (ed), Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Oriental Studies, 2011), pp. 274–277. 45 T.G. Horia, “Cu vălul islamic pe cartea de identitate” (With the Islamic Veil on the Identity Card), evz.ro, 19 February 2012, available at www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/cu-valul- islamic-pe-cartea-de-identitate-967063.html, accessed 4 February 2013. 544 irina vainovski-mihai channel broadcasting from Bucharest nationally, although with a small audience) hosted a weekly programme, Islamul azi (Islam Today) pre- sented in Romanian by the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre. The programme was cancelled after DDTV started broadcasting movies only. Webcasting is used increasingly: video clips (in Romanian or with Romanian subtitles) on dailymotion (www.dailymotion.com/Asociatia SuroriMusulmane), YouTube (www.youtube.com/islamulazi, www.youtube .com/muhlisun) and Ikhwan Tube (www.ikhwantube.org/), and audio streaming on websites such as Radio Islam (www.radioislam.ro/radio. html). The web portal Islam Romania (http://islamromania.ro/), admin- istered by the Islamic and Cultural League and the Foundation “Islam Today” Cultural Centre, presents information from diverse sources in the Romanian language and offers downloadable books in Romanian.

13 Family Law

The Romanian legal system is secular. According to the Civil Code, mar- riages are only recognised if they are performed and registered by a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. In litigation, a non- denominational premarital contract may be taken into account. The Civil Code prohibits polygamy but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Gener- ally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim festivals and special events are regularly attended by non-Muslim representatives of local authorities. Government agencies, such as the Department for Interethnic Rela- tions (Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice, www.dri.gov.ro/) and non- governmental institutions, such as the Intercultural Institute Timisoara romania 545

(Institutul Intercultural Timişoara, www.intercultural.ro/rom/index.html) are promoting dialogue through symposia, publications and websites, such as Intercultural Calendar (Calendar Intercultural, www.calendarinter cultural.ro/index.php), comprising both ethnic and religious festivals. Probably as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as familiar, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Balkan coun- tries), are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Media coverage concerning Muslims in Romania at the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, eth- nic festivals and public performances) (see also Section 17). The regional media (in Dobrudja) covers in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by new-comers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim popula- tion and not understood by them. Media focus on Islam tends mostly to be related to international events, and presentations and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, Middle East experts and ad-hoc analysts.

16 Major Cultural Events

Nawruz, the annual spring holiday, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurdish immi- grants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension, such as Küreş (traditional Tatar wrestling) and Hîdîrlez (a Tur- kic spring festival). While the Parliament rejected a proposal to institute Nawruz and Hîdîrlez as legal holidays, on 5 May 2011 the Day of the Tatar Language was celebrated for the first time, after the Parliament voted in favour of establishing it as an official annual feast.

RUSSIA

Elmira Akhmetova1

1 Muslim Populations

There is no official record of the number of Muslims in the Russian Feder- ation as the 2010 census did not include a question about religious beliefs. However, according to that same census, the total number of members of Muslim ethnic groups indigenous to Russia is about 15 million, and there are significant numbers of labour migrants from Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose expatriates form a significant portion of the approximately nine million officially regis- tered labour migrants in Russia. In addition, the Federal Migration Ser- vice estimates that there are around five million illegal immigrants in the ­country.2 According to Ravil Gainutdin, the Head of the Russian Council of Muftis (RCM) as well as the Head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia, 80% of labour immigrants in Russia are Mus- lims by cultural background.3 Accordingly, the RCM estimates that there are over 20 million Muslims in Russia, which is about 14%–15% of the total population (about 143 million as of October 2012). In 2003, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, addressing the Organization of the Islamic Con- ference (OIC) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also said the Muslims of Russia numbered about 20 million. According to the report of the Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, among self-identified Muslims of Russia, about nine in ten (89%) profess their faith in God and the Prophet Muhammad, while 44% say that religion is very important in their lives.4

1 Elmira Akhmetova is a PhD candidate in history and civilisation at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). 2 This number may be even higher as some unofficial agencies estimate there are 10 to 15 million unregistered foreigners in the country: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ eo20060921a1.html, accessed 25 December 2012. 3 http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/03/11/2323_type63378type63381_214089 .shtml, accessed 25 December 2012. 4 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” August 9, 2012, pp. 8 and 38–39 (see www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_ Affiliation/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf), accessed 9 April 2013. 548 elmira akhmetova

Islam first entered the region when in 641 a Muslim army under the leadership of ‘Abd Rahman ibn Rabi’a al-Bakhili reached the Southern Caucasus. In 685–6, Arabs took the town of Derbend, which subsequently became the focus for the Islamisation of the north-eastern Caucasus, referred to as bab al-jihad (the gateway of jihad).5 In the other part of modern Russia, the upper Volga basin, Islam gradually took root through trade and other economic relations with the Muslim world. The first Mus- lim state on the territory of modern Russian was the Bulghar Kingdom,6 which voluntarily recognised Islam as an official state religion in 922 in the presence of a delegation sent by the Abbasid Caliph Ja’far al-Muqtadir Billah.7 From there, Islam spread to other parts of modern Russia. The second wave of the spread of Islam in Russia took place during the period of the Golden Horde (Altyn Urda), a western province of the vast Chenghizid Empire, which was established in 1242 as a result of the Mon- gol invasion of the Bulghar Kingdom and other neighbouring territories. Under the rule of Uzbek Khan (1312–42), Islam became the official religion of the state and, from the mid-fourteenth century until the demise of the Golden Horde in 1437, the Volga Bulghar elite dominated the cultural and Islamic discourse of the empire.8 At the beginning of the fifteenth century a number of independent Islamic khanates (or states), including the Kazan, Crimean, Siberian, Noghay, and Astrakhan khanates, emerged from the gigantic Golden Horde. From the sixteenth century, these Muslim states were conquered one after another and incorporated into a newly centralised Muscovite state of proto-Russians: Kazan in 1552, Astrakhan in 1556, and Western Siberia in 1598.9 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian advance had reached the Northern Caucasus too. In 1859, Muslims of

5 Galina Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia: An historical perspective,” in Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova (eds), Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 28. 6 The Bulghar Kingdom existed in the Middle Volga region, a territory of the modern republic of Tatarstan, from the eighth century until the Mongol invasion in 1236 CE (see www.onislam.net/english/politics/europe/425970.html), accessed 10 January 2013. 7 Marjani, Shihabetdin, Mustafadu al-Akhbar fi Ahwali Qazan wa Bulghar (Useful infor- mation about the conditions of Kazan and the Bulgars) (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nashriyaty, 1989), pp. 124–130; Wimbush, Enders, “Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 271–272; Yemelianova, Galina M., Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 7. 8 Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia”, p. 21. 9 On Russian expansion into Muslim territory, see Wimbush, “Islam in Central Asia”, p. 272. russia 549

Dagestan (Chechnya and Ingushetia were also part of Dagestan) lost their country to the Russian Empire after 34 years of resistance under Imam Shamil (1797–1871).10 Today the majority of Muslims live in their histori- cal territories of the Volga-Urals basin, western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. Other parts of Russia, including large cities such as Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg also have significant Muslim popula- tions. The Muslim population of Moscow alone is widely estimated to be more than 2 million (about 20% of the total), and St Petersburg’s Muslim community is approximately 700,000 (out of a population of about 4.78 million, according to the 2010 census). Russia’s Muslims belong to more than 40 ethnic groups,11 such as the Volga Tatars, the Siberian Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Bashqorts, , , Avars, , , Kabardins and many others. In the Dagestan region alone, there are tens of indigenous Muslim ethnici- ties. The majority of Russia’s Muslims follow two Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence—the Hanafi and Shafi’i . Muslims of the Volga- Urals region and the , Karachays and Balkars in the Northern Cau- casus follow the Hanafi madhhab, while Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia are Shafi’is. Shi’is are a small minority to be found almost exclusively in the Caucasus, among Azeri Turks and the Azeri diaspora and part of Dagestan’s small Muslim ethnic group, the Lezgins. Ethnic Muslims are predominant in seven out of the 21 republics of the Russian Federation: Bashkortostan and Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals region, and Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia in the Northern Caucasus.

2 Islam and the State

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that Russia is a secular state and that “no religion can be established as the official or compulsory [religion]” (Article 14). It guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any

10 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven CT: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1998), pp. 304–318; Blanch, Lesley, The Sabres of Paradise: Conquest and Ven- geance in the Caucasus (London: Tauris Parke, 1960). 11 If we include the tiny ethnic groups of the Caucasus region, this number may be even higher. For example, President Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, noted that 57 of Russia’s 182 ethnic groups identify themselves as Muslim. 550 elmira akhmetova religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them (Article 28), and prohibits “all forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds” (Article 19). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, a supplemental law on reli- gion, does not recognise a state religion. But its preamble identifies Rus- sian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism as traditional religions and recognises the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Rus- sia and the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture. Islam is repeatedly affirmed to be part of Russian society by the Russian authorities and political leaders. Russian then-president Dmitry Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, stressed the importance of Islam in the country’s internal affairs and declared: “We are a nation of many ethnicities and faiths, and the Mus- lims of our nation have due respect and influence in our country. Muslim religious organisations make important contributions to supporting civil order, to providing spiritual and moral guidance to an enormous number of people, and to fighting extremism and xenophobia.”12 During his visit to Ufa in November 2011, Medvedev also stated that: “Our huge country is a common historical motherland for the Christians as well as Muslims; not one of them arrived at here from outside, but did accept Christianity or Islam here, on this land.”13 The central and provincial muftiates are on good terms with the Kremlin and the regional leadership. On 2 November 2009, the grand mufti Ravil Gainutdin was decorated by the government with the Order “For Services to the Fatherland, 4th degree” in recognition of his contribution to propagating spirituality and strengthening harmony between the nations of the Russian Federation. The Russian government assists Muslim institutions by financing some educational and cultural developments. In December 2006, a Fund for Supporting Islamic Culture, Sciences and Education (www.islamfund.ru) was founded by the Russian president, with an annual budget of about 200 million Russian Roubles (about €5 million) to support Muslim organi- sations, scholarships, Islamic events, conferences, seminars, festivals and

12 Medvedev, Dmitry, “Opening remarks at meeting with Muslim spiritual leaders of Russia,” www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/07/15/1219_type84779_219684.shtml, accessed 15 January 2013. 13 “O tom, Kto Rodnoi, a Kto Prishliy, Rasskazal Prezident Rossii,” www.islamnews.ru/ news-98641.html, accessed 15 January 2013. russia 551 the Muslim press. In 2012 alone, 1,200 grants of widely varying amounts were given for the previously mentioned purposes. It should be stated that the Islamic factor played a minor role in the declaration of war by the Russian government against Chechnya in 1994 and 1999. Many experts agreed that the Caspian Sea’s oilfields and the strategic significance of oil pipelines passing through the Caucasus were major incentives for Moscow to use force against the separatist movement in Chechnya during the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000. In the wake of the Russian Extremism Law of 2002, adopted by the Rus- sian government after the declaration of the US-led global ‘war on terror’, cases of discrimination and violation of Muslims’ rights under the pretext of ‘fighting against religious extremism’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ have signifi- cantly increased in Russia. Dozens of mainstream Islamic books such as the al-Salihin (The Gardens of the Righteous), Forty of Al- Nawawi, al-Amal (Balanced Criterion of Action) of Imam Ghazali, Jizn’ Proroka Muhammada (The Life of the Prophet Muhammad) of Ibn Hisham and al-Mubarakfuri, parts from the Risale-i Nur of Said Nursi have been indiscriminately banned in various district courts in Russia for alleg- edly inciting interreligious and interracial hatred and promoting exclusiv- ity and superiority on the basis of religion. In 2012 alone, more than eighty different classical and contemporary Islamic books on ethics, theology, jurisprudence and Sufism were banned in compliance with the verdicts of several district courts. A number of Muslim organisations, movements and societies such as Hizb al-Tahrir, Jama’a al-Tabligh, Nurcular (followers of Said Nursi), the so-called ‘Ahl as-Sunna’, Islamic Jamaat, Salafism, Wahhabism and oth- ers have been banned in Russia as being ‘extremist’ and “contradictory to the traditional Hanafi madhhab”. These bans have inevitably led to the arrests of dozens if not hundreds of Muslims in Russia on allegations of belonging to “extremist groups.”14 In practice, only the Hanafi madhhab

14 On the banning of Islamic books and organisations, see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: The battle with ‘religious extremism’—a return to past methods?”, http://forum18.org/Archive .php?article_id=1288, accessed 10 January 2013; idem, “Russia: Religious freedom survey, October 2008”, www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1196, accessed 10 December 2011; Akhmetova, Elmira, “Time to burn Islamic books: Russia 2008”, www.onislam.net/english/ politics/europe/443176.html, accessed 10 December 2011; “Fabrication of ‘Islamic extrem- ism’ criminal cases in Russia: Campaign continues”, www.memo.ru/2008/09/04/0409082 .htm, accessed 10 January 2013; and Ruslan Kurbanov, “Banning Hadiths and Seerah in Russia,” www.onislam.net/english/politics/europe/457866-banning-hadiths-and-seerah-in- russia.html, accessed 14 January 2013. 552 elmira akhmetova is considered acceptable and traditional in Russia while other schools of thought and fiqh, apart from the Shafi’i madhhab (which can be tolerated as indigenous Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, such as the Chechens and Ingush, are Shafi’is), are ‘non-traditional’ and unwelcome.15 Pressure on Muslims to follow only the traditional Hanafi madhhab significantly increased in the Republic of Tatarstan in 2012 after an attempt on life of the Mufti, Ildus Faizov, and assassination of his deputy, Valiullah Yaqupov. The monopoly of the Spiritual Directorate and regional authori- ties over the religious practices of Muslims arouses feelings of suspicion about everyone who does not follow the ‘traditional’ Hanafi madhhab. Consequently, the rivalry between government backed traditional Islam and the followers of other Islamic schools had significantly widened in the last few years. At least ten of Russia’s imams and muftis were assassinated in 2012, and, in most of the cases, the responsibility for their murders was put on jihadi groups of North Caucasus and Hizb al-Tahrir.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The voice of the Russia’s Muslim population is mainly represented by three Islamic structures. The most influential among them is the Russian Coun- cil of Muftis (Soviet Muftiyev Rossii, RCM, 7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel./fax: ++7 4956814904, www.muslim.ru), founded in July 1996 by the decision of the first Assembly of the Heads (muftis) of Regional Spiritual Boards of Russia, which elected Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia (Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Evropeiskoi Chasti Rossii), as its first chairman.16 The RCM is an umbrella organisation that unites religious Muslim associations in the Russian Federation on a voluntary basis. Among its main tasks are: consolidation of Muslim religious organisations of the Russian Federation with the aim of finding solutions to problems affecting the whole Muslim community in Russia; coordination and mutual assistance with respect to activities organised by individual religious boards; clarification of the Council’s official position with regard to various issues in relations with

15 The Oslo-based Forum 18 News Service also reports on the existing Hanafi monopoly in Russia (see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Any school of Islam, as long as it’s Hanafi”, www .forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1324, accessed 10 January 2013. 16 Hunter, Shireen, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), p. 56. russia 553 public authorities on federal and local level, organisations representing other confessions, international and foreign organisations; organisation of Hajj, conferences, public relations campaigns concerning the Muslim population, the government, and the non-Muslim population. The second in importance but also the oldest Muslim religious organi- sation is the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims (CSBM) of Russia and European countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Rossii i Evropeiskix Stran SNG, CSBM, 50, Tukaeva str., 450057, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, RF, tel.: ++7 3472508086/2508079 http://cdum.ru). It was established in post- Soviet Russia in 1992 and is located in Ufa, Bashkortostan; its head is Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin. The origins of the CSBM go back to 1788, when the Empress Catherine II ordered the establishment of the ‘Ufa Spiritual Gath- ering for Mohametan Law’ (Ufimskoe Duxovnoe Magometanskogo Zakona Sobranie), which was renamed the Central Muslim Religious Board of Inner Russia and Siberia (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Vnutrennoi Rossii i Sibiri) in 1917 and then the Muslim Religious Board of the European part of the USSR and Siberia (Musul’manskoe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Evropeiskoi Chasti SSSR and Sibiri) in 1948. Regional Muslim religious boards are registered with either the RCM or the CSBM and every local Muslim community must be affiliated to a regional Muslim religious board in order to be officially recognised as a legal organisation. These two organisations enjoy equal rights and status in the government structure and are recognised by the state as umbrella Muslim organisa- tions of Russia. A third large Muslim organisation in Russia is the Coordinating Cen- tre of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Koordinatsionniy Cen- ter Musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza, CCMNC, 49, Ostojenka str., 119034, Moscow, RF, tel.: ++7 499-255-2147, email: [email protected]). It was established in 1998 and unites almost all regional Muslim religious boards of the North Caucasus region. There are no Muslim political parties in Russia, but Muslims are inte- grated into Russian political life. In republics with a Muslim majority, especially in the Northern Caucasus, major posts in the government struc- ture and industry are largely occupied by ethnic Muslims. 554 elmira akhmetova

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques or prayer houses are to be found in almost every Russian city and town that has a Muslim community. Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the RCM, estimates that at least 7,200 officially registered mosques are func- tioning in Russia at the moment and their number continues to increase.17 There are new mosques in ancient Russian cities such as Tver, Yaroslavl, Nizhniy Novgorod and many others. In regions with a Muslim majority, there is a boom in mosque openings. In the small Republic of Dagestan alone, with a population of about 2,577,000, more than 1,700 mosques are registered. The first mosques that opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union have often been reconstructed on the historical sites of old mosques, which were confiscated and in some cases destroyed by the regime in the 1930s. The mosques are purpose-built and their size depends on the size of the community. Village mosques are usually designed for several dozen Muslims, while city mosques can accommodate from several hun- dred up to several thousand believers. The biggest mosques in Russia are the recently-built Qul-Sharif Mosque located inside the Kazan Kremlin, Tatarstan, and Ahmad Kadyrov Grozny Central Dome Mosque located in the capital of Chechnya. There is no official record of the number of prayer houses (molel’niyi komnaty) in the Russian Federation. They are commonly single rooms opened in universities, schools, workplaces, hospitals, prisons and in small towns with a Muslim minority. In 2011, a mosque was opened on the terri- tory of the Grozny Airport, Chechnya. More mosques and prayer houses, however, are needed by practising Muslims in many regions of Russia, especially in Moscow. There are currently four mosques in Moscow, which together can only accommodate only a few thousand believers. The fifth mosque of Moscow, the Cathedral Mosque, which was originally built in 1904 by local Muslims and remained open even during Soviet times, was destroyed in September, 2011, due to restoration works. According to the City Interior Affairs Department (GUVD) records, about 170,000 Muslims gathered in four mosques of the city to perform the ‘Id al-Adha prayer in 2012, while about 80,000 Muslims gathered around the Moscow Cathedral Mosque site alone. Since mosques could only accommodate several hun- dred, worshippers had no choice but to pray wherever they could find a space, several blocks away from the mosque itself. The same happened in

17 See Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, p. 13; Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 137–138. russia 555 other Russian cities. Construction of new mosques is therefore a burning issue for Russia’s Muslims. Work recently began on the restoration of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, Rus- sia, tel.: ++7 4956-814904), which is expected to be completed by 2015. There are no restrictions in Russia, including Moscow and St Peters- burg, on the adhan being called outside the mosque, although it is usually conducted discreetly.

5 Children’s Education

The 1997 law on religious freedom establishes the secular nature of public school education in Russia. However, in July 2009, then-President Med- vedev announced the first national plan to teach the basics of major reli- gions and secular ethics in Russian schools. Since September 2012 pupils are offered the choice of studying one of Russia’s four federally recognised religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism or Judaism—or a course in comparative religion. Russia’s Muslim children can learn about Islam in maktabs (mektebe in Russian) or Sunday schools and private Islamic schools, which are expected to follow the state school curriculum. The first such school, the Islamic Usmaniyya school, was opened in Kazan in 1995 (38, Musa Bigiev st., 420047, Kazan, tel.: ++7 8435-119364, www.usmania.ru). In addition to all the compulsory secular subjects, the pupils there also study Arabic, Qur’an recitation, , basics of fiqh and theology. There are currently around 120 pupils studying at primary and secondary levels. Muslim children who do not have the option of attending an Islamic school may get basic knowledge about Islam at maktabs or Sunday schools in mosques in the cities and some villages. Some madrasas (see section 6 below) also have their own maktabs. For example, the Mahinur madrasa operates a number of maktabs and summer schools, where children, in addition to enjoying themselves, study Arabic, Qur’an, basics of fiqh, and stories of the and rightly guided caliphs. In Tatarstan alone, about 5,600 children participated in Islamic summer school programs in 2010. 556 elmira akhmetova

6 Higher and Professional Education

Presently, more than 90 registered professional and higher educational Muslim institutions exist in Russia. Professional Islamic education is car- ried out primarily in madrasas.18 There are currently over twenty licensed madrasas in the European part of Russia, excluding the Northern Cau- casus region.19 Eight are in Tatarstan, seven are branches of the Russian Islamic University set up by the CSBM in various regions, and three are run by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan. In addition, the Spiritual Boards of Muslims of the European part of Russia, Saratov and Nizhniy Novgorod each have one madrasa.20 Russian Islamic University established by the CSBM in Ufa has several regional branches: Khadji Tarhan in Astrakhan, Bilyar in Ulyanovsk, Nur in Samara, Husainiya in Orenburg, Nurul-Islam in Oktyabrsk, and Gulistan in the village of Shigirdani in Chuvashiya. The three madrasas, all quite small, established by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, the RCM, are Imeni M. Sultanovoi madrasa (3, Sotsialisticheskaya str., Ufa, tel.: ++7 3472-723858) and Galiya (3, Mustay Karim str., Ufa, tel.: ++7 3472-721987), and Nur al-Iman in Sterlitamak (73, Bogdan Hmelnitskiy str., 453100, Sterlitamak; tel.: ++7 3473-252223). The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia runs the Moscow Spiritual Islamic College (7, Vipolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel.: ++7 4952-844704), Sheikh Said madrasa in Saratov, and Mahinur in Nizhniy Novgorod (6, Kazanskaya Naberezhnaya str., Nizhniy Novgorod). There are no madrasas for women only in the European part of Rus- sia, but the Muhammadiya madrasa in Kazan (35, Gabdulla Tukay st., 420021, Kazan, tel.: ++7 8432-931706), the Fanis in Yutazi and the Nur al- Iman madrasa in Sterlitamak accept both men and women as full-time students, using separate classrooms, and all madrasas accept women as part-time students.

18 The term madrasa in the modern Russian context usually refers to a higher Islamic educational institution, equivalent to a higher technical college or specialist high school. Students enrol at the madrasa after completing the secondary school programme. 19 The exact number of madrasas in the Northern Caucasus is unknown, but is in the hundreds. 20 Muhetdinov, Damir, “Sovremennoe medrese dlya Sovremennoi Ummy (Modern madrasa for a modern nation)”, in D. Muhetdinov (ed.), Problema Stanovleniya i Razvitiya Musulmanskogo Obrazovaniya v Postsovetskom Prostranstve (The Question of the Estab- lishment and Development of Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Space) (Nizhny Novgorod: Knijniy Dom Medina, 2009), p. 11. russia 557

Male madrasa graduates can receive diplomas as ‘imam-khatib’, ‘Islamic sciences teacher’, ‘Arabic language translator’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and ’. Female graduates can qualify as ‘teacher- advisor’, ‘teacher and translator of Arabic language’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Study programmes last from two to five years and the diplomas are recognised by the state. The majority of madrasa graduates enrol at Islamic universities in Russia to obtain higher religious education. Higher Islamic education in Russia is provided by Islamic universities and institutes. According to Damir Mukhetdinov, there are sixteen higher Islamic educational institutes and universities operating currently in North- ern Caucasus Republics.21 Another three institutions of higher Islamic education are located in central parts of the Russian Federation: Moscow Islamic University (Moskovskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 12, proyezd Kirova, Moscow, tel.: ++7 495-3513067, www.miu.su), Russian Islamic University, Kazan (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, RIU, 19, Gazovaya str., Kazan, Tatarstan, tel.: ++7 8432-775536, www.e-riu.ru), and Russian Islamic University (RIU), Ufa (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 5, Chernyshevskogo str., 450077, Ufa, Bashkortostan; tel.: ++7 3472-519787, http://rio.bspu.ru). The biggest and best established Islamic university in Russia is the RIU in Kazan. Currently about 500 students (male and female) from twenty regions of Russia and from former Soviet Republics (Commonwealth of Independent States) are studying at this university. It also has a centre for memorisation of the Holy Qur’an and its own mosque, called Anilar (Mothers). Practically all madrasas and universities have their own buildings and student hostels and there are currently about 3,000 Muslims studying at Islamic tertiary educational institutions. Tuition at all educational institu- tions is free. In addition, hostel accommodation is free, and full-time stu- dents are given three meals a day free of charge. About US$10–12 million a year from the federal budget are spent to support Islamic education in the country.

21 See, Damir Mukhetdinov, “Sistema Rossiyskogo Islamskogo Obrazovaniya: Puti Raz- vitiya,” www.idmedina.ru/books/islamic/?1982, accessed 15 January 2013. 558 elmira akhmetova

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslim cemeteries exist in all parts of the predominantly Muslim repub- lics and also in Muslim populated villages in other regions, such as Oren- burg, Saratov, Yekaterinburg, Penza and Chelyabinsk. Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in most Russian cit- ies, including Moscow (e.g. Perepechenskoe Cemetery) and St Petersburg (Novovolkovskoe Cemetery, established in 1820). When no special areas are available locally, relatives bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries in neighbouring regions. Most of the ethnic Muslims take the observance of burial customs seri- ously. Russia’s Muslims widely practise the custom of the Qur’an Ashy (literally ‘Banquet of the Qur’an’) on the third, seventh, fortieth and fifty- first days and the first anniversary after the funeral. On those days, the family of the deceased invite relatives and everyone who took part in the funeral to a meal, and verses from the Qur’an are recited by the local imam or, in the case of female gathering, by the most knowledgeable woman (abystai). Prayer (du’a) is said for the deceased and his/her family, and gifts of money sadaqa (usually a very small amount) are distributed among the guests and those who took part in the funeral ceremony. Men and women usually gather separately. Recitation of the whole Qur’an and the slaughter of an animal as a sacrifice (qurban) in the name of the dead person is also widely practised.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There have been officially appointed Muslim chaplains in some parts of the Russian army in the Northern Caucasus since 1 February 2010, and this is planned to expand to other regions in coming years. In some places imams pay occasional visits to the armed forces, and Muslim religious representatives are often invited to new soldiers’ swearing-in ceremonies. Some private hospitals in Moscow, Kazan, Ufa and cities of the Northern Caucasus have prayer rooms for Muslim patients and staff. There is a Mus- lim prayer room in the military hospital in Orenburg regularly attended by an imam from the local Karavan-Saray mosque. There are no officially appointed Muslim chaplains in prisons, although some prisons in Tatar- stan, Bashkortostan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Mordovia, Penza, Sverdlovsk and other regions have mosques and prayer houses with regu- lar imams, usually appointed from among the detainees. In the prisons russia 559 in Tatarstan alone, there are currently seven mosques and eight prayer houses with libraries and basic Islamic teaching facilities.

9 Religious Festivals

The Muslim religious festivals ‘Id al-Adha (Qurban Bayram) and ‘Id al-Fitr (Uraza Bayram) are public holidays in almost all the predominantly Mus- lim federal republics. Muslims living in other regions can usually take a day off work, provided they make up for their absence later. The Rus- sian president officially congratulates Muslim citizens at their religious festivals every year. On festival days and during the month of Ramadan, Muslim communities organise fundraising for local orphanages, prisons, hospitals, old people’s homes and homes for the disabled. In Moscow, the RCM organises the so-called Shater Ramadana (the Ramadan Tent), a cul- tural charity project, where diplomats from Muslim countries, as well as local Muslim and non-Muslim political leaders, activists, scholars, pub- lic figures, the media, representatives of other religions and soldiers, as well as ordinary citizens, are invited to attend cultural programmes and share iftar with Muslim religious leaders. Public cultural events, such as lectures, competitions, sports and performances, are often organised at these times. On festival days, Muslims also often visit cemeteries and pray for deceased family members, and during Qurban Bayram Muslim charities, such as the Solidarity Foundation (Solidarnost, 11, 71, Dubininskaya str., 115054, Moscow, tel./fax: ++7 4957873307 www.solidarnost.su) organise the slaughter of sacrificial animals and distribute meat to orphans, elderly people, the disabled and others in need. The Muslim New Year, the ‘Blessed Night’ and especially the Prophet’s birthday (Mawlid Bayram) on 12 Rabi‘ al-Awwal are also widely celebrated. During the Mawlid Bayram (and through the whole month) Muslims gather together for talks and Friday sermons on the life and importance of the Prophet Muhammad, and to read from the Qur’an and perform qasidas (Arabic poems about the Prophet Muhammad, particularly the Burda), prayers and munajats (nashids). Charitable donations, gifts and sweets are distributed and congratulations are exchanged with relatives and neighbours. 20,500 Muslims of Russia performed their hajj duties in 2012. 560 elmira akhmetova

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

There are no restrictions in Russia on slaughtering of animals according to Islamic regulations. Halal certification is carried out by Muslim religious authorities, who issue halal certificates to food manufacturers and suppliers. Halal stan- dards have been recognised by the governments of Tatarstan and Bash- kortostan. Most regional Muslim religious boards have established halal committees for the development and promotion of halal standards. They issue the halal logo, control its usage, and notify the authorities of the illegal use of the halal sign on manufactured products. Halal restaurants and shops are widespread in predominantly Muslim Republics. A number of confectionary and bakery companies in Tatarstan produce halal cakes, sweets, chocolate products and pastries and, in 2009, the Mustella Talir Group in Kazan began producing cosmetics with a halal logo.22 Halal meals are provided in twelve Tatar schools and sixteen kin- dergartens in Kazan and in all schools and kindergartens in Nizhnikamsk, another large city in Tatarstan. In Kazan alone, meat with a halal logo is sold by a number of supermar- ket chains such as Bahetle, Metro, Edel’veis, Perekrestok, Real and Pat- terson. Also, almost every mosque has its own shop, where visitors can buy halal food, Islamic garments and literature. In cities with a minority Muslim population, halal food, mostly meat and processed meat prod- ucts, is usually available at local mosques. Imported halal goods may be found in major supermarkets. In Moscow, there is a halal supermarket called “Apelsin” (Apt.1, House 3, Gospitalniy val, M. Semenovskaya, Mos- cow). The largest Russian retail company, X5 Retail Group, in 2010 signed an agreement with the halal meat manufacturer Safa of the Moscow region (www.safahalal.ru) to supplying halal meat products to major Rus- sian supermarket chains such as Karusel’, Pyaterochka and Patterson in Moscow, Voronezh, St Petersburg, Kazan, Ufa, Novosibirsk and other cities. A famous Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts) stated that the manufacturing of halal products in Russia increases by 30–40% annually.23

22 www.talir.ru/catalog.php?parent=1, accessed 24 December 2011. www.talir.ru/catalog .php?parent=1, accessed 15 January 2013. 23 Svetlana Morozova, “Halal 2.0: Osobennosti religiousnoi Edy,” www.aif.ru/food/article/ 44962, accessed 15 January 2013. russia 561

On 19 November 2010, Halal Industrial Park “Baltach” was launched in Baltach district of Tatarstan. This first halal business park in Russia cur- rently produces processed meat products and plans to house 20–30 small halal manufacturers in future. By 2011, about forty companies of Bashkor- tostan had obtained certificates to produce their production such as con- fectionaries, meat products and cosmetics with a halal logo. The Third International Halal Exhibition in Moscow—Moscow Halal Expo 2012—was organised by the RCM with the support of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Moscow city administration on 7–10 June 2012 in the largest exhibition centre of Russia “Crocus Expo.” More than 150 companies from forty dif- ferent countries such as Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Palestine, Tunisia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Philippines, Spain, Malaysia and Indonesia took part in the exhibition displaying food and beverages, cosmetic products, medicine, Islamic books and clothes. Seminar on Islamic finance, banking and insurance as well as Islamic business meetings were held during the exhibition. There is no Islamic bank in Russia, but in March, 2011, a Financial House Amal, was established in Kazan, specialised in innovative financial services in accordance with Shari’a (67, Ostrovskiy str., 420107, Kazan, tel.: ++7 8432-376812, www.fdamal.ru). Islamic banking, finance and insurance have become a popular topic among Russia’s Muslims within last few years as alternative financial solutions, especially after the last global economic and financial crisis. International and domestic conferences and seminars were organised in different cities of the country discussing the principles of Islamic economic system, and prospects of founding Islamic banks in Russia. The most noteworthy among them is KAZANSUMMIT—Interna- tional Islamic and Finance Summit, which takes place annually in Kazan in the months of May–June starting from 2009 (http://kazansummit.com). The last Summit in 2012 hosted about 1,000 participants from 13 regions of Russia, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The participants were investors, financial officers, bankers, Sharia experts, lawyers and politicians. More than 100 mass media outlets covered the event, including Al-Jazeera TV channel, Russia Today, British and Malaysian television. The 3rd Interna- tional Trade Fair of Halal goods KAZANHALAL 2012 was opened two days before KAZANSUMMIT 2012. More than 150 halal producers from differ- ent regions of Russia, Central Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle East demonstrated various types of products and more than 10,000 visitors of 562 elmira akhmetova different faiths had attended KAZANHALAL 2012. The next International Islamic and Finance Summit is scheduled for May 2013.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on the wearing of Muslim dress in pub- lic. Muslim women wearing head scarves are no longer an unusual sight. In 2002, Muslim women won a court case that allowed them to be pho- tographed with the head scarf for identification documents. There are also some cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab, particularly in the Republic of Dagestan. However, wearing black, particularly black hijab, is taboo among Muslim Tatar women, as black is traditionally the colour of mourning. Yet, in October 2012, the wearing of hijab triggered a controversy in Russia after five Muslim students were banned from attending classes in their school in the village of Kara-Tyube in the southern Stavropol region. President Putin consequently declared his sympathy for banning of Muslim head scarfs in schools.

