Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005

ISSN 16488024

General Jonas Þemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy

Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER

LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2005

Vilnius 2006 Editorial Board Raimundas Lopata, Jûratë Novagrockienë, Gediminas Vitkus

Reviewers for sections:

Global International System and Lithuania, Changing European Security Space, and Security Issues in Lithuania. Prof., habil. dr. Algimantas Prazauskas, Professor of the School of Political Science and Diplomacy with the Kaunas Vytautas Magnus University Laimonas TalatKelpa, Director of the Foreign Policy Analysis and Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Lithuania

Reviewers for section Lithuanias Eastern Neighbours Doc. dr., Graþina Miniotaitë, Professor of the Political Science Department with the Lithuanian Military Academy Doc. dr., Lauras Bielinis, Associate Professor of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science with the University of Vilnius.

Managing Editor: Gediminas Vitkus Make-up editor: Amy Elizabeth Jurkauskas

Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2006.

The main objective of this publication is to provide the readers with a wide-scale analysis and generalization of the changes, essential and significant, for the national security of Lithuania at internationalsystemic, regional and national levels. The book also aims to give maximum emphasis to the specificity of Lithuanian national security issues and comprehensively presenting them to a widely interested and concerned audience.

© Authors of the articles, 2006 © Lithuanian Military Academy, 2006 CONTENTS Preface ...... 5 Global International System and Lithuania ...... 7 The Transatlantic Rift: Ideological Roots and Implications for Central and Eastern Europe Algirdas Degutis ...... 9 Empires, the World Order and Small States Raimundas Lopata, Nortautas Statkus ...... 27 Changing European Security Space ...... 53 Lithuanian-German Relations in the Context of Global Geopolitical Challenges at the Beginning of 21st Century Egidijus Motieka, Laurynas Kasèiûnas ...... 55 In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland Tomas Janeliûnas, Kristina Baubinaitë ...... 75 Debate in Lithuania on EU Expansion to East: the Case of Turkey Egdûnas Raèius ...... 93 Lithuanias Eastern Neighbours ...... 107 The Role of History in the Relationship between Lithuania and Russia Èeslovas Laurinavièius ...... 109 Economic Ties between Lithuania and Russia: National and Group Interests on the Global Background as Viewed in the Light of Positive Economics Dalia Ðiukðtienë ...... 127 Ukraine: the Orange Revolution and its Aftermath Vladas Sirutavièius ...... 145 National Security Issues in Lithuania...... 167 Lithuanian Deterrence Strategy Vaidotas Urbelis ...... 169 The Solution to the Problem of the KGB Reserve and/or National Security Interests Arvydas Anuauskas ...... 195

5 Preface

Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005 is already the fourth publication of the Strategic Research Center, functioning under the basis of a joined agreement between the Lithuanian Military Academy and the Institute of Inter- national Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University. As in the previous editions of 2002, 2003 and 2004, it presents an overall coverage of the changes essential and significant for the national security of Lithuania at international- systematic, regional and national levels. And on this basis of this, Lithuanian foreign and security policy is better projected and evaluated. It is no doubt that the academic nature of the publication, printed only once a year, makes it impossible to effectively react to all political actualities. Yet contained within this volume the readers of the Review will find a more comprehensive and deeper analysis of processes that have been developing throughout 2005. The analysis is based on a sufficiently defined standpoint to treat concrete problems in compliance with the position of Lithuania in international and regional space. This publication discusses actual and sensitive problems, with reference to Lithuanian foreign and security policy, as a state of transatlantic relations. It also goes into depth about empire-debates in the US and around the world, the projection of the relations of Lithuania with both Germany and Poland, along with discussions related to the further enlargement of the EU. The researchers have also intently looked at the processes under way in the post-soviet space in Russia and Ukraine. Two of the studies are devoted to the actualities of relations between Lithuania and Russia. The part of the Review devoted to national security problems discusses the study on the defendability of Lithuania, the last-year KGB reserve scandal in Lithuania, which has now been placed in a wider historical context and its repercussions for present-day society. Every year, in projecting the contents of the new Review, the Strategic Research Center demonstrates fruitful cooperation between two academic institutions. The Strategic Research Center seeks to expand as much as possible the circle of its partners and grant researchers working in other institutions, who are concerned with similar problems, the possibility to express their views. The- refore, in this volume, the reader will find publications by the authors who represent not only the Lithuanian Military Academy or the Institute of Interna- tional Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, but also the Lithua- nian Institute of Culture, Art and Philosophy, the Lithuanian History Institute, the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Center, and the Public Estab- lishment Strategic Studies Center. We would like to point out that the latter institution, though having a similar name with the publisher of this publication, is in fact an independent institution that has been functioning since 2004. This institution is more oriented towards applied activity and seeks to supply direct recommendations to the highest governance institutions, enterprises and organizations of the Lithuanian State. We wish that our readers will take the time to get acquainted with new studies on the actualities of Lithuanian foreign and security policy. We would also like to point out to our readers that this and the previous volumes of the Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review are always available on the Internet web site of the Lithuanian Military Academy - http://www.lka.lt .

Editorial Board Global International System and Lithuania

9 Algirdas Degutis* Lithuanian Institute of Culture, Philosophy and Art

The Transatlantic Rift: Ideological Roots and Implications for Central and Eastern Europe**

The recent transatlantic row is not merely about ways of dealing with specific issues of international concern such as the war in Iraq. The rise of anti-American sentiments in Europe seems to imply that there is a deeper rift in the transatlantic alliance. There are several explanations of this phenomenon. They are not mutually exclusive, since they can be subsumed under a more general explanation pointing to two different ideologies, those of individualism and collectivism, prevalent respectively on the western and the eastern side of the Atlantic (or possibly, the Dover strait). The difference is reflected in the policies both at the domestic and at the international level: the American distrust of big government contrasts sharply with the European statism, and the American reluctance to submit to supranational rule, contrasts with Europe- ans readiness to embrace post-national governance. The Central and East European countries have sided with America (and NATO) for reasons of security, and they have also sought a closer European integration for the reasons of economic growth. The two objectives might prove to be incompatible, unless Europe moves to the more individualist and dynamic Anglo-Saxon model of economic development as against that of social market favored by Germany and France.

Introduction

An observer of the international scene should have found it strange that after the horrible attacks of 9/11 the West has not closed its ranks in the face of the new threat. On the contrary, the two main partners of the Western world, the USA and Western Europe, have become increasingly divided over major issues of international concern and have drifted apart in their domestic and foreign policies. Some fundamental differences have emerged in their views on the desirable international order and on the ways of dealing with the threats facing it. The simplest explanation of the rift is the one appealing to the clash of the ambitions of current political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. However, its

* Dr. Algirdas Degutis is a Senior Fellow of the Lithuanian Institute of Culture, Philosophy and Art, Address: Saltoniðkiø 58, Vilnius, Lithuania; tel. +370 5 273 7658; [email protected] ** I am grateful to the colleagues of the COST Action 24 program (Evolving social construction of threats) for inspiring research assistance. I am especially indebted to Pertti Joenniemi for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 10 naïveté is revealed by the strange phenomenon of the upsurge of anti-America- nism in Western Europe after 9/11. This was the way Western European societies and their intellectual leaders responded to the belligerent pronouncements and the military responses by America to the attacks of 9/11. What is behind this European pacifism? We shall consider several hypotheses proposed as explanations of the phenomenon and as answers to this question, and then formulate a more general hypothesis which, as it seems, helps explain all the major controversies between the USA and Western Europe. Finally, we shall consider the implications of the rift for Central and Eastern European countries by con- centrating on the tensions that have emerged between these countries security policies and their hopes of economic growth placed in the Western European social model.

1. The Reemergence of European Anti-Americanism

A remarkable feature of the recent quarrels between the American and European political elites over issues of international concern is that they have been accompanied by the spread of anti-American sentiment in Western Euro- pe. The anti-Americanism of European elites has been a familiar phenomenon since the very foundation of the United States. However, in the past it was never matched by the same sentiment of the European masses. Ordinary Europeans felt no hostility to America. In fact, many of them preferred the New World, the land of opportunity, to the Old World by voting massively, with their feet, for America. Things have changed. Now even the masses are solidly behind the European elites in their suspicion of, and hostility to, America. As Glenn Frankel wrote in the Washington Post: Anti-Americanism, West European-style, is widespread, rising and migrating from its traditional home among left-wing intellectuals, academics and café society to the political mainstream Countries such as France, Germany and Britain, which for more than five decades have been the closest allies of the United States, are beginning to drift away, propelled by a popular wave of concern, alarm and resentment. The immediate focus might be U.S. policy toward Iraq, but the larger emerging theme is an abiding sense of fear and loathing of American power, policies and motives.1 According to a Pew survey, a year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the wars conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Doubts about the motives behind the U.S.-led war on terrorism abound and a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. The survey of 2005 showed that percentage of the population

1 Frankel, Glenn, Anti-Americanism Moves to W. Europes Political Mainstream, Washing- ton Post, Tuesday, February 11, 2003; Page A01. 11 holding favorable views of the United States has dropped in France from 62 percent in 2000 to 37 percent in March 2004 (43 in 2005) and in Germany from 78 percent to 38 (41 in 2005) percent in the same period.2 West Europeans now doubt U.S. good will, mistrust U.S. policies, resist U.S. intrusion in European politics and many consider George Bush a greater threat to world peace than Kim Jong-il. Historian James Ceaser quotes the French analyst Jean-François Revel, according to whom If you remove anti-America- nism, nothing remains of French political thought today, either on the Left or on the Right and adds that the same is true of Germany and of almost any other Western European country: anti-Americanism now reigns as the lingua franca of the intellectual class in Europe.3 And the European masses lend it solid support. But what is anti-Americanism? It should certainly be distinguished from mere criticism of the United States. In P. Hollanders definition, anti-America- nism denotes a particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, aversion, or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the United States. In short, anti-Americanism refers to a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is to various degrees unfounded.... [It is] an attitude similar to [such other] hostile predispositions as racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.4 Does the European anti-American sentiment satisfy this definition? It seems that it does. The sentiment is now so profound and deep-seated that it has little or nothing to do with any actual US policies; rather it reflects a blanket, out of hand rejection of anything the United States does at any place at any time. The dominant perception is that America rides roughshod over international laws and treaties and threatens stability and peace the world over. America is hypocritical in its foreign dealings and it wields its unparalleled military power unilaterally. In short, despite its rhetoric of fighting rogue states in the global arena America is itself a rogue state, a bull in the global china shop. Americas domestic policies are also seen as fundamentally flawed. The US is perceived as a selfish, individualistic society singularly driven by the profit motive and spreading its greedy corporate reach over the globe. It is uncaring of its own poor and indifferent to the rest of mankind. The European street is prone to stereotype Americans as obese, loud-voiced, ill-mannered children roaming the planet, armed with dead- ly guns. This is a discourse expressing pervasive animosity and suspicion against the United States, its government and its people, a discourse which sees the US as a global predator whose actions are conditioned by its evil grabbing nature. The discourse is not merely critical, it is one of total damnation. The target of the

2 The Pew Survey Report of March 16, 2004: A Year after Iraq War. The Pew Survey Report; U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, released: 06.23.05. http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=800, 15 09 2005. 3 Ceaser, J., A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism, The Public Interest, Summer 2003. 4 Hollander, P., Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational, Transaction Publishers, 1995, p. lxxviii. 12 critique is beyond redemption. In this kind of totalizing critique the target is given no opportunity of mending its ways, no chances of improving its character. America is criticized for being interventionist and for being isolationist, and the same person can make both criticisms in the same breath. There is no action or inaction, no omission or commission on its part that can falsify the bias against it. The criticism is rationally unassailable. It needs no logic, or is led by the logic of conspiracy theories. The stance is strikingly similar to anti-Semitism. The reasons for attacking America constitute much the same sets of contradictory claims: like Jews, Americans are overzealously religious, but also crassly materialistic; they are stingy, but also spendthrifts; they are uncultivated, but also intent on imposing their own culture on the rest of the world; they are aggressive, but also cowardly; they are stupid, but also exceptionally cunning, etc. It was in this vein that Franz Müntefering, the chairman of Schröders Social Democratic Party (SPD), compared American financial dealers operating in Germany to swarms of locusts ravaging German companies5 the kind of language used by the Nazis to describe Jews. The bias is also conspicuous in many publications and public declarations. A best-selling book 9/11: The Big Lie by one Thierry Meyssan6 claimed that the 9/11 attacks were mostly a fabrication of the American government; in fact, so Meyssan alleges, they were planned by the right-wing cabal in the U.S. government and actually carried out by the American military, to advance their own interests a palpably crazy idea. The books popularity high- lights the basically irrational, and yet evidently appealing, character of anti- Americanism in Europe. A popular new book in Germany is Eric Freys Schwarz- buch USA (Black Book USA). It is a 497-page catalogue of American crimes throughout history, beginning with the annihilation of the Indians. The oft-repeated complaint is that George W. Bush squandered international sympathy for the United States, prompted by the terrorist blood-bath of 9/ 11. However, in reality he had little to squander. With the Twin Towers still smoldering European intellectuals were already indulging in a virtual feast of Schadenfreude. The famous French philosopher, Jean Baudrillard, notoriously declared: Basically, they [the terrorists] did it, but we wanted it. Terrorism is immoral, and it responds to a globalization that is itself immoral.7 Another French celebrity, philosopher Jacques Derrida, went so far as to virtually justify the attacks by deconstructing the notion of terror. Derrida wonders: We are perhaps wrong to assume so quickly that all terrorism is voluntary, conscious, organized, deliberate, intentionally calculated: there are historical and political situations where terror operates . . . as if by itself, as the simple result of some apparatus, because of the relations of force in place, without anyone . . . being really conscious of it or feeling itself responsible for it. And he goes on: Cant one terrorize without killing? Cant letting die, not wanting to know that one is letting others die hundreds of millions of human beings, from hunger,

5 In an interview to Bild am Sonntag, April 17, 2005. 6 11 septembre 2001: LEffroyable Imposture, Chatou: Carnot, 2002. 7 Baudrillard, J., The Spirit of Terrorism (Verso), 2002, p. 134. 13 AIDS, lack of medical treatment, and so on also be a part of a more or less conscious and deliberate terrorist strategy?8 The implied suggestion is that the terrorists acted in legitimate self-defense against the terror of Americas omission. Another luminary, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, just as readily identified the root causes of the terrorist attacks: Without the political taming of an unbounded capitalism, the devastating stratification of world society will remain intractable. The disparities in the dynamic of world economic development would have to at least be balanced out regarding their most destructive consequences the deprivation and misery of complete regions and continents comes to mind.9 Since America is quintessentially associated with the evils of unbounded capitalism, the attacks are therefore at least understandable, if not justifiable. This perception of the root causes of terror has repercussions for Euro- pes view on its relations with America. While most Americans regard 9/11 as an attack on Western civilization by an implacable enemy, Europeans tend to regard it as a response to specifically American policies, representing a risk from which they are largely immune. They feel immune because, though formally still Americas allies, they see themselves different from Americans. And this perception of themselves as un-American shapes their conception of the Islamist threat. Since America is so expansive, overpowering and arrogant, and since it is basically an exploitative capitalist society, attacks on it by those who feel threatened or exploited by it are only to be expected. The radical Left go even farther and proclaim America itself as the root cause of terrorism. With these perceptions, the policy options for the Europeans are either shaming America into mending its ways or disengaging from America in order to avoid similar attacks on themselves. Since there is little or no hope of achieving the former goal, the only option of averting the Islamist threat seems that of disengagement from America. (Spains reaction to the terrorist attack might be a case in point.) Ame- ricans might condemn this policy as surrender, as an appeasement of the implacable enemy, as another Munich. However, for Europeans, who see America itself a rogue state, this might seem the right policy. Actually, there is no common perception of the roots of Islamist threat that could help close the divide between Europe and America. Since many Europeans tend to perceive the threat as a derivative one from that posed by America itself, dissociating from America is a reasonable option for them. The European formula ready at hand for the explanation of all the worlds discontents is now remarkably simple: blame America first. Anything going wrong in the world is an indictment on America; it can be faulted on Americas omission or on Americas commission. Since America is so powerful and yet so

8 In Borradori, G., Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 107-108. 9 Op. cit., p. 36. 14 deeply vicious, there is apparently no action undertaken by her abroad that would not provoke protests by those watchful of her mischievous ways, and there is apparently no target, no country, no regime so wrong that an American effort to destroy or to change it would not lead to righteous recriminations against Americas imperial reach, unilateralism and Manichean arrogance. This is now the dominant stance of European intellectuals and street protesters, as well as of Americas far left Bush-bashers such as Noam Chomsky and Michael Moore. There is obviously a pragmatic inconsistency here: blaming America for her evil doings presupposes that America, unlike the former Soviet Union or North Korea, is responsive to blame and thus not as evil as her detractors presume. One should note that mass demonstrations in Western Europe against Americas war in Iraq were never matched by demonstrations against the tyranny of Saddam. And the media outcry against prisoner abuse at Abu- Graib or Gitmo has never been matched by an outcry against the videotaped beheadings of civilians in Iraq. For East and Central Europeans this is a reminder of another amazing fact. Mass demonstrations in Western Europe against the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe in 1980s were never matched by demonstrations against the tyranny of the Soviet regime. Again, for someone from the East and Central Europe it is amazing, that what prompted Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida to proclaim, in the famous manifesto published in major Western European newspapers, the birth of the European public forum were mass demonstrations against Americas war in Iraq on February 15, 2003.10 In their view, the event was the most significant since the end of the Second World War. The implica- tion is that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of its rule over the eastern part of the European continent was much less significant. Apparently, in contrast to America, the Soviet Union was not evil enough to mobilize Europe and to give birth to the European public forum. Nor, as it seems, is the Islamist terrorism evil enough for Europe to get united with America against it. Current European anti-Americanism is only tangentially related to the post-9/11 foreign policy of the Bush administration. America was notoriously castigated as an arrogant hyperpuissance by Hubert Védrine, French minister of foreign affairs, during the Clinton administration. The antiglobalization movement led by the Attac organization in France was vehemently anti-American since its inception in 1998 and it had such luminaries as the philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, a harsh critic of neoliberalism, among its most active members. It was in 1999 that the French anti-globalization activist José Bové destroyed a McDonalds restaurant in France in an act of symbolic vanda- lism. Thus, for a long time already European anti-Americanism extends beyond

10 Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2003/05/31; Europe: plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure commune, Libération, 2003/05/31 - 2003/ 06/01). 15 any criticism, right or wrong, of American foreign policies. As Revel puts it in his Anti-Americanism, it is a kind of an irrational surplus, an obsession. It will hardly disappear when the current occupants of the White House retire to their ranches or if the current leaders of the core Europe leave their posts. The sources of the antagonism seem to lie at a deeper level than that of disagreements on current international policies; they have to do with the intellectual climate now reigning in Western Europe. The recent wave of European anti-American obsession has its inevitable costs. In fact, it is highly counterproductive. It drowns even reasonable criticism of American policies in the avalanche of prejudiced invectives and it makes Americans more likely to shrug off all European criticism as totally flawed and irrelevant, and to consider Europe as old and in the way (Karl Zinsmeister) or to revile the French as cheese-eating surrender monkeys. Paradoxically, vehe- ment anti-Americanism is quite likely to make Europes influence on America still less significant.

2. Explanations: Imbalance of Power and Dependency

How can one explain this rift in transatlantic relations? Is it just another family quarrel in the community of the West? Or is it symptomatic of deeper divisions that have been developing for some time and were only revealed by the crisis over Iraq? Robert Kagan11 put forward the now famous explanation which is readily applicable to current European anti-Americanism and its American backlash, Europhobia. It is time to stop pretending, he says, that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. He goes on drawing a dual caricature of Europeans as Venu- sians, believing in a Kantian self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and co-operation and Americans as Martians, convinced that military muscle and power is still much needed in the Hobbesian jungle beyond Europes cozy bubble of the postmodern paradise. In Kagans view, The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. First, there is the factor of European military weakness and Americas unprecedented military power the factor that was itself partly created by America providing a safety net for Europe during the Cold War era. Weakness generates a certain psychology, a certain mental attitude: when you are weak you tend to lay low, to seek negotiations and peaceful settlements, to appeal to norms and laws binding to all. You are averse at showing muscle as indicating the possible use of force even as the last resort. In a vivid simile, Kagan writes that a man walking through a forest armed with a knife will have a different response to a prowling bear than a man armed with

11 Of Paradise and Power, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. 16 a rifle. Second, there is a factor of Europes history a factor that explains Euro- peans drift to a different world-view. Shocked and shamed by their own bloody past, they place the highest premium on peace as a value in itself. They aspire to a Kantian, end-of-history world of perpetual peace. And they want others to imitate their model of integration. Thus being both weak and peace-loving, they would rather not hear the growls from the jungle outside their paradise and would be upset by anyone showing off muscle. According to Kagan, the European vision is only partially right. Europe- ans have indeed created a Kantian world for themselves, now within the Euro- pean Union, where the former anarchy of sovereign states has given way to a transnational, or even supranational organization, a largely peaceful world that to an increasing degree can be governed by law, norms and international agreements. However, what they dont understand is that the peace and safety of their Euro-bubble is ultimately guaranteed by American power. Their Kantian world was made possible and was in fact created under a shelter screening them off from the wider world only because America stood on guard on the walls of the West, between it and the rest of the anarchic Hobbesean world. One can decipher in the Venus/Mars metaphor an allusion to Europes femininity in revolt against Americas masculinity the revolt of someone weak, yet presumably on higher moral grounds, intent to subdue the stronger and to direct the ways his power is exercised. However, the option of assuming all the risks for taking action in the world while being guided by someone be- aring little or no costs of the action is something America cannot afford. Euro- pes feminist demands, though possibly valid in her own small world, cannot be accepted by America acting in the wide world. Europeans live under illusion. They think that they are autonomous and self-sufficient; unaware that without the Americans standing by they would be dragged back into history. There is a certain tension in Kagans explanation: are Europeans pacifists because they do not have enough guns, or do they not have enough guns because they are pacifists? Kagan seems to favor the former view, though he also allows for an influence the other way round. Further, some of these differences he attributes to the fact that, since the end of the Cold war, Europeans have sought to define Europe as something apart from America, rather than seeking a common definition of the West in the post Cold War era. His remedy, rather tentative and not very optimistic, is twofold. First, Europe should stop being a military pygmy and spend more on defense and the military. Second, Europe should recognize that, beyond the postmodern world of the EU, there is a modern and a pre-modern world outside. Europeans may be Kantian in their village, but they must be Hobbesian in the jungle around and welcome the Uni- ted States assuming the role of global Leviathan. One may add: they should, but would they? There are some similar, though more psychologically based, explanations of the rift. American military historian Victor Hanson and French political philosopher Pascal Bruckner descry the dependency syndrome and the deb- tors complex behind the European animosity. Being free-riders on Ameri- 17 cas security welfare the Europeans have developed dependents resentment of the benefactor. Precisely because America protects Europe, Europe will need ever more protection, and will grow ever weaker. And because it will need the United States to defend it, it will ever more resent the United States. Americas six-decade security guarantee to Europe has been a strategic error. The basic flaw in the Atlantic alliance is that for almost all its participants the free world is a free lunch: a defense pact of wealthy nations in which only one party pays the bills. Like any other form of welfare, defense welfare is a hard habit to break and profoundly damaging to the recipient. As Bruckner puts it: the more we curse the United States, the more we depend on it. We are like a child who rebels against his parents so that he will never leave them. 12 In fact, this is not a new diagnosis. As far back as in 1982 British historian Michael Howard offered a similar generalization: The peoples of Western Europe effectively abandoned responsibility for their own defense. Their own armed forces, forces which have always had the social role of embodying national self-consciousness and will to independent existence, became almost peripheral, part of a mechanism of nuclear deterrence the ultimate control of which lay elsewhere.13 On this view, the peculiarly obnoxious character of postmodern Europe is a consequence of Washingtons willingness to absolve it of responsibility for its own security. In fact, Americas military presence in places like Germany does real damage in enabling an opportunistic pacifism and anti-Americanism fueled by dependency and ignited by resentment. Americas saying good-bye to Europe would be the best solution of European anti-Americanism and it could open the prospects for more mature relations.

3. Deeper Reasons: the Ideological Divide

Still, can we ultimately explain the European revolt against America in terms of the power imbalance and the psychology it generates (resentment of the benefactor, diminished perception of threats, an appeasement mentality)? What if, as historian Tony Judt contends, Europeans underspend on defense not just because the American guarantee allowed them to enter a garden of perpetual peace, but because in the third quarter of this century they chose to devote a lot of money to expensive (and very popular) public services? The expanding welfare state, the collective provision of ever more goods, has been squeezing out private endeavor, and just as the public sector has displaced individual initiative in many parts of national life, so the habit of collaboration shapes European approaches to international affairs.14

12 Hanson, V., Goodbye to Europe? Commentary, October 2002; Bruckner, P., Europe: Remorse and Exhaustion, Dissent, Spring 2003. 13 Howard, Michael, Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s, Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982/1983), pp. 312-313. 14 Judt, Tony, Its Own Worst Enemy, The New York Review of Books, August 15, 2002. 18 In deploring Americas unilateralism Europeans are giving expression to their own particular vision of both domestic and international policy a vision which can be characterized as collectivist in distinction to the much more individualist one espoused by the Americans. The difference manifests itself in various ways. One is the relative value put on individual self-reliance, which is very high with the Americans. Europeans, by contrast, tend to exalt solidarity. The percentage of Americans who believe that success is determined by forces outside their control has fallen from 41 percent in 1988 to 32 percent today; by contrast, the percentage of Germans who believe it has risen from 59 percent in 1991 to 68 percent today.15 Another difference is Americans endorsement of capitalism and their celebration of the creative genius of the business people, which is only comparable to the French celebration of the creative genius of artists and intellectuals. Next, there is the widespread anti-statism of the Americans, boosted by the conservative revolution of Ronald Reagan. Government is considered by most Americans as part of the problem, not part of the solution, as is the case with most Europeans. Related to this is American religiosity, a character trait that has encouraged Americans to see problems in terms of individual virtues and vices. It has also encouraged Americans to try to solve societys ills through voluntary activity rather than state action.16 Euro- peans, by contrast, are much more secular. Indeed, radical secularism has become a kind of religion for many Europeans. Finally, Americans are deeply patriotic and nationalist in a way that is embarrassing to the Europeans, who, because of their bloody history of nationalist wars, tend to associate nationalism with xenophobia and chauvinism and are now engaged in a grand project of dissolving national identities in the European superstate. These are substantial ideological differences and it seems that they are becoming even more prominent. The old cliché of common Western values might be false, if the basic values freedom, human rights, etc. are interpreted differently on the two sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, as Tony Judt observes, What Europeans find perturbing about America, then, is precisely what most Ameri- cans believe to be their nations strongest suit: its unique mix of moralistic religiosity, minimal provision for public welfare and maximal market freedom the American way of life coupled with a missionary foreign policy ostensibly directed at exporting that same cluster of values and practices.17 It was precisely the American way of life that was condescendingly dubbed by Gerhard Schröder as amerikanische Verhältnisse, not to be imitated by Europe. To be sure, the day to day politics in America and Europe are not thus starkly different Americans have imbibed large doses of statism since the 1960s, while Europeans formally embrace liberal democracy. Yet their deeper attitudes are different, even opposite. Americans, writes Pascal Bruckner, understand freedom as a dream. They chose liberal democracy as the best of all systems, while many Europeans embraced liberalism because more exciting alternatives

15 Micklewait, John and Wooldridge, Adrian, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America, The Penguin Press, 2004, p. 312. 16 Micklewait and Wooldridge, Op. cit., p. 326. 17 Judt, T., Its the anti-American Way, Financial Review, April 17, 2003. 19 had disappointed them.18 The center of gravity of American public opinion is much further to the right (more classically liberal) than in any other developed nation. Europe has never had (with the exception of Thatchers England) any movement analogous to the conservative movement in America that has been on the rise for the last 30 years. And America has never had a major party or a movement resembling European social democracy. As the title of the book by Micklethwait and Woolridge has it, America is the Right Nation. Since America is conceived by Europeans as a brazenly capitalist country and since they reject capitalism (except as a last resort the well-regulated, tame sort) insisting on the widening and deepening of the sway of social justice, the two visions necessarily clash. It is no accident that anti-Americanism in Europe goes hand in hand with the anti-globalization movement, often in tandem with anti-Semitism since all these movements and sentiments are virulently anti- capitalist and vehemently opposed to the neo-liberalism promoted by Ameri- ca. As Jean-François Revel points out, The principal function of anti-America- nism has always been, and still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its supreme incarnation. Behind the fight against globalization lies an older and more fundamental struggle against liberalism, whose chief representative and most powerful vehicle is the United States.19 (To prevent misunderstanding, liberalism is used by Revel in the European sense; in America the meaning of the term is rendered roughly by conservatism). It is not the case that the French and the Germans, or even the British, were passionately pro-American during the Cold War. But as long as the Soviet empire was menacing Western Europe with missiles and troops at its borders, there was a very practical reason for the unity of the West. However, with the menace gone the incentives for transatlantic harmony have grown steadily weaker, while the ideological differences have grown starker. There is also a connection between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of anti- movements on the left of the political spectrum. After the demise of real socialism and with Marxism falling in disrepute the left has lost the positive grounds for its unity. Though it can appeal to such vague notions as social justice or progressive values, the real glue of the unity of the left today (both in Europe and America) is its opposition to, and resentment of, the United States, the embodiment of the system they consider evil, even if indispensable.20 The US model of capitalism is culturally and philosophically alien to the Euro- pean political mainstream. The American or, more broadly, the Anglo-Saxon model is conceived as a danger to the European view of society. This is why the defense of the European social model, a code word for a highly regulated, corpo- ratist economy, is now the common endeavor of the labor unions on one side and the anti-globalization and anti-American opinion-makers on the other.21

18 Bruckner, P., Op. cit. 19 Revel, Jean-François, Anti-Americanism, Encounter Books, 2003, p. 12, 31. 20 Markovits, Andrei S., The European and American Left since 1945, Dissent, Winter 2005, p. 5-14. 21 Two recent books defending the European and the Anglo-Saxon model are, respectively, Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europes Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Tarcher/Penguin, 2004; Olaf Gersemann, Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Reality, CATO Institute, 2004. 20 These different visions of a good society have repercussions at the level of international relations. On the one hand, American domestic individualism naturally translates into international unilateralism. Just as Americans typically believe that in domestic public life citizens are best left to their own devices, with limited government intervention, so they project this view onto international affairs as well. The emphasis upon exit strategies, upon being in the world community but not quite of it, always at liberty to retire from the global scene, has its domestic analogue in the individualism of American life. On the other hand, Europes international multilateralism is a translation at the international level of domestic collectivism, of the voice strategies (to use Hirschmans terms). The underlying idea is that of collective responsibility, joint action, submission to a higher authority of the state (domestically) or the international community (globally). The transatlantic dispute over international relations is the same as that concerning domestic policies, only writ large. Its a conflict between two ideologies. One is based on the presumption that individuals and nations should be self-reliant and free to develop their own capacities (forming coalitions of the willing if they want) without being overly coerced by national or global elites. The other is based on the presumption that no individual or nation can go off and do as it pleases them, but should work instead within governing institutions that establish norms and provide security. Accordingly, multilateralism has different meanings on the two sides of the Atlantic. Most Europeans believe in what Robert Kagan called principled multilateralism. In their view, gaining international approval (e.g. of U.N. Secu- rity Council) is not a means to an end but an end in itself, the sine qua non for the legitimacy of an action on the international arena. Even if the United States were absolutely right about Iraq, Europeans believe the United States would be wrong to invade without formal approval of the international community. On the other hand, most Americans are not principled multilateralists. They are instrumental multilateralists. Their formula, descending from the Clintons presidency, is multilateralism if possible, unilateralism if necessary. Richard Haas, a high ranking Was- hington official, put the idea this way: No organization, not even the United Na- tions, has a monopoly on legitimacy; rather, legitimacy depends most on the ratio- nale for an action and the manner in which it is undertaken.22 This is deeply troubling for the Europeans. They have already transferred much of the authority of their nation states to supranational organizations of the European Union, and European life is ever more regulated by powers beyond national control, by a post-national regime of EU multilateralism. As Javier Sola- na insisted, the demand for multilateralism was not a ploy of Europeans to tie down the American giant by international agreements: The European attachment to a multilateral approach in those issues is a matter of conviction, not of malign strategy. Our experience tells us that sovereignty shared is sovereignty magnified. To misquote Sir Winston Churchill, multilateralism is the worst of

22 Haas, Richard, [State Department Policy Planning Staff, Director] Sovereignty: existing rights, evolving responsibilities, remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center of International Studies, Georgetown University, 14 January 2003. 21 international government, except all the others have been tried.23 No wonder that Donald Rumsfelds blunt assertion the worst thing you can do is allow a coalition to determine what your mission is caused an uproar in Europe. On the American view, international institutions whatever legitimacy they possess will have to be based on the underlying legitimacy of nation-states and the contractual relationships they negotiate ...Europeans, by contrast, tend to believe that democratic legitimacy flows from the will of an international community much larger than any individual nation-state.24 Americans tend to be individualist, while Europeans lean towards collectivism. On the collectivist view of the world politics, only collectivities can have the right to define missions: missions are to be distilled from, and to have the approbation of, the collective will. While for a collectivist an action is illegitimate unless approved by a collective, for an individualist an action is legitimate unless proven otherwise. Europe and America thus have different views of the source of agency in world politics. For the past few decades, Europeans have been engaged in the process of dismantling the nation-state and denationalizing political life, and this is why they now consider American displays of nationalism, or unilateralism, anachronistic. Many Americans, by contrast, consider the European endeavor with great suspicion, as a ploy for the realization of the social-democratic dream at the international and ultimately at the global level. They fear that the European model of governance would lead to transnational progressivism and to the rule of the Acronymia of supranational organizations.25 The choice between unilateralism and multilateralism, writes Russell Berman, points far beyond the technicalities of international relations. A difference between two fundamentally distinct cultural worldviews is at stake. Mul- tilateralism involves, by definition, an infringement of individual prerogative and implies the deferral of responsibility to a regime of committees, which as the political theorist Hannah Arendt would have put it is a responsibility of no one. It has a consequence in domestic policy as well as international relations: the overcoming of egoism. The association of the United States with unilateralism, in contrast, involves a different notion of liberty, outside the state and outside the suprastate.26 Francis Fukuyama concurs: Whether in regard to welfare, crime, regulation, education or foreign policy, there are constant differences separating America from everyone else. It is consistently more anti-statist, individualistic, laissez-faire and egalitarian than other democracies.27 This

23 Solana, Javier, Europe and America: partners of choice, speech to the annual dinner of the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 7 May 2003. 24 Fukuyama, F., The West May be Cracking: America vs. The Rest, New Perspectives Quarter- ly, vol. 21, no. 3, Summer 2004. 25 Fonte, John, Liberal Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism: The Future of the Ideolo- gical Civil War Within the West,Orbis, Summer 2002; John OSullivan, Gullivers travails: The U.S. in the post-Cold-War world, The New Criterion, Vol. 23, No. 2, October 2004. 26 Berman, Russell, Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem, Hoover Institution, 2004, 79-80. 27 Fukuyama, F., op. cit. 22 is the Anglo-Saxon notion that liberty rests with the individuals; it is not a privilege conferred by collectivities. The contrast is with the Continental (French) tradition, where the General Will is the source of any liberty conferred to individuals and their groups. The American political tradition has its origin in one particular predecessor in Europe, namely classical English liberalism. As a result, its political culture is much more monolithic than the European one. There is no American counterpart of the left-right divide in Germany or France. And the European type social democracy has never achieved, nor is likely to achieve the high ground of mainstream politics in America.28 As the authors of The Right Nation put it, the center of gravity of American opinion is much further to the right and the whole world needs to understand what that means.29 Both for the cultural elite and on the level of broad cultural values, the differences between Western Europe and the United States are significant, implying important political ramifications. Their different conceptions of freedom, their different visions of the good society lead to very different attitudes toward projecting their visions to the wider world. These differences better explain the current transatlantic acrimony than the imbalance of power which is probably a consequence rather than the cause of the rift within the West.

4. Repercussions of the Rift: Old and New Europe

It is hardly surprising that West European anti-Americanism had no real run in former captive nations of Central Europe and the Baltic States. The Cen- tral European states and the Baltic States, in particular, credit a strong and decisive America with bringing down the Soviet Union and helping them regain independence. The idea of national sovereignty is consequently strong here and it resonates well with American nationalism. However, the nationalism of Cen- tral and East European countries has been under considerable stress recently. It seems that virtually all Central and Eastern European countries face a dilemma in the current transatlantic crisis.30 The two pillars of their post-communist policies have been integration into European and Transatlantic structures (primarily EU and NATO). They trust NATO as the main vehicle for effective defense, but only because membership in this organization implies close rela-

28 Recently there has been a flow of studies purporting to draw the distinction between Euro- pean and American (more precisely, Anglo-Saxon) political traditions: Alan MacFarlane, The Riddle of the Modern World: Of Liberty, Wealth and Equality, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity : The British, French, and American Enlightenments, Knopf, 2004; Huntington, Samuel, Who Are We: The Challenges to Americas National Identity, Simon and Schuster, 2004; James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004. 29 Micklewait and Wooldridge, op. cit., p. 11. 30 See Budryte, D., The Dilemma of Dual Loyalty: Lithuania and Transatlantic Tensions, in. Old Europe, New Europe and the US, ed. by Tom Lansford, Blagovest Tashev, Ashgate, 2005. 23 tions with the USA, the most powerful member. And they want good relations with the USA because they do not believe that European core nations, though also members of NATO, would have either the will or the power to come to their defense in case of need. Their skepticism is well founded. They have witnessed Europes repeated failures to deal with the calamities in its own backyard, with the strong and decisive America repeatedly coming to the rescue. They were embarrassed when they saw France and Germany cooperate with Russia (and China) to block Americas efforts at getting Security Council approval for the invasion of Iraq. They can also draw skeptical conclusions concerning Europe- an guarantees for their security from such facts that Germans have a much more favorable opinion of Vladimir Putin than of George W. Bush. By lining-up behind the Americans on the issue of Iraq, Central and East Europeans (together with Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands) prevented Germany and France from creating an anti-American EU foreign policy. And they did not let themselves to be intimidated by threats from Paris and Berlin. The Washington Times announced that the countries of Central and East Europe have become the major allies of America in Europe.31 The transatlantic rift thus made its appearance as a crack within Europe itself. On security issues Europe was obviously divided into pro- and anti-Americans, into new and old Euro- pe so much so that The Economist was led to wonder if NATO and the European Union were partners or rivals.32 However, on the other hand, the new Europeans consider the EU the main vehicle for their economic development. This stance of being pro-Ameri- can on security issues while being pro-EU on economic matters might prove to be unfeasible if the EU develops as a counterweight to the USA which is exactly how the Franco-German tandem envisages its future. The new Europeans thus seem to be faced with a dilemma: either effective defense (alliance with America) or economic growth (alliance with the Franco-German tandem in the EU), not both. But is this a real dilemma? It is real only if it is granted that the EU as a political union is indispensable for the economic development of new Europe. Precisely this can be doubted. It is far from obvious that the ever closer Europe, based as it is on the social model, would best serve the new-comers economic interests. Indeed, one may wonder if a closer Europe is at all beneficial for them. The dilemma is premised on the idea that the European social model is a viable one and that even if less efficient it provides more social security than the Anglo-Saxon model. The premise, however, is increasingly coming under attack. British historian Paul Johnson claims that the EU economic philosophy, in so far as it has one, is epitomized by one word convergence. The aim is to make all national economies identical with the perfect model. This, as it turns out, is actually the perfect formula for stagnation. What makes the capitalist system work, what keeps economies dynamic, is precisely nonconformity, the new, the unusual, the eccentric, the egregious, and the innovative, springing

31 A Ticket to the New Europe, Washington Times, 9 February 2003, p. 4. 32 NATO and the European Union, The Economist, February 26, 2005. 24

from the inexhaustible inventiveness of human nature.33 Overregulation and conformity, coupled with monopoly powers of the trade unions, lead to stagnation and high unemployment in the core Europe, giving the lie to the promise of security and solidarity.34 The situation is further exacerbated by the impending collapse of the social security system with Europes populations growing older and with birth rates far below the reproduction level. There is a growing concern, not least in Germany and France, that the social model is deeply flawed and that reforms are needed to bring it closer to the Anglo-Saxon one. In fact, the disease now suffered by the core Europe is analogous to that the US and Great Britain themselves suffered in the 1970s. The British and to a lesser extent the Americans have already had social models implemented and found them deficient. As is generally recognized, it was the free market reforms initiated by Reagan and Thatcher that had put an end to the stagnation and decline. Its no wonder that since the early 1980s the United States and the U.K. have had twice the rate of economic growth of Germany, France and Italy; unemployment rates in the U.S. and U.K. are under 5 percent while in Germany and France they are in double digits. Analogous doubts about the feasibility of the social model have been expressed by the Czech President Vaclav Klaus who echoes the Nobel laureate economist Friedrich Hayek in pointing out the dangers of bureaucratic centrali- zation in a political entity consisting of many different nations. According to Klaus, integration conceived as open markets is good, since it encourages competition and makes interventionism much less viable, while unification is definitely bad for a viable economy. Moreover, it is dangerous, for it attempts to forge a political unity where there is no demos to be united.35 Mart Laar, a well known Estonian politician expressed a similar view in his response to President Chiracs notorious outburst: it is time for Europe to change. It must become more dynamic, decisive, competitive, open and future-orientated. European nations can retain their unique identities, while remaining open to each other. This is the real European identity not some false oneness.36 These critical voices are quite numerous. How is it possible to have the economic benefits of EU without the costs of the ever closer union? David Hannan, a British conservative MP, suggests an answer. Britain, in his view, needs to retain trade links with the EU with close inter-governmental co-operation, but not with political assimilation. This is no utopia, for consider the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA): Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. They participate fully in the four freedoms of the single market free movement of goods, services, people and capital. But they are outside the Common Agricultural and Fisheries

33 Johnson, P., What Europe Really Needs, The Wall Street Journal, Friday, June 17, 2005. 34 See Gersemann, O., op. cit., Ch. 2, 3. 35 Ich habe Angst um Europa [I am afraid for Europe], interview mit Vaclav Klaus, Frank- furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.03.2005. 36 Laar, Mart, New Europe Wont Keep Quiet Until All Europe Is New, The Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2003. 37 Hannan, Daniel, The EU can work for Britain if we quit, The Daily Telegraph, 28/08/ 2005. 25 Policies, they control their own borders and human rights questions, they are free to negotiate trade accords with non-EU countries and they pay only a token sum to the EU budget. Unsurprisingly, they are much richer than the EU members. According to the OECD, per capita GDP in the four Efta countries is double that in the EU.37 Is this a prospect that would be welcome by the new Europe? With the failure of referenda on the EU constitution in France and Nether- lands and with the subsequent British revolt on the EU budget it has become evident that Europe is as divided on matters of economy as on security. The EU Summit in Brussels of June 16 to 17, 2005 turned out as battle ground of diverging views on the future direction of Europe, in political and economic terms. One may wonder whether the Central and East Europeans are willing and/or able to prevent Germany and France from creating an anti-American EU economic policy. Can their pro-Americanism on security translate into an anti-EU (French-Ger- man) stance on economic issues? Would they dare to side with the British against core Europe? Can Europes dominant parties from across the political spectrum from the Right in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to the Left in Sweden, Poland and Portugal converge on Mr. Blair as the potential standard-bearer for a new vision of Europe which is less politically ambitious but more economically dynamic. There are no simple answers to these questions. The new Europeans might choose to play the opportunistic game of trying to please both parties of the divide and thus to gain some small pay-offs. It would be the usual interest groups politics often leading to zero-sum or negative-sum outcomes. This seems to be the dominant position, currently also in Lithuanias foreign policy.38 Lithuanias long-term economic policy is also based on a naïve hope: Lithuania, being an EU old-timer by that time and having modernized its economic policies and receiving EU financial and technical support would have implemented the EU socio-economic model, namely that of a welfare state with low unemployment, high labor costs, strong social guarantees and a high level of social solidarity.39 Or they might take a principled reformist stance on EU, as Estonians seem to do. The choice depends on many factors, including the availability of political acumen and the state of public opinion. For Lithuanias population at large one should admit that it is still too early to make predictions regarding the similarities of societal values with the ones prevalent in America and Europe, because Lithuanian society is still in the process of transition On the one hand, the experience of transition reforms makes some groups of the population prone to take risks, making them similar to the Americans. On the other hand, a still very strong attachment to the paternalistic state as evidenced by popular surveys might actually be reinforced

38 Kauèikas, Nerijus, Prancûzai ieðko sàjungininkø [The French are looking for allies], Vei- das, Nr. 30, 2005 liepos 28. But there are also those inclining towards the British position, see: Lietuva ir naujoji Europa, kuriuo keliu þengsime?[Lithuania and new Europe: which way we are heading?] , Veidas, Nr. 27, 2005 liepos 7. 39 Lietuvos respublikos ûkio ministerija, Lietuvos mokslø akademija, Lietuvos ûkio (ekonomikos) plëtros iki 2015 metø ilgalaikë strategija [The Long-Term Strategy up to 2015 of Lithuanias Economic Development], Vilnius, AB Vilspa, 2003, p. 20. 26 by socializing with societies from European countries with extensive welfare conditions.40 Much the same is true of other EU new-comers. Anyway, the no-votes in France and the Netherlands in June 2005 with regard to the EU constitution made the dream (or fear) of deeper political integration and of an ever closer European Union evanescent. The EU now appears to be adrift. For some countries this is a time-out from the danger that even those corners of Europe that have resisted excessive government manipulation of the economy would be dragged toward the statist norm by EU rules. This is also a time-out for thought in preparation for tough decisions. There is also some chances that Miss Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy, who are quite likely to take the top political positions in Germany and France respectively, might be more willing to move closer to the British or the Anglo-Saxon model. But they do not seem to have the stamina of Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Reagan to do what they did. Besides, they are operating in a social environment hostile to surrender to neoliberalism. Yet they may be able to buy a little more time for Europe until the people realize there is no constructive choice other than following the Anglo-Saxon model of lower taxes, less government spending and regulation. And with the economic models getting closer there would be more chances of healing the transatlantic rift.