12 Publications and Media

Within a short period of the collapse of the USSR, Russia witnessed a boom in the field of Islamic literature and periodicals, as well as a pro- liferation of Islamic books and audio and video materials produced in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Great Britain. Within two decades, a number of publishing houses, such as Iman in Kazan (27, Qayum Nasi- yri str., Kazan, 420022, tel./fax: ++7 8432-934292 http://musliman.ru) and Ummah in Moscow (http://ummah.ru) have become Russia’s leading specialist Islamic publishing houses and Islamic books are appearing in increasing numbers and improved quality. Annual Islamic book fairs have become customary. Among other influential Muslim publishers is the Medina Publishing House in Nizhniy Novgorod (www.idmedina.ru), which produces four academic journals and a newspaper; it also aims to produce a 12-volume encyclopaedia, Islam v Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Islam in the Russian Federa- tion) by the year 2014. By 2012, six volumes had appeared (in Russian): Islam in Nizhegorodchina, Islam in Saint Petersburg, Islam in Moscow, Islam in Central Russia, Islam in the Volga Region, and Islam in the Urals. russia 563

In addition, it has produced important books on fiqh and also organises international and local symposiums, conferences and seminars. In Tatarstan alone there are about 25 Muslim publishing houses pro- ducing newspapers and magazines amounting to 66,000 copies per year in both the Russian and Tatar languages. The major ones are: Islam info, Iman, Vera and Umma. The Spiritual Board of Tatarstan issues the Islam Nury (Light of Islam) newspaper and a magazine called Deen ve adap (Religion and Morality). In 2003, the Muslim Journalists’ Union was set up under the auspices of the RCM and with the support of the Russian Journalists Union. In 1997 the RCM, together with private individuals, established the TV Company Islamskiy Mir (Islamic World, www.islamtv.ru), which in 2007 launched the first Islamic internet channel in Russian, Islam TV. The chan- nel currently broadcasts daily for fourteen hours online. Its programmes include Islamic lectures, documentaries, news, children’s programme, ser- mons, etc. Islamskiy Mir also produces audio, video and printed Islamic materials. In August 2009, during his meeting with political and religious leaders of the Caucasus region, then-President Medvedev stressed the necessity of creating an Islamic satellite channel under Russian state television. The launching of the first Islamic TV channel in Russia, Al-RTV, took place in August 2012. It broadcasts in the regions of the main Muslim ethnic groups but not in Russian. In addition, since 2002, Russian state television has been broadcasting a weekly programme called Musul’mane (Muslims) which is devoted to the traditions, customs and culture of Russia’s Mus- lims, and state radio stations have similar programmes. Muslim leaders often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. The most popular Islamic websites are http://golosislama.ru, www .islam.ru, http://islamnews.ru, http://ansar.ru, http://umma.ru and http:// islamrf.ru.

13 Family Law

Russian law does not recognise Muslim marriage contracts conducted in mosques or marriage or divorce certificates issued by local imams. Rus- sia’s Muslim couples usually first perform nikah rituals, and then, on the same day or later, have a civil marriage ceremony at state offices, which 564 elmira akhmetova is the only form of marriage recognised by Russian law. Both ceremonies are widely celebrated by the Muslim community. Regarding inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved to follow either Islamic law or the secular state law.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations in the Russian context mean interactions between the followers of the minority creeds such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and the dominant Russian Orthodox Christianity, with its centre, the Mos- cow Patriarchate. All these religions have coexisted on the territory of the Russian Federation for over a thousand years. Over time there have been periods of peaceful relations, competition and even ruthless confronta- tions, especially between the victorious Orthodox Christians and their Muslim subjects. This deep-seated historical antagonism as well as recent developments such as war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the emergence of anti-Russian feelings in the Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, and, the most importantly, the events of 11 September 2001 have played an impor- tant role in creating the stereotype image of Islam as an aggressive, mili- tant religion, associated with separatism, terrorism and drug-trafficking. This stereotype was adopted by the great part of Orthodox believers and the Russian Orthodox Church authorities.24 Another problem of the relations between Muslims and Orthodox Christians is related to a recently evolved wave of competition for “human souls” between their official institutions. In the last few years, the most active priests have begun to propagate Christianity among traditionally Muslim peoples of Russia. Muslim leaders, on their part, have started to involve new converts to Islam from Christianity in the management structures of official Muslim organisations. As a result, mutual mistrust and the opposition between Islam and Christianity have been signifi- cantly increased. It should be also noted that this hostile attitude is not shared by all leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate and Muslim officials. On 23 December 1998, the Interreligious Council of Russia (Mezhreligiozniy

24 See, Alexander Sotnichenko, “Islam-Russian Orthodox Church Relations and the State in the Post-Communist Russia,” www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/images/pdf_ files/srpski/godina3_broj2/Analiza%203.pdf, assessed 10 January 2013. russia 565

Sovet Rossii) was founded at the initiative of the country’s religious lead- ers. This council unites all the country’s traditional religious associations and has undertaken an important role in coordinating social projects with religious organisations. On 2 February 2011, Patriarch Kirill in the Sobor25 stated that the Russian Orthodox Church pays great attention to coop- eration with Islam and other traditional religions of the Russian Federa- tion. In recent years, the movement for peace, dialogue and co-operation between Muslims and Christians has become quite popular in Russian educated circles. On 29–31 October 2012, the Second International Forum “Islam in a Multicultural World” was held at the Institute of Oriental Stud- ies and International Relations, Kazan (Volga Region) Federal University. Russia’s Muslims and their umbrella organisations are engaged in vari- ous local and international interfaith activities. The RCM is one of the founders of the Interreligious Council of Russia and has also initiated a number of international conferences on interreligious dialogue, starting with the public forum “The New Bridges of Inter-civilisational Interaction” (May 2007). In fact, organising round tables, seminars, conferences and public lec- tures on interreligious dialogue, greeting followers of other faiths at their religious festivals and inviting them to iftars and other Islamic festivals has become a tradition in modern Russia. Joint sports, cultural and reli- gious events between followers of different faiths also occasionally take place.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

As in many other countries, the September 11 attacks were the catalyst for Russia’s decision to focus on ‘Islamic extremism’. Earlier attacks within Russian territory, such as the September 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow, were in most cases seen as an overspill from the localised con- flict in Chechnya and the product of separatism rather than any religious ideology. The new phenomenon of Islamophobia has emerged very rap- idly in Russia. Along with the beginning of the US-led ‘war on terror- ism’, the Russian Federation adopted a new law “On Fighting Extremist Activity” in June 2002. The Beslan school siege in September 2004 was a

25 A council of bishops, equivalent to synod in the Western churches. 566 elmira akhmetova turning point in the emergence of the politics of hatred towards all things Islamic in Russia.26 The Russian media and cinema industry also adopted a hostile stance towards Islam and Muslims and played a vital role in creating a negative image.27 As a result, several negative developments took place, such as cases of public and official objections by the Ortho- dox Church, regional administration and non-Muslim populations to the construction of new mosques and the refusal to give jobs to head scarf- wearing women and bearded men. There is no single mosque in the city of Voronezh, which is home to about 30,000–40,000 Muslim residents. The appeal of the local Muslim organisation to obtain land for a mosque was rejected by the regional administration. Muslims of Kolomna, a city in the central European part of Russia, continue appealing repeatedly to the city administration to get land for a mosque for 13 years without any results. The construction of mosques in Kostroma as well as in Kaliningrad is also blocked by the city administration. These negative developments have had an overwhelming impact on the security, rights and well-being of Russia’s Muslims. In fact, the most integrated traditional Russia’s Muslims such as Tatars and Bashqorts, whose religious adherence is not noticeable, do not face serious adverse public opinion on the part of the non-Muslims. Mus- lims of the North Caucasus region and Central Asian immigrants, how- ever, are unwelcome in Russian cities. This intolerant nature of the ethnic Russian population toward Muslims from the Caucasus is evident in the opinion polls conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in May 2010. 29% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy towards Cau- casian nations due to fear of terrorism. Another opinion poll conducted by the Fund of Public Opinion (FOM) in August 2012 shows that 23% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy, while 53% of respondents demonstrated their neutrality toward Islam and Muslims in general.28 Moreover, in recent years ethnic Russian nationalism has increased. The reported skinhead attacks have been mainly directed against immigrants from Central Asia and are largely confined to a few cities such as Moscow, St Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod. At least 21 non-Slavs were killed in

26 Hunter, Islam in Russia, p. 6; Dow, Leah, “Religious discrimination in Russia impor- tant issue: Muslims, Jews, non-Orthodox Christian groups targeted”, www.america.gov/st/ democracyhr-english/2008/September/20080919173838clwod9.507388e-02.html, accessed 10 January 2013. 27 For instance, in the most recent Russian movie Orda (international title is The Horde, 2012, director Andrei Proshkin) the Tatars, who are the largest Muslim group in modern Russia, are displayed as barbarians, brutal, bloodthirsty and evil-minded people. 28 http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/10652, accessed 10 January 2012. russia 567

2011 at the hands of Neo-Nazi gangs and racist groups. On 11 April 2012, Metin Mekhtiyev, a 33 years-old well-known Muscovite Muslim activist was killed on his way home in Moscow. Leaders of Muslim organisations and scholars are involved in public debate on various social issues, such as the issue of immigrant workers, crime, religious and racial tolerance.

16 Major Cultural Events

The diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Russia’s Muslim popu- lation give rise to numerous cultural events throughout the year. They range across sporting, arts and religious events, and attract local as well as international participants. The major arts event is the Kazan International Festival of the Muslim Cinema (the previous name before 2010 was Altyn Minbar—The Golden Minbar), which takes place annually in the capital city of Tatarstan. This event is mainly sponsored by the government of Tatarstan, and has become internationally recognised. Another annual event, which brings together diverse Russian Muslim communities, is the celebration of the acceptance of Islam by the Volga Bulghar Kingdom, organised by the CSBM in June since the 1990s. Several thousand Muslims from all parts of Russia29 gather at the ruins of the ancient city of Bulghar (present-day Spasskiy district, Tatarstan) to perform prayers and make special supplications for their forefathers. The Russian Islamic Book Fair, where major Muslim publishers exhibit their new publications, takes place annually in June in Kazan. Qur’an reci- tation competitions for men, women and children are organised by Mus- lim communities every year in various parts of Russia. The main event is the Moscow International Qur’an Reciting Competition, which attracts participants from Muslim countries and Muslim communities in non- Muslim countries. Thirty four participants from Arab countries, France, Sweden, UK, Malaysia, Indonesia, Finland, South Africa, USA, Central Asia and Russia took part in the 2012 competition.

29 Please provide footnotes.

SERBIA

Srđjan Barišić1

1 Muslim Populations

Muslims are one of the acknowledged traditional religious communi- ties that have been present in Serbia for centuries. Serbian Muslims are almost all Sunnis following the Hanafi School of Islamic law. Islam started to spread in the territories of Serbia with the Ottoman conquest of the late 14th century and parts of Serbia remained under the Ottomans for three to five centuries. After the incorporation of the medieval Serbian state into the Ottoman Empire, Islam over time became the majority religion in some regions due to conversion and migration. The Ottomans withdrew from the territories of today’s Serbia slowly over the centuries, starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699. The with- drawal process was completed after the Balkan wars in 1912–13, when Serbia doubled its territory by taking over the Ottoman regions of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia. At that time there were about 500,000 Muslims in Serbia. In the territories left by the Ottomans prior to 1912, Muslims were in various ways very quickly reduced to insignificant num- bers. Soon after the first phase of Ottoman withdrawal in 1834, only 12,000 Muslims remained in the then Serbia (much smaller than today’s Serbia), and by 1866 there were only 5,000 Muslims, mostly Roma. Many of the expelled Serbian Muslims settled in Bosnia and Sandžak, which were then still under Ottoman control. Some migrated all the way to , where there is today a significant Bosniak community. The migrations continued after World War I but on a smaller scale, so that most Muslims in the ter- ritories acquired by Serbia after 1912 and 1913 stayed where they were.2

1 Srđan Barišić is a postgraduate (MA) student at Sociology Department, Faculty of Phi- losophy, University of Belgrade. 2 Zirojević, Olga, Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804 (Serbia under Turkish Rule 1459–1804) (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2007); Bandžović, Safet, Iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća (Migration of the Muslim Population from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century) (Sarajevo: no publ, 1998); Avdić, Hakija, Položaj Muslimana u Sandžaku (The Status of Muslims in Sandžak) (Sara- jevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991); Karčić, Fikret, Muslimani Balkana ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX 570 srđjan barišić

The latest census in Serbia was conducted between 1 and 15 October 2011, but as of the end of 2012, the results regarding religious composition of the country had not been published.3 According to preliminary results, Serbia’s population has decreased by 5% (377,335 persons) since the previ- ous census, which was held in 2002. Among the municipalities registering an increase in population were two predominantly Muslim municipalities (Novi Pazar and Tutin). However, the Albanian population in southern Serbia largely boycotted the census.4 According to the data from the census of 2002, there were 239,658 self- declared Muslims among a total Serbian population of 7,498,001 citizens in 2002. As 3.2% of the population, they constituted the third largest reli- gious group in Serbia after the Orthodox (6,371,584) and the Catholics (410,976).5 As a result of historical developments, the Muslim population today is concentrated mostly in south-western Serbia, known as Sandžak6 (where, according to the 2002 census there were 142,685 Muslims, or 60.57% of the local population in the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj and Nova Varoš), and in southern Serbia, known as Preševo Valley (municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, where there were 58,903 Muslims, or 66.2% of the local population). In addition to these two regions, a significant Muslim community is pres- ent in Belgrade (20,366, or 1.3% of the local population in 2002). In 2002, Sandžak was home to 59.5% and Preševo Valley to 24.6% of Serbia’s Mus- lims. They are a majority in the municipalities of Tutin (95.2% in 2002), Novi Pazar (78.3%), and Sjenica (75.6%) in Sandžak, and Preševo (87.4%) and Bujanovac (59.1%) in southern Serbia. In the province of Vojvodina, the northern part of Serbia, 8,073 self-declared Muslims lived in 2002, which was 0.4% of the local population.

vijeku (Muslims of the Balkans: The ‘Eastern Question’ in the Twentieth Century) (Tuzla: Behram-begova medresa, 2001). 3 According to the statement of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (pub- lished on 26 October 2012) publication of Book 3: 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia: Population by Mother Tongue and Religion and by National Affiliation, Sex and Age was postponed until further notice. 4 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia—First Results, http://media.popis2011.stat.rs/2011/prvi- rezultati.pdf, accessed 30 December 2012. 5 “Book 3: Confession, Mother Tongue and National Identity or Ethnicity According to Age and Gender—Data by Municipalities” (2003), Belgrade: Statistical Office of the Repub- lic of Serbia; See the details at http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd//en/popis.htm. 6 Southern part of Sandžak belongs to Montenegro. serbia 571

By ethnicity, Bosniaks make an absolute majority of the total Mus- lim population (mostly concentrated in Sandžak), then come Albanians (mostly concentrated in Preševo Valley), Roma and other ethnic groups. Most of the few thousand Arabs living in Serbia, chiefly in Belgrade, are also followers of Islam. Conversions to Islam are rare today but do hap- pen. Some Muslim representatives questioned the accuracy of the 2002 census data and refer to a much higher number of Muslims, even up to 700,000.7 There are no surveys on levels of practice but, generally speaking, the Muslims of Sandžak and Preševo Valley are said to be more religious than those in other parts of the country.

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia states that religious commu- nities are equal and separate from the state.8 The Law on Churches and Religious Communities9 (2006) regulates the issue of state-religion rela- tions. It distinguishes between seven “traditional churches and religious communities,” including the Islamic community, and all other “entities of religious freedom,” and these seven enjoy the privilege of having inher- ited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia, which the Republic of Serbia automatically recognised.10 This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community. The law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national iden- tity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country.

7 See Alibašić, Ahmet, “Serbia”, in J. Nielsen, et al., Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 4, Brill (Leiden, Boston: 2012), p. 519. 8 Articles 11, 21, 43, 44, and 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, see details at www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php. 9 The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 36/2006). 10 For the history of church-state relations in Serbia, see Bremer, Thomas, “Relations between the church and the state: The case of the Serbian Orthodox Church”, in Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Religion and Democracy in Moldova (-Chisinau: ISCOMET and ASER, 2005), p.88; Bašić, Goran, “Status of churches and religious communities in Serbia”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South- Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 143–157. 572 srđjan barišić

The issue of the legal regulation of post-communist restitution of prop- erty was revived in 2011. On several occasions, representatives of the tra- ditional churches and religious communities held press conferences and issued public statements on the problem of implementing the Law on the Return (Restitution) of Property to Churches and Religious Communities. According to a report from the official web site of the Directorate for Restitution, the Islamic Community has submitted 56 requests for property: 51 hectares of land, 38 buildings, and 18 cemeteries. The same property has been claimed by the two rival organisations: the Islamic Community in Serbia and the Islamic Community of Serbia, and it is for this reason that the property had not been returned by 1 March 2012.11 The basic question is: which of these two communities is the legal successor of the Islamic Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1930?12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Today, two independent Islamic communities exist in Serbia: the Islamic Community in Serbia, with its headquarters in Novi Pazar (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji, Ul. 1. Maja 70/b, 363000 Novi Pazar, www.islamskaza- jednica.org), and the Islamic Community of Serbia, with its headquarters in Belgrade (Islamska zajednica Srbije, Ul. Gospodar Jevremova 11, 110000 Beograd, www.rijaset.rs, www.mesihatsandzaka.rs). The Islamic Commu- nity in Serbia is an autonomous organisational unit within the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Islamic Community of Serbia is an independent organisation. The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international recognition of newly formed countries caused the creation of new organisational forms of Islamic communities adjusted to the new state and administrative borders. A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mashihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak), which covers the part of Sandžak within Serbia,13 was established on 30 October 1993 as an autonomous organisational unit within the Islamic Community in

11 The Report of the Directorate for Restitution included the period until 1 March 2012. 12 Direkcija za restituciju Republike Srbije (Directorate for Restitution of the Republic of Serbia), www.restitucija.gov.rs/latinica/direkcija-za-restituciju.php. 13 The part of Sandžak that exists within the territory of Montenegro is under jurisdic- tion of the Islamic community of Montenegro, which is an autonomous and independent Islamic community. serbia 573

Bosnia and Herzegovina,14 while the Islamic Community of Serbia was founded in Niš in 1994, as an autonomous Mashihat which covers the ter- ritory of Serbia, without Kosovo and Sandžak. For more than ten years, these two Islamic communities operated independent of each other. Since the Law on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006 envis- ages the registration of only one organisation, with the words ‘in Ser- bia’ in its name, for each of the seven traditional religious communities, the initiative for uniting all the Muslims living on the territory of Serbia into a single Islamic community, during 2006, was intensified. In spite of numerous meetings among representatives of the Islamic communi- ties from Novi Pazar and Belgrade, agreement on fundamental issues was not achieved. The Sandžak Islamic Community’s Mashihat insisted on the tradition of relations with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herze- govina, whereas the Serbia Islamic community’s Mashihat insisted on the tradition of Serbian Muslims, an ethnically mixed structure of the Mus- lims in Serbia and on territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. After a halt in the negotiations about the forming of a unitary Islamic community in Serbia, on 19 February 2007, the Council of the Islamic Community of Serbia passed the Constitution of the Islamic Community of Serbia in Belgrade and formed the Riyasat. This decision of the Council of the Islamic Community of Serbia was interpreted in Novi Pazar and Sarajevo as a unilateral and illegitimate act. After more than one month, on 27 March 2007 the Council of Unifi- cation of the Islamic Community in Serbia, held in Novi Pazar, enacted the new Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia and constituted the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, headquartered in Novi Pazar. The current Sandžak Mufti Muamer Zukorlić was appointed the Mashihat’s president, and the Rais al-‘Ulama (reisu-l-ulema) from Sara- jevo, who also attended the Council, as the community’s Supreme Head. This decision of the Islamic Community in Serbia was not recognised by the Islamic Community of Serbia, headquartered in Belgrade. The two communities have been disputing each other’s legality and legitimacy since 2007, occasionally with violent outcomes. The Islamic Community in Serbia would like to stay formally connected to the Islamic

14 After reorganisation initiated with the Constitutional decision of the Council in Sara- jevo in 1993, the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists at present of Islamic communities in Croatia, Slovenia and Sandžak (Mashihat of the Islamic Commu- nity in Serbia since March 2007) according to 1997 Constitution (Article 1 of the Constitu- tion of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 574 srđjan barišić

Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Islamic Community of Serbia wants complete independence. During 2011, after several years of inaction, a new initiative was launched to unify the Islamic Community or, more precisely, to overcome the dispute(s) between the rival organisational structures. As of the end of 2012, the intensive diplomacy which has involved top leadership of Turkey and Serbia as well as the leaders of the Islamic communities in Bosnia and Turkey had not come to fruition.15 Today, the Islamic Community in Serbia16 is organised into four muf- tiates (Sandžak, Preševo,17 Belgrade and Novi Sad), which are currently headed by three muftis. Its executive body is the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, headed by a Chief Mufti with his office in Novi Pazar. The Islamic Community of Serbia18 today consists of three organisa- tional entities: Serbian Mashihat, Sandžak Mashihat and Preševo Mashi- hat. With headquarters in Belgrade, the executive body of the Islamic Community of Serbia is Riyasat, headed by Rais al-‘Ulama. The Head Imam Adem Zilkić from Tutin was elected as the first Rais al-‘Ulama, and Belgrade mufti of that time Hamdija Jusufspahić was pronounced as life- long honorary Rais of the Islamic Community of Serbia. The position of Muslims in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medveđa is very specific, since some 60 mosques and 70 imams are under the jurisdiction of at least four organisational structures, which are individually linked to Priština, Novi Pazar, Belgrade and even Riyadh.19

15 Amicable settlement was initiated by Turkish Prime Minister Taip Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davatoglu and Mehmet Gormez, the head of the Turkish Islamic Com- munity. 16 Islamska zajednica u Srbiji (Islamic Community in Serbia): www.islamskazajednica .org. 17 Muslims in Preševo Valley are connected with the Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës) 18 Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia): www.rijaset.rs. 19 “Rijad i Kosovo bliži od Ankare (Riyadh and Kosovo closer than Ankara)”, Danas, 7 November 2011.; “Verske podele i na jugu Srbije (Religious divisions in the south as well)”, RTS, 3 November 2011. www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/984178/ Verske+podele+i+na+jugu+Srbije.html, accessed 15 December 2012. serbia 575

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Today, there are some 190 mosques in Serbia: about 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern Serbia, and one in each of Belgrade, Niš, Mali Zvornik, and Subotica. On the territory of Serbia, there are a few dozen masjids. Almost every big town in Serbia has at least one masjid. A number of mosques are under construction, many of which are new in the regions where Muslims form a majority, but some old mosques are under reconstruction as well. During 2011, the Bajrakli mosque in Belgrade, built in 1575, which was damaged by fire in 2004, was restored and the premises of madrasa and Islamic faculty were built with the help of grants from benefactors, pri- marily the government of Azerbaijan. An educational centre and the reno- vated mosque were opened on 3 May 2012.

5 Children’s Education

The Law on Churches and Religious Communities guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools.20 Confessional religious education was introduced in the Serbian public school system as an optional subject by a governmental regulation published on 27 July 2001.21 The main lobby in favour of confessional reli- gious education was the Serbian Orthodox Church, the majority religious institution that pressed the government to make quick decisions.22 In public schools, Islamic religious education is an ‘elective compul- sory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may not later withdraw during that school year. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by two Islamic communities and paid by the state. The sub- ject is offered once a week in all grades if there are seven or more inter- ested pupils.

20 Article 40 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities. 21 The Regulation on the Organisation and Practising of Religious Education and the Alternative Subject in Elementary and Secondary Schools (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 46/2001). Under the Regulation, seven “traditional” religious communities are privileged: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Commu- nity, the Islamic Community, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Christian Reform Church and the Evangelical Christian Church. 22 Kuburić, Zorica and Vukomanović, Milan “Religious education: The case of Serbia”, in Kuburic, Zorica and Moe, Christian (ed.), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Compara- tive Approaches in the Western Balkans, (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), pp. 107–138. 576 srđjan barišić

For the last several years, the issue of misunderstanding between the rival organisational structures of the Islamic community revolved around the authority to select and appoint teachers of religious studies to primary and secondary schools.23 On 26 September 2012, Mufti Muamer Zukorlić issued a fatwa concern- ing “completion of religious studies in primary and secondary schools of the Republic of Serbia.”24 The fatwa prohibits attending of religious classes by unauthorised and incompetent religious teachers and urges all parents to send their children to attend religious education at a mosque.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic Community in Serbia is the founder of the “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa25 and the Faculty of Islamic Studies,26 both located in Novi Pazar. The “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990 while the female section was established in 1996. Another female section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty was established in 2001 as a two-year Islamic Educational Acad- emy.27 Today, it provides a four-year training programme for imams and Islamic religious education training for school teachers. Programmes are offered at BA, MA and PhD levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many members of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

23 Misunderstanding took place at the beginning of the 2008/2009 school year. There was a problem with twenty-three deposed teachers of religious studies who had been installed by the Islamic community in Serbia were prevented from holding classes of Islamic religious studies. The appointment of new religion teachers, who are the follow- ers of the Islamic Community of Serbia, sparked protest by the representatives of the Islamic Community in Serbia, who argued that newly appointed religion teachers were not qualified. 24 “Fatwa on Islamic religious education attendance”, Mashihat of the Islamic Commu- nity in Serbia, 26 September 2012, www.islamskazajednica.org/index.php?option=com_ezi ne&task=read&page=2&category=12&article=6961, accessed 1 October 2012. 25 Medresa “Gazi Isa-beg” u Novom Pazaru (“Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa in Novi Pazar): www.medresa.net or www.medresa.edu.rs. 26 Fakultet za islamske studije u Novom Pazaru (Faculty for Islamic studies in Novi Pazar): www.fis.edu.rs. 27 In May 2001 Islamic community of Sandzak council brought a decision about estab- lishing the “Islamic pedagogic academy” in Novi Pazar, as a college. The two year academy outgrown in three year academy named “Islamic academy”. According to Mashihat’s deci- sion, in May 2006. it has been renamed into “Faculty for Islamic studies”. serbia 577

In addition to these two institutions, the Islamic Community in Serbia runs the International University of Novi Pazar,28 which is formally regis- tered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in four other towns in Serbia (Belgrade, Niš, Subotica and Pančevo), which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students. The Islamic Community of Serbia is the founder of the Belgrade madrasa,29 the “Bakije Hanume” madrasa30 for girls in Prijepolje and “Sinan-beg” madrasa for boys in Novi Pazar.31 There are a few dozen stu- dents in Prijepolje and Novi Pazar. The Faculty of Islamic Science32 was founded by the Riyasat of the Islamic Community of Serbia in 2010. With the seat in Belgrade and a branch in Novi Pazar, the Faculty provides a four-year training programme in Islamic pedagogy and Islamic theology. Programmes are offered at BA, MA and PhD levels. Many future imams attend higher education schools in Sarajevo (the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo), Skopje (the Islamic Faculty in the village of Kondovo, near Skopje), or in Muslim countries, especially in Egypt (Al-Azhar University in Cairo).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

As the status, history, problems, and ethnic and social composition of the Muslim community differ from one region to another, so does the situa- tion with cemeteries. In Sandžak, Preševo Valley and some other parts of the country, Muslims have no difficulty in carrying out burial according to Islamic tradition. In a number of towns, where a local Islamic community exists, there are Muslim cemeteries, often as parts of public cemeteries. In some towns where there are no Muslim cemeteries, Muslims choose to be buried in the nearest city where there is one.

28 Internacionalni univerzitet u Novom Pazaru (International University of Novi Pazar): www.uninp.edu.rs. 29 On 18 March 2004, when the Bajrakli mosque in Belgrade was burnt, the Belgrade’s madrasa was also burnt, and from that time, realisation of the education process in these institutions is very difficult. 30 “Bakije Hanume” medresa u Prijepolju (“Bakije Hanume” madrasa in Prijepolje): www .medresaprijepolje.com. “Bakije Hanume” madrasa was opened in 2009. 31 “Sinan-beg” madrasa was an extended section of the Belgrade’s madrasa in Novi Pazar, but from 2009 it is a separate madrasa. 32 Fakultet islamskih nauka (Faculty of Islamic Sciences): www.fin.edu.rs/. 578 srđjan barišić

After many years of complaining about the need for a Muslim cem- etery, the agreement signed in October 2012 between Belgrade Mayor Dragan Đilas and Mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić allows Muslims to be buried in full accordance with their customs. Muslims have shared burial spaces with members of other faiths, something that unintentionally prevented graves from being properly oriented.33 This agreement implies that every future alteration of cemeteries will include a section for Muslims.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

On 18 October 2011, the Minister of Defence and six representatives of traditional churches and religious communities, including the Islamic community of Serbia, signed separate bilateral agreements regulating the performance of religious services in the Serbian Armed Forces.34 After the adoption of the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces in Decem- ber 2007 and, in particular, the Law on the Performance of Religious Ser- vices in the Serbian Army in March 2011, the conditions were created for the introduction of religious services in the Serbian Army. Religious ser- vice providers or chaplains will not bear arms and will strictly keep the confessions of members of the defence system secret. They will also have the function of an advisor to the commander.35 In mid-September 2012, the Ministry of Defence issued a tender for military chaplains. Applica- tions were invited for 13 orthodox military priests, one Catholic main mili- tary chaplain and one chief military imam.36

9 Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids/Bayrams are the two main Muslim festivals in the coun- try. On the occasion of both holidays the chief mufti holds an official

33 “Agreement to improve Muslim relations in Belgrade”, 27 October 2012, www .setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/27/ feature-01, accessed 1 December 2012. 34 The first agreement regulating the mutual relations in the performance of religious services in the Serbian Army was signed by Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac and Patri- arch Irinej (Serbian Orthodox Church) in Niš, on 28 June 2011. 35 “Signing of agreements with the representatives of religious communities in Serbia”, Serbian Armed Forces, 18 October 2011, www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=9bd6e0d4-4ac7- 102f-8d2f-000c29270931, accessed 1 December 2012. 36 Ministry of Defense, www.mod.gov.rs/novi_lat.php?action=fullnews&id=4711, accessed 1 December 2012. serbia 579 reception. The manner in which the bayrams are celebrated varies signifi- cantly between Muslim majority and Muslim minority areas. In addition, Muslims in Serbia mark the Islamic New Year, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, and the five sacred nights.37

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal slaughter is permitted in Serbia. Both Islamic Communities have their own Halal quality certification agencies which operate on a commer- cial basis. Halal products can be found in some supermarkets. In addition, Muslims often slaughter animals privately following the halal practice. Certificate of the Halal Agency Serbia or Halal Agency of the Islamic Community of Serbia38 is verified by the International Halal Integrity Alliance. In early December 2012, representatives of the US Agency for Interna- tional Development (USAID), the Governments’ Office for Sustainable Development of Underdeveloped Areas, and Halal Agency Serbia signed a Memorandum of Understanding paving the way to the first ever Halal Food Shop in Belgrade. USAID Mission Director Susan Fritz, Serbian Min- ister without Portfolio Sulejman Ugljanin and Halal Agency Director Mufti Mustafa Jusufspahić attended the signing ceremony hosted by the Halal Agency. The shop will be opened in early 2013.39 Both Islamic communities are organising Hajj. Islamic communities organise Hajj independently by sending their representatives to Saudi Arabia to negotiate directly with representatives of the Ministry of Hajj. In 2012, the Islamic Community of Serbia sent 229 pilgrims,40 while the Islamic Community in Serbia sent 106 pilgrims.41

37 There are: Laylat al-Raghaib, Laylat al-Mi’raj, Laylat al-Bara’ah, Laylat al-Qadr and Laylat al-Badr. 38 Halal Agency Serbia: www.halal.rs/news.php. 39 “USAID and the Government of Serbia support Serbian Food Producers to Open First Ever Halal Shop in Belgrade”, USAID Serbia, 4 December 2012, http://serbia.usaid.gov/ program-updates/latest-news-and-events/serbia.1071.html, accessed 25 December 2012. 40 Mashihat of the Islamic Community of Sandzak, 17 October 2012, www.mesihat- sandzaka.rs/vijesti/782-ispracaj-i-ikrar-dova-za-229-hadzija.html, accessed 15 December 2012. 41 Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, 19 October 2012, http://mesihat.org/ index.php?option=com_ezine&task=read&page=4&category=19&article=7043, accessed 15 December 2012. 580 srđjan barišić

Within the Islamic Community in Serbia operates the International Humanitarian Organisation (IHO) and there are also three associations: for women, Islamic scholars (ulama) and youth.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on wearing hijab, but few women would do so outside the Muslim majority regions of Sandžak and Preševo Valley. Hijab is now allowed in photographs for personal documents.

12 Publication and Media

The Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia publishes Glas Islama (Voice of Islam), a monthly newspaper for religious, social and cultural issues.42 Its El-Kalimeh publishing house43 is very active. The Riyasat of the Islamic Community of Serbia publishes Vakat, monthly newspaper for religious, scientific and cultural issues.44

13 Family Law

Only marriages conducted by a public registrar are legally valid. The Islamic community encourages ‘Shari’a weddings’ administered by an imam. Such weddings have no legal standing and are usually performed after the civil ceremony. Divorce is usually formalised only by the civil authorities. This is also true of inheritance: families may agree privately to divide an inheritance according to the norms of Islamic law but they must still go to the civil authorities to have it authorised. There have been cases of polygamy, including some involving officials of the Islamic Community in Serbia. No formal ‘Shari’a divorce’ procedure has been adopted.

14 Interreligious Relations

Since June 2010 there has been a formal Interreligious Council of the Ministry for Religion which brings together representatives of traditional

42 Glas islama (Voice of Islam): www.glas-islama.com. 43 Izdavačka kuća El-Kalimeh (Publishing house El-Kalimeh): www.kelimeh.com. 44 Vakat (Vakat): www.vakat.rs. serbia 581 churches and religious communities. There was an intensive coopera- tion between traditional religious communities in the Religious Educa- tion Commission (see sect. 5), the forums about Restitution (see sect. 2) and religious services in the Serbian Armed Forces (see sect. 8). But Mus- lim participation has suffered from the rivalry between the two opposed structures (see sect. 3). Representatives of the Islamic Community in Ser- bia were not included in creation of these institutions. Also, there were occasional formal meetings as the international con- ference entitled “The Edict of Milan (313–2013): A Basis for Freedom of Religion or Belief?” in Novi Sad (held on 2–5 May 2012), which were attended by representatives of Churches and religious communities from all of Europe. From Serbia there were Bishop Irinej of Bačka as the host (Serbian Orthodox Church); Stanislav Hočevar, Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan (Catholic Church); Adem ef. Zilkić, Rais-ul-ulama of the Islamic Community of Serbia, Yitchak Asiel, Rabbi of the Federation of the Jewish communities in Serbia as well as many other distinguished representatives.45 The opening ceremony of the renovated Bajrakli mosque and Islamic educational centre in Belgrade was attended by dignitaries of all tradi- tional religious communities in Serbia and the diplomatic corps, and the ceremony was opened by a release of a flock of white doves.46 On the second day of Hanukkah47 2012, a candle lighting ceremony held in front of “Sukkat Shalom” synagogue was attended by Mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić, Vicar General of the Belgrade Catholic Archdiocese Pater Leopold Rohmes, and representatives of the diplomatic corps. Most of the interreligious events in which the Islamic Community in Serbia as well as the Islamic Community of Serbia have participated have

45 This International conference is part of three year project “Everlasting Value and Per- manent Actuality of the Edict of Milan—On the Way to the Great Jubilee in 2013” which started in February 2011 in the City of Niš where the first Conference “Eternal Value and Perpetual Topicality of the Edict of Milan” was held. 46 The ceremony was attended by representatives of the Government of Azerbaijan (main donor), President of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus Shaykh al-Islam Alahsukur Pasazade and Bishop of the Diocese of Baku and Azerbaijan Alexander Ishenin, the ambassadors of Turkey and the U.S., Patriarch Irinej, Archbishop of Belgrade Stan- islav Hočevar, Rabbi Yitchak Asiel, and Boris Tadić who up until recently held office of Serbia’s president. “Renewed mosque, Islamic center opens in Belgrade”, B92, 3 May 2012, www.b92.net/eng/news/society-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=05&dd=03&nav_id=80082, accessed 20 December 2012. 47 Hanukkah, also known as the Festival of Lights, is an eight-day Jewish holiday com- memorating the rededication of the Holy Temple (the Second Temple) in Jerusalem. 582 srđjan barišić been organised by a few NGOs, like Belgrade Open School, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung etc. There was an interesting meeting of religious officials at the Office of the President of Serbia, on 6 December 2012, when the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić delivered the medals of Sretenje Order of the Second Degree to the representatives of the Church and religious communities in Serbia. President Nikolić previously awarded honorary Rais al-’Ulama of the Islamic Community of Serbia Hamdija Jusufspahić with the Sretenje Order, of the First Degree, with the Serbian Patriarch Irinej and other representatives of the traditional religious communities present at the ceremony.48

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Continuous and very sharp criticism addressed to the Belgrade authorities directed by Mufti Muamer Zukorlić49 and attempts at unification of the Islamic Community by Turkish and Serbian governments have dominated public discourse on Islam and Muslims in Serbia during the year 2011. The year 2012 was marked by the continuing deadlock in the negotiations between the conflicting organisational structures in the Islamic commu- nity, the presidential candidacy of Mufti Zukorlić and two fatwas. Mufti Zukorlić’s candidacy for the post of the President of the Republic in the 2012 elections was the subject of headlines in the country. For the first time in Serbia’s modern history, a religious leader collected signa- tures for a presidential bid. Zukorlić’s candidacy was supported by Rais al-’Ulama of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina Mustafa Cerić who called on all Bosniaks to vote for the Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia and the coalition “All Together.”50

48 “Representatives of Traditional Churches and religious communities Awarded With Sretenje Order”, Serbian Orthodox Church, 7 December 2012, www.spc.rs/eng/representa- tives_traditional_churches_and_religious_communities_awarded_sretenje_order, accessed 20 December 2012. 49 Mufti Zukorlić criticised the marking of St Sava’s Day in schools in the Sandzak municipalities (January 2011), the editorial policy of the Radio Television Serbia (March 2011), the annulment of the elections for the Bosniak National Council and scheduling of new elections (July 2011) etc. The Islamic Community in Serbia adopted the Declaration on discrimination in Sandžak (September 2011) and called on Bosniaks to boycott the census in Serbia (October 2011). 50 “BiH mufti urges Bosniaks to vote for Zukorlic”, Tanjug, 23 April 2012, www.tanjug. rs/news/40418/bih-mufti-urges-bosniaks-to-vote-for-zukorlic.htm, accessed 20 December 2012. serbia 583

Zukorlić’s candidacy caused numerous reactions in the public. Mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić, from the Islamic community of Serbia, said that Mufti Muamer Zukorlić’s decision to take part in the presidential election showed that ours is “a free country,” but he at the same time, wondered whether it was “normal” for a person who calls for civil disobedience to become a presidential candidate. Belgrade’s daily newspaper Večernje Novosti wrote that although the controversial Mufti is as eligible to run like any other citizen, “many see this as a violation of the Islamic Commu- nity’s Constitution,” and that it also raises issues regarding the principle of separation of religious communities and state.51 In the first round of the presidential elections held on 6 May 2012 Mufti Zukorlić won just 1.39% of total votes; however, in Novi Pazar 33% of citizens voted for Zukorlić, while the Democratic Party candidate Boris Tadić won 29%. In 2012, there were several spontaneous and organised protests by Mus- lims. For example, several thousand people in Novi Pazar staged a peace- ful protest against the “Innocence of Muslims” movie that caused fury in many Muslim countries. The protest was organised by a group of football fans, i.e. Torcida—supporters of the Novi Pazar football club. The Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Muamer Zukorlić, said the community did not organise the protest but supported it.52 In the context of the disputed “Pride”, the photo exhibition “ECCE homo” provoked sharp reactions on the part of religious officials. The Islamic Community of Serbia joined the request of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Movement “Dveri” to ban the exhibition because it alleg- edly defiled the image of Jesus Christ and insulted the Christian believers. A fatwa issued by Mufti Zukorlić, in late September 2012, reignited a controversy between the Ministry of Education and the Islamic Com- munity in Serbia. With this fatwa the Mufti prohibited the completion of religious studies in primary and secondary schools of the Republic of Serbia as well as the attendance of classes of unauthorised and incompe- tent religious teachers and urged all parents to allow their child to attend religious education at the mosque. In other words, the fatwa demanded that parents not allow their children to attend religious classes in those

51 “Mufti comments on colleague’s presidential bid”, B92, 9 April 2012, www.b92.net/ eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=09&nav_id=79690; “Controversial Mufti Bids for Serbia’s Presidency”, BalkanInsight, 9 April 2012, www.balkaninsight.com/ en/article/serbia-s-mufti-joins-presidential-race, accessed 20 December 2012. 52 “Serbia Sandzak Muslims Protest Over US Film“, BalkanInsight, 24 September 2012, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/novi-pazar-protests-over-the-innocence-of-muslims, accessed 20 December 2012. 584 srđjan barišić schools where teachers were “loyal” to Adem Zilkić’s Islamic Community of Serbia. The Minister of Education Žarko Obradović said that this fatwa represented a serious interference of religious and political issues in the field of education and that such interference is unacceptable.53 There was one more interesting fatwa. In mid-October, the outgoing head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mustafa Cerić, issued a fatwa concerning “the work and activities of Adem Zilkić.” The head of the Islamic Community of Serbia was accused of “splitting the Islamic Community, creating discord among believers, and putting himself in the service of those who are previously known to not wish any good on the Islamic Community.” Further, he was accused of “represent- ing himself falsely” and in this way bringing “great disgrace upon Muslims in Serbia, Sandžak, and the Balkans.”54 In his reaction, Rais al-’Ulama of the Islamic Community of Serbia Adem Zilkić said that a fatwa issued against him represented an abuse of Qur’anic quotes and sacred principles. He also noted that Cerić “mali- ciously overlooked the fact that he was not only the Mufti of Bosniaks but also of all other Muslims of Serbia,” and in a statement to Tanjug accused him of a “flagrant meddling in the internal affairs of the Islamic Commu- nity of Serbia.”55

16 Major Cultural Events

Most Muslim cultural events take place in Sandžak, which is the centre of both religious and cultural life. The most common of these are concerts of religious songs (ilahije), literary evenings, the traditional days celebrating Bosniak culture, various exhibitions, and book promotions.

53 “Minister condemns Muslim leader’s ‘fatwa’”, B92, 27 September 2012, www.b92 .net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=27&nav_id=82388, accessed 20 December 2012. 54 “Fetva reisu-l-uleme o Ademu Zilkiću (Reisu-l-ulema’s Fatwa about Adem Zilkić)”, Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovine, 13 November 2012, http://rijaset.ba/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15320:fetva-reisu-l-uleme-o-ademu- zilkicu&catid=203:mina-vijesti-kat&Itemid=459, accessed 20 December 2012. 55 Rais-ul-ulama added that Cerić had also “maliciously” neglected to take into account that this Muslim organisation received its autonomous status in 1868—fourteen years before the same status was granted to the Islamic Community of Bosnia. Zilkić explained that his Shari’a authority was based precisely on the document that in 1686 gave the Islamic Community in Serbia its legality in performing any religious function. “Islamic Community Head Responds to Fatwa”, B92, 14 November 2012, www.b92.net/eng/news/society-article .php?yyyy=2012&mm=11&dd=14&nav_id=83157, accessed 20 December 2012. SLOVAKIA

Jaroslav Drobný1

1 Muslim Populations

Accurate data on the number of Muslims in Slovakia are not known. At the latest census of the population in May 2011, the Muslims in Slovakia, as well as members of other religious groups which are not registered by the state as recognised religious communities, had the opportunity to claim allegiance to their religion by ticking the box “other” and adding their religion into the empty line in the census sheet. The results of this census of the population were published in July 2012,2 however, they did not pro- vide any new data on the number of the Muslims in Slovakia. Muslims are included in these results in the category “other,” if they also stated their religion, or in the category “unknown,” if they did not state their religion in the census. Despite the fact that the first Muslim communities appeared on the ter- ritory of Slovakia already in the 10th century, and a part of today’s south- ern Slovakia belonged to the Ottoman Empire for almost 150 years, the majority of Muslims in Slovakia are recent immigrants. A smaller compo- nent consists of converted Slovaks and those who were born in Slovakia to Muslim immigrant parents. The emergence of the modern Muslim community in Slovakia should be linked to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia (1878/1908) by Austria-Hungary. The first wave of Muslim immigrants, who settled on the territory of (not only) Slovakia was from Bosnia. In most towns only few individuals settled, only in bigger cities more numerous communi- ties (comprised of several dozen of persons) arose. Slovakia as part of

1 Mgr. Jaroslav Drobný is a graduate of History and Arabic Philology at the Comenius University in Bratislava. He is completing his Ph.D. thesis on the Arab reports on Islam and Islamized ethnic groups in the Carpathian basin from 9th to 13th century, and lectures at the Department of Classical and Semitic Philology of the Comenius University. 2 Juhaščíková, I., Škápik, P., Štukovská, Z.: Základné údaje zo Sčítania obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2011. Obyvateľstvo podľa náboženského vyznania. (Basic data from the Census of Population and Housing 2011. Population by religion.) Bratislava, 2012 www .scitanie2011.sk/wp-content/uploads/EV_v2-N%C3%A1bo%C5%BEensk%C3%A9- vyznanie.pdf, accessed 22 March 2013. 586 jaroslav drobný

Czechoslovakia was among the best industrially and educationally devel- oped countries in the Socialist Bloc, which from the turn of the 1950s and 1960s allowed a high number of students, also from Muslim countries, to study at its universities. A majority of these students came from Arab countries which had good relations with the Socialist countries. Some of these students stayed to work in Slovakia and they also often founded families here. It is this group with their family members which forms the basis of the Muslim community. In the 1990s, they were joined by Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Muslims from the Balkans (mostly Albanians) lived there during the Communist period as well, running small restaurants or selling sweets and ice cream. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.3 As estimated by the Islamic Foundation, around 4,700 Muslims live in Slovakia, of whom 1,500 are Arabs (students and naturalised citizens from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Palestine), 1,000 from Macedonia, 240 Afghans, 300–400 Muslims from the former USSR, 200 from Bosnia, 200 from Kosovo, 200 from Africa (mostly from Somalia) around 400 from other parts of the world and approximately 350–500 Slovak converts (mostly Slovak women, married to Muslims of foreign origin).4 Most Muslims and Islamic activities are concentrated in the capital Bratislava, with small numbers living in the cities of Košice, Martin, Nitra, Levice and Piešťany.

2 Islam and the State

In the Slovak Republic, there is no official state religion, but because of the high number of followers (62% of the inhabitants), Roman Catholicism is considered to be the dominant religion. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees freedom of religion and gives the right to change reli- gion or faith, and also the right to renounce any religion.

3 Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1, 2010, p. 305. 4 Lenč, J., Štefančík, R.: Mladí migranti v slovenskej spoločnosti. Medzinárodná migrá- cia, moslimovia, štát a verejná mienka. (Young migrants in the Slovak society. Interna- tional migration, Muslims, state and public opinion.) Brno, 2012, p. 159. slovakia 587

The registration of churches and religious communities is not manda- tory, however, the legal right to build places of worship, perform public church services and carry out other activities belongs only to registered churches or religious communities. The registered churches and religious communities receive state contributions and subsidies for salaries of their clergy. They have the right to visit prisons and hospitals and to provide there the spiritual service to their own members. The Act on Registration of Churches and Religious Societies (adopted in 1991) was amended in May 2007. According to the amendment of the Act, the registration of a new religion requires at least 20,000 members of the respective religious community permanently living on the territory of the Slovak Republic. In addition, these 20,000 members must submit the “solemn declaration” confirming their membership, knowledge of the fundamental articles of the respective faith, birth certificate number, per- manent address and supporting opinion on the registration of the com- munity. The Act in the former wording allowed registration of religious organisations on the basis of the petition of 20,000 people. Fourteen churches and religious communities, which legally existed in the country before the adoption of the Act on registration of churches and religious societies in 1991, were exempted from the criterion of the compulsory membership basis. Although the Muslim community existed in the coun- try already before 1991, but as it was never properly registered, the Act of 1991 did not recognise its status of a registered church or religious society. Because of the small number of members, according to the amended Act, the registration of a Muslim organisation today is practically impossible.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Foundation in Slovakia (Islamská nadácia na Slovensku, PO Box 247 Bratislava 814 99, www.islamweb.sk) is generally regarded as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Mohamad Safwan Hasna, Artan Qineti and Akram al-Haiwan. The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature (Združenie priateľov islamskej literatúry, Žabotova ulica č. 2, 811 04, Bratislava) was founded by Abdulwa- hab Al Sbenaty. Al-Sbenaty was also a founding member of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies (Inštitút blízkovýchodných štúdií), established in 2006, and the Muslim Community in Slovakia (Komunita muslimov na Slovensku, Žabotova 2, 81104 Bratislava). The Muslim Foundation in Slovakia (Nadácia moslimov na Slovensku, Podkolibská 1, Bratislava) was 588 jaroslav drobný established in 2009 by Ammar Qari and Chiboub Hidbani. This organi- sation is presumably close to Salafi movements. The Foundation al- Huda (Nadácia Al huda, Hemerkova 33, Košice) was founded in 2010 by Mohamad Farah in Košice (second largest city in Slovakia).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Bratislava is one of a few European capitals without a mosque. Long-time efforts to build an Islamic cultural centre, which would also include a mosque, have not been successful till now. The main reasons are admin- istrative barriers in the approval of construction. In 2009, the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia opened an Islamic cultural centre, called the Cordoba Centre for Intercultural Dialogue (Cordóba cen- trum pre medzikultúrny dialóg; Obchodná 31, Bratislava) in central Bratis- lava. The centre has a prayer room and a library. In 2010 The Muslim Foundation in Bratislava (with a Salafi background) opened the Islamic Culture Centre (Islamské kultúrne centrum, Podkolib- ská 1, Bratislava) with a prayer room. In 2012, they reconstructed the build- ing, where they want to establish in 2013 a new prayer room. (Peterska 2, Ružinov, Bratislava). In 2010, the Foundation al-Huda in Košice opened a prayer room “Masjid alhuda,” on Gudernova 3, Košice. In addition to the prayer premises managed by Muslim organisations, Muslims in Slovakia have the opportunity to participate in joint prayers on private premises, which entrepreneurs (mainly in the restaurant indus- try) occasionally provide.

5 Children’s Education

Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in religious education, which are organised by officially registered churches and reli- gious communities. Islam is not registered, so no Islamic religious edu- cation can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes in an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘ethics’ are pro- vided, which include some coverage of history of religions. The Islamic foundation organises several courses (including on the internet) on the religion of Islam. Muslim pre-school children also have the opportunity to attend private kindergartens, where the education is in the spirit of the Islamic faith. slovakia 589

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in Slovakia. The Islamic Culture Centre (Muslim Foundation in Slovakia) is an approved exam centre5 of the Islamic Online University (IOU).6

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The only burial place assigned to Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery, Slávičie údolie, in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are several dozen burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a gen- eral problem in the capital, which is not specific to the Muslim commu- nity. Members of the Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Muslims (as a non-registered religious community) cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services.

9 Religious Festivals

No data.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Muslims in Slovakia have access to halal food in several stores with imported ‘Oriental’ food. Some restaurants and many fast food stalls in Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities serve halal food.

5 www.islamskecentrum.sk/index.php/aktivity/pravidla-nariadenia, accessed 12 March 2013. 6 www.islamiconlineuniversity.com/. 590 jaroslav drobný

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting or limiting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab and niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported.

12 Publications and Media

The only printed Islamic periodical publication is Al-Islam magazine, published bimonthly (6 numbers + special edition) by the Islamic Foun- dation. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), which is the official medium of the Slovak Muslim community. The foun- dation runs also a number of Facebook pages and groups. The Associa- tion of Friends of Islamic Literature and the General Union of Muslims in Slovakia have a joint website (www.islam-sk.sk); the Slovak translation of the Qur’an by Abdulwahab Al Sbenaty is available here, as well as on the website www.koran.sk, managed by Mr Al-Sbenaty. The web page of the Muslim Foundation in Slovakia (www.islam skecentrum.sk) is under construction. Both the Islamic Foundation and the Muslim Foundation issued publi- cations about Islam in the Slovak language.

13 Family Law

Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state. Muslims per- form Islamic marriage ceremonies, but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. Some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia.

14 Interreligious Relations

No data.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Although Muslims in Slovakia constitute a tiny proportion of the pop- ulation and are fully integrated with the majority, most Slovaks show slovakia 591 clear aversion toward Muslims.7 During the 2012 election campaign, SNS (Slovak Nationalist Party) tried to use slogans against “the Islamisation of the country,”8 without significant success. According to a survey of the Open Society Fund, half of the respondents (50.5%) fully or partly dis- approve of the construction of Islamic religious and cultural centres in Slovakia.9

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

7 Bihariová, I.: Racism and related discriminatory practices in Slovakia. ENAR Shadow Reports 2011–12, p. 11. http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/publications/shadow% 20report%202011-12/Slovakia.pdf, accessed 25 March 2013. 8 Nová karta SNS: Po Maďaroch a Rómoch prichádza islám (The new card of SNS: after the Hungarians and Roma islam come). Pluska, 11 january 2012 www.pluska.sk/spravy/ z-domova/nova-karta-sns-po-madaroch-romoch-prichadza-islam.html, accessed 25 March 2013. 9 Elena Gallová-Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J.: Verejná mienka v oblasti pravicového extrémizmu. (Public opinion about right-wing extremism) (Open Society Foundation: Brat- islava, 2012), p. 15. www.osf.sk/kniznica_a_open_gallery/publikacie/2011/verejna_mienka_ v_oblasti_pravicoveho_extremizmu/?IDe=182456&IDcheck=2dd6c39a028732b47b649952a c16075e, accessed 25 November 2012.

SLOVENIA

Christian Moe1

1 Muslim Populations

According to the census data, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population in 2002. The real figure was likely higher, as the religion of 23% of the population was not known, but not much higher, judging by the census data on (ethnic) nationality. The figure did not include short- term guest-workers. By the time of 2011 census, which no longer provided data on religious or national identity, the total population of the country had grown by 4.4%. The Islamic Community reports a membership of over 7,000 families, of which nearly 4,800 pay regular dues.2 About 4,000 people join the central prayer events during the two Bayrams; no data are available on everyday participation in religious practice. For centuries, encountered Muslims primarily as Ottoman armies, though in World War I Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal migrants from other parts of Yugosla- via to meet the need for low-skilled workers in the growing economy of the most-developed Yugoslav republic. Consequently, nearly all Slovenian Muslims are urban dwellers, concentrated in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by thousands of refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic Community (IC) began to organise itself in the early 1960s, and the first local council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967.3 The census data on the ethnic makeup of Slovenia’s Muslims are open to interpretation, as some categories are contested, fluid or overlapping. Of those who declared themselves Muslims by confession in 2002, some 74% declared themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav-era

1 Christian Moe (PhD candidate, History of Religion, University of Oslo) is a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 2 The brochure “Are you a member of the Islamic Community”. 3 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji (Islam and Muslims in Slovenia) (Sara- jevo: Emanet, 2002), pp. 103–106. 594 christian moe category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);4 they originated mainly from northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They were followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Montenegrins, Mace- donians, and others (ca. 1% each).5

2 Islam and the State

Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 Constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. Religious communities (including two Islamic ones) are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities, which in 2012 was folded into a new super-ministry for education, culture, science, and sport. In 2007, the Islamic Community became the fifth Slovenian religious com- munity to conclude a separate agreement with the state detailing its legal status and rights.6 The Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Commu- nist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Some provisions of the Act have been struck down by the Constitutional Court, but bills to amend it have been opposed by the major religious communities, and have so far died in committee in parliament.7 The state contributes part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. The IC also benefits from an arrangement that lets individu- als designate up to 0.5% of their income tax as donations to NGOs or religious communities of their choice. The state may grant minor sums to religious communities as direct material support. The IC has so far not managed to benefit from the opportunities for religious communi- ties to apply for state funding for social programmes (probably because of

4 On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing contexts and redefini- tions of identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia”, Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 149–171. 5 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo (Immigrants: Studies on Immigration and Inclusion into Slovenian Society) (Lju- bljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007), p. 536 (Table 10). 6 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008). 7 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, decision no. U-I-92/07-23 of 15 April 2010; bills to amend the Act were tabled in 2011 and 2012 (documents EPA 1911-V and EPA 331-VI, see www.dz-rs.si). slovenia 595 limited capacity) or for maintaining cultural heritage (as they have little material heritage to maintain). There has been no public financial support for the mosque project (see Section 4).

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia (Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, e-mail; mesihat@ islamska-skupnost.si, tel.: ++386 12313625, fax: ++386 12313626, www.islamska- skupnost.si), headed by Mufti Dr. Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the reli- gious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims through eighteen local chapters. It is a branch of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School (see Bosnia-Herzegovina in this vol- ume for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks. Mufti Grabus is in his second mandate, lasting until 2015.8 Noteworthy cultural initiatives in the IC’s orbit are the Zemzem wom- en’s group (address: same as the IC), which inter alia organises an annual food festival and events in commemoration of Srebrenica; and the Aver- roes Institute (Grablovičeva ul. 14, p.p. 2725, 1001 Ljubljana, tel.: +386 12313625, www..si), which hosts lectures, book launches and simi- lar events. The Muslim Community of Slovenia (Slovenska muslimanska skupnost, MCS, Ledina Center room 33, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel.: ++386 14304866, fax: ++386 14304866, www.smskupnost.si) was registered in 2006 by the former Mufti Osman Đogić. The MCS, which claims some 500 members and sympathisers,9 is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the IC in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation. A small Salafi association for the promotion of Islamic culture,10 which is not registered as a religious community, has two local chapters (Resnica-hak, Cesta Maršala Tita 68, Jesenice, tel.: +386 4082 0521, e-mail: resnicahak@

8 A collection of the Mufti’s speeches and writings was recently published in Nedžad Grabus, Sožitje je naša pot: Intervjuji in govori muftija dr. Nedžada Grabusa 2006–2010 (Coexistence Is Our Way) (Ljubljana: Kulturno-izobraževalni zavod Averroes, 2011). 9 Osman Đogić, personal communication. 10 This group is briefly discussed along with the two registered communities in Mari Jože Osredkar, “Teološki in kulturološki razlogi za islamski pluralizem v Sloveniji” (Theo- logical and cultural reasons for Islamic pluralism in Slovenia), Bogoslovni vestnik, vol. 71, no. 3 (2011), pp. 357–367. 596 christian moe gmail.com; El-iman, Dunajska cesta 190, Ljubljana, tel.: +386 4151 4427; both at www.resnica-haq.com).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Slovenia has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret. Muslims have sought to build a mosque in Ljubljana since 1969. Anti-mosque referen- dum initiatives have twice been quashed by the courts. A location has been zoned for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque, and the IC has bought most of the land from the city. The IC’s activities have largely revolved around paying off the resulting debt, which stood at 1.347 mil- lion Euros at the end of 2012,11 and preparing for the eventual construction of the mosque. In October 2012, the IC hired the architectural firm that had won the previous year’s design contest to prepare documentation, in order to apply for a construction permit by April 2013. Local congregations have prayer-houses of varying quality. The IC has a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana, used for meetings, prayers and a halal restaurant. The MCS has a space in the city centre. Explicitly multi-faith prayer rooms are rarely provided in public institu- tions. Homes for the elderly and hospitals usually have chapels attached. Confessional activities are not permitted on school premises.

5 Children’s Education

There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An optional non-confessional course in religions and ethics exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state fund- ing if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited demand and resources this is not on the agenda of the IC. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding schools (madrasas) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to children in mekteb classes organised outside school hours in seventeen towns by local congregations of the IC. Mekteb edu- cation has been a dynamic field in recent years, with new classroom approaches as well as extra-curricular activities, such as an outing for 500

11 As this chapter went to press in 2013, the remaining debt was paid off with a donation from the Emir of Qatar. slovenia 597 pupils across the country to Postojna in May 2012. Some adult religious instruction is also offered; in Ljubljana, for instance, 38 persons com- pleted an introductory course, and 19 persons completed a Qur’an course in 2012.12

6 Higher and Professional Education

Slovenian imams have typically received their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IC holds some internal train- ing courses, and the Egyptian embassy has arranged short-term scholar- ships to Al-Azhar University in Egypt. In 2012, Slovenian imams attended a week-long intensive course in Kuwait offered by the International Mod- eration Centre. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Stud- ies, and there is no separate course in Islamic Studies. Some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theol- ogy. Teacher training for the optional school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims (Jesenice, Maribor, Kranj, Krško, Tržič), most, including the capital, have not. An important heritage site to Slovenian Muslims is a cemetery for Mus- lim troops from Bosnia who fought for Austria-Hungary in World War I at Log Pod Mangartom. A memorial monument was unveiled in June 2012 by the heads of state of Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiri- tual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police

12 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Educa- tion in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008); Porić, personal communication (2010). 598 christian moe and the army. The Act’s provision for direct state employment of chap- lains, however, has been ruled unconstitutional. The right to provide such care is also stated in the IC’s agreement with the state. The IC has raised the issue with the authorities, but Muslim spiritual care in state institu- tions remains ad hoc and informal, and receives no public financial sup- port. One imam is responsible for prison visits, and there is cooperation with the public official coordinating spiritual care in penal institutions.

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays is publicly recognised by official greetings and a nationally tele- vised short address by the Mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, the central communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. Open-air religious events such as iftar and Ramadan prayers are held on the future mosque site. Mevluds () and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., Muslim New Year, blessed nights). Twenty-one pilgrims from Slovenia went on hajj in 2012.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

A new initiative to institutionalise the certification of halal meat was taken by the IC in 2007, and the first butcher’s shop so certified opened in Ljubljana in 2008, but halal products are not generally available in grocery stores. Several food companies (notably the Perutnina Ptuj Group) have long held halal certificates, chiefly for export. The law requires the ani- mal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, and under amendments tabled in 2012, to the consternation of the Muslim community, exceptions may no longer be granted for ritual slaughter.13 Private slaughter, com- mon on farms and formerly the occasion of a folk holiday, is allowed for the personal consumption of one’s own animals, but there are hardly any rural Muslims.

13 Animal Protection Act, ZZZiv, art. 25, amended by ZZZiv-C (EPA 666-VI), adopted by Parliament 7 March 2013. slovenia 599

Several companies offer Muslim funeral services, most prominently the Velenje-based Babajić funeral company. Islamic banking or other financial services have not been developed; however, the Slovenian investment fund Ilirika in 2010 launched an Emerging Europe Islamic Fund targeting the Bosnian market.

11 Dress Codes

While some older women may wear traditional head scarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young women in the 1990s, most Muslim women do not cover their heads except on religious occasions. Niqab is worn only by a handful. The law does not regulate religious attire, and hijab in schools has not been an issue. Passport photo rules allow exceptions for religious headwear, as long as the face is shown. Slovene politicians have not joined the burqa-banning bandwagon, whereas the IC leadership has spoken out against burqas as an obstacle to education. The major contribution to the ethnography of Islam in Slovenia remains a monograph on Muslim dress and identity published in 2007.14

12 Publications and Media

The IC operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), occasionally pub- lishes the Amber internal newsletter (5 issues by 2012), and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. The Salafis have launched several websites for a broad public, only to close them for lack of funding after a few years; they continue to maintain one main website (www.resnica-haq.com). Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious reach a Mus- lim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community. They include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and Bošnjak magazine, which currently appears once or twice a year.

14 Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I Am Not a Barbie Doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kul- turno antropologijo, 2007). 600 christian moe

13 Family Law

Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have an additional religious ceremony. The IC encourages and registers Islamic marriages (‘Shari’a weddings’) performed by imams. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,15 though the IC discourages the practice. A new family law was defeated in a March 2012 referendum. The IC had joined the Catholic Church in opposing the law over provisions for same- sex partnership and adoption.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue and cooperation take place on an ad hoc basis. There is no permanent interreligious institutional framework, except that the state Office for Religious Communities convenes regular consulta- tions with representatives of religious communities. In the last few years, however, there have been joint appearances of the three major churches (Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, and Evangelical) and the Islamic Community. In 2012, Islamic and Jewish communities also made com- mon cause against attacks on infant boy circumcision. Mufti Grabus is a frequent participant in dialogue events at home and abroad. At the end of the year, the Averroes Institute published the proceedings of an inter- cultural dialogue event held in 2010 with representatives of Slovenian and Bosnian academia.16 (See also Sections 15 and 16.)

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Media attention to Islam has continued to focus on plans for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana, but this is no longer a promi- nent issue in public debate. As in previous years, national media cover- age focused on Muslim holidays, the hajj, the Bosnian Food Festival, and local reactions to global controversies. Over the last few years, the IC has taken on a more public role by joining the Roman Catholic Church in

15 Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66. 16 Nedžad Grabus and Denis Striković, eds., Z dialogom do medsebojnega spoštovanja (Ljubljana: Kulturno-izobraževalni zavod Averroes, 2012). slovenia 601 successful public opposition to bills on family law and on religious com- munities (see sections 2 and 13). In 2012, however, Muslim ritual practices became a matter of public debate and faced legal pressure. A legal excep- tion for ritual slaughter was slated to be abolished (see Section 10 above). Also, Slovenia’s human rights ombudswoman declared the circumcision of male infants on non-medicinal grounds a violation of the rights of the child, a move sharply protested by the IC, the Jewish Community and the Catholic Church. In particular, the IC complained of a failure to consult with Muslim representatives in these processes.17

16 Major Cultural Events

The most successful event in terms of public outreach may be the annual Bosnian Food Festival in the centre of Ljubljana, organised by the women’s group Zemzem; in 2012, they also presented traditional footwear crafts from Bosnia. An exhibition of contemporary Middle Eastern art, “Systems and Ornaments,” was held in Ljubljana.

17 Ombudsman statement, 3 February 2013, www.varuh-rs.si/medijsko-sredisce/ aktualni-primeri/novice/detajl/obrezovanje-fantkov-iz-nemedicinskih-razlogov-je-krsitev- otrokovih-pravic; IC press release, 6 February 2013, www.islamska-skupnost.si/images/ stories/sporocilo_za_javnost/sporocilo_za_javnost_6_2_2012_cirkumcizija.pdf; statement of the Justitia et Pax commission of the Slovene Bishops’ Conference, 13 February 2012, www .islamska-skupnost.si/images/stories/PDF/versko%20svobodo%20je%20potrebno%20 varovati.pdf.