Concluding Remarks

We have argued that the causes of the transatlantic rift are mainly ideological, having to do with the difference between the mostly individualist (Ameri- can) and the mostly collectivist (European) visions of the national and the international community. The difference helps explain a number of controversies and divisions between the two sides of the Atlantic. Security concerns, perception of threats, the role of international organizations, nationalism and religiosity as well as the issues of economic policy find different interpretations on the two sides of the Atlantic because of the different ideologies underlying the rift in the West. Central and East Europeans have already done their share in preventing the core Europe developing an anti-American EU foreign policy. It seems that now they have the window of opportunity for pushing the core Europe towards the evolution in a more American-friendly way on issues of social and economic policy. Failing this they risk not only catching the malaise of prematu- re euro-sclerosis but also that of forfeiting their security concerns. The challenge they face is formidable, yet not beyond their capacities.

Vilnius, September 15, 2005.

40 Vilpiauskas, R., The Dilemmas of Transatlantic Relations after EU Enlargement and the Implications for Lithuania, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2003/1-2 (11-12) http:// www.lfpr.lt/latest.phtml, 15 09 2005. 27 Raimundas Lopata, Nortautas Statkus* Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

Empires, the World Order and Small States**

This article is centered on the opportunities of small states in the emerging imperial world order. Particularly, policy options for Lithuania as a small state in the evolving new international arena are explored. The authors present a brief analysis of theoretical studies and historical researches on the empires and the roles of small states in imperial structures. The article focuses on the current characteristics of the U.S., Russia, and the EU core countries. This permits one to draw a conclusion concerning the imperial developments in domestic and foreign policies of these geopolitical actors. Having completed this analysis, the authors cautiously investigate foreign policy options for Lithuania that possibly follow from the interplay of the projects of the liberal global empire of American neoconservatives, projects of enhanced cooperation of the EU core and Putins policies to reintegrate CIS states under Russian domination.

Introduction

We must create a self-dependent empire and substantially expand our pivot. Former territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constitute our natural borders and crossing them would present no challenge < >. Europe and, I think, the United States too, needs our empire both powers will soon realise it. After all, all their actions indicate they have already realised it, although not to the extent to which we are prepared to go. What good is having our own empire for us? We need it in case the U.S. and Russia collapse. Europe will then remain the power field and we must be one of those powers controlling Europe. These are a few excerpts from Gintaras Beresnevièius book Forging an Empire. Sket- ches of Lithuanian ideology, which received somewhat ironic but generally positive appraisals a few years earlier.1 The critics were apparently captivated not so much by the idea of the Lithuanian empire as such but by the idea as an

*Prof. dr. Raimundas Lopata is a director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius; Dr. Nortautas Statkus is an associate professor of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Vokieèiø 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2514130., e-mail: [email protected] ** The authors would like to thank MA students of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius K. Aleksa, A. Èepukënas, S. Dobriakov, E. Gailiû- nas, D. Jurgelevièiûtë, and N. Kauèikas for their help in preparing this article. 1 Beresnevièius G., Imperijos darymas. Lietuvikos ideologijos metmenys [The making of Empire. Guidelines for Lithuanian Ideology], Vilnius, 2003, p.18, 75 (in Lithuanian). 28 intellectual provocation. However, only the foreign policy makers succumbed to the provocation and began talking about Lithuanias ambition to become the regional leader.2 The pride taken in the recent publication of the Russian edition of Professor Edvardas Gudavièius History of Lithuania reveals that the public opinion seems to be more enticed by the retrospective supposedly, now the Russians will finally be able to read about the medieval empire of Lithuania in their own language.3 Its a pity though. The metaphor of empire is becoming entrenched in the expert debates regarding the condition of the international system as a serious methodological instrument both in the analyses of the international power distribution and for predicting further development of the international system. This was recently spotlighted by Kêstutis Paulauskas in his review of Colossus: the Price of Americas Empire, a study by British historian and political scientist Niall Fergusson, which came out after Beresnevièius book. As Pau- lauskas notes, the author does not shun from value judgements, does not feign objectivism and openly pronounces for the empire by making a convincing argument that the anarchic society of sovereign states can no longer cope with contemporary challenges. Hence, Fergusson urges to acknowledge that which most prefer to gloss over: whether we like it or not, the world is living in the century of the American empire and the persistent attempts of the White House administration to deny the imperial nature of the United States only confirm that the problem exists.4 Doubtlessly, both the theoretical imperiological debates and the empirical studies of the particularities of the so-called American empire are encouraged by the domestic and foreign policy developments in the United States in the context of unipolarity. Naturally, historical parallels remain an important source of their popularity. After the US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, especially, it is often emphasised that American troops repeated Alexander the Greats march to Kabul and that American tanks that roared over the Mesopota- mia cannot but create associations with the empire-building projects attempts to master the overseas colonies. However, it is not so significant in these cases that the new insights are often based on the images, notions or concepts that had already captured the minds and hearts of researchers at some point in the past. In these cases, the intellectual intrigue the reasonableness of the reconstruction plays the decisive role. Admittedly, the current understanding of empire has been cleansed of the images of primitive, traditional imperialism, which were woven by the Soviet and American ideologists during the Cold War when the main criterion of an empire was the fact of direct rule over colonies. The criteria for identifying empi-

2 Speech of the Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Artûras Paulauskas at the University of Vilnius May 24, 2004. : http://paulauskas.president.lt/en/one.phtml?id=4995. 3 Kultûra áveikia iðankstiná prieðiðkumà [Culture overcomes negative prejudice], Lietuvos Rytas, 193 22 ,08, 2005 (in Lithuanian). 4 Paulauskas K., Apie laisvës imperijà, europietiðkà rojø ir naujà pasaulio tvarkà [On Liberal Empire, European Heaven and the New World Order], Politologija, 1, 2005, p. 87 (in Lithuanian). 29 res are undergoing gradual refinement in the research (imperial ideology, power concentration, centre-periphery relations, and imperial dynamics) and are increasingly used in modelling the evolution of other international relations actors as well. The processes of empire creation identified in the European Union, Russia and China on the basis of the said criteria, sometimes even nourish explanations that the world order is gradually evolving towards the imperial structure. This article will discuss the peculiarities of the application of this instrument in the studies of the international system, as well as its explanatory strength in predicting the place and the functions of small states in the eventual imperial structure, which will be created if, to rephrase Beresnevièius, the imperial or empire-like entities do not collapse.

1. Imperiology

The notion of empire and its building strategies is not a new subject in the history and theory of international relations. However, the concept of empire that refers to the distribution of power in the international system has recently (beginning with the mid-nineties of the twentieth century) gained increasing popularity. It may be noted that there is a pattern in the resurgence of discussions about empires and imperialism. There is a link between the genesis of debates and the development phases of the international system debates surge with the weakening of the hegemonic power and the growing ambition of the candidates to replace it (in other words, during the interregnum). Debates about empires at the end of the nineteenth century can be found in the academic literature at the start of the twentieth century. The New imperialism spans from 1871 to 1914 (from the Franco-Prussian War until the First World War). The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Spanish-American, the South African, and the Russo-Japanese wars are said to mark the beginning of the new imperialism. It is associated with the spread of the industrial revolution, the development of the capitalist system, and the ensuing expansionist policies and colonial acquisitions of the European powers, the U.S. and Japan, as well as their struggle for Africa.5 Proponents of the theory of economic imperialism supported such struggles. Charles A. Conant, who is regarded to be the author of the concept of economic imperialism, claimed in his essay The Econo- mic Basis of Imperialism (1898) that imperialism was necessary to absorb surplus capital in the face of a shortage of profitable investment outlets. Meanwhile, critics of economic imperialism associated the concept of the empire with the negative aspects of capitalism: economic exploitation, inequalities of economic development, subservience to the interests of the ruling class, as well as racism.

5 Foster J. B., The Rediscovery of Imperialism, Monthly Review, 11, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/analysis/2002/02rediscovery.htm, 05 01 2005. 30 British economist John Hobson was the leading critic. In his Imperialism: A Study (1902), he argued that every improvement of methods of production and the concentration of capital lead to imperialist expansionism. Imperialism was motivated by the need for new markets where goods could be sold and investments made and, in order to preserve new markets, it was necessary to establish protectorates or perform annexations.6 Hobson had an influence on Lenin, who explained the mutual competition between empires in an analogous book Impe- rialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916) that became the basis of Marxist studies of imperialism. As a consequence of these normative discussions about empires among the Marxists and liberals at the start of the last century, the term empire later had negative associations in the U.S.: it was not considered academic and was avoided. During the Vietnam War, which may be regarded as a new stage of the study of empires, the term came into usage but, again, mostly among the leftists. Harry Mag- doffs book The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (1969) is considered to have initiated systematic analyses of imperialism anew. He regarded the Vietnam War not as choice of separate individuals in the U.S. government but as an outcome of long-term U.S. foreign policy tendencies closely related to capitalism. Magdoff argued that imperialism is directly beneficial to the capital at the imperial centre and the imperial struggle resulted from the unequal development of capitalism. Liberals criticised him, disagreeing that the control of resources was useful only to the U.S. corporations and the government that served their interests. Contemporary academic debates about empires were stimulated by attempts to grasp and give a practical sense to the prospect of the potential unipolar world order. The debates examined the global dominance of the U.S., their relative and structural power shifts, and the significance of domestic and foreign policy tendencies to the international system. Especially noteworthy is the change in the terminology the concept of empire in the analysis of international politics gradually replaced by the concept of hegemony. This indicates the increasingly prevalent view that the U.S. is undergoing a fundamental transformation and they are no longer regarded only as a hegemon or a superpower.7 In other words, the discussion is whether the U.S. has already become or will soon become or will not become an empire at all. For example, some neoliberal and most neoconservative authors agree that the U.S. has already become an empire. However, the former criticise the U.S. empire and the latter support it. According to them, there has never before been an empire that would exert as much influence as the U.S., although it does not directly rule overseas territories and mostly exercises informal control. The imperial ambitions of the U.S. are also made more credible by the new strategic thinking after September 11 (the war against terrorism, the war in Iraq), which arising from a certain world outlook and a specific assessment of U.S. power which reflect the neo-imperial U.S. ideology.

6 Hobson J. A., Imperialism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1948, http://www.fordham.edu/ halsall/mod/1902hobson.html , 17 06 2005. 7 Rilling R., American Empire as Will and Idea. The New Major Strategy of the Bush Administration (2003), http://www.rainer-rilling.de/texte/americanempireaswillandi- dea.pdf, 03 11 2004. 31 The third participants of the debates, the critics of the imperial approach question whether the U.S. could be viewed as an empire because such a view relies on the assertion that the international system is unipolar. However, this assessment of the structure of the international system raises some doubts since U.S. power in non-military sectors is not entirely unquestionable. Thus, these authors believe that the U.S. may be viewed as superior to other states (especially in military terms) but not as a hyperpower. Finally, there is a rather original argument in the debates about empires that the age of the U.S. empire is ending, rather than beginning, because imperial domination is based on hard power, while the U.S., although dominant militarily, is gradually weakening in the economic sphere.8 Thus, discussions about the U.S. as an empire started from the emphasis on the role of its exceptional power in the creation of a unipolar world. The entrenchment of neoconservatives in the U.S. administration, the new strategic thinking of the administration and the emerging tendency in the U.S. foreign policy to replace influence by control in relations with other states provide basis to talk about the United States as an empire. On the other hand, it remains debatable whether the changes are significant enough to call the U.S. an imperial power. Therefore, it is worth reviewing the discussions about empires in general first. Who seeks to introduce the notion of the empire into the discourse of International Relations, and why? And, conversely, why is the notion of the empire viewed negatively? Second, it is important to distinguish the attributes of the creation (and collapse) of empires, as well as their general characteristics, which would allow assessing the applicability of the concept of the empire in the analysis of contemporary international relations.

1.1. The Notion of the Empire in International Relations

Debates about empires have a significant impact on the theoretical discussions of International Relations and serve as a challenge to the (neo)liberalist and globalist theories that have garnered a lot of supporters since the Cold War. Moreover, the participants of the debates about empires question the realist explanation of the international system, which was dominant for a long time. Debates about the significance of empires introduce a new approach to International Relations. While the (neo)realists take the perspective of national (sovereign) states and the (neo)liberal institutionalists* as well as the globalists adopt the perspective of globalisation, the students of empires argue that the past and future political, economic and socio-cultural processes in the international system are hierarchical in nature. In their view, the relations between the

8 Todd E., After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, New York: Columbia Univer- sity Press, 2003. * The authors of this article do not make a strong distinction between realism and neorealism and between liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism because the axioms of the theories of these two paradigms with regard to the nature of international relations are identical and the explanatory differences are insubstantial for the examination of the subject of this article. 32 subjects of the international system may be (and ought to be) studied through the prism of the relations of control and subordination. The (neo)realists accept the classical notion of empires, according to which empire refers to one states direct or indirect political domination with regard to other states or (and) nations.9 The proponents of the (neo)realist theory rely on the Westphalian model of the international system: the contemporary international system was formed out of sovereign states precisely after the disintegration of pre- modern empires and other political entities. According to them, the international system is anarchic (because there is no higher authority above the nation-state), although not chaotic, and therefore, the state is the most important and independent unit of analysis of international politics. Following this approach, decoloni- sation and the dismemberment of multiethnic socialist states, such as the USSR and Yugoslavia, may be viewed as the victory of nationalism and anti-imperialist ideologies over the imperialist ones.10 However, the (neo)realists do not take sufficient account of either the impact of globalisation or the hierarchical (subordinati- ve) relations between states in the international system. During the Cold War, the concept of the empire was usually used by leftist scholars (globalists) subscribing to Marxist views, who associated it with economic exploitation, racism, etc., thereby condemning the expansionist foreign policies of the U.S. and questioning its morality.11 In the early eighties of the twentieth century, the paradigm of liberal institutionalism based on theories of mutual dependence and globalisation was gaining strength. The latter approach emphasises peaceful relations between the largest states, which are conditioned by increased multilateral linkages, international regimes and international institutions. In the opinion of the (neo)liberals, globalisation forces even the U.S. to adjust to other international actors and processes. The world is thus too complex and interdependent to be ruled from an imperial centre.12 According to the theorists of globalisation, the empire is a new form of global sovereignty, consisting of a series of national and supranational actors united under a single logic of rule.13 It is the whole system of moral and ethical norms and the law that regulates market and political relations between governments, organisations, individuals, companies and other actors. The postmodern globalist notion of the empire asserts a paradox that the empire is functioning not as some clearly defined subject of the international system but as a regime of governance without government. Governance is here understood in the Foucauldian sense as the regulation of the behaviour of subjects. Such governance is a network of social relations, institutional powers

9 Motyl A. J., From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse, in Good D.F, Rudolph R.L. eds., Nationalism and Empire, Minnesota: St. Martin Press, 1992, p. 17 10 Mann M., The First Failed Empire of the 21st century, Renner Institut 2, 2004, http:// www.renner-institut.at/download/texte/mann.pdf, 03 04 2005. 11 For more, see Cox M., Empire, imperialism and the Bush doctrine, Review of International Studies 30, 3, 2004, 587-589. 12 Ikenberry G.J., Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, Foreign Affairs, 03/ 04, 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301fareviewessay83212a/g-john-ikenberry/ illusions-of-empire-defining-the-new-american-order.html, 03 11 2004. 13 Hardt M., Negri A., Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. xi. 33 and ethical principles that define the norms of the actions or the behaviour of any particular subject. The postmodern notion of the empire deprecates the practice of the exploitation of peripheries by the classical imperialist centre and argues that, while the postmodern liberal empire does not eliminate the manifestations of subordination, it follows the logic of pacification and not exploitation. In other words, states under the liberal empire submit to the conditions of the governance regime because this ensures development and peaceful coexistence for them.14 Thus, the (neo)liberals and the globalists view various international agreements, the creation of multilateral institutions and the rule of international law positively because this strengthens the formation of the global security and governance system.15 Unilateral actions of the United States are deprecated because of the alleged failure of the U.S. to grasp the importance of mutual interdependence and the overestimation of its power and because such U.S. policies will ultimately lead to a blind alley as the logic of globalisation defies the imperial logic.16 According to the neoliberals and the globalists, international security is indivisible. Security is understood as a shared interest and value that the states can only achieve through co-operation and not by strengthening their national security individually.17 According to the neoliberals, ensuring national security by the (neo)realist means of increasing power is no longer adequate and cannot eliminate contemporary security threats because of their transnational nature.18 They do not believe that the U.S. or any other state could ensure its security by military force and emphasise the large financial costs and the coercive nature of the emerging U.S. empire, as well as threats to institutions and alliances that have so far guaranteed the security of the United States and its allies. Finally, the development of the international system may be viewed in the context of the hierarchical nature of relations between international subjects. Hence scholars who approve of the revival of the concept of the empire argue the fundamental categories of international relations were developed without sufficient regard to the nature and the character of those international relations that encompass the bigger part of the planet < >, in particular, to the various

14 Ibid.; Coward M., The Imperial Character of the Contemporary World Order, Theory and Event, 8, 1 (2005), 12, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/mpc20/global/springsems/sem10/ Coward,%20New%20Imperialism%20Review.pdf , 30 03 2005. 15 Joseph Nye claims that the unilateral actions of the U.S. deplete its soft power. See Nye J., The Paradox of American Power, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Ikenberry G.J. repre- hends the unilateral actions of the U.S. and argues that it should act through alliances see Ikenberry G.J. (note 12). Kupchan G. emphasises the importance of international institutions see Kupchan G., The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century. From an address to the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, February 27, 2003, http://www.cceia.org, 03 04 2005. 16 See Mann M., Incoherent Empire, New York: Verso, 2003, quoted from Ikenberry G.J. (note 12). 17 Cohen R. and Mihalka M., Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, The Marshall Centre Papers, 3, 2001; Cohen R., Spreading Cooperative Security: Creating a Euro-Atlantic Council? Connections 1, 1, 2002, 13-21. 18 Cohen R. and Mihalka M. (note 17), 33 34

types of imperial relations.19 Currently, the concept of the empire is becoming more and more acceptable to the U.S. right wing the so-called neoconservatives who claim that the choice of the imperial strategy is determined by the need to defend against threats to national security and to promote freedom and democ- racy20 (although this is indistinguishable from striving to preserve and expand U.S. power). As the Hobbesian world order vision was confirmed by the events of September 11 and as the traditional assumptions about threats and deterrence strategies lost their meaning, the logic of neo-imperialism is becoming too attractive to be refused.21 The imperial approach envisions imperial rule as a certain response to the challenges of globalisation to the nation-state. In other words, it is sought to re-empower the state to control its fate in the age of globalisation. However, apart from self-interested imperialism, when the empire is justified by the desire to ensure the safety of the imperial centre, there is also humanitarian imperialism, when the empire is motivated by the benefits to the periphery (transposition of good government traditions, resolution of human rights issues).22 Intellectual links between globalisation theories and the authors of the imperial perspective may be noted as relations in the international arena are becoming more interconnected, there emerge the premises of global politics and the need for global governance which could be implemented by a global multilateral institution or a hyperstate (which in its political structure would essentially be comparable to a global empire). On the other hand, a certain ideational affinity between the theorists of imperialism and the hegemonic stability theory within the (neo)realist paradigm as well as the neoliberals may be discerned. The said theory states that international stability depends on the will and capacity of the hegemonic power to create and maintain the world order.23 On the basis of this idea, the authors of the imperial perspective develop the ideas of the global liberal empire.24 The hegemonic stability idea is associated with the doctrine of liberal imperialism, which emphasises the political inequality of states: some states cannot legitimately intervene into the domestic affairs of other states disregarding the principles of national sovereignty and self-determination.25 As J. N. Pieterse notices, neoliberalism and the imperial perspective and

19 Barkawi T. and Laffey M., Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations, Millennium 31, 1 (2002), 110. 20 Cheney D., Rumsfeld D., Wolfowitz P. and others. See Mann M., (note 10). 21 Mallaby S., The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire, Foreign Affairs, 81, 2 03/04, 2002, 6. 22 Rao R., The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Ignatieff), Millennium 33, 1, 2004, 146. 23 Ikenberry G. J., Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony, Political Science Quarterly 104, 3 1989, 377, quoted from M. Cox (note 11), 587. 24 Ferguson N. believes that the U.S. is a liberal empire and regrets that world may not get enough of her because the U.S. does not fully exploit its capabilities to make the world a safer place. See Ferguson N., Colossus: the Price of Americas Empire (Penguin Books, 2004), quoted from Mann (note 10). 25 Purdy J., Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments, Carnegie Council on Ethics and Interna- tional Affairs, 3, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/analysis/2003/10liberalempi- re.htm, 05 01 2005. 35 the theorists and practitioners of neoliberal globalisation follow the same logic and lead to the same result to the global hierarchical integration.26 Therefore, it is understandable that, in order to protect the United States against threats and preserve domination, the U.S. neoconservatives promote the use of U.S. power in an insecure world it is considered to be a liberal force that nurtures the spread of democracy and is capable of suppressing tyranny and terrorism.27 Essentially, the authors of the imperial perspective who lament the undeserved abandonment of the concept of the empire may be called globalisation imperialists (or liberal neo-imperialists). Thus, in analysing debates about empires, three conceptualisations of the empire may be distinguished: classical, neo-classical and postmodern. Differentia- tion between the classical, neo-classical and postmodern ideal types of empires is particularly important for the recognition of empires the current imperial processes are different from past imperialism and the postmodern and neo-classical concepts of the empire permit discussion on new forms of empires. The qualitative difference between the classical (past) and the neo-classical (present imperialism) versions can be apprehended by analysing the foundations of imperial power and the relations between the imperial centre and peripheries: the hard (military) power, which was dominant in the past and on the basis of which empires were forged, is replaced by the soft (economic, social and cultural), while the formal relations of subordination between the imperial centre and the periphery is replaced by more informal and indirect ones. Theories of globalisation present a radically revisited postmodern conceptualisation of the empire. Basically, the empire is defined not by the clear relation between the centre and the periphery but by focusing on the governance regime. This conceptualisation of the empire does not have the centre as a political subject or, more precisely, the imperial centre is nothing more than a set of rules and norms constituting the governance regime and the network of institutions supervising these rules and norms. One of the more important features of such an empire that distinguishes it from the classical one is decentralisation. No single subject either nation or state is or can be the imperial centre or posses the power of the centre. Such imperial rule regime does not have limiting boundaries, it is characterised by universality and the sense of the end of history. However, we would argue that, when even the proponents of the postmodern concept of the empire admit that imperial relations are hierarchical relations of control and subordination and that there are subjects of the international system who are overseeing the implementation of the governance regime, the motives for which the imperial international relations system is created cannot be an essential argument in validating the academic independence of the postmodern concept of the empire. In other words, it seems that it is merely a concealed version of the neo-classical concept of the empire. Finally, it should be noted that as the imperial ambitions of such powers as the U.S., Russia, China or the EU are growing in the international arena, the

26 Pieterse J.N., Globalization or Empire, New York: Routledge, 2004, 39. 27 Kagan R., Power and Weakness, Policy Review, 113, 2002, http://www.policyreview.org/ JUN02/kagan.html, 03 04 2005. 36 study of empires is reasonably claiming to integrate the globalist, (neo)realist and (neo)liberalist theories in explaining the politics implemented by the subjects of the international arena and their mutual relations.

1.2. Attributes of Empires

Participants of debates about empires basically distinguish three essential criteria for the identification of empires: imperial ideology, concentration of power in the imperial centre (hierarchical structure of the centre), imperial peripheries existence of client states (satellites) (specific configuration of the structure of relations between the centre and the periphery).

1.2.1. Imperial Ideology

First, a state can become an empire only if it has an imperial perspecti- ve28 (self-understanding as an empire) or, in other words, an imperial ideology. Empires are a type of ideocracies, projections of one or more ideas (value systems) in the geopolitical space, as well as structures for their spread and implementation. The origin of ancient empires is indistinguishable from theocracy based on transcendental absolute sacral truths that are not bound by either time or space. Empires are missionary by definition. Therefore, an empire essentially lacks boundaries it is global and eternal because its ideational foundations are the absolute truths and values of belief. From this viewpoint, any imperial borders are temporary. Naturally, in reality geopolitical or ethno-cultural barriers stop the expansion of an empire and the assimilation of the barbarians. However, theocracy (ideocracy) inevitably presupposes the aspiration towards the global empire based on the spread of an absolute sacral truth.29 All previous empires were characterised by self-portrayal as a superior civilisation or ethnic or ethic (religious) community. The mission of all classical empires was to civilise (to proselytise) or at least contain the barbarians. Simi- larly, it may be observed that the Cold War barbarians, the Soviet Union and China, are being replaced by the axis of evil states, international terrorism and other freedom enemies in the contemporary rhetoric of American globalisation imperialists. For the ideologists of EU expansion, the barbarians are sub- stituted by the instability at the EU borders.30

28 Said E., Imperial Perspectives, Al-Ahram 24-30, 07, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ empire/analysis/2003/0730perspectives.htm, 05 01 2005. 29 ßêîâåíêî È., Îò èìïåðèè ê íàöèîíàëüíîìó ãîñóäàðñòâó[From Empire to Nation-State], in Ýòíîñ è Ïîëèòèêà [Ethnic group and Politics], ed. Ïðàçàóñêàñ À.À. (Ìîñêâà: Èçäàòåëüñòâî ÐÎÓ, 1997), 107-109 (in Russian). 30 Emerson M., The Wider Europe as the European Unions Friendly Monroe Doctrine, CEPS Policy Brief 27, Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2003, http://www.ceps.be. 37 1.2.2. Power Concentration in the Imperial Centre

As already mentioned, although empires are potentially global by nature, the barriers of geopolitical and cultural reality draw the boundaries of empires by impeding their expansion and force them to create a network of satellite (client) states the periphery of an empire.31 The authors of the imperial perspective emphasise that the key precondition for the formation of empires is a significant disproportion in power among the subjects of the international system. The imperial relationship of subjects indicates domination and control. The necessary condition for the emergence of this relationship is power, which may be defined as a causal link when the one who possesses power determines the behaviour of the subject of power. The hierarchical nature of relations in the international system that permits the formation of concentrated power pools (imperial centres) is considered to be the main precondition for the creation of empires. The emergence of a global empire requires a hierarchical world order, which exists if there is a dominant power in the international arena that establishes and enforces order. Discussions of the current state of the international system point out that the international arena is dominated by the U.S., which has a monopoly over the use of force, and that the domestic order of states at the national level is also influenced by the global influence of the United States.32 Therefore, the current structure of the international relations system is often called unipolar. Unipolarity impels the creation of an empire but is not the only condition for the emergence of the global imperial centre. Thus, apart from the imperial ideology, the second basic characteristic of an empire is the large concentration of power in one centre (not necessarily a physically defined territory) and its capacity for controlling the periphery. Imperial ideology and the concentration of power create the conditions for the recurrent, although not essential, feature of an empire a specific relationship between the state and an individual and a hierarchical (autocratic) imperial rule model. An empire does not have citizens but only subjects. Empi- res nurture the ruler-ruled political culture and autocratic (monarchical, sul- tanic) political regimes. This is not surprising. The raison dêtre of empires is the idea of which an empire is an earthly reflection. Therefore, an individual and the population of an empire are merely means for the implementation of the imperial idea. An empire is a perfect incarnation of the hierarchical principal the supreme hierarch (it could also be a collective institution) is a mediator between the sacral transcendental truths and the inhabitants of the empire, qualitatively superior to all the other subjects of the empire.33

31 Cox M., (note 11), 600. 32 Ibid. 33 È. ßêîâåíêî, (note 29), 107-109. 38 1.2.3. Imperial Periphery

Thus the phenomenon of empires is not possible without the imperial centre, and the latter without the periphery controlled by such a centre. There is a dialectics of the imperial centre and periphery. Classical definitions of an empire indicate that the object of the relation between the centre and the periphery is state sovereignty or communal capacity for self-regulation. It is emphasised that the peripheries may have their autonomous institutions and elites but without the possibility of independent government and decision-making. The level of subordination of the peripheries to the centre varies. On the basis of the historical analysis, some authors observe that ancient and medieval empires were characterised not by rigid hierarchy but by graduated political structures in which the influence of a hierarchically more organised centre was progressively lessening towards the deeper peripheries.34 In comparison to past empires, contemporary proto-imperial subjects (e.g., the United States) are able to control the periphery much more effectively due to globalisation and the speed of communication. The periphery may thus be much larger and more readily accessible by means of the new forms of control. The latter are related to the second aspect the increasing importance of soft power. According to J. G. Ikenberry, in shaping the world order, power and liberalism provide a much more potent mixture than the usual use of crude material power.35 Therefore, it is maintained that the liberal empire is far more attractive and its control would not be resisted (furthermore, such control would be less noticeable as well).36 The periphery of contemporary proto(neo)empires consists of a network of client states and other political subjects. The cost of administration of such a network is substantially lesser than the annexation of territories and a more favourable image of the imperial state can be created.37 In discussing past colonial empires, the rule over territories is particularly important. Empires were created by annexing the territories of others and appointing vicegerents to positions of authority. There was a belief that there has to be some sort of direct rule over the dominion for a power to be classified as an empire.38 On the other hand, control was not necessarily implemented directly: for example, the British imperialism pursued formal annexation and informal domination, direct political government and indirect economic control.39

34 Weaver O., Europes Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security, in International Society after the Cold War, eds. R. Fawn and J. Larkins (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 220-260. 35 Ikenberry G. J., Liberalism and Empire: Logics or Order in the American Unipolar Age, Review of International Studies 30, 3, 2004, 617. 36 Pieterse J. N., Neoliberal Empire, Theory, Culture & Society 21, 3, 2004, 119-140. 37 Sylvan D., Majeski S., An Agent-Based Model of the Acquisition of U.S. Client States, Paper prepared for presentation at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 2003, http://hei.unige.ch/sections/sp/courses/0304/sylvan/docs/hostile/ agentbasedmodel.pdf, 25.02.2005. 38 Lieven D., The Concept of Empire, http://www.fathom.com/feature/122086, 03 04 2005. 39 Gallagher J. and Robinson R., The Imperialism of Free Trade, Economic History Review 6, 1 ,1953, 1-25, quoted in Cox (note 11), 599. 39 The neo-classical concept of the empire emphasises new forms of the manifestation of imperial influence: the expansion of military bases it is based on the expansion and control of military bases, rather than the occupation of territories. It is suggested that the U.S. is consolidating its Cold War military power and re-arranging it bases according to the new global imperial rule sys- tem40 ; temporary territorial imperialism intervention to a foreign state, regime change and withdrawal after the establishment of a friendlier regime41 ; the current debates about empires emphasise greater disposition towards the rule of territories through informal control and not through annexation (i.e. the formal rule of territories is replaced by control through economic dependency, etc.).

1.2.4. Imperial Dynamics

When the international system is viewed as hierarchic by nature, the history of international relations appears as cycles of the formation and collapse of empires, and the strategy of building an empire is considered by the new imperialists to be the strategy of national and international security. While the Westphalian state system always made a claim to permanency, empires were always limited in time, emerging and disintegrating.42 According to A. J. Motyl, degeneration is typical to the very system of imperial government and, therefore, they can be considered to be self-destructive systems.43 The preconditions for the collapse of an empire: Disintegration from within. The constant friction between the centre and the periphery gradually leads to an inevitable conflict and the joining of the forces of peripheries against the centre may result in the disintegration of an empire. Imperial overstretch. It is conditioned by, firstly, the hypercentralisation of an empire, which means a less effective accumulation of information and use of resources that encourages the socio-political fragmentation of an empire. Se- condly, the excessive economic cost of the maintenance of an imperial regime increases the appeal of nationalism to regional elites and hampers the capacity of an empire to compete on the international arena with less fragmented states.44 Growing power of hostile forces. Empire building always prompts the formation of counter-alliances. The emergence of blocs of adversarial states either stops the expansion of an empire and increases the cost of its preservation (which eventually leads to its disintegration (see the second precondition) or destroys its power altogether.

40 Johnson Ch., The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, Metropoli- tan Books, 2004, 610. 41 Frum D. and Perle R., An End to Evil: How To Win the War on Terror , New York: Random House, 2003. 42 Coward M., (note 14). 43 Motyl A. J., From Imperial Decay to imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective, in Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and The Soviet Union, eds. Rudolph R. L. and Good D. F., St. Martins Press, 1992, 40. 44 Ibid., 27-28. 40 Thus the hierarchical international system, the concentration of power at the centre through the subordination of the periphery, and the imperial ideology creates conditions for the emergence of an imperial state. Imperial rule manifests itself in the control of other units of the international system. The conditions of the collapse of an empire are inbuilt in the imperial rule itself and the capacity of the units of the international system to form balance against an imperial power. Therefore, the dawn of the new age of empires is inseparable from the new age of anti-imperial revolts.

2. Imperiography (Identification of Empires)

As already mentioned in examining the theoretical debates regarding the formation of empires, they are essentially incited by the ongoing changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. under the conditions of increasing unipolarity. Therefore, the natural course to begin the identification of empires would be to examine the existence of the main attribute of empires the imperial ideology in the U.S. (without disregard to the other two attributes as well). Ana- lyses of this and the other attributes of empires in the cases of the EU, Russia and China indicate the empire building processes in these countries as well.

2.1. The United States of America

At the moment, the United States may not yet be called a fully-fledged empire. However, among all the contemporary great powers, the U.S. has the greatest potential to become a global empire. The U.S. has a messianic imperial vision and sufficient power to implement it, which after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, is upheld by an influential political force the neoconservatives. The neoconservatives essentially understand the U.S. global rule as the Empire of Freedom, which primarily aims to build peace in the world through the spread of freedom and democracy based on the U.S. military superiority. Scholars analysing events in the international arena agree in principle that the U.S. is the only global hegemon after the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no state that could match the U.S. in its power. Naturally, a state or an alliance capable of challenging the U.S. may emerge in the medium term, i.e. in the next 10-15 years. Nevertheless, the United States substantially surpasses all its closest competitors claiming the status of a global hegemon both in terms of its military capacity and in terms of economic potency, as well as the level of technological development and the global reach of its culture. As mentioned, a certain vision is required for building an empire. It seems that the U.S. has such a vision. It is a messianic universalist world vision, in which the American nation (as a civic nation) performs the divine mission related to the spread of freedom and democracy in the world. The universalisa- 41 tion of democratic liberal values creates the conditions for the qualitative transformation of the global hegemony of the U.S. Apart from the unprecedented dominance of U.S. power in various areas, some episodes of concentration of power in the centre can already be observed. After September 11, activists of the administration of President G. W. Bush initiated the establishment of several new intelligence, security and strategic planning institutions that are accountable only to the president or his close subordinates: a new special service the Homeland Security Department; a new analysis and planning unit the Office of Special Plans under the Ministry of Defence45 ; the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization under the State Department, which is responsible for co-ordination of the activities of the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA and other U.S. institutions in stabilising Iraq and other collapsed states and conflict regions. Moreover, a draft bill has already been registered at the Senate regarding the establishment of the Office for International Reconstruction and Stabilisation, which would be responsible for full-scale international implementation of the functions of the said co-ordinator for reconstruction and stabilisation.46 The main characteristic of an empire is political domination. Political domination means that the periphery does what the centre commands it.47 All the empires that have existed so far (e.g., Roman, Chinese, British empires) had a clear hierarchy of authority. While the current political domination of the U.S., which manifests as political influence, in some states (e.g., Iraq) may remind of the political control of peripheral zones by past empires, this obviously does not yet give reason to talk about a fully-fledged global American empire. Neverthe- less, the problems encountered by the U.S. in the implementation of foreign policies remind us of those that were troubling past empires.48 As America ensures control over a certain number of states and societies and with the corresponding changes in its domestic political-administrative structure, the implacable logic of the resolution of these problems may force the United States into becoming a fully-fledged global empire. The U.S. currently has the largest network of client (satellite) states in the world. According to S. Majeski and D. Sylvan, at least sixty states in the world are currently dependent on the U.S., i.e. their patron state.49 Many of the geostrategically most important states are clients of the U.S.; the indirect control of these states allows talking about the potential creation of a global system of governance based on American values. A significant increase in the control exerted from

45 Pieterse J. N., Neoliberal Empire, Theory, Culture & Society 21, 3, 2004, 119-140. 46 Ignatius D., A Quiet Transformation, Washington Post, May 18, 2005, http://www.was- hingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/17/AR2005051701327.html, 18 05 2005. 47 Schell J., Americas Vulnerable Imperialism, Yale Global Online, 2003, http://yaleglo- bal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2873 , 19 03 2005. 48 Cohen E. A., History and Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs 83, 4, 2004, 49-63. 49 Majeski S. and Sylvan D., An Agent-Based Model of the Acquisition of U.S. Client States, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2003, http://hei.unige.ch/sections/ sp/courses/0304/sylvan/docs/hostile/agentbasedmodel.pdf , 21 06 2005. 42 Washington over the domestic and foreign policies of client states and the growth of the number of new satellite states could be considered to be a clear-cut criterion of the formation of the U.S. empire.

2.2. The European Union

The current European Union has features of both the neo-classical and the postmodern empire. First, the EU functions as a governance regime characterised by a unified set of rules. Second, a power relation exists, in which the peripheries accept and conform to the decisions of the centre. Third, the enlargement of the EU conditions the absence of clear boundaries and the internal mobility of the governance regime, as well as a weakly hierarchical structure. However, the problems of the centre of the EU empire result in the uniqueness of the European Union as an emerging empire. The idea of Europeanisation is the European Unions analogue to the U.S. ideology of liberal globalisation. In our opinion, Europeanisation can most usefully be defined as the deepening of the European integration and the impact of this process on the states outside the EU, as well as the adjustment of these states to the EU. Europeanisation is essentially the process of synchronisation and harmonisation of the domestic and foreign policies of the member states, the candidate state and the neighbouring states. Europeanisation takes place through the adaptation of the business conditions to the norms functioning in the EU, the democratisation of domestic political systems, the implementation of obligations in the area of human rights and freedoms, and the introduction of European values, beliefs and identity. Therefore, in our opinion, Europeanisa- tion is a complex historical phenomenon that characterises the potential imperialism of Europe, the spread of cultural values, norms, traditions, as well as political and economic practices50 , while the promotion and propagation of Europeanisation serves as the Pan-European ideology.51 The governance system of the EU and its comparisons to the nation-state system has been one of the main puzzles of leading EU scholars for quite some time now. The mainstream approaches conceptualise the EU as a multi-level governance system.52 The more critical ones see the EU as network governance,

50 Diamandouros N., Cultural dualism and political change in postauthoritarian Greece, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 1994, quoted from Featherstone K., Introduction: In the Name of Europe, in Featherstone K. and Radaelli C. eds., The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press, 2003, 3-27. 51 Motieka E., Statkus N., Jonas Daniliauskas, Global Geopolitical Developments and Op- portunities for Lithuanian Foreign Policy, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius: Lithuanian Military Academy, 2005, p. 27-66, http://beta.lka.lt/~serveris/biblioteka/ KNYGOS/strategic_review_2004.pdf 52 Marks G.M., Scharpf F.W., Schmitter P.C., Streeck W., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage Publications, 1996); Christiansen T., Reconstructing European Space: From Territorial Politics to Multilevel Governance, in Jørgensen K. E. ed.Reflective Approaches to European Governance, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 43 while others specialise in more narrow analyses of decision-making processes. However, all these approaches share the view that the EU has already become a governance system in which the competencies of the main decision-making actors the national governments and the supranational EU institutions are intertwined. The EU has already become a governance system in which the centre the supranational institutions of the EU create rules that are mandato- ry for the peripheries the member states.53 The position of peripheries in relation to the centre, largely determined by the close integration and voluntarism, is being replaced by dependency. Some states agree to implement voluntary imperisation in the areas of high politics as well (the last sanctuary of states); however, other states have different visions of the EU. The discrepancies between the visions, variations in the integration to the EU structures, and the different coalitions of the member states determine the European Unions movement towards a postmodern empire. The imperial power relation of the EU is also manifest in the enlargement policy. As old member states attract third parties like a gravitation centre, the EU policies towards these states turn into the domination of the centre and the control of the peripheries. By setting the conditions of membership, the centre sets and controls the reforms and adjustment in the peripheries. The result is that external peripheries become internal ones. The membership negotiations of Central and Eastern Europe illustrate this process. Various geopolitical factors and the European Unions reputation as a guarantee of democracy, prosperity and welfare in third countries turned the EU club into a centre of gravitation. Through its enlargement policies, the EU functions as an integral imperial centre that directly and indirectly influences the peripheries the states seeking to join the EU. The membership conditions that must be met by the candidates in order to achieve full membership in the EU function as a mechanism of domination and control.54 The new European Neighbourhood Policy has already become a compromise that reconciles the deceleration of enlargement with the further projection of EU power to third countries without giving a clear promise of membership. Action plans devised for each particular state participating in the Neighbourho- od Policy are used by the EU to exert indirect influence they determine the progress, assess the state and the technical analysis of relations with the EU, and encourage reforms financially. Thereby the EU creates buffer zones of stability in the East, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Sea region. This new Euro- pean Neighbourhood project contributes to the EUs evolution towards the imperial model by softening the boundaries between the inside and the outside of the EU. Agreements at various levels between the EU and the neighbourhood

53 On the regulatory state in the functional sense, see Majone G., Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Carporaso J.A., The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?, Journal of Common Market Studies 34, 1, 1996, 29-52. 54 Böröcz J., Empire and Coloniality in the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, in Böröcz J. and Kovacs M., eds., Empires New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement, Central Europe Review, 2001, http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~eu/Empire.pdf. 44 countries that are likely in the future will form additional overlapping structures. The Barcelona Process for the Mediterranean Sea region and the Stability Pact supporting the Balkan countries perform essentially the same function as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Thus the EU enlargement process obscures the boundaries between the inside and the outside that are characteristic to the classical state. Shifting borders is a typical feature of medieval empires. The enlargement of the European Union is becoming a form of colonialism, whereby the Other is incorporated into the population of the empire but does not fully become part of the Self. The complex structure of the EU is characterised not by hierarchy but rather by overlapping, graduated structures. The Euro-zone and the Schengen area provide the best example of the formation of overlapping circles-coalitions, which create the inside-outside effect the core states inside and the peripheries outside. The postmodern EU Empire as a geopolitical entity does not have a future in the Westphalian international system. Further enlargement and the lack of unity will paralyse the EU as a unitary agent in foreign policy. In the event of the Post- Westphalian international system (the new middle ages), the development model of the EU empire would become the model. Institutionalised interdependency, an integrated system of multiple policies and unified rules, obscure boundaries between the inside and the outside, and the voluntary movement towards the dissolution of state sovereignty are the defining features of the Post-Westphalian international system. In an ideal case, the evolution of the Post-Westphalian system would culmi- nate in a global voluntary empire without the sovereign subject at the centre.