SPAIN

Jordi Moreras1

1 Muslim Populations

The contemporary presence of Islam in Spain is a result of the settlement of different immigrant communities, from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan and the Middle East. But the Spanish case also presents the peculiarity of the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla, where a significant Muslim population has resided for centuries. Counting reli- gious affiliation is prohibited by the 1978 Spanish Constitution (Article 16.2), therefore the number of Muslims in Spain is a subject of estimates that are not always based on reliable criteria. According to statistics on foreign residents of Muslim origin, 1,132,032 Muslims lived in Spain as of September 2012.2 To this figure must be added 141,598 people of Mus- lim origin who have acquired Spanish nationality from 1958 to 2011. This means a total of 1,273,630 Muslims, amounting to 2.7% of the total Spanish population. The Observatory Andalusi,3 an entity created by the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain in 2003, suggests another quantification of the Muslim population: 1,671,629 Muslims (3.5% of the total Spanish population). This is detailed as follows: Muslim population of Ceuta and Melilla (35,990 and 40,525, respectively); Muslim converts (20,360); foreign residents of Muslim origin (1,157,687); naturalised Muslims (142,393); and descendants of Muslim families (274,674).4 According to the estimates in

1 Dr. Jordi Moreras is professor of Social Anthropology at the Faculty of Humanities, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain). He is the author of Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008) and ¿Garantes de la tradición? Expresiones de autoridad religiosa islámica en Cataluña. Bar- celona: Bellaterra, 2012). 2 Immigration Observatory. Ministry of Employment and Social Security. See http:// extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Estadisticas/index.html, accessed 21 January 2013. 3 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2012. (Demographic study of the the Census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2012) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2013. See http://oban.multiplexor.es/index.html, accessed 10 Febru- ary 2013. 4 This data is questionable, since Spanish nationality is not obtained automatically by being born in Spanish territory, if both parents are foreigners. 604 jordi moreras this report, 30.7% of the Muslim population residing in Spain are Spanish citizens.

2 Islam and the State

The 1978 Constitution defines the Spanish state as following a principle of non-confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations. There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. This frame- work of religious freedom was developed in law in 1980. In April 1992, a Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish State and the Islamic Com- mission of Spain was signed. This agreement marks a milestone in the recognition of the Muslim presence in Spain, as it allowed for the creation of a specific legislative body to regulate the basic principles of the Muslim community’s practice of religion. The Socialist Party government proposed in 2008 the amendment of the Religious Freedom Act. The strong opposition of the Catholic Church and the People’s Party (Partido Popular, right) stopped this initiative. Since the arrival of the government of the People’s Party in November 2011, legisla- tive reform of this type has not been raised again. Before coming to power, some leaders of the People’s Party (for example, the Prime Minister, Mari- ano Rajoy) expressed very critical views on Islam, which they considered it a religion of foreigners and intolerant of women. Since coming to gov- ernment, the party’s policy towards Islam and other religious minorities has been a very low profile topic. For instance, 2012 marked the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission of Spain. The Ministry of Justice, citing reasons of budgetary constraints, did not consider it necessary to organise any official event. It was finally announced that, on 31 January 2013 an official ceremony would be held in Madrid with representatives of major religious minori- ties, sponsored by the KAICID Foundation (King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue). With regard to Islam, the Spanish government continues to promote cultural activities in Muslim communities through the annual grants pro- gramme of the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (Fundación Plu- ralismo y Convivencia). Grants for 2012 have not been made public, but it is known that they have suffered a major cut due to economic austerity measures of the Spanish government. spain 605

In July 2009, the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat of Catalonia) passed a law on places of worship, with which it wants to regu- late the opening of places of worship and to prevent conflicts that have led in recent years to the establishment of Islamic centres in Catalonia. The law provides that municipalities must make reservations of public land for religious facilities according to their abilities. In September 2011, the new Catalan government (centre-right nationalist), proposed a reform of this law, which affects this reservation of public land for new places of worship (which would be no longer required), and introduced a provision in the conditions of these new places of worship “that [they] must respect the architectural features, culture, tradition, history and artistic elements” (provisional text of the reform). This reform continues its passage through the Parliament of Catalonia. In July 2011, the Basque Government presented a draft law on religious freedom to regulate the conditions for opening places of worship, in this way seeking to eliminate controversies as those arising in Bilbao and Vitoria before opening new mosques.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1992, on the occasion of signing the Cooperation Agreement with the Spanish State, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, with the de facto union of the two major Muslim federations: the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, Calle Brescia 17, Madrid 28028, www .feeri.eu) and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE, Anas- tasio Herrero 5, Madrid 28020, http://es.ucide.org). The FEERI was created in 1989 and until 2006 was managed by members of the Junta Islámica,5 an organisation made up of Spanish converts, with Mansur Escudero6 as president. The UCIDE was created in 1991 by Riay Tatary Bakri, of Syrian origin, who in 1971 had created the Muslim Association of Spain (Asocia- ción Islámica de España), which manages the Abu Bakr mosque in Madrid. Since then, Riay Tatary continues to chair the federation that brings together the majority of Muslim communities in Spain.

5 Junta Islámica is an Islamic religious association established in 1989. This entity main- tains Webislam (www.webislam.com), the main portal on Islam in Spain, and the Instituto Halal, dedicated to the certification of halal products. 6 Mansur Escudero, one of the most prominent figures of contemporary Islam in Spain, founder of Junta Islámica, died on October 3, 2010, in Almodóvar del Río. 606 jordi moreras

The president of FEERI is Mounir Benjelloun, one of the main lead- ers of the ‘Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) movement in Spain. In October 2009, he replaced the previous board made up of members of the Union of Muslims of Ceuta, who were linked with the Moroccan govern- ment’s official policy. In June 2012, there were 1,150 Islamic religious institutions in the Reg- ister of the Ministry of Justice. According to data from the Observatory of Religious Pluralism,7 there were 1,227 mosques in Spain as of December 2012. In the absence of development following the 1992 Cooperation Agree- ment, and the lack of operational capability of the Islamic Commission of Spain, various Islamic organisations called for the modification of the representation model of Islam in Spain. In December 2009, the Commis- sion had registered 23 Islamic federations. In the early months of 2010, the Spanish government proposed to begin a process of electing Muslim representatives at the regional level, which then must choose the board that has to lead a renewed Islamic Commission of Spain. This proposal has sparked an intense debate within Muslim communities, generating new organisational initiatives and new strategies for cooperation between associations. In April 2011, twelve Islamic federations created the Spanish Islamic Council.8 The Council is chaired by a board of eight members, whose mis- sion will be performing the tasks necessary for the legalisation of docu- ments and the implementation of the new entity. Five of these members belong to the UCIDE, including Riay Tatary, the federation president. Also elected were Yusuf Fernandez (Secretary of the Spanish Muslim Federa- tion, FEME), Mounir Benjelloun (secretary of the Islamic Federation of Murcia, FIRM) and Amparo Sánchez, President of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia, the first woman to chair an Islamic entity in Spain. The new board was created due to the failure of the Islamic Com- mission of Spain (composed exclusively of two federations, UCIDE and FEERI), which remained closed to the incorporation of new federations and Muslim communities, despite the provisions in the Agreement of Cooperation of 1992. The decree passed by the Socialist government in October 2011, amending the first Article of the Cooperation Agreement of 1992 which states that Islamic religious entities may be incorporated

7 See www.observatorioreligion.es. 8 See www.consejoislamico.es/. spain 607 in the Islamic Commission without having previously belonged to one of the two previous federations, provides legal support to the proposal of the Spanish Islamic Council. In October 2012, there were 35 registered religious organisations in the Ministry of Justice that were linked to the Islamic Commission. On November 18, 2012, at a meeting of the standing committee of the Islamic Commission, Mounir Benjelloun was proclaimed President with the support of the other Muslim federations against UCIDE, the main Islamic federation which represents two thirds of mosques in Spain. This election was appealed by Riay Tatary to the Ministry of Justice, which has not yet accepted this change in the board of the Islamic Commission.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The 2012 report of the Observatorio Andalusí estimates that in Spain there are some 1,177 Muslim places of worship, fourteen of them major Muslim centres. There are no substantial differences with the official estimates (see above). The spatial integration of Islam in Spanish society manifests a strong contrast between the great Islamic cultural centres, along with their architectural form clearly identifiable, with their minarets, and prayer rooms in garages that were opened on the initiative of small immigrant communities, without any symbols that might identify them as religious centres in the public space. The paradox is that while these well-known centres are part of the urban landscape of cities where they are located, it is the prayer rooms that despite their invisibility receive social opposition to their location. The analysis of conflicts around the mosques in Spain9 should refer to two dynamics of creation of these religious centres: the first, induced and operated externally, through the intervention of Muslim countries to finance the construction of these centres, and the second, through a process of self-organisation of religion by Muslim communities of immi- grant origin. These dynamics cannot be presented as unconnected, but they incorporate different logics and interests. When in the early 1980s, the Saudi Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud promoted the building of the mosque of Marbella (Malaga), as the first mosque opened in Spain

9 See Jordi Moreras, “A mosque in our neighbourhood!” Conflicts over mosques in Spain,” in Stefano Allievi (ed.), Mosques of Europe. Why a solution has become a problem. (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010). 608 jordi moreras in modern times,10 he probably was not thinking as much about meeting the worship needs of Muslims in Spain, as about the needs of his own entourage that accompanied him during his summer breaks in the lands of the former al-Andalus. Located in the exclusive neighbourhood of Las Lomas de Marbella, its minaret of 25 metres and its 400-person capacity, do not disturb local residents. Between the 1980s and the early 1990s, four new Islamic centres were opened in Spain, sponsored by several Muslim countries. In 1983, the Abu Bakr mosque was built in the Estrecho neighbourhood of Madrid. It is the home of the UCIDE. It takes up a total of 3,500 m2, distributed over four floors and has a minaret. It was financed by the contributions of different Arab countries. The opening generated little interest in the Madrid press, which considered it a centre for the Muslim-Arab diplomatic corps posted to the Spanish capital. The Spanish press were more attentive to the opening in September 1992 (five months after the approval of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission) of the Omar ibn al-Jattab Mosque, or Islamic Cultural Centre of Madrid (popularly known as the mosque of M-30, a highway that circles Madrid). The 16,000 m2 area where the mosque is located was ceded by the Madrid City Council, and King Fahd Bin Abdu- laziz Al Saud undertook to finance it. The prayer hall of this mosque occupies 550 m2 with capacity for 700 men and 130 women. Until the inauguration in 1997 of the mosque of Rome, the mosque in Madrid was the largest in Europe. Outside Madrid other centres were opened in the same period: in June of 1992, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia was inaugurated, financed by Kuwaiti capital and under the authority of the Organisation of Arab Cities. In 1994, the mosque of Fuengirola, headquarters of the Suhail Islamic Community, was opened, financed by Saudi Arabia and linked to the Muslim World League. During the rest of the 1990s no Islamic centres were opened. However small prayer houses proliferated throughout the Spanish landscape, which are indicative of the first settlement of Muslim communities of immigrant origin on the Spanish territory. In the early 2000s, two new Islamic centres in Andalusia were launched. First, in July 2001 the Cultural Association

10 During the Protectorate of Northern Morocco (1912–1956), the Spanish colonial administration built mosques, prayer halls, and other Islamic religious buildings. The two main mosques of Ceuta and Melilla, the mosque Sidi M’barik and the mosque on the street Garcia Cabrelles, respectively, are good examples of this. spain 609

Azzagra built a mosque and the Centre of Andalusian Studies in La Puebla de Don Fadrique (Granada). Located on a 120-acre farm, this centre has the financial support of Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasim, Emir of Sharjah. Second, and after two decades of polemics concerning its place- ment in the Albaicin neighbourhood, in July 2003, the Great Mosque of Granada was officially inaugurated. Various Muslim-majority countries (Libya, Morocco, the Arab Emirates, and Malaysia) eventually contributed to its construction. The centre is managed by members of the Murabi- tun (a Sufi movement inspired of Darqawi’s brotherhood, founded by the Scottish Muslim convert, Ian Dallas, in the 1970s). Finally, the last major Islamic centre was opened in Malaga in August 2007, which occupies over 4,000 m2. Its construction has cost about €22 million, provided by Saudi Arabia. The Suhail Foundation owns this new mosque which can accom- modate over 1,000 worshipers, and has nursery, auditorium, rooms for men and women, and translation service.

5 Children’s Education

The only Islamic school in Spain is the Umm al-Qura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex. It provides pre- school, primary and secondary education. The school was recognised by the Spanish state in April 1998 and has 400 students and 24 teachers. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic religious education in the national educational system.11 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–04 school year, when it began in some Autonomous Communities (regional authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia, and Madrid). Accord- ing to the Observatorio Andalusí, in the 2012–2013 school year there were 222,429 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and

11 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in Alvarez Veinguer, A., G. Dietz, D.P. Jozsa and T. Knauth (eds), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009). 610 jordi moreras

46 teachers of Islamic religious education. According to UCIDE, the full implementation of this agreement would require 400 teachers.12 Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious edu- cation, the communities themselves have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, youth and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be com- plementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside of the structured, formalised school environment. In 2006, the UCIDE, with funding from the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence, published a textbook on Islam Descubrir el Islam (Dis- covering Islam) for primary education. In 2009, they edited the material for secondary education.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

As a result of the history of al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Span- ish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Sevilla and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new initiatives in training and inter- disciplinary research in other academic fields. The Cooperation Agree- ment of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the International University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, but closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support, after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. This university offered courses in Arabic language and Islamic sciences taught by Muslim teachers. With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiative began in the 1980s at the initiative of various associations and Islamic centres in Spain. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. No projects, however, were completed because of internal disagreements.

12 Observatorio Andalusi (2013). No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the refusal by various regions to implement these programmes. spain 611

The Spanish university system has undertaken two initiatives to train imams and Muslim leaders. The private University Camilo José Cela has organised, with Junta Islámica, an online course on Islamic culture and religion offered to general public. This course was previously (from 2006) organised by the National University of Distance Learning (UNED, www .uned.es), and in 2010 organised its fifth cycle. Secondly, in January 2009, the UNED, sponsored by the Foundation Pluralism and Coexistence, ini- tiated a training programme for Islamic religious leaders under the title “Islam and democratic principles.” The third cycle was developed in 2011 in Madrid, Valencia and Terrassa (Barcelona). By 2012, these two courses had been abandoned. In 2012, Junta Islámica created Educa Islam (www.educaislam.com), a distance learning centre dedicated to the teaching of Islam in its different dimensions. Some of the courses offered are academically recognised by the University Carlos III of Madrid. The Muslim communities have organised different training courses for imams: in Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has, since 2006, run a training programme specifically for imams, coordi- nated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Simi- larly, the Muslim Federation of Murcia has, since 2007, organised several training sessions with teachers and imams from Belgium, France, Spain, Morocco and Egypt. The Muslim Federation of Valencia has organised various training sessions for imams since 2010.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The need to provide space for the Muslim population in municipal cem- eteries has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Muslims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were either those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the different com- munities in both cities), or historical cemeteries (like those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), or cemeteries that belonged to the govern- ments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached its capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained on per- sonal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and 612 jordi moreras are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. Actually, there are thirty Muslim burial places around the country. However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no contravention of other legal principles, which require the use of a coffin, and the burial 48 hours after death. In April 2007, the Barcelona City Council opened a room in one of the local funeral homes to perform mortuary practices that are required by Islam. The Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia released in 2008 a “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs at funerals,” and in 2009 “Recommendations for the management of religious diver- sity in cemeteries,” addressed to the municipalities. The “Handbook for municipal management of religious diversity,” developed by the Foun- dation for Pluralism and Coexistence in 2011, recommended the reserva- tion of spaces in the cemeteries for the burial of Muslims and the legal recognition and accommodation of Islamic burial practices. In Andalusia since 2001, Muslims can bury their dead directly in the ground without a coffin.13

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 1992 regulate Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the Span- ish government has developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Muslim patients, especially in the treatment of the bodies of the deceased. In December 2005, the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia published the “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs in hospitals,” and in 2011 the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence also published a “Guide for religious diversity management in hospitals.”

13 For an overview of the Muslims burials in Spain, see Jordi Moreras-Sol Tarrés, “Les cimetières musulmans en Espagne: des lieux de l’altérité”, Revue Européenne des Migra- tions Internationales, Vol. 28 (3): 13–26. spain 613

In Spanish prisons, as of 2011, there were some 7,758 Muslim prisoners. An agreement was reached in October 2007, which states that Muslim chaplains will be paid by the Spanish state, provided they gather a group of ten or more prisoners. The imams in charge of this service must be accredited by the Islamic Commission of Spain. According the Observato- rio Andalusi, twelve imams offer religious care services in Spanish prisons. The fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit prisoners has led to efforts to control pastoral care there. Prison authorities have in mind the reports by the Spanish National Intelligence Centre, which determine the adequacy of these imams. Police sources estimate that 2% of Muslim prisoners are showing signs of radicalisation. The Military Honours Regulation still states the obligation of Spanish soldiers to participate in Catholic religious events. The Defence Ministry in July 2009 introduced a new draft of the regulation, more consistent with the principle of non-confessionalism, and with the growing pres- ence of non-Catholic soldiers (Muslims, especially in Ceuta and Melilla). The new regulation will make attendance at religious military ceremonies voluntary.

9 Religious Festivals

Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and reli- gious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha is becoming increasingly vis- ible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or public streets for these cel- ebrations. From 2010, the celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha have become official holidays in Ceuta and Melilla, by agreement of the local governments with the local Muslim communities.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

The 1992 Cooperation Agreement recognises the right of Muslims to apply for food produced in accordance with Islamic requirements at public facilities such as schools, prisons and the army. So far there have been no major problems regarding this law, partly because these institutions have developed alternative menus. 614 jordi moreras

The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal prod- ucts is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concen- trated, a good number of halal butchers and grocery shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initia- tives are in response to an incipient demand for these products on the part of the Muslim community, which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica has promoted the creation of the Instituto Halal (Halal Institute, c./ Arco, nº 13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, tel.: ++34 902431937, www.institutohalal.com), which since 1999 has been certifying and regulating the use of the halal label.14 For some time now, Muslim communities have been asking the politi- cal authorities for the facilities necessary for slaughter on ‘Id al-Adha. Various political institutions have developed recommendations to comply with current health regulations, but variations exist across the country. While some regions provide sites for sacrifice (Ceuta, Melilla and Aragon), others threaten severe financial sanctions against those who slaughter animals outside the slaughterhouses. Meanwhile, Muslim families con- tinue discreetly to carry out the ritual sacrifice in private.

11 Dress Codes

There is no legal restriction prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. However, since 2002, there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photograph Mus- lim women with hijab when preparing identity cards.15 However, since November 2009, a regulation of the Ministry of Interior has allowed Mus- lim women to wear hijab in these photographs. Since the xenophobic party Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya) put forward in 2007 a motion to ban the wearing of the burqa in

14 The Halal Institute is a facility for companies to certify their products as halal, but it does not organise the halal trade. 15 Ramírez, Ángeles, La trampa del velo. El debate sobre el uso del pañuelo musulmán (Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, 2011). spain 615

Vic (Barcelona), representatives of other political parties have referred to the desirability of establishing a limit to use of clothing by Muslim women. In 2010, fifteen municipalities in Catalonia passed motions against the use of face covering in public spaces. The first was Lleida, which included in their municipal laws a ban on niqab in public buildings such as municipal offices, schools and hospitals. The motions against the burqa responded to a strategy of restrictive immigration policy in a political context marked by regional and municipal elections. Meanwhile, the use of the niqab is rare among Muslim women.

12 Publication and Media

Since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish jour- nals. Some have had a very short life span while others have been irregular. Various Muslim communities have published translations of the Qur’an, doctrinal treatises and essays on contemporary Islam through publishing houses such as Junta Islámica, Editorial Kutubia Mayurqa, and Madrasa Editorial. It is interesting to note that in recent years some Muslim con- verts (such as Yaratullah Monturiol, Abdennur Prado, Abdelmumin Aya or Jalil Bárcena), have begun to publish with non-Muslim publishers. Muslim community leaders appear only occasionally in the media, in the context of conflicts involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Mohamed Chakor, a Spanish journalist of Moroccan origin. More recently, Catalan public television broadcast live the final prayer of Ramadan in 2006 and the ‘Id al-Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discon- tinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television but are sometimes consulted on cer- tain topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been adopted by the Spanish Muslim community as an alternative way of expressing their views. There is a significant Muslim blogosphere, and the main internet portal is Webislam (www.webislam .com) (created in 1997 by Junta Islámica). UCIDE also has its own web- site (http://es.ucide.org) and a blog (www.islamhispania.blogspot.com). Another prominent internet portal is Nurain Magazine, coordinated by the Socio-Cultural Association Nurain based in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (www.nurainmagazine.info/). Red Musulmanas (www.redmusulmanas. com/) is an independent website made by individuals and associations 616 jordi moreras whose goal is to share and exchange information related to initiatives to empower Muslim women. The Muslims from the West Programme of Casa Árabe (http://mdocc.casaarabe.es/) offers a comprehensive and updated list of links of Islamic websites in Spain.

13 Family Law

The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of a marriage celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law but the marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths to be fully valid.16 Polygamy is not recognised in Spanish fam- ily law, although some instances of polygamy have occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious dif- ficulties for divorced women.

14 Interreligious Relations

Since the 1970s, numerous activities related to Islamic-Christian dialogue in Spain have been held. Many of them had the implicit support of the Spanish Catholic Church, following the principles of the Second Vatican Council. The evolution of the Church’s participation in these activities has to do with the development of the Muslim community itself in Spain (especially accelerated since the immigration of the 1990s) and with the change of the Vatican’s doctrinal approach in relation to Islam.17 The initiatives in favour of dialogue and mutual understanding which should have been carried out long before the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 have multiplied throughout Spanish territory. The most influ- ential are the activities of inter-religious dialogue which, in addition to the doctrinal content, make the presence of representatives of these groups actively visible with reference to Spanish society. Their intervention as mediators in resolving some local conflicts about the location of Muslim

16 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español [Islamic marriage and its effectiveness in Spanish law] (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003). 17 For a synthesis of these activities, see Jose Luis Sánchez Nogales, El islam en la España actual (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2008). spain 617 prayer sites has at times been very positive, making these initiatives seem viable and credible. The economic crisis in Spain has increased the number of interfaith ini- tiatives providing social care programmes to unemployed people. Many soup kitchens have been opened, where members of different religious communities are involved as volunteers. Financial constraints have also limited other interfaith initiatives, which in previous years had been spon- sored by government.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Spanish society appears to be having trouble coming to terms with the cultural contributions of certain groups, particularly Muslims. This per- ception of “otherness.” which is a combination of the accumulation of old stereotypes and the introduction of new images and demands, interferes with carrying out a debate on the Muslim presence in Spain and the place it is to occupy in Spanish society. One crucial factor that makes the full recognition of Islam difficult may be the insistence of many citizens on seeing the Muslim presence in Spain as a result of certain migratory cycles rather than as a result of a process by which a religious minority has been created. Islam is still seen as an import, an alien reality, in clear contradiction to the understanding of Islam as a permanent presence, which was one of the motivating fac- tors for adopting the Cooperation Agreement. Due to the impact of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks, the old stereotypes were replaced by a feel- ing of diffuse and unpredictable threat that is, however, implicitly related to concrete faces and a concrete presence. In the context of the current financial and economic crisis, negative perceptions about Muslim communities have increased. Entities such as SOS Racism or the Movement Against Intolerance have warned of the consolidation of Islamophobic attitudes. The European report prepared by Amnesty International, Europe: Choice and prejudice: Discrimination against Muslims in Europe (April 2012), analysed the case of demonstra- tions against the opening of mosques in Catalonia and other controversies related to Muslim communities.18 An indicator of the increasing consoli- dation of xenophobic discourse is increasing statements by political and

18 See Amnesty International “Choice and prejudice. Discrimination against Muslims in Europe,” (2012) (www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR01/001/2012/en). 618 jordi moreras media columnists, in relation to certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab. Another example is the growth of extreme right parties (such as the Platform for Catalonia, which has achieved political represen- tation in fourteen municipalities), with an openly xenophobic discourse that has spread to other more moderate political forces. In the regional elections of November 2012, the party returned to present a political pro- gramme against the “Islamisation” of Catalonia. Although the party lost 15,000 votes compared to previous elections, during the election campaign it had the support of leaders of other European xenophobic parties.

16 Major Cultural Events

Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicul- tural rather than specifically Islamic initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)19 in Madrid annually organises an extensive programme of cultural and artistic activities, including debates on contemporary Islam. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival “Nights of Ramadan” in 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the Arab House published the book Muslims in Spain. Reference guide, commissioned by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). This guide is intended for the media to improve their understanding of the realities of Muslim communities in Spain. In 2010, Arab House released the English version of this guide.

19 Casa Árabe (www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and as a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, the Gov- ernment of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba. SWEDEN

Göran Larsson1

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930 and 15 individuals were recorded as Muslims in that year.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of approximately 9,550,000. This estimate is not supported by hard evidence as it is, on the basis of protection of individual freedom, against the law to collect personal data on religious belief, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include potentially sensitive personal information. The figures are therefore nec- essarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute approxi- mately 4% of the population. According to the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 110,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.3 The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to Sweden as both eco- nomic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish component was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group domi- nates the Swedish Muslim scene and it would be incorrect to analyse,

1 Göran Larsson is Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Muslims and the New Media: Historical and Contemporary Debates (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). 2 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organiserad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence)”, in I. Svanberg, and D. Westerlund (eds), Blågul islam? Mus- limer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 3 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmenta- tion? A Contextual Study (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008). 620 göran larsson present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phe- nomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of con- verts to at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered as provisional only.4 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden, and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.5 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally uncertain.6

2 Islam and the State

Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitution, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Com- munities (SST, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Cul- ture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and it describes its grants as being divided into three categories:

– Organisational grants enabling ‘parishes’ to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education; – Working grants to support specific areas that the state wishes to sub­ sidise, e.g. the Hospital Church and theological training at certain seminaries; – Project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation.

4 Roald, Anne Sofie, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2002), p. 102. 5 Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: Teachings and Life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 6 Larsson, G., Muslims in the EU. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), www.eumap.org/topics/ minority/reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 4 November 2009. sweden 621

In 2012, the six Muslim organisations recognised by the SST received SEK 6,757,000 (778,385 Euros) in grants. The SST also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2012 granted SEK 6,315,000 to be distributed among the religious communities the SST has recognised. Out of this sum, the six Muslim organisations received only a small pro- portion (around SEK 385,000).7 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that reli- gious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious com- munities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups must guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Muslim organisations can also receive economic support from local municipalities, but there appears to be no collected information about this support. Registration also makes it pos- sible to use the taxation system to collect dues from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state automatically reduces the economic sup- port that the organisation can receive from the SST. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service signed an agreement with the Swedish Muslim Council (SMR) in 2002. According to the agreement SMR is responsible for coordinating the Islamic spiritual care in Swedish prisons and for this job it receives a grant (for 2009/2010, approximately SEK 600,000). In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citi- zenship8 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.9 On the basis of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, the child can apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish.

7 Personal e-mail from SST (2013-01-23). 8 See, for example, Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’. 9 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5. 622 göran larsson

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along ethnic, politi- cal, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the for- mation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are six umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substanti- ate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the statements of these six organisations. Besides the umbrella organisations it is also necessary to stress that a number of international Muslim organisations and networks are active in Sweden and that the Swedish Muslim community is heavily influenced by international developments and discussions. The first national Muslim organisation, the Union of Islamic Congrega- tions in Sweden (Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige, FIFS, Kapell- gränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, http://www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Swedish Muslim Union (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, SMF, Kyrkbacken 14, bv SE-169 62 Solna). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisa- tion called the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd, SMR, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organ- isations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the SMR. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, the beginning of the 1980s saw the establishment of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen, IKUS, Box 61, SE-191 21 Sollentuna), an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Swedish Islamic Assemblies (Svenska Islamiska Församlin- gar, SIF, Moränvägen 13, SE-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. The Islamic Shi’i Communities in Sweden (Islamisk Shiasamfund, ISS, Box 690, SE-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund.se/sida1.html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi’i Muslims in Sweden. In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both local and national. For example, Bos- nian (Bosniakiska Islamiska Samfundet, Barnarpsgatan 39 G, SE-553 33 Jönköping, www.izb.se), Shi’i, Ahmadi (Nasir Moské, Tolvskillingsgatan 1, sweden 623

SE-414 82 Göteborg, www.ahmadiyya.se) and Sufi organisations have been established in various locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing Muslims in Sweden (espe- cially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Unga Muslimer, SUM), but it is also important to mention the Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer, SEUM, www.seum.nu) and the Muslim Youth Organisation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosnien-Hercegovinas Muslimska Ungdomsförbund, BEMUF, www.bemuf.org). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Brännkykagatan 111B, SE-117 26 Stockholm, http://www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. The results from the Swedish Muslim Congregation, a project lead by Professor Klas Borell at Mid-Sweden University, indicate that Muslim con- gregations in Sweden are very active and give support to their members. Study classes, introductions to Swedish society, and dialogue with munici- palities and other organisations are part of the daily work of the general Muslim congregation.10

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are seven purpose-built mosques in Sweden (five Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, Göteborg and two in Stockholm), one Shi’i mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, having been opened in 1975/1976). In Gävle, Västerås and Sundsvall, Muslims have adapted old churches and converted them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinc- tion between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Karlskrona, Växjö and Örebro, and a mosque is already under construction in Skövde. The most recent purpose-built mosque was opened in Göteborg in May 2011. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building per- mit. However, the economic difficulties associated with the building of a

10 An English summary of this project can be downloaded via professor Borell’s web- page, see www.miun.se/sv/universitetet/Organisation/Institutioner/soa/Om-institutionen/ Medarbetare/Forskare/Klas-Borell/. 624 göran larsson mosque are clearly illustrated by the fact that the Muslim congregation in Umeå (Northern Sweden) decided to halt their plans to build a mosque. The organisation had for several years been planning to build a mosque, but in 2012 they shelved the plans because of financial problems. In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of ‘basement mosques’ is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö. But these figures are changing rapidly and there is no official record.

5 Children’s Education

Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and pupils should not be indoctrinated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Nevertheless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.11 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. In addition to traditional Islamic communal education, which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinctive characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and financial subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society.”12 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way”, and pupils must follow the national curriculum

11 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. 12 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in H. Daun and G. Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191. sweden 625 for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.13 Permission to start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2010, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 68, of which nine were Islamic/Muslim.14 The first Muslim independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the overwhelming majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in his- tory of religions, Islam and Middle East studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic study of Islam and Muslims.15 In 2009, the Ministry of Education finalised an inquiry into the pos- sibility of starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams in Sweden. The inquiry came to the conclusion that there was no need for a specific training programme for Muslim spiritual leaders. It was argued that the existing educational system could satisfy the current needs and the state should not take part in confessional training programmes.16 In 2012 Uppsala University inaugurated and installed its first professor in Islamic theology and philosophy. Besides its academic foundation, this

13 On the content of religious education in Muslim independent schools in Sweden, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421. 14 See www3.skolverket.se/friskola03/l_sok_i_be_p.aspx?skolkategori=GR&inriktning =B1&bidrag_enl=+&profil=&lan=&kommun=&tamed=G&omgang=&B1=Skick, accessed 11 November 2010. 15 See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and aca- demic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/36), 2006. 16 SOU 2009:52 Staten och imamerna. Religion, integration, autonomi (The State and the Imams: Religion, Integration, Autonomy) (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2009). 626 göran larsson professorship should also facilitate and contribute to the development of Islamic theology in Sweden.17 Ibn Rushd, which is an independent educational association with a Muslim profile, organises courses in the field of religion, culture and lan- guage. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim com- munity and inform non-Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures. In 2009 the Kista folk high school outside Stockholm was started with a Swedish Muslim profile and the school aims at combining, strengthening and developing a Swedish-Islamic identity and they have an ambition to start a training programme for imams.18

7 Burials and Cemeteries

Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities have no difficulty in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden through the Cemetery Administration (Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen).19 There is no prohi- bition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administra- tion, as in Malmö, specifically permit Muslims to be buried in this way.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No Muslim religious leaders are employed by the state in the health ser- vice, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the SST and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and other religious lead- ers receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services. Since 2006, the SST is also funding a hospital imam at the Skaraborg hospital in Skövde (25%) and since 2008 the SST has paid for three 25% positions as coordinators for Muslim healthcare.20 It is nevertheless clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there is a great imbalance between non-

17 See www.uu.se/press/pressmeddelanden/pressmeddelande-visning/?id=1825&area= 3&typ=pm&na=&lang=sv, accessed 31 January 2013. 18 On this school, see http://kistafolkhogskola.se/. 19 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 20 SST, Årsbok 2009, p. 16. sweden 627

Christian denominations on the one hand and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations on the other hand, which have a long his- tory and an established platform for such work.

9 Religious Festivals

Even though the major religious festivals are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, they are not recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ‘Id/bayram religious festivals, and the employer has discretion as to whether an employee should be given time off.21 We have very few academic studies of how Muslims celebrate their religious festivals in Sweden and this is an important topic for future research.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving the ani- mal an anaesthetic before it is killed), but this method is not accepted by all Muslims. There is, however, no difficulty in finding halal food in Sweden, and there is easy access to imported meat. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available.

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab and niqab in the health-care sec- tor, in schools, in the police, etc. The niqab has also been extensively dis- cussed in the media in 2009/2010 and some politicians have argued that it

21 Berglund, J. and S. Sorgenfrei (eds), Ramadan: En svensk tradition (Ramadan: A Swed- ish Tradition) (Lund: Arcus, 2009). 628 göran larsson should be banned, but no law has been passed as of 2012.22 The debate has often been focused on health issues, integration and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab and sometime the niqab as being coloured by Islamopho- bia and xenophobia. In January 2012 the Swedish National Agency for Education came to the conclusion that a general ban against the full veil (niqab) in school was against the freedom of religion law and that the Swedish school system should be open to all pupils. However, if the niqab was a danger to the pupil—for example in laboratory classes—it was possible for a teacher to hinder the pupil from wearing the full veil. But the Swedish National Agency for Education stressed that all teachers should strive for equality and that most practical problems could be solved and the school should try to find a solution that was acceptable for both teachers and pupils. The Muslim designer Iman Aldebe, who among many things took part in the reality show Project Runaway Sweden, received death threats in 2012 after she had designed a so-called police veil (i.e. a veil that could be used by female Muslim police officers). The aim of the project was to illustrate that Swedish society had become multicultural and religiously plural.23

12 Publications and Media

Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Mus- lims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. In 2012, Swedish television broadcasted a documentary about Islam and equality that demonstrated that many mosques and imams in Swe- den supported patriarchal structures and were breaking Swedish law by neglecting domestic violence and polygamy. The programme was filmed with a hidden camera. In a follow-up programme broadcast in January 2013, the problem was not solved and many critics argued that Islamic

22 Danielsson, S. and L. Pettersson, “Fel dölja ansiktet i öppet samhälle (It is wrong to cover the face in an open society)”, SvD, 16 October 2009. 23 See www.aftonbladet.se/nojesbladet/tv/article15531821.ab, accessed 31 January 2013. sweden 629 organisations and mosques should be stripped off economic support from the state and the municipalities. Many Muslim leaders argued, however, that the programme should be seen as an illustration of general negative opinions about Islam and Muslims in Sweden.24 Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discus- sion lists, etc.), and there are probably over 100 Swedish Islamic websites, such as http://www.islamguiden.com. The al-Ghazali institute (http://al- ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and Eng- lish books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad and a collection of hadith-texts). In addition to journals and books published by Sunni and Shi’i Muslims, the Ahmadi community has published a large number of Swedish translations of Ahmadi books (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community).

13 Family Law

No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims must follow. Consequently, Islam has no distinct legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages and serve as surrogate civil servants. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a so-called double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic mar- riage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available.

14 Interreligious Relations

In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions (Jews, Christians and Muslims) organises lec- tures and a football match for peace annually on 11 September (since 2009). Similar activities were also organised in other Swedish cities. Cur- rently, the Church of Sweden is funding a priest in Gothenburg who is

24 www.svt.se/ug/kampen-om-koranen, accessed 31 January 2013. 630 göran larsson working explicitly in interfaith relations, and in Stockholm it has set up a centre for religious dialogue (Centrum för religionsdialog, Västra trädgårds- gatan 2, Box 16345, SE-103 26 Stockholm, www.svenskakyrkan.se/default .aspx?id=663471) and an interfaith centre was opened in Gothenburg in 2012 (Interreligiösa centret, Kyrkogatan 25, SE-411 15 Göteborg, http:// interreligiosacentret.se/). The centre is funded by the city of Göteborg. Dialogslussen, an organisation close to the Turkish Gülen movement, is also active in interfaith dialogue work in Gothenburg (Gustaf Dalénsgatan 8, SE-417 05 Göteborg, www.dialogslussen.se/).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and preconceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2011, 5490 hate crimes/incidents were reported (43% out of 650 anti-religious hate crimes were reported as Islamophobic) and compared to earlier reporting the figures is higher than the year before. Both the number of anti-religious hate crimes and the total number of reported hate crimes are on the rise.25 As in other European countries, the building of mosques in Sweden has given rise to public debates and strong anti-Muslim reactions.26 For exam- ple, on ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the building site of a new mosque in Göteborg was desecrated with pigs’ heads and an anti-mosque demonstration was organised for the ground breaking ceremony in 2010 and for the opening in 2011. This specific building was mainly attacked because it was sup- ported and funded by Saudi Arabia (see, for example, the anti-Muslim website http://www.ramberget.com). The Swedish right-wing populist party, Sverigedemokraterna, has also publicly targeted Islam, Muslims and

25 Hatbrott 2011. Statistik over polisanmälningar med identifierade hatbrottsmotiv (Hate crimes 2011. Statistics relating to offences reported to the police with an identified hate crime motive) (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2012). For an English summary of this report, see www.bra.se/ download/18.1ff479c3135e8540b29800020067/2012_Hate_crime_2011_summary.pdf, accessed 31 January 2013. 26 See Allievi, S., Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy Issues and Trends (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009). sweden 631 the building of mosques, but it is also clear that anti-mosque demonstra- tions have attracted support from other so-called counter-jihad milieus.27 During 2012, anti-Muslim demonstrations were organised by support- ers of the so-called counter-jihad movement in Stockholm and the Dutch politician Geert Wilders who has expressed strong anti-Muslim opinions took part in a meeting in Malmö.28 The Swedish artist Lars Vilks was also invited to an anti-Muslim meeting in New York organised by Pamela Geller and the anti-Muslim network SION (Stop the Islamization of Nations).

16 Major Cultural Events

No reported data.

27 Åkesson, J., “Muslimerna är vårt största hot (The Muslims are our biggest threat)”, Aftonbladet, 19 October 2009. See also www.ramberget.com/. 28 See http://expo.se/2012/counterjihad-rorelsen-samlas-i-stockholm_5109.html; www .dn.se/nyheter/varlden/vilks-deltar-i-islamfientligt-mote and www.tryckfrihet.com/geert- wilders-till-malmo-och-tryckfrihetssallskapet/, all three accessed 31 January 2013.

SWITZERLAND

Stéphane Lathion and Andreas Tunger-Zanetti1

1 Muslim Populations

Prior to 1960, the presence of Muslims within the Swiss population was rare. That changed with three waves of immigration. The first wave, in the late 1960s, was mainly caused by economic factors and consisted chiefly of men coming to work in Switzerland with no particular intention to stay permanently in the country. These immigrants were mostly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The second wave came in the late 1970s, after Switzerland changed its legislation concerning foreigners to allow family reunion. This decision had direct implications: from this point on, Islam was no longer an ephemeral, male social factor in Switzer- land but, with the presence of families, had become a lasting reality. The last, political, wave consisted of foreigners seeking asylum from oppres- sive dictatorships, various civil wars, famines and other situations. More accurately, this is not so much a wave as an ongoing movement, since it started in the 1960s (mainly from the Middle East) and continues today with the exodus of people from the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, North Africa and other African countries. Censuses in Switzerland have been carried out every ten years since 1850 and always included the question of affiliation to a religious community. In 2000, 301,807 individuals declaring their affiliation to Islam were living in Switzerland, making up 4.3% of the population. For several reasons the increase observed in preceding decades (1970: 16,353, 1980: 56,625, 1990: 152,217) has slowed down considerably. With the 2010 census the method of data collection changed from a full census to that of random sample. Furthermore, only persons aged over 15 years were considered. This is why the Swiss Federal Statistical Office published a lower figure of Muslims for

1 Dr Stéphane Lathion is founder of GRIS (Research Group on Islam in Switzerland) and a researcher associated with the Observatoire des Religions en Suisse, University of Lausanne. His latest book is Islam et modernité, Identités entre mairie et mosquée (, Identities between Mosque and Secular State)(Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2010). Dr Andreas Tunger-Zanetti is coordinator of the Centre for Research on Religion at the University of Lucerne and currently engaged in a project on Muslim youth groups. 634 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti

2010 than for 2000, namely 295,798 (margin of appreciation: 1.8%). Taking into account that in the 2000 census 39.2% of Muslims in Switzerland were under 20 years of age, the number can be calculated to ca. 420,000 persons for 2010 and to 440,000 for 2012 corresponding to 5.5% of the total Swiss population. The percentage is slightly higher in the German-speaking parts than in the French- and Italian-speaking parts of the country. The great majority of the country’s Muslims live in industrialised areas. Automatic Swiss nationality is by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory. Foreigners, including those born in Switzerland, must generally have lived for a total of twelve years in Switzerland before they can apply for Swiss nationality; the years spent in the country between the ages of ten and twenty are double counted. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. Since 2000, the proportion of Muslims with Swiss citizenship has risen from 11.7 to ca. 35%. It was 31.4% in 2010 according to the official figures for those aged over 15, but it is most probably higher for those up to 15 years. Still, the majority of Muslims in Switzerland hold foreign nationalities, some 30% from one of Yugoslavia’s successor states, followed by Turkey (around 16%, Alevis included), North Africa, Sub-Saharan African and the Middle East (all below 5%).2 Muslim communities in Switzerland are 75% Sunnis, 7% Shi’is, 10%– 15% Turkish Alevis, including some members of Sufi orders. The propor- tion of those practising Islam on a regular basis is estimated at 10–20%.

2 Islam and the State

Switzerland is a secular state. Its Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of belief and conscience (§15) and equality before the law. However, since Switzerland is a federation of states (cantons), the Constitution in §72 delegates all matters of religion to the competence of the cantons. This means that a canton is free to grant one or more religious communities a privileged status including the possibility to levy a special tax for them. The only two cantons that have clearly separated state and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel.3 Almost all the others have granted special status to the Roman Catholic Church, to the Reformed

2 For more details, see www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/05.html. 3 Mahnig, Hans, “L’intégration institutionnelle des Musulmans de Suisse: L’exemple de Bâle-Ville, Berne, Genève, Neuchâtel et Zurich (The institutional integration of Muslims in switzerland 635

Church and to the small Old Catholic Church, six to Jewish congregations. No canton so far has done so with an Islamic corporate body. Most Islamic umbrella organisations, however, declare the privileged status of official recognition as their long-term goal. The two main umbrella organisations FIDS and KIOS (see next section) are pursuing the idea to assemble a national ‘parliament’ of Muslims in order to coordinate efforts for recogni- tion. There is generally cooperation between local or cantonal authorities and the respective Muslim organisations. On 17 October 2012 the Parliament of the Canton of Basel-Stadt granted official recognition of largely symbolic value to two Alevi organisations. This was the first case of recognition for a congregation outside the Chris- tian or Jewish traditions, and Muslim organisations noticed this with interest.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The situation outlined in section 2 means that there is yet no official rep- resentation of all Muslims, neither on the national nor on the cantonal level. In ten cantons, however, there are umbrella organisations uniting the majority of local associations and acting as interlocutors for authori- ties and civil society for issues such as cemeteries, swimming pools, con- struction of mosques, etc.; one organisation of this type covers six cantons in Eastern Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein.4 Another type of umbrella organisations coordinates local associations of the same ethnic and ideological background all over Switzerland. A third type of non-local organisation groups individuals with particular interests such as the Union of Albanian Imams in Switzerland (www.uais.ch), founded in January 2012, or organisations for women or for burial services; important among the older ones are Musulmans et Musulmanes de Suisse (Muslim Men and Women of Switzerland, www.islam.ch) and Ligue des Musul- mans de Suisse (League of Swiss Muslims, www.rabita-ms.ch). There are two umbrella organisations whose presidents have been try- ing for several years to establish their organisation as the main player on the national level. One is Föderation islamischer Dachorganisationen der

Switzerland: The example of Bâle-Ville, Berne, Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich)”, Tangram: Bulletin de la Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme, vol. 8 (2000), pp. 102–111. 4 A good overview with only few lacunae is found on www.islam.ch/joomla/index .php?option=com_weblinks&view=categories&Itemid=27 (accessed 31 January 2013). 636 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti

Schweiz (FIDS, Federation of Islamic Organisations of Switzerland, Bahn- strasse 80, 8105 Regensdorf, www.fids.ch), headed by Dr. Hisham Maizar and bringing together thirteen organisations of the middle-range type described above. The other is Koordination Islamischer Organisationen Schweiz (KIOS, Coordination of Swiss Islamic Organisations) with Dr. Farhad Afshar (Kappelenring 44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen, [email protected]) as its spokesperson and with the cantonal umbrella organisations of Basel, Berne and Zurich as its members; KIOS has no website, and nothing is known about its structure, committee etc. FIDS and KIOS, though rivals, cooperate in setting up a representative body of Swiss Muslims and they have formed a common front against a more recent player, the hard-line Islamischer Zentralrat Schweiz (Islamic Central Council of Switzerland or ICCS, www.islamrat.ch). The ICCS was founded on 25 October 2009, one month before and as a reaction to the referendum on minarets. Headed by young Muslim convert Nicolas Blancho, it is constantly seeking media attention, often through provocative initiatives, and has attracted much sympathy among the second and third generation of Muslims for speak- ing out against discrimination. The ICCS states as one of its objectives “to unite in the future the majority of practising Muslims institutionally and to represent them.”5 On the local level, nearly every one of the 200 mosques and prayer houses is under the responsibility of an association or a foundation. Most of them have a youth and a women section. Another type of associa- tions focuses on cultural activities and attracts primarily non-practising Muslims.6

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Switzerland has nearly 200 mosques and/or prayer halls. Only four of them show features of Islamic architecture, in particular a minaret: Zurich (inaugurated in 1963, run by the Ahmadiyya movement), in Geneva (1978, financed by Saudi Arabia), and more recently in two converted industrial buildings in Winterthur (2005, Albanians) and Wangen (2009, Turks).7

5 www.izrs.ch/vision.html, accessed 2 April 2013 (authors’ translation). 6 Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, De l’etranger au musulman, immigration et intégration de l’islam en Suisse (From Foreigner to Muslim, Immigration and Integration of Islam in Swit- zerland) (Saarbrücken: Editions Universitaires Europeennes, 2010), p. 170sq. 7 www.religionenschweiz.ch/bauten/en/e-index.html (accessed 31 January 2013) and Patrick Haenni and Stéphane Lathion, Les minarets de la discorde, Infolio/Religioscope, Fribourg, 2009. switzerland 637

On 29 November 2009, the Swiss population voted in a referendum to prohibit the building of minarets in Switzerland (see section 16 below). Building permission for the fifth minaret, planned by the Albanian congre- gation in Langenthal, was issued, but not realised before the vote on the minaret ban. This caused uncertainty about whether it is still valid. On 29 March 2012 the administrative court of the canton of Berne ruled that the planned plexiglass cupola could be built, but not the 6 meter minaret. The court grounded its decision on details of local construction law thus leav- ing open the question of the effect of the constitutional minaret ban. The Albanian congregation has accepted the verdict. A newly built mosque, from the outset planned without dome or minaret, was inaugurated in Wohlen (Aargau) in 2007. Another one with a lofty appearance and a front with oriental decorative elements opened its doors in Volketswil near Zurich in December 2012. Two more (Grenchen, Wil), both with , are in an advanced stage of planning. The remaining mosques are mainly prayer halls with nothing but a signboard as outward indication of their Islamic function. Most have facilities such as a small library and/or cafeteria. Prayer rooms in public institutions are still few and generally designed to accommodate all faiths with the qibla indicated for Muslims.

5 Children’s Education

The question of religious education is the responsibility of the cantons. Each canton, according to the cantonal constitution and laws, has its own system of teaching in religion or about religion or—rarely—both (usually no more than one hour per week). At the primary school level, religious education often takes the form of optional confessional instruc- tion, given in public schools by staff of churches enjoying the status of official recognition (see section 2). However, this type of education is evolving and is slowly being replaced in many cantons with non-religious and inter-religious classes taught by public school teachers and manda- tory for all pupils. In secondary school, only an introduction to the history of religions is offered and is usually taught in a non-dogmatic or non- confessional fashion. Enbiro (Enseignement Biblique Romand, ENBIRO, www.enbiro.ch) has developed a new pedagogy for teaching religion in school. This new programme gives an introduction to the world’s most influential religions and has been generally welcomed in French-speaking Switzerland, although not in the canton of Wallis, where a controversy erupted in November 2003. Some conservative Christian parents removed 638 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti their children from the religious education class when they learned that Muhammad was presented as a prophet who received messages from God and that the Qur’an is a holy book. These parents were concerned that presenting Islamic teachings conflicted with the religious education they wanted to provide for their children. All the objections to this new kind of religious education were related to Islam, and not to the other religions taught. In the German-speaking part of Switzerland the variety of types of teaching in/about religion on secondary level is as big as at primary level.8 Muslim children are socialised in religious matters, depending on their parents’ initiative, through the family or at the preferred mosque, which may offer an introduction to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic by the imam or, often, by poorly trained volunteer teachers. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which often take place on Saturdays or in the early evening. Islamic instruction in public schools (beside the regular classes) is possible in some cantons even without official recognition of the respec- tive community and only depending on consent of local authorities. So far, qualified Muslim teachers teach classes of Muslim children in four municipalities (since 2002 in Kriens, Ebikon and Turgi/Obersiggenthal, since 2010 in Kreuzlingen).9 These classes are optional and given in Ger- man to all nationalities together. A federal research report on religious education was published in sum- mer 2009.10 There is an agreement that teachers of Islamic religion are needed, but the question is how to organise a training course in practice. The scarcity of Islamic education in public schools is due to a combination of factors: weak Muslim organisations depending on voluntary donations, lack of qualified Muslim teachers, and fear of Islamophobic reactions. Secular classes are usually unaffected by problems related to Islam. The few cases where the rules and guidelines of public schools are not

8 For a recent overview see Ansgar Jödicke: Unterricht zum Thema Religion an der öffentlichen Schule (Teaching about religion in public schools), final report, PNR 58 (Col- lectivités religieuses, Etat et société), Freiburg, 2010. www.nfp58.ch/e_projekte_jugendliche .cfm?projekt=106, accessed 31 January 2013. 9 The Kreuzlingen classes are extensively documented on www.viuk.ch. 10 Formation en Suisse des imams et des enseignants-es en religion islamique (Training in Switzerland for imams and teachers of Islamic religious education), PNR 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société) (Berne, 2009), German and French version available on www .nfp58.ch. switzerland 639 accepted by Muslim parents are mostly about participation in school camps or swimming lessons. Normally pragmatic solutions are found. Only rare cases end up before the courts, causing disproportionate media attention. In 2012 some cases in and around Basel have escalated: Several families refused to send their daughters to the mandatory swimming les- sons in the public school. They were fined increasing amounts, but remain resolved; a non-Muslim consultant pays the fines for them.

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Switzerland, there is a small number of university chairs in Islamic stud- ies (Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Basel). They are slowly beginning to broaden the spectrum of research topics from the philological, historical, civilisa- tional and sometimes political aspects towards a contemporary view of the Islamic world. Islam in Europe is primarily a research topic of some Departments of Religious Studies (Universities of Lausanne, Fribourg, Lucerne and Zurich). On 7 May 2003, in Wallis, a Catholic canton, an imam from Macedonia was denied a work permit to work as an imam, largely due to the fact that he had studied in Medina (Saudi Arabia) and the canton authori- ties considered him to be a potential threat to religious harmony. The case contributed to imam training becoming a political issue and a study group was established which reported its findings in July 2009. The report11 confirms that the Muslim majority expect training courses for imams as well as for teachers based on the German model (educational studies, Arabic, Islam). The situation in the French part of Switzerland is quite different and seems more orientated towards an historical and ecumeni- cal approach proposed by the NGO Enseignement Biblique et Interreligieux Romand. The study revealed widespread consensus on the necessity for imams and religious teachers to be fluent in one of Switzerland’s national languages and familiar with its society, laws and history. Two models for training of imams and religious teachers are discussed. One is to establish an academic unit for ‘Islamic theology’ at a university, similar to recent initiatives in Germany. An intermediate solution is to provide adult con- tinuing education to supplement the theological training that functioning imams already have, and also to make it available to leaders in Muslim

11 Details see preceding note in section 5. 640 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti associations; a one-year course of this type, called “Religious support in an interreligious context” and open to religious staff of all religions has been conducted at Zurich University of Applied Sciences in Winterthur in 2009 and 2010 with resumption planned for 2013.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

As a federation of states, Switzerland has left this issue of cemeteries to the cantons, which usually allow the individual local authorities to find the solution that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cem- eteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978. It was not until 2000 that other major cities began to define and establish sections suited for Muslim burials. Meanwhile the 11 biggest cities, except Lausanne, now have such sec- tions, the one in Winterthur having been opened in 2012; there are also Muslim sections at cemeteries in some middle-sized or small municipali- ties. Negotiations and planning are under way in the cities of Neuchâtel, Fribourg, St. Gallen, Schlieren and Lausanne. Usually Muslim residents of neighbouring cities or villages can also be buried in these sections provided the authorities of the two municipalities have signed a general agreement. Demand for existing burial places is low so far, because the majority of first generation Muslim immigrants still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. But Muslim functionaries expect this to change in the future. With regard to funeral rites, Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When there are no local regulations governing the details of funeral rites, local parishes or civil authorities usually try to do their best to find a solution acceptable to the family.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No chaplaincy arrangements are formally organised for Muslims, and what services there are depend exclusively on the good will of institu- tions and individuals. The Swiss Army has only Roman Catholic and Prot- estant chaplains. These have to care for any member of the Army asking for assistance. A similar situation is found in Swiss prisons and hospitals. Only some prisons (e.g. Pöschwies prison in Regensdorf near Zurich) have arrangements with individually selected professionally trained imams or switzerland 641 with confidential Muslims persons, sometimes brokered by regional Mus- lim associations. A sociological study on religious pluralism in Swiss pris- ons recommends not only a more systematic involvement of imams, but also to raise awareness of prison staff of Islam and related issues through further education in order to counter gross stereotypes.12 There is a chap- laincy service in the Geneva hospital that works because of the involve- ment of some Muslim doctors. Some hospitals give their staff further training on aspects of religious and cultural diversity.

9 Religious Festivals

No specific arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim reli- gious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic dif- ficulties for the employer. There is no legal right to a reduction of work- ing hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. Students fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration. Most schools have guidelines on how to treat requests for dispensation related to requirements of any religion. Given the federal system, these guidelines differ among cantons and even among municipalities. Hajj is organised by the major Islamic umbrella organisations in col- laboration with authorised travel agencies. According to the Consular Section of the Saudi Embassy in Switzerland, “the number of hajj visas granted from Switzerland for the year 1433H/2012AD is approximately 1,700 visas.”13

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Slaughter without prior anaesthetisation is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. This is not a serious problem because halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, Austria and New Zealand (60% of lamb meat) is readily available. There are butcher- ies selling meat as halal which is from anaesthetised animals slaughtered

12 Irene Becci et al.: Enjeux sociologiques de la pluralité religieuse dans les prisons suisses, PNR 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société) (Berne, 2011), available on www .nfp58.ch. 13 E-mail reply of the Consular Section to the authors on 18 February 2013. 642 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti by a Muslim. Halal meat is rarely offered in prisons or hospitals as it costs more than ordinary meat. Official statistics for 2012 show an imported quantity of 335 tons of halal beef (permitted: 350) and of 158 tons of halal mutton (permitted: 175). The biggest contingent (142 tons of beef) was bought by Halal Import SA in Basel, one among 11 import companies.14 Halal certificates for any prod- ucts usually originate from foreign certifiers. Business and services under explicitly Islamic headings are few.15 This applies also for Islamic banking. The only bank working entirely according to Shari’a principles was Faisal Private Bank, Geneva, founded in 2006, but they stopped their banking activities in November 2012 because demand for halal banking products was too weak; they operate now only as a family office. Several other banks still have a small Islamic window. Hajj and ‘Umrah are organised by the major Islamic umbrella organisations cooperating with travel agen- cies authorised by the Saudi embassy.

11 Dress Codes

There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Swit- zerland, but emotions have been higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. The hijab is permitted at school for students and pupils but prohibited in most can- tons for teachers. Two cantons have had to deal with legal cases concerning hijab. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to rule that public officials may not wear ostentatious religious symbols, such as hijab. In theory this ruling could become a precedent for the whole of Switzerland, but the decision remains with individual cantons. Schools allow Muslim girls to wear the ‘burqini’ for swimming lessons. Since July 2009, as in France, complete veiling has become a subject of public debate in Switzerland. After a phase of mostly theoretical and hypothetical polemics echoing discussions in France, the controversy is continuing in some cantons and even on the national level. The same

14 www.blw.admin.ch, accessed 31 January 2013. 15 See the category “Musl. Unternehmen” on www.islam.ch, accessed 31 January 2013. switzerland 643 political forces that initiated the minaret ban are now preparing an initia- tive to ban any type of ‘disguise’ in public, aiming primarily at the niqab (very often mistakenly labelled as burqa which is more or less non-existent in Switzerland; authorities estimate the number of niqab-wearing women at 100–150). The intention to launch a popular initiative in 2013 has been confirmed, after the national parliament rejected a request advanced by the canton of Aargau, on 28 September 2012, with 93 against 87 votes. A similar request was submitted to the National Assembly by a parliamen- tarian and won a majority in the Lower House in 2011, but was rejected by the Council of States on 5 March 2012. Head scarves are permitted on photos in ID cards and passports as long as the face remains visible from the chin to the hairline.16

12 Publication and Media

Muslims do not have their own programmes on either television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Themes such as creation, death, health and fundamentalism are examples of subjects covered. Similar topics are raised on the Internet, where Muslims are particularly active with websites of their own making. This shift in media use is sym- bolised by the end of Er-Rahma—Die Barmherzigkeit, a journal produced in 200 copies by private enthusiasts, in 2007, after sixteen years in print. Some of the Muslim websites that show how well organised the associa- tions are becoming are: Islam en Suisse (www.islam.ch/); Gesellschaft Schweiz—Islamische Welt (www.gsiw.ch/, with a rich monthly news­ letter), Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (www.rabita-ms.ch/); Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève (www.mosque.ch/); Association Cul- turelle des Femmes Musulmanes de Suisse (www.femme-musulmane.ch); Centre Islamique de Genève (www.cige.org/cige/index.html); Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zürich (www.vioz.ch); Stiftung Isla- mische Gemeinschaft Zürich (www.sigz.ch); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (www.sig-net.ch/); Bulletins du Centre Islamique de Genève (www.cige.org/cige/publications/bulletins_du_cig/index.html) is a newsletter produced three times a year. Many groups consisting of

16 www.schweizerpass.admin.ch/content/dam/data/passkampagne/definitivefoto mustertafel220906.pdf, accessed 31 January 2013. 644 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti mainly young people do not maintain websites, but organise themselves through social media, especially Facebook.

13 Family Law

In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal; nev- ertheless, sometimes international private law obliges some exceptions. Conflicts may arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.17 Marriages can only be formalised according to civil law. Research on family law and on the consequences of increasing legal diversity has received more attention since the foundation, in 2008, of the Center for Islamic and Middle Eastern Legal Studies (CIMELS) at the University of Zurich (www.rwi.uzh.ch/oe/cimels.html).

14 Interreligious Relations

Since 1992, the Interreligious Working Group of Switzerland (www.iras- cotis.ch) counsels religious communities on practical questions (e.g. resi- dency permits for staff, rooms), coordinates their activities and publicly promotes interreligious encounter through a “Week of Religions” held every year since 2007 in the beginning of November. One Muslim woman and two men are among the ten members of the committee. The woman, Rifa’at Lenzin, was awarded the title of honorary doctor of the University of Berne in 2010 for years of engagement in interreligious dialogue. Aiming at a more political level, the Swiss Council of Religions (SCR, www.councilofreligions.ch) was established in 2006 with the goal of con- tributing to the maintenance and promotion of religious harmony and freedom in Switzerland. It consists of representatives of the three churches officially recognised in most cantons (Roman Catholic, Old Catholic and Protestant), the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, the two Islamic umbrella organisations FIDS and KIOS (see above section 3), an Orthodox Christian bishop and three independent women (Jewish, Christian, Mus- lim). The power of the body’s statements is purely symbolic. Partly as a reaction to the SCR which consisted only of men at its start, women of the three Abrahamic religions founded the Interreligious Think

17 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Erwin Tanner (eds), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002). switzerland 645

Tank (www.interrelthinktank.ch) in 2008. They work on theological ques- tions of social relevance such as integration politics, women’s position in their religions, minaret ban, and sometimes publish comments on pub- licly debated issues. The capital Bern is home to a unique experiment named Haus der Reli- gionen (House of Religions, www.haus-der-religionen.ch). After stages in provisional premises, currently at Laubeggstrasse 21, and difficult fund- raising, construction work at Europaplatz started on 27 June 2012. Once finished, the complex will comprise separate but neighbouring prayer rooms for Alevis, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and Muslims as well as a common meeting space, offices, apartments and a hotel. At the cantonal level there are a number of interreligious fora that conduct meetings, public debates, and joint prayers in connection with the main religious festivals. During recent years, Muslim representatives such as imams or choirs have in some cases participated actively in public events of a civic nature, foremost the Federal Day of Thanksgiving, Repen- tance and Prayer (mid-September).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate continues to be marked by the features noted during the months before and after the minaret ban decided by the Swiss electorate in a referendum on 29 November 2009.18 The debate is highly emotional. Since 2007, all main political parties developed a strategic paper on the place of Islam in Switzerland focusing on how to integrate Muslims in society.19 A discussion about prohibiting the ‘burqa’ (actually meaning the niqab, cf. section 11) has taken the place of the imaginary wave of requests for building minarets. The same right wing and evangelical Chris- tian activists who promoted the minaret ban are trying to bring about a referendum to this end. Another phenomenon is the hysteria fuelled by the same circles and amplified by mainstream media every time the ICCS (cf. section 3) announces a public event. In 2012, it was especially the

18 The ban and its broader context are analysed in detail in: Adrian Vatter (ed.): Vom Schächt- zum Minarettverbot. Religiöse Minderheiten in der direkten Demokratie (From ban- ning kosher slaughtering to banning minarets. Religious minorities in direct democracy) (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2011). 19 The Swiss Confederation, through the Federal Commission against Racism (CFR), has published a special issue of its Tangram review on hostility against Muslims in no. 25, June 2010. 646 stéphane lathion and andreas tunger-zanetti annual assembly, held on 15 December in Fribourg, which caused media attention; the Federal authorities banned scheduled speaker Muhammad al-Arifi from Saudi Arabia from entering the country. Although the mech- anisms of the game are obvious, authorities and civil society actors are reluctant to increase efforts to combat the widespread ignorance about Islam among the population and politicians. Two public debates were imported from Germany in 2012. In spring, local committees of activists followed a German campaign to distribute copies of the Qur’an in pedestrian zones of some Swiss cities. Media watched out for local activities, and some local right-wing politicians urged the authorities to take measures. In the canton of Thurgau, a popu- lar initiative supported by 4,466 citizens demanded to prohibit the use of “misogynous, racist or murderous” textbooks in public schools, explicitly aiming at the Qur’an; the initiative was declared invalid by the cantonal parliament on 19 December. The other imported debate concerned cir- cumcision and arose in summer after a German district court had prohib- ited circumcision of male children. The main hospital of Zurich suspended circumcisions in July, but after internal discussions and legal and ethi- cal consultation resumed them one month later. The authorities played a moderating but defensive role in these debates. The authorities also showed little activity in the Grenchen case: In that town, on 11 November 2011, police found a dead pig and four pigs’ heads buried on the building lot after various media had received an anonymous letter to this effect. The police have been unable to find the perpetrators so far.

16 Major Cultural Events

The main regular event with Muslim participation is the interreligious “Week of Religions”, held each year at the beginning of November (cf. section 14). Many prayer halls will then have a “Day of open doors”, some will also delegate a spokesperson to a podium or a children’s choir to an interreligious gathering. The participation depends very much on a few local activists. In 2012 fewer mosques arranged a “Day of open doors” as a result of poor demand in preceding years. Some umbrella organisations use iftar dinners or ‘Id al-adha for invit- ing representatives of authorities and churches, or in some cases, as e.g. in Zurich, their heads and imams are hosted on this occasion by city authorities. switzerland 647

Young activists are increasingly beginning to organise events for their peers. The biggest one is the Ummah Day (www.u-day.ch) in Dietikon. After causing a big fuss in the media when starting in 2010 with Tariq Ramadan, the second one on 17 December 2011 went unnoticed by the public and attracted many less young Muslims. The event was not organised in 2012.