2.3. Russia

Russia is not merely a state or a distinct society it is an individual and unique civilisation. The defining characteristic of the Russian civilisation is the constant fear for its survival. This fear finds its expression in messianism and the missionary imperialist state created and constantly recreated by it. Over the centuries, only the names of missions and the ideological grounding were changing. The duchy of Moscow liberated itself as well as other Russian duchies from the Mongol Tartars. Later, Muscovy liberated the Orthodox lands of Kiev Russia captured by the Catholics and the Muslims. Then the Russian empire liberated brother Slavs and other nations from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire and the Germans. Finally, the Soviet Union liberated the proletariat of the entire world. In actual terms, liberation usually meant incorporation to Russia and the imposition of the Russian civilisation, which was supposed to result in increasing the security of both the incorporated ones and Russia. This mission of liberation indicated the indeterminacy of Russian identification. On the other hand, the mission of liberation concealed the intertwined aspirations of security and imperialism, the Machiavellian realism and the Campanilian idealism.55

55 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., Baltijos valstybiø geopolitikos bruoþai. XX amþius [The Baltic States in the Twentieth Century: A Geopolitical Sketch], Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005), 313-314 (in Lithuanian). 45 At present, Russia no longer has any particular mission of liberation but the general disposition of the disseminator of the good still remains. This disposition is noticeable in the daily ideological propaganda in Russia in relation to, for example, the countries that once belonged to Moscows sphere of influence and, especially, that were part of the USSR. The propaganda reveals a tendency to emphasise that the population (the people) of one or another state favour Russia and express desire to integrate with it and that, seemingly, only the ruling elites of these countries divert them from Russia. This is a typical symp- tom of latent imperialism.56 Currently, the ruling elite of the Russian Federation propagate an idiosyncratic set of symbols and values composed of individual components of Soviet ideology, the ideas of Zapadniks (Westernisers), and elements of the Eurasian perspective. True, it must be noted that the ideological schizophrenia is characteristic to Russias transitions from one political and social order to another. During the presidency of V. Putin, a closer political and economic integration of the former republics of the USSR with Russia as well as the centralisa- tion of the administration of the Russian Federation itself has become a priority for the presidents administration.57 In this way, Putin seems to have returned the state to the traditional domestic and foreign policy course of Russia. In order to achieve control over the post-Soviet space (including the Baltic States), Russia uses the instruments of diplomatic pressure, economic and energy dependence, and information conditioning. Moreover, Russian foreign policy-makers take advantage of ethnic tensions and conflicts in the former republics of the USSR, as well as connections with criminal organisations and special services of the USSR.58 In domestic politics, Putin strengthened and expanded the powers and the apparatus of the presidents administration, thereby creating the so-called vertical of authority. The presidents administration doubles the work of the government and other state institutions. The administration and presidential representatives in federal districts essentially perform the functions of the apparatus of the former Communist Party. Putins administration supplements the power monopoly of the central authorities with economic state monopolies. Current plans are to form a multip- rofile mega-concern of raw materials on the foundation of Gazprom. The logic of central state control would inevitably spread to other strategically important areas of the economy as well. In other words, the oligarchic monopolies of the times of B. Yeltsin are gradually being replaced by the monopolies of state ap- paratchiks (a large number of whom consists of former and present members of special services).59

56 Ibid., 313-314. 57 Bugajski J., Cold Peace. Russias New Imperialism ,Westport: Praeger, 2004, 29. 58 Ibid., 32-49. 59 Shevtsova L., Russia in 2005: The Logic of Backsliding, New Europe Review 2, 3, 2005, http://www.neweuropereview.com/English/Shevtsova.cfm . 46 Russia still has imperial ambitions and its relations with the near abroad possess the character of the relations between the imperial centre and the peripheries. However, these ties are weakening and the ambitions are not supported by effectively co-ordinated actions of the governmental and non-governmental structures in mobilising the required resources. Russias attempts to control the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia were not successful. Thus the project of the restoration of the new USSR may at best be implemented within the bounds of the territories of Russia, Belarus, Eastern Uk- raine and Northern Kazakhstan.60 Essentially, this corresponds to the boundaries of the geostrategic continental zone the heartland. This re-imperisation of Russia would be based on ethnic and cultural commonalities, the existing integration of economies and the energy dependence on Russia. Russias influence in other post-Soviet states is waning and there are no convincing indications that Russia could restore control over these states in the medium term. Russia is currently undergoing a crisis of realisation of its imperial potential. The Russian Federation faces a set of external and internal problems that is ruining the remains of the former empire. Internally, Russia faces the social and economic backwardness of regions and the growing extremism of the Muslim subjects of the federation. The case of Chechnya shows that Russia encounters difficulties in controlling the situation inside the state and the Chechen tendencies threaten to engulf neighbouring Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, as well as Turkmenistan and Bashkiristan that are experiencing crises of regional government and growth of the Islamic factor. Externally, the Russian Federation encounters the problem of making a geopolitical choice between the Euroconti- nentalist and the Eurasian perspectives. In the event of a choice, Russia will be treated as a junior partner that has energy resources and a well-developed military industrial base as its main advantage.

2.4. China

The imperial traditions of China go back to two thousand years before Christ. The strategic and political culture of China is essentially imperial. They affect every aspect of life in China.61 The traditional Chinese strategic and political culture has profound influence on the modern Chinese state and geopolitical identity, as well as its foreign policies, and encourages Sino-centrism and Chinese imperialism in East Asia. The modern imperialist ideology of China focuses on the concept of the peaceful ascension in international politics. The so-called fourth generation of Chinas leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao) replaced Chinas strategic foreign policy goal of creating a multipolar world with the aim of peaceful ascension. Peaceful ascension is primarily based in the supposedly mutually beneficial co-operation in economic, social and military areas with the neighbouring coun-

60 Ibid. 61 Tao Jiyi, Chinese Tradition on Foreign Policy, Chinese American forum 19, 4, 2004. 47 tries. The provision of good neighbourhood policies is meant to resolve disputes with the neighbouring countries and strengthen economic ties with other East Asian states, as well as provide for the peaceful expansion of Chinas influence in the region and help China integrate into the global economy.62 However, Chinese strategists discuss the necessity for China to create a survival space around it (i.e. essentially turning the neighbouring states into buffers and controlling the South and East Chinese seas). Thus, the concept of peaceful ascension is basically supposed to help China create in the medium term a regional system and economic co-operation in East and Southeast Asia under the leadership of China, which would exclude the U.S.63 Chinas aspiration to become the leader of East and Southeast Asia is based on a long historical tradition of Sino-centrism.64 Moreover, the global and regional position of China determines that continental China understands itself not as the only legitimate Chinese state (in the dispute between China and Taiwan) but as the defender and promoter of the entire Chinese civilisation as the state of all the Chinese of the world. The growth of Chinese power is a long-term historical process. In the course of the last two thousand years, China has more than once reached the status of a regional power* . The idea of the revival of Chinas influence was used in the rhetoric of both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, as well as Jiang Zemin. The concept of the recovery of power involves a psychological understanding of power, which is manifested in Chinas aspirations to reclaim the former global status of the country and the concept of peaceful rise. In 1978, the Communist leadership of the country made the decision to implement four radical modernisations of the countrys industry, agriculture, science and technology, as well as its military force. The Programme of Four Modernisations aims to integrate China into the global economy, create a viable modern socially-oriented market economy and a defence system corresponding to the status of a superpower.65 The surprising continuity of Chinas domestic and foreign policies was ensured by the stability of the Chinese Communist Partys rule. The party basically performs the role of a traditional monarchical dynasty. The structure of the party is characterised by strict hierarchies, distribution of functions and centra- lisation of authority. The functions performed by the chairman of the party may be seen as analogous to the traditional functions of the Chinese emperor. Alt- hough lately China has been placing more emphasis on its economic growth as

62 Medeiros E.S. and Fravel M.T., Chinas New Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 82, 6, 2003, 22-35. 63 Motieka E., Statkus N., Jonas Daniliauskas (note 51), 27-66. 64 Van Ness Peter, Chinas Response to the Bush Doctrine, World Policy Journal 21, 4, 2005, 38-47. * During the rule of the Chan (206 BC-220 AD), Tang (618-907) and early Ming (1368-1643) dynasties. According to the calculations of historical political economy, Chinas GDP in 1820 (29 years before the Opium Wars) constituted approximately a third of world GDP. The defeat in the Opium Wars substantially weakened the Chinese Empire ruled by the Cin dynasty and paved the way for its collapse in 1911. 65 Barnett A. D., Political Overview, in Shao-chuan Leng ed., Reform and Development in Dengs China, Virginia: University Press of America, 1994, 1. 48 the foundation of overall national power, China also seeks to strengthen its military power and its strategic position as well. The programme for the modernisation of the national military forces of contemporary China states the aim of Chinese political and military leadership is to strengthen its influence on the sea, as well as its view of the east and the south as the main source of threats to China. Regaining influence over the neighbouring states is an important indicator of Chinas rebirth as an empire. Chinas relations with Mongolia and Myan- mar (Burma) are particularly important in this regard. The rapid economic growth of China, the programmes for the modernisation of the armed forces, and its increasing political and economic influence over the countries of the ASEAN worries the foreign policy elites of the U.S.66 Therefore, the U.S. is creating a system of preventive alliances against China in East Asia.67 The U.S. is strengthening military co-operation with India and has reinforced its strategic ties with Japan, Australia68 , and Singapore.69 Thus, as in the case of the imperial ambitions of the EU and Russia, the future of Chinas empire in the long term depends on its ability to resolve its domestic problems and create (as well as preserve) a bloc of satellite (peripheral) states (a certain buffer zone of its own). The creation of such a bloc would be favourable to the implementation of Chinas concept of peaceful rise. In building a bloc of exclusive influence, China would reduce the strategic superiority of other powers, primarily the U.S. and Russia.

3. Opportunities for Small States in the Imperial Structure

The imperiographical analysis presented above reveals that the great states of the world the U.S., Russia and China are evolving towards the formation of neo-classical imperial structures. The formation process of the EU as a postmodern empire is taking place in Europe. Naturally, questions arise regarding the impact of these processes on the foreign policies of small states (including Lithuania) and the eventual opportunities for their international action. The definition of small states is not universally accepted in the academic literature and depends on the criteria selected by each scholar. There are two approaches in describing small states and, correspondingly, two groups of definitions: those based on quantitative parameters and those based relational characteristics.

66 Sutter R., Why Does China Matter? The Washington Quarterly, 27, 1, 2003, 75-89. 67"How ASEAN can hold its own against China, The Straits Time, http://straitsti- mes.asia1.com.sg/home/0,1869,,00.html 68Blank S., Toward a New U.S. Strategy in Asia, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/about/ 2004/feb/feboped.pdf 69 The US and Singapore establish new strategic defense and security ties, Radio Singapore International, 22, 10, 2003. 49 Quantitative definitions list the measurable characteristics of states, such as territory, population and GDP, and assign various values to these criteria, according to which a state may be described as a small state. Relational definitions are based on the results of mutual relations between states, as well as ideational factors (identity, etc.). According to these definitions, small states are those which do not have independent policies and are under the influence (tute- lage) of larger states. It is clear that both groups of definitions use state power as an essential criterion in distinguishing states as small and large, only definitions of the first group value the relative power of states and definitions of the second the structural power.70 In our opinion, both types of power are important in describing the status of states in the international system. It is important both how a state assesses itself and how it is assessed by other subjects of the system, as well as the material parameters of power. However, it must be stated for the purposes of this article that the existence of small states, however defined, depends on and acquires meaning only in the context of the interests of large states.71 Small states in multipolar or bipo- lar international relations systems may perform a number of useful functions: they may serve as buffer states, barriers, outposts, geopolitical gateways, resource-rich peripheries, diplomatic mediators, etc.72 In the context of the problems examined in this article, it is important to examine and historically compare the roles of small states in hierarchical (imperial) structures of the international relations system. The results of comparative historical studies of the role of small states in imperial international relations structures show that: First, small states in strictly hierarchical (imperial) international relations structure survive if they are sufficiently far from imperial centres and have geostrategic importance; Second, small states in international systems dominated by land empires more often perform three main roles buffers, barriers, and outposts; Third, small states in international systems dominated by sea empires are more often performing the role of outposts and geopolitical nodes (protection of communication nodes).

4. Opportunities for Lithuania

According to the mentioned scenarios of the imperial world order, Lithu- anias opportunities will be determined by two circumstances.

70 Statkus N., Motieka E., Laurinavièius È., Geopolitiniai kodai [The Geopolitical Codes], Vilnius: Vilniaus Universiteto leidykla, 2003, 84-87 (in Lithuanian). 71 See Background notes on the notion of weak state as employed in International Relations Studies, Central European University: Notes made in preparation of the Florence Blue Bird Overcoming State Weakness: An Agenda for State Reform in Eastern Europe Conference, http:// www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/pap/aligica3.pdf, 15.01.2005. 72 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N. (note 55), 15-16. 50 First, the decision of the large states regarding the eventual functions of Lithuania as a state at the junction of geostrategic zones. Geostrategically, Lit- huania and other Baltic States are located at the fringe of the discontinental geostrategic zone. This essentially delineates the range of particular functions: a barrier of maritime states or an outpost against the continental states; a barrier of heartland states or an outpost against maritime states. Second, the resolution of Lithuania itself regarding the functions provided for it by the geopolitical codes of the large states. At the moment, as a result of its political initiative and civilisation belonging, Lithuania orients itself towards sea states.73 The orientation is based on the historical experience and the belief grounded in the realist paradigm that Russias political and military power in the region can only be counterbalanced by the U.S. This creates tension with both Russia and the core states of the European Union that attempt to use Russia in acquiring strategic independence from the U.S. If the key global power centres are evolving towards empires, Lithuania will soon doubtlessly face the necessity to reconsider the consequences of its choice. Essentially, the number of choices is limited: continuing orientation towards the U.S., aligning with the continental core of the EU, or benefiting from the growth of Russias influence. Each of these choices entails different correla- tions of threats and opportunities in the short and in the long term.* Orientation towards the U.S. With regard to short-term threats, the cost required by the U.S. imperial project of global democratisation should first be mentioned: financial and human resources for the peacekeeping, peace enforce- ment and democracy promotion operations initiated by the Americans. This could decrease Lithuanias possibilities of ensuring smooth socio-economic development and create tensions in domestic politics. The situation would be aggravated by Russias attempts to take advantage of the domestic problems of the country, as well as the diplomatic pressure of the EU core states with regard to joining the Eurozone, delays in European projects, reduction of support from structural funds, etc. In the long term, the client status of Lithuania, as well as other states continuing similar orientation, would strengthen. Eventually, multilateral institutions under the exclusive control of the U.S. would not fulfil their purpose as they would not ensure the political autonomy and, even more, if there were exchanges of the spheres of interests between great states. On the other hand, Lithuanias opportunities resulting from orientation towards the U.S. are already apparent. Tensions with Russia and the core states of the EU have been overcome, albeit with some difficulty. Lithuania receives support in positioning NATO and the EU towards the East (Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, Belarus, Moldova, and South Caucasus). In other words, Lithuania is regarded as an effective implementer of democratisation projects that reasonably aspires to distinctiveness in the region. In the long-term perspective, the acquired experience and the accumulated human potential

73 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N. (note 55), p. 80. * Threats and opportunities are assessed from the viewpoint of the general national interests: political autonomy, territorial integrity, and material welfare of citizens. 51 would allow Lithuania to achieve the role of an expert on Eastern Europe and Northern Russia and diplomatic mediator (an outpost of the spread of U.S. influence), transformable into the role of the barrier against Russias imperial reintegration. The implementation of U.S. plans aiming at strengthening transatlantic co-operation (e.g., the creation of a transatlantic free trade zone, the transatlantic summit council, etc.) would allow expecting both economic benefits and political dividends for Lithuania. To conclude, it may be argued that the long-term benefits of this choice would outweigh the threats and their costs. Alignment with the continental states of Europe. The short-term threats of this strategy are lesser but the long-term benefits are dubious. Full integration of Lithuania into the functioning EU mechanisms, the introduction of euro, and so forth, should result in social stabilisation and economic development, although at the likely price of reduced political autonomy. If Lithuania manages to integrate with the economic nucleus of the EU and perform economic or political functions that are useful for the large EU states, Lithuania would become a safe, golden province of the EU. On the other hand, alignment with the core of the EU would be one of the factors strengthening the federalisation of the European Union, i.e. its becoming a fully-fledged geopolitical subject, which would melt the autonomy of states. In regaining its strategic independence, the EU may be forced to enter into exchanges of the spheres of influence with Russia. This would be particularly felt at the eastern borders of the EU, liberated from the imperial influence of the U.S., where Russia would gain dominance. Elements of these event scenarios may be observed in the current situation as well. The core states of the EU are sometimes rather indulgent towards Russias efforts to increase Lithuanias dependence (e.g., energy dependence) and to ostentatiously point to its continuing presence within Russias sphere of influence. Russia motivates its actions by both short-term (social stabilisation, development of communications transport and energy, as well as agricultural sectors) and long-term benefits, cultural affinities and the important geopolitical function of Lithuania in bringing Russia closer to Europe. Such motivation has the following implications turning Lithuania into an agent of influence in the Western transatlantic and European institutions and strengthening shared cultural (linguistic) basis. Doubtlessly, the implementation of this projection would eventually turn Lithuania into an outpost of the renovated Russian empire in Europe.

Concluding Remarks

Obviously, the projection of Lithuanias capabilities is based on a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. It illuminates the range of available options. Howe- ver, this analysis alone may not serve as the basis for making a decision. Prima- rily, because the so-called imperial tendencies discerned in the international system lack any definitiveness. Apparently, only the third the Russian option 52 does not raise questions. Yet, even in this case, the pragmatic allurement of stability could be stronger than the other two options that presuppose more freedom but greater risks as well. In other words, further political analysis of these issues is futile because the choice will be finally determined by the values dominating in the Lithuanian political community. Naturally, Lithuanias resolution regarding one or another foreign policy strategy will not have a decisive influence on its international position. The context of global geopolitical processes is particularly important in this regard. The growing imperial tendencies in international relations should neither be perceived as only threatening nor ignored. The tendencies of imperialisation indicate efforts to minimise the possibility of global turmoil by increasing control over global processes. If this process accelerates, the basis for the survival of small states will be their ability to find specialised niches in the imperialist international environment (e.g., administration of the territories of failed states, development of market economy mechanisms and democratic institutions, etc.). In the particular case of Lithuania, global management needs must be identified and corresponding capabilities must be created for the fulfilment of these needs. A pragmatic cost-benefit analysis seems to indicate that, in the long term, the global (imperial) governance project nurtured by the U.S. is superior and more advantageous for Lithuania. Among other things, this would mean a serious revision of Beresnevièius idea we have already been invited to forge an empire. Changing European Security Space 55 Space Egidijus Motieka, Laurynas Kasèiûnas* Public Establishment Center for Strategic Studies

Lithuanian-German Relations in the Context of Global Geopolitical Challenges at the Beginning of 21st Century

The article puts forth several tasks. The first tast is to ascertain the possible Germanys impact on the further development of Lithuanias geopolitical subjectivity. The second task is to identify the main principles of current Germanys geopolitical code. Thirdly, it will examine Lithuanias and Germanys interests in the context of eventual global geopolitical transformations and construct scenarios of development relating to the international environment. Fourthly is will construct the broad spectrum of possible scenarios (including positive and negative ones) on Lithuanias and Ger- manys bilateral relations. And fifth, it will ascertain the optimal model for Lithuania in shaping its relations with Germany.

1. Factors Determining Lithuanias Geopolitical Subjectivity: the Impact of Germany

Lithuanias geopolitical status directly depends on its global geopolitical situation because of the weak relative power parameters (internal potential) of the country. The global geopolitical situation depends upon the geopolitical tendencies in the geostrategic triangle consisting of the USA, the European Union and Russia. This is why the geopolitical projections of the main geopolitical subjects, particularly the USA, Russia and main European powers (Germany, in this case) and the configurations of those projections should be identified and predicted at the global, as well as at the regional level, before indicating the probable dynamics of Lithuanias geopolitical situation. International organisations such as NATO and the EU perform the functions of power projection instruments for the great powers. This is why the interaction of power levers dynamics and the geostrategic choices of the main

* Dr. Egidijus Motieka Director of the Public Establisment Center for Strategic Studies, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Vokieèiø 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2514130, [email protected]; Laurynas Kasèiûnas Head of division, Public Establishment Center for Strategic Studies, MA student of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Vokieèiø 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2514130, [email protected]. 56 actors the great powers unavoidably have direct influence on the further development prospects of the international organisations mentioned above. If the currently existing international institutionalism does not provide the conditions to control the geopolitical interaction processes with other actors for the geopolitical subject, presumably the subject would seek to reform the functioning international organisations in a manner so that the new tendencies of institutionalism or de-institutionalism would increase their structural power. This leads to the conclusion that Lithuanias membership in NATO and the European Union does not eliminate its dependence on various tendencies of the great powers and their power balancing games or the redistribution of their geographic and/or sector spheres of influence. The conjuncture of Lithuanias geopolitical situation, conditioned by the instability and dynamism of the global geopolitical situation, is the main geopolitical challenge for Lithuanian foreign policy in the beginning of 21st century. The German factor is very important in the context that Germany is the largest state with the greatest structural power in Western Europe. The transformation of European Russian, American European and even American Russian relations is impossible without Germanys (self)-involvement in the global geopolitical schemes1 . Such situations turn Germany into a very important player in the international arena, because of Germanys potential power for directing the further developments of the international system. The European Union, for example, had been initially created as the reminiscence of Carolingian empire (i.e. the core of Western Europe) under the cover of Euro-Atlantism (the USA) and later has turned towards the concept of the Greater Europe, yet progressively still remaining under this cover. On the other hand the geopolitical concept of euro-atlantism or, more precisely the USA, which created the conditions for the development of the new power centre in Europe, is experiencing increasingly sharper contradictions with this new centre of power at the moment. Germanys bolstered idea of realising the independent Greater Europe concept through the European Union is the cause of such contradictions. The degree of this Euro-Atlantic collision or the critical limits of disagreements practically depends not on the position of France or any other European state, but on Germanys choice of its geopolitical code. It means that the degree of collision depends on the way Germany chooses for the realisation of its propa- gated vision of Greater Europe: would that be realized under the concept of Euro-Atlantism or contrary under the concept designed on limiting the spread of American influence to the European security system? This example shows exactly the impact of such alterations in Germanys geopolitical code on Lithuanias geopolitical subjectivity. Lithuania could feel safe enough as the part of the democratic world, which dominates today, as long as the symbiosis between Europe (Germany) and the USA exists, because Lithu-

1 Belov V., Russian Perceptions of Germanys Role in the EU and Europe in Joop M., Schneider H., Schmalz U., eds., Germanys European Policy: Perceptions in Key Partner Countries, Berlin, 2002, p. 271. 57 anias structural power correspond with the paradigm of the global spread of democracy. All of Lithuanias loses experienced while performing one or another possible geopolitical function are covered automatically from the resources of the whole democratic world in this context. But those loses could fall on Lithuania alone a split between the USA and the Europe (Germany) occurred in the Euro-Atlantic structures. If Lithuania could not bear the costs of the aforementioned loses, then it may become the geopolitical province either of Europe (in the best case) or Russia.

2. The Contemporary Geopolitical Code of Germany as the Derivation of Historical paradigms of German Foreign Policy

The current geopolitical code of Germany may be considered as the derivation of the various German foreign policy paradigms, which have come into play in various historical periods. Germanys strategic orientation towards atlantistic states was structured by Konrad Adenauer after the World War II and today still occupies the most important place in the hierarchy of those paradigms. The primary and main function of this orientation is Germanys geopolitical linking with the forpost of liberal democracy (the Atlantistic states) in aspiration, that Germany consequently would become the bridgehead of democracy instead of the geopolitically destabilising factor in Europe. Such strategy also may be considered as the doctrine of self-containment2 . Some manifestations of the Ostpolitik tradition enforced by Willy Brandt in the 1970s are characteristic features of contemporary Germanys foreign policy. The decline of tensions between the East and the West is the essence of Brandts Policy towards East and Germany is currently one of the geopolitical subjects calling for good relations (the cohabitation) with Russia in the spirit of it3 . Germany supports the EUs enlargement into Central and Eastern Euro- pe and the Balkans, and backs deeper European integration towards federalism. Such policy makes allusion one of the main elements of the Greater Europe concept, e.g. expansion of the European Union, which would be composed of all countries of European civilisation and would even step in the area of neighbouring civilisations consequently creating the system of satellite states around it in the East and thereby increase Germanys influence on those countries. The paradigm of the Greater Europe together with the concept of Atlantism dominate in todays Germany and those paradigms may either be coherent or conflict with each other depending on the way of the implementation of the Greater Europe vision: would it be implemented under the cover of an American provided hard power shield or without it.

2 Hacke Ch., Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, Ullstein Verlag, 2003, p. 521-584. 3 Belov V., (note 1) p. 274. 58 On the other hand, the concept of Greater Europe competes with the vision of Carolingian Europe in the current German foreign policy. The concept of Carolingian Europe expresses the supranational Western European commonness and also indicates Germanys geopolitical orientation towards some kind of political-economic core of Europe and the deeper European integration on the basis of this core, which means an orientation to the two-speed Europe model. The strategic partnership between Berlin and Paris is the expression of the Caro- lingian Europe vision in German foreign policy4 . Such a geopolitical axis makes preconditions for a fusion of the most important Western European countries into one geopolitical subject. Germany needs an alliance with France to increase and preserve its influence on the EU and to limit the American unilateralism5 . However, the paradigm of Carolingian Europe incites the dissolution of Germany in democratic supranational structures, especially in the European Union. On the other hand, this German geopolitical code may be called the post- national one and it is based on the congruity of the EU and Germany. The Europe- an Union becomes one of the most important global power centres in the world and Germany as a leader (or one of the leaders) of it automatically acquires a means to realise its global geopolitical interests as well as the interests of the EU6 . Germany acts not only as one of the components of the supranational EU, but as a national power as well. Germanys policy towards Russia is the demonstration of just this and the later is interested in a bilateral form of the same relations too. Consequently the European Union places higher value criteria as the precondition for the cooperation with Russia, more strictly then Germanys government tends to do. It seems that German foreign policy has a tendency for cohabitation with Russia that directly correlates with the paradigm of Brandts Ostpolitik. Russia is not the only space for realisation of economic, energetic, trade and cultural interests for Germany, but also has a possibility of playing an active role in the concert of global great powers. It is important to take notice of the fact that Russia has set its priority not on the relations with Germany as the part of the EU, but on the relations based at the national level. Anyway, the German balancing policy in its relations with Russia does not exceed the limits of the transatlantic system at the moment. Germany uses the Russian card usually during the deep crises in the Euro-Atlantic relations as the lever in its short-run tactical geopolitical combinations. The reality shows that such amplitude of geopolitical constructions could not be described as a traditional balancing of powers, because it does not neglect the basic German connection with the Western Atlantist based security structures. It seems that the decisive influence on the further development of the German geopolitical code would be conditioned by the general tendency of an

4 Hacke Ch., Challenges for German Foreign Policy at the beginning of the 21st Century. Oxford: Europaeum, 2004, 10. 5 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., Baltijos valstybiø geopolitikos bruoþai. XX amþius. Lietuvos istorijos institutas, Vilnius, 2005, p. 254. 6 Buras P., Cichocki M.A., German European Policy a Polish Perspective in Joop M., Schneider H., Schmalz U., eds., Germanys European Policy: Perceptions in Key Partner Countries, Berlin, 2002, p. 201-202. 59 international system development and the role of the USA would be very important at that point. The turn towards priority of the American national interests instead the ones of the international community by the current government of the USA may weaken the general tendency of international institutionalism. This could stimulate the other countries to define their national interests, also stimulating the decline of collective security instruments. In this case German the geopolitical code may become more strictly based on the national interests of this greatest Western European power and it would make Germany return to the traditional policy of balancing7 .

3. The Scenarios of Germanys Course in the Context of Global Geopolitical (the USA the EU Russia) Ones

Four main scenarios on the relations development between Russia, the USA and the EU can be outlined8 : Transcontinental alliance (Russian - American - European axis); An isolation of Europe (Russian American axis); Euro - continental alliance (Russian European axis); Euro-Atlantic alliance (American European axis).

3.1. Germanys Role in the Transcontinental Alliance

Politically it is the scenario of a conjuncture alliance that has formed after 11 September 2001. The more formal reasons for this is a common fight against international terrorism. The real reason is the inclination of the great powers towards the restoration of their classical institute - the concert. All three or even four the actors are self-sufficient centres of power, which together practically determines the structure of the international system. The G-7 or G-8 summits also have some features of the concert9 . The balancing among self-sufficient centres of power is an immanent and natural state. The current situation and the one in the nearest predictable future does not provide the conditions for the confrontation of these power centres. So the form of balancing is the concert, when all the actors are more or less satisfied

7 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., (note 5), p. 254-255. 8 Motieka E., Statkus N., Daniliauskas J., Global Geopolitical Developments and Opportuni- ties for Lithuanias Foreign Policy. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius: Lithuani- na Military Academy, 2005, p. 27-66. 9 Couloumbis Th.A., Toward A Global Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Concert of Powers? Contemporary Issues in International Politics, Ankara, 2004, p. 8. 60 with the current situation, with China being the least satisfied one. The concert relaxes the balancing of power so diminishing the value-based relations. Thats why the alliance among The USA, the EU, Russia and, partly, China may not be firm even if it de facto exists until now and may exist for a rather long time in the future. Such a scenario does not mean that there will be any significant changes in Germanys geopolitical code for some time, but the disruptive elements of this code would be generated further simultaneously. First of all the Euro-Atlantic ties would be further weakened and the need for Germanys national reflection would increase in such a case. Furthermore, this scenario would increase the area of the EUs influence and the importance of the German factor would be growing simultaneously during that process. It spontaneously would lead to tensions between the institutions of the EU and Germanys national interests. The recovery of German economy in the future may suspend the growth of this tension, but it is likely to be an only temporary occurrence. The transcontinental alliance globally is an alliance of the highest level. But meanwhile it is amorphous structure with low intensiveness, which has the ability to connect the more intensive alliances of the lower level. The transcontinental alliance scenario would be likely to provide the con- ditional calm for the short-term10 , but there is the possibility that it would cause a serious erosion of the Western democratic institutions and the basic reconstruction of Germanys geopolitical code in the long-run perspective. The reconstruction of Germanys geopolitical code would move towards the code of a traditional national state and it would be inevitable in the case of the disintegration of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. But the evolutional transformation of Germanys geopolitical code is also possible, if the concert of great powers once created would survive a sufficient time without confrontation. Germany would become a recognised leader of the EU then and the EU itself respectively would become a strategic counterbalance to the USA, Russia and China.

3.2. Germanys Role in the Scenario of Isolation of Europe

The scenario of isolation of Europe may be projected as an outcome of American Russian alliance. Such scenario practically would lead to the sub- version of Europe and the EU, especially from the side of Russia and the USA. The European Unions (or Germanys) resistance capabilities to the destruction of such scale referring only to its own resources and its geoeconomic ties with East Asia and Latin America is very low. Such scenario inevitably would mean the revolutionary alteration of Germanys geopolitical code. This revolution would catalyse the process of Germanys geopolitical re-nationalisation and its retreat from the paradigm of post-nationalism, which incites Germanys melt-

10 Ibidem, p. 7. 61 down in the EU and that of Atlantism, which connects Germany with the transatlantic security structures. The probability for the realisation of this scenario is low. The elements of it emerged during the Iraq crisis in the form of alliance among the USA, Russia and Israel, but the checks system came into work with European (including Germany) efforts to appease the tension with the USA and adequate corresponding moves of the Americans.

3.3. Germanys Role in the Euro-Continental Alliance

The euro-continental alliance scenario has strong triggers in the German as well as the Russian sides. The concepts of euro-continentalism in Western Europe and neo-euroasism in Russia operate in this direction. The unavoidable mutual economic interdependence between Russia, because of its need for capital and the EU and its need for energy resources, may incite the movement to the euro-continentalist direction11 . But this would be unlikely to expand further than a close geo-energetic cooperation, theory concepts, or public relations cam- paigns12 . This scenario should be considered more factual, if the EU would completely relax the euro-atlantic bounds and would create the strategic armed forces that were adequate and comparable to the American ones. It would undoubtedly mean the systemic cleavage in the American German axis and the emergence of favourable conditions for the implementation of the German projected vision of the independent (from atlantist bounds) Greater Europe. Germany would become the core power of the EU also possessing its nuclear potential in this case. It is clear that the USA would not agree with such a course of the European Union (and Germany). The strategic receding from the USA implicated by the euro-continental scenario would be very dangerous for Europe itself as well.

3.4. Germanys role in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

The alterations in Germanys geopolitical code would not be crucial if the intensity of euro-atlantic ties would increase. This would make the American German axis even stronger (the reminiscence of Adenauers geopolitical code) and Germanys meltdown in the European Unions institutions would accelerate increasing its turn to the post-national geopolitical paradigm. Germany may set the implementation of the Greater Europe geopolitical concept or more precisely the expansion of the European structures into the traditional Russian sphere of influence as its priority if the policy of Russias

11 Bahgat G., Terrorismus und die Ölversorgung des Westens. Die Energiepartnerschaft mit Moskau, Internationale Politik, 2003/3, p. 11-17. 12 Daniliauskas J., Janeliûnas T., Kasèiûnas L., Motieka E., Ðiaurës ðaliø geostrateginë svarba Lietuvai. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005, p. 65. 62 containment would become more intensive. But the German projected vision of Greater Europe would be implemented under the cover of America provided that hard power is needed in this case.

3.5. The Coherence/Conflict Problem of Lithuanian and German Interests in the Context of Global Geopolitical Scenarios

Germanys participation in the global concert of the Great Powers provides the rather open amplitude of geostrategic choices for it. The analysis of Germanys role in various global geopolitical scenarios demonstrates that the development of Lithuanias geopolitical situation may be directly affected by Germanys choices about its geopolitical orientation. The re-nationalization of German foreign policy would be the most unfavourable scenario for Lithuania, because it would mean a return to the traditional politics of the balancing of power in Europe and the traditional anarchy of national states in the international relations. Such a course of matters would create an advantageous situation for the realization of Russian geopolitical projections. Germanys move towards the Carolingian or two-speed Europe geopolitical paradigm may spear Lithuania from the process of the German foreign policys re-nationalization. But possibly Germanys orientation to the core of the EU may create the conditions, which would turn Lithuania towards the political and economic periphery inside the EU. The vision of the Greater Europe symbolizes Germanys aim to create the system of satellite states around itself. This may turn Lithuania into geopolitical and geo-economic province of Germany and the EU. It could practically mean Lithuanias subordination to the German geopolitical projections. The vision of Greater Europe may become especially dangerous for Lithuania, if it would be developing as the counter to Atlantism. Lithuania should be interested in strengthening Adenauers geopolitical paradigm (Atlantist self-containment) in the German foreign policy agenda, because the domination of this concept would limit the opportunities for Rus- sian geopolitical manoeuvres in the European security system. The symbiosis of Germany projected the Greater Europe vision (the expansion of European structures into the area of post-soviet CIS). And an Ameri- can implemented Russian containment strategy would be very useful for Lit- huania in an attempt to construct the mechanism for effective control of Russias geopolitical power. 63 4. German Policy Towards Lithuania: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic projections

4.1. Eventual German Policy towards Lithuania

4.1.1. The Context of Russia

Lithuania may be important for Germany in the perspective of German Russian relations; it also may perform some various functions. Lithuania may be considered by Germany as a geopolitical barrier (or bridgehead) in the case of the Russian threat or as connection (the bridge) in the case of cooperation. Lithu- ania also may be recognized as the sphere of Russias interests in some sets of circumstance, if it would thereby help Germany to overcome the hurdles for its cooperation with Russia. Germany, geopolitically, may be also interested in Lithuania as a helpful link between it and Russia for the development of their relations13 . But this link may provide only some specific functions, mainly those of transit and economics, because Russia and Germany tend to keep direct relations in the political sphere. Lithuanias efforts in the implementation of active foreign policy that are directed towards the growth of a regional centre, would have some important influence on the gravitation of post-soviet states towards the West. But this could be taken sceptically by Germany, if its relations with Russia would improve. Such Lithua- nian policy would be considered as initiative against the interests of Russia in this case. If the strengthening of Russian German relations would stay as one of the main German foreign policy priorities, Germany probably would not support Lithuanias ambitions and its active foreign policy and may even try to block it.

4.1.2. The Context of Central and Eastern Europe

Lithuania may be useful for Germany in an attempt to limit the Polish ambitions on increasing Polands influence inside the EU. Germany may become more active in its relations with Lithuania with intention to influence Po- land* . Such a course of events would have a negative influence on Lithuanian foreign policy. Germanys motives for this may be: to reduce the Polish influence on the region and make Poland more dependent on Germany;

13 Heimsoeth H.-J., Der Ostseeraum im Wandel. EU-Erweiterung, Nordliche Dimension und Zusammenarbeit mit Russland Die Prioritaten der Deutschen Prasidentschaft im Ostseer. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2001/2(8), p. 36. *Meanwhile there is a notable tendency in coordination of actions between Poland and Germa- ny in the field of foreign policy during the last few years. The best example is a policy towards the neighbours of the European Union and especially Ukraine. Lithuania would be left apart in this case, because Germany and Poland acts in the form of bilateral relations here. 64 to isolate Poland as an ally of the USA; to create obstacles for eventual strategic alliance of Poland, Lithuania and other Baltic States in the region; to implement the strategy directed to weaken the countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the Baltic countries at least in the benefit of Russian interests so improving relations with it. Germany may be very interested in Lithuanias potential in keeping or resto- ring relations with Belarus. Lithuanias relations with the representatives of Belaru- sian opposition may be very useful in the post-Lukashenka era. Even current contacts with the official structures of Belarus and knowledge about it may be very important for Germany, especially in the sectors of transportation and energetic.

4.1.3. The Context of Baltic Sea Region

The main attention of Germany is focused on the Kaliningrad region in the area of the Baltic Sea. This region may interest Germany not only for the satisfaction of Russian geopolitical interests, but also for practical, economic and transportation reasons. Closer cooperation with Lithuania may become one of priorities of German foreign policy for the purpose of enhancing Germanys inclusion into the set of problems concerning Kaliningrad. Germany may be interested in accelerating Kaliningrads inclusion into European structures through Lithuania. Lithuania may become some kind of mediator between Kalinthe ingrad region and Germany, because the later hardly may act in this Russian region directly due to mainly historical reasons.

4.2. German Geoeconomic Interests in Lithuania

The growth of German exports is one of the most important goals of Ger- manys foreign policy. Lithuania is not important for Germany in this perspective, because the Lithuanian market is small and the purchasing power of its people is low still comparatively. Lithuania may be important for Germany only as a place of transit or a middle-link to German production. That may become very important, if Germa- ny would implement the strategy of its influence and expansion towards the East trying to gain ground in the Russian market. The port of Klaipëda should interest Germany in this case. The German enterprises interested in expanding their exports to Russia and China may also be interested in the logistical and infrastructural development of Klaipëdas port and the objects servicing it. Some German companies may be planning to transfer their enterprises to Lithuania after its accession to the EU, because the cheaper Lithuanian labour force and more favourable taxation system would provide for very important advantages in expansion of their exports to the East. 65 4.3. The Threats to Lithuania from German Foreign Policy

The misbalance of structural and relative power between Lithuania and some of its neighbours, especially Russia, causes serious threats to the countrys political independence. Germanys impact on Lithuania may be ambiguous in a given situation. Germany could use its tools for political pressure rather easily and they would not cause very important costs or threats to it. The attention to such actions may be rather low in the international arena. The threat to Lithua- nia would become even more serious, if Germany would join any others countrys pressure, adding onto it. The common actions of Russia and Germany are considered as the most dangerous combination of external pressure. Germanys influence on Lithuanian energy security may be very impor- tant14 , because it is one of the main consumers of Russian energetic resources and one of the most influential members of the Russian European energetic dialog. These features potentially make Germanys influence on the intensity and dynamics of energy threats very important. Russia even could change its position as to Lithuanias place, in the common Russian European energy policy according to the needs of Germany because of the importance of the later. Germanys position on priorities relating to projects guaranteeing the piping of Russian gas and oil to the EU may be very important to Lithuania. Germanys intentions for development of the Baltic Sea gas pipeline system are not advantageous for Lithuania in this context, because Lithuania practically would not participate in the projects of the Russian gas piping to the EU and would remain only a final consumer of Russian gas, probably even losing the monopoly of gas transit to Kaliningrad region in the case the branch of Baltic Sea gas pipeline would be directed to this Russian region. Such situation would increase Lithuanias dependence on Russian energy resources. German support to Russia in implementing energetic projects flanking Lithuania increases the danger that Lithuania would remain the final consumer of Russian energy resources. Therefore they could not successfully integrate into the European energetic system and would not have any alternatives to the Russian energy resources. German investments to Lithuanian energy objects, often are considered as a counterweight to the Russian capital. But the German alternative should be considered very carefully, especially if there are indications that German companies invests in Lithuania only to satisfy the interests of Russia or just to meet the formal criteria of capital origin, which should be euro-atlantic one15 . The common companies, consortiums or something like that with Russian capital is usually created to fulfil those criteria.

14 Landsbergis V., Putino Schroederio paktas galimas Europos politinio þemëlapio per- braiþymas, ELTA, 2005 09 07. 15 Bagdonienë S., Dujos prieð ES vienybæ. OMNI naujienos, http://www.omni.lt, 2005 09 16. 66 5. Lithuanian Policy Towards Germany: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Projections

5.1. Lithuanian German Relations in the Context of the European Union

The analysis of German geopolitical and geoeconomic projections towards Lithuania indicates the asymmetry in Lithuanian German relations. This asymmetry occurs because German political and economic importance to Lithuania is considerably higher than Lithuanias to Germany. That is why Lithuania should be interested in the activation of bilateral relations, especially political ones, with Germany. The intensive Lithuanian German relations proportio- nally would be most useful to Lithuania first of all.16 Oe should bear in mind the fact Lithuania and Germany are in the different groups of states inside the EU when their positions are evaluated. There are a lot of differences in the approach to many institutional and political problems between Germany and Lithuania. The former is an active supporter of federalism and deeper integration. The later has a rather reserved outlook on the strengthening of the federal elements inside the EU and they completely oppose the idea of Two-speed Europe, because it would inevitably push Lithuania into the periphery. The Lithuanian position towards the USA and relations with them are very different from those of Germany. Lithuania is pro-American in international issues and Germany is one of the most prominent critics of current American foreign policy among the members of the EU. To sum it up German and Lithuanian positions and interests inside the EU diverge more than coincide. Their influences on the EUs decisions are also very different. German position on common European policy issues often clash with Lithuanian one and the influence of Germany on Lithuania may counter each other only in coalition with the EU members sharing the similar or identical interests. German and Lithuanian positions also differ in the field of further enlargement of the EU, because Germany tends support the enlargement in the Southeast direction (e.g. allow the Ukraine to join the EU) instead of the Eastern one as Lithuania does. Lithuania would be interested in the alteration of German position here and set the reduction of economic differences inside the EU and enlargement towards the East or the intensification of relations with the EUs Eastern neighbours at least as German priorities. It would be useful for Lithuania to increase Germanys involvement in the European Neighbourhood initiatives, achieve the shift from neighbourhood policy to partnership in the case of the Ukraine, Moldova, and post-Lukashenkas Belarus and strengthen the EU accession perspective for, at least Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe may shift the balance inside the Union itself by shifting the gravitation of EUs power (or weight) centre to the pro-American regions of Central and Eastern Europe.

16 Geralavièius V., What is Germany for Lithuania?, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2001/ 2(8), p. 110. 67 5.2. Lithuanian Interests in the Context of Russian German Relations

Lithuania is permanently in danger of becoming the geopolitical trade object, because of its geopolitical situation between Germany and Russia. The seriousness of this threat is witnessed by the practically implemented agreements between Russia and Germany in some various periods of history and current close and intensive cooperation between German and Russian governments especially after Vladimir Putin was elected as the President of Russia. The coincidence of Russian and German geopolitical activity would inevitably lead to the division of their influence on the regions between them, thereby elimina- ting the unclear spots in geopolitical map of Europe. The current situation provides favourable conditions for such a compromise because Germany is looking for possibilities to strengthen its influence on Europe and Russia is looking for opportunities to remain an active player in the European affairs17 . Thats why the decreasing coherence of German and Russian interests is Lithuanias basic long-term interest. It would be useful for Lithuania, if Russia and Germany would not be close allies. The coherence of Russian and German interests may be useful to Lithuania only until it would become the geopolitical trade object for them.

5.3. Lithuanian Policy Towards Germany in the Context of Strategic Polish Lithuanian Partnership

Lithuania should avoid the situation of worsening relations between Ger- many and Poland because this would leave a negative effect on Lithuanian Polish relations. It would not be useful for Lithuania, if the intensified Lithua- nian - German relations would be used against Poland by Germany, or Germa- ny would try to exploit Lithuania aiming to diminish Polish influence on the region. The Lithuanian German relations should not be developed on an anti- polish basis. The inclusion of Poland in common initiatives is the best way to avoid it and neutralize the possibility of Polands isolation. Lithuanias policy towards Germany should be based on the no damage principle to the Lithua- nian - Polish strategic partnership.

5.4. Lithuanias Economic Interests in Germany

One of the most important interests for Lithuania is its inclusion into the international energy infrastructure projects connecting Russia with Germany. It would guarantee not only the incomes from transit, but it also would increase

17 Belov V., (note 1) p. 271. 68 Lithuanias geo-energy importance in the region. Thats why the most important economic interest of Lithuania, is the assurance of Germanys support for its energy projects, which would turn Lithuania into an important transit country closely connected with European energy systems instead of the final consumer of Russian energy resources. It is strategically important to introduce Lithu- ania as the useful mediator instead of a possible hurdle in the German Russian relations. Germany would tend to give Lithuania away into Russian sphere of influence, if the German government would consider it as a potential economic or political hurdle in its relations with Russia. Lithuania would be able to influence Germanys position on Russia as much as its mediator role would be important to Germany. Lithuania should construct a clear mechanism of political and economic mediation that would not allow for economic intermediaries to be dependent on the influence of Russia or Russian capital for achievement of the aforementioned goal. The intermediaries should base themselves on the Europe- an values and rules, and lean on the Western capital.

6. The Scenarios of Lithuanian German Relations

6.1. An Overview of Current Lithuanian German Relations

The current Lithuanian German relations could be described as rather passive and cautious. Lithuania considers Germany as the potential depressor of its interests especially inside the EU. Germany currently does not consider Lithuania as a potentially useful partner either. Germanys obscurity about its role in the future Europe and international system is probably the main cause of this situation. The character of German Russian relations probably would be the most important factor determining Germanys role in Europe. In fact it is a choice between two great strategies: the Osteuropa versus the Mitteleuropa18 . If Germa- ny would chose the first one, then its strategic activity would be directed towards Russia and the countries between them like Lithuania, Poland, the Ukrai- ne and Belarus. The choice of the second strategy would demonstrate Germa- nys efforts in creating its own sphere of influence in the Central and Eastern Europe and its interests would be first of all directed towards the Czech Repub- lic, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia in this case. The more intensive activity of Germany was observed in the regions of the Central Europe and the Balkans during the last decade, which is what the flows of investments and tourists as well as peacekeeping missions in the Balkans indicate. That leads to a conclusion about the domination of the forces supporting Mitteleuropa strategic course in Germany.