TURKEY

Ahmet Yildiz1

1 Muslim Populations

The census conducted by Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (the Turkish Statis- tics Institution, TÜİK), as of 31 December 2011, recorded the population of Turkey as 74,724,269.2 Following the founding of the Republic of Tur- key in 1924, the nation-building process envisaged a thoroughly homoge- neous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affilia­tions of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some signifi- cant surveys, the most important of which was con­ducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-KONDA company.3 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the popu­lation), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks com- prise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi’is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in east­ern and south-eastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, and 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (4,500,000 people), and are 43% Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8% of various other ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central Anatolia and the Mediterranean

1 Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms as well as the role of Islam as a socio-political determinant in Turkish democracy. He contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and politi- cal vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Cizre, Ümit (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 2 TÜİK figures available at www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10736, accessed 15 February 2013. 3 Milliyet-KONDA, Biz Kimiz? Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması 2006 (Who Are We? Survey of Social Structure 2006), accessed 15 February 2013. 650 ahmet yildiz region. The Ja’faris are the country’s principal Shi’i community and num- ber around 500,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi’is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scien­tists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate yourself in the con- tinuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identi- fied themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meanings ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5

2 Islam and the State

Under its 1982 Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for free- dom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) not only prescribes a separation between religion and the state but also requires religion to be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on reli­gious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf. Article 219 of the penal code prohibits imams, priests, rabbis and other religious lead- ers from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there is legislation against insulting any religion, interfering with a reli- gion’s services or damaging its property. The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diya- net), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, admin- isters Sunni Muslim religious facilities and teaching courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil ser-

4 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2011, www.state.gov/j/ drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192871, accessed 15 February 2013. 5 Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), pp. 29–31, 38–39. turkey 651 vants, and also covers the cost of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, par­ticularly some Alevi associations, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diyanet of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the cost of utilities at ‘Alevi cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship.6

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The establishment of political parties based on religious affiliation is legally forbidden. Thus, in legal and official terms, there is no religious political party. Parties attesting special importance to Islam express this leaning in indirect ways. Accordingly, it is known that the Felicity Party, currently not represented in the parliament and apparent heir of the National Outlook Parties is a party with an Islamic background. The Jus- tice and Development Party (JDP), the party in power since 2002, is a con- servative democratic party, and an offspring of the Virtue Party, a party with a National Outlook. Another offspring of the National Outlook, HAS Party led by Numan Kurtulmuş dissolved itself on 19 September 2012 and merged with the ruling AK Party (JDP).7 While Sunni religious sensitivities are represented by these parties, the main heterodox group, Alevis, are mainly represented in the secularist Republican People’s Party. Like political parties, there is ban on the legal establishment of the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas). This ban remains de jure, however, not de facto. Yet, Mevlevi and Bektashi orders continue to hold official endorsement and Naqshabandi and Qadiri Sufi groupings as well as non-Sufi religious groupings, namely Nurcus and Suleymancis have social representation in various civil society organisations. The oldest of these in Republican

6 Upon the written question submitted by the Tunceli deputy Hüseyin Aygün, from the main opposition Republican People’s Party, (RPP) the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly restated the current official position that Cemevis are not among the recognised places of worship in Islam. See, for example, www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ 22126869.asp, accessed 15 February 2013. In 15 May 2012, a motion by Ali Özgündüz, a deputy of the Republican People’s Party from Istanbul, on the “Re-Organization of the Places of Worship” was debated in the Plenary and the demand of its direct inclusion to the agenda was rejected. See www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_basl angic?P4=21186&P5=H&page1=15&page2=15&web_user_id=10907078, accessed 15 February 2013. 7 See www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1100879&Ca tegoryID=78, accessed 21 February 2013. 652 ahmet yildiz

Turkey are the Nurcu movement founded by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (d. 1960), and the Suleymancis originally led by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d. 1959), the establishment of both dating back to the 1930s. Sufi and other mystical, religious-social orders, brotherhoods, and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Der- vish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925, but tariqas and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Calls for the lifting of this ban are part of the on-going agenda in Turkish politics,8 but Kemalists and neo- Kemalists are resolutely against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Alevis in Turkey are organised in various forms, which represent basi- cally two lines, traditionalists and reformists. While traditionalists use more Islamic rooted idioms and language, the reformists are more secu- lar and equipped more with a political language. Alevi organisations of the first form are individual associations or foundations, gathered around Cemevis (Alevi places of culture and religious rituals), such as Şahkulu Sultan Vakfı, Karaca Ahmet Sultan Derneği and Vakfı, Erikli Baba Derneği, Garip Dede Derneği. Alevi organisations of the second form are composed of associations or foundations with multiple branches like Hacı Bektaş Veli Dernekleri and Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri. The third form is foundation- Cemevis linked to central foundations, namely Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı. All these organisations serve as centres for Cem and Culture. The umbrella organisation for Alevi groupings is Alevi Bektaşi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi-Bektashi Unions of Turkey).9 Apart from miscellaneous non-official Islamic groupings, the most important official organisation is the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Eskişehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel.: ++90 3122957000; www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/default.aspx), an official insti- tution estab­lished by Law 429 on 3 March 1924, the same day as the aboli- tion of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority

8 Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ of Justice and Development Party in an iftar organisation by the World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation on 22 November 2012 referred to this state of affairs, and expressed his willingness that some day this ban be removed. For his speech, see “Başbakan Yardımcısı’ndan tarikat açıklaması,” (A Statement Regarding Tariqats by Deputy Prime Minister), www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21985765.asp, accessed 21 February 2013. 9 www.guvencabdal.com/aleviligin_inanc_esaslari_hakkinda_soz_sahibi_olan_ kurumlar-t373.0.html, accessed 11 April 2012. turkey 653 in the country. According to Article 136 of the Constitution: “The Depart- ment of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” It is empowered to regulate issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and to provide soci- ety with religious guidance. Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows:

– Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (The Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs), Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak No. 72/B, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel.: ++90 3124171235, fax: ++90 3124181900, E-mail: [email protected], web: www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax- exempt foun­dation, has the right to collect donations without prior per- mission, and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the activities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, to enlighten and guide the population in religious mat- ters, to build mosques and to work towards strengthen­ing social soli- darity. The prestigious Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of Islami Araştırmalar Merkezi (the Islamic Studies Centre, ISAM), İcadiye Bağlarbaşı Cad. 40, Bağlarbaşı 34662, Üsküdar-Istanbul, tel.: ++90 2164740850, fax: ++90 2164740874, www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. – Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfi (The Foundation for Turkish Vol- unteer Associations, TGTV), Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. No:1, 134050, Edirnekapı/Eyüp/Istanbul, tel.: ++90 212534040708, fax: ++90 2123104679, e-mail: [email protected], web: www.tgtv.org) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. – There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the so-called “cemaat”, a neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by a retired preacher, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi, now living in the USA, including Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (the Journalists and Writers Foundation) Tophanelioğlu Caddesi, Aygün Sokak, Altunizade Plaza No: 4 Altunizade/Üsküdar/İstanbul, tel. :++90 2163399196, fax: ++90 2163399149, e-mail: [email protected], web: www.gyv.org.tr/), established on 29 June 1994. The Founda­tion has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: The Dia- logue Eurasia Platform, the Abant Meetings and the Intercultural Dia- log Platform. 654 ahmet yildiz

– Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (the Anatolia Youth Association), Sokullu Mehmet Paşa Cad. No: 184 Dikmen, 06000 Çankaya, Ankara, tel.: ++90 3124801844–45, fax: ++90 3124801569, e-mail: [email protected], web: www.agd.org.tr) is the successor of Milli Görüş Vakfı (the National Outlook Foundation), the most impor­tant social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the country. It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, (d. 2011).

There are numerous socially and financially powerful Islamically oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphans, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associa- tions are: İnsani Yardım Vakfı (International Humanitarian Help, IHH), www.ihh.org.tr), Kimse Yok Mu? (Solidarity and Aid Association), www .kimseyokmu.org.tr, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), (www.denizfeneri.org.tr), Cansuyu (www.cansuyu.org.tr) and Yardımeli (www.yardimeli.org.tr).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2011, there were 82,693 mosques in Turkey.10 The total number of reg- istered mosques/masjids in public institutions is 956.11 More than 60,000 mosques are village mosques. Almost all mosques have an imam. City mosques have also an azan and tasbihat reciter called muezzin. Istanbul is the city housing the greatest number of mosques whereas Tunceli holds the least. The most famous are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman , called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important to have been built in the Republican period.

10 See www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-AnaMenu-istatistikler- 561.aspx, accessed 18 Febuary 2013. 11 This figure is taken from the Presidency of the Religious Affairs Human Resources Management Database, a non-public source. The breakdown of the mosques/masjids in public institutions is as follows: hospitals 53; schools 82; other public institutions 432; Qur’an Courses 143; in the premises of the Office of muftis 114; Diyanet in-service training centres 12; universities 80, ibid. turkey 655

Mosques are open during prayer times. In the intervals between prayers most mosques are generally closed. If they have a small section reserved for prayer, one may use it for that purpose only. In recent years, there is a strong sensitivity to keep the mosques open all day, but this is still not applied in all mosques. In recent years, women attendance at daily prayers in mosques has been increasing. Many mosques have special places allocated for the use of women only. There is a strong awareness to keep mosques open to women and children and hence to modify the existing mosques accordingly.

5 Children’s Education

The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military gov- ernment in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduc- tion to Alevism. In 2011 however, in line with the relevant ECHR decision, school curricula was revised so as to cover many aspects of Alevism start- ing from the grade 4 till the last grade of high schools.12 Only the Diyanet is authorised to provide courses in religion (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine and unofficial private courses do exist. After the 1997 military coup, students who have completed the first five years of primary school might enrol in Diyanet Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older might legally register for official Qur’an courses, which included 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. All these restrictions were removed by Article 15 of the Decree no. 653, dated 17 September 2011.13 Since 1997 it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of schooling, after which those who wish to receive Islamic religious edu- cation may continue their studies at Imam-Hatip high schools (lycees), which cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. There are currently 537 such secondary schools attached to the

12 See “Alevilik Müfredata Daha Geniş Girdi,” (Alevism Has Entered the Curriculum More Comprehensively), http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/alevilik-mufredata-daha-genisgirdi/ gundem/gundemdetay/09.09.2011/1436332/default.htm, accessed 10 January 2012. 13 See the Official Gazette, 17 September 2011, No: 28057 656 ahmet yildiz

Directorate of Religious Education.14 Although they date back to 1924, Imam-Hatip schools were only named Imam-Hatip high schools in 1973, when they were authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Educa- tion of 1973. During the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary school sections of these schools were closed down and the high school sections became four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology, and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the span of just five years. In July 2009, the regulation that discriminated against students from vocational schools, including Imam- Hatip high schools, was changed by the Higher Education Council so as to provide them with equal opportunities in university entrance examina- tions without restricting the university programmes they could apply for outside their vocational specialisation.15 After the repeated cycle of the removal of the ban and the annulment of the removal by the High Admin- istrative Court (Council of State), the Higher Education Council finally removed the ban on 1 December 2011.16 This decision however was again put before the court by two MPs of the main opposition party, the Repub- lican People’s Party.17 The Parliament approved the law modifying Article 45 of the Law on Higher Education removing the application of differing quotient in the university entrance exams for the graduates of vocational schools including the Imam-Hatip Schools. This change provided for the application of an equal quotient in the calculation of the success rate for the determination of the total points. Accordingly, all lawsuits regarding the quotient application became null and void.18 Many religiously devout citizens consider the religious instruction provided in state schools to be inadequate and most families who enrol their children (especially girls)

14 http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2011_2012.pdf, p. 94, accessed 18 February 2013. 15 www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=872057&title=meslek-liselilerin-katsayi- magduriyeti-sona-erdi, accessed 18 November 2009. 16 “YÖK: Katsayı Kaldırıldı,” http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/yok-katsayi-kaldirildi/ gundem/gundemdetay/01.12.2011/1469625/default.htm, accessed 10 January 2012. 17 See “CHP’den Danıştay’a katsayı davası,” (The Lawsuit to the Council of State by CHP), http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/chp-den-danistay-a-katsayi-davasi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/ 20.01.2012/1491268/default.htm, accessed 18 February 2013. 18 For the relevant law number 6287, see www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6287.html, accessed 18 February 2013. turkey 657 in Imam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. On 30 March 2012, the law entitled “Law Changing the Primary Edu- cation and Education Law, and Making Changes in Some Laws” was accepted in the Plenary. This law created a big controversy and met with the fierce opposition of the main opposition Republican People’s Party but in the end was approved by the Parliament. The law defined the dura- tion of the compulsory education as 12 years. It stratified the duration of primary, secondary and lycee education as four years, and reintroduced the secondary part of Imam-Hatip Lycees.19 Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic associations. These schools are not designed as Islamic religious schools, but provide a more conducive environment for Islamic socialisation. Many of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated to the Gülen community. Boys and girls are usually taught together in the education system, in both public and private schools. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the head scarf in both primary and secondary schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are 51 theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes.20 Cur- ricula of theology faculties include courses in three subject areas: Basic Islamic Sciences, Philosophy and Sciences of Religion, and Islamic History and Arts.21 Since the 28 February 1997 military coup, only a few more have been opened. Student numbers have fallen drastically. In post-2007, the situation has begun to change.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries­ in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals

19 www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6287.html, accessed 18 February 2013. 20 This figure lists only the faculties that accept students. See http://eilahiyat.com/ index.php/ilahiyat-dkab/rakamlarla-ilahiyat-istatistikleri, accessed 18 February 2013. 21 http://eilahiyat.com/alphacontent/kyazarlarinmenu-260/79-dodr-bilal-gkir/693- ahiyat-tefsir-ve-bologna-si-.html, accessed 8 April 2012. For the curricula of theology fac- ulties, also see www.divinity.ankara.edu.tr/lisans_programlari.php, accessed 18 February 2013. 658 ahmet yildiz in accordance with Islamic practice and relevant legislation,22 including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Religious services in prisons date back to 1974, but were not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy.’ However, under a pro- tocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency of Reli- gious Affairs on 15 May 2001,23 Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly basis.24 Since then, 10,000 copies of the Qur’an have been distributed in prisons. According to 2011 Activity Report of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there are 56 ‘chaplains’ in prisons.25 Overall, there are 500 permanent staff positions reserved for chaplaincy in prisons.26 No religious services or spiritual guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals, but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated­ the prin- ciple of secularism.27

22 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393.html, accessed 16 March 2009. 23 For the protocol between the Diyanet and Ministry of Justice see, www.diyanet.gov .tr/turkish/dinhizmetleriweb/irsat/pdf/protokoller/adalet.pdf, accessed 12 January 2012. 24 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu Religious Ser- vices Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 2 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. See also www.haber7.com/ haber/20090312/Diyanetten-cezaevlerinde- irsad-hizmeti.php, accessed 12 March 2009. 25 See www.diyanet.gov.tr/strateji_gelistirme_baskanligi/dok/faaliyet_raporu2011.pdf, p. 13, accessed 21 February 2013. 26 Ibid., p. 46. 27 See Başar, Serpil, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dışı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı (The Need for the Hospital Chaplaincy within the Context of the non-Mosque-based Religious Services),” in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religious Ser- vices Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 621–623; also see, İlhan, Ayşegül, “Dünya Hastanelerinde Din Hizmetleri (Hospi- tal Chaplaincy in the World),” www.onder.org.tr/projeleroku.asp?ID=7, accesssed 10 March 2009. turkey 659

There is a core army chaplaincy structure, but this is reserved for times of war and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus.28

9 Religious Festivals

Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fıtr) as national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and second­ 4.5).29 Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası), pio- neered by the Diyanet. The theme of the 2012 celebrations, selected by the Presidency of Diyanet, was “The Prophet Muhammad and the Injunction of Brotherhood.”30 The first day of this week is named as gül günü (the day of the rose), which symbolises the Prophet. In addition, there are other holidays known as kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, though not officially recognised.31 Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Muslims and all prepare a traditional dessert known as ashura to share with their neighbours. In 2010 for the first time in the Republic’s history, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan joined the commemorations held by the Ja’fari Com- munity in Istanbul.32 Similarly, the Turkish State television, TRT, broad- casted several short videos inspired by the Shi’i-Alevi culture during that month. The Hajj service is regulated according to the Saudi country quota stipulating as one to 1,000 in proportion to the total population. In 2012, the Turkish quota was 74,000. The actual figure happened to be 75,598.33 With the addition of Turkish citizens in Europe, this figure reached 83

28 See Acar, Erkan, “Din İşleri Subayı Ataması NedenYapılmıyor? (Why are No Military Officers Appointed as the Army Chaplains?),” Zaman, 11 May 2005. 29 For the relevant legislation regarding religious holidays, see “Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun. Kanun no. 2429 (Law on National and Public Holidays. Law no. 2429)”, Official Gazette, no. 17284, 19 March 1981, www.alomaliye.com/ulusal_bayram_ve_ genel_tatiller_.htm, accessed 6 May 2010. 30 See www.kardeslikahlaki.org/default.asp, accessed 18 February 2013. 31 For Diyanet’s kandil activities, see www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dinhizmetleriweb/ giris.htm, accessed 18 February 2013. 32 http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?i=292884, accessed 08 January 2011. 33 The figure is taken from the Presidency of the Religious Affairs Human Resources Management Database. 660 ahmet yildiz thousand.34 This is only nine per cent of the total number of the appli- cants for Hajj.35 In 2012, the total number of people who went to ‘Umrah was 382,857.36 The distribution of this figure between Diyanet and A type travel agencies is as follows: Diyanet: 136,262, Agencies: 246,595.37

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Stan- dards (TSE) is working towards a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.38 In 2011, a law entitled “Law on the Ratifica- tion of the Founding Agreement of the Islamic Institution of the Finance of International Trade” was passed by the National Assembly of Turkey.39 The law provided for the legalisation of halal certification by TSE and also favourable treatment in terms of the financing opportunities by the Islamic Development Bank. In a public opinion poll conducted in 2010, 66% of the interviewees gave positive response to the question “Will the existence of the halal cer- tificate upon a product affect your buying choices?”40 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regulations, provided that the place be allo- cated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accor- dance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.41 The Hajj and ‘Umrah organisations are done under the supervision of the General Directorate of the Hajj and ‘Umrah Services attached to the Diyanet. Since 2006, in accordance with the Saudi Hajj quota, 60% of the

34 www.diyanethaber.com/Diyanet-sayilarla-2012-hac-7657.html, accessed 24 February 2013. 35 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012 Yılı Performans Programı, p. 83. 36 The figure is taken from the Presidency of the Religious Affairs Human Resources Management Database. 37 Ibid. 38 Malatyalı, “Helal gıda nedir, ne değildir (Halal food: What it is, and is not)”, TSE Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 39 See the Official Gazette, 10 March 2011, No: 27870. 40 www.haber7.com/haber/20101214/Salam-ve-sucukta-guvenmiyoruz-ama-satin- aliyoruz.php, accessed 08 January 2011. 41 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1386. html, accessed 7 March 2009. turkey 661 pilgrims go to Hajj via Diyanet while 40% is allocated to the A type travel agencies.42 Hajj travel is organised by a joint committee of the ministries headed by the Diyanet since 1981.43 Hajj travel has been exclusively done by air since the first Gulf War of 1990–91. Islamic banking in Turkey dates back to 1985, when Turgut Özal’s government passed legislation for interest-free banking. The first “par- ticipation bank” was Albaraka Türk, established in February 1985, fol- lowed by Faisal Finans two months later. In present day Turkey, there are four banks participating: Albaraka Turk (www.albarakaturk.com.tr/, Saray Mahallesi Dr. Adnan Büyükdeniz Caddesi, No: 634768 Ümraniye/ İSTANBUL, tel.: ++90 2166660101, fax: ++90 2166661600), Bank Asya (www .bankasya.com.tr/Asya Katılım Bankası A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü, Saray Mah. Dr. Adnan Büyükdeniz Cd. No. 10 34768, Ümraniye / İSTANBUL, tel.: ++90 2166335000 Pbx, fax: ++90 2166335050), Türkiye Finans (www.turkiyefinans .com.tr/tr/) and Kuveyt Turk (www.kuveytturk.com.tr/pages/tarihce.aspx). These banks have an umbrella organisation called Union of Participa- tion Banks in Turkey (Türkiye Katılım Bankaları Birliği: www.tkbb.org .tr/, Kısıklı Cd. No: 22 Altunizade Üsküdar / ISTANBUL, Türkiye, 34662; tel.:++90 2166519435 (pbx), fax: ++90 2166519439).44

11 Dress Codes

The wearing of head scarves was banned in universities (1984) and for civil servants in public buildings (1982). The debate on this question revolves around whether the head scarf is religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to pro­tect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly ban- ning the wearing of head scarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the head scarf, while in February 2008, the Parliament passed constitutional

42 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012 Yılı Performans Programı, p.83; see also www .genchacilar.org/sayfalars.asp?pageID=IcerikseDetay&id=206&grup_id=12, accessed 24 February 2003. 43 www.haberx.com/diyanetten_karayolu_ile_hac_aciklamasi(17,n,11117574,890).aspx, accessed 21 February 2013. 44 www.tkbb.org.tr/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=82, accessed 25 Febru- ary 2013. 662 ahmet yildiz amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing head scarves on univer- sity campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.45 In 2011, the ban on the use of photographs with headscarf in the exams held by ÖSYM as well as headscarf wearing in universities was removed by YÖK, and this decision was widely observed.46 Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of reli- gious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of non-Muslim religious communities and the President of the Diyanet are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.47 There is no restriction for photos with hijab either on identity cards48 or in passports.49

12 Publication and Media

There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most widely sold daily news­paper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated to the Gülen com­munity. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni Şafak, Türkiye (the İhlas Group), Milli Gazete (the Felicity Party), Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya (a Nurcu Group) are known to be affiliated to religious groups. There are also ‘Islamist’ col- umnists who write in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies.

45 Şentop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban:A quest for the solution”, SETA Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=7253&q=the-head- scarf-ban-a-quest-for-solutions Mustafa_Sentop.pdf, accessed 6 May 2010. For the relevant legislation, see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of the headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 46 Only in very exceptional instances , there was insistence on the continuation of the ban. See, for example, a news about Ege University of İzmir, “Rektörden ‘Başörtülüler Gire- mez’ Duyurusu,” “From Rector: Hijab wearers cannot Enter,” Zaman, 6 April 2011. 47 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879. 48 www.nvi.gov.tr/Sik_Sorulan_Sorular,Sorular.html, accessed 25 February 2013. 49 www.epasaport.gov.tr/hakkinda/biyometrikfoto.aspx, accessed 25 Februrary 2013. turkey 663

Among the national television channels sensitive to religious concerns,­ Samanyolu (the so-called Hizmet Movement) is among the top five most watched national tele­vision channels. Kanal 7, TGRT Haber (the İhlas Group), Ülke TV, Kanal A (a Naqshabandi group called Muradiye)), TV NET, Mehtap TV (the so-called Hizmet Movement), TV 5 (the Felicity Party), Hilal TV (a group of devotees gathered around Mustafa İslamoğlu), Semer- kand (the Sufi Menzil group) and Dost TV (a Nurcu group) are known to be affiliated to Muslim religious groups. There are, of course, various rep- resentations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (Cihan News Agency, CHA, affiliated with the Hizmet Movement) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İhlas News Agency, İHA, affiliated to İhlas Group) are among the most important news agencies­ in the country. Burç and Dünya FMs (the so-called Hizmet Movement), Radyo 15 (the Sufi Menzil group), Akra FM (a Naqshabandi group called İskenderpaşa), Moral FM (a Nurcu group), TGRT FM (the İhlas group) may be counted as national radio stations with an Islamic orientation.

13 Family Law

The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role sharing within marriage, although the husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. offi- cially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The Civil Code does not recognise religious marriage contracts, and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a reli- gious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permit­ted by law to conduct mar- riage ceremonies in mosques, nor are imams entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early religious marriages still occur. Adul- tery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce cases. According to the civil code, men and women are equal in terms of their entitlement to inheritance. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in litigation. In practice, however, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family. 664 ahmet yildiz

14 Interreligious Relations

The most important interreligious occasion is the attendance of the Presi- dent of Religious Affairs and the religious leaders of non-Muslim minori- ties, i.e., Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews, at iftar dinners during the months of Ramadan. In terms of public opinion, there is strong support for interreligious dialogue on part of both the Diyanet and some Muslim communities, par- ticularly the followers of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. Some neo-Kemalist and nationalist religious groups vehemently oppose the interreligious dialogue discourse on suspicion of underlying missionary activities, imperialism and alleged syncretism.­ Overall, there are few serious problems between communities of different religions. The locus of problems in terms of interreli­gious relations is not between communities but between the state and communities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The heated points of public debate in Turkey have been the compulsory religion courses in primary and secondary education, the status of the Diyanet as a constitutional institution and its composition, the recogni- tion of Cemevis as places of worship, and the wearing of head scarfs in state and semi-public organisations like law offices. These may change over years, however. The religious divide in Turkey represents the dichot- omy of “Kemalists” vs “Islamists.” According to Kemalists, with all their variants, the removal of bans on public appearances of Islam is not a democratic move but manifestation of the hijacking of the state by Islam under the guise of “democratisation.” The so-called “Islamists,” including both traditional Islamic groupings and the Justice and Development Party in government, are insistent on removing the bans on religious education and dress. Although they are receptive to the demands voiced by the Alevi organisations, there is no concrete expression of this yet. The events listed below must be read in this context. The year 2012 witnessed vivid manifestations of Alevi political activism. The Federation of Alevi-Bektashi Associations submitted its proposals regarding the new constitution to the Constitution Reconciliation Com- mittee. These proposals suggested the recognition of Alevi identity, the legalisation of cemevis as places of worship, removing the Diyanet from turkey 665 the Constitution, the acceptance of ‘Ashura a new official holiday, and the abolition of the Law No. 667 on the Closing Down of the Shrines.50 During the year, the Alevi associations were very vocal on the recogni- tion of the status of cemevis as places of worship. A private members bill by Ali Özgündüz, a member of the Parliament from the main opposition party RPP, towards the attainment of this goal was rejected in the Plenary.51 Tunceli Deputy Hüseyin Aygün from RPP applied to the Presidency of the Parliament for the setting up of a cemevi for the worship needs of Alevis within the premises of the National Assembly. The Presidency refused this demand on the ground that cemevis do not have the status of place of worship.52 Mehmet Görmez, the President of the Religious Affairs, in an iftar meeting stated that Diyanet is not a party to discussions regarding Alevis, and that the problems associated with Alevis are not particular to them; on the contrary, these problems are end-products of modernity and hence must be considered within the need for the reconsideration of state-religion relations in Turkey.53 On another occasion, Görmez criti- cised the views that Alevism is not part of Islam by referring to the fact that Alevism is not something new. It has existed for at least one thousand years and relates not only to those living in Dersim but to Bektashis in the Balkans. He stated that Diyanet does not favour the ‘sunnification’ of Alevis on theological ground even if the law permits this.54 A Diyanet initiative to be noted was the appointment of 1,000 madrasa educated religious leaders called mele in Kurdish, meaning mullah, in South East Anatolia and Istanbul on a contractual basis in order to estab- lish better contact with Kurdish speaking people,55 to keep mosques open for at least twelve hours a day, and answering questions posed by the believers by imams during the day were among other developments in

50 www.haber7.com/haber/20120305/Aleviler-anayasa-onerilerini-TBMMye-sundu.php, accessed February 26 2013. 51 www.takvimhaber.com/haber/siyaset/3677-cemevleri-onergesi-kabul-gormedi.html, accessed February 26 2013. 52 www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=217796, accessed February 26 2013. For Alevi demands in this regard, see, for example, “Cafer Solgun: AKP Kutuplaşmayı Derinleştiriyor,” Interview with Cafer Solgun by Neşe Düzel, Taraf, a National Daily, 16 July 2012. 53 www.takvimhaber.com/haber/guncel/8451-diyanetten-alevilik-aciklamasi.html, accessed February 26 2013. 54 www.takvimhaber.com/haber/guncel/8538-alevilerin-evinin-onunde-beklerim.html, accessed February 26 2013. 55 www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/894050-diyanet-1000-mele-atamasi-yapti, accessed February 26 2013. 666 ahmet yildiz religious life.56 The opening of the Diyanet TV (www.diyanettv.gov.tr/) in partnership with the state radio and television institution, TRT, was a breakthrough in religious services to the public. A protocol in this regard was signed between these institutions, and Diyanet TV started broadcast- ing on the frequencies of TRT’s Channel Anatolia.57 Diyanet introduced chaplaincy in hospitals for the terminally ill who volunteered for spiritual therapy. In case of service for members of other beliefs, this service will be provided by the religious leaders of the relevant religion. The project conducted by the Ministry of Family and Social Poli- cies chose the city of Gaziantep as the pilot region.58 The Ministry of National Education signed a protocol with Hayrat Foundation (www.hayratvakfi.org/tr/) in April. The protocol ended the monopoly of Diyanet in the field of the delivery of Qur’an courses and prescribed for the organisation of Qur’an and Ottoman Turkish courses free of charge in 900 centres of popular education throughout Turkey.59

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colour- ful, often military-style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ‘Id al-Fitr creates a special atmo­ sphere throughout the country and book fairs organised by the Diyanet Foundation have become a part of this. The Hajj, occurring at the same time as ‘Id al-Adha, also creates a very particular countrywide religious awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated in the third week of April under the auspices of the Diyanet, the Hacı Bektaş Fes- tival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, particularly marked by Shi’is, may also be cited as important cultural events.

56 www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1288814, accessed February 26 2013. 57 www.haber7.com/medya/haber/878055-diyanet-tv-icin-protokol-imzalandi, accessed February 26 2013. 58 Zaman, a national daily, 11 May 2012. 59 www.takvimhaber.com/haber/siyaset/3707-diyanetin-tekeli-kalkiyor.html, accessed 25 February 2013. For the relevant courses, see these links: www.osmanlicaegitim.com and www.kuranegitimi.com. turkey 667

The Commemorative Ceremony for Mevlana, the great Sufi saint (1207– 1273), held every year in Konya, the ancient Seljuk capital, in the month of December, is one of the world’s greatest spectacles. More than a million people visit the city for this festival of Sema (the ‘Whirling Dervishes’).

UKRAINE

Elmira Muratova1

1 Muslim Populations

The number of Muslims in Ukraine is the subject of a certain amount of speculation. Muslim leaders and other interested parties insist that there are 1.5–2 million Muslims in the country, although the 2001 national cen- sus recorded only 436,000 Muslims by birth (0.9% of the population).2 There are 40 ethnic groups that traditionally practise Islam, the biggest being (248,000), Volga-Ural Tatars (73,000) and Azerbai- janis (45,000). The Crimean Tatars constitute about 57% of all Ukrainian Muslims. They are the only indigenous Muslim people of Ukraine, having settled in the territory of the modern Crimean Autonomous Republic in the early fifteenth century. Today the Crimean Tatars live mostly in the Crimea, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions. The Ukrainian communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars appeared during the industrialisation of the Don- bas area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today they predominantly live in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions. The majority of the Azerbaijanis settled in the eastern regions of the country— Donetsk, Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk.3 The history of Islam in Ukraine is related to the history of the expansion and development of the religion on the Crimean Peninsula. Islam came to Crimea with Muslim traders and Sufi missionaries from Asia Minor in the ninth to eleventh centuries. During the Crimean Khanate (1443–1783) Islam became the state religion. For several centuries Crimea was the centre of Muslim culture in the region, and a huge number of mosques, madrasas, mektebes (elementary schools), and mausoleums were built. By the end

1 Dr. Elmira Muratova is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University, Simferopol, Ukraine. 2 CD “Natsional’nyi sklad naselennya Ukrainy ta yogo movni oznaki za danymi Vseukrains’kogo perepisu naselennya 2001 roku” (CD “National make-up of the Ukrainian population and its language features based on the 2001 All-Ukrainian census”) (Kiev: Derj­ komstat, 2003). 3 Bogomolov, A. et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini (Islamic Identity in Ukraine) (Kiev: AMES Publishers, 2005), pp. 16–23. 670 elmira muratova of the eighteenth century there were about 1,600 mosques, 25 madrasas and a lot of mektebes in Crimea.4 The annexation of Crimea by the Rus- sian Empire in the late eighteenth century was a considerable blow to the independent and consistent development of Islam. The mass emigra- tion of the Crimean Tatars resulted in many villages being abandoned and mosques, madrasas and mektebes closed down. By 1914, there were only 729 mosques left in Crimea and the number of Muslim clergy fell to 942.5 The Soviet regime delivered the final blow to the development of Islam in Crimea. By 1940, there were no active mosques on the peninsula; many were closed on the pretext that they were in a poor condition and turned into clubs, grocery stores, schools, etc. In May 1944, the remaining Muslim population of Crimea (about 200,000 people) were deported from their homeland to the Central Asian republics. The return of Crimean Tatars (about 13 per cent of the Crimean population in 2011) and collapse of the USSR contributed to the current Islamic revival in Crimea.

2 Islam and the State

Ukraine is a secular state where religion is separated from the state. Accord- ing to the relatively liberal law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” (Pro svobodu sovisti ta religiini organizatsii) passed in 1991, a religious community may be registered if it has a minimum membership of ten adults over the age of 18. On the basis of this law, 597 Muslim com- munities had been registered in Ukraine by early 2012.6 The legislation on religion also includes two acts which were issued to help religious organi- sations to repossess property taken from them under the Soviet regime. They are the Presidential Edict “On measures to return religious prop- erty to religious organisations” (Про заходи щодо повернення релігійним

4 Aleksandrov, I., O musul’manskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul’man v Krymu posle ego prisoyedineniya k Rossii (On Muslim clergy and Muslims affairs’ spiritual administration in Crimea after its annexation to Russia) (Simferopol: Tipografiya Tavricheskogo gubernskogo zemstva, 1914), p. 8. 5 Krichinsky, A., Ocherki russkoi politiki na okrainakh: k istorii religioznykh pritesnenii krymskikh tatar (Essays on Russian policy at the margins: towards a history of the religious oppression of the Crimean Tatars) (Baku: Izdanie soyuza musul’manskoi trudovoi intel- ligentsii, 1919), chapter 1, p. 43. 6 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine, 1 January 2012 (Form #1), Department of Religions and Nationalities Affairs, Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/mincult/doccatalog/document?id=278229, accessed 30 January 2013. ukraine 671

організаціям культового майна) issued in 1992 and the second Presi- dential Edict “On urgent measures on the final settlement of the negative consequences of the totalitarian policy of the former USSR toward religion and restoration of violated rights of churches and religious organisations” (Про невідкладні заходи щодо остаточного подолання негативних наслідків тоталітарної політики колишнього Союзу РСР стосовно релігії та відновлення порушених прав церков і релігійних організації) issued in 2002. Under this legislation, Ukrainian Muslims have regained part of their religious property. National religious policy is viewed positively by Muslims, but there is dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities. For example, Crimean Tatar leaders complain that the Crimean authorities have discriminated against Muslim communities, accusing them, among other things, of sabo- taging the above mentioned Presidential Edicts, treating representatives of Orthodox Christianity and Islam unequally with respect to involvement in state and regional events, not giving official recognition to the Muslim festivals of Oraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha).7 Dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities can also be found in other regions of Ukraine. In March 2012 the Muslim community of Niko- laev organised a picket in front of the City Council demanding the return of a building that previously was a mosque. The mayor of the city believes that a mosque in the centre of Nikolaev would cause inconvenience for the school, the hospital and the residential area located nearby. Instead of returning the old building, he proposed giving Muslims a piece of land on the outskirts of the city but local Muslims insist on the return of the historical building.8

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Ukrainian Muslim organisations fall into three categories: spiri- tual boards, charitable organisations and political organisations.