18 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., (note 5) p. 255-258. 69 Such a situation provides little opportunities for notable changes in Lit- huanian German relations if the basic factors should remain stable. The Lithu- anian German relations would remain inert and being kept in the rutinised bilateral form. They could be considered as a little bit more intensive as average (e.g. in the context of the EU) than relations with any other member state in the multilateral contacts and this is in the best case. But the differences in interests lead to the possibly for an increase in the number of disagreements between Germany and Lithuania. They also strengthen the opinion about Lithuanias and Germanys dependence to the different groups of member-states and their presence on the different sides of barricades. The search for opportunities to strengthen the bilateral relations and alter the current situation is necessary for Lithuania. The purposeful intention towards relations intensification from the side of Lithuania and/or Germany may radically change the situation. These efforts could create the preconditions for a few various scenarios of Lithuanian Ger- man relations in the mid-term.

6.2. Strategic Partnership de facto: Lithuania as the Geopolitical Link

Strategic Lithuanian German partnership de facto may emerge if Germa- ny would set its priority on the development of its relations with Russia or more widely with CIS using the geopolitical advantages of Lithuania for this. Lithua- nias importance to Germany would increase according to this scenario, because Lithuania would become one of the most important countries performing this key geopolitical link function between Germany and Russia. The role of the geopolitical link would mean an active Lithuanian policy as a mediator in various levels and sectors. The Lithuanian German partnership on various levels would mean that Lithuania would be more included. This would at least incite Lithuanias participation in Germanys cooperation with Russia on the regional (the relations between Russia or CIS and the EU), international (between Germany and Russia) and federal (between German lands and Kaliningrad region) grounds19 . There are some necessary preconditions for this scenario: Germany should understand that Lithuania could add an important surplus value in developing its relations with the East. It should consider that Lithu- ania is capable of performing some specific functions that were not in the direct Russian German relations. These suggestions could be provided by the Lithua- nian lobby as well as German or even Russian ones in the form of concrete projects; Russia should be convinced that Lithuanias participation in the Rus- sian German dialog is useful or at least not harmful to its national interests. Germany could do it more effectively.

19 Heimsoeth H.-J., (note 13) p. 31-40. 70 Lithuania should demonstrate its advantages over the other potential candidates for a role of geopolitical link e.g. Poland and Latvia. This scenario is useful to Lithuania, because it increases the number of alternatives for Lithuanian foreign policy and also helps Lithuania to understand German geopolitical intentions as well as its foreign policy decisions also providing possible space for the coordination of the latter with Lithuania. A real strategic partnership with Lithuania could provide Germany the means for indirect handling of some issues, which it could not handle itself directly e.g. the Europeanization of Kaliningrad. The basic threat of this scenario is the possible or eventual transformation from a geopolitical link between two great powers to their trade object20 . This threat could be countered only by Lithuanias usefulness to Germany. As long as Germany considers having Lithuania as a partner more useful than possible concessions from Russia on the other fields, this threat would not arise. Lithua- nias role in the Kaliningrads integration into the common structures with the EU could be one of the opportunities in the creation of notable surplus value. Lithuanian German strategic partnership de facto would indicate Germa- nys willingness to take more responsibility in defending Lithuanias interests. The probability of the implementation of this scenario is rather low, because currently there are no signs that Germany would consider Lithuania as providing apparent surplus value in its relations with Russia and Germany relies on the direct bilateral relations instead.

6.3. Formal (Institutional) Strategic Partnership

This scenario would mean only the declarative German Lithuanian strategic partnership would be truly implemented only from the Lithuanian side. Germany would formally recognise the Lithuanian efforts and the importance of these efforts in shaping the relations with Russia and its regions (Kali- ningrad). But Lithuanias real inclusion into the realm of international cooperation would be inconsistent and occasional. Practically such a given situation would indicate that Lithuania is not considered as a useful partner by Germany and the German tendency to keep the direct relations with Russia would persist. But the formal (institutional) strategic Lithuanian - German partnership could be used by Lithuania for the institutionalisation of its relations with Germany. This would lead to the creation of more official mechanisms for cooperation like institutions, agreements, declarations and so on allowing Lithuanias formal participation, at least, in the processes important for securing its national interests. Lithuanian German relations were in some kind of formal partnership during the last decade. Germany declared itself the advocate of Lithuania, but

20 von Berg D., Lithuania, Germany and the European Union. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 1999/4, p. 4. 71 had not shown any notable interest in Lithuania and the cooperation between both countries was only formal. In fact, this scenario coincides with Lithuanias interests. The formal partnership may already be developed and has intensified without basic changes in German interests, which would be necessary in the case of true strategic partnership. Lithuanias risk to become a trade object between Germany and Russia is less in the case of this scenario, because Lithuania may remain practically closed for the economic and political influence of Germany. The probability of this scenario is average, because it is based on the current situation in Lithuanian German relations and the efforts of one partner are sufficient to intensify the relations.

6.4. Lithuania: Economic and Political Bridgehead for Germany

The expedient effort by Germany to aggressively increase its influence towards the East is the main element of this scenario. Germany could try to use the strategic situation of Lithuania for achievement of these goals by creating the political and economic conditions favourable for such policy in the future. Lit- huania could become the bridgehead for Germany strengthening the strategic German expansion into Russia. Germany would try to expand its influence on Lithuanias foreign and internal policy decisions first of all. Those decisions should be influenced in the way they conform with Germanys strategic and tactical tasks in expanding to the area of CIS. This scenario would mean that Germany is a rival of Russia in at least at some political aspects. An aggressive German expansion to the East should inevitably collide with the Russian response. Lithuania could perform various functions as the German bridgehead: it could provide the advantageous geostrategic position for further expansion of German influence towards the East; it could implement an active policy towards Belarus and the Ukraine reflecting Germanys interests; it could maintain some influence over the region as the barrier to the possible expansion of Russia. The subjectivity and autonomy of Lithuania would be questioned in any of these cases, because Lithuania would be considered not as a partner, but as an instrument to achieve Germanys goals. The implementation of this scenario would mark the rather radical change in German foreign policy. It is not very likely of this in the near future, because it requires a lot of economic and political resources and currently there is no political will to implement an aggressive geopolitical expansion towards the East from Germanys side. This scenario is disadvantageous for Lithuania, because of its relative passivity and loss of geopolitical subjectivity. Lithuania would fact the threat of 72 becoming nothing more then a tool for the implementation of German interests. But an active German role in Lithuania may be a better outcome than the aggressive domination of Russia.

6.5. Lithuania as a Trade Object between Russia and Germany

This scenario would indicate the full contempt of Lithuanias autonomy and subjectivity as well as Germanys intentions to keep only direct relations and coordinate German interests at least the ones in Central and Eastern Europe only with Russia itself. Three conditions should be fulfilled for the realisation of such scenario: there should be projects and strategies as to the active increase of Rus- sian and German influence in the Central and Eastern Europe; Russian and German interests should coincide in this region; The relations between Russia and Germany should be warm with the tendency towards negotiations and agreements instead of concurrence and confrontation. It seems that currently there exist two and half out of the three required conditions with the doubt as to Germanys efforts towards creating projects on the active increase of its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. But the interests and intentions of Russia in this region do not leave any doubts21 . Lithuania may be included in the Russian German agreements as the trade object, either the main or complementary one. Thats why the probability and danger of such scenario is rather high. The scenario may be modified. The division into German and Russian spheres of influence could be based on the sector principle (e.g. Germany influence the political and, maybe military decisions of Lithuania and Russia the economic ones) instead of geographic one. The role of the trade object either partial or complete would be least favourable scenario for Lithuania, because it creates the danger of being included into the Russian sphere of influence and to become a Russian bridgehead. The probability of this scenario would be considered average to high according to the historical experience and the increasing aggressiveness of Rus- sia in the region.

21 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., (note 5) p. 329-330. 73 7. An Optimal Model of Lithuanian German Relations

The strategic partnership with Germany de facto or the formal (institutional) one, would most likely fit Lithuanias interest the best. Lithuanias role could be increasingly more active in the international relations arena in both cases. Germany would then respond to those Lithuanian aspirations and will determine the form of relations between two states. They may be either truly strategic or strategic only formally. Germanys euro-atlantic orientation or the refusal of it, and Germanys place in the middle-run or long-run geopolitical strategy of the USA would become one of the most important factors shaping future Lithuanian German relations on global scale. The probability of a real strategic partnership between Germany and Lithuania would be low, if Germany would depart from its euroatlantic geopolitical orientation. If Germany would choose the orientation towards Central and Eastern Europe instead of the East at the regional level, Lithuanias possibilities to intensify its relations with Germany and form a strategic partnership de facto would become increasingly low too. Even Lithuanias notable efforts to intensify its relations with Germany may be overshadowed by bilateral direct Russian German relations. Meanwhile the cooperative relations between Lithuania and Germany could form if there would occur some events useful to Lithuania, like: the setback of Russian German relationships encouraging Germany to prevent the spread of Russian influence; the growth of Germanys role in the American geopolitical strategy directed towards surrounding Russia so weakening its power; the increase of intensity of German Russian relations requiring for more mediatory states. The formal (institutional) strategic partnership is the most valid form of German Lithuanian relations if the global and regional situation would remain undefined. Such a scenario may be encouraged by Lithuanias efforts in intensifying its relations with Germany. 75 Tomas Janeliûnas, Kristina Baubinaitë* Public Establishment Center for Strategic Studies

In Search for the Optimal Regional Allian- ce: Strategic Partnership between Lithua- nia and Poland

It is essential for the state to have a strategic partner at the regional level. This is justified by the fact that Lithuania decided to turn into an active regional country while reducing the possible threat from Russia. The potential alliance of Lithuania and Poland should be the most rational direction of the strategic partnership. In attempting to justify this assumption the geopolitical interests of Lithuania and Poland, its coherence and compatibility, are examined. Conditions strengthening the development of the strategic partnership are reviewed. The most plausible scenarios of further co-operation between Lithuania and Poland are also presented.

Introduction

Additional foreign policy objectives were defined quite rapidly after Lit- huania entered into the EU and NATO. These objectives were defined with the goal in seeking active participation in international politics and searching for possibilities of how to turn into an important player in the region, or even to become a certain geopolitical centre within the region. These aspirations were stipulated by the perception that even when the membership in the EU and NATO is assured the passivity of Lithuania would be unforgivable affluence. The geopolitical situation of Lithuania (it is precisely defined as a geopolitical anomaly by Èeslovas Laurinavièius, Egidijus Motieka and Nortautas Statkus in the book The Baltic States in the Twentieth Century: a Geopolitical Sketch) would condition that passivity and eventually could reduce the geopolitical subjectivity of Lithuania and could enhance the threat to become an object of interchange or even informal periphery of non-transparent agreements between the powerful geopolitical subjects.

* Dr. Tomas Janeliûnas is the Deputy Director of the Public Establishment Center for Strategic Studies, Lecturer of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, J. Tumo-Vaiþganto g. 2, LT-01511 Vilnius, tel. +370 5 236 24 81, e-mail: to- [email protected], Kristina Baubinaitë is an analyst of the Public Establishment Center for Strategic Studies, the postgraduate student of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, J. Tumo-Vaiþganto g. 2, LT-01511 Vilnius, ph. tel. +370 5 236 24 81. 76 Recently, it has almost been universally admitted that Lithuania as a member of the EU and NATO remains the object of the exclusive interest of Russia. Although Lithuania has strengthened its own structural power and receives military guarantees from NATO, Russia is the main source of threat for Lithuania. Arrogant speeches such as those made by the officials of Russia concerning the occupation recognition of Lithuania and assessment of the end of the World War II and the suspicions spreadings of the violation of Lithuania airspace when the Russian fighter SU-27 which crashed on 15 September 2005 in the territory of Lithuania are apparent examples which illustrate Russias hostility towards Lithuania. In the presence of this historically developed and prevailing threat, the objective to strengthen the foreign policy activity of Lithuania is a natural choice. While being active, Lithuania could further strengthen its structural power and influence for the geopolitical processes in the region. At the same time activity in foreign policy allows Lithuania to avoid the destiny of the exchangeable card in the game of the powerful forces. Nevertheless if Lithuania would operate alone the geopolitical features of Lithuania hinder expectations of higher influence even at the regional scale. Consequently the essential and rational task is to find relevant strategic allies. Lithuania could strengthen its influence while acting together with the allies. Basically searching for the strategic allies at the global scale was completed in the first years of independence restoration only the USA became an adequate geopolitical power which could help Lithuania to escape from the influence of Russia and to enter to the defense alliance NATO. However demand for a strategic partner at a regional scale strengthened consequently due to the membership in NATO and respectively because of the declining interest of the USA towards Lithuania. Lithuanian choice among potential directions of strategic partnership is limited. The alliance of the three Baltic countries is not attractive only due to the comparatively weak power of this alliance at the regional scale. Besides, as the historical experience shows, this alliance would not be enduring.1 The Center for Strategic Studies presented a fairly comprehensive analysis concerning the possibilities of cooperation between Lithuania and Nordic countries.2 Also, in the article Relations between Lithuania and Germany in the context of global geopolitical challenges of 21st century by Motieka and Daniliauskas the possibilities for further developing co-operation with Germany as one of the most important players in the region are discussed. Nevertheless the main assumption of this article is that the potential alliance between Lithuania and Poland would be the most rational direction of the strategic partnership. In attempting to justify this assumption the geopoliti-

1 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., Baltijos valstybiø geopolitikos bruoþai. XX amþius, [The Baltic States in the Twentieth Century: a Geopolitical Sketch], Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005,83-196 (in Lithuanian). 2 Strateginiø studijø centras, Ðiaurës ðaliø geostrateginë svarba Lietuvai, [The Geo-strategic significance of the Nordic contries to Lithuania], Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005 (in Lithuanian). 77 cal interests of Lithuania and Poland, their coherence and compatibility are examined. Conditions for strengthening the development of the strategic partnership are also reviewed. Finally, the most plausible scenarios for further cooperation between Lithuania and Poland are presented.

1. The Assumptions of the Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland

1.1. The Geopolitical Interests of Poland at Global and Regional Level

At least a limited influence to the decisions adopted at the global level is a pivotal geopolitical interest of Poland. Several geostrategic vectors can be identified and by the combination of these vectors Poland can implement its interests. First of all, the possibilities for Poland to influence the global geopolitical processes are defined by its orientation to the USA as a strategic partner.3 The strategic partnership with the USA is a factor relatively protecting Poland from the potential geopolitical manipulations of the surrounding geopolitical actors that could reduce the geopolitical subjectivity of Poland. At the same time, this strategic partnership for Poland ensures a certain platform or to put it in a more simpler way security guarantees in seeking to implement its own regional geopolitical interests. On the one hand, in developing strategic partnership links with the USA, Poland is enhancing its structural power that gives additional levers in its relationship with comparatively stronger countries such as Russia and Germany. On the other hand, a strategic partnership with the USA creates a beneficial geopolitical environment for the development of its relative (mostly in economy sector) power. The attempt to strengthen the influence in decision making inside the EU with the support from the USA can be treated as the second geostrategic direction of Poland as for the country possessing global interests. Eventually, the active policy of Poland inside NATO is the third direction or vector oriented towards the extension of the possibilities to influence the processes at the global geopolitical level. NATO membership for Poland provided the possibility to take a role of the geopolitical subject shaping the external environment. Poland supports the anti-terrorist campaign of the USA; Poland is also an active proponent of NATO transformation and strengthening it role. At the same time Poland encourages, for the priority of Alliance, the structure of the European security together supporting the preservation and consolidation of the positions of the USA in Europe.4 Thus a strategic partnership with the USA

3 Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., Baltijos valstybiø geopolitikos bruoþai. XX amþius, [The Baltic States in the Twentieth Century: a Geopolitical Sketch],Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005, 300 (in Lithuanian). 4 Sejm of the Republic of Poland, The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 22 July 2003. http://www.poland-embassy.si/eng/politics/strategy.htm, 20 05 2005. 78 can maintain a balance of power in the structure of the European security bene- ficially for Poland. This could ensure levers to influence the dynamics of the global geopolitical processes. It can be stated that Poland, holds a disposing powerful cultural-civiliza- tional potential and balancing among three pivotal players of global geopolitics (Russia, the EU and USA). And while implementing an active and multilevel foreign policy, Poland has considerable potential in influencing the dynamics of the configurations of international politics at the global level. The objective to make and influence, for the development of the global geopolitical process, creates a necessity to implement and shape active regional policy. This could enable one to avoid the potential manipulations of the powerful geopolitical players at the global level thereby reducing the geopolitical subjectivity of Poland. The objective to consolidate the region of Central and Eastern Europe with the assistance of the USA defines the geopolitical strategy of Po- land at the regional level. The essential condition of this process is an effective Eastern policy of Poland whose aim is in the long-run to become important factor shaping common Eastern policy of the EU and NATO.5 Active dispersion of the geopolitical interests in the region of Central and Eastern Europe eventually helped to form an effective buffer against the direct influence of Rus- sia and at the same time reduced the possibilities of the potential geopolitical manipulations between Russia and Germany towards Poland. Thus the particular chain of geo-strategic tactics of Poland at the regional level is forming: in the beginning of this chain the support of the USA for Poland is noticeable, which afterwards in the format of the EU and NATO is transformed into the dispersion of Polands image as a regional leader. In turn this leads to a stronger decision-making process for Poland in the EU and NATO and afterwards in the processes of decision-making at global scale. The pivotal geopolitical interest of Poland is to guarantee the effective circulation of this chain.

1.2. The Geopolitical Interests of Lithuania at Global and Regional Scale

Lithuania belongs to the geopolitical conjuncture subregion, which emerged after the collision of the hostile geopolitical powers.6 Being a small country the ambitions of Lithuania to influence the processes occurring at the global scale are limited. However, in seeking to maintain its geopolitical subjectivity it has to turn its own geopolitical code towards the direction of one seeking to neutralise the negative consequences of the geopolitical manipulations. The background of this strategy lies within the process of strengthening the relative and

5 Sirutavièius V., Lithuanian Polish Strategic Partnership: Genesis and Prospects, Lithua- nian Foreign Policy Review, 2, 1998, 17-18. 6 Statkus N., Motieka E., Laurinavièius È., Geopolitiniai kodai: tyrimo metodologija,[Geopoliti- cal Codes: Research Methodology], Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2003, 118 (in Lithuanian). 79 structural power. This process can be stipulated by the involvement of Lithua- nia in the emerging alliances within Central and Eastern Europe and by the cooperation with countries having similar geopolitical interests. Since neutrality or co-operation with the Nordic or with the Baltic countries cannot lead to security guarantees, the optimal geopolitical code version of Lithuania could be the orientation towards Poland and the strengthening of the strategic links with this country. This assumption is reflected and proven by the provisions of the conception of the New Foreign Policy which states that Lithuania is able to become the leader of the region through the quality of the membership in the EU and NATO and actively developing the relations of strategic partnership with Poland.7 The USA and Poland are linked by this strategic partnership. While co-ordinating foreign policy and strengthening the partnership with Poland, Lithuania could ensure more support from the USA and also support for the implementation of the geopolitical objectives. A common geostrategic direction of Lithuania and Poland towards Eastern neighbouring countries Belarus, Ukraine and Russia could become an essential instrument of the USA while seeking to develop democracy in the so-called discontinental geostrategic zone. While operating together with Poland in this area the potential possibility could emerge for Lithuania to influence the interactions of the powerful geopolitical players (USA, the EU, Russia) in the regions of Eastern Europe and the East-Baltic and in this way to influence the development of the geopolitical situation. The latter geostrategic vector oriented towards the East- ern neighbouring countries of the EU potentially could emerge as a source of structural power expansion for Lithuania. Being a member of the EU and NATO Lithuania potentially could turn into the country performing the functions of geopolitical juncture. Lithuania could be a mediator in the relationship among the Euroatlantic structures and the countries of Eastern Europe Ukraine, Bela- rus, Moldova, South Caucasus countries promoting democracy and turning the geopolitical orientation of these countries towards Euroatlantic space.8 De- epening the strategic partnership relations between Lithuania and Poland should be a goal for Lithuania. Lithuania should thereby have the possibility to strengthen relations with the USA, while actively advocating national interests inside the EU and performing the functions of a geopolitical juncture between Nort- hern and Southern Europe. Eventually, the structural and relative power of Lit- huania can be further strengthened and that would contribute to the reduction of the manifestations of the conjuncture environment.

7 Daniliauskas J., Naujoji Lietuvos uþsienio politika [The New Foreign Policy of Lithua- nia], Praneðimas konferencijoje Lietuva po Seimo rinkimø 2004, Vilnius, 19 November 2004 (in Lithuanian). 8 Statkus N., Motieka E., Daniliauskas J., Globali geopolitinë raida ir Lietuvos uþsienio politikos galimybës, [Global Geopolitical Development and Opportunities for Lithuanian Foreign Policy], Lietuvos metinë strateginë apþvalga 2004. Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005 (in Lithuanian). 80 2. The Coherence of the Geopolitical Interests of Lithuania and Poland

Lithuania often emphasizes the importance of strategic partnership links with Poland. It can be stated that Poland is the most important partner for Lithu- ania in bilateral relations. Since 1997 the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the Co-operation Council of Governments are in action. Frequent meetings at high levels or between representatives of these Governments are the evidence of the active co-operation between the two countries. One of the most important factors blocking active political co-operation between Lithuania and Poland is a great difference in relative (at the same time structural) power between Lithuania and Poland. Consequently, the strategic partnership between Lithuania and Poland can be named as partial or one-way co-operation. Strategic partnership is a necessity in safeguarding support for the security and foreign policy interests of Lithuania. Poland generally uses the term strategic partnership in relations with Lithuania and in general. But Lithu- ania occupies only the secondary role (however not of a small importance) in foreign policy of Poland. The geoeconomic interests of Lithuania and Poland can be treated as a certain localisation of geopolitical interests or as another link in the process of the formation of strategic partnership. The localisation of geopolitical interests at the level of economy and cultural relations, mostly will determine the quality of the strategic relations. Accordingly, it is essential to analyse the directions of the economy relations between Lithuania and Poland extending in parallel with geopolitical interests of these countries. The intensity of economy relations is noticeably lower than the intensity of political cooperation. In 2004 (see Table 1) the exports of Lithuania to Poland amounted to 1.243 billion Litas and constituted 4.8 percent of total exports from Lithuania Poland was the fifth main export country. Imports from Poland amounted to 2.63 billion Litas and constituted 7.6 percent of total imports to Lithuania Poland was the third largest import country.

Table 1. Main foreign trading partners of Lithuania9

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9 Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania, Foreign Trade, http://www.ukmin.lt/ files/Uzsienio_prekyba/apzvalg-04.doc, , 25 04 2005. 81 Accordingly, Poland exports to Lithuania comprised 1.8 percent of the total of Polands exports (15th position). Imports from Lithuania comprised 0.6 percent of the total of Polands import (26th position).10 The economic importance of Lithuania for Poland is obviously modest. The investments from Poland into Lithuania are also small. In the beginning of 2005 the Polish investments totalled 290 million Litas (according to this indicator Poland was in the 19th position).

Table 2. Foreign direct investment of Poland in Lithuania (beginning of year)11

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Slow aggressiveness in the foreign markets and an underdeveloped infrastructure between Lithuania and Poland are the most important factors determining non-intensive economic co-operation between Lithuania and Poland. Both countries do not posses the common networks of energy sources (oil and gas pipelines, electric power networks) or modern highways (the projects Via Baltica and Rail Baltica still are unfinished). It is also important to take into consideration the cultural relationship between Lithuania and Poland. The quality of the strategic relationship between the two countries will partly depend on the localisation of geopolitical interests and on the level of cultural relationship. The importance of the cultural relationship may be defined by two key factors: common historic experience and significant national minority groups in Poland, as well as in Lithuania. Approximately 30,000 Lithuanians (mostly in small districts of Punskas, Seinai and Suvalkai in Suvalkai voivode) are residing in Poland. The Polish group is considered to be the largest national minority group in Lithuania. According to the data of the general census of the population 235,000 Poles were living in Lithuania in 2001 (it makes 6.74 percent of the whole population). The policy of national minorities is one of the most important (quite often as one of the most sensitive) aspects in Lithuanian-Polish bilateral relationship. It is quite possible to assert that Poland bears much greater influence (especially political) on Lithuania than vice versa. Lithuania is important to Po- land as a political (quite often also as a military partner) partner that supports Polands initiatives among international structures. In the economic area, Lit- huania could stand as an intensive transit corridor to Northern Europe. Polish cultural influence on Lithuania is quite significant because of a long common historic experience, as well as a big Polish community in Lithuania. Moreover, Poland has traditionally been the bridge carrying material and spiritual values from Western Europe to Lithuania.

10 Department of Statistics, Statistics, Foreign trade, http://www.std.lt/web/main.php?parent=524, 25 04 200 11 Department of Statistics, Statistics, Economy and Finance, Foreign direct investment by investing country as of beginning of year, http://www.std.lt/web/main.php?parent=365, 25 04 2005. 82 Taking into consideration the Lithuanian-Polish geopolitical interests as well as geoeconomic vectors and cultural connections, it is possible to make presumptions that in most spheres the two countries share the concurrence of geopolitical interests while the aim to realise them provides a natural opportunity (in perspective necessity) to extend the strategic partnership between Po- land and Lithuania. First, the similarity of geopolitical interests is partly determined by the fact that both countries have territorial contact and belong to the same geostrategic zone (rimland). Common historic experience (common state during XVI-XVII centuries, a Soviet period) is of the utmost importance in influencing the geopolitical orientation and gravitation tendencies in the societies of both. Second, the geopolitical situation of Poland and Lithuania determines the fact that the regulations of geopolitical codes in both countries are mostly determined by the development of the global geopolitical situation and the contact among the great geopolitical powers. The presumptions of a strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania on the global level (after the regaining of the sovereignty of Poland and Lithuania when the USSR collapsed) are mostly connected with the identical geostrategic aim of two countries to gain hard and soft security. Seeking for the goal has defined the community of geopolitical interests for both countries: they have connected their security with the integration into Euroatlantic structures. In perspective of the global geopolitical level, the guarantee for efficiency and continuity of these international structures in the very general meaning may be provided by the biggest EU countries and USA, which are able to ensure the continuity of geopolitical subjectivity within Cen- tral and Eastern European countries on the basis of cross guarantees (EU is the channel of soft and USA is the source of hard security import). While defining the potential necessity of the Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership in the context of the relationship between the two countries and the USA, one has to make a great emphasis on the fact that Lithuania could gain a closer relationship with the USA via Poland (which is supported strategically by USA). Where- as Poland which is seeking for a leaders status in the region of Central and Eastern Europe could be in the need of political support from Lithuania, which in its turn could enlarge the international prestige of Poland as well as its potential to have influence upon the global geopolitical processes. The coherence of Lithuanian-Polish geopolitical interests on the global level form natural conditions for the expansion of strategic partnership between the two countries. Lithuanian Polish interests come into contact in the regional policy so it would be rational to seek for strategic co-operation between the countries while realizing foreign policy in the terms of the region. It is possible to identify the following spheres of perspective between Lithuanian-Polish co-operations within the region: co-operation within multilateral structures (NATO, the EU, etc.), common policy towards Belarus and Ukraine, co-ordinated policy towards Russia (especially Kaliningrad Oblast). Lithuania and Poland are in different categories within the EU context and have quite opposite interests concerning EU integration in general, in parti- 83 cular EU institutional setup. However, there are many EU policy spheres where Poland and Lithuania have the same positions: foreign policy, security and defence, economic development, etc. One should pay attention to the fact, that if there is a possibility to form a certain economic core within EU and get Poland involved into it, then Lithuania (after making a certain union with Poland) might form a different level of relationships with EU states and get the opportunity to pursue a more active foreign policy. One also has to bear in mind that Eastern Europe is one of the most important vectors in Polish regional geopolitics. Namely this (European Neighbour- hood Policy) vector in the regional geopolitics might be treated as sort of geostrategic axis with the potential to provide nearly the strongest impulse to form a real Lithuanian Polish strategic partnership. Both countries speak in support of the democratisation of Ukraine and are ready to convey their Euro-integration experience. The two countries also support the formation of civic society and the process of democratisation in Belarus. Lithuanias participation in building stronger ties with Ukraine (and maybe with Belarus) is rather important for Poland. Due to historical reasons in Belarus, as well as in the Ukraine, there still exists some sort of Polonofobia. So, for Poland while implementing their policy towards these countries, in some cases it would be more preferable to act together with Lithuania (or via Lithua- nia as a mediator). Lithuania is an important partner for Poland in discussing the question of Kaliningrad Oblast. With the view in the future to integrate Kaliningrad into Western sphere Poland (who does not want to strain their relationship with Russia) gains much more benefit if Russia considers Lithuania (but not Poland) the main obstacle for binding Kaliningrad to Russia. If Lithuanian Polish policy directed towards the consolidation of Cen- tral and Eastern Europe region could draw the USA and EUs biggest countries attention, as well as manage to co-ordinate the policy of Western European countries towards Eastern European countries (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine), then the conditions for Lithuania and Poland could be created to implement their common regional geopolitical interests in order: to form the mechanism of drawing Kaliningrad into European space to seek for democratisation of Belarus making this country to serve as a barrier against the dissemination of Russian power, and to strengthen Ukrainian USA EU relationship. It is obvious that Lithuanian Polish geopolitical interests are mostly coherent, that is why it is more reasonable for the two countries to combine their efforts trying to attain their foreign policy goals on the global, as well as on regional, level thus forming preconditions to expand the Lithuanian Polish strategic partnership. 84 3. Factors Influencing the Development of Strategic Partnership

3.1. External Factors

The relationship among the greatest geopolitical actors in the international system will make an inevitable influence on the Lithuanian Polish relationship. It is possible to mark out several reciprocity scenarios among the most important geopolitical subjects: Transcontinental Alliance (USA EU Russian axis) EU countries vs. USA Russian Alliance (Europes isolation scenario) Eurocontinentalism (EU Russian axis) Eurasism vs. Euroatlantism (USA EU axis) In case the Transcontinental Alliance it is realised that there could be formed an inter-balance alliance among the most important geopolitical actors Russia, the USA, the EU. In such a situation Lithuania and Poland could become a conditionally stable geopolitical zone thus providing the possibility to expand their strategic partnership relations and to gain the status of golden provinces or to become a geopolitical link between the EU and Russia. On the other hand, a formal transcontinental alliance could potentially stand for a certain cover for the aim to mask long-term geostrategic interests of the greatest geopolitical subjects. If Russia gets involved in transcontinental alliance and becomes the most important geopolitical partner of USA in Europe, it could potentially seek for geopolitical influence in the European region thus getting an eventual possibility to gain freedom for its manoeuvre in the post-Soviet space. Such actions could provide conditions under which Lithuania could return to grey security zone thus obtaining the status of an exchange object. In this context Poland would become a power foremost for the USA and would be used to neutralise the geopolitical manipulations of Russia. One of the possibilities to avoid such a geopolitical perspective would be strengthening the strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania. It would allow a consolidating of the region of Central and Eastern Europe and to form a geopolitical environment, which would be an effective block for Russias attempts to spread geopolitical power in this region. Another possible reciprocity combination among geopolitical actors is the USA Russia alliance or Europes isolation scenario. In this context both Russia and the USA may try to exploit Central and Eastern Europe countries forcing them to act as their influence agents in the EU. Such a situation wouldnt be favourable for Lithuania and Poland, which seek for their geopolitical and economical interest co-ordination on a strategic USA basis, and on the possibilities provided by the EU to expand their economy. If the possibility to keep the balance among the great geopolitical actors were lost then Lithuanias and Po- lands geostrategical independence would eventually diminish. 85 On the other hand, Europes isolation geopolitical scenario could naturally raise the interest of great European countries to break the isolation thus increasing their influence in Central and Eastern Europe. In such a context Lit- huania and Poland could play a significant role acting as the moderators between the EU and the USA and search for possibilities to contribute to the reanima- tion of the transatlantic alliance, which could be more favourable in realising Lithuanian Polish geopolitical interests. An increasing Russian European economic interdependence and Rus- sias (EU strive to limit the USA monopoly in the international policy could encourage an alternative) Eurocontinentalistic geopolitical scenario could also occur. If this scenario is successful then the optimal geostrategic direction for Lithuania could be its active mediation between the EU and Russia thus ensuring favourable conditions for their mutual economic transit. Co-operation with Poland could help Lithuania to amortise negative consequences of Russias EU political rapprochement could provide a good possibility for Lithuania to implement its geopolitical interests. On the other hand, if Russia and the EU decide to share their influence in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, on the principle of geography but not on the principle of influence on certain sectors, then Lithuania and Poland might potentially become either Russian or EU provinces. In this context the Lithuanian Polish gravitation towards one of the above-mentioned control centres actually would depend on these countries integration levels into EU. If Lithuania and Poland get involved in the EU economic core and pursue a regional policy (which mostly conforms with the interests of the great EU countries) then there would be a greater probability to avoid the perspective of becoming Russias geopolitical province. However, if the Eurocontinentalistic scenario is successful there is also the probability that the USA would try to break it and exploit the Central and Eastern European region as a geopolitical wedge between the EU and Russia. It would suit Lithuania as well as Poland because both countries intersect the EU and Russias geopolitical interests and there might come the possibility to return to the traditional balance between the geopolitical codes of these countries. Finally, it is necessary to mark out one more possible scenario of global geopolitics and its potential consequences on the development of Lithuanian Polish strategic partnership. If Russia took back the neo-Eurasian dimension into its geopolitical code and tried to strengthen its positions in a post soviet space, then it is likely that the relationship between Russia and the West would get colder and lead to the Euroatlantic (USA EU) conceptions conflict with Russian neo-Eurasian geopolitical code. In such an international context Lithu- ania and Poland would act as a buffer against the dissemination of Russian power towards a western direction. Such scenarios would suit both countries because their intersection with geostrategic zones could let them expect the attention and support from great geopolitical actors while fulfilling strategically important functions to block and/or delimit Russia and naturally could strengthen their structural power. 86 In conclusion it must be noted that none of the above-discussed scenarios spontaneously implicate a radical discrepancy of Lithuanian and Polish interests that could hamper the development of their strategic partnership. At the moment, a creation of a Euroatlantic alliance is the most favourable case for a Lithuanian Polish strategic partnership as it potentially guarantees the possibility for the two countries to co-ordinate their political and economical interests while construc- ting the conception of a new power centre in Central and Eastern Europe.

3.2. Domestic Policy Dynamics

Further development or stagnation of the Lithuanian Polish relationship will depend on the international political environment as well as on internal social, economic and political factors. The analysis of Lithuanian and Polish domestic policies define the factors that could potentially influence the perspectives of the two countries strategic partnership: change of political leadership, state policy towards national minorities, and development of economical relationships. The dynamic factor of domestic policy is related to the potential change of Lithuanian Polish geopolitical orientation. Polands geopolitical orientation and gravitation towards the West causes no doubt. Whereas Lithuanias geopolitical situation as well as its historic experience give the background for the ambivalence of the countrys geopolitical orientation (both towards the West and Russia) and during a long period for the possibility of a change in geopolitical orientation (towards Russia). The basic changes in Lithuanian government (in case some pro-Russian parties and/or politicians came to power) could be expressed by their strives to change Lithuanian geopolitical orientation (from Western towards Russian) and that could mean the basic changes in Lithuanian geopolitical code thus potentially destabilise the development process of the Lithuanian Polish strategic partnership. However, Lithuanias integration into Western structures is getting more and more intensive that is why the possibilities for the above-mentioned basic changes in Lithuanias domestic policy are diminishing. One of the most important factors that will certainly have influence on the future relations of Lithuania and Poland should be the situation with Polish ethnic minorities in Lithuania and the Lithuanian ethnic minority in Poland. The development of a strategic partnership between Lithuania and Poland will be influenced mainly by the means (democratic, based on respect for ethnic minorities or politically engaged and filled with aggressive nationalism) of solving the outstanding problems of the ethnic minorities in both countries. Also, strategic partnership will be influenced by the development or stagnation of bilateral economic co-operation. Currently seeking for bilateral economic development it is important to concentrate on the infrastructural projects (transport, energy, communication), that would physically interconnect Lithua- nia (and, eventually, other Baltic States, Northern countries and North-West Russia) with Poland and Western Europe. 87 4. The Perspectives of the Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland

4.1. Formal Strategic Partnership

Current relations between Lithuania and Poland can be described as formal strategic partnerships: the states coordinate interests of foreign policy only in those cases when it doesnt contradict geopolitical interests of both sides. This kind of partnership, that is seen only in coincidental interests, but not based on common geopolitical, economical and cultural aims, is very fragile. Potentially any of the political, economical or ethnical incidents can break the relations. Still, this scenario of partnership should be treated as positive to Lit- huanias national interests because Lithuanias and Polands importance and interest to each other does not change radically and in this situation cooperation between the countries can deepen. The possibility to anchor this scenario is big. In the short run strengthening of Lithuanias and Polands integration into the EU and NATO and the reclamation of hard and soft security supplied by those alliances can help Poland and Lithuania give more attention to foreign policy. This means more chances for both countries to extend geopolitical influence and implement foreign policy in the wider regional context and that can help to activate and to deepen strategic partnership between Lithuania and Poland to make it de facto.

4.2. Strategic Partnership de facto

The evolution to this scenario of strategic partnership can be identified with active deepening of relations and filling the vacuum made by formal strategic partnership with certain political, economical and cultural actions. In the case of de facto strategic partnership Lithuania and Poland should constantly harmonize their foreign policy positions and mutually ensure politically equivalent status for each other. The basis for this scenario should be the growth of Lithuanias and Polands geoeconomical importance in Europe. If Poland will treat Lithuania as a geoeconomically perspective partner that can consolidate regions of Southern and Northern Europe, then Poland should be prone to take bigger responsibility in order to safeguard Lithuanias interests. That would be eminently favourable from the stand point of Lithuanias national security. By widening the common infrastructural potential of Lithuania and Poland it is possible to create transit terminal between Central and Eastern Europe (in which Poland is seeking leadership), which will interlink Europe in East-West and South-North directions. As well the de facto strategic partnership can be activated by the common regional actions of Lithuania and Poland while trying to implement the EU Neighbourhood policy. The interest of Poland as a possible regional leader is to 88 divide with Lithuania the political burden of representing EU interests in Kali- ningrad, Belarus and Ukraine. And this can be the main motive to treat Lithua- nia as a geopolitical partner and to deepen relations between the two countries. If politicians in both countries will understand that the most effective regional policy can be reached by joint actions, than de facto strategic partnership of Lithuania and Poland could be very possible.

4.3. The Possibility for Geopolitical Alliance of Lithuania and Poland

The geopolitical alliance of Lithuania and Poland can mean a qualitative change of the strategic partnership from common coinciding interests to mutual liability on the political level. In the case of this scenario, the interests of Poland should be understood as Lithuanians interests and vice versa. If this scenario materialized it would have opened for Lithuania more possibilities to use joint structural power in forming relations with other geopolitical actors. Also, this would help to increase the level of Lithuanias national security, because it would lower the risk of becoming the object of geopolitical interchange. On the other hand, the alliance of Lithuania and Poland can be anchored only when Lithuania is a concurrent part of Lithuanian-Polish economical and political ties between East West and South North directions. The development of geopolitical alliance could be functional only in the long or middle term. The asymmetry of relative and structural power between Lithuania and Poland makes us question the possibility of creating the alliance in short or middle term.

4.4. Lithuania as the Geostrategic Periphery of Poland

The presumption for this scenario would be Polands, as the leader of Central and Eastern Europe and the closest ally of the USA in Europe, ambitions to seek the implementation of its foreign policy aims when acting alone. In this case Lithuania will act as the periphery in Polands foreign policy. If Lithuania is a periphery of Poland this would mean that Lithuania is at risk of becoming an object of interchange between the geopolitical actors. As well, it would affect negatively the chances for Lithuania to make a profit from the widening of geopolitical networks in the Central and Eastern Europe and this would reduce Lithuanias structural power. On the other hand, if Poland will make Lithuania a geopolitical periphery it would distance itself from several viable regional policy directions: the expanding of a geopolitical network to Latvia, Estonia, Nordic countries and North-West Russia, European Neighbour- hood Policy towards Eastern neighbours, and the Westernization of Kalining- rad. Those regional issues would be more effectively solved and would give more economical and political divident by acting together. Thats why the possibility for Lithuania of becoming the Polands geostrategical periphery is small. 89 4.5. Lithuania Object of Interchange between Poland, Germany and Russia

After becoming a member of the EU and NATO, Poland feels less danger of being transformed to interchange object between geopolitical actors. So, there is a possibility that Poland can join the informal agreement between Germany and Russia that would redraw political and economical spheres of influence in Europe. For some economical or political rewards Poland would agree to the possible transfer of Lithuania to Russias sphere of influence. As well, there is also the possibility that Poland can make Lithuania a sounding board of radical positions. The rudiment for such a situation can be seen in Polands unofficial position concerning Kaliningrad, when Lithuania was left to solve problems with Russia on its own. A possible scenario would be when Lithuania is treated as an object of interchange between Poland, Russia and Germany. This would be the most negative, because eventually Lithuania can become Russias bridgehead to Euro- pe and/or the spreader of Russian interests into the EU. So, Lithuania would lose the possibilities of making independent geopolitical manoeuvres and this would be a threat for ones sovereignty. Still, the possibility for this kind of scenario is small. First of all, it would negatively influence Polands security, for which Lithu- ania acts as one of the possible geopolitical buffer states from Russia, thus the domination of Russia could mean the growing threats for Poland. There is small chance that Poland would sacrifice the most perspective security scenario (the consolidation of Central and Eastern Europe with the support of USA) even though Poland has huge comparative and structural power. Because the USA is the only real superpower in the world, it is almost impossible that there can be any radical redistribution of geopolitical power in the Central, Eastern Europe and in the Baltic states without ones support. On the other hand, there is possibility that it would be Russia and the USA that will share spheres of influence in the Central European and in the Baltic states even though they are members in NATO. For example the USA would dominate the military sector and Russia would increase its influence in the economy and mostly in the energy sector12 . The analysis of possible relations between Poland and Lithuania allows us to assume that there is only a small possibility of negative scenarios for Lithu- ania. Partly it is because of todays geopolitical reality, which determines big attention to Central and Eastern Europe from the main geopolitical subjects. This helps Poland and Lithuania to implement active regional foreign policy and expand structural power. Thats why we can forecast that if there will be no change in the current geopolitical configuration there is a big possibility that a formal partnership between Poland and Lithuania can develop to a de facto strategic partnership.

12 Janeliûnas T., JAV ir Rusijos átakos persiskirstymas Vidurio ir Rytø Europos regione, [The Re-division of USA and Russian Influence on the Region of Central and Eastern Europe], Praneðimas konferencijoje Lietuva po Prahos Vilnius, 2002 m. lapkrièio 29 d (in Lithuanian). 90 Conclusions

In the evaluation of the conjunction of interests between Lithuania and Po- land, let us presume that the strengthening of this partnership would be the most rational choice for both countries. It is mostly Lithuania who seeks for a reliable and influential partner in the region if it doesnt want to stay passive country. For Lithuania it is important to strengthen co-operation in these aspects: Seeking for Polands support in strengthening the network between Northern and Southern Europe and between the West and East, while at the same time trying to suppress Russias influence and looking for support from USA in European affairs; reducing the possible competition for Kaliningrad, Belarus or Ukraine; stimulating bilateral economic co-operation; co-ordinating security policy from Russia in economical sector; employing and expanding Lithuanias analytical potential. Still, it is very important to mention the big difference in power between Lithuania and Poland, and the asymmetrical interests to each other. Lithuanias efforts in seeking strategic partnership shouldnt become an end in itself. So, it is necessary to describe some conditions for a strategic partnership. 1. Partnership with Poland should give evident benefits for Lithuania. A principal provision of Lithuania concerning Poland should be formed in this way: Lithuania is trying to co-ordinate its policy with Poland, but doesnt identify itself with Poland and doesnt try to melt in Polands sphere of influence. This means the one main principle in the strategic partnership with Poland is possible only when it helps Lithuania: to maintain ties with Northern and Southern Europe; to maintain the functions of a geopolitical bridge between West and East; to counterbalance the influence of Russia; to promote the presence of the USA in European affairs. 2. When speaking on the relations with Poland, the complementation of actions and not competition should be highlighted. Even though Poland is a much more powerful state, it can feel as if it is in a diplomatic competition (for example for Kaliningrad, Belarus or Ukraine) with Lithuania. Those provisions could block the basis for building a common understanding and building trust. Thats why it is important as frankly as possible to explain to the Polish side, what Lithuania is seeking for and how the common exertion in the foreign policy can give the mutual benefits. 3. Improvement of economic co-operation. At the moment the economic interests of Poland are diverted towards the West (first of all, towards Germany) and building of infrastructure towards the West is the main aim for Poland. The intention of Lithuania should be to convince Poland, that only by tying Sout- hern and Northern Europe together is it possible to embody ones geopolitical interests. 91 4. Co-ordination of the economic security policy. Lithuania and Poland feel insecure while depending upon Russias energy resources. The intensiveness of those threats varies and depends upon the current entrenchment of Rus- sia in Poland and the Baltic states. If Russia will dominate within this zone of the oil production and transit it would gain a powerful tool for the manipulation (for example by stimulating the artificial competition between countries) of the various countries. Thats why it is important to look for a common understanding, that decisions about possession of strategic objects will influence ones neighbour and in the long run can negatively influence the economical security of both countries. 5. Lithuania should present its analytical potential. In this sphere Lithu- ania can present its peculiar view on Eastern Europe and give advice on how to solve the problems in the South Caucasus. Poland may be interested to take account of Lithuanias diplomatic and military experience in co-operation with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and countries of the South Caucasus. Also, Poland can entrust to Lithuania the planning of some intellectual projects (for example in foreign policy, economic co-operation, building of civic society, etc.) To summarise, it can be stated that strategic partnership or possible geopolitical alliance between Lithuania and Poland can be a rational aim of Lithu- anias foreign policy. It can help to strengthen Lithuanias structural power and minimize the possibility to become Russias object of influence. Yet, the low importance of Lithuania in European geopolitical games can create obstacles for Lithuania to become a strategic partner for Poland. That is why the only chance for Lithuania to enlarge its geopolitical potential is in an active foreign policy. Political indeterminacy in Belarus and Ukraine should give Lithuania chances to perform an important role in geopolitical games. Eventually, this can help them to to become seen by the bigger geopolitical actors. 93 Egdûnas Raèius* Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius Lithuanian Military Academy

Debate in Lithuania on EU Expansion to East: the Case of Turkey

Although Turkey has been knocking on the EUs gates for almost four decades, only the echo of that knock was being heard in Lithuania until 2004. After Lithuania joined the EU, the question of Turkish membership in the EU was by design added to the agenda of the Lithuanian governments foreign policy. High-ranking state officials rushed to assure both citizens and the world that Lithuania supports the objectives of Turkey, whereas opposition (rightist) parties expressed concern about the lack of debate on this issue in the Parliament, the government and society in general. The opinion of the society, to which the Lithuanian government had not yet appealed in any way, is not clear yet. Political analysts and journalists writing on this issue tend to demonize Turkey and practically frighten the general public. It seems that a passi- vely negative mood is settling over ordinary citizens, which in the case of referendum can become potential Nos to the Turkish membership in the Bloc.

Introduction

In this article the author analyzes discussions in the Lithuanian public discourse on possible Turkish entrance into the EU with the purpose to find out opinions and positions of separate groups of society. The approach to the problem is both political and public. The political approach includes speeches of top politicians and statements of some parties, MPs and members of the Europe- an Parliament on the issue of Turkey. The second one involves analytical texts and initiatives of citizens which are published in the countrys mass media. The purpose of this analysis is to find out how much the governments position correlates with the publics mood and if there is an unspoken agreement and congruence of positions or whether there is still some discrepancy. Since the question of the Turkish entrance into the EU will hold relevant for at least ten coming years, the results of this analysis should be useful for further discussions.

* Dr. Egdûnas Raèius is associate professor and head of the Centre for Asian and African Studies of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University; associate professor (part-fine) of the Political Science Department, Lithuanian Military Aca- demy. Address: Vokieèiø g. 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail - [email protected] 94 1. Turkey on the Way to Europe

Notwithstanding the several national coup de etat and successive military juntas, Turkish political elites have been actively knocking on the doors of the European Union already for several decades. Indeed, this push expresses the logical apogee of the Kemalist ideology and its eventual fruition the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal back in the third decade of the XX century delineated the landmarks of Turkish Europeasation and pursing it under coercion he hoped to change the stereotyped attitude (dominant in Europe) towards the predecessor of the Turkish Republic the Osmanli Empire, which ever since the mid- XIX century Europeans sarcastically called the sick man of Europe a headache for European powers1 . After Kemals death, Turkey went through a rather stormy stage of state development, when eventually in 1982 the military transferred power to civilians and a new constitution was adopted giving birth to a system of institutional democracy, which has been functioning with minor disruptions to this day. The government is elected in practically free elections, where women can elect and be elected, candidates are nominated by almost a dozen major political parties and the supremacy of law is respected. However, the criterion of legitimacy to participate in the countrys political life the non questionability of the cult of the state founder and the Kemalist ideology during the entire existence of the Turkish Republic has remained the same everyone, who even lightly criti- cizes this almost sacred line of domestic and foreign politics, immediately feels the reaction of the system, asserted by legal and military means. If Kemals reforms and the politics of his successors gradually formed a new type of Turk in the greater cities, life in provinces remained traditional the patriarchate is still dominant there, local customary (in certain places even tri- bal) relations2 , the broadly used unpaid work of children and women and the society is still agonized in a rooted culture of violence. The concerning study about this culture of violence was made public by Amnesty International in mid-20043 . Various annual indexes formed by independent international organizations on economic, civil and political freedoms, which cover from 140 to 180 countries, rank Turkey below the 80th position. This witnesses that both democ-

1 About Turkish europeasations influence on relations with Europe/EU see Larrabee F. S., Lesser I. O., Turkey and Europe, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/; Morin A. Crafting A Nation: The Myt- hic Construction of the New Turkish National Identity in Atatürks Nutuk, 2004, p. 26-33, http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/europe/initiatives/pdf/Morin_Paper.pdf, 6th of Septem- ber, 2005. 2 On August 30, 2005, BBC published a report about the prevalence of illegal polygamy among Kurdish in the southeast Turkey, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/ this_world/4165896.stm 3 Turkey: Women confronting family violence, Amnesty International, June 2, 2004, http:// web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur440132004 95 racy and civil society in Turkey are far away from meeting European standards (EU members, as a rule, are in the first forty positions)4 . After the adoption of series of legislative packages in 2002 and 2004 Turkey made noticeable progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria opening way for the EU membership negotiations. These packages initiated the countrys legal system reform (e.g. parliament disbanded National Security Courts equivalent to war tribunals), and thus recalled many restrictions on free speech and political freedom, and established civil control over the armed forces. These reforms without doubt are to the credit of the Turkish government. However, the fact that certain institutional reforms were started from above a few years ago does not mean that they set in motion the process of the reappraisal of values in Turkeys society. Nor these reforms show that the Turks accept European or even Christian values. All these things do worry Brussels, the governments of some EU countries and their societies, about Turkeys preparedness for possible EU membership. They expect Turkey (as a state and society) to be not only in Europe, but also to become a part of Europe. Unfortunately, as Mustafa Aydin has noticed there is clear evidence that todays Europeans still think that the Turks have not yet achieved the standard of civilization, that is, the Copenhagen criteria in todays European Union.5 This opinion can be implicitly backed by the latest results of Eurobarometer6 showing that only 35 per cent of EU citizens support Turkeys membership in the EU, and half of the respondents oppose possible Turkish membership. On the other hand, the 10 new EU members support the idea stronger (48 per cent) than the old ones, where only 32 percent of citizens support Turkeys membership in the EU. Discussions about possible Turkish membership in the EC/EU have lasted from the 1960s. They intensified in 1999, when Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate state and reached their apogee so far in 2004 when the EU had to decide whether and when it will open the accession negotiations with Turkey. In December of 2004, the European Council agreed that the negotiations will be opened on the October 3, 2005. Disregarding the EU citizens opposition to Turkeys membership, Brussels and many governments of the EU member states prepared themselves and their citizens for opening the EU accession negotiations with Turkey. And only a few EU member states are stricter on the question of the EU enlargement and possibly Turkeys membership7 .

4 For example, Press Freedom Index, made by Reporters sans frontiers, among 167 countries analyzed, Turkey was ranked 114 , http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11715; Index of Economic Freedom 2005, made by Heritage foundation, Turkey was ranked 112 among 155 countries, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm; Human Development Report 2004, UNDP, Turkey was ranked 88 among 177 countries, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf 5 Aydin M., The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkeys European Vocation, Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, Issue 2, Winter 2003, p. 327 6 European Commission, Eurobarometer 63, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opi- nion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63.4_en_first.pdf, July 2005. 7 For example, recent speeches of political leaders in France, Holland and Germany. Look: EU to Present Roadmap for Turkish Entry Talks, Reuters, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/ international/international-eu-turkey.html 28th of June, 2005; BBC, EU hears fresh doubts over Turkey, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4189384.stm, August 26, 2005. 96 2. Turkeys Membership in the EU and Lithuania

2.1 Political Level

According to the public opinion surveys in Lithuania on Turkeys membership in the EU, Lithuanians support Turkeys membership equally to the average of the EU level 31.8 per cent8 . The European Commissions Eurobarometer shows a bit stronger support9 . But it seems that the Lithuanian citizens opinion does not disturb the government. It openly but not always formally declares its support for the EU accession negotiations with Turkey and eventuall Turkeys membership. This position was taken by Lithuania and confirmed at the EU Sum- mit in Brussels in December of 2004. Then the European Council introduced some conditions and clauses saying that the EU accession negations not necessarily should end up with Turkeys membership. Shortly after the Summit, Lithuanias government members started speculating on these (essential) conditions and clauses. This is probably done because of realizing that strong support for Turkeys membership can be harmful to the government itself when the countrys citizens do not support Turkeys objectives to join the EU. Meanwhile, shelving active support would not bring any harm to Lithuania or its government.

2.1.1. The Government

In any case, Lithuanias president Valdas Adamkus several times expressed his positive opinion on Turkeys membership in the EU10 . Once giving an interview he said: To my mind the answer should be positive. This is my personal opinion Parti- cipating in several discussions on this question I did not hear any clearly negative positions. [ ] Only one thing should be required from all European countries it is satisfaction of criteria established for the EU countries. This is unalterable condition. If

8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Most of Lithuanians support EU enlargement, http://www.urm.lt/index.php?228118696, July 27, 2005. The survey ordered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was carried out by the Market and Opinion Research centre Vilmorus. In the survey of news portal Delfi 21 per cent of respondents answered positively on the question of Turkeys membership, 67 proc. DELFI skaitytojø nepritaria Turkijos narystei ES, on July 29, 2004, http://www.delfi.lt/news/ daily/euronews/article.php?id=7183414. Another non-representative internet survey ordered by member of the European Parliament Margarita Starkeviciute was carried out in Decem- ber, 2004. 45 per cents from 900 respondents were against opening of EU accession negotiations with Turkey. 27 per cents of respondents were for Turkeys membership with some conditions and only 18 per cents supported Turkeys full membership in EU. Lietuviø nuomonë dël Turkijos narystës ES iðsiskyrë, Publicum, http://www.vtv.lt/content/view/ 756/55/, December 3, 2004 9 European Commission, Eurobarometer 63.4 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opi- nion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_nat_lt.pdf 10 The Chacery of President of the Republic of Lithuania. Prezidentas priëmë Turkijos vicepremjerà A. Giulá, http://www.president.lt/lt/news.full/5236, Sepmtember 12, 2004 97 Turkeys reforms, system and laws satisfy the EU requirements, I think there will be no moral or other obstacles for Turkey to become a part of Europe.11 Indeed, the Lithuanian governments position on Turkeys membership in the EU has always been positive. Speeches of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrate this very well. When Turkeys Minister of Fo- reign Affairs visited Lithuania in September of 2004, Lithuanias Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed a statement which in no uncertain terms said that Lithuania supports Turkeys objectives to become a member of the EU and will support the decision to open the EU accession negotiations with Turkey, if the European Commission report on Turkey is positive and the country satisfies the main membership criteria.12 The peak of discussions about Turkeys possible membership in the EU in Lithuania was in December of 2004. At that time some politicians and political analysts critically covered the internal situation of Turkey and its relationships with neighbouring countries. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania An- tanas Valionis quickly publicly reacted to these discussions indirectly asking to stop them or at last urging them to be politically correct and not to criticize Turkey. According to the minister, in discussions concerning Turkeys membership in the European Union less highly motivated assessments should be declared reservedly, otherwise it can set off national and religious hatred13 . (sic!) Lithuanians Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed a statement which also said that Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the opinion saying that Turkey was not European, but a Muslim country and the EU accession negotiations could not be opened with such a country.14 But Valionis does not deny that Turkey belongs to another civilization. Speaking on the particularity of Turkeys EU membership negotiations in the Seimas he admitted that in the case of Turkey, it is its size and civilization barrier.15 Besides, the minister indirectly expressed his fears that acting against Turkey could overthrow this modern Turkish government and restore Islamic fundamentalism there16 , thus giving in to his frequently cited S. Huntington and mass media. Later, the minister expressed a similar opinion: If we do not negotiate with Turkey, we would show that Europe is xenopho- bic, closing itself from impact of other cultures. In this case possibly the scenario of Samuel Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations would become a reality. Then the reformists of Turkey would loose their positions and the positions of radicals in Islamic

11 V. Adamkus: referendumas dël Konstitucijos Europai nereikalingas, Bernardinai.lt, http:/ /www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?-23724286, September 24, 2005 12 Lietuva remia Turkijos sieká tapti Europos Sàjungos nare, Omni.lt, http://www.omni.lt/ index.php?base/z_199046, September 12, 2004. Lithuanias prime minister Algirdas Bra- zauskas told the same after his meeting. 13 BNS, A.Valionis: Turkija negali bûti atstumta dël religiniø ir tautiniø argumentø, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=5763970&categoryID=2045412&ndate=1104872185, January 4, 2005 14 Ibidem 15 The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Twelfth (12) sessions, http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/ preps2?Condition1=246859&Condition2=, December 9, 2004 16 Ibidem. 98 world would be strengthened. We would start building fences that in todays globali- zed world are not effective and September 11, 2001 has already proved that. Though the ministers fears that in a laïcist Turkey for so many years influenced by secularization Islamic fundamentalism which, by the way, was not present even in the Osmanli times, could return or misgivings that the reformists of Turkey would loose their positions and the positions of radicals in the Islamic world would be strengthened, following the reislamization process there, are quite reasoned, relating this to Turkeys possible non-inclusion into the EU and to S. Huntingtons predictions shows the superficiality of Lithua- nias political rhetoric. Answering the questions of a journalist in January of 2005, Valionis once again repeated that Lithuania supports the European Commissions recommendations for opening the negotiations. He added that this process will be long because Turkeys level of preparedness for the membership will be evaluated according the same criteria. For Lithuania and other countries it is important that this big and important member of NATO would follow common European values.17 A bit earlier answering the questions of MPs about Lithuanias politics in the context of possible Turkeys membership in the EU, the minister described the distribution of the EU countries positions on this question in the following way: Today there are three or four groups of states having different positions on Turkeys negotiations with the EU. Lets say, that the first group agrees with the Euro- pean Commission recommendations to open the EU accession negotiations with Tur- key and thinks that after the negotiations Turkey will become a full member of the European Union. This position is supported by Great Britain, Italy, Greece, Poland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia. The second group the governments agree with the European Commission recommendations and thinks that Turkey should become a member of the EU but the opposition and most of citizens oppose this position. These would be France and Ger- many. The other group agrees with the opening of negotiations but does not think that they should necessarily end with Turkeys membership in the EU. These would be the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary and Lithuania. The last group which opposes Turkeys membership in the EU and is in favour of the third road, that is, as I already mentioned, stronger strategic partnership. This position is supported by Austria and Cyprus. Ireland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia havent et expressed their position.18 A.Valionis placed Lithuania into the third but not the forth group (the one that is in favour of a special partnership) referring to Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations and fair politics purportedly, Lithuania should give Turkey a chance and if Turkey does not blow it, it will become a member of the EU. As one of the reasons for Lithuanias support for Turkey one can pinpoint Director of EU Sector Policies Coordination Division Vidmantas Purlys opi-

17 A. Valionis: Rytuose mes turime labai didelá veiklos laukà, Omni.lt, http://www.omni.lt/ index.php?base/z_242208, January 6, 2005. 18 The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Twelfth (12) sessions, http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/ preps2?Condition1=246859&Condition2=, December 9, 2004. 99 nion that Lithuania supports Turkeys integration objectives because Turkey has supported Lithuanias efforts to become a member of NATO and now we should show our solidarity.19 Turkey has occasionally reminded Lithuania of its support for Lithuania on its way to membership in NATO20 .

2.1.2. Opposition

But the Governments policy for some MPs (especially in opposition) raises some doubts about Turkeys possible membership in the EU. The elder of the Homeland Union Group in the Seimas and the chairman of the Homeland Union Andrius Kubilius in the beginning of December of 2004 distributed a statement where he: expressed his regrets that today the Deputy Chairmen of the Seimas were reluctant to accept inquiry and place the Homeland Unions raised question about Lithuanias position on Turkeys membership in the EU on the agenda of the Seimas session. The discussion of this inquiry at a plenary session of the Seimas would draw societys attention to this important question, allow hearing the arguments of various fractions and would lead the government to formulate an official position on this question. However, as a member of the Homeland Union Jurgis Razma who participated in the Deputy Chairmen of the Seimas meeting admitted, representatives of the ruling fractions showed no interest in public discussion on the question, they were explaining that the minister A.Valionis possibly would not be able to participate in the session and they finally agreed that the Deputy Chairmen of the Seimas would consider the question on Thursday.21 Shortly after that on December 9, 2004, minister A.Valionis had to answer quite tough questions coming from the MPs. Some of them openly accused the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of going beyond its competence and without broader discussions in the society and the Seimas or their authoriza- tion of acting in favour of Turkey. A conservative Rimantas Jonas Dagys rhetori- cally asked whether the minister did not think that there should be a deeper discussion and not so hurried support for all positions which tie the greater countries and accused the Government of hurrying in a perfunctory manner as well as irresponsibility22 . The minister rejected all the blames and accusations from the opposition saying that this question lies within the competence of the Govern- ment and there is no necessity to consider it at length in the Seimas:

19 Pakalkaitë V. Besikaupiantys debesys Vilniuje iðvaikë piketuotojus prieð Turkijos narystê ES, ELTA, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/print.php?id=7168896, July 27, 2004. 20 While the visit of the chairman of the Seimas in Turkey in the spring of 2004 the chairman of Turkeys parliament said that he believed in Lithuanias support for Turkeys objectives to join this honourable international organization as Turkey supported Lithuania seeking to join NATO. ELTA, Narystës ES siekianti Turkija tikisi Lietuvos paramos, http://www.omni.lt/index.php?base/z_152921, March 3, 2004 21 Press agency of the Homeland Union report, http://www.tsajunga.lt/index.php?698168312, December 7, 2004 22 The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Twelfth (12) sessions, http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/ preps2?Condition1=246859&Condition2=, December 9, 2004 100 Do not usurp in the Parliament that what can be done in the Government. Questions related to amendments of laws and the Constitution must have the mandate from the Seimas; thats why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government, applied to the Seimas for such a mandate. But forgive us, when the mandate is not necessary. We will work on our own and bring all the detailed information about our work to the Seimas in case it asks us. Do not think that the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will start sharing with others the works that belong to its competence.23 However, members of the ruling parties in the Seimas have no united position on the question of Turkeys EU accession negotiations. According to a member of the ruling Social Democrat party LSDP and vice chairman of the Seimas Èeslovas Jurðënas, Lithuania owes Turkey because of its moral support for Lithuania seeking membership in the NATO.24 He said that there should be free space for Turkey because the idea of the EU enlargement [ ] is to make that united welfare and democratic Europe larger. [ ] I think we should feel joy and it principle is a good thing that there will be more democratic countries and the high values of the EU will be spread to all margins and in this case to the Near East.25 In his contemplations, Jurðënas does not even try to place Turkey into Europe emphasizing the spread of imaginary high values of the EU to the Near East. Other MPs indirectly support the image of Turkey as a non European country. A member of the ruling coalition Vaclovas Stankëvièius states that Tur- key is an Islamic country belonging to an absolutely different culture. Europe- ans do not perceive Turkey as a part of Europe even geographically.26 Opposing to Jurðënas, another member of his party, a member of Europe- an Parliament Aloyzas Sakalas is strongly against possible Turkeys membership arguing that Turkey does not belong to Europe: The main argument why Turkey can not become a member of the EU is a legal one. The Constitutional Treaty for Europe signed by the leaders of EU member states says that The Union shall be open to all European States (Articles I-1 and I-58), Turkey does not belong to Europe and the Treaty does not mention that countries of other continents or Eurasia (Turkey, Russia) could be potential EU members. There it is written that The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries (Article I-57). So, according to the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, Turkey cannot be a member of the EU, but it still can be a good neighbour developing a special relationship with the EU.27 Sakalas and some other of his political colleagues (especially from the oppositional parties) have indirectly accused the Government of Lithuania and

23 Ibidem. 24 ELTA, È. Jurðënas: Turkija turi atitikti keliamus reikalavimus, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/ article.php?id=7167985&categoryID=2045412&ndate=1122459541, July 25, 2005 25 Ibidem. 26 Danilavièius V. Pingantis euras Lietuvai nepakenks, Londono þinios, http://www.londo- nozinios.com/index.php?nc=naujiena&id=150&mnc=naujienos, June 15, 2005 27 Sakalas A. Pasakëlës Turkijai, Veidas, http://www.veidas.lt/lt/leidinys.nrfull/ 41c2af597a373, No. 51, December 16, 2004. Practically the same was said in report published by his bureau in Vilnius on the 16th of December, 2004, http://www.asdf.lt/article.php?id_art=5271, January 11, 2005 101 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular of on the one hand having no independent political will and on the other hand hiding it from society28 . These accusations very likely displeased minister Valionis whose warnings about less highly motivated assessments could be partly addressed to Sakalas. But later Sakalas denied that he is against Turkeys membership because it is a Muslim country. In his point of view the main obstacle for Turkey to become a member of the EU is its geographical position. The Constitutional Treaty for Europe says that only European countries can be members of EU. Turkey is not a Euro- pean country, it belongs to Eurasia.29 A colleague of Sakalas in the European Parliament, the liberal centrist Eugenijus Gentvilas, despite supporting the opening of negotiations with Tur- key also criticized actions of the Lithuanian government and the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning this question: I can openly say that Europe for several months is simply boiling with discussions about opening the EU accession negotiations with Turkey. But in Lithuania it is calm. There were a few remarks that Lithuania supports the opening of negotiations and thats all. No opinion polls, no analytic articles and no emotions in the society. Besides, it was the same with very hurried ratification of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe.30 He was also angry with the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Valionis: I do not think that Lithuania without doubts has to support Turkeys membership because of what Valionis has squeaked.31 Gentvilas also thinks that Turkey is not a European country. According to him, Turkeys culture is based on the Asiatic tradition with a strong impact from Europe.32 Besides, he warned that if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, Lithuanias contributions to the EU budget will grow by 100 million Litas annually and the EU payments from structural funds will decline.33 Nevertheless, similarly to A.Valionis, E.Gentvilas frightens that in the case Turkey will not be a member of the EU, Islamic fundamentalists will return to power: Different Turkish governments in this modernizing country worked step by step constantly fighting against savagely resisting Islamic fundamentalists. If the EU does not open negotiations, this element will rise up and will wipe out todays government which hasnt yet attained its objectives. Europe in that case will have an Iranian or Iraqi type monster where all economic reforms will be stopped and the human and national minorities rights will be finally forgotten.34 So, according to Gentvilas, Turkey is between two civilizations and worldviews. Certainly, Europe has not and cannot lead Turks to Christianity and to

28 Ibidem. 29 BNS, A. Valionis: Turkija negali bûti atstumta dël religiniø ir tautiniø argumentø, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=5763970&categoryID=2045412&ndate=1104872185, January 4, 2005. 30 Gentvilas E. Rimbas ir saldainis Turkijai, Omni.lt, http://www.omni.lt/index.php?base/z_236604, December 14, 2004 31 Europarlamentarai sprendimus uþ Lietuvà priima patys, Voruta, No. 20 (566), November 12, 2004 , http://www.voruta.lt/article.php?article=654 32 Gentvilas (note 30). 33 Ibidem. 34 Ibidem. 102 demand from them to give up their traditions. But it would be silly to leave Turkey to its fate and make it a bastion of Islam or even terror. So far the most active in this political discussion has been the Homeland Union. Though its previous leader, the Honorary Chairman of the party and a member of the European Parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis supports Turkeys bid35, other members of the party are not so favourable. Deputy elder of the parliamentary Homeland Union Group in the Seimas Jurgis Razma signed a petition of an international public movement Voice for Europe which urged to never open negotiations with Turkey or accept this country into the EU. Then, he explained that special partnership is better than imitation of negotiations. Ha- ving a special treaty would allow Turkey to feel comfortable and integrate into European processes without trying to mix different cultures and traditions.36 Another conservative and a member of the European Parliament Laima Andrikienë said that she understands Lithuanian and other EU countries citizens who are against opening the EU accession negotiations. According to her, the EU enlargement also has its own limits and there are more arguments against Turkeys membership in the EU than in favour of it. Today we have to think not only about the start but also about the end of the negotiations, its outcomes for both the EU and Lithuania. Thats why I understand these citizens of Lithuania and other EU member states who are against the opening of negotiations with Turkey that according to the agreement of the previous year will start very soon on October 3. She admitted that after detailed analysis of the whole big European Parliament report on Turkey she spoke and voted against opening accession negotiations with Turkey.37 Andrikiene subscribed to the opinion of many Europe- an politicians that Turkey should be satisfied having a privileged partner status.38 From Lithuanian politicians speeches and discussions one can draw a conclusion that many of them are not so generous to Turkey despite a positive Governmental position on the question of opening the negotiations. Politicians opposing Turkeys membership in the EU generally present the same standard packet of Turkeys problems involving aspects of its domestic and external politics. Although most of them agree that some of the problems with or without the help of EU could be solved in ten or more years time (until the hypothetical end of the EU accession negotiations with Turkey in 2015), other problems identified as permanent constantans (geography, religion, demography) will never allow Turkey to become a European country and at the same time to become a full-fledged member of the EU. The rigidity and awkwardness of the Lithuanian Government and the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in considering the question of possible Turkeys

35 ELTA, V. Landsbergis ragina balsuoti uþ derybø dël Turkijos narystës ES pradþià, http://www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?263796998, December 9, 2004 36 Pakalkaitë V. Besikaupiantys debesys Vilniuje iðvaikë piketuotojus prie Turkijos narystê ES, ELTA, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/print.php?id=7168896, July 27, 2005 37 Ibidem. In Laima Andrikienes personal portal www.laimaandrikiene.lt a survey on the question of Turkeys EU membership was carried. Most of its respondents answered the question negatively. 38 Europos informacijos centras, L. Andrikienë siûlo strateginës ES-Turkijos partnerystës kelià, http://eic.euro.lt/index.php?-66031732, December 14, 2004 103 membership both at home in Lithuania and on the broader EU level has split Lithuanias politicians. On one side are the highest officials of Lithuania (leaders of the leading parties, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Seimas, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the non-partisan President) and those politicians who si- lently support them, while within the other one could make out several groups. One of these groups is the Homeland Union which insists on open discussions on the question and not necessarily opposes the negotiations with Turkey. The other oppositional parties (especially marginal and with no representation in the Parliament) and politicians from the ruling parties who have negative individual position on the question belong to the second group. To the third group belong some members of the European Parliament opposing negotiations with Turkey. The first and the third groups were the most active opponents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this discussion among them took at time an imperative (from the side of Ministry), sharp and even personalised (from the side of Euro-parliamentarians) tone. The third group is exceptional because it influences decisions not only in Lithuania but also in Brussels and Strasbourg. That is why one can speak about a double-sided Lithuanian position on the question of the EU accession negotiations with Turkey on the one hand, Lithuanias government supports the opening of negotiations, yet on the other, some members of the European Parliament (supposedly half of them) vote against the negotiations with Turkey during the sessions of the European Parliament. Besides, the Euro-parliamentarians were the only ones who tried to find out the moods of Lithuanian citizens and argued that they voted taking into account these moods.

2.2. Public Level

2.2.1. Mass Media

Probably one of the first to call onto Lithuanians for discussion on the question of Turkeys possible membership in the EU was Egidijus Vareikis. In the spring of 2004 in his considerations on the question he presented a few pros and contras. 39 Among the contras was the one that despite Turke- ys declarations of its secularity, it is an Islamic country and it will never natura- lize in such a Western Christian construct as the EU is. No matter whether Christianity will be mentioned in the Constitution for Europe, Turkeys membership would apparently destroy the understanding of the so called European identity. However, even back then Vareikis supported the opening of negotiations with Turkey. Later, once he returned to the Seimas and became a member of the Parliamentary Group for the Relations with Turkey, Vareikis basically repeated his positive position on Turkeys membership.40

39 Vareikis E. Ar Turkija turëtø tapti Europos Sàjungos nare?, Bernardinai.lt, March 1, 2004 http:/ /www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?-2030592092 40 Vareikis E. Turkija Europoje visada bus kitokia, Europos komitetas, http://www.euro.lt/izinios/2003_01_kitokia.php 104 Unfortunately, after Vareikis call for discussion there was no reaction in the Lithuanian mass media for more than half a year. Only in the end of 2004 half a dozen of articles about Turkeys possible membership in the EU were published. One of the observers, Mantas Martiius, drew readers attention saying that Turkeys membership would be apparent argument against Samuel Huntingtons myth about the clash of Christian and Islamic civilizations and would prove that the confessants of these religions can live together.41 But he also found a lot obstacles related to Turkeys foreign policy (especially with neighbouring countries) that would not allow the country for a long time or even for ages to satisfy the membership criteria. A weekly Horizons of the 21st century published a bit scarring short article on the topic.42 Èeslovas Ikauskas, another political analyst, also published similar considerations at the time.43 Later, articles in the Lithuanian mass media on the same issue reappe- ared in the summer of 2005. Though they were provoked by the referendums in Holland and France as well as terrorist attacks in London, the observers did not present any new original ideas. Juozas Ruzgys warned that Turkey would bring with itself that culture and belief which are not compatible with Christian roots.44 Valentinas Mitë, who lives in the Czech Republic, where he works for the Radio Free Europe, wrote in his article that Turkey in every way is different from the EU members and the question of Turkeys membership is a problem of different cultures and religions and also historical traditions. According to Mitë, the history of European and Turkish relationships gives little optimism. Europe and the Ottoman Empire fought against each other several times. The associations of a Turk being a brutal invader are in the minds of many Europe- ans and many Turks still remember the Crusades.45 An observer with the weekly Atgimimas Deividas lekys in his article The Dilemma of Brussels46 wrote that the opening of the negotiations with Turkey signifies a new stage in the EU enlargement, which it seems will be done at the expense of another big neighbour of the EU. This neighbour is the Ukraine. This remark of lekys reminds us of the fears of some Lithuanian politicians that the Ukraine, which is more relevant to Lithuania, will stay overboard of the EU. Some of them (e.g. Rimantas Dagys) in the meeting with minister Valionis and on other occasions suggested for the Lithuanian government to have a more principled position

41 Martiius M. Iðorinës kliûtys Turkijos kelyje á ES, Bernardinai.lt, December 29, 2004 , http:// www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?-417649794 42 Katinas P. Musulmonai ateina!, XXI amiaus Horizontai, http://www.xxiamzius.lt/ar- chyvas/priedai/horizontai/20041222/1-1.html 43 Iðkauskas È. Ar Turkija verta bûti ES nare?, Penki kontinentai online, 16th of December, 2004 1st of January, 2005 ., http://online.5ci.lt/Article.asp?Lang=L&ArticleID=7352, Ja- nuary 11, 2005 44 Ruzgys J. Europos islamizacija, Leono XIII fondas, 28th of April 2005, http://www.leo- noxiiifondas.lt/index.php?id=146, September 6, 2005. 45 Mitë V. Turkijos narystë kabo ant plauko, Bernardinai.lt, http://www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?- 1277576973, September 10, 2005. 46 lekys D. Briuselio dilema, Atgimimas, http://www.atgimimas.lt/ ssi.php?id=1104153220¤t=2, December 27, 2004. 105 and to raise in Brussels and elsewhere the question of the Ukrainian membership in the EU. Valionis, in answering these urges, said that the Lithuanian government fully supports the Ukraines Euroatlantic membership objectives. He added that the Ukraine will have to work hard if it wants to satisfy the EU membership requirements and to join the EU.47

2.2.2. Civic Initiatives

Probably one of the strongest initiatives calling Lithuanians to discuss the question of Turkeys membership was a picket near the Seimas in July of 2005. Actually, this action was organized by non-Lithuanians. It was organized by the movement Voice for Europe.48 A Lithuanian Vilius Aliauskas who presented himself as the coordinator of the movement in Lithuania explained that the motto of the picket was: Yes for Turkey, No for Turkeys membership in the EU.49 Alas, the participants of the action failed to draw the interest of inhabitants of Vilnius on the question only a handful of MPs and several passers- by joined the picket. The organizers admitted that it was a wrong time for such a picket because most members of Lithuanian nongovernmental organizations were on vacation. Mass media spotted this picket, but it had not evaluated it very seriously. A reporter with the news agency ELTA Vija Pakalkaitë for example rallied in her article that participants of the picket were late to show up and dispersed after less then four hours scared by the gathering clouds.50 Mitë around the same time while observing Turkey membership perspectives doubted that recently in Lithuania established opponents of Turkey membership could change anything and added that similar organizations in France and Germany can change a lot.51 Ho- wever, the organizers and their spokesman Aliauskas doubtlessly expressed the opinion of a big part of Lithuanians. According to Aliauskas, Turkey is not democratic, has lots of problems with its neighbouring countries and ethnic minorities, does not propagate human freedoms and political rights, does not cherish European culture and values and geographically is out of Europe.52

47 The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Twelfth (12) sessions, http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/ preps2?Condition1=246859&Condition2=, December 9, 2004 48 Official site of the movement: http://www.voiceforeurope.org/, 2nd of September, 2005 49 Pakalkaitë V. (note 36). Arguments against Turkeys membership in EU are enumerated in the article The Republic of Turkey is not ready for accession talks with the EU. The European Union is not ready for accession talks with Turkey in the official site of Voice of Europe. http://www.voiceforeurope.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Ite- mid=17&lang=LTU, September 6, 2005 50 Pakalkaitë V. Besikaupiantys debesys Vilniuje iðvaikë piketuotojus prieð Turkijos narystæ ES, ELTA, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/print.php?id=7168896, July 27, 2005 51 Mitë V. (note 45) 52 BNS, Lietuviai jungiasi prie tarptautinës iniciatyvos tarti grieþtà ne Turkijos narystei ES, http:/ /www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?-1807643198, July 26, 2005 106 After reviewing the Lithuanian mass media of the last two years one sees a clear trend of demonizing Turkey in the Lithuanian mass media. Practically all articles of Lithuanian observers are warning and scarring or even openly antagonistic to Turkey. Hence it is hard to evaluate what impact on the public opinion these articles have but one can guess that because of having no alternative (positive toward Turkey) position many Lithuanian citizens go along with the insistent emphasizing of negative facts and processes in Turkey and hold and strengthen stereotyped negative view on this EU candidate country.

Conclusions

In summary, two conclusions could be drawn: The Lithuanian Government (in the person of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the whole political level of Lithuania are inert. This inertness is more conditioned by the governments spinelessness than its integrity or political insight. It also covers the majority of the Seimas which practically does not control the government. There are reflexive voices in the opposition of the Sei- mas that have been calling for broader discussions in the Seimas in particular and Lithuanian society in general. But it is too weak and split in order to make their suggestions audible for the ruling majority. The only group of Lithuanians who actively discuss Turkeys possible membership are the members of the Eu- ropean Parliament. But their opinion not only disagrees with the official governments position but mostly is hostile toward it. That is why one can argue that there is a double-sided position on the political level a positive governments (ruling majoritys) position which is not widely supported in society and a cautious and negative position of most Lithuanian members of the European Parlia- ment supported by the majority of Lithuanians. One can also speak about apathy on the societal level the question of Turkeys EU membership for most citizens of Lithuania is not relevant. Their activity is not stimulated either by mass media or civil movements or nongovernmental organizations practically everyone notices more obstacles for Turkey to become an EU member see more harn than the advantages or benefits to the EU, Lithuania and Turkey itself if et join the EU. Such a position of observers corresponds to the negative opinion of the majority of Lithuanians on the question of Turkeys membership. Besides, the mass media further demonizes and stereoty- pes Turkey forbidding the society to weight and rethink its positions. Therefore, it is likely that the majority of Lithuanians would vote against Turkeys membership in the EU if such a referendum is held (minister Valionis has publicly mentioned about such a possibility). However, it is more likely that the Govern- ment will not allow such a thing and will make all relevant decisions itself. Lithuanias Eastern Neighbours 109 Èeslovas Laurinavièius* Lithuanian History Institute

The Role of History in the Relationship between Lithuania and Russia

The history of Lithuanias and Russias national intercommunion is a basic part of their coexistence as well as the manifestation of their cultural life. However, their history plays a great role in the relationship between these two countries. And it is not a good sign when it includes not only a cultural, but also political sphere as well. Usually it points towards the fact that countries such as these still lack a steady civil identification and that their relations are still being influenced by various ideologies, myths, versions or simply speculations. Lastly, they may also have various and apparent, as well as theoretical pretences towards each other. Therefore these countries practically cannot develop normal relations built on partnerships and collaboration. On the other hand, this situation undermines history too. In practice it is being turned into an ideology, because competing countries do not need an objective history, but a version that grounds their position and disproves the opponents one. The article discusses the tension of historical interpretations existing today between Lithuania and Russia and its genesis. It also explores the negative impacts on the relations between Lithuania and Russia in the general field of relations and offers ways to reduce these tensions.

Introductory Remarks

History has always played an important, perhaps even decisive, role in the relations between Lithuania and Russia. In the Middle Ages a common talking point was whether The Grand Duchy of Lithuania had its legitimacy or it was a fragment of the joint ancient Kievan Rus, which The Grand Duchy of Moscow was trying to assemble. The fate of Lithuania, Russia and even the whole region between the Baltic and Black seas depended on the answer to this question. Historic researches showed a different origin of The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, other than Rus- sian countries in Kiev or Moscow. But those researches could not unambiguously give the answer to the raised question. Moreover, objective history was simply unne- cessary because both sides wanted to have a handier version. Thus for instance, according to the popular version of The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Lithuanian

* Dr. Èeslovas Laurinavicius is a senior fellow and Head of the Department of History of the 20th century of the Lithuanian History Institute. Address: Vilnius, Kraiø 5-215, tel. +370 5 2611787, e-mail: [email protected] 110

roots are in Italy1 . According to the version of Moscow, disagreement between Gediminas and Kalita was a family row, a row over who would rule Russia2 . There was no and nor could there be any unified answer to the ideological historical questions, therefore the problem was dealt upon the battlefields. In practice it meant constant wars between The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Moscow. Those wars were intervened only by cessation of arms periods because a real peace was impossible between the subjects who looked at each other as an intrigue-produced double, a thief of territories or identity. Incidentally, since general masses on the both sides were indifferent, that contention was relevant only for the aristocracy. Those masses went about without any rights and were recruited just for the battles they were like gunnery meat. As Russia had more meat, this situation finally ended with the fall of The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, despite the fact that Poland was in the same union. The Russian historical version, expressed by the words of tsarina Jekaterina II ottorþenych vozvratych (what was left after being ripped off to restore) won. Due to the Partitions which took place at the end of 18th century, Lithuania ended up in the Great Russian Empire. Here even the name of Lithuania was hidden under the net of Russian Guberniya. The attitude towards the national foundation changed during the New Times or so-called period of modernism. The rulers legitimacy was altered by the democratic principle of a nations self-determination. The State of Lithuania was reestablished in 1918 and it seemed that this time it was completely different from Russia, because the modern State of Lithuania was being formed by a nation that had unique language - Lithuanian. Unfortunately, the hostility and struggle for the authentic identity between Lithuania and Russia didnt reduce. Full-blown modern ideologies deformed or simply changed the concept of a nation. According to the spread of the communistic ideology, instead of nation there was the craftily offered the notion of people. And it could be claimed that it was a translation of the Russian word narod. Due to this, a new metaphy- sical question was raised again, whether the Lithuanian nation in a democratic way decided to live independently, or on the contrary it was prevented from the decision to stay with Russian people. Even though the history proclaimed it was for the good of nations self-determination, once again a homologous answer could not be given. Defending a nation from the social deformation of the concept of nation gave a nation too much prominence. It was also being reviewed for problems in security even in relation to a racial substitution of a nation. Due to this huge tension that formed with in the region the Russian version of the peoples community, which also had greater power, won. Once again Lithuania became a part of the Russian Empire, only this time it was ingeniously called the USSR - as a Lithuanian ethnographic shade of the great soviet people. One soviet diplomat

1 VijûkasKojelavièius A., Lietuvos istorija. [The History of Lithuania], Kaunas, 1989, p. 44-46 (in Lithuanian). 2 Ustrialov N., Izsledovanije voprosa, kokoje mesto v Russkoj istorii dolþno zanimat Velikoje Kniaþest- vo Litovskoje? [Issue Research of What Place Grand Duchy of Lithuania Should Take Part In Russian History], Sankt Peterburg, 1839, p. 36 (in Russian). 111 (i.e. Ivan Maiskij), upon explaining what happened in 1940, even suggested an allegory: once during a drinking spree a peasant Ivan (the most important representative of the people) was so drunk that thieves stole his implements. But as soon as Ivan sobered, he recaptured everything that had been taken away. By the way, one must note that such an explanation was widely accepted in the East as well as in the West. At the end of the 20th century the idea of an individuals freedom shattered the modern communistic ideology and the State of Lithuania was rebuilt again; this time it was more democratic than national or popular. The Russian Federa- tion was also established, which called itself democratic. However, soon it appeared that this Russian Federation could not be democratic, because first of all the basis of this federation was not clear and under democratic conditions it could simply be decomposing until infinity. Such a prospect tightened Russians and they began recoiling from democracy. In thoughts they returned to the past, drea- ming and identifying themselves with the former Russian Empire. Meanwhile in Lithuania although democracy was anchoring more successfully than in Russia, there were some problems. Lithuanians then began to associate those problems with a negative Russian influence. That is the reason why still today conflicts are appearing between Lithuania and Russia and the situation is growing tenser. Once again both sides try to ground their position in history. The question now is whether in 1940 there was an occupation from Russian (the USSR) partly in respect of Lithuania or that it should be called something else. This question is very topical and important for both sides because resting upon this answer depends the further material and identificational development between Lithuania and Russia. If the occupation really existed, Russia is responsible for aggravated aggression and in all aspects illegal action against the sovereign state of Lithu- ania. This could mean that Russia, as a direct successor of the USSR, should apologize for this historical and legal crime and pay billions for compensation. And what will be next with this for Russia, when after Lithuanias precedent, all present or even future Russian neighbours start claiming for their appropriate compensations? Will it survive as a state? From Lithuanias standpoint, it is only the business of Russia itself. Of course, such a prospect is not suitable for Russia. But if there was no occupation, and even though they were a little bit pressed and threatened, then it was still the authentic decision of Lithuania to integrate into the State of Russia (the USSR). If this must be more precise, then the resolve to come back into this historically determined, and in this sense natural coexistence, with Russia was by choice. If so, Lithuania would have to calculate differently who is indebted to whom. But the most important thing is that in the case of this version, there would be reasonable suspicion that maybe Lithua- nias new seclusion from Russia is just temporal, the result of values reappraisal. What is more, is that at the moment a general foundation can set upon neither a dynastic legitimacy nor a communistic ideology. However, it is possible to look for and find a new basis for reunion if, of course, it is a natural immanent not only to Russias but also to Lithuanias interest. Until that basis is found, Lithuania can exist as independent from Russia or integrate into various unions it does not change the essence of the matter. Of course, if that new basis 112 for reunion with Russia does not show up,then this version is totally unacceptable for Lithuania because of the approach towards identity. So Lithuania, as well as Russia, want to ground their positions in history and are thus looking for the answers in history. But once again, can history unambiguously and without any appeal answer the questions raised and solve the dilemma? It is a common knowledge that from the theoretical point of view history cannot strictly answer the question what happened. This answer could be found only with the help of ideology. However, history can tell us a lot about what and how it happened. And perhaps such a statement could be the factor to reject a too ideological history and combine other spheres, such as politics, diplomacy, ethics and moral that probably could better solve this dispute. Therefore, let us look into what history can tell us about the latter dispute between Lithuania and Russia, specifically for the sake of each others version.

1. The First Proclaim why it could be claimed that Occupation Existed

Confidential papers of the USSR and Germany, signed between 1939 - 1941, can be considered good evidence to claim to the fact that the USSR occupied Lithuania (secret protocols were signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop on August 23, 1939 and September 28, 1939 as well as secret annex to the treaty of January 10, 1941). For those who are familiar with the great politics, it is obvious that in conformity with them Germany allowed the Soviet Union to destroy the State of Lithuania; this is what the USSR did in the summer of 1940. According to the 20th century principles of law, politics and moral the so-called division of spheres between The Great Powers and little states destruction on those grounds was no longer accepted. The USSR did the best it could to hide and deny the fact of the existence of those secret protocols. The USSR was able to do that because of the inside totalitarian regime, which lasted for 50 years. When the Soviet Union began the campaign of publicity and democracy, by the courtesy of Michael Gorbachev, it became impossible to deny the existence of secret protocols. Due to this fact on December 24, 1989 a so-called Congress of the Peoples Deputies passed the resolution (1432 votes for, 252 against, 264 suspended) according to which Molotov and Ribbentrops secret protocols were qualified as void and invalid since the minute they were signed because, they violated third countries sovereignty and independence3 . However, such recognition raised a question of the legitimacy of Lithua- nias (as well as that of Latvia and Estonia, which was destroyed in 1940) belonging to the USSR. Propagandists of the USSR began to look for means to retain an actual territorial entity of the USSR and two arguments were used for this purpose.