7 Muratova, Elmira, Islam v sovremennom Krymu: indikatory i problemy protsessa vozro- zhdeniya (Islam in Present-day Crimea: Indicators and Problems of the Process of Revival) (Simferopol’: Elinio, 2008), pp. 174–175. 8 “Mukolaivs’ki musulmanu piketuvaly meriyu, vymagayuchi povernuty budyvlyu mecheti” (Muslims in Nikolaev picketed city council demanding return of building of the mosque), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/11404/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 672 elmira muratova

There are six Muslim spiritual boards in Ukraine:

– The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Kryma, DUMK, 4, Kurchatova St, Simferopol, Crimea, tel./ fax: ++380 652274353, http://www.qirimmuftiyat.org.ua) was estab- lished in 1992 in Simferopol. It is one of the biggest Muslim spiritual centres in Ukraine. By January 2012, it included 353 officially registered Muslim communities (59% of the total number in Ukraine) and is often called the “Crimean Tatar Muftiate.” – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy, DUMU, 46, Luk’yanovskaya St, Kiev, 04071, tel.: ++380 444651877, http://www.islamyat.org) was registered in 1992 in Kiev. It includes 115 Muslim communities of various ethnic back- grounds registered in different regions of Ukraine. Since its inception, it has had only one leader—a native Lebanese and now a Ukrainian citizen sheikh Akhmed Tamim, who has a background in the Ahbash movement.9 – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Ukrainy, DTMU, 1, Prospekt Marshala Zhukova, Donetsk, 83071, tel./fax: ++380 622521815) was created in 1995 in Donetsk. It coordinates the activities of 26 Muslim communities established mostly by Volga-Ural Tatars who live chiefly in the Donbas area. – The Religious Board of Independent Muslim Communities of Ukraine “Kiev Muftiate” (Religioznoye Upravleniye Nezavisimykh Musul’manskikh Obshin Ukrainy “Kievskiy Muftiat”, RUNMOU, 10-A, Nevskaya St, Tatar- skiy Dom, Kiev 03062, tel./fax: ++380 445013778, http://kievmuftiyat. wordpress.com) was registered in 2007 in Kiev. It unites 28 registered and 16 non-registered Muslim communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars who did not want to join any of the existing spiritual boards and has strong connections with Russian Muslim leaders. – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma” (Dukhovnoye Uprav- leniye Musul’man Ukrainy “Umma”, DUMU, 25-A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev, 04119, tel.: ++380 444909900, www.umma.in.ua) was established in 2008 in Kiev. It now includes 19 Muslim communities of multi-ethnic origin (many of them native Ukrainian or Russian converts to Islam). – The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Kryma, DTMK, apt. 39, 60 Let Oktyabrya St. 20, Simferopol, 95000, tel.:

9 See http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum/9652, accessed 30 January 2013. ukraine 673

++380 501314601, http://dcmk.org) was created in December 2010 in Simferopol. It unites Muslim communities of the Crimean Tatars who disagree with the position of the DUMK. Ideologically it is close to the leadership of the DUMU.

Among the charitable organisations, one of the most active is the All- Ukrainian Association of Public Organisations “Alraid” (25–A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev 04119, tel.: ++380 444909900, www.arraid.org). It was established in 1997 and has 20 member organisations in various regions of Ukraine. Ideologically, it gravitates towards the European Council for Fatwas and Research (ECFR). The organisation contributes to the development of Islamic education and mosque construction, and initiates charitable projects to help the poor, orphans and widows. “Alraid” cooperates closely with Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma”. An active political organisation is the Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://qirim- vilayeti.org). Although it is not officially registered, its followers (mostly Crimean Tatars) organise conferences (there have been eight all-Crimean and twelve regional conferences during the last five years), political actions (meetings in support of people of Syria, against the film “Innocence of Muslims” and alleged persecution of Muslims in Russia) and control some Crimean mosques. It represents the so-called ‘Islamic opposition’ to the national Crimean Tatar Mejlis and DUMK.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

As of early 2012, there were 95 new mosques in Ukraine (87 of them in Crimea) and 10 mosques under construction. Sixty-six old mosques have been rebuilt, renovated and returned to use (56 of them in Crimea). There are another 246 buildings throughout Ukraine in use as Muslim prayer spaces.10 Some positive changes regarding the situation with mosques took place in Crimea in 2012. Three new mosques were built: in the Simferopol prison #102, in the village Veresaevo in the Saki region and in the village of Zele- nogorskoe in the Belogorsk region. Construction of three other mosques

10 Report on providing of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine religious buildings and apartments adjusted for prayer on the 1 January 2012 (Form #2), Department of Religions and Nationalities Affairs, Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, http://mincult.kmu .gov.ua/mincult/doccatalog/document?id=278230, accessed 30 January 2013. 674 elmira muratova was started and the construction of a complex for ritual services at the Muslim cemetery “Abdal” in Simferopol was completed.11 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that his country will cover all expenses related to the construction of the central mosque in Simferopol for which the City Council allocated land after more than eight years of delay.12

5 Children’s Education

The school system in Ukraine is separated from the church so religious subjects used not to be taught in schools. However, several years ago the Orthodox Church introduced a course on “The basics of Orthodox culture” to be taught on an optional basis in Ukrainian schools. This initiative met with opposition from Crimean Muslims who did not want their children to take this course at school, and the Crimean Tatar organisations designed a programme of the course on “The basics of Muslim culture”, which is now taught in schools where the language of instruction is Crimean Tatar. There are 127 Qur’an or Sunday schools in Ukraine where basic Arabic and the fundamentals of Islam are offered to anyone wishing to attend.13

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are seven Muslim secondary-level educational institutions in Ukraine which provide imam and hafiz training with currently approxi- mately 230 students.14 The biggest madrasa in Crimea, “Kalai”, founded in the village of Azovskoye by the private foundation Aziz Makhmud Hyudai, has been functioning since 1998. It runs a three-year course that is free for students, and has separate departments for men and women. Subjects taught include the Qur’an, the fundamentals of worship, Islamic ethics, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic law, Sufism, Turkish and

11 “Muftiat podvel itogi 2012 goda” (Muftiate worked out the totals of 2012), http://qha .com.ua/muftiyat-krima-podvel-itogi-2012-goda-121684.html, accessed 30 January 2012. 12 “Tursiya vydelila sredstva na stroitel’stvo Buyuk Juma-Jami” (Turkey distinguished money on building of Central mosque), qha.com.ua/tursiya-videlila-sredstva-na-stroitelstvo- buyuk-djumadjami-foto-video-119692.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 13 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine, 1 January 2012 (Form #1), accessed 30 January 2013. 14 Ibid. ukraine 675

Arabic. On graduation, students normally receive a diploma that quali- fies them as imams.15 There are also two hafiz schools in Crimea which concentrate on teaching students to memorise the whole Qur’an. One has functioned since 2002 with the support of Alraid and the other since 2008 with the help of Aziz Makhmud Hyudai. There were two other institutions in Crimea that previously functioned as madrasas (“Seit-Settar” and the Higher Islamic madrasa) but were later downgraded to ‘Sunday schools’. The madrasa in Kiev was established by the RUNMOU “Kiev muftiate” with the support of Russian Muslims. In 2010 DUMK opened a new madrasa in Saki (Crimea). It has a single male department designed for 20 boys. There is one Islamic university in Ukraine, founded in Kiev in 1994 by DUMU. It has a Department of Shari’a and the Basics of Religion and a Department of Education and Eastern Linguistics. The programme is based on materials provided by the Association of Islamic Charitable Proj- ects (www.aicp.org).16 Eighty-two students were studying there in 2012. After graduation students get diplomas as imams and teachers of Islam and usually work in Muslim communities and centres under the jurisdic- tion of DUMU.17

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims in Ukraine face certain problems regarding cemeteries. There are no major difficulties where there are significant Muslim populations, as in Crimea, but in other places the situation is quite sensitive. In the major cities, such as Kiev or Kharkov, it is quite difficult for commercial reasons to acquire land for use as a cemetery, so Muslims often have to bury their dead in public cemeteries without sections set aside for Muslims. In 2012, there were several acts of vandalism (desecration of graves) at Muslim cemeteries in Crimea.

15 Muratova, Elmira, “‘He who pays the piper calls the tune’: Muslim sponsors of Islamic revival in Crimea”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 37, no. 3 (2009), p. 268. 16 Bogomolov et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini, pp. 80–81. 17 Islamskiy universitet pri Duhovnom upravlenii musul’man Ukrainy (Islamic University under the Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board), www.islamyat.org/religioznoe-obrazovanie/ islamskiyi-universitet.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 676 elmira muratova

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams or priests in state institutions—hospitals, prisons or armed forces. However, imams on their own initiative visit Muslims in prisons to lecture on Islamic topics. For example, such activity is carried out on a regular basis in Simferopol. For several years during Ramadan Islamic leaders of DUMU ‘Umma’ and Alraid have been organising meet- ings with prisoners to support them by giving religious books, food and other presents. For instance, a meeting of this kind was held in August 2011 in Jitomir prison.18 Imams in Crimea are usually present during the swearing in ceremony of army recruits where they address the Muslim recruits.

9 Religious Festivals

Oraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha) are celebrated communally at Islamic centres and privately. They do not have official sta- tus like some Orthodox festivals. Muslims, however, insist that the state should adopt a neutral position towards the major religions in Ukraine. In 1993, the Council of Ministries of Crimea took a decision to declare the first day of Muslim festivals a holiday for Muslims. This gave Mus- lims the right to a day off work or school, while the rest of the Crimean population has to follow their regular schedule. At the initiative of the Crimean Tatars on 20 October 2010 the deputies of the Crimean parlia- ment requested the President of Ukraine and the speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament to introduce amendments to the Labour law in order to give Muslim festivals a regional status in the Peninsula19 but the decision has not been taken yet. Ukrainian Muslims also celebrate Mawlid—the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. In 2012 the celebrations were organised in Crimea (by Alraid and the DUMK), in Donbas area (by Alraid and the DUMU “Umma”).

18 “Islams’ki lidery provely zustrich iz musul’manamy Jitomirs’koi vypravnoi kolonii # 4” (Islamic leaders conducted meeting with Muslims of prison # 4), http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/ full_news/10018/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 19 Seitkhalilov Y. Neobkhodimo zakrepit’ v zakone sovmestnoe prazdnovanie khristian- skikh i musul’manskikh prazdnikov (The joint celebration of Christian and Muslim festivals should be fixed in the law), www.qha.com.ua/haber.php?id=80598, accessed 30 January 2013. ukraine 677

During the last six years Alraid and the DUMU “Umma” organised religious caravans in the cities of Eastern Ukraine during which they pre- sented lectures about life and personality of the Prophet Muhammad.20 In 2012, 165 pilgrims (among them 35 women) participated in hajj.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food is not available at public institutions in Ukraine but the halal industry is well developed in areas with significant Muslim populations— in Crimea, Kiev, Kharkov, and Donetsk. There are places in the markets, special shops and cafés where Muslims can buy halal products. For exam- ple, there are about ten fashionable cafés and restaurants in Crimea that serve Crimean Tatar cuisine compliant with Islamic norms. The situation is different in Western Ukraine, where the number of Muslims is rather small. The Muslim spiritual organisations intend to regulate the halal industry.21 In 2008 the Credit union La riba (“Zero percent”) was created in Simfer- opol by Crimean Tatar banker Yunus Ablyamitov. The organisation works as an Islamic bank using individual shares in business. By 2012 it had more than 300 clients, the majority of whom are small businessmen.22

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public, includ- ing in educational establishments. But while opportunities are ample for other professions, (education, medicine, etc.) not many businesses in Ukraine are prepared to hire a woman in hijab.23 It is quite common to see women wearing hijab in the streets of Crimea, especially among the younger generation Crimean Tatars. However, the Ministry of Internal

20 “V Donbasi zavershilsya 6 sezon religiino-presvitnitskogo karavanu ‘Milost’ dlya mirov’” (The religious caravan ‘Favour for the worlds’ was closed in Donbas), http://islam.in.ua/3/ ukr/full_news/9043/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 21 www.trademaster.com.ua/134/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1152&cHash=3881a786a9, http:// islam.com.ua/news/6248/, accessed on 30 January 2013. 22 The credits under Shari’a laws started to be given out in Crimea, http://islam.in.ua/3/ rus/full_news/9368/visibletype/1/index.html, accessed 30 January 2013. 23 Muslim women navigate cultural, religious divides with beliefs intact, www.kyivpost .com/news/guide/general/detail/78131/#ixzz0wllDWasx, accessed 30 January 2013. 678 elmira muratova

Affairs has issued an instruction that hijab may not be worn for photo- graphs used for passports. This was strongly opposed by Crimean Muslims and, at the end of 2009, they started to collect signatures on a petition to challenge the instruction through the courts. There were several court hearings of the case brought by Crimean Muslims against the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine in 2010. The last one took place in June 2010 and ended with the Ministry of Interior’s instruction being upheld.

12 Publication and Media

Four of the spiritual boards in Ukraine have their own periodicals. The DUMK publishes a newspaper, Hidaet (Straight path), the DUMU the newspaper Minaret, RUNMOU “Kievskiy Muftiyat” issues a journal Ukraina i Islamskiy mir (Ukraine and Islamic World), and the DUMU “Umma” publishes the newspaper Umma (http://ummainua.wordpress. com/2009/05/28/gazeta1). The “Alraid” Association issues the newspaper Alraid (http://gazeta.arraid.org) and runs a number of websites. Hizb ut- Tahrir publishes the newspaper Vozrodzdenie (Revival, http://vozrojdenie. crimea.ua) and has a website. Every Friday, representatives of the DUMK participate in a television programmes Mir Islama (The world of Islam) and Ezan Sedasy (The voice of azan) in which they talk about the basic tenets of Islam and current issues in Crimean society. Another religious programme called Klyuch schast’ya (The key of happiness) was started on Crimean TV-channel ATR in 2012. In 2012 the DUMK started to publish the journal Istochnik mudrosti (The source of wisdom) that contains materi- als in Russian and Crimean Tatar. It also published several books, among them Osnovy islamskikh znaniy (The basics of Islamic knowledge), 250 khadisov o normakh zhizni musul’manina (250 Hadiths on the Muslims’ way of life). Alraid translated and published book Muhammad—chelovek i prorok (Muhammad—person and prophet) written by Adil Salih. The DUMU publishing house “Al-Irshad” has published several dozen books on various topics, many of them devoted to the prevention of extremism. In 2012 a translation of the Qur’an into Ukrainian was done by Myhailo Yakubovych. It was made in accordance with requirements of the King Fahd Complex for the printing of the Holy Qur’an (Medina). ukraine 679

13 Family Law

As well as civil marriage, Ukrainian Muslims contract Islamic marriages, nikah, which may be conducted in a mosque or in the home by an imam, who after the ceremony issues a certificate. These certificates are not rec- ognised by the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

The leaders of Muslim spiritual centres are members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations created in 1996 in Kiev. This is a representative interfaith consultative body which initiates meet- ings with high-ranking officials to discuss various issues of religious life in Ukraine. For example, a current issue is the question of improving the existing Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations. In 1992, an interfaith council called “Peace is a gift of God” (Mir—dar Bozhii) was created in Crimea. The DUMK was a member of this council until 2000, when a conflict arose between the Muslim and the Orthodox com- munities (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) over the massive project for erecting crosses in Crimea. In May 2011 there was a new conflict around cross erecting in Feodosia region of Crimea. A cross was erected along the roadway without the permission of the local authorities and provoked a protest of the local Muslim community. After the intervention of representatives of the regional authorities the cross was moved. Several Crimean mosques became an object of vandalism in the latter half of 2010, with a couple of mosques being set alight and two others sub- jected to vandalism. In 2012 grave stones were destroyed at two Muslim sacred places (Aziz) in Bakhchisarai and Belogorsk regions of Crimea. In December 2012 the caravan at the future construction site of the central mosque in Simferopol was shot at by unknown people. There was Mus- lim indignation when Christian ceremonies were held with Crimean Tatar children in a kindergarten in Staryi Krym and a school in Simferopol.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Coverage of Islam in the non-Muslim media is mostly within the context of extremism and terrorism associated with Muslims at the international 680 elmira muratova level. It often happens during election campaigns in Crimea that politi- cians use the ‘Islamic card’ in order to mobilise the pro-Russian electorate by appealing to anti-Tatar or anti-Islamic feelings. During the presidential campaign in 2010 the issue of Islamic radicalism was raised several times by representatives of several Cossack organisations warning against vari- ous networks of ‘radicals’.24 On the other hand, parliamentary elections in 2012 were not accompanied by any noticeable anti-Islamic hysteria.

16 Major Cultural Events

There are annual competitions in Qur’an recitation organised by Alraid and DUMK. In 2012 two Crimean Tatars represented Ukraine at the com- petitions in Qur’an recitation in Egypt and Tajikistan. In 2012, for the first time in Ukraine, Alraid organised an azan (call to prayer) recitation competition. There is also a competition of researches dedicated to Islam organised by the Ukrainian centre of Islamic studies with the support of Alraid. This institution also supported the organisation of three women’s seminars and round tables on the role of women in Muslim society and a summer school for orphans.

24 Netraditsionnyi islam v Krymu: kak voznikayut ‘goryachie tochki’ (Non-traditional Islam in Crimea: how ‘hot spots’ appear), www.novoross.info/5444–netradicionnyj-islam- v-krymu-kak-voznikayut-goryachie-tochki.html; Ne vashimi molitvami: Krym—ne Porta (Not your prayers: Crimea—not Porta), www.novoross.info/5809-ne-vashimi-molitvami- krym-ne-porta.html, accessed 30 January 2013. UNITED KINGDOM

Dilwar Hussain1 and Seán McLoughlin2

1 Muslim Populations

Islam is the second largest religious grouping in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). The census of 2011 revealed an overall figure of 2.7 million Muslims (4.8%) in England and Wales (this figure obviously excluding Northern Ireland3 and Scotland). The data for the Scottish Muslim population will be released by the end of 2013, but the 2001 census figure was 42,557. The isolated figure for Muslims in Wales was 45,950 in 2011. The largest Muslim population was in London with just over 1 million residing within the Greater London area and forming 12% of the population there. In one borough of London, Tower Hamlets, the Muslim figure (34.5%) was larger than the Christian figure (27.1%). Perhaps somewhat high, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) sugges- tions in 2011 that 80 % of Muslims are ‘practising’ their religion also gave rise to reflections on how soon such numbers are likely to outnumber those of church-going Christians (Telegraph, 27 January 2011). There are now estimated to be 100,000 converts to Islam in Britain too (Independent, 4 January 2011). The 2011 Census showed an increase in most of the minor- ity faiths, as well as a significant increase in those declaring ‘no religion’ (now 25.1%). Historical contacts between the British Isles and the Muslim world date as far back as the 8th Century, shown by artefacts such as coins attrib- uted to King Offa of Mercia (d. 796) that bear Arabic inscriptions. Most Muslims now living in the UK are the British-born descendants of immi- grants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. According to the 2011 census

1 Dilwar Hussain is an Associate of the Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge. 2 Dr Seán McLoughlin is Senior Lecturer in Theology and Religious Studies at the Uni- versity of Leeds. The authors are grateful to Dr Victoria Montgomery (see Ireland) for the information relating to Northern Ireland. 3 Belfast Islamic Centre’s annual report (2009–10) estimates 8–10,000 Muslims living in Northern Ireland: www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/NR/images/doct/BIC%20Annual%20 Report_2009-2010%20%282%29%20%283%29.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. 682 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin

Pakistani heritage Muslims form 43.2%, Bangladeshi heritage Muslims form 16.5% and Indian heritage Muslims form 8.3% of the overall British Muslim population. Historically, the first significant numbers of Muslims to arrive in the UK were mainly Kashmiri and Bengali ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors) who jumped ship or were stranded in London and other ports having been employed by the British East India Company from the late eighteenth century.4 The Indians were later followed by Yemeni sailors, employed after 1869 in Aden; initially they settled in ports such as Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some eventually moving on to major industrial cities.5 The end of World War II saw significant migra- tion to the UK from its former colonies, including those regions of the newly partitioned Indian subcontinent from which chain migration had been established by the lascars, as well as Indian soldiers who had fought in World Wars I and II. As a result, thousands of Muslim men of mainly peasant farming background took up unskilled work in British factories and mills from the 1950s. Today Pakistanis, with numbers more than one million strong, form the dominant ethno-national sub-population of Muslims in Britain as mentioned above, with the majority hailing from the disputed territory of Kashmir. Other smaller groups come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya, Uganda and beyond), Cyprus and across the Middle East. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia and Iraq. Many Muslim communities, especially those of Bangladeshi and Kashmiri origin, have low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited educational success and relatively high unemployment amongst men and low participation in the labour mar- ket amongst women.6 Prison populations of Muslims are also dispropor- tionately high with the figure reaching 12.5% in 2011.7 East African Asians tend to be more socially mobile, and London, where 38.9% of all Mus- lims in Britain are settled, is host to a high number of often very wealthy Arabs. Outside London, Birmingham has the highest total numbers of Muslims (234,411 representing 21.8%), but it is northern towns such as

4 Ansari, Humayun, The Infidel Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004). 5 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992). 6 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655. 7 Berman, Gavin, Prison Population Statistics (London: House of Commons Library, 2012). united kingdom 683

Blackburn (27%) and Bradford (24.7%), as well as other towns in the south such as Luton (24.6%) and Slough (23.3%) that have the most sig- nificant concentrations. Most Muslim migrants of the 1950s and 1960s entered the UK with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth of Britain’s for- mer colonies. These Commonwealth citizens had full political rights and could thus vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire UK citizen- ship (Britain allows multiple citizenship), and children born in the UK acquire citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in Britain are UK citizens; the exceptions are those who have arrived as refu- gees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. There are currently eight Members of Parliament (MPs) of Muslim backgrounds (six Labour, two Conservative) and eleven members of the House of Lords.

2 Islam and the State

There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the UK: each constituent country has its own arrangements.8 Although there is no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, and most recently the Human Rights Act (1998), guarantees freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head of the Church of England (Anglican) and, through the Prime Minister’s Office, appoints its bishops, some of whom are ex officio mem- bers of the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. Each of the other main traditional churches of England, both various Protestant denominations and Roman Catholics, as well as Jews, has a particular status established by legislation. Other smaller and more recently arrived religious communities, including Muslims, tend to register as private asso- ciations, or ‘companies’ under the Companies Act, or ‘charities’ with the Charities Commission. Many remain as unincorporated organisations, which the law allows if the income is below a particular threshold or if the objects of the group are not charitable. A new legal status of Charitable

8 Weller, Paul, Time for a Change: Reconfiguring Religion, State and Society (London: T & T Clark, 2005). 684 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin

Incorporated Organisation (CIO) was introduced in December 2012 to combine the benefits of being a company and a charity. Until the last decade or so, the official UK response to migrant com- munities has not been formulated in terms of religion.9 The Race Rela- tions Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 were designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin but the courts did not interpret this to include religion (although Jews and Sikhs, based on case law, were protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). During the 1980s, policy-making under the rubric of multiculturalism eventually offered greater, if ad hoc, local rec- ognition for Muslims in arenas such as education, especially where there was a large community. In 1992, under a Conservative administration, the Department of Environment, in collaboration with the Church of Eng- land and the Interfaith Network for the UK (IFNUK), formed the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC) as the first government forum for multi- faith representation on a national level and with a view to tapping into religious communities’ resources as a part of urban regeneration.10 From 1997 onwards, the New Labour government engaged ‘faith’ much more publicly and controversially.11 An Act of 2006 finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’. Following the events of ‘7/7’ (the terrorist attacks on London of 7 July 2005), state relations with Mus- lims have been conducted almost entirely in terms of counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) including a ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE, Prevent) strand, which from 2007 saw £80m of public money spent on 1000 projects in demographically significant local areas (BBC News Online, 7 June 2011).12 The Prevent strategy is shared between different govern- ment departments, though led by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) based in the Home Office. In early 2009 a revised Contest strategy was introduced and in July 2009 a cross-party Select Committee began an inquiry into the Department for Communities and Local Government’s (CLG) Prevent work. The findings were published on 16 March 2010. Speaking about the report at a press briefing, the Chair of the Committee, Dr Starkey, suggested that the Prevent programme is

9 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edin- burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 10 McLoughlin, Seán “The state, new Muslim leaderships and Islam as a resource for engagement in Britain”, in Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 55–69. 11 McLoughlin, Ibid. 12 Cf. also Lewis, Philip, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum, 2007) which discusses the response of various Muslim organisations to the issues raised by ‘7/7’. united kingdom 685 backfiring in local communities. She said that, “Much of the positive work undertaken by CLG—to promote better community cohesion and to curb social exclusion—has been tainted by association with the counter- terrorism agenda. Any decision to widen the Prevent programme would only make this problem worse.” The report also added that the “current overall approach to Prevent is contentious and unlikely ever to be fully accepted in its existing form by those it is most important to engage.”13 In November 2010, under a new Coalition Government, the Home Sec- retary announced another review of the entire Prevent strategy, stating Prevent “isn’t working as well as it could be” and it needed to be “effective and focused.” The review was independently overseen by Lord Carlile of Berriew. In his report to the Home Secretary (released alongside the new strategy), Lord Carlile mentions: “. . . at the root of this Prevent strategy is the basic assertion that extremism breeds terrorism; and that extremism is the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, includ- ing democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”14 The review stressed the need to distinguish integration strategy from PVE, to build trust and avoid any perception of spying on Muslim communities; it also promised that there would be stricter monitoring of organisations with whom it was appropri- ate to co-operate in tackling radicalisation, given that some ‘extremists’ seemed to have been supported in the past.15 However, comment sug- gested that a less discriminating approach to ‘extremism’ failed to make important distinctions between different groups and orientations to Islam (Guardian, 9 June 2011). In another policy area relating to Muslims, an ‘All Party Parliamentary Group’ looking into Islamophobia16 was convened in 2010 and has been gathering evidence. The ‘Tell MAMA’ (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks)17 project was established in 2012, with government funding, in order to ascertain and record the level of anti-Muslim attacks and to gather a case histories. Conservative Chairman, Sayeeda Warsi, publicly criticised the

13 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism. Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010). p. 3. 14 HM Government, Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy (London: HM Government, 2011). 15 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy, accessed 18 May 2012. 16 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/islamophobia.htm. 17 http://tellmamauk.org/. 686 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin fact that Islamophobia has passed ‘the dinner table test,’ meaning that it has become socially acceptable in middle-class Britain (Guardian, 20 January 2011).18 However, soon after that speech, Prime Minister, David Cameron, affirmed the view that the biggest threat to the UK remained al-Qaeda related ‘Islamist extremism’. While he was careful to distinguish this ideology from ‘Islam’, he advocated a ‘muscular liberalism’ based on universal rights, equality and integration, reiterating earlier political comment throughout the 2000s that the ‘hands off tolerance’ of state multiculturalism had failed to communicate a strong vision of the nation to diasporic Muslim youth. This sentiment was taken further in a 2012 document that articulates the coalition government’s approach to ‘Integration’.19 However, tensions between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ in the coalition government were revealed when Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, refused to rule out engagement with non-violent ‘extremists’— ‘you don’t win a fight by leaving the ring’—at the same time recognising multiculturalism as ‘a laudable goal’ (Guardian, 4 March 2011). The last few years has seen a decline in government funding across the board with the economy in crisis. The coalition government has favoured more selective and centralised forms of grant funding moving to support the creation of a ‘Big Society’20 amongst the mainstream voluntary sector and a grant called ‘Near Neighbours,’21 managed by the Church Urban Fund, amongst the faith sector specifically, as well continuation of (more limited) Prevent funding to local authorities to tackle extremism.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The largest Muslim umbrella organisation is the Muslim Council of Britain which claims 500 affiliated organisations (MCB, PO Box 57330, London E1 2WJ, tel.: ++44 8452626786, www.mcb.org.uk). Founded in 1997, the year that New Labour came to power, it quickly established itself as the first Muslim port of call for a government keen to link faith and social action.22

18 See Allen, Chris, Islamophobia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) and , Salman and Vakil, Abdoolkarim, Thinking Through Islamophobia (London: Hurst, 2011). 19 Department for Communities and Local Government, Creating the Conditions for Integration (London: CLG, 2012). See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/7504/2092103.pdf. 20 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/big-society-faqs-and-useful-links. 21 www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours. 22 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. united kingdom 687

Closely associated with the MCB, in 2007, Scottish Muslims announced an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (MCS, 27 Arlington Street, Glasgow, G3 6DT, tel.: ++44 7999333850, www.mcscotland.org). There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff CF24 1PU, tel.: ++44 2920487667, www.muslim- councilwales.org.uk/index.html), while the main organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ireland is the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC, 38 Wel- lington Park, Belfast, BT9 6DN, tel.: ++44 2890664465, www.belfastislamic centre.org.uk/NR), established in 1978. A major Twelver Shi’i group with roots in Iraq, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, Lon- don, NW6 6TN, tel.: ++44 2073724049, http://al-khoei.org) represents Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas. The MCB fell out of favour with the New Labour government, how- ever, when it failed to back the so-called ‘war on terror’. Indeed, an MCB affiliate, also founded in 1997, largely by Muslims of Arab heritage with historic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, 124 Harrowdene Road, Wembley, Middlesex HA0 2JR, tel.: ++44 2089089109, www.mabonline.net) became an important member of the Stop the War Coalition.23 After ‘7/7’ especially, relations between the MCB and New Labour deteriorated significantly with the media and think-tanks of the left and right exposing the ‘Islamist’ (Jama’at-i-Islami) heritage of some MCB activists and affiliates and criticising its decision to refuse attendance of the national Holocaust Memorial Day.24 The MCB received at least some public funds until early 2010 (Telegraph, 16 April 2011). Nevertheless, unconvinced that the MCB ‘moderates’ could effectively challenge radicalisation and violent extremism, from 2005 onwards the government sought with public money to broaden the range of Muslim organisations it engaged, most especially traditionalist Sunnis and Sufis.25 The British Muslim Forum (Eaton Hall, Retford, Nottinghamshire, DN22 0PR, tel.: ++44 1777706441) claims to embody the largest number of Sunni (especially Pakistani Barelwi) related networks, with 500 member

23 It campaigned against UK involvement in the war in Iraq, having a central role in the RESPECT coalition, a Muslim-Leftist political alliance. See Phillips, Richard “Standing together: the Muslim Association of Britain and the anti-war Movement”, Race & Class, vol. 50, no. 2 (2008), pp. 101–113. 24 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4582736.stm. 25 McLoughlin, Seán “From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain” in Axel Kreienbrink and Mark Bodenstein (eds.) Muslim Organisations and the State—European Perspectives, (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010), pp. 123–149. 688 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin mosques/organisations and particular strongholds in the English North and Midlands. Launched in 2005, it benefitted from PVE funds to build up capacity, representing a belated attempt to respond to numerically less significant but hitherto better-organised and higher profile Jama’at-i Islami and Deobandi related rivals working on a national level through the MCB. Historically, Barelwi networks have been oriented to South Asia rather than Britain and highly fragmented in terms of allegiances to vari- ous Sufi sheikhs and ‘ulama (religious scholars). Similarly, the Sufi Muslim Council (2a Wanlip Road, Plaistow London E13 8Q, tel.: ++44 2070555355, http://sufimuslim.homestead.com), was also launched with government support in 2006, but despite claims to better represent the majority of peaceful Muslims, it became effectively defunct when questions were asked about its use of PVE funds.26 One of its founders, Haras Rafiq, went on to form the ‘counter-extremism’ body, Centri.27 However, despite being prepared to periodically adopt positions openly criticising so-called ‘Islamist’, ‘Salafi’ and ‘Wahhabi’ influenced organisations, the BMF and SMC have been generally inactive and / or beset by factionalism, with one respected insider describing the Barelwis of the UK as ‘beleaguered and dysfunctional’.28 A Sunni/Sufi movement that has established a growing public profile and reputation in recent years is Minhaj ul-Quran (http:// minhajuk.org/minhajuk). In recent years, the Muslim counter-attack (at times state-backed) on Islamism in its apparently ‘moderate’ as well as more ‘radical’ guises has been most clearly manifest in the career of the Quilliam Foundation (QF, PO Box 60380, London. WC1A 9AZ, tel.: ++44 2071827280, www.quilliam- foundation.org). Launched in 2008, it was established by former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, www.hizb.org.uk/),29 though taking its name from English solicitor and convert to Islam, Henry (Abdullah) Quilliam (d.1932), as a symbol of integrated British-Muslimness.30 Having received £2.7 million

26 www.iengage.org.uk/component/content/article/758-lord-ahmed-queries- government-funding-of-the-sufi-muslim-council-, accessed 27 May 2012. 27 http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2011/02/haras-rafiq-at-long-last- we-have-a-prime-minister-who-rightly-makes-the-distinction-between-islam-an.html, accessed 18 May 2012. 28 www.musharrafhussain.com/wp.../5.-Maulana-Shahid-Raza-OBE.pdf, accessed 25 May 2012. 29 On HT in the UK, see, for example, Hamid, Sadek “Islamic political radicalism in Britain: the case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir”, in Tahir Abbas (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism: a European perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 30 See Geaves, Ron, Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam, (Markfield, Leicestershire: Kube Publishing, 2010) who notes how much Quilliam was actu- ally engaged in global Muslim politics of the day. united kingdom 689 of government funding,31 at its height the QF employed 18 members of staff and has published a number of high profile reports critical of Brit- ish Muslim organisations, institutions and movements. However, while retaining influence in some political circles, Quilliam became a contro- versial body and in 2011 it was refused £150,000 of government money to continue its ‘counter-extremism’ work as it sought to make the transition to private funding.32 In 2010 Ed Hussain, co-founder of Quilliam left the UK and the QF to join the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Having been first proposed in 2006 following the recommendations of the PVE working groups in 2005, the Mosques and Imams National Advi- sory Board (MINAB, 20–22 Creffield Road, Ealing, London, W5 3RP, tel.: ++44 2089937141, www.minab.org.uk) was finally launched in 2009. As a self-regulatory collaboration between organisations representing many key Muslim constituencies (MCB, MAB, BMF and al-Khoei), it claims to be an independent, community-led, non-sectarian body to promote good governance and improve service standards in mosques.33 However, in relying upon PVE funding to develop itself, as well as endorsing the Pre- vent review in 2011,34 accusations of DCLG interference were made.35 As with the BMF and SMC, MINAB seems to have made little headway thus far with its declared objectives. The Muslim Institute, originally established in the 1970s, has experienced a revival and a renewed agenda since December 2009. Establishing a new legal structure, the group’s focus is on becoming “a network dedicated to pluralistic thought, creativity, excellence and high achievement.”36 The network has managed to attract a diverse range of voices around its more cerebral agenda and produces a regular journal, Critical Muslim, edited by the popular writer and cultural critic, Ziauddin Sardar. Other impor- tant organisations operating on the national level include a plethora of relief organisations that have fast become the best resourced of all Muslim organisations in the UK, the largest, Islamic Relief, raising over £56 million