3 Soobðèenije komissiji po politièeskoi i pravovoi ocenkie sovietsko-germanskogo dogovora o nienapadenii ot 1939 goda [Information Of Commission On Political and Juridical Valuation Of Russo-German Non Agression Pact of 1939"], Pravda, 1989 12 24 (in Russian). 113 According to one of them, Germany the USSRs secret protocols had nothing to do with the proceedings that took place in the Baltic States in 1940; in other words, those treaties did not condition the juridical and political position of the Baltic States and they stop existing because of some unnameable other circumstances. 4 Another argument is that it had no importance and that the secret agreements signed by Germany and the USSR in 1939 1941 were void and their validity expired on June 22, 1941 when Germany started a war against the USSR. This was due to the fact that when going to war Germany violated the public non-aggression and friendship and territorial treaties with the USSR signed in 1939. Besides, secret protocols did not exist anymore. Therefore, confidential papers did not affect the subsequent Lithuanian (as well as Latvian and Estonian) fate5 . Both these arguments were related to one another. They could be easily denied therefore they seemingly were raised in just the hope that for most people it would be difficult to make sense out of convolutions of such a sphere. In fact, in secret protocols it was not directly stated that according to the agreement between Germany and the USSR, the USSR is going to occupy the State of Lithuania. It is only said that Lithuania devolves to the USSRs sphere of influence and that the USSR because of its interest would be able to make special territorial and political readjustments in respect to Lithuania6 . Howe- ver, only a person who has no clue about politics or simply does not have cons- cience, can doubt what those statements could mean in the lay of the land and what they meant. By using an indirect (or so-called concludent) method, it is not very difficult to prove that the above mentioned phrases meant an agreement to destroy the country. First of all, the statement devolves to the sphere of influence practically meant that the little Lithuanian state becomes totally dependent on the will of the great state the USSR - and that another great state - Germany in the lay of the land is able to prevent the USSR from proceeding in respect to Lithua- nia when it decides and when it agrees that in respect to Lithuania the USSR proceeds the way it wants. Moreover, extant secret negotiation protocols and correspondence between The Soviets and Nazis do not leave any doubts that secret treaties opened way for the USSR to destroy the Baltic States as well as Lithuania7 . Especially there was a significant sign about the preparation for the

4 1939 metø ávykiai þvilgsnis ið pusës amþiaus distancijos. A. Jakovlevas atsako á Prav- dos klausimus, [The Proceedings in 1939 a Look from the Distance of a Half Century. A Jakovlev answers questions of Pravda], Tiesa, 1989 08 19 (in Lithuanian). 5 Ibidem. 6 TSRS Vokietija 1939. TSRS ir Vokietijos santykiø dokumentinë medþiaga 1939 metø balandþio spalio mën. t.1 [The USSR and Germany in 1939. Documentary Material of Relations between the USSR and Germany. April October, 1939 vol.1], Vilnius: Mokslas, 1989, p. 62, 109-110 (in Lithuanian). 7 Lietuvos þlugimo preliudas. 1939 metø rugsëjo 2729d. Vokietijos SSRS derybø Maskvo- je dokumentai Paruoðë Nerijus Ðepetys [The Prelude of Lithuanias Fall. September 27 29, 1939. The Documents of Negotiations between Germany and the USSR. Prepared by Nerijus Sepetys], Naujasis þidinys Aidai, 2002, No 9-10, p. 457 (in Lithuanian). 114 destruction of the State of Lithuania during the split of Lithuanias territory: according to the secret protocol signed on September 28, 1939, Lithuanian part in Sudovia had to be separated from the bigger part of Lithuania which went to the Soviets and the rest was left for Germany. Finally after the documents of negotiations between the USSR and Lithuania, which took place after secret treaties between the USSR and Germany, there was witness that Stalin personally told the Foreign Secretary Juozas Urbsys about the agreement with Germany and about the division of spheres of influence. This means that Stalin himself admitted that Lithuania was transferred to the USSRs sphere of influence and that is why the USSR could do with Lithuania whatever it decided8 . And the fact that the USSR did not destroy Lithuania immediately does not change the point. It is obvious that because of secret treaties with Germany the USSR they thereby eliminated the objective as well as subjective barriers of the destruction. That is why there was no force that could stop the actions of the USSR as the main power. Besides, Lithuania having found out its real position (similar to the way Latvia and Estonia realized their real situation) was morally stricken against the actions of the USSR. That is why using blackmail the USSR could thrust a treaty on Lithuania, according to which the contingent of the Red Army was brought in9 . After that for a while the USSR could easily play cat and mouse with Lithuania till finally having decided the USSR could thrust assumed accusations on Lithuania (about soviet soldiers capturing or a treaty between Latvia and Estonia against the USSR) and delivering an ultimatum to require from Lithuania to let the Red Army in its territory10 . Finally it could affect the election of proper persons to so-called Peoples Parliament and using a pressure to make the Parliament say the word of the Lithuanian state joining to the USSR11 . On the other hand, a statement that on June 22, 1941 broke all treaties between the USSR and Germany is not quite reasonable. It is true that public agreements (non-aggression, friendship and territorial, etc.) broke, but secret treaties concerned with the destruction of the Baltic States are hardly to be broken. After all a fact that having occupied the Baltic States, Hitler did not yet re-establish the Baltic States should have been a signal to Stalin that their secret treaty about the destruction of The Baltic States is still valid no matter how the war between them ends. Finally, even if we agree with the statement that on June 22, 1941 all public and secret treaties between the USSR and Germany were still valid, it had still not changed the USSRs attitude towards the position of the Baltic States. Due to those secret treaties public officials acts on the incorporation of The Baltic States into the USSR were made, which were still valid12 .

8 Lietuvos okupacija ir aneksija 19391940. Dokumentø rinkinys [Lithuanias Occupation and Anne- xation in 1939 1940. File Collection], Vilnius: Mokslas, 1993, p. 71 (in Lithuanian). 9 Ibidem, p. 95-98, 101-104, 125-147. 10 Ibidem, 180-265. 11 Baltijos valstybiø uþgrobimo byla. JAV Kongreso Ch. J. Kersteno komiteto dokumentai 19531954 metai [The Case of the Seizure of the Baltic States, The Documents of the CH. J. Kerstens US Congress, 19531954], Vilnius: DUKA, 1997, p. 323-353 (in Lithuanian). 12 Baltijos valstybiø uþgrobimo byla (11 nuoroda) [The Case of the Seizure of the Baltic States (note 11)], p. 265-271, 293, 352-356 (in Lithuanian). 115 On July 30, 1941 the USSR signed a declaration only with Polands Emig- rant Government, according to which it was recognized that all treaties made by the USSR and Germany in 1939 in Polands territory were invalid13 . Of course, that declaration was invalidated public territory treaty between the USSR and Germany signed on September 28, 1939 which became invalid when Germany started a war against the USSR, but this declaration had not invalidated secret protocols 14 . However, in practice that declaration should have meant that a legally internal right of the USSR was invalid in Polands territories, which the USSR officially called its own in 1939. That is why on principle its former citizens, that were the citizens of the USSR, could return to Polish juris- diction15 . (By the way, in some way that declaration of the USSR and Poland was topical for Lithuania, too, because it was concerned with the land around Vilnius. The question of Vilnius dependency was conditioned by the decision on Polands Eastern border in line with the Curzon line16 . However, the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR on the grounds of the treaty between the USSR and Germany about was not cancelled. Therefore, from the USSRs point of view, its internal right in respect of the Baltic nations was still valid and appealing to that right, i.e. voluntary decision of the Baltic States to join the USSR and because of this supposed approval, the Soviet diplomats could treat the Baltic States as a legal part of the USSR. And since the USSRs internal right was implemented practically because of secret treaties between the USSR and Germany about the division of spheres of influence, the Soviet Union did the best to deny the existence of those secret protocols. It was obvious that admitting to the existence of illegal protocols and then invalidating them would automatically recall legitimacy and the public USSRs rights, referring to which the Soviet Union considered that it legally governed the Baltic States. At the time when on December 24, 1989 in the Congress of Deputies of the People secret treaties of 1939 1941 with Germany were voided, the Baltic nations had already expressed their demand to re-establish their independency. Therefore, the USSR could lay claim to the governance of the Baltic nation only by using force. The USSR legally refused its rights to the Baltic States only on September 6, 1991 after the president of the USSR Gorbachov had admitted the independency of the Baltic States. Consequently, considering only the above mentioned circumstances a person who has moral and some knowledge about relationship between countries could hardly doubt that proceedings in Lithuania, as well as in Latvia and

13 Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovietsko polskich otnoenij, t. 7 [Documents and Materials On Soviet-Polish Relationship History Vol. 7], Moskva: Nauka, 1973, p. 208 (in Russian) 14 TSRS Vokietija 1939 (6 nuoroda) [The USSR and Germany in 1939 (note 6)], p. 107-108 (in Lithuanian). 15 Historia dyplomacji Polskiej 19391945 t. 5 [History of Polish Diplomacy in 19391945 vol.5] Warszawa, 1999, p. 211 228 (in Polish). 16 Sovietskij Sojuz na mieþdunarodnych konferencijach perioda Belikoj oteèestvennoj boiny, 1941 1945gg: Sbornik dokumentov t. 2, Tegeranskaja konferencija [Soviet Union in the International Conferences During The Worls War II, 1941-1945 Vol. 2, Conference if Teheran], Moskva, 1984 (in Russian). 116 Estonia, were a direct and determined result of secret treaties between the USSR and Germany. Due to theses treaties the USSR made a forcible act of aggression against the Baltic States and any other circumstances could not change the essence of those aggressive acts. As it has been mentioned, after long hesitations and tossing, the Congress of the USSRs Deputies of the People came to such a conclusion and on Decem- ber 24, 1989 pronounced a resolution concerned with a political and legal evaluation of the Non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany signed in 1939. In this resolution it was also delivered that the Congress states that with protocols of August 23, 1939 and other secret protocols that were contracted with Germany in 1939 1941, set the limits of spheres of interests of the USSR and Germany and other acts were legally against the sovereignty and independence of third parties. Stalin and his toadies used the protocols in delivering ultimatums and pressing other countries, breaking the legal responsibilities that it had obligated in respect to them17 . The attention should be given to the phrase of resolution in respect of law. It seems that it appeared as a certain compromise because democratically- spirited deputies claimed is as a conception in respect of international law. However, authoritys representatives (such as Valentiv Falin) maintained that at the time, i.e. in 1939 1945, there was no such thing as international law, there were only separate treaties18 . Probably this is the reason why in the resolution there is the following paragraph: The congress notes that during that period, the USSRs relationships with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were regulated by the system of treaties. According to the peace agreement of 1920 and treaties contracted in 1926 1933, their parties obligated to respect each others sovereignty, territorial unity and immunity in any circumstances. Similar obligations the Soviet Union had for Poland and Finland19 In any case the resolution carried by deputies of the People on December 24, 1989 seems to be close enough to the conclusion that can be drawn while consciously and objectively evaluating proceedings in 1939 1940. However, the policy of Moscow begins to recede from such a position, and with a help of various sophisms avoids political responsibility for the violence in respect to the Baltic States. Such a fundamental expression is a try at distinguishing the USSRs actions against the Baltic States in 1940, i.e. to distinguish annexation from occupation, and on the one hand, admitting annexation imposed by force and at the same time denying the fact of past occupation

17 Soobðèenije komissiji po politièeskoi i pravovoi ocenkie sovietskogermanskogo dogovora (3 nuoroda) [Information Of Commission On Political and Juridical Valuation Of Russo- German Non Agression Pact (note 3) (in Russian). 18 Landsbergis V., Lûþis prie Baltijos [The Break by the Baltic Sea], Vilnius, 1997, p. 143 (in Lithuanian). 19 Soobèenije komissiji po politièeskoi i pravovoi ocenkie sovietskogermanskogo dogovora (3 nuoroda) [Information Of Commission On Political and Juridical Valuation Of Russo- German Non Agression] (in Russian). 117 Occupation is denied on the grounds that in the middle of June in 1940 the USSR sent its formidable army into the Baltic States not because of a declaration of war and even not because of hostility without a declaration of war, but because of treaties with the Baltic States20 . Of course, it is admitted that those treaties were a result of the USSRs ultimatum, however, it is claimed that then law did not forbid threatening by force21 . Besides, with a help of an ultimatum it was not demanded to surrender. For example as in the spring of 1938 Germany demanded from Austria to join the Reich or another example is when in the spring of 1939 from Czechoslovakia it was required to surrender to the protecto- rate of the Reich. The USSR demanded only for guarantees that the internecine treaties of 1939 between the USSR and the Baltic States would be cleanly and honestly carried on. Thus, not only Russian lawyers and propagandists but also official representatives of Russian government drew a conclusion that there was no occupation of the Baltic States22 . And subsequent annexation, even though it included some legal breaches, was not solely unilateral USSR actions but they were also performed because of the resolve of the Baltic States themselves. By the way, in this way those other circumstances, that in his time Ale- xander Jakovlev did not resolved to name, were clarified. Of course, this Russian position is only a desperate evasion. It can be easily criticized. It contains an incorrect thesis of the position that international law did not forbid to threaten by force. The existence of such a ban is witnessed by the statement of the State Department of the USA, made on July 23, 1940 when the Soviets aim to destroy the Baltic States had become clear. Actually it was stated that: During the last few days shameful processes, during which political independence and territorial unity of three little Baltic Republics - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania were consciously destroyed by one of the powerful neighbors, apace coming to the upshot The policy of our government is well known to everybody. The people of the United States are against any predatory actions, irrespective whether they are performed by direct force or only threatening to use it. The people of this country are also against intervention of any form independent of by what country it is performed, even if it is very powerful, independent of which countrys affairs it is being intruded in, even if it is very weak country. These principles make a foundation to which the relationship of 21 sovereign countries that form a New World refers. The United States is going to uphold these principles because Americans are sure that if the doctrine that embodies these principles does not gain ground in interne-

20 Lietuvos okupacija ir aneksija 19391940 (8 nuoroda) [Lithuanias Occupation and Annexation in 19391940 (note 8)], p. 265-268 (in Lithuanian). 21 Èernièenko S., Ob okkupacii Pribaltiki i naruðenii prav russkojazyènogo naselenija [About The Ocupation of Baltic States and The Violations Of Russian Speaking People Rights] , Meþdunarodnaja þizn. 2004/4; Èerniðenko S., Okkypacii ne bylo [There Were No Occupation], Moskovskij komsomolec v Latvii, 2004 08 24 (in Russian). 22 RF uþsienio reikalø ministro Vladimiro Èiþovo 2005 metø liepos 18 d. pareiðkimas [July 18, 2005 Statement of Vladimir Cizov, the Secretary of the Russian Federation], www.regnum.ru. (in Rus- sian). 118 cine relationship between countries, then sense, justice and standards of law, in other words the foundation of the most modern civilization, will not be preserved.23 The USSRs actions against the Baltic States in 1940 could be reasonably called the indirect aggression. And it is not serious to argue that if international law forbade aggression as such, it did not professedly forbid an indirect aggression. The official statement of the Soviets characters proclaimed that the USSR considered indirect aggression as unacceptable, too. For instance, in the March of 1938 Maxim Litvinov, Narkom of Foreign Affairs, during the Assembly of the League of Nations said: The League of Nations should not change its attitude towards indirect seizure or annexation of other countries territories as well as towards cases when such annexations are being masked creating puppet the peoples governments that seemingly are independent but in reality serve only as a cover or tool for foreign aggressor24 . Another Narkom of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, in the summer of 1939 during negotiations with representatives of The Great Britain and France concerned with guarantees of the Baltic States, particularly heartily demanded guarantees for countries in the case of indirect aggression25 . Molotov appealed to the possibility of such aggression from Germany even though Western allies had no doubts that with such a request the Soviets tried to cover its targeted indirect aggression against the Baltic States. Due to the treaty with the Western counties at that time, the Soviet Union could not reach its goal. It is important to note that Russias attitude to deny the fact of occupation particularly showed up in the spring of 2005 when Russia commemorated 60 years of victory against Hitlerian Germany. It is undoubted that the checkmate of Nazism had a huge importance to Europe and all of the world. It cannot also be denied that in the checkmate of Nazism the Soviet Union and mainly the Russian nation played the main role. That is why Russia can deservedly be proud of its role and forever remember the slain from that fight. However, it could not go unnoticed that commemorating victory against the Nazism Russia apparently tried to emphasize the USSR as a liberator and at the same time to cover, conceal or simply deform the reality about the crime of the Soviet regime against other sovereign nations. This fact especially hurt the Bal- tic States because according to the Russian version they refused their independence by themselves, and from the USSRs side if there had been some illegal

23 Baltijos valstybiø uþgrobimo byla (11 nuoroda) [She Seizure of the Baltic States case (note 11)], p. 292 (in Lithuanian). 24 Hough W. J. H., The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory, New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1985, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 390. 25 Baltijos valstybiø uþgrobimo byla (11 nuoroda) [The Seizure of the Baltic States case, (note 11)], p. 189 (in Lithuanian); God krizisa 19381939, t. 2, Moskva, 1990, p. 90 (in Russian). 119 actions, they cannot anyhow derogate the mission of the USSR as a liberator and cannot deny the legitimacy of the Baltic States connection to the USSR26 So it is not a surprise that the Baltic States have thrown into contractions against such Russian propaganda and it can assuredly be claimed that their position have won a big enough understanding and favour in the worlds community, even though the same worlds community took trouble and showed respect to Russia for its historical merits in the checkmate of Nazism27

2. The Second Proclaim why it could be Doubted that Classical Occupation Existed

Indeed the Soviet Army was let in according to a treaty there was neither resistance with arms nor had the Government of Lithuania entered into an official protest. This was because the larger part of the intelligentsia, that until then had been in opposition, started to support the new government that was formed in reference to the invaders will and without any protest to participate in the Parliament organized by factual invaders. And in the Parliament having pilo- ted though a resolution on entering the USSR, neither of deputies voted against it. Of course, it could be said that there was a fear that one would be physically disposed of. On the other hand, it could be claimed that for the biggest part of national intelligentsia their welfare was more important than the destiny of the country. Besides one could suspect that nobody protested not only because of fear, but also because some citizens clearly approved the prospect of these new social reforms. Of course it could also be appealed that during the summer of 1940 a special situation was in all of Europe. Political arenas that had been in bigger and older countries were disappearing or had already disappeared. But in this case a look will inevitably turn to the past and a question will arise: what national self-awareness and efficiency did, for example, Lithuania demonstrate during all period of its independency? Of course, everybody knows that practically from the beginning of the existence of the State, Lithuania fought against Poland because it had occupied Vilnius - the historical capital of Lithuania. This fact, of course, was Lithuanias bane due to which all Lithuanians had come through a lot of things. However, the essence of this bane is not that clear. It is not only that Poland seized Vilnius,

26 Sergej Karaganov, a famous political scientist in the Russian Federation, in one of his articles (Rosijskaja gazeta, September 23, 2005) described Russias propaganda war against the Baltic States in this way: Due to our inner weakness, we ofter react inadequately. For example, look at the reaction towards a pribalts claim to admit the USSRs fault for Molotov - Ribbentrops pact! With this wild reaction we amost eclipesed the celebration of the Victory Day was which successful and reinforced the countrys prestiþe. 27 Even in Russia was is admitted that attempts to isolate the Baltic States during the comme- moration of Victory day were not successful (Kondraov D., Front protiv Rossiji: napravlenije agressiji [The Front Against Russia:The Turn of Agression], 2005 03 28, www.regnum.ru) (in Russian). 120 but more important is that Lithuanians could not preserve non-Lithuanian Vil- nius by themselves. It is even less known (or to be more precise it is desirable to know) about Lithuanias actions when this all happened. Unfortunately, we must state that Lithuanias behaviour brought luck neither to its image nor to consolidation of its positions in the international scene. On the contrary, with its behaviour Lithuania more often endangered not only itself but other as well. It was not a surprise that feeling a threat from Poland, Lithuania was looking for the support of the Great Powers. However, it appealed not to democratic countries, because Lithuania did not understand or appreciate their support, but it appealed to the Germany and the Soviet Union which were not satisfied with the situation after World War I and were seeking for a new war. These are some stronger episodes from Lithuanias foreign policy between the two World Wars. Already in the summer of 1920 Lithuania agreed to give permission to the Red Army to use its territory while this Red Army was laun- ching a fateful attack against Poland, even though officially it declared itself to be strictly neutral. Thus, Lithuania helped the Red Army to attack even though it was not a secret that this army was seeking to sovietize Poland and Lithuania itself. During the autumn of the same year Lithuanias army actually helped the Red Army in the fight with Poland in Sudovia28 . In the spring of 1923 Lithuania started rather risky actions towards Klai- peda and Vilnius and was hoping for Soviet Russias support in a war29 . Becau- se of that, a new war in the Eastern Europe almost started. At the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926 Lithuania offered the Soviet Union a secret war alliance against Poland but at that time the USSR was not ready for a war30 . In 1927 1928 once again a new war almost started in the region because of Lithuanias venturesome actions. And in 1929 Lithuanias as revisionist countrys image was so strong in the international scene that even Litvinov, Narkom of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, refused to come to Kaunas for the official visit. According to him, such a visit would look suspicious to the international opinion and that they would think that the USSR was looking for a war agreement31 . In the fourth decade, in Lithuanias behaviour, it could be noticed that stronger manifestations of responsibility came forth not only for its own good but also for the whole regions security. However, at that time Europe was already unstoppably moving towards a new war. So, inevitably a question arises

28 Laurinavièius È., Lietuvos Sovietø Rusijos taikos sutartis [The Peace Agreement between Lithu- ania and The Soviet Russia], Vilnius: Valstybinis leidybos centras, 1992, p. 131-166 (in Lithua- nian). 29 Senn A. E., The Great Powers, Lithuania and Vilna Question 19201928, Leiden, 1966, p. 105- 136. 30 Kasparavièius A., Didysis X Lietuvos uþsienio politikoje. 1926 metø Lietuvos ir Sovietø Sàjungos nepuolimo sutarties sudarymo analizë [The Great X in Lithuanias Foreign Policy. The Analysis of the contract of Non-aggression treaty between Lithuania and The Soviet Union in 1926], Vilnius, 1996. p. 61-74 (in Lithuanian). 31 Augustino Voldemaro uþsienio politika ir Lietuvos geopolitika 19271929 þr.: Laurinavi- èius È., Politika ir diplomatija [The Foreign Policy of Augustinas Voldemaras and Lithuanias Geopolitics in 19271929" in Laurinavièius È., Politics and Diplomacy, Kaunas, 1997, p. 188- 226 (in Lithuanian). 121 whether for the World War II reasonably blaming The Great Powers, first of all Nazi Germany and Stalins Soviet Union, is possible and at the same time it is possible to ignore the responsibility of little countries, such as Lithuania. Claims for the Soviet Union are usually grounded on the fact that imposing aggression against The Baltic States broke many obligations that had been fixed in treaties signed by it. From the standpoint of a formal letter it cannot be denied. However, historically it is important in respect to what kind of treaties there were, how they were signed, and how they affected political proceedings of that time. For instance, let us discuss the so-called peace agreement between Lithua- nia and The Soviet Russia that was signed on July 12, 1920 in Moscow. According to the formal letter of that treaty, Lithuania got its independence as well as Vilnius. Of course, this development was very important to Lithuania. Despite this, a fact that this treaty had an annex that allowed the Red Army, which at that time was attacking Poland, to use Lithuanias territory was also very important32 . The examination perusal also does not let us doubt that if such an annex hadnt had existed, there would have been the treaty itself. Consequently, this treaty between Lithuania and the Soviet Russia can be considered only having in mind the war context of The Soviet Russia and Poland. At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1920 in Riga, the Soviet Russia signed a treaty with Poland, which actually replaced a treaty with Lithuania. Because according to the interpretation of the apparent treaty of Moscow, Russia had to guarantee Lithuania together with Vilnius. And according to the treaty of Riga, Russia allowed Po- land to seize Lithuanias eastern part, including Vilnius and Russia even lost its common border with Lithuania33 . On September 28, 1926 the Soviets signed the so-called non-aggression treaty with Lithuania and formally confirmed that the treaty of July 12, 1920 was not valid anymore. However, Poland contested that and in 1932 the Soviets signed a non-aggression treaty with Poland which confirmed the treaty of Riga. On April 4, 1934 the USSR extended its treaty of 1926 signed with Lithuania. Howe- ver, Poland contested again and after a month the USSR extended the treaty of 1932 that had been signed with Poland. So a collision of treaties or to be more precise speculation with treaties that had opposite meanings - was formed. Of course, Lithuania can say that an acceptable version under the treaty of Moscow in 1920 was valid; on the other hand, Poland can claim that an acceptable version under the treaty of Riga in 1920 was valid. Historically it is obvious that all of those treaties confirmed not the stability and legitimacy in the region, but on the contrary kept weakening it34 . By the way, not only the bilate-

32 Sirutavièius V., Nekraðas E.,Lopata R., sudar., Svarbiausios Lietuvos Respublikos tarptautinës sutartys 19181995 [Main International Treaties of the Republic of Lithuania], Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 1997, p. 13-30 (in Lithuanian). 33 Laurinavièius È., Lietuvos Sovietø Rusijos taikos sutartis (28 nuoroda) [The Peace Agreement between Lithuania and The Soviet Russia (note 28)], p. 131-166 (in Lithuanian). 34 Kam Lietuvos neápareigojo lenkø sovietø Rygos sutartis þr.: Laurinavièius È., Politika ir diplomatija (31 nuoroda) [Things that Lithuania was not Obliged according to the Treaty of Riga between Poles and Soviets in: Laurinavièius È., Politics and Diplomacy (note 31), p. 134-144 (in Lithuanian). 122 ral but also the collective agreements in the region were not determined as well. It makes an allusion to the agreement about the pact of Briand and Kellog coming into effect in the region (so-called Litvinovs protocol) signed in 1929, in Moscow35 as well as a treaty that defined aggression signed in 1933, in London. The important thing is that the interpretation of the significance of those treaties depended on those countries geographic location. On the one hand, since the USSR signed them with its real neighbours Lithuania, did not take part in it. The common significance of these treaties was that all obligations were through those borders. Specifically in respect of the dispute between Lithuania and Po- land those treaties witnessed that a legal position was acknowledged in reference with the treaty of Riga but not Moscow. That is why Lithuania took all possible actions when signing separately with the USSR mentioned treaties, in either way they would include the validity of the treaty of Moscow. And the USSR more or less tried to satisfy Lithuanias wishes but not because of sympathy to disadvantage Lithuania but so that the situation between Lithuania and Poland would come to be incompatibly different. It is obvious that a string of treaties between Lithuania and the USSR, and between Poland and the USSR, not only made the situation in the region uncertain but also endangered the security of Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Estonia. It is also clear that such a situation was very useful for the USSR and Germany which sought for revenge. Besides, it was not a coincidence that in a secret protocol of August 23, 1939 Lithuanias interests in respect to Vilnius were recorded. On the other hand, such a situation was not useful for the security of the USSR too. The latter statement should be emphasized because it is naive to think sort of that the USSR generally had no right to its security (although while rea- ding todays Lithuanian publications a different opinion can be formed). Anot- her thing is that the security of that country in history was usually implemented using aggressive tools as well as expansive objectives of that country. Therefore, it is essential not only to identify expansive objectives and prevent from them, but it is also important not to provoke those expansive objectives which later could be seemingly considered as the search for security. Such an illustration as this ambivalent situation in history can be so- called the neutrality policy, that Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia started from the autumn of 1938. Formally with such a policy the Baltic States tried not to intervene into the growing tension between blocks of the Great Powers and specifically stay neutral between the USSR and Germany. Despite this, in practice the Baltic States failed to stay neutral. With their neutrality declaration they took up a good position for Germany and not only practically but also delibera-

35 Litvinovo protokolas (1929 metø vasario 9 d.) ir Lietuvos diplomatija þr.: Laurinavièius È., Politika ir diplomatija (31 nuoroda) [The Protocol of Litvinov (February 9, 1929) and Lithuanias Diplomacy in Laurinavièius È., Politics and Diplomacy (note 31)], p. 157-187 (in Lithuanian). 123 tely, because they did it advised by Berlin36 . Due to this fact, such a policy of the Baltic States contributed to the failure of negotiations between the USSR and the Western countries in 1939, but of course they did not decide everything. At the same time the policy of the Baltic States was useful for the agreement between the USSR and Germany in 1939, but once again they did not decide anything37 . So, if the USSR and its successor - the Russian Federation - are responsible for aggression against Lithuania, isnt Lithuania responsible for constant provocation of that aggression? Isnt Poland responsible for the situation in 1939? By the way, the same question could be given to other aggression victims.

Instead of Conclusion: Is History Necessary in Relationships Between Countries?

Of course history is necessary because even a superficial and episodic look into it gives an opportunity to see the fragments of different nations objectives, victories and defeats, joys and torments as a film. They stimulate feelings and mind. They are necessary for human nature. They are needed for social and international communication. Despite this, they can hardly bring any good or bad to relationships between countries. Because the past of those relationships is usually varied, everything could be found in it. On the other hand, the organization of that past is of that kind that it will never be destined to find out what really happened. However, even a fragmentary look into relationships between Lithuania and Russia in the first half of the 20th century let us realize that not everything was that simple and unambiguous. There was neither total truth nor guilt without fault. That is why trying to draw a conclusion in reference with this historic past history can be turned into an ideology or simple politics. Of course, the seize of guilt could be measured; articles of the criminal code could be applied or looked for mitigating circumstances, etc. But and in this case, we cannot disregard with realia. As it is obvious that with the present circumstances the codification of historical guilt will be worth something only if both parties recognize it. Yet let us talk in more detail about those realia. It is clear, that Lithuania in its dispute with Russia cannot agree with a version that in 1940 it disclaimed its

36 Laurinavièius È., The Baltic States between the World Wars: Foreign Policy Op- tions and the Problem of Neutrality in Die baltische Staaten im Schnittpunkt der Ent- wicklungen. Verganenheit und Gegenwart. Herausgegeben von Carsten Goehrke und Jürgen von Ungern Sternberg. Schwabe & Co.AG. Verlang. Basel, 2002, p. 121-132. 37 Ahman R., The German Treaties with Estonia and Latvia on 7 June 1939 Barga- ning Play or Alternative for German Soviet Undrestanding? Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 1989, p. 337-364; Feldmann I., Stranga A., Latvia and the Baltic Policies of the The USSR, Poland and Germany in the Late 1930s, Procedings of the Latvian Academy of Science Section A, 1994, No. 3, p. 9-15. 124 independency not because of compulsion but with free will. Lithuania cannot accept such a version because of historical facts as well as todays constitutional acts. Official civilizations position to this question, the final and the most important reason is elementary self-respect and the foundations of political identification. But it should not be hoped that Russia will officially admit its responsibility for Lithuanias occupation in 1940 and all the outcomes that resulted from it. There is no doubt that the present government of Russia will not do that as it would undermine its imperial objectives which, of course, it has. However, it should be realized that the same government of Russia will not do that because of the security of Russia itself as well. But the most important thing is that nobody should expect that from Russia since the majority of Russians would not approve that. And it is not only because Russians have a strong imperial gene but also because in their opinion it would simply be unfair. By all means, Lithuania can pay no attention to the interests of Russia and should go by its own interests. The first interest is a fight against manifestations of Russian expansion. So, Lithuania can strongly keep claim for Russia that finally it would admit the occupation. Then in such a case realism would demand to evaluate powers that could be a good ground for such a position. It is a common knowledge that the civilization did not recognized Lithu- anias annexation in 1940. This can certify a fact that most of the Western countries with which Lithuania had diplomatic relations in 1918 1940, renewed their relationships after Lithuania re-established its de facto independence in 1991 and not contracted them as with a new country. In general, it could be said that the Western countries accept Lithuanias version about the proceedings in 1940 and succession of the State of Lithuania. On the other hand, it can not be denied that in the position of other countries there is a certain duality. On the one part, supporting Lithuanias position or showing apprehension about their concern about the threat from Russia, on the other part, those countries consider Russia as their strategic partner and officially declare that they are not going to encroach on interests of Russias security. Such of these countries could be treated as simple courtesy and a desire not to fuel the difference in positions between Russia and Lithuania (as well as other Baltic States) hoping that during this time this difference will bridge. In such a behaviour or to be more precise its symptoms - one can notice something similar to the policy that the USSR pursued during the interwar period in respect to the dispute between Lithuania and Poland when one party was being told one thing and another - another thing in order that their positions would not close In its claims in respect of Russia, Lithuania can refer to another factor which is the nation of Lithuania itself which suffered from occupation, trans- portations and other repressions. However, the position in this respect is also variegated. Even though the major of Lithuanians agree that Russia endangers Lithuania, the majority of those people consider Russians to be their closest and friendliest neighbours. Friendly appreciations about Lithuanians, to be precise 125 about litovskij narod, come from Russia as well. And at the same time a recent survey in Russia shows that the worst of the most unfriendly countries are considered to be the Baltic States, including Lithuania. All of this does make the questions arise: can it be that Lithuania in the sake of its security is decisively pushing Russia into the corner and at the same time thrusts itself into a new international isolation? Or is it possible that by leading a propaganda war against Russia, Lithuania helps to form a new version about Lithuania and Russia the consolidation of peoples masses? At any rate, the present political realia should make Lithuania seriously think about its political relations with Russia in general, and specifically about the role of history in those relationships. The political culture would require treating historical facts and their interpretations in a more correct way, without breaking any morality. Politicians who care about national interests should not ignore arguments of the other party. Of course, it is not easy and one recipe for all cases is hardly possible. Communities of the Western countries could be a certain criterion. There the role of history in relationships between countries is smaller than in the post-communist world. There it is also being avoided in making the history of relations between counties a hostage of domestic problems because in Europe it is being tried to avoid conflicts that are evaluated according to historical measures. 127 Dalia Ðiukðtienë* Lithuanian Military Academy

Economic Ties between Lithuania and Russia: National and Group Interests on the Global Background as Viewed in the Light of Positive Economics

This article aims to review the economic cooperation between two countries, with more attention devoted to the energy sector as seen in the light of positive economics that describes the world as it is through statistical indicators, calculations, statements and examples (as opposite to normative economics). The intentions are to analyze the economic trends, events and facts in Russia and Lithuania between the years 2004-2005, focusing on the significance of the national energy system, explaining reasons of certain solutions, unveiling the strategists and executors as well as possible consequences affecting the economic development and the economic security of the population.

Introduction

The standing statement to be heard nowadays both in the academic and the political circles is that the Lithuanian national economy is part of the global economy, while its strengths and weaknesses depend on the extent of its ability to develop in line with the common economic trends. At the beginning of 2005, a renowned Lithuanian economist and author was sharing his cheerful expectations: Our neighbours outside the EU seem to have grasped that Lithuania is a EU member, and investment as well as other economic ties with its business mean ties with EU business, whereas the main achievement of the independence years is demolition of command economy as well as the fall of the behe- moths that had been providing it1 . The researcher had no doubts about economic growth and noted that within 14 years, Lithuania is likely to resemble present-day Luxembourg or some other similar small European country2 . This conclusion was intriguing, since the impressions of the Luxembourg study visit, and a look into, its economic policy and views on economic security were fresh

* Dalia Ðiukðtienë is an economist and lecturer of Political Science Department at the Military Academy of Lithuania, e-mail: [email protected] 1 Prof. J.Èièinskas apie 14 metø kuriamà mûsø valstybæ [Prof. J.Èièinskas interviewed by Integ- ration News on 14 years of state-building], IÞ interviu, Integracijos þinios, 2004 m. Nr.7-8. 2 Ibidem. 128 enough. Thats where principles of positive economics come in handy. As put by Milton Friedman, every such system of conclusions may be meaningful if it aims to predict the consequences of any change of circumstances while creating theories and hypotheses about phenomena that have not yet been obser- ved3 . The author of this article believes that a sole aspect in the whole structure of the economic ties between Russian and Lithuania, and specifically trade in energy resources, globally applied for political causes and on the background of economic security concept becomes a threat for the welfare of a small state. As author, I conclude with this maxim: New harvest comes fed by old roots. The Lithuanian national security system lists these factors of economic security: competitive economy, energy supply and transport infrastructure4 . Now, being proud members of the EU, we remember that the resources for the national economy originate in the East, and Russia holds 25 percent of global mineral resources. This makes the national economy to a certain extent dependent on the interests of Russia. Regrettably, political speculation in Lithuania is often confused with economic reality. To give an example, lets look back at early 2005, on a discussion related to whether the President should attend the Moscow celebrations of 60th anniversary of the victory against Nazism. This was said by President of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists that we should not worry about demonstration of any tail, we should rather think of what we shall eat and put on the table, how the economy will work, because economic issues are more important5 . The opposition labelled the wording as an attempt by the Kremlin to intimidate us, where monetary interest overweighs national pride6 . Meanw- hile, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement that Russia and the EU agreed on Road Maps to create the Common Spaces (for Economic Co- operation, External Security, Internal Security, Freedom and Justice, and Cultu- re), and prepared the guidelines for the agreements7 . In Lithuania, the statement received no comment, whether economic or political. In Russia it was discussed as a new opportunity, where as in Europe it was painted in search of the roads for 3-4 years. Russia was then open to take advantage and formulate the real common future instead of the road maps designed to obscure the airy relations and foster small trade, since we, as before, may win from rising energy demand and rising prices, because globally we weigh more than some think we do8 . Lithuania is boiling in discussion on the lesser, Russian energy-related problems. The Government Report to the Seimas (Parliament) 2005 notes that due to the tense relations between Maþeikiø nafta and the Government of Russia,

3 Friedman M.., The Methodology of Positive Economics, in: Essays in Positive Economics (1953), University of Chicago Press, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ us/friedman.htm , 2004 10 03. 4 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, 2002 metø nacionalinio saugumo sistemos bûklës ir plëtros ataskaita, Vilnius, 2003, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3, 2005 05 16. 5 Kuzmickaitë J., B.Lubys: Inþinieriø kartos verslininkas, Atgimimas, 2005 03 22. 6 V.Landsbergis: pramonininkai spaudþia prezidentà, DELFI informacija, 2005 m. kovo 3 d., http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?d=6167388. 7 DELFI informacija, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?id=6646370. 8 Êàðàãàíîâ C., Ðåçêîå ïàäåíèå âëèÿíèÿ Ðîññèè â ñòðàíàõ áûâøåãî ÑÑÑÐ, Ðîññèéñêàÿ ãàçåòà, 21.07.2005, http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print.html. 129 Russia may attempt to, through government-loyal Lukoil and Gazprom take over direct control of Maþeikiø nafta and thus become dominant in the national oil sector. The National Security Committee responded much later in July it requested a stricter governmental position, based more on national security, rather than on purely economic criteria9 . This discourse provokes certain popular views on the ties between Rus- sia and Lithuania10 . Management of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute expressed the opinion that holding an oil pipe in not enough to exercise political influence, unless we ourselves are willing to empower it ( ). Taking the oil story seriously, Lithuania would magnify the political risk, and would lessen the economic one11 . Anyway, contemporary economic thought invites us to view economic cooperation between the two states and its influence on national economies in the light of positive economics combining two elements assumptions and a set of hypotheses.

1. Normative Statements Suggest Evaluation, Positive Economics Explains the World as it is

On the academic level, the search for rational answers to what is economics? goes on for years. So does the search of common ground for fundamentalism and realism. The 19th century scientist Alfred Marshall defined economics as a science of human behaviour in business. Oscar Morgenstern, in search of a place for modern economic theory within economic policy was critical about statistical indicators and tended to separate economic analysis from ideology. Contemporary views are based on the assumption that normative economics is comparable to prescription writing as requested by political demand. Indeed, a lot of standard normative economics statements are uttered during election campaigns, coming from a variety of speakers declaring intentions to conduct economic reforms, collect larger budget at the expense of the rich, etc. Positive, or descriptive, economics is based on the fact of disclosing how the economy works in reality. It looks into causality, standard indicators and faces difficulties while interpreting them - for economic experiments are not possible, since people get experience and change the usual behaviour. The theory of positive economics relies on statistics and seeks to disclose what is

9 BNS informacija, 2005 m. liepos 26 d., http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?id=7162893. 10 Lietuvos verslininkai neigiamai vertina Gazprom ir Lukoil, DELFI, 2005 m. liepos 26 d., http://www.delfi.lt/archive/index.php?id=716153). [From 2004 August-September Baltijos tyrimai Report : 14 per cent of the population believe that Russia is willing to develop mutually beneficial relations; a year later, 75 per cent of entrepreneurs believe that Lithuania is in need of an independent supply of oil, 47 per cent are unfavourably disposed towards Gazprom, 31 per cent towards Lukoil]. 11 Steponavièienë G., Dalybos briedþiø girioje, Laisvoji rinka, 2005 Nr.1, sausis-kovas. 130 happening now, what has happened and what is probable, while the society is in the process of search and realization of rational solutions through elected political leaders12 . The difference between normative and positive economics may be well illustrated by different comment on a hungry man. A normativist would say: This man is hungry, and we must feed him. The positivist would consider: This man is hungry, but what are the feeding costs? How would society benefit if we feed him? What would we lose if he remains hungry?. The positivists answers would vary with analysis of costs and benefits per solution, hypotheses would be tested and new ones created. According to F. Friedman, there is no such formal methodology on how to act. The process must be discussed and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or theorem.

2. About Tangible Lithuanian Capital, Economic Vision and Weak Links in the Chain

From the strategic point of view, the global economy is seen as an environment for trends in which to act upon opportunities or threats affecting long-term national development strategies. Five decades of Lithuanian history were shared in the economy of the collapsed USSR. Historically, we were an agricultural country. The tangible capital was constructed in process of Soviet industrialization, transp- lanted by Moscow institutions and at its will as internal co-operation of branches of economy. Even now we complain about the obstructions due to the inherited, old tangible capital. Yes, we continue to bicker, we have become independent as an economy that had been built on Soviet principles of regional development (as part of North West region together with Belarus and Leningrad, or the Baltic Region with Kaliningrad region). Independent, we were still a perverse structure of economy. We should remember that such sectors as electronics, machine-building, chemical industry and military complex came into existence in the days of the Soviet era, together with the traditional ones food, textiles, building materials, etc.13 . None of these were related to local resources or raw materials. The transitional years, 1990 to 2000, were dedicated to specific problems, because correlation between the structure of the economy and its advantages was poor and is still hard to integrate with the global economic trends. While the global economic trends at that period were characterized as dynamic and pre- dictable14 , Lithuania resembled a country of low and medium income. The struc-

12 Sampson H., Welcome to are 012, http://www.cals.nesu.edu/course/are012/lecture.htm, 2004 04 18. 13 Vilkas E., Vasiliauskas A., Kuodis R., Ekonomikos augimo ir jos struktûros plëtotës strategija, psl.13, http://www.ukmin.lt/files/Docs/Ilgalaikë.doc., 2005 05 19. 14 Accepted by majority of researchers, primary sectors (agriculture and mining) are replaced by secondary sectors (processing and construction), and by third-tier (services). By the end of the 20th century, this general trend resulted in 60-70 per cent of GDP of developed countries generated by services. In industrial countries, share of processing in GDP grows to a certain level, and stays or even recedes, while agriculture, industry and trade integrator into an agroindustrial complex that reflects a new type of industrial relations. 131 ture of economy is directly related to the quantities of the physical capital supported by adequately qualified labour, a proportion slow to change. On the other hand, the slice of IT and telecommunications in the GDP, as well as higher value of services like management, education and healthcare are slow in growth, as the resources to finance them15 are slim. The 2001-2002 analysis of the Lithuanian economic situation resulted in a document Long-term Economic Development Strategy of Lithuania until 2015. The vision for Lithuania 2015 depicted it as a member of the EU with modernized economic strategies, national economic policy and employing financial and technical support of the EU, as well as EU economic model of a welfare state with low unemployment rate, high labour costs, strong social guarantees and close social cohesion16 . The document contains statements directly relating to this article. For example, if accepted that world trade is largely, to the extent of one third, is trade between transnational corporations, the document recommends the government to apply measures for the elimination of animosity arising from the general public and local business towards the big corporations. Meanwhile, among the strategic goals is the policy of continuous and active exports of electricity and oil products, promotion of transit of electricity and gas and improving the research of Russian, NIS and Asian markets regarding their high growth potential. The World Bank study of the investment climate in Lithuania concludes that on the international scale the country lacks specialization and works in the low added value sectors. Merely 5 to 6 percent of its total exports are high-tech, low and only comparable to Latvia, and they share the lowest place among EU members17 . Statistics too, reflect that the workforce is not prepared for the market, although well-educated18 . The employment rate of population aged 15-64 in smaller European countries is high. E.g. this indicator is as high as 61.2 percent in Switzerland, 87.6 percent in Iceland and 78.3 percent in Denmark19 . While in Lithuania it is as low as 60.9 percent, with college or high school graduates comprising more than 13 percent of the unemployed. A study Higher Education System: Problems and Solutions (September 2005) by the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists lists 44 drawbacks that hinder measuring contemporary education in terms of added value growth, development of spiritual values, effectiveness of financial activity and common levels of the quality of life. The income of the population is adequate to the low added value generating activities. Statistics shows that in 2002 the average monthly net income was

15 Vilkas, (note 13), p.27. 16 Respublikos ûkio ministerija, Lietuvos mokslø akademija, Lietuvos ûkio (ekonomikos) plëtros iki 2015 metø ilgalaikë strategija, V.: AB Vilspa, 2003, p. 20. 17 The World Bank, Lithuania, Investment Climate Assessment, Draft Report, ECSPF, December 2004, http://www.lrv.lt/pasaul_bankas/FINAL%20DRAFT%201CA%REPORT.pdf., 2005 02 18. 18 Statistikos departamentas, Lietuvos statistikos metratis 2004, Vilnius. 19 Ranked only seventh, http://www.rovo.ch/swissinfo.org./sen/swissinfo.html, 2005 09 16. 132

795.6 Litas and has been growing by 50-60 Litas annually20 . Meanwhile, the take home money or the salary that we should expect the country to resemble within 14 years should serve as an argument to drop our illusionary expectations. To compare, in Switzerland 2002, average monthly net income was SFR 75000 (LTL 13900), in Norway and Denmark about USD 40000 annually (LTL 9500 monthly), Austria - USD 30000 annually (LTL 7100 monthly)21 . Thus, from a purely theoretical point of view if viewed objectively, security is lack of threat to existing values, but viewed subjectively, lack of fear that these values shall not be attacked22 , it is evident that purchasing power, and consumption (both its quality and quantity) of the Lithuanian population is most fragile.

3. Foundations of Lithuanian and Russian Economic Diplomacy

Several years ago Lithuania was declaring that its mineral resources are meagre, technologies are old and its economic structure does not correspond to the real advantages and goals of economic integrity, while its foreign policy lacks adequate defence of national interest. Having become a member of the European Union (EU), Lithuania lost its rights to implement an independent foreign trade policy as the common trade policy is an exclusive competence of the European Community. The country has to support international economic relations often at the expense of national interests and obey the rulings of external institutions. The foreign trade regime and policy since the independence date, and for a decade, had been based on a number of unilateral decisions or agreement- based decisions that were in force until the accession date. The country was undergoing systematic change, as it was leaving the centralized planning system that had barred non-tariff trade, and transiting into the open economy. Thus, Lithuania was curbing foreign trade with the former USSR and facing Western countries, thereby relating re-orientation to the political goals and security23 , often worded as EU and NATO membership. In the process, foreign trade has been changing. All pre-EU free trade agreements were denounced. In accordance with the EU regulations, the Ministry of Economy started issue of licenses and supervision documents for the import of textiles and steel products from third countries, where quotas and double control were applicable; advance documents for provisional exports of textile with re-import as compensational pro-

20 Metratis, (note 18), p. 141. 21 Ranked, (note 19). 22 Buzan B., Þmonës, valstybës ir baimë: tarptautinio saugumo studijos po ðaltojo karo, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997, p. 50. 23 Èièinskas J., Cornelius P.K., Treigienë D.,Trade policies and Lithuanias reintegration into the global economy, in: Lithuanian Economic Reforms: Practice and Perspectives. Vilnius: Margi ratai, 1997, p. 347-365. 24 Volovik N., Foreign trade, in: Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, December 2004, Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow, 2004, p. 45. 133 ducts were issued, too. On May 1st, 2004, the Law on Export Control of Strategic Goods, aligned with the EU regulations, as well as the Law on Export, Import and Transit of Strategic Goods, Intermediation and Licensing was enforced. The Russian Federation opened 2005 with major changes in foreign trade legislation too such as: new Customs Code followed by about 20 Government Resolutions and more than 80 federal customs acts. More than 900 legal acts on foreign trade regulations became null and void during 2004; by the end of 2005, electronic declarations system has to be installed in 56 customs posts24 . Formally, the EU accession and joining the EU Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia, the Russia-related initiatives on Russia did not change the foundations of economic ties with Russia. Trading with Russia was based on preference, and Common Customs had hardly any effect on imports from Russia (general increase of costs was 3.1 per cent25 ) but non-tariff measures related to quality of goods and certification then came into more active use. In 2004, the Economy and Trade Ministry of the Russian Federation, declaring further economic interests in Lithuania, favoured the opportunity to use Lithu- ania as a base for the movement of its capital aiming at bigger influence on the EU economy as well as make use of the EU funds in the Kaliningrad region where Lithuania is the third most important partner in terms of trade and investments (after Germany and Poland). Statistics gives the following figures of Lit- huanian-origin capital in Russia (2004): in 2004 it was USD 76.3 million compared to USD 12.4 mill in 2001. A larger part of investments are located in the Kaliningrad region, where the market entrants are a confectionary (AB Naujoji Rûta), meat processor (AB Klaipëdos maistas), fish processor (UAB Vièiûnai), refri- gerator producer (AB Snaigë), fertilizer producer (Arvi). These are private initiatives and represent private interest in search of better supply of raw materials and higher sales as well as inexpensive labour for traditional production. Based on private influence on local public sector and businessmen, these investors are far from implementing the strategic goals as they are laid in Long-term economic development strategy of Lithuania until 2015. Statistics show that the presence of Russian capital in the Lithuanian economy in most significant in the high-profit sectors: USD 23.1 million in 2001, it rose to USD 466.3 million by the end of 2004, after Jukos acquired 53.7 percent (USD 160 million) of an oil refinery Maþeikiø nafta, Lukoil-Baltija became owner of the biggest petrol stations network for USD 120 million, and 2 acquisitions by Gazprom 34 percent of Lietuvos dujos (Lithuanian Gas) for USD 81 million and a bulk of Kaunas heat supply network Kauno ilumos tinklai shares for another USD 36 million26 .

25 Ñîñòîÿíèå òîðãîâî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ ñâÿçåé ÐÔ è Ëèòîâñêîé Ðåñïóáëèêîé, Ìèíèñòåðñòâî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðàçâèòèÿ è òîðãîâëè ÐÔ, http://exportsupport.ru/law.tv?n$docid=193899, 2005 09 06. 26 Ibidem. 134 Related to these investments came the significant Lithuanian economy the end to energy policy issues as they are outlined in the global context: globally the environmental requirements are becoming more rigid, the EU is stimulating Lithuania to use the clean fuel - gas, while modern technologies and the quest for higher quality of life raise the demand of oil products. It is quite natural that Russian analysts have spotted the pending oil power pressure on Lithuania, which is only by 10 percent lower than the financial power of any country; for Lithuanians must eat, procreate and behave just like any other nation, and while big money flows where theres security and stability, The same methods apply whether it is America, Eastern or Western Europe but the code of conduct applied may differ. Analysts widely agree that a Common Trade Policy is fully integrated in Lithuania and is in working condition27 . On the other hand, group interests and markets protection instruments provided by EU and its members intertwine with trade protection measures and foreign trade policy measures as well as personal business interests of politicians. The trend may help augment the powers of the interest groups. A prominent trade policy expert28 notes that no other economic sector is influenced by interest groups to the extent that trade is influenced. There, as illustrated by Lithuanian realities, interest groups prevail over consumers and large corporate producers and together they join forces with the political elite. Otherwise, both Lithuanian and Russian institutional structures benefit from the status quo. As for modernized market strategy, Lithuania is no different from any other state with its unstable financial markets due to globalization of financial resources and wider liberalization. The latter paves the way to hot money mostly flowing from Russia. While the is in process, complemented by interest of various groups and nurtured by lack of responsible modern management, the Lithuanian economy is affected on a growing scale and itself becomes the obstacle to building the economic structure based on the real economy rather than financial capital. Contemporary transnational corporations employ innovative marketing methods and principles, hardly ever known to the politically biased top management tolerated by the national political leadership. For example, it is widely known in the academic circles, that many large corporations have employed the POISE idea in strategy-building. In POISE, P stands for PROFITABLE, O - OF- FENSIVE, I - INTEGRATED, S STRATEGIC, E EFFECTIVELY EXECUTED29 . POISE proponents have observed that in 100 international mergers that only 49 result in higher share value and have a positive effect on the host country economy, 39 cases qualify as losers and 12 show somewhat in-between results. In Lithuania, privatization and sales of strategic companies is not really a matter of calculation and logic, it is rather the instrument of political games. More comment follows in chapters 4.5 and 6.

27 Meunier S., Nicolaidis K., Who speaks for Europe? The delegation of trade authority in the EU, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.37, No.3, p.5. 28 Pelkmans J., European Integration, Methods and Economic Analysis, NewYork: Longman,1997, p.207. 135 The classical view on the national foreign and internal policy gives the upper most hand to the political decisions rather than decisions by economic players. The choice for the state between butter (welfare) and cannon (security or military powers)30 , is too simplistic for the modern world where global trends rule and to a larger extent in the post-soviet economies. If one so by declared that both are sought after, a special factor pops up the quest of political leaders for economic security and growth for the sake of ones own stability and financial support guarantees. The principles of primary privatization, deliberate and the accidental legislative mess-up, indicate that economic or, if put more accurately, the ow- nership interests of the owners, conduct the national position and decisions on so many issues, including foreign trade. For instance, Russian Ministry of Fo- reign Affairs, in response to the WTO requirements to introduce uniform prices for both internal and external markets on energy resources (as a precondition of Russian membership in WTO) they have worded their position as follows: the growing economic and especially energetic and infrastructural, interdependence of countries within the common European space makes Russia as significant as the EU. Thus, Russia may disregard the WTO requirement, which is a fair recognition of the natural competitive advantage31 . The link between national economic policy and the business of gas was demonstrated in 2003, when upon assignment of the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Gazprom prepared a program of incentive measures for the promotion of international activities of local energy and fuel companies and a medium-term strategy of reinforcement for Gazprom on the international gas market.

4. Gazprom as a Grand Prix of National Games

At the end of 2004, the first signs of stagnation appeared in Russian economy, after years of rapid growth. Government institutions and some analysts looked into statistics and tried to elucidate the reform as a positive factor affecting growth of GDP; independent analysts were relentless on slowdown diagnosis32 . The economic change had to be modelled by foreign capital investment and foreign interest to participate in the events, and hold influence on own

29 Hugh Davidson, Offensive Marketing or How To Make Your Competitors Followers, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 19. 30 Kirshner J, Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War, in: Review of International Political Economy, Vol.5, No 1, 1998, pp.64-91. 31 Ýêîíîìè÷åñêàÿ äèïëîìàòèÿ Ðîññèè â 2003 ãîäó, ÌÈÄ Ðîññèè, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-dipe- con.nsf, 2004 12 16. 32 E.g. Evgenij Gavrilenkov, chief economist of Troika Diaqlog, an investmen company, Troika Dialog, or Michail Dmitriev, head of Strategic Development Research Centre, are pessimistic; both seem to agree that economic growth will be hindered by lack of fundamental decisions in non-economic sectors, since the state is not mature for change. It is actively involved in the private sector activities, while drastic tax measures tour the economy backwards. (See: Fomi- chev O., Of the Course of Reforms in December 2004, in.: Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, December 2004, Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow 2004, p.6). 136 markets. 2002 McKinsey research reports interest of big asset managers in investing in Russia. In countries like UK, France, Germany, the acceptable premium on shares for good governance ranges from 10 to 12, in Russia they would readily pay 38 percent premium for good governance33 . The research Good governance reflects a set of 16 indicators related to the capital structure, shareholder structure, profitability, publicity and transparency, loyalty of staff and shareholders in respect of corporate policy, and accounting standards. Fuel and energy sector was singled out as the most attractive. Results of 2004 led to the conclusion that Gazprom growth has stopped. Gas production fell to the level of 1999. But the developments in the global energy sector had restructured the flow of capital: 2004 foreign investment in Russia increased by 2.9 percent compared to 2002, and foreign capital targeted fuel. By the end of 2004 the sector had attracted USD 8 billion, and that was 2.5 more than at the end of 200334 . Luxembourg-based companies were considered to be the most powerful source of capital with 4-fold growth of total assets during 2004 and 52 percent of the total in the fuel industry. The Government of Russia cut a slice off this fat lump by overtaking the management of Yukos, one of the oil giants, and approached the portal to take control of Gazprom35 . Russian reviewers noted wittily36 that while Western politicians were busy with exports of democracy, the gates were widely open for the Russian government and Gazprom to enter the European market, which has been good for exports of gas with a long-term guarantee and significant geopolitical outcome. It is not about the monopoly of gas production and supplies. It is all about a Russian-German energy alliance, where the interest is expressed both by business leaders and political figures in these countries. The principal agreement was delivered in the familiar milieu the Hano- ver trade fair that was attended by 150 Russian corporations, the President himself and, of course, Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder. There, among the 8 me- moranda signed, 3 were on energy issues. The contents of the agreements were not public, but on the eve of public announcement, referring to its sources in the government, Handelsblatt informed that Wintershall AG, via its subsidiary, shall sign an agreement with Gazprom on a joint venture on exploiting a West Siberian gas field and construction of a pipeline on the Baltic Sea. Actually, the Septem- bers 8th, 2005 agreement on the Baltic Sea oil pipeline between Russia and Ger- many was the result of that earlier memorandum.

33 Newell R., Wilson G., A Premium for Good Governance, in: The McKinsey Quarterly, No3, 2002. 34 Ilyuchina E., Foreign Investment// Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, December 2004, Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow 2004, p. 29. 35 Jun 16th, 2005 is the date of the first deal. Gazprom agreed to sell 10,7 per cent of stock to the Government for 7,2 bill USD. As holder of 50 per cent, the Government would offer it all to foreign investors. As long as shares were not listed on the stock exchange, they were only available as ADRs on the US market. As soon as they appear on the Russian stock exchange, the Government would be prepared to deliver a energy giant similar to the Saudi Arab Aramko (See in Mixing oil, gas and politics, The Economist, Jun 20th 2005). 36 Ìîñÿêèí À., Çäåñü ðóññêèé ãàç, çäåñü Ðóñüþ ïàõíåò, http://www.w-europe.org/rel-RU/260505- 2.php, 2005 09 18. 137 So when did the Lithuanian expectations fail? The answer is as simple as that: after the failure of a long-play on the idea of the future pipeline across the Baltic States and Poland. Economists and politologists named authorities as the culprits, while the authorities put the blame on the overall political situation37 . Meanwhile, Gazprom was gaining weight. Just a fortnight after the grand agreement, 6 of the largest global banks concluded their readiness to extend a USD 12 billion 5-year loan to Gazprom, to be repaid in instalments. The forecast of Rus- sian analysts was now coming into reality: for the largest-ever per-legal-entity loan Gazprom acquired Sibneft38 , an acquisition from a private person and oligarch Roman Abramovich and his partners. Representatives of the Russian authorities at Gazprom voted in favor of the USD 13 billion deal and control over 75 percent of Sibneft shares, although the registered capital of the company was as mean as 7.6 million rubles. On the other hand, its profitability in 2004 was by 10 percent lower than a year before, and according to GAAP amounted to USD 2.04 billion39 . That was the deal of the century, a wording fit both to Russian and global financial markets. Although Russian analysts had preferred having Europe on the Russian energy needle40 , the talk now is on Europe becoming financially dependent on Russia. The European institutions will have to release pressure on the Russian monopolist for very sound reasons: Gazproms profit from activity in 2005 may reach USD 3 billion, while its loans are a meager 10 percent of its capital41 , while five-year expectations are similar; Europe will not press the on the spot deals, it would rather sign long-term contracts at acceptable prices. As soon as Gazprom acquired Sibneft, it became co-owner of a share in TNK-BP42 assets, or, indeed, became the first Russian transnational corporation. Upon acquisition of a company that extracts three times more oil than Gazprom, the corporation is an oil and gas producer capable of supplying both

37 President V.Adamkus was quoting to the media his discussion with President Horst Koeh- ler: I told him it was regrettable that Lithuania, EU member, will not be able to participate in the project ( ) which is a violation of Baltic and Polish interests; the German president answered that the situation could hardly be changed ( ) and the EU Energy commissioner had mentioned that these are negotiations between two countries and they could not be reverted (see: BNS information, 2005 09 15, http://www.delfi.lt/archive.php?id=7492905). 38 An investment company Millhouse Capital, incorporated by R.Abramovich and partners owns 72,663 per cent of stock. The obligation of Gazprom is to purchase them for USD 13,091 billion; Gazprom has already acquired 3,016 per cent of stock, while another 20 per cent of Jukos-owned shares are under arrest, and, as soon as the dispute is settled in court, would hardly be bought by anyone else but Gazprom. 39 Ùåãëîâ À., Ñäåëêà âåêà áëèçêà ê çàâåðøåíèþ, http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/ html?mid=6692461. 2005 10 18. 40 Gazprom holds 20 per cent of global gas resources, produces 16 per cent of the total extraction and has a 25 European market share. Largest supplier to Germany. When Nordic gas resources consumed, and the demand tripling by 2020, Russia is to grow into the largest supplier (see: Mosiakin, note 36). 41 Ïëåòíåâ Ñ., Â ÐÔ ñîçäàåòñÿ ïåðâàÿ ÒÍK, http://www.rambler.ru/db/news.html, 2005 10 13. 42 The company owns 6 oil refineries in Russia and Ukraine, half the shares are owned by British Petroleum, the rest is held by Russian AlfaGroup, Access Industries and Renova. In 2002, till Slaveneft, a purchase by TNK-BP, was not divided between partners (Sibneft and TNK-BP), Gazprom will overtake it by becoming co-owner of TNK-BP assets. 138 raw materials and a wide range of products for refineries and final consumers. This type of diversification is typical of transnational corporations, and aims at levelling of profits by becoming less dependent on the fluctuations of price on raw materials. Lithuanian consumers never bothered themselves with gas as long as the Lithuanian gas supplying company raised heating prices. In 2004 gas consumption totalled 2.881 billion cbm at a price of USD 85 per 1000-cbm, compared to USD 150 per 1000 cbm paid by other EU members. Currently, when West Euro- pean consumers are complaining about rocketing prices of gas, we know that the agreement between Lithuania and Gazprom envisages review of prices in 2006, and the plans are to raise gas prices by 10 USD annually till it equals European price levels43 . We know that the current price was put into primary agreement, when the gas supplier Gazprom acquired 1/3 of the Lithuanian gas supplier Lietuvos dujos. What was there in this acquisition? Was it a nice dis- count to a neighbour? And how much of POISE was in the agreement? The answer is straightforward: the situation on both sides was very favourable for the POISE principles to prevail in favour of the Gazprom scheme, when all gas was provided from a single source oil fields of Gazprom and supplied to consumers by a chain of intermediaries. The scheme seems to be favoured by the new project partners, e.g. by the German political and business moguls. The first intermediary company in Lithuania was Lietuvos dujos (Lithuanian Gas) that was conceived as a natural monopoly but soon entered the scheme in- vented by Gazprom, but implemented by the staff and related persons. The scheme embraces registration and management of intermediary companies in neighbouring countries, and finally, sharing the profit received from gas supplied at advantageous prices. The number of those willing to share the sunny side of the wall, and owning the cash to buy the ticket, were available at first call. The National Audit Office calculated that the two (Dujotekana and Lietuvos dujos) could help consumers save about 100 million Litas44 if the price structure had been based on cost of imports. As a matter of fact, Dujotekana alone applied a margin that in some months was as high as 27 percent, and managed to generate annual turnovers as high as LTL 514.6 million and pre-tax profit LTL 55.8 mill (2003). Alongside, Russian politicians adopted resolutions on intentions to raise the price of gas supplied to Lithuania, thus affecting inflation and preventing the Euro. On the other side of the border the comment is about Russia intimida- ting Lithuania and changing its tone from irritation to foot-stamping and fist- shaking45 . Gazprom management makes statements on its neutral position on Lithuanian internal matters. Meanwhile, the representative of Gazprom, in negotiations with Lithuania, is Chairman of the Board of Lietuvos dujos who is also representing E.On Ruhrgas, co-owner of Gazprom. As seen from this perspective,

43 Maskva dël kainø gàsdina, o Vilnius ramina , Lietuvos rytas, 2005 m. liepos 12 d. 44 Makaraitytë I., Kiek kainuoja dujos arba kodël V.Uspaskichui Dujotekanos dujos piges- nës [What is the price of gas, or Why is the gas from Uspaskichs Dujotekana cheaper?], Atgimimas, 2005 m. liepos 15 d. 45 Editorial of national daily Lietuvos rytas, 2005 07 12. 139 the representatives are in the position to blame the Lithuanian Government for failing to meet certain requirements of the privatization agreement as regards regulation of gas market and pricing methodology. Thus, they are in the position to determine the pricing, terms and conditions that would meet their own financial interests.

5. On the Reliability of the Lithuanian Energy Sector and the Dictatorship of the Black Gold

The economic, social or environmental progress of the modern state runs on energy. Lithuanian national energy strategy declares such priorities as reliability and safety of energy supply at lowest costs important. Thus supporting the competitiveness of the energy sector within the EU energy market as well as increasing its productivity, and cutting emission of waste upon closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Plant. Strategies, realities, and facts could be measured by the ISED (Indicators for Sustainable Energy Development) system. Three criteria help measuring the reliability of energy: the indicator of energy supply dependence on net imports, the level of utilization of local resources and the share of renewable energy in the total balance of the primary energy and electricity46 . Recently, numerous information sources indicate the falling dependence on net imports in Lithuania; figures show that 90 percent of the national energy sector depends on net imports. The energy consumption per unit of GDP is widely used to measure the relationship between energy consumption and economic development of a nation. In the old members of the EU, for years, this ratio has not been changing significantly, while in Lithuania it has been rising. In 2000, final energy output consumption was 50 per cent, and electricity - 60 per cent of 1990 levels. The primary energy per GDP unit in Lithuania is twice EU average47 . Globally, the output of energy from primary to useful is about 30 to 35 percent, while Lithua- nia stands among the ones listed low on the list in terms of output consumption. The National Energy Consumption Program 2000 indicates the availability of about 20 to 50 percent energy saving capacity both in households and principal sectors of economy. The national program offers long-term measures for more effective use of energy, but finances are not available. Discussions on the limited global energy resources have been in the air since the past century. The oil price has become the main fluctuator of the welfare of industrial nations due to a long list of factors including the: growing demand of oil, political instability in oil-rich countries, overcapacity in OPEC countries, market speculations related to instability of the oil market, unreliable sup-

46 International Atomic Energy Agency, International Energy Agency, Indicators for Sustai- nable Energy Development. Overview, 2002. 47 IAEA Coordinated Research Project. Indicators for Sustainable Energy Development. Lithu- anian case study // First progress report, 2002. 140 ply, new environmental requirements, the US dollar exchange rate, and quite numerous accidentals such as hurricane Katrina. In 2004 the International Energy Economics Conference participants fo- recasted further rises of the 13-year highest oil price up to USD 30 per barrel. And that was a wrong guess: in August 2005, after a quarter of US oil fields devastated by Katrina, global commodity markets were in turmoil48 , for a barrel was at the level of USD 70.85, with October futures at USD 64.4 per barrel. New attempts to forecast events a week later were controversial. Claude Mandil, head of International Energy Agency, promised a global energy crisis; Stephen For- bes, billionaire, saw the break of price to USD 35 per barrel and an unpleasant threat to Russia, much worse than crisis of 199849 .

6. Lithuanian Oil Games Mix of Politics, Economic Pragmatism and Tragic Global Milieu

The Lithuanian national grand oil games, although not so bright, are quite discernible in the milieu of global battlegrounds. The Government is in discussions on the alternatives of the new owners for the 40.6 percent of Maþei- kiø nafta and options for incomes from privatization of the company. They are also discussing the options opened by the Russian Jukos, owner, via its subsidia- ries, of 53.7 percent. The single oil refinery in Lithuania, constructed in 1980 as a Union-level company, with guaranteed supplies and sales, Maþeikiø nafta has an marine oil terminal in Bûtingë with a 91.5 km crude oil pipeline, pumps, onshore terminal equipment and tanks, offshore pipeline, and a single point mooring buoy. Maþeikiu Nafta owns and operates a system of pipelines that includes two pump stations near Birzai and another near Jonikis, crude oil pipelines to the Mazeikiai Refinery and Bûtinge Terminal, a crude oil pipeline leading to Ventspils, and a products pipeline supplying diesel fuel to Ventspils. In 2004, the total flow of oil was 9.0 tons, whereas the annual capacity is 16.2 tons50 . The gap must have caused wide discussions in spring 2005, with numerous opinions and interests intertwining on the privatization agreement article demanding to sell 11.5 percent of shares at a fixed price, of course much lower than the current market rate. V. Uspaskich, Minister of Economy at that time in history, demanded control and sales of 36 percent to supplier of raw oil in Russia, with supply guarantees, plus sales of 15 percent to financial investor. Meanwhile, Baltic Holding, representing bank Gazprom (owned by Gazprom itself), and Jurimex, a company registered in Austria, was offering to buy Maþeikiø nafta shares from Jukos. Maþeikiø nafta proposed to start the production of polyp- ropylene, an investment offered by Baltic Holding, a serious investment group ( ) able to extend the technological process of Maþeikiø nafta ( ) to make it more

48 CNN, News on Financial markets, 2005 08 29 and 2005 09 04. 49 Îïèâøèåñÿ íåôòúþ [Oiloholics], http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/mid=6503145, 2005 10 06. 50 Ñîñòîÿíèå (note 25). 141 potent, as seen by Prime Minister Brazauskas51 . Advisor to PM Saulius Spëèius was open to comment that without Russian capital Maþeikiø nafta will not be able to operate, ( ) because we do not hold any gas, oil or line connections to the West, while the national security issues related to the company are overestima- ted. Authorities were pragmatic, since the measure of economic security within national security system is worded as supplies of energy and resources, but not the price paid by the society for the decisions made by the authorities. In Septem- ber 2005, upon public discontent with Maþeikiø nafta52 piracy, Prime Minister Brazauskass reaction was simplistic:( ) the global background is tragic. It is a natural disaster ( ). One cannot take away the profit of a good company; it would look strange in Europe. Profits are high, but the oil business is always profitable, if well-run. According to the PM, the excise duty of 382 EUR per ton is the lowest possible allowed by the EU, while large imports of cheap petrol from Russia or Belarus is restricted by the EU regulations53 . The Prime Minister did not find any possibilities to have an influence on the company. This pragmatic approach of the authorities could be explained by the economic indicators. Taxpayer, Maþeikiø nafta paid semiannual LTL 1.3 billion, and that is 1.53 times more than the semiannual in 2004. Exports to Western Europe, the USA, Canada and other countries via Klaipëda rose by 16 percent. Good count of this was related to the GDP and less worry was on rising prices or inflation54 . The prehistory of the current national oil production starts back in 1999, when the Government signed an agreement that, as was later concluded by the Constitutional Court, contained anticonstitutional articles. Having declared in- tegrational NATO-driven guidelines, the government passed Maþeikiø nafta on to the American Williams International. The Russian Ministry of Energy threatened to turn the refinery into a heap of junk55 , and Lukolian plans to be masters of both production and consumption had to be abandoned, at least for some time. Nevertheless, the oil giant was feeding the political and academic circles on the idea that fully operative refinery is the guarantee of Russian success on the international oil markets should the oil prices rocket. The present day Lukoil is a company established in 1991, after merger of oil and gas companies operating in Western Siberia (Langepas, Uraine, Koga- lym wherefrom comes the corporate name) and an oil processing companies in

51 Gazprom keièia strategijà dël Maþeikiø naftos [Gazprom is changing strategy on Maþeikiø nafta] Lietuvos þinios, 2005 m. rugpjûèio mën. 29 d. 52 In 2002, Maþeikiø nafta signed a 10-year agreement on supplies oil with Jukos, whereas the latter - with the following Russian companies: LUKoil, Rosneft, TNK-BP, Sibneft, Salveft, Sur- gutneftegaz, and Tatneft. Total amounts or prices are not disclosed, but it seems to be known that they are lower than market price. 53 A.Brazauskas to ELTA, 2005 09 08, http://www.delfi.lt./archive/php?id=7441041. 54 Presuming that the producer price for both local and overseas consumers is the same, ironically, we are in the advantageous position in this tragic global milieu. Within half a year, we have consumed about 19 per cent of total Maþeikiø nafta production and let it earn, domestically, a profit of 7,28 cent per litter, but we seem to have profited well from sales overseas. 55 Äèêòàòóðà ÷åðíîãî çîëîòà, Ïîëèòýêîíîìèÿ, http://www.baltkurs.com.russian.htm, 2005 10 16. 142 Perm, Volograd and Novoufimsk. It operates on the vertical integration principle (i.e. from oil well to the petrol station) and expresses its priority interest to expand production and sales both domestically and on international markets in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Cyprus, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Columbia, USA the Baltic countries too56 . 11.3 percent of Lukoil is owned by US energy giant ConocoPhillips, intending to augment its share. In 1992, when shrewd businessmen were transporting oil and oil products to Maþeikiø nafta by rail, Lukoil Baltija was established to take care of its flows of oil, refining business, exports and settlements57 . Presently, the company buys, refines and sells products, with a turnover of a billion Litas, and also with an expanding network of petrol stations (more than 110 now and to operate up to 120 by the end of 2005). It declares on the website that the present-day network owner is market leader and reliable partner, which applies the principles of justice and legitimacy. And is also the retail price dictator to boot. No surprise was the news on September 13, 2005, when President Bra- zauskas was quoted saying that his old acquaintance since the days in Ufimsk Vagit Alekperov, President of Lukoil, was planning a visit to Lithuania. Was it a hint that Lukoil was a company meeting the criteria as buyer of the refinery? The tandem bicycle could have turned into a simplistic bicycle, for Lukoil, operating oil fields in Western Siberia and the Urals, would have overtaken all the agreements on supplies (including diesel produced in Russia) by the pipeline, while Maþeikiø Nafta, under the EU banners would have remained supplier of lowest acceptable quality products at wholesale price, that, as worded by its representatives, are set by Rotterdam; meanwhile, its subsidiary Lukoil Baltija would have controlled supply and consumption in Lithuania and other Baltic countries in the interest of its profit margin. President of the Russian Lukoil seemed to have left clear guidelines for the Lithuanian authorities, i.e. with no space for negotiations between Lukoil and Jukos on Maþeikiø Nafta shares, for it is the business of the Lithuanian Government. The national political opposition was urging the government to look for oil-solutions and were addressing another candidate TNK-BP, which was introduced as a British company. A. Brazaus- kas, interviewed on the radio after accusations of private interests was pleased to change his mind: It seems that TNK-BP may be a priority ( ) No objections, if the Parliament approves the deal we have prepared. That would be quite satisfactory, and many would be calmed58 . Lithuania seems to be a small bump on the road of Gazprom-the-Giant, who has already girdled a portion of TNK-BP. It is hardly possible for Lithuania to open negotiations with the investor who seems to be more interested in overtaking the position of Lukoil in the Baltic markets than the production of Maþei-

56 About the group, http://www.lukoil.lt, 2005 09 11. 57 After five years of Lukoil on the Lithuanian market, Ivan Paleichik, head of Lukoil Baltija, Ltd, evolved as a charismatic personality (... ) Five years ago he was a successful investor into the election campaign of the Brazauskas party. Smoothly, as soon as Paksas became Prime Minister, he concluded successful negotiations on Russian oil supplies to Lithuania (see: Äèêòàòóðà, note 55). 58 ELTA information, 2005 10 11, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/php?id=7680490 . 143 kiø nafta. Modern political thought is intrigued: these games are separate and independent, but plying these games is about making moves where purpose is set in the rules59 . As seen in the light of the modern game theory, there is no political or economic puzzle on the Lithuanian-Russian Grand Oil Game, for the players are merely striving to raise the probability of victory and are proceeding in the direction best fitting their goal. Should the observer feel misled by the misbehaving player, there is only one thing that helps convincing the observer that the (mis) behaviour has a proper purpose. Well, what about the final consumer, who, according to G. Soros, has the right to change the rules of economics and social systems just by merely expressing their views on the rules?60 It is not just the demand of oil products that makes Lithuania dependent on oil. Oil products are being bought at the best terms, while the problem lies in the lack of oil supply or poor governance of Maþeikø nafta, and loss of competitive edge. Author of this article, as the smallest entity, had found an individual solution when petrol prices reached the peak, a solution to serve extra proof of the hypothesis that the quality of locally produced petrol is poor61 . Unfortunately, this is an endangered solution, for the supplier of the Scandinavian product and competitor of Lukoilian applies certain rules of the game, and the rules are created in accordance with collective solutions, or politics62 , that may as well be dictated by Lukoil, should it succeed in merging its own and Maþeikiø nafta-owned Ventus network of petrol stations. Alternatively, Gazprom may dictate, if it divides the assets with TNK-BP and overtake Maþeikiø nafta shares for a premium (a matter of time and availability of monetary resources) either from TNK-BP, or from Lukoil or any more.

Conclusions

Facts and figures serve proof that current trends may have a negative effect on the integrity of national economy and the security of the population. They may also ruin both the strategic and the weaker sectors of economy. Just like in other countries with limited resources and big ambitions, the gospel of economic liberalism is spread by the most competitive sectors with ties to transnational corporations and with direct interest in internationalization as a possibility to cut costs and raise profits as well as exert influence on regulations. It would be wise to agree that after 16 years of independence Lithuania has solved quite a number of economic problems, but has hardly acquired enough skills of national strategic planning. Political geography is favourable and is exploited

59 Political Economy, Englewood Cliffs, New York.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 60 Soros G., Pasaulinio kapitalizmo krizë: Atviroji visuomenë pavojuje, Vilnius:Tyto alba, 1999, p.23. 61 Replacing Lukoilian A-95 petrol by the same type from Scandinavia; bought at a higher price per litter (by 2 per cent compared to Lukoilian equivalent), the driving distance, provided similar driving conditions, was longer by 20 per cent. 62 Soros (Note 60). 144 for transit between East and West; EU membership is a guarantee of economic stability. Nevertheless, Lithuania must take into account economic integrity, national competitiveness and national security, and create an efficiently structured economy based on production, where energy plays key role. Now that we are still discussing the restructuring of the economy, only the traditional sectors and products guarantee growth due to the volume and this helps producers to enter new markets or to maybe recover the lost ones. Still, after 16 years of independence production remains on too small of a scale and primitive. The share of more sophisticated sectors (electronics, machine tools) have shrunk, while the simpler ones (food processing, textiles) have expanded. Compared to services, the proportion of processing has also shrunk by far too much, while products of some sectors of economy are of lower technical levels than in the Soviet days. This context requires an ironical view on our illusion that we have any advantage as compared to the new EU member states just because we are close neighbours of Russia. President Adamkus had once noted: Lithuania is interested in Russia as participant of European life. We are dedicated to cooperation with neighbouring Russian regions ( ) Together, we can turn the Baltic region into one of the richest in the world63 . Regrettably, the reality seems to be the opposite. It is Russia, or indeed its energy (oil and gas) giants, which decide what projects Lithuania is to participate in, best serving the Russian interest.

63 LR Prezidento V.Adamkaus kalba, pasakyta Karaliðkajame tarptautiniø santykiø institute: Lietuva integruotame pasaulyje, Londonas, 2002 m. kovo 27 d [Speech by President Adamkus at the Royal Institute of International Relations Lithuania in the Integral World], in: Lietuvos uþsienio politika 2002, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2004, p.63. 145 Vladas Sirutavièius* Institute of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Vilnius

Ukraine: the Orange Revolution and its Aftermath

The purpose of this article is to discuss the causes of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and find out how changes in the political regime have influenced the course of Kievs foreign policy. The first part of the article tries to clarify what internal and external factors determined the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. The answer to the question why the Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place is provided. It is based on the assumption that the transformation of the political regime was influenced not only by internal circumstances (first of all a crisis of the oligarchic political regime) but also by external ones. The West and Russia treat Ukraine as a strategically important state; therefore, it is becoming a special object of competition for the influence between Western institutions and the East. It should be pointed out that such overlapping of interests is a dynamic process: it can determine the tendencies of stability and cooperation between the West and the East or confliction. The author comes to the conclusion that in the near perspective future, Ukraine might become a hotbed of tension and conflicts between Russia and the West (primarily the USA). The second part of the article answers the question how the political crisis of September 2005, the splitting of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenkos alliance, the gas conflict of Russia and Ukraine can affect tendencies of foreign policy of the country before the Rada elections in March 2006. The article points out that in spite of a complicated social and economic situation and political crises, Kiev attempted to adhere to a pro-Western course of foreign policy. Cooperation of Ukraine with NATO and Kievs regional policy experienced particular impetus. Such tendencies in foreign policy of Ukraine are actively supported by the USA which is hoping to establish, in the western part of the CIS, a counterbalance for Russias ambitions to restore its influence there. On the other hand, such Kievs activity makes relations with Moscow even more strained. The author of the article claims that further cooperation of Ukraine and Western institutions will depend on the Rada elections in March 2006.

Introduction

In previous studies on the development of Ukraine after the Cold War, the greatest attention was paid to issues of statehood consolidation and implementation of economic-political reforms emphasizing that foreign and security policy of Ukraine is determined not only by specific internal factors (regionalism, specific oligarchic political system) but also by the circumstance that the coun-

* Dr. Vladas Sirutavièius is an associate professor of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius and a Director of the public establishment Ukrai- ne Institute. Address: Vokieèiø 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2514130, siruv- [email protected] 146 try is at the junction of two overlapping integral spaces. It is pointed out that Ukraine is influenced by the neighbourhood of Western institutions that have expanded to Central and Eastern Europe and manifest themselves by the so- called Eastern policies of the European Union and NATO, meanwhile being directly affected by Russia.1 Lately, the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 has been receiving ever growing attention. According to opti- mists the Orange Revolution made favourable conditions for political and economic reforms in the country as well as for faster integration of Ukraine into Western organizations. Those tending to be more cautious believe that the Orange Revolu- tion encounters ever increasing challenges within the country and this has a negative impact on the policy for the integration into Western bodies. (By the way, such a standpoint is confirmed by the emerging crisis in power and the splitting of pro-Western democratic forces.) Assessments that the Orange Revolution has not achieved its primary objectives are being more often expressed.2 This article has two essential objectives. First, to ascertain what internal and external factors have determined the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Thus the answer to the question why the Orange Revolution became possible in Ukraine is sought after. It is based on the assumption that the transformation of the political regime was influenced not only by internal circumstances (for example peculiarities of the political system) but also by the nature of structural overlapping. In other words, the West and Russia treat Ukraine as a strategically important state; therefore, it becomes a special object of competition for the influence between Western institutions and Russia. It should be pointed out that the structural overlapping is a dynamic process: it can determine tendencies of stability and cooperation between the West and Russia or confliction. Second, the article aims at answering the question about what implications the September political crisis have had and what is more important. The article also addresses what the splitting of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Ty- moshenkos alliance could have for the tendencies of foreign policy of the country in the near perspective, i. e. before the Rada elections in March 2006.

1 See: Bugajski J., Cold Peace. Russias New Imperialism, West-Port: Praeger Publisher, 2004, p. 79-95 Brzezinski Z., The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Impe- ratives, Basic Books, 1997, p. 126-138. Also by Lithuanian authors Laurinavièius È., Motieka E., Statkus N., Features of the geopolitics of the Baltic States 20th century, Vilnius, LII Publishing House, 2005, p. 357-374. 2 Compare with Kuzio T., From Kuchma to Yushchenko. Ukraines 2004 Presidential Elec- tions and the Orange Revolution, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.52, no.2, March/April 2005, p.29-42 and DAnieri P., What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the implications of Orange Revolution, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no.5, Septem- ber/October 2005, p.82-91. 147 1. Orange Transformation of the Regime: Internal and External Causes

The problem to be discussed in this part could be briefly be stated as thus: why did the process of the political power transfer in Ukraine fails? In other words, why did the dominant political elite and its leader fail to retain (in trans- ferring the power to their henchman) their influence in the political system even taking advantage of the possibilities provided by the so-called administrative resource and manipulation of democratic elections. By the way, in other CIS space countries this political operation used to be generally implemented with sufficient success. It is obvious that the presidential elections held in Uk- raine had only to cover and camouflage the transfer of power. It was this power transfer failure process that analysts called a revolution.3 In the theories which by the causes and nature of revolutions are explained, it is usually emphasized that their development (success or failure) is determined by a combination of internal (structural) and external (impact of international environment) factors. A similar explanation is attempted in the case of the events in Ukraine. For example, Dimitrij Trenin claims that bourgeois democratic revolution in Ukraine could not be prompted by the impact of the external factor alone: influence from the West or errors by the Kremlin. Important internal causes also existed: Kuchmas ambition to retain power at all costs, regime crisis, splitting of the political elite, tactics correctly chosen by the opposition, mobilization of the middle class in Kiev, impact by the mass media, and finally the inability of the regime to resort to coercion and neutralize opposition leaders.4 A similar explanation only dubbed the Orange Revolution is presented in studies of Western analysts. They emphasize that the revolution in Ukraine was a continuum of democratic revolutions in Central Europe and later in Serbia and Georgia. Essentially they can be considered as a rebellion of societies, albeit peaceful, against corrupt, undemocratic regimes.5 Below we will discuss several structural factors which, in our opinion, had a significant impact on the dénouement of the revolutionary political crisis in Ukraine.

3 Pipes R., In Borderland. The Struggle for UkraineNational Review, December 27, 2004, p. 20. 4 Tpeíèí Ä., Bíeøíee âìeøaòaòeëücòâo â coáûòèÿ ía Yêpaèíe è Poccèécêo-Çaïaäíûe oòíoøeíèÿ, Mocêoâcêèé öeíòp Kapíeãè. Ápèôèíã, 2nd ed.,vol.7, 2005, p. 1-6. 5 Karatnicky A., Ukraines Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2005, vol.84 Issue 2. 148 1.1. Internal premises of the regime transformation

1.1.1. Pluralism of the political regime

Without denying the circumstance that Leonid Kuchmas regime was undemocratic, it would be necessary to point out that it remained sufficiently pluralistic and open. In other words, the opposition, though restricted through administration measures, enjoyed relatively adequate conditions of political activity. This circumstance enabled various, frequently ideologically opposing parties and organizations, essentially united under the sole objective a change of Kuchmas regime to rally around the popular ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko removed from office by Kuchma in 2001. Thus the block Our Uk- raine consisting of ten political parties and organizations was created. The nucleus of the block electorate was Western and partly consisted of Central Ukraine. Within the spectrum of political parties and organizations Our Ukrai- ne made efforts to take over the niche of pro-Western political force. The positions of the movement Our Ukraine became stronger when it was joined by the Yulia Tymoshenko-led coalition of political parties. Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were ex-members of close-to-Kuchma power nomenclature. (Ty- moshenko belonged to one of the branches of the Dnepropetrovsk Clan headed by the then Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko.) However later they became estranged from the regime and eventually turned their fight against Kuchma and the so-called oligarchic power system into the utmost goal of their political struggle. This alliance of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko proved very productive during the presidential elections in Ukraine; both leaders of the anti-Kuchma opposition supplemented each other well: Yushchenko demonstrated a more moderate, evolutionary line whereas Tymoshchenko a more radical and revolutionary one. In general, about in the middle of 2004, two political blocks competing between themselves and representing two different visions of country development were definitely created in Ukraine. The first one was a power-opposing Yushchenko and Tymoshenkos tandem with Our Ukraine rallying around it, and the second block united behind the Kuchma-supported aspirant to the presidential office, the Head of the Ukrainian Government Viktor Yanukovych and the political block For the United Ukraine led by him. The basis of this political alliance was the Party of Regions representing the interests of Donetsk industrialists. If Yushchenko and political forces supporting him represented themselves as a rather pro-Western force, Yanukovych and political institutions standing for him were for closer relations with Russia. Generally creation of two sizeable political blocks or alliances, declaring opposite directions of country development, politicizes and polarizes society and in this sense produces preconditions for a revolutionary situation.6

6 Tilly Ch., European Revolutions 1492-1992, Blackwell, 1993, p.29-51. 149 It is also important to note the circumstance that Ukraine under Kuch- mas presidency remained not only pluralistic but also open to influences of Western democratic organizations. This circumstance played a very important role during the presidential elections.7 The presidential elections, particularly the second round of voting was under scrutiny of an unprecedented number of observers from various foreign democratic organizations and institutions. It was their assessment of the election results that shaped the overall attitude of the West (the EU and the USA) and the Ukrainians themselves to the second round of voting at the presidential elections as being not transparent, undemocratic and rigged. Finally, in Ukraine, primarily in major cities, particularly Kiev, civil organizations (e.g. Pora) functioned actively with the main aim to oppose the ambitions of the power to legitimize fraudulent elections.

1.1.2 Peculiarities of Oligarchic Politics

In analyzing peculiarities of the Ukrainian political system and deficit of democracy characteristic of it, it is often stated that the shortage of democracy is also determined by direct merging of large business-financial or in other words oligarchic groups with political power. Without deeper discussing this assumption we will note that around the year 2000 a crisis of the oligarchic system emerged consequently leading the country to the revolutionary transformation of the regime. In Ukraine several major oligarchic groups competing among themselves for influence on the supreme political power are generally singled out. They are the Dnepropetrovsk group (L. Kuchmas son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk belongs to it), the Kiev group (the most influential representative of this group Viktor Med- vedchuk was also the Head of Kuchmas administration), the Donetsk group led by Rinat Akhmetov was also closely linked with Yanukovych. Apart from these largest oligarchic groups Ukraine hosted a lot more of smaller, politically and economically not so influential groups and informal unions. Overall growth of the Ukrainian economy made premises for the formation of such smaller groups.8 At first the influence of these groups was more manifested in regions. For example, one of the main financial Yushchenkos supporters Piotr Poroshenko had strong economic and political positions in the western part of Ukraine. Having consolidated their influence in regions such groups and their leaders became dissatisfied with the closed oligarchic system which increasingly hindered the development of their business and political influence. The presidential elections created political possibilities for such groups to gain more influence in the centre of the political system and this had to open new possibilities for the development of their business.

7 Chand k. , Democratisation from the outside in: NGO and international efforts to promote open elctions, Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no.3, 1997, p. 543-550. 8 In 2002 the GDP of Ukraine increased 5.2 per cent, in 2003 already 9.4 per cent, and in 2004 12.5 per cent. Overall from 1999 to 2004 the GDP of Ukraine doubled. See Karatnycky (note 5) p.87. 150 Another feature of the oligarchic system crisis was linked to changes in the role of the president. Within the Ukrainian oligarchic system, the president de facto played the role of a coordinator or intermediary of interests among different groups. Until the beginning of 2000, Kuchma succeeded in executing these functions; he was both a sufficiently active and strong president, able to at least formally keep a certain distance from oligarchic groups. However, around 2000- 2001, the prestige of the president and confidence in him deteriorated and, in turn, his actual power decreased. This was prompted by political scandals (G. Gonga- dze assassination) and practically completely transparency-lacking privatization which caused discontent of smaller business groups and society in general. Thus the oligarchic system based on presidents balancing between largest business groups hit a critical stage. (In 2004 L. Kuchmas popularity completely deteriorated, only 3 percent of the population had confidence in him.) Seeking security, primarily protection of his own interests, Kuchma was forced to more closely adhere to one oligarchic group, thus still further increasing discontent and pressure from the society. The object of public criticism and discontent became not only the person of the president, one or another oligarchic group, but the entire system. Opposition forces made good use of this situation, presenting themselves as fighters against the corrupt oligarchic political and economic system.

1.1.3 Regionalization and politics

The course of the presidential elections demonstrated that regional specificity of the country, geopolitical orientation, and gravitation of Ukrainian regions have considerable implications on the choices and behaviours of the electorate. Throughout the three rounds of the presidential elections Yushchenko was granted the greatest support in western regions of Ukraine, whereas Yanu- kovych in the eastern and southern parts.9 Therefore, in our opinion, of no less importance for a successful revolution was the fact (which from the geopolitical point of view most probably played a decisive role) that Yushchenko and his supporters gained victory in the central Kiev region and in the capital of the country itself. Data for comparison: during the three election rounds in Kiev region Yushchenko collected 59.72, 76.36, 82.70 percent of vote respectively while in the city of Kiev itself respectively 62.3, 74.36, 78.37 percent.10 This circumstance helped the opposition not only to rapidly mobilize its supporters and execute mass resistance actions, but was also unexpected for Yanukovych who found himself in complete isolation in the country capital and could neither perform his functions effectively nor assemble his supporters.

9 Data of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine. See www.cvk.goua/pls/vp2004/ wp0011, 2005 02 14. 10 Ibid. 151 1.2. Orange Revolution and Geopolitics

Yet in explaining the dénouement of the political crisis in Ukraine, the influence of external factors i.e. geopolitical causes of the Orange Revolution are most often emphasized. First of all it is claimed that Ukraine, having found itself at the particular junction of geopolitical interests of the West and Russia, was affected by both the influence of the West as well as Russia and also in the participation in the elections. The West, first of all the USA, and Russia had their preferred candidates. The West acted more effectively and therefore, won thus consolidating their influence in the western part of the CIS and dealing a severe blow to Putins regional ambitions. On the basis of such geopolitical logic Yushchenkos election was often interpreted in Russia as a special operation well planned and executed by the West.11 Even disagreeing with such reasoning typical of the logic of the conspiracy theory, it would be necessary to acknowledge that the external impact or a sharper competition in Ukraine between the West and Russia was an important factor that influenced the political crisis and its dénouement in Ukraine. We believe that this happened due to several key reasons. First, the West (rather the USA) and Russia considered the presidential elections in Ukraine as strategically significant i.e. capable of determining further geopolitical orientation of the country. Second, with respect to Ukraine the most important external actors (the USA, the EU and Russia) followed different policies. Putin, taking advantage of the elections, sought to directly strengthen Russias influence in Ukraine whereas the West aimed at accelerating democratization processes in Ukraine and thus expanding their influence. Third, it is necessary to have in mind that the so-called overlapping of interests of Western institutions and Russia in the CIS space is a dynamic process, which predetermines a continual competition. True, because of mutual interests it does not escalate into direct conflicts. Conse- quently both the West and Russia, by making use of internal political conjuncture of the countries, are attempting (and will attempt in the future) to compete for influence in them.

1.2.1 Putins Ukrainian Project

It is possible to state that the Kremlin tried to exploit the presidential elections in Ukraine as a means of consolidating Russias influence in Ukraine and accelerating formation of the United Economic Space (UES) framework. The establishment of such a structure would have not only strengthened Moscows positions in the post-Soviet CIS space, but what is still more important would have increased Putins international prestige.

11 Turbakov I., Wanted:Compatative and Attractive Social Model to Help Russia Retain its Crumbling Sphere of Influence, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2. Issue 10, (January 14) 2005; Æoâep Â., Òâopöû peâoëþöèé, www.archipelag.ru 2005 05 27; Øaéxyäèíoâ P., Äeìoêpaòèÿ â ycëoâèÿx cïeöoïepaöèè: êaê yáèòü ãocyäapcòâo, www.archipelag.ru 2005 05 27. 152 While the attitude of Kazakhstan and the more so that of Belarus to the UES project was in essence positive, the official Kiev hesitated and manoeuvred for a long time expecting to gain concessions from the West. However, as early as 2003, Kuchma enhanced his cooperation within the format of the UES organization. Cooperation within the framework of the UES also provided for establishment of joint political bodies. It is obvious that deepening of economic and eventual political integration would have finally isolated Ukraine from Western institutions. It seemed before the elections that Moscows calculations, which were favourable for its completion of the presidential election campaign, had a very solid political, economic and social basis. The Ukraine enjoyed a presence of strong business groups and political forces, maintaining close relations with Russia, a significant part of Ukrainian population considered relations with Russia or with the union of Slavic states a priority. The Kremlin had good informational and financial possibilities to influence the election process and finally, in the fall of 2004, personal popularity of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine was indeed great (he was considered to be the most popular politician12 ). In the Kremlins opinion the international situation for expanding its influence in Ukraine was favorable: the USA was busy with the presidential elections and the war in Iraq, and the EU with the integration of new members and Constitution adoption issues. When evaluating the strategic importance of the elections and available resources, the Kremlin decided on a sufficiently simple policy to support one possibly more preferable candidate. In the program speeches the candidate to the presidents post Yanukovych promised to denounce Ukraines objective to become a member of NATO, offered to grant the Russian language the status of the official language and to introduce a double citizenship.13 An unconcealed favour for this candidate was demonstrated by the official mass media of Rus- sia. The president of Russia himself manifested his personal support for the candidate by visiting Kiev at least twice and communicating exceptionally with Yanukovych (later, after the second round, Putin even congratulated him with the victory though official results of the presidential elections had not been announced yet14 ). At the same time Russia rejected the possibility to cooperate with Yushchenko. (It is asserted that as early as spring of 2004 Yushchenkos staff tried to establish personal contacts with Putin yet the Kremlin did not respond to this initiative.15) This might have been influenced by the circumstance that Moscow perceived Yushchenko as a candidate preferred by the West. Therefore, it is completely understandable that Yushchenkos victory was interpreted in Moscow as a strategic, geopolitical and finally personal defeat of the president of Russia Vladimir Putin. First, a real threat to the UES project favoured by Russia and alongside it to the dominance of Moscow in the CIS

12 Trenin (note 4) p.2. Ìoøec A., Äâoéíoe pacøèpeíèe è poccèécêo-yêpaèícêèe oòíoøeíèÿ, Ìocêocêèé öeíòp Kapíeãè. Ìeæäy Bocòoêoì è Çaïaäoì. Yêpaèía è Áeëopycèÿ ía Eâpoïeécêoì ïpocòpaícòâe, Ìocêâa, 2003, p.12-16. 13 Yêpaèía âûáèpaeò ïpeçèäeíòa è ìecòo ía êapòe ìèða, www.korespondent.ua 2004 10 04 14 Zarakhovich P., Calabresi Y., etc. The Orange Revolution, Time, 06 12 2004. 15 Trenin (note 4) p. 2. 153 space emerged. Second, the presidential elections campaign in Ukraine and its finale demonstrated that Russias influence in the CIS region keeps weakening. In other words, the new model of CIS countries integration (UES), put forward by the Kremlin, loses competition against cooperation forms suggested by the West. Third, the political crisis in Ukraine demonstrated incompetence of both the Kremlin and the president of Russia himself. Though apparently enjoying more favourable conditions of operation in Ukraine, Moscow failed to properly exploit them. Eventually, Putin was forced to pull back and agreed on the crisis management scenario presented by the West to arrange a second run-off election round.

1.2.2 The West and the Democratization Project of Ukraine

Essentially the West (rather the USA than the EU) also considered the elections as strategic, i.e. capable of influencing not only the perspectives of the development of Ukrainian state or Russias dominance in the CIS region, but also relations between the West and Russia in general. We think that the West (first of all the USA) were apprehensive about both the Kremlins ambitions to strengthen its influence in Ukraine or consolidate the dominance in the CIS and changes in Russias home policy. Putins attempts to expand presidential powers, strengthen the power vertical became increasingly assessed in the West as a withdrawal from democracy. The West, first of all the USA, and also the new EU members shared the attitude that such internal tendencies in Russia as well as Moscows ambitions to consolidate its influence in Ukraine meant no other than attempts of the Kremlin to restore its dominance in the entire Central East region of Europe. In Washingtons opinion, development of such tendencies would destabilize the situation among the new EU and NATO members which in its turn would pose a threat not only to Euro-Atlantic relations, but eventually could considerably strengthen the tendencies of the establishment of continentalism in Europe. Alongside strategic and geopolitical arguments shaping the attitude to the elections in Ukraine, an ideological imperative was also present democratization of the post-Soviet space. The establishment of democracy could contribute not only to Ukraines stabilization and thus make premises for its integration with Western institutions, but could also have an overall positive, stabili- zing impact on the entire region of Central East Europe. Therefore, it is completely understandable that Washington, notwithstanding the Iraq crisis, got involved in the presidential elections in Ukraine. True, officially George W. Bushs administration supported not a single candidate (unofficially Yushchenko) and were for the organization of transparent, fair and democratic elections expecting, in case of such elections, Yushchenko to win. According to reports of the USA State Department to Congress, Washing- ton had been following this very strategy since the beginning of 2004.The main financial support was allotted to non-governmental mass media, various Ukrai- 154 nian Non-Governmental Organizations that had to guarantee election transparency. Washington directly allotted a lot of means to maintain observers. By the way, the major part of the American support in general was assigned from and through various non-governmental funds and organizations, the primary task of which was to promote development of democracy in the post-Soviet space. According to the State Department approximately 13.8 million dollars was assigned for these causes in 2004.16 With approaching elections, the USA started more actively pressing the official Kiev to guarantee fair elections. At the beginning of October 2004, the House of Representatives adopted a special resolution on Ukrainian elections demanding the official Kiev to ensure fair and honest elections.17 In the middle of October and in November, the State Department made several statements regarding the elections in Ukraine warning the Ukrainian authorities of the consequences of violations. It was for the observation of the elections that the White House sent the Senator Richard Lugar to Kiev. By the way, after the second round of elections (22 November), the Senator stated that the Ukrainian authorities were involved into the forgery of election results and were incapable of ensuring honest elections. Finally, on 25 November, the USA State Secretary Collin Powell, on the basis of conclusions by various international (first of all OSCE mission) and Non-Governmental Organizations that observed the elections and reported numerous violations, stated that Washington would not acknowledge the election results in Ukraine. The EU made a statement albeit less strict on the same day. According to the then EU Chairman, the Prime Minister of Holland Jan Peter Balkenende, the presidential elections did not reflect wishes of the Ukrainians. When mass protest actions of Yushchenkos supporters started, Was- hington applied further pressure on the official Kiev warning it not to use force against protesters, to start negotiations with the opposition and urged it to organize genuinely democratic elections. The attitude of the EU was essentially the same. (On 1 December, Balkenende reiterated to Putin the same demands as Washing- ton had done.) Doubtless such principled commonness of the EU and the USA positions made Ukrainian authorities seek compromise in political decisions and negotiate with the opposition. Eventually, on 3 December, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the decision of the Central Election Commission on the victory of Yanukovych and announced that a second run-off round of the presidential elections would be held. It was namely this that the opposition had demanded. This Court decision was also welcomed by Washington. On 26 December, a second run-off presidential election watched by approximately 12 thousand observers was arranged. Yushchenko collected 52 per cent of vote and Yanukovych 44 per cent. Yushchenko won in 17 regions in Western and Central Ukraine and Yanukovych in 10 southern and eastern regions.

16 Tefft J., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Testimony Before the House of International Relations Committee, December 7, 2004. 17 The George Marshall Fund of US in co-operation with Center for European and Internatio- nal Studies, Kiev, Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Community: Startery Dialogue. Summary Report of the First Session, Kiev, 24-26 09 2004. 155 1.2.3 Regional actors: the tandem of Poland and Lithuania

Though the West agreed that it was necessary to regulate the crisis in Ukraine by political peaceful means, the actual decision on how to resolve the political situation was proposed by Poland and supporting it was Lithuania, the new EU members and Ukraines neighbours. It should be pointed out that in the beginning Brussels did not demonstrate greater enthusiasm to get directly involved into the crisis management. (Researchers even note that formal EU foreign policy mechanisms did not play their role in resolving the crisis: the EU Trio (Troika) did not participate in this process at all and the then chairing Holland played a secondary role.18 ) Only after long-lasting persuasions by War- saw, Javier Solana agreed to ask the leaders of some EU states about their attitude towards sending an EU mission to Ukraine. It seems that the German Chan- cellor gave the idea his reserved agreement whereas the attitude of the president of France was more sceptical. However, Polands initiative was supported by Washington.19 The initiative and participation of the new EU and NATO members Poland supported by Lithuania in crisis management were important in several aspects. First, participation of foreign mediators (apart from the Presi- dent of Poland Kwasniewski, the President of Lithuania Adamkus, the mediation mission was performed by Solana and the Chairman of Russian Duma Gryslov) strengthened the conviction that the political crisis could be settled peacefully, without bloodshed. Second, the activeness and initiative of Poland and Lithuania indicated that the new EU members could make a substantial practical contribution to the Eastern policy of the EU. Finally third, foreign mediation again demonstrated limited possibilities of Russia to resolve political conflicts in the CIS space. The plan, suggested by Warsaw and Vilnius for management of the political conflict (other mediators finally also supported it), was a compromise coordi- nating interests of both conflicting parties: to organize a second run-off round of the presidential elections and make amendments to the law on elections. An agreement on the principles of the political reform was also made at the same time. The essential provision of the planned political reform was to decrease presidential powers and influence in the political system of Ukraine and to strengthen the powers of the Parliament and the Head of the Government. These suggestions satisfied both Yanukovych and Yushchenko as well as laid the groundwork for the democratization of the Ukrainian political system. (The political reform should come into effect after the elections to the Rada in March 2006.)

18 Gromadzki G., Sushko O., Vahl M., Wolczuk R., Will the Orange revolution bear fruit? EU- Ukraine relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006. Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2005, p. 15. 19 Áocaöêèé M., Âoéöexoâcêèé M., Çaêyëècíaÿ ècòopèÿ peâoëþöèè, http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/218911/html 15 04 2005. 156 2. In the Aftermath of the Orange Revolution: Perspectives of the New Foreign Policy

Literature analyzing Ukrainian security and foreign policy usually points to the fact that Yushchenkos victory formed preconditions for a more pro-Western foreign policy of Ukraine.20 The new President of Ukraine himself tried to confirm such preconditions made by analysts. On 26 January 2005, during his visit in Strasbourg and speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the EC, Yushchenko emphasized that the main objective of the countrys foreign policy was to join the EU. On February 22, at the NATO summit in Brussels he stated that foreign policy of Ukraine had two priorities: to integrate both into the EU and NATO. However, the implementation of this policy is connected with several dilemmas. First, Ukraines aspiration to accelerate its integration into the West might cause tension in the East. In other words, while pursuing the policy of integration into the West, Kiev would inevitably aggravate its relations with Russia, and this aggrava- tion of relations with Moscow can block out Kievs pro-Western policy. Second, Wes- tern institutions are neither politically nor ideologically ready to propose to Ukraine a faster plan of integration. The internal indecisiveness of the West, reluctance to aggravate relations with Moscow and, ultimately, the objective fact that Ukraine is not prepared for the integration influence this. In other words, after the Orange Revolu- tion, Kiev will have long to face the inertia that is typical of the West with regards to Ukraine. This circumstance can weaken the support of the Ukrainian society for the pro-Western orientation of the new authorities and push the elite in power towards the multi-vector policy which was characteristic of Kuchmas term in office. (By the way, sociological polls indicate that the support of society for the countrys membership in NATO, for example, remains fairly inconsiderable.21) In our opinion, the ability of the new Ukrainian authorities to deal with these dilemmas will depend on internal and external circumstances. The internal circumstances are whether the bloc of Yushchenko and Y.Timoshenko will manage to consolidate political forces and win the elections to the Supreme Rada in 2006. The victory of pro-Western and democratic forces would be a signal to the West that political and economic reforms will be carried out. At the same time, this would also imply the continuum of the pro-Western foreign policy course. The external circumstances cover the stance Moscow and the West are going to take in respect of the new Ukrainian authorities and the policy they are going to pursue.

20 Kuzio T., From Kuchma to Yushchenko. Ukraines 2004 Presidential Elections and the Oran- ge Revolution, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.52, no.2, March/April 2005, p.29-42. 21 Shamsur O., Ukraine between the Major International Players, roundtable seminar Neigh- boours or Relatives? organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Embassy of Finland in Ukraine, Kiev, 04 26 2005. In general, throughout Ukraine, the support of the population for NATO is well under 20 per cent. For example, according to the data of the polls conducted at the beginning of 2005, only 15 per cent of the Ukrainian population are for joining the Alliance, while 48 per cent are strongly against. See: Gorska A., NATO mowi tak Ukraine, Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich. Komentarze, Warszawa, www.osw.pl 2005 10 27. 157 2.1. The September Crisis of the Government and the New Political Situation in the Country

Unfortunately, already in September 2005, the tandem of Yushenko and Timoshenko broke up. At the beginning of September, supporters of the Head of the Government made allegations of corruption against politicians close to Pre- sident Yushchenko (first of all, against Piotr Poroshenko). Eventually, the Presi- dent decided to announce the dissolution of the Timoshenko Government and part with some of his political associates. Thus, the political bloc of Timoshenko formed opposition to the President. This circumstance only further aggravated the political crisis in the country. The Rada approved the new Head of the Go- vernment Yurij Yechanurov only on 22 September. Yechanurov was approved only after the Yanukovich-led Party of Regions supported his candidacy. (The first time, Yechanurov lacked deputies votes.) Seeking to get out of the political crisis and form the Government, Yushchenko signed an agreement with Yanu- kovich according to which the new authorities pledged not to judicially perse- cute Yanukovichs supporters. This pact led to the formation of the Government and, consequently, stabilization of the situation in the country; however, at the same time it divided the ranks of the supporters of the Orange Revolution. Actu- ally, it became clear that Yushchenko and Timoshenko would go to the Rada elections in March 2006 in separate political blocs. This circumstance adds to Yanukovichs prospects for winning the Rada elections. True, gaps between the main political forces in the would-be Rada should not be significant and this can cause difficulties in the formation of a stable government.22 It can be assumed that an unstable government with a narrow majority will not be capable of carrying out necessary, yet often painful economic and social reforms, or propose ambitious pro-Western integration projects. It is possible to maintain that the winners of the Orange Revolution did not manage to take an effective advantage of their victory. Their words often differed from their actions. In fact, no structural reforms were being made in the country, the fight against corruption was not effective enough, there were no administration, court reforms, due to the constant and contradictory statements made by representatives of the authorities concerning re-privatisation, the countrys investment conditions deteriorated, the Government did not keep its pro- mises given to the main supporter of the Orange Revolution small and medium business. In essence, the Timoshenko Government continued the policy of its

22 Surveys indicate that the Party of Regions led by Yanukovich has the strongest possibilities to win the coming Rada elections. Approximately 20 per cent of electors would vote for it. Our Ukraine, whose Chairman of Honour is Yushchenko, would get 12.5 percent of votes. The bloc led by Timoshenko would win approximately the same number of votes. In total, three more parties can expect to exceed the 3 per cent barrier: Communists led by Simonenko 6.2 per cent, Morozs Socialists 5.7 per cent and the National Party headed by the Chairman of the Rada Vladimir Litvinov 3.4 per cent. The sociological survey was conducted by an independent Razumkov Economic and Political Research Centre during the political crisis in the country. See: Îïðîñ: íà âûáîðàõ â áëèæàéøåå âðåìÿ ïîáåäèëà áû Ïàðòèÿ ðåãèîíîâ, www.korrespondent.net 2005 10 20. 158 predecessor Yanukovich: he had increased pensions before the Presidential elections, and Timoshenko came up with as much as 57 per cent of the pay rise to state employees. In general, the economic policy she chose to pursue was assessed by analysts as socialist and populist23. It did not take long for the results of such policy to manifest themselves: the economic situation of the country started considerably deteriorating. If in 2004 the rise of the GDP was 12 percent, in the spring of 2005 it dropped to 5 per cent, whereas the inflation grew 15 percent. In the autumn of 2005, the increase of the GDP went down to 3.7 percent.24 Economic recession became obvious in different fields ranging from agriculture to building industry. The economy of the country was in severe oil, meat, sugar and similar crises. Negative social and economic processes undermine confidence in Yushchenko and his new Prime Minister. (According to opinion polls, about 50 percent of Ukrainians think that after the elections of Yushchen- ko as President, their living conditions have deteriorated, and only 11.5 percent think that they have improved.25) It is hardly probable that the new Head of the Government would manage to fundamentally change the economic and social tendencies in the country which implies that the forces striving to retaliate for their loss in the presidential elections of 2004 have rather favourable conditions for that. In fact, it is not yet clear whether they will be able to make political capital out of the dissatisfaction of the major part of the population with their social and economic situation. What is more, certain signs of optimism can already be witnessed in the economic space of Ukraine. The new authorities succeeded in efficiently and transparently completing the case of re-privatisation of Krivojriþstal: a foreign investor paid an impressive price of 24 mln. grivnas, or 4.8 million US dollars for this plant. (It should be noted that in 2004 the Ukrainian budgetary revenue made up 70 million grivnas.) In sum, it can be stated that after the splitting of the coalition of Yushchen- ko and Timoshenko, the political situation in the country became complicated. The possibilities of all key political groups in the Rada elections in March became, in essence, equal.

2.2. Perspectives of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Until about the spring of 2005, it was likely that the Kremlin would pursue a moderate policy regarding its relations with Ukraine. This strategy is based on the assumption that Kievs integration into Western institutions is, at least in the immediate future, hardly possible, whereas economic, social and

23 Àñëóíä À., Ïðåäàòåëüñòâî ðåâîëþöèè, http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/222224.html 2005 05 18; Êîõåí À., Óêðàèíå ïîðà ïåðåñìîòðåòü ñâîþ ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ ïîëèòèêó, http:// www.inosmi.ru/translation/222224.html 2005 08 16; DAnieri P., What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of Orange Revolution, Problems of Post- Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 2005, p. 82-91. 24 Íàéäåíîâ Â., ×þäà íå áóäåò, http://www.grani.kiev.ua/ 2005 09 01. 25 Ïî÷òè ïîëîâèíà óêðàèíöåâ ñ÷èòàåò, ÷òî ïðè Þùåíêî îíè ñòàëè æèòü õóæå, www.rosbalt.ru 2005 10 20. 159 cultural positions of Russia in Ukraine remain fairly strong despite the pro- Western course declared by Yushchenko. Therefore, it would be inexpedient for Moscow to escalate the political situation in Ukraine. On the contrary, attempts should be made to maintain good neighbourly relations, and this would eventually strengthen political ties between Moscow and Kiev. This tendency surfaced immediately after the political crisis during the first meeting of Putin and Yushchenko on 24 January 2005 in Moscow. The meeting demonstrated that the Kremlin (by the way, similarly to Kiev) was not interested in escalation of the relations. At the meeting, the countries agreed to continue their economic cooperation and political dialogue. This policy was extended by Putins visit to Kiev on 19 March. During the visit, the President of Russia declared that Moscow and Kiev had to eliminate problems existing between the countries (in the original this phrase sounded more impressive zachistit problemy).26 It was important for Vladimir Putin to elucidate the perspectives of Ukraines participation in the UES, whereas for Yushchenko to find out whether Russia was ready to create a free-trade zone. No concrete agreements on the mentioned bilateral issues were made. True, in place of the inter- governmental commission, Kiev and Moscow agreed to establishing a Putin - Yushchenko commission which would consist of four committees: defense, international cooperation, economic cooperation and humanitarian issues.27 Trying to ensure the support of a part of the electorate (especially Russia- oriented) and trying not to aggravate its already rather complicated relations with Moscow, the official Kiev was pursuing a pragmatic policy regarding the UES. (By the way, an opinion was held in the West that in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian authorities would publicly declare their refusal to participate in the activities of the UES.) Yushchenko did not refuse to participate in UES activities, however tried to limit his participation in different ways. The fact that in the new Government of Ukraine there were politicians whose business interests are closely related to the United Economic Space also had an impact on the determination of the new authorities to maintain limited relations with the UES. Promoting the idea that Ukraine should take part in the UES, they, in fact, seek their own economic benefit. On the other hand, Kiev tends to more frequently emphasize that within the framework of the UES they are mostly interested in the development of bilateral relations with Russia. These tendencies were confirmed by the UES summit meeting held at the end of August in Kazan, the Russian Federation. During the meeting, Ukraine did not strain the situation, but prepared a dozen of various initiatives and tried hard to stress the importance of bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine.28 It should be noted that in the Kremlins stance regarding Ukraine there was yet another policy that could relatively be called revanchist. Its objective would be restoration of political influence in Ukraine and, in general, strengthening of Russias influence within the western part of the CIS. This policy was probably most clearly identified by Gleb Pavlovskij, a political consultant of

26 Ïóòèí çà÷èñòèò ðîññèéñêî-óêðàèíñêèå ïðîáëåìû, Èçâåñòèÿ, 2005 03 21. 160 the Kremlin. According to the analyst, Russian authorities had made a fatal mis- take in Ukraine because they were working with the political elite only, igno- ring the social factor, i.e. different non-governmental organizations. He claimed that after Yushchenkos victory, Moscow should more actively cooperate with institutions that were in opposition to the new regime, employing them for the implementation of its interests. (According to G. Pavlovskij: ... Mr. Yushchenko cannot be considered a person having exceptional rights to voice the interests of society, political and non-governmental organizations of Ukraine. 29) Thus, the immediate aim of Moscow would be to achieve that in the Rada elections in March 2004 pro-Russian forces that are in opposition to the new regime would win.30 The conflict between Yushchenko and Timoshenko, the mounting tension between political forces create conditions for Moscow to further intensify its policy in Ukraine. On the other hand, it seems that in their attempts to consolidate political positions, at least a part of the Ukrainian political elite are doing their best to take advantage of the Moscow factor (it is likely that as the elections approach, this will be done still more actively). This political logic is dictated by the conviction that in order to win the elections (primarily in the Russian regions of the country), it is necessary to ensure support from the Kremlin. Apparently, such or similar considerations prompted the ex-Prime Minister Timoshenko to almost secretly go to Moscow as well as induced the Public Prosecutors Department of Russia to drop the case against the ex-Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the most effective instrument of Russias influence in Uk- raine remains in the energy sector. The gas conflict that occurred between the countries at the end of 2005 and its consequences testify to this. The conflict not only ended in a not transparent agreement between Moscow and Kiev, but also gave rise to another political crisis in Ukraine. Political forces in opposition to Yushchenko in the Rada accused the Yechanurov Government of inability to negotiate with Russia and, on the grounds of the political reform that had come into force, dissolved it. Yanukovichs and Timoshenkos political blocs voted for the dissolution of the Government in corpore. So, the settlement of the gas conflict did not enhance President Yushchen- kos prestige, contradictions between the allies in the Orange Revolution became even sharper, while the positions of Yanukovich and the Party of Regions strengthened. In general, it can be stated that with the approaching elections to the Supreme Rada, Moscow consolidated its positions in Ukraine. On the other hand, in spite of whatever government will be formed after the Rada elections in March, it will be forced to resolve the issues of gas price and gas supply in the first place. (According to the agreement, the compromise price of gas for Ukraine is valid only until July 2006.) We suppose that it is the energy sector that in the nearest future will be the most important instrument of Russia in maintaining its political influence in Ukraine. 27 Ibid. 28 Þùåíêî:Óêðàèíà áóäåò ó÷àñòâîâàòü â ÅÝÏ, www.Korrespondent.net, 2005 08 22. 29 Sokor , Kremlin redefining policy in post-soviet space, Eurasia daily Monitor, February 8, 2005. 30 Even sharper in his attitude was a well-known representative of the Russian Eurasian geopolitical thought Aleksandr Dugin. According to him, the Kremlin should not only try to politically isolate Yushchenko, but also promote separatistic tendencies in the east of Ukraine. 161 2.3. Ukraine and the West: Towards Closer Integration?

It is usually claimed that before the Orange Revolution, Western institutions, especially the EU, considered relations with Russia within the CIS space a priority. Immediately after Yushchenkos victory, considerations whether there might be a turning point in the relations between the West and Ukraine were voiced. We might assume that similarly to Yushchenkos attitude towards the West, the attitude of the West towards Ukraine faces a dilemma: expanding and strengthening their cooperation with Ukraine, the EU and NATO are simultaneously trying to develop cooperation relations with Russia and would like the cooperation with Kiev not to complicate their relations with Moscow. In our opinion, the EU tends to give in to such political and geopolitical logic. Yet one should bear in mind that by no means the positions of all key institutions of the EU and member-states on the issue of cooperation with Ukraine and its membership in the Union coincide. Soon after the revolution, new members of the EU (primarily Poland) tried to raise the idea of Ukraines membership in the EU. (Scan- dinavian countries were also in favour of the development of closer relations with Ukraine.) The European Parliament actively supported the strengthening of cooperation with Ukraine. On 13 January 2005, the Parliament passed a special resolution providing for concrete measures for strengthening cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, implying a possibility of its membership in the European Union.31 It should also be stated that in their relations with Ukraine, the European Council and Commission took a far more cautious position. Although Brussels welcomed the new strategic choice of Ukraine to reform and democratize32, it was inclined to further slow down the Euro-integration enthusiasm of Ukraine and refused to treat Kiev as a potential member-state of the EU. First of all, Kiev was implicitly informed that it was too early to raise the membership issue or have discussions whether the EU door was open or closed. According to Benita Ferre- ro-Waldner, the Commissary of the European Commission of External Affairs, the EU could negotiate granting the status of privileged membership to Ukraine but not its membership in the EU. This stance of the EU was undoubtedly determined not only by and maybe not so much by the Kremlins response, but by important internal reasons, i.e. institutional indeterminateness of the European Union and objective non-preparedness of Ukraine. Therefore, it is completely understandable that the EU suggested that the new authorities of Ukraine should return to the idea of the Action Plan. In Brussels opinion, in this way the format of cooperation with Ukrai- ne would be defined for at least a three-year period and the irksome questions about Ukraines membership in the European Union could be avoided. The Action Plan was completed already in December 2004. It provided for key directions of the EU-Ukrainian cooperation, but did not refer to the perspec-

31 Gromadzki G., Sushko O., Vahl M., Wolczuk K., Will the Orange revolution bear fruit? EU- Ukrainian relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006. Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2005, p. 17-18. 32 Gromadzki G., Lopata R., Raik K., Neighbours or Relatives? Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish perspectives on the EUs policy towards its new Eastern neighbourhood. Draft paper, p. 26. 162 tive of the membership. True, taking into consideration democratic changes in Ukrainian politics and approving of them, the EU supplemented the EU Action Plan (31 January). The Action Plan was supplemented by measures that should further enhance cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. These supplements provide for granting the status of market economy to Ukraine, support for the membership in the WTO, liberalization of trade regime. Also foreseen is the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free-trade zone in 2006 and simplification of the visa regime. Although the Action Plan did not fully meet Kievs expectations, on 21 February 2005 the EU and Ukraine did sign it. Seeking to strengthen cooperation with the EU, the Government of Ukrai- ne established a post of a special vice-Prime Minister for the European integration and drew up a concrete schedule for the implementation of the Action Plan. At the same time, the officials of the new authorities point out that Kiev is still a long way off to the practical implementation of the schedule: the order of communication between different agencies and decision-making is not clear yet, they lack qualified personnel and, finally, there are apprehensions that practical performance of some part of homework in the sphere of Euro-integration will have a negative impact on the election results in March 2006.33 President Yushchenko has repeatedly spoken about the necessity to intensively perform homework. According to the President, in its attempt for the membership, his country must pass 350-400 new laws or their amendments, whereas membership negotiations should start only after the implementation of the Action Plan.34 No more significant changes in the relations between the EU and Ukraine are expected until the spring of 2006. True, on 1 December 2005, at the summit meeting of the European Union and Ukraine in Kiev, Ukraine was acknowledged as a market economy country. Support was expressed for as prompt as possible Ukraines membership in the WTO, which would enable to implement an important provision of the Action Plan: to proceed to negotiations on the establishment of a free-trade zone. It is not yet clear though when these negotiations could start. Political crises and other disagreements between different business groups prevented the adoption of documents necessary for joining the WTO. This implies not only that Ukraines Euro-integration schedule will have to be made more exact, but, what is more important, at the time of the elections President Yushchenko will not be able to boast of any concrete achievements concerning relations with the EU. The EU is likely to pursue a cautious policy in relations with Ukraine. The EUs position during the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine testifies to this assumption. The EU took, in essence, a neutral stance of non-involvement in the conflict and eventually congratulated Moscow and Kiev after they reached a compromise agreement. Referring to the nearest perspective concerning relations between the EU and Ukraine, it should be noted that mutual relations and cooperation enhancement will be influenced by the results of

33 Rybachuk O., Domestic Challenges to Ukraines Europeanisation, April 26, 2005, Kiev Roundtable seminar Neighbours or Relatives? organized by the Finnish Institute of Interna- tional Affairs in co-operation with the Embassy of Finland in Ukraine. 34 Þùåíêî óâåðåí î âñòóïëåíèè â ÅÑ, www.Korrespondent.net, 2005 05 13. 163 the elections to the Supreme Rada. With a possible victory of pro-Russian forces, the dialogue between Brussels and Kiev can lose dynamism altogether. In the analysis of the perspectives of the USA and NATOs relations with Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, several circumstances should be taken into account. First, within the Alliance there is no unanimous opinion regarding the perspectives of Ukraines membership. However, worth noting is the fact that from the formal point of view, joining NATO is not as complicated as joining the EU. Second, the issue of Ukraines NATO membership is complicated by the fact that the membership is supported by approximately 15-20 per cent of the Ukrainian population, whereas at the beginning of 2005, 44 per cent of the population was for membership in the EU. Third, it is necessary to point out that the USA supports Kievs aspirations to join the Alliance. This tendency came into light during President Yushchekos visit to the USA in April 2005.35 George W. Bush promised support to Ukraine in joining not only the WTO, but also NATO. (By the way, during Yushchenkos visit in Washington, intensive negotiations between highest military officials of both countries were taking place.) True, the Bush administration associates perspectives of cooperation with Ukraine with strengthening of democracy and free market development. The standpoint of the USA on enhancing cooperation between the Allian- ce and Ukraine was also reflected at an informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO countries that was held on 21 April 2005 in Vilnius where Ukrainian representatives also participated. At the same time, the NATO-Ukrai- nian Commission had a meeting in which an intensive dialogue with the Al- liance was suggested to Kievin October of the same year, during informal NATO- Ukrainian consultations held inVilnius, the USA Defence Minister Donald Rums- feld again supported the Ukraines aspiration to join the Alliance.36 After the meeting representatives of the Ukrainian authorities declared that next year the plan of Ukraines joining NATO (MAP) could be prepared and adopted.37 Also, the concrete date of joining the year 2008 came to be mentioned more often. (In fact, in Vilnius both parties agreed that both the efficiency of reforms being carried out in Ukraine and, of course, the results of the Rada elections would have an impact on the tempo of joining.) In our opinion, this policy of the USA is determined primarily by geopolitical logic: while strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, Was- hington is seeking to limit Russias influence not only in the western part of the CIS, but in Central and Eastern Europe in general. The same geopolitical reasons

35 On the eve of Yushchenkos visit to the USA an influential Republican political committee of the Senate released a special analytical note in which the Bush administration is urged to actively discuss the issue of Ukraines NATO membership, increase economic assistance to the country, etc. The document states that the future of Ukraine is important to the West from the standpoint of security, political and economic interests. See: Óêðèíôîðì, Óêðàèíöû çàñëæèâàeò íåìåäëåííîé ïîääåðæêè Àìåðèêè, 2005 04 04. 36 Ñèëèíà Ò., Ïîâåðü â ìå÷òó è â ïóòü, http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/, 2005 10 29 11 04. 37 Ibid. 164 make the USA take interest in the increasing role of Ukraine in the region. Unlike the EU, Washington actively backed up the attempts of Ukraine to revive the so- called GUUAM, an organization comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azer- baijan and Moldova. (After Uzbekistan left the organization, it became GUAM.) This tendency was also confirmed by the so-called Kishinev summit held on 22 April 2005, where alongside members of the GUAM, Presidents of Lithuania and Romania as well as representatives of the USA State Department took part. (It seems that trying not to complicate its relations with Russia that considered the GUAM to be a geopolitical project of the USA, the EC chose not to participate at the summit.) The issues dealt with at the summit meeting included strengthening of cooperation primarily in the field of energ: also, a special declaration was adopted stating that the ultimate goal of its signatories is the establishment of democracy in the Baltic-Black Sea Region. The USA gave active support to one more joint regional project of Ukraine and Georgia, i.e. the establishment of the Association of Democratic Choice (ADC). An idea to create such a body was first raised in August 2005. Formally, the organization was set up on 1-2 December of the same year, i.e. at the same time when the EU and Ukrai- ne summit meeting was held in Kie (Again, neither the EC nor the old members of the EU participated in setting up the association.) Alongside Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia took an active part in the establishment of the ADC. (Russia was also invited to participate in the activity of the organization, yet in the role of an observer.) All these countries delegated their presidents to the summit. The association announced that its goal was to promote democracy in the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea Region. In fact, the ADC was conceived by its founders as an alternative to the Russia-dominated CIS. In conclusion, it can be stated that the G. Bush administration grounds its policy in Ukraine mainly on a realistic perspective and geopolitical logic. Accor- ding to it, democratic and pro-Western Ukraine is considered a geopolitical factor that could balance Russias domination in Central and Eastern Europe. This fact would lead to the assumption that Washington will demonstrate more political activeness in Ukraine than the EU.

A Few Remarks in Lieu of Conclusions

It is possible to maintain that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was determined by both internal (the crisis of the oligarchic regime, the ability of the opposition to mobilize society, etc.) and external (the competition for the influence in Ukraine between the West and Russia revolutionized the society) circumstances. It is evident that democratization of the political system was the ultimate goal of the Orange Revolution. Therefore, it was supported by both a considerable part of the Ukrainian society and numerous supporters in the democratic West. The Orange Revolution not only predetermined the democratization of the political system of Ukraine, but also formed a perspective of qualitati- 165 vely new relations between Ukraine and the West. A pro-Western, Atlantic trend became increasingly dominant in Ukrainian foreign policy. The further, already post-revolution development of Ukraine demonstrated that the implementation of such a vector in foreign policy encounters various difficulties. First, seeking a closer cooperation with Western institutions, it was necessary to make economic and political reforms in the country. Second, in order to implement political and economic reforms, consent among the political elite as well as support for such reforms from at least a major part of society are required. It seems that the new political elite of Ukraine failed to achieve these and, in our opinion, principle goals. The situation got complicated by the splitting of the alliance between Yushchenko and Y. Timoshenko, decrease in the Presidents, clearly manifesting pro-Western line in foreign policy, influence within the political system and, finally, the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine which ended in an agreement far from being transparent. Assessing the situation in Ukraine, politicians and analysts often claim that the results of the Rada elections in March 2006 will be of utmost importance to further development of Ukraine, to the direction of its foreign policy. If Wes- tern forces won the elections, this would consolidate the achievements of the Orange Revolution and its new foreign policy direction; if, however, pro-Rus- sian forces won, changes in foreign policy would become inevitable. These considerations can be generally agreed with. Nevertheless, democratic, transparent, complying with Western standards elections in Ukraine will imply that the country is advancing according to the political development model different from that of Russia.

November 2005 National Security Issues in Lithuania 169 Vaidotas Urbelis* Institute of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Vilnius

Lithuanian Deterrence Strategy

The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the milita- rys capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.

Introduction

Deterrence strategy defines how military power is used indirectly to achieve ones national security objectives. Deterrence is aimed to prevent unwanted actions from other countries or non state actors. The popularity of deterrence was influenced by the experiences brought from World War II, the demoralized conventional wisdom of traditional war and the advance of nuclear bombs that made defensive strategies obsolete. Deterrence became prominent since from the first glance it rejected the traditional notion of war and softened war fighting and killing elements embedded into the concept of military conflict. Quite cynically, deterrence strategy even allowed certain countries to proclaim that their policy is not directed against other nations and is of a purely defensive nature. This explains why in strategic documents of most countries, including Lithuania, the concept of deterrence occupies the central place and forms the basis for force structure development. In Lithuania, the deterrence strategy was declared officially for the first time in the National Military Strategy approved by the State Defence Council in 2000 although its roots could be traced back to the concept of civil defence which was very popular in the first year after independence1 . The latest version of the National Security Strategy and the National Military strategy declare deterrence as one of the main strategic principles2 . The Lithuanian National Security Stra-

* Dr. Vaidotas Urbelis is a lecturer of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Vokieèiø 10, LT-2001 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2785206, e-mail: [email protected] 1 Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy, Vilnius: Leidybos centras prie KAM, 2000. 2 Lithuanian National Security Strategy, Vilnius: KAM Leidybos ir informacinio aprûpinimo tarnyba, 2005; Lithuanian Military Strategy, Vilnius, KAM Leidybos ir informacinio aprûpini- mo tarnyba, 2004. 170 tegy of 2004 emphasises: [Lithuanian deterrence strategy] relies upon the strengthening of the national defence system of the Republic of Lithuania and its military capabilities and on the principles of NATOs collective defence. A strong alliance is the most important factor of security of Lithuania, ensuring effective deterrence and in case of a direct threats a collective defence. NATO Strategic Concept emphasises that the Alliance does not foresee a threat of conventional military attack against its member states. However in the future Lithuanian and their Allies threat perceptions are subject to change. In the last decade threats to the world security, such as genocide or terrorism, came unex- pectedly. Nobody can predict what awaits the world in next decades. The NATO intelligence community cannot provide Lithuanian military planners with the exact list of future threats let alone in the conventional military area. Ten year ago Poland in Lithuania was conceived as the major strategic opponent, now it is the main strategic friend and a close ally in NATO and the EU. No doubt that after ten years the Lithuanian threat perception will be completely different from the present. New challenges will come from non state actors or non-governmental organisations what will not be linked to any of the existing states. New threats could arise sudden- ly therefore the Lithuanian deterrence strategy must remain flexible and able to respond to different challenges of military and non-military nature. Currently no country officially threatens Lithuania, although in neighbouring countries alarming tendencies can be noticed. The President of Belarus in public speeches frequently attacks NATO countries and organises military exercises within close proximity to Polish or Lithuanian borders. In most cases they coincide with elections and referendums in Belarus or NATO exercises in the neighbouring countries. For example in 2001 Belarus organised exercises - Neman 2001. According to their scenario, which was leaked to the press, Belaru- sian forces repulsed a Lithuanian and Polish attack and together with Russian forces occupied part of the NATO territory. During the exercise Berezina 2002 Belarusian forces crossed Berezina and launched attacks westward.3 Most Be- lorussian exercises have a double agenda peace operations for the public eyes and offensive military actions to demonstrate Belarusian and Russian military might and send strong political signals to NATO countries. The development of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy could be divided into several important phases before NATO membership and after it. Before 2004 Lithuania was seeking to deter its potential opponents, primary by using national assets. After becoming a member of NATO, the deterrence strategies of other NATO nations are extended to Lithuania. This article will present a comparison of both approaches to deterrence and highlight their weaknesses and strengths. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, political and other measures. Special attention will be given to effectives of extended deterrence in Lithuania. The methodology of such research suffers from several difficulties embed-

3 Stratfor, Russia: Hoping Military Exercises Speak Louder than Words to U.S. 2005 rugpjû- èio 8 d. http://www.stratfor.biz; Vaiceliunas A. Lithuanian membership in NATO and the EU: a Secure Future, Canadian Forces College, 2004, http://198.231.69.12/papers/nssc6/ vaiceliunas.htm, 01 06 2005. 171 ded into the concept of deterrence. Military force in the modern world is primarily used for indirectly. For this reason calculations of events that have never happened are difficult. Furthermore information containing such data is often classified and not accessible to outside