31 htttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110315/halltext/ 110315h0001.htm#11031559000001. 32 www.quilliamfoundation.org/component/content/article/61-press-releases/778- press-release-quilliam-praised-in-parliament-as-government-cuts-funding-.html, accessed 27 May 2012. 33 http://minab.lmnocouk.netdna-cdn.com/images/stories/Documents/MINAB- Constitution-Standards-012011.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. 34 www.minab.org.uk/news/press-releases/168-press-statement-minab-ready-to- support-integration-and-prevent-strategy, accessed 27 May 2012. 35 http://blogs.salaam.co.uk/article.php?story=20110204152800585, accessed 27 May 2012. 36 www.musliminstitute.org/about-us/overview. 690 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin pounds in the UK for the year 2011–201237 even though about 40% of Mus- lim charities, according to a 2007 estimate by the Charity Commission of England and Wales, had an income of less than ten thousand pounds.38

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first officially designated mosque in the UK was founded after Henry Quilliam, who had converted to Islam during travels in Morocco, returned to Liverpool in 1887, while the first purpose-built mosque was established during 1889 in Woking, Surrey, by Hungarian Orientalist, Dr Gottlieb Leitner.39 However, as post-war immigration began to impact in the early 1960s, there were only a dozen or so mosques listed with the Registrar General, most being conversions of existing buildings including terraced housing. More recently, most mosques have been purpose-built. In 2009 there were 870 were officially registered in England and Wales,40 although several hundred may not have full planning permission, and other estimates suggest that the total number of mosques and Islamic centres in Britain is as high as 2000.41 While formal religiosity has increased amongst Muslims in diaspora, the growth of increasingly multi-functional mosques from the 1970s and 1980s onwards accompanied the reuniting of families, which in turn raised issues concerning the transmission of Islam.42 Over the years, mosque building has also aroused opposition in wider society. Significant campaigns to stop the building of new mosques have been seen in a number of towns and cities, often led by Right Wing groups such as the English Defence League or the British National Party.43

37 www.islamic-relief.com/NewsRoom/6-2-464-islamic-relief-ranks-in-top-80-of-uk- charities.aspx. 38 www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/about_us/faithmus.pdf. 39 Gilliat-Ray, Sophie Muslims in Britain: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2010) p. 184. 40 www.brin.ac.uk/figures/#NumberMosques, accessed 18 May 2012. 41 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birming- ham, UK”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1161–1179. 42 McLoughlin, Sean, “Mosques and the public space: Conflict and co-operation in Bradford”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1045–1066. 43 http://conciliocic.org/news/22-who-you-gonna-call-mosque-busting-with-gavin- boby-by-h-s-lane. united kingdom 691

5 Children’s Education

Until 1870, the churches dominated educational provision in the UK. Despite the clear secularisation of schooling, the place of religion has continued to be recognised in key Education Acts (for example, 1944, 1988 and 1996).44 Religious Education (RE) is compulsory, as is a daily act of collective worship, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents. Since the 1970s, RE syllabi, which have a locally agreed element, have had a more multi-faith emphasis and included content on Islam. In 1988, however, there was a restatement of the expectation that RE and col- lective worship should reflect the nation’s Christian character. Teachers of the subject are professionally trained (and at secondary level subject specialists); they do not require the approval of religious authorities or need to belong to any particular religion. Over the years, most state schools, which still teach the vast majority of Muslim pupils, have sought to accommodate the needs of ethnic and religious minorities. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local authorities have generally been flexible. More contentious, but usually resolved, are issues around appropriate dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Mus- lim groups have opposed such teaching), halal meat and religious holidays. Around one-quarter of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England (4598) and the Roman Catholic Church (2010), with much smaller numbers of other schools.45 Since 1998, six Muslim primary and five Muslim secondary schools have been admitted to this ‘main- tained’ sector in England. A number of Islamic schools have applied to become ‘free schools’ (on the Swedish model backed by the Conservative party), although so far only two have been approved. A small percentage of Muslim children attend Islamic independent schools—the Association of Muslim Schools (http://www.ams-uk.org/, established in the 1990s) cur- rently lists 172 UK Muslim schools in total on its website. Outside the state and independent sectors, Muslim children receive Islamic education during the late afternoon or weekend in community based supplementary schools, usually at local mosques or associated ‘madrasas’. Learning to read (if not comprehend) the Qur’an in Arabic, and

44 Halstead, Mark, British Muslims and Education (Budapest and New York: Open Soci- ety Institute, 2005). 45 www.education.gov.uk/aboutdfe/foi/disclosuresaboutschools/a0065446/ maintained-faith-schools, accessed 18 May 2012. 692 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin instruction in the basic beliefs and practices of the faith, have both been a feature of the institutionalisation of Islam in Britain for many decades. However, Muslims and non-Muslims alike have questioned the impact of such further studies on learning at school, as well as traditional pedagogi- cal methods and discipline. Some Muslim parents have sought alterna- tive arrangements for their children, including weekend provision with a broader based Islamic Studies provision in English that is also attentive to contemporary pedagogy, while many mosques have begun to employ teachers keen to develop new approaches. Reforming such institutions has also increasingly become a concern of local authorities required to address child welfare and protection issues. Against the context of greater public scrutiny of institutions hitherto hidden from the public gaze, the Institute of Public Policy Research, a ‘pro- gressive’ think-tank, surveyed 179 madrasas and conducted interviews and workshops with teachers, pupils and parents in a bid to shed more light on an estimated 2000 institutions said to be teaching 250,000 children.46 The report, Inside Madrassas, reported that 26% had over 140 pupils attending each week, while 38% had an income of less than £10,000 a year, 90% of this coming from parents; 70% had been operating for six years or longer. It concluded that while madrasas are valued and have potential, teaching standards are poor and the curricula narrow, something the government should seek to address through greater regulation.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since ‘7/7’, and particularly since it emerged that Umar Farouk Abdul- muttalab, who attempted the 2009 ‘Christmas Day bombing’ on a flight headed to the US, had been a student at the University of London, there has been much focus on ‘radicalisation’ and politicisation of Muslims at university level. Home Secretary, Theresa May, criticised universities, as well as the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS, http://fosis. org.uk/), for their alleged complacency in addressing campus radicalisa- tion; both denied this, questioning whether Higher Education is indeed a significant trigger (Guardian, 6 June 2011). A more general window on the experiences of British Muslims at UK uni- versities is provided in a study of 5,523 Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage

46 www.ippr.org/publications/55/8301/inside-madrassas-understanding-and-engaging- with-british-muslim-faith-supplementary-schools, accessed 25 May 2012. united kingdom 693 students of Business Studies based on data from the National Student Survey, 2008–10: ‘British Muslim students get comparatively low A-Level grades, overwhelmingly enter post-1992 universities (former polytechnics), live at the parental home during term-time, and are decreasingly satisfied with the quality of the higher education which they receive.”47 Islamic Studies is offered at a large number of universities, usually in the context of departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies or Reli- gious Studies, with positions sometimes funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and beyond. As well as traditional Western and Islamic scholarship, some universities now also offer Islamic studies com- ponents in conjunction with the professional training of teachers and youth workers. The Higher Education Funding Council for England desig- nated Islamic Studies a strategically important subject following a review of all aspects of ‘Islam at Universities in England’ in 2007.48 Involving the Muslims in Britain Research Network (http://www.mbrn.org.uk/), as well as the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (http://www.brismes .ac.uk/) amongst others, the resulting Islamic Studies Network has enabled new conversations about the nature of Islamic Studies as a scholarly project and the extent to which it engages issues concerning, or the needs of, Muslims in Britain. There is no imam training as such at publicly-funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses leading to the status of imam, while some prospective imams also complete a degree at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Most of these private colleges are established on the (dar al-‘ulum) model of the Indian .49 Other courses are offered by the Muslim College in London and, since 2009, the Cambridge Muslim College. The Islamic Foun- dation (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), a research and training organisa- tion in Leicester,50 founded the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (www.mihe.org.uk) in 2000 which offers postgraduate degrees and certifi- cates in Islamic Studies, Muslim Community Studies and Islamic Banking and Finance Management. In 2012 it also introduced an undergraduate

47 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/british-muslim-students-experience-of-higher- education/, accessed 18 May 2012. 48 See www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/kes/sis/islamicstudies/ for details, including a link to Dr A. Siddiqui’s report, accessed 27 May 2012. 49 See Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994/2002) and Gilliat-Ray, Sophie, “Educating the ‘ulama: Centres of Islamic religious training in Britain”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006), pp. 55–76. 50 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. 694 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin programme aimed in large part at graduates from Muslim educational institutions.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Although there is still a significant movement of the remains of the dead of migrant origins back to their homelands for burial, most British cit- ies and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslims although these are rapidly filling up. Perhaps this in part explains the emergence of dedicated Muslim burial sites such as MCB affiliate, the Gardens of Peace Muslim Cemetery Trust in Essex. Despite tensions with government in other regards, since 2001 a representative of the MCB is the only Muslim to sit on the Ministry of Justice’s Burial and Cemeteries advisory group. Leicester is home to the Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire (http:// www.mbcol.org.uk/, established 1994), one example of a local body which negotiates with local authorities to provide for Muslim needs. As well as a widespread expectation that the burial take place within 24 hours of death, such organisations have also sought to clarify Islamic requirements that the deceased be ritually washed by members of the family or com- munity (many mosques now have such facilities) and laid in the ground facing Mecca, as well as buried without a coffin. Yet beyond established areas of settlement, public recognition for Muslims still meets with mixed reactions, stories of localised contesta- tion increasingly picked up by the national press to amplify a generalised discourse concerning Muslims’ ever increasing demands and the creeping ‘Islamification’ of British life. As public markers of a minority presence, graves and cemeteries sometimes also come under physical attack by van- dals and those with more racist and politicised motivations.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

In the UK there are Muslim chaplains, male and female, employed full- time or part-time in Higher Education Institutions, the National Health Service and other public services, as well as the Prison Service, Police, Armed Forces and industry. On-going research at Cardiff University51

51 www.cardiff.ac.uk/share/research/centres/csi/research/muslimchaplaincyproject/ index.html, accessed 18 May 2012. Gilliat-Ray, Sophie. 2010 ‘Bodyworks and Fieldwork: research with British Muslim chaplains’, Culture and Religion 11 (4): 413–432. united kingdom 695 reports that many chaplains are Darul Uloom graduates and denomina- tional, others more ecumenical. The Prison Services UK now employs 233 full-time and part-time imams or chaplains in English and Welsh prisons and while they are required by the state to take a more active role in com- bating terrorism, the religious nature of their role can also raise suspicions in the workplace. As mentioned earlier, the prison population of Muslims is disproportionately high. In 2011 it was reported that ‘The percentage of Muslim prisoners has almost doubled since 2000, partly reflecting the nat- ural growth of Muslims in society at large, and partly the concentration of criminals among young and economically disadvantaged people, who are disproportionately Muslim. That figure has continued to rise. 59% of Muslim prisoners were aged 15–29 compared with 47% of all prisoners’.52 Prison chaplains have an extensive network of support and mentoring, most especially in terms of the Muslim Chaplain’s Association (www.mca- hmps.co.uk/). There is also an Association of Muslim Chaplains in Educa- tion (www.amced.org.uk/). Markfield Institute of Higher Education runs a Certificate in the Training of Muslim Chaplains.

9 Religious Festivals

Some 18,000–25,000 Muslims travel from Britain for the Hajj in Mecca every year, while the pattern of life in Muslim neighbourhoods is trans- formed during Ramadan (about two months before the time of Hajj). Trips for Umrah (the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca) are also held throughout the year. Annual ‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr celebrations are held throughout the UK, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the signifi- cant number of people attending and some mosques will hold repeat cer- emonies for the ‘Id prayers. In recent years, there have been celebrations of ‘Id al-Fitr in Trafalgar Square dubbed ‘Eid in the Square.’ Amongst Sunni Barelwi and Sufi communities especially, ‘Id Mawlid al-Nabi is also celebrated with public processions, speeches, recitations of the Qur’an, poetry (na’at) and song (nashid) in praise of the Prophet Muhammad on the anniversary of his birth as well as the celebration of ‘Saints days’ (urs) marking the life of various saints from Sufi traditions. Shi’i Muslims in particular commemorate the death of the Prophet’s

52 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/religion-of-prisoners-england-and-wales-2010/, accessed 18 May 2012. 696 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin grandson, Hussain, on the day of Ashura (10 Muharram), although some of the more physical aspects of matam (ritualised mourning) have come under close public scrutiny. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals as part of their statutory holiday entitlement. However, given divergent sources of religious authority at homes and overseas, there has long been a tendency for different denominations to hold celebrations such as ‘Id al-Fitr on dif- ferent days. Some cities have attempted to co-ordinate religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general.

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have campaigned against exemp- tion from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and other lobbies. As the UK prepared to implement a new EU regulation on the protection of animals at the time of killing, from 2013, a number of meetings with Muslim and Jewish organisations have taken place recently.53 However, there are no plans to make religious slaughter illegal. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109, Fulham Palace Road, London, W6 8JA, www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk), which has roots in the now largely defunct Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (www.muslimparliament .org.uk/), was established to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the UK. The HFA lists approved and delisted members. The HFA allows for animals to be stunned before slaughter, a process which can be carried out mechanically. Indeed, according to the RSPCA, around 75–90% of halal meat in the UK is pre-stunned.54 Elsewhere it is suggested that 25% of cattle and 7% of sheep are slaughtered without prior stunning.55 Indeed, the Islamic legitimacy of stunning is disputed by the Leicester- based Halal Monitoring Committee (HMC, established 2003, www.halalmc .co.uk), which maintains that for meat to be halal animals should be fully conscious at the time of slaughter, with no machinery involved. This is

53 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01314.pdf, accessed 27 May 2012. 54 www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?blobcol=urlblob&blobheader=application/pdf& blobkey=id&blobtable=RSPCABlob&blobwhere=1109267162636&ssbinary=true, accessed 27 May 2012. 55 www.dialrel.eu/images/factsheet-assesment-practices.pdf, accessed 18 May 2012. united kingdom 697 allowed in the UK but can only take place in a slaughterhouse. In 2003, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) had agreed guidelines for Halal slaugh- ter with Muslim leaders and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), but to date there is no unified seal of assurance for Halal food. For some non-Muslims, including secular and Sikh groups, there is a concern that not all of this meat is being marked as produced using halal slaughter methods, despite its very wide use by commercial outlets and public institutions.56 However, ‘there is no legislative requirement for products to be labelled as Halal . . . [indeed] there are practical difficulties in establishing traceability to identity method of slaughter to the point of consumption.’57 There are a variety of businesses catering for a growing ‘Muslim market’ domestically as well as trying to attract sales from abroad. Perhaps the most widespread of these relate to the food and finance industries. Esti- mates suggest that ‘about 40% of poultry and 25–30% of lamb consumed in the UK meets halal specification.’58 Despite the lack of a single agreed standard, halal food outlets are now quite easily available in most of the larger towns and cities in the UK. The Islamic finance sector has experi- enced some growth over the last decade. The UK is currently the largest Western hub for Islamic finance initia- tives, with an estimated $19bn of assets.59 London has actively marketed itself as an important location and Western gateway for Islamic invest- ment, considering the growing interest in Islamic Finance and the market globally. This has also gained support from Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain.60 The key target is to attract inward investment from the Muslim world, particularly the Gulf countries as well as Malaysia and Indonesia, but a small market also exists domestically. This has attracted cross party political support and in 2003 initiatives were undertaken to create a more compatible regulatory framework for Islamic finance, including the removal of double taxation (stamp duty), and the

56 www.sikhsangat.com/index.php?/topic/58824-halal-food-authority/, accessed 27 May 2012. 57 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01314, accessed 18 May 2012. 58 www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2010/09/23/123611/Meat-industry-defends-halal-slaughter- policy.htm, accessed 27 May 2012. 59 McKenzie, Duncan, Islamic Finance. Financial Markets Series, London: TheCityUK, 2012. 60 www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/MCBBriefingLondonandIslamicFinance.pdf. 698 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin extension of tax relief on Islamic mortgages.61 Bonds (sukuk), funds and insurance (takaful) services are also emerging. In 2012, 37 sukuk prod- ucts (with an estimated value of $20bn) were listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). According to 2011 data, seven exchange trade funds and two exchange trade products were also listed on the LSE.62 An annual international takaful summit has taken place in the UK since 2007 in order to raise market awareness of Islamic insurance services and the 2013 World Forum is scheduled to take place in London, the first venue outside the Muslim world. There are five ‘Shari’a compliant’ banks and an estimated 17 conven- tional banks that have set up windows in the UK to provide Islamic finan- cial services. The Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) is the only Islamic bank with a high street presence. It has five branches and caters for around 50,000 customers.63 To service the Islamic finance sector around 25 major law firms provide legal services in Islamic finance and management con- sultancy firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte have established Islamic finance teams in London providing to offer advice. Courses in Islamic finance and banking are offered by at least ten universities and business schools, as well as private institutions such as the Markfield Institute for Higher Education.

11 Dress Codes

Across the UK, it has long been common to see Muslim women wear- ing the dupatta (South Asian style scarf/head covering) and hijab (head- scarf), while the niqab (face veil), jilbab (long and loose garments, coat) and other forms of modest dress have become a more familiar sight in the last decade. Many young, headscarf-wearing Muslim women ‘are working modesty in relation to mainstream fashion trends, not through wearing so-called ethnic or traditional clothing . . . [they] expect to express every aspect of themselves through participation in consumer culture’ (cf. www .hijabstyle.co.uk; www.hijabshigh.com; ‘some showcase fashions that only show the face, hands and feet’) (Guardian, 16 June 2011).

61 www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1658&Itemi d=93. 62 McKenzie, Duncan op cit. 63 Ibid. united kingdom 699

There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in UK pub- lic institutions, and questions of uniform in schools are a matter for indi- vidual school managers (see section 5 above). Schools, local authorities and employers have been successfully sued for imposing dress codes that directly or indirectly discriminate in terms of race and ethnicity. However, in 2006 the House of Lords upheld a decision that a schoolgirl in Luton who wished to wear a jilbab could not do so as it was not part of the agreed uniform.64 Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women. That face-covering marks a significant boundary in attitudes to Muslim women’s dress codes in the UK was illustrated by a 2011 YouGov online poll of 2,258 British adults. It found that two-thirds would ban the burka even though the Home Secretary had said that the UK government had no intention of following France which banned wearing it, the niqab and other face-veils in public.65 The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2010, published in 2011 also revealed that 69% of all respondents (and 83% of over-55s) felt that a bank, for instance, should be able to insist that a female Muslim employee remove a (face) veil, but only 23% said the same of a headscarf, 24% of a and 15% a crucifix.66

12 Publications and Media

There were UK-based Muslim periodicals in the early twentieth century but it was only after the consolidation of significant post-war immigra- tion in the 1970s that a number of titles such as Arabia, Afkar, Impact International, the Jang and the Crescent established themselves.67 In the 1980s both Saudi Arabia and Iran sponsored English-language magazines that were published out of London. However, the longest running Muslim newspaper in circulation is The Muslim News (established, 1989; PO Box 380, Harrow, Middlesex HA2 6LL, www.muslimnews.co.uk). The Muslim Weekly is a more recent newspaper published from east London. For many years another significant player was Q-News magazine (established 1992,

64 R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School, House of Lords 2006, UKHL 15: www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/15.html, accessed 27 May 2012. 65 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/burka-britain/, accessed 26 May 2012. 66 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/scottish-social-attitudes-discrimination-module, accessed 18 May 2012. 67 www.britishcouncil.org/scotland-enews-june-2006-british-muslims-book-mailing .pdf, accessed May 2012. 700 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin ceased publication in 2006 but with some back issues accessible online at www.q-news.com). A more recent title is emel Magazine (established 2003; Canfield Place, London, NW6 3BT, www.emelmagazine.com), which originally had its roots in the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB, www.isb.org .uk/) and focuses on Islamically inspired culture and lifestyle for Muslim professionals. In recent years Muslim speakers, including Shaykh Abdul Hakim Murad and Professor Mona Siddiqui, have also begun to contribute regularly to mainstream broadcast media such as BBC Radio Four’s ‘Thought for the Day’ programme. There are about 29 local community radio stations authorised by the Radio Authority that serve a Muslim audience, particu- larly during Ramadan.68 The first of these was set up in Bradford during the early 1990s. In terms of mainstream television, for probably the first time in the UK, Channel 4’s Shariah TV (2004) presented a panel of Muslim experts debat- ing Islamic practice with an audience of young Muslims. More recently, Muslims have also appeared on Channel 4’s 4thought.tv slot following the evening news (http://www.4thought.tv/tags/Muslim) and regularly guest on BBC1’s Sunday morning show, The Big Questions. Over the last decade the number of Islamic satellite television channels broadcasting in the UK via Sky has also grown. The Islam Channel (established 2004), for instance, is said to be ‘watched regularly by three in every five British Muslims.’69 In 2011 it was reported that following his banning from a UK preaching tour in 2010, Indian scholar, , could lose the broadcasting licence for Peace TV (established 2007) (Daily Star, 12 February 2011) this did not transpire, but a ban on Zakir Naik remains in place. Other specifically ‘Islamic’ labelled channels include Noor TV (established 2006), Ummah Channel (established 2009) and Takbeer TV (established 2010) and two Shi‘i channels, Hidayat and Ahlulbayt, (both established 2009). Iran’s Eng- lish language platform, Press TV, includes a regular show hosted by Tariq Ramadan. A number of other channels are either broadcast from abroad (such as Aljazeera) or are domestic ethnic focused channels such as Bangla TV and these may intersect with a domestic Muslim audience. Online activity is very prolific (though hard to measure precisely), including streaming audio and video services. Conventional sites such

68 www.ramadan.co.uk/radio-ramadan.php, accessed 26 May 2012. 69 www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/islamchannelreport.pdf, accessed 27 May 2012. united kingdom 701 as YouTube are frequently used by many activists, preachers and social commentators to self-broadcast messages digitally. ‘Diary of a Badman’ a satirical series by HumzaProductions had over 45 million views from 2009–2012,70 mainly popular among youngsters. Blogs, Facebook mes- sages and Tweets have also taken up some of the space previously occu- pied by more conventional printed methods of communication among Muslim activists.

13 Family Law

Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, or else register the building for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the UK. However, apparently, significant numbers of Muslim marriages (nikah) in the UK take place outside this official framework. In partnership with MINAB the Ministry of Justice is seeking to raise awareness with imams concerning the implications of this should a relationship fail, or a part- ner die e.g. in terms of inheritance tax relief, widows’ pensions, property rights, custody of children and passports. While since 2008 the Muslim Institute has made a model nikah contract available (http://muslimmar- riagecontract.org/) outlining key rights and responsibilities especially in terms of gender equality, it is still not well known or used in Muslim com- munities (Guardian, 12 October 2011). The persistence of Muslim religious and cultural marriage practices in a non-Muslim state, most especially in respect of polygamy, divorce and disputes involving children, also creates a number of potential conflicts with the English legal system.71 One response has been the establishment of licensed Muslim arbitration tribunals in London, Bradford, Manchester,

70 www.youtube.com/user/HumzaProductions?feature=watch. 71 See, for example, Poulter, Sebastian Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Menski, Werner, “Muslim law in Britain”, in M. Koga, M. Naito and T. Hamaguchi (eds.), From Migrant to Citizen: South Asian Communities Overseas (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2000), pp. 294–318. 702 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin

Birmingham and Nuneaton (under the 1996 Arbitration Act, see http:// www.matribunal.com/), all of which seek to provide Islamic solutions that both parties consent to within the requirements of English law. Indeed, law firms have begun offering advice from specialists in Muslim family law alongside civil law. However, there is a concern that such tribunals cannot be guaranteed to protect women’s rights,72 and how they relate to the operation of a number of Shari’a councils in the UK (see also Islamic Sharia Council, www.islamic-sharia.org/ and Muslim Law (Shariah) Coun- cil, www.shariahcouncil.org/). In 2011 Baroness Cox, backed by an alliance of Christians, secularists and women’s groups such as the Muslim Wom- en’s Network UK (www.mwnuk.co.uk), proposed a Private Members’ Bill in the House of Lords which would outlaw any court conflicting with the British legal system: ‘some tribunals applying Sharia are going well beyond their legal remit, and some rulings are being misinterpreted as having the force of UK law’ (Independent, 20 June 2011; Telegraph, 7 August 2011). The Bill passed the second reading of the House of Lords in late 201273 and is currently awaiting further debate.

14 Interreligious Relations

A key focus for inter-religious activity in Britain has been the Interfaith Network of the UK (IFNUK, www.interfaith.org.uk). Founded in 1987, it now has links to interfaith fora in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the English regions and localities. In collaboration with the DCLG, and following the publication of Face to Face and Side by Side— a Framework for Partnership in our Multi Faith Society (2008), Interfaith Week (www.interfaithweek.org/) was first held in 2009 in England and Wales, though a similar event had run in Scotland since 2004 (www.scottish interfaithcouncil.org) around St. Andrew’s day (30 November). In 2011, 407 events were in England, Wales and Northern Ireland held from 20–26

72 N.B. secular activism in this regard in terms of the One Law for All campaign (www .onelawforall.org/) and the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (www.ex-muslim.org.uk/). See also, Bano, Samia ‘Cultural translations and Legal Conflict: Muslim women and the Shari’a Councils in Britain’ in (eds) A. Hellum, S. Ali and A. Griffiths, Transnational Law and Trans- national Relations, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 73 http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/arbitrationandmediationservicese qualityhl.html. united kingdom 703

November, mainly led by local organisations with a focus on dialogue but also celebration, education and social action.74 A 2011 survey for Premier Christian Media undertaken by online inter- view with 529 church-going Christians aged 18 and over, revealed that 46% saw secularism as the ‘greater threat’ to Christianity, the figures for Islam being only 13%, though 30% viewed both as an equal concern.75 Muslim individuals are involved at all levels of inter-religious activity, but member organisations of the national body of the IFNUK include the BMF, MCB and MINAB, as well as the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jamiat-e- Ulama Britain, World Islamic Mission and the Islamic Foundation. The last named of these established an Interfaith Unit in 1977, both to pursue faith-based dialogue in a secular society but also to monitor post-colonial Christian missionary activity world-wide. A representative of the Islamic Foundation, Dr Manazir Ahsan MBE, is Co-Chair of the IFNUK, while other Muslims sit on the executive committee. Muslims also participate in more bi-lateral inter-religious activities, especially across the Abrahamic traditions, for example, through the Christian Muslim Forum (www.christianmuslimforum.org) and other organisations such as the Three Faiths Forum (www.threefaithsforum.org. uk). Local groups have proliferated in the UK since 2001 and many large cities now have a local interfaith gathering or a ‘faith leaders’ forum. Due to traditional hesitation in state funding of faith activities, many of these forums have remained quite small and self-funded. Since the 1997 Labour Government there were some changes in the approach to funding as faith groups and networks became increasingly viewed as helpful in the pro- vision of social and community services. As mentioned above, the Near Neighbours fund has created a specific grant scheme for nurturing very local interfaith activities. The fund currently uses four Christian centres for ‘Presence and Engagement’76 and is limited to a number of localities in the UK.77 Initiatives aimed at ‘scriptural reasoning’ have emerged over the last decade. Interfaith marriage, particularly Christian-Muslim marriage, has emerged has a point of discussion and in 2012 a set of ‘Ethical Guidelines for Inter-Faith Marriages’ was launched by the Christian-Muslim Forum

74 www.interfaithweek.org/images/stories/pdfs/IF_Week_2011_210x210.pdf, accessed 26 May 2012. 75 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/perceived-threats-to-christianity/, accessed 18 May 2012. 76 www.presenceandengagement.org.uk/. 77 www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours/grants/places. 704 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin and other partners78 during the national Inter-Faith Week. Academic cen- tres for interfaith study and engagement include the Derby Multi-faith Centre,79 the Cambridge Interfaith Programme80 based at the University’s Faculty of Divinity and which has a special emphasis on ‘scriptural rea- soning,’ and the Woolf Institute’s Centre for the Study of Jewish-Muslim Relations,81 also based in Cambridge. There are also initiatives in other locations such as the St Philips Centre and the Markfield Institute for Higher Education.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

A ‘9/11—ten years on’ survey of 1,947 adult Britons by YouGov revealed that 51% viewed Islam per se—as opposed to any ‘extremist’ ideology—as threatening to liberal democracy, rising to 65% of Conservatives and 60% of the over-60s; only 13% thought that Islam posed no threat at all and 63% acknowledged that, ‘while the great majority of British Muslims were peaceful and law-abiding, there was a dangerous minority who exhibited disloyalty and sympathy for terrorism.’82 Interestingly, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, (where 1,000 adults aged 18 and over were interviewed by telephone) reported that 64% of Britons held a favourable opinion of Muslims.83 22% of Britons regarded Muslims unfavourably, much higher than the figures for Chris- tians (6%) or Jews (7%). 52% in Britain saw ‘most Muslims as wanting to remain distinct from mainstream society, rising to 59% for those without degree-level education. Just 28% thought Muslims wanted to adopt Brit- ish customs . . . 70% in Britain were concerned about this.’ According to a ComRes poll of 1,004 adults aged 18 and over undertaken by telephone survey for the Ahmadiyya movement, 25% of adult Britons ‘blame Muslims for the existence of Islamophobia in the UK.’ The media were most likely to be blamed (29%), rising to 40% among those aged 18–24 (against 18% of over-65s). Asked whether the Qur’an justified the

78 www.mcmarriage.org.uk/. 79 www.derby.ac.uk/virtual-tours/multi-faith-centre. 80 www.interfaith.cam.ac.uk/en/sr. 81 www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/cmjr/. 82 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/911-ten-years-on/, accessed 18 May 2012. 83 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/muslim-western-tensions-british-experiences, accessed 18 May 2012. united kingdom 705 use of violence against non-Muslims, only 14% agreed that it did, with 65% disagreeing and 21% uncertain.84 Analysis of the British Crime Survey (BCS) 2007–10 by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), drawing on the experiences of 137,907 adults aged 16 plus, revealed that the number of people ‘experienc- ing crime in the previous twelve months and attributing it to a religious motivation was highest for Muslims (8%), almost twenty times more than for Christians . . . albeit lower than the 15% of Asians identifying their expe- rience of crime as caused by ethnic prejudice.’85 However, the 2008/9 BCS also ‘showed that Muslims were more likely than the general population to give their local police a rating of excellent or good. This was true of all Muslim gender and age groups, separately considered. Although young Muslims (aged 16–34) of both sexes were less likely to give this rating than the over-34s, 59% against 66%, this was still 6% more than for young adults generally.’86 In joint polling by YouGov and the University of Cambridge87 in 2012 41% of participants felt that ‘peaceful coexistence is possible,’ and 43% felt there is a ‘fundamental conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds.’ Cases of anti-Muslim prejudice are now being recorded by a number of research and community projects. A 2010 report from the European Mus- lim Research Centre argued that “between 40% and 60% of the mosques, Islamic centres and Muslim organisations in the UK have suffered at least one attack that has or could have been reported to police as a hate crime since 9/11.”88 The report continues to say, “An estimate of between 100 and 200 hate crimes a year against mosques, Islamic institutions and Muslim organisations since 9/11 is not unreasonable and probably highly conservative.” The ‘tell MAMA’ project mentioned above has argued that a significant number of cases of attacks are linked with increasing Far Right support in the UK. Work by Hope Not Hate, an anti-racist campaign group in the UK, also reinforces this notion. In a 2012 report they men- tion the emergence of a transatlantic ‘Counter-Jihad’ movement bring- ing together a “broad alliance of people and ideas embracing sections of

84 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/britons-islamophobia-and-the-quran/, accessed 18 May 2012. 85 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/crime-and-religion/, accessed 19 May 2012. 86 www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/british-muslims-and-the-police/, accessed 18 May 2012. 87 YouGov-Cambridge (September 2012), www.yougov.polis.cam.ac.uk/. 88 Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2011), Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies 2010. European Muslim Research Centre and University of Exeter. (p. 106). 706 dilwar hussain and seán mcloughlin neo-Conservatives, Christian evangelicals, hard-line racists, football hooli- gans, nationalists, right wing populists and some former leftists.”89

16 Major Cultural Events

During the 1990s, and more recently in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011, the ISB has organised ‘Living Islam’, a summer camp and festival for families involving lectures, activities and halal entertainment in general.90 There were various partners at the recent event, including the whose staff gathered many ‘Hajj Stories’ for its 2012 exhibition.91 ISB once again also organised Islamic Awareness Week (established 1994) across England and Wales on the theme of ‘love.’92 Other cultural events and festivals, aside from the religious festival mentioned above, include the annual Muslim News Awards93 and a range of local and national arts and cultural events and exhibitions for example the Mica Gallery94 and the exhibitions of Mohamed Ali, a graffiti artist and founder of ‘Aerosol Arabic’.95 The Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS) organised an ‘Artistic Jihad’96 competition to nurture and showcase emerging Islamic art in the UK. There are also emerging performances and shows by theatre groups such Khayaal97 and Arakan Creative.98 The 2012 Olym- pics were also marked by many Muslim groups with special events linking Ramadan, the Olympics and Islamic cultural life, for example the Rama- dan Festival.99

89 www.hopenothate.org.uk/counter-jihad/. 90 www.livingislam.org.uk/, accessed 19 May 2012. 91 www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/past_exhibitions/2012/hajj/hajj_stories.aspx, accessed 20 May 2012. 92 http://iaw.org.uk/pages/page.php?id=past. 93 www.muslimnews.co.uk/awards/. 94 www.micahome.co.uk/. 95 www.aerosolarabic.com/. 96 http://artisticjihad.com/. 97 www.khayaal.co.uk/. 98 www.arakancreative.co.uk/. 99 www.ramadanfestival.org/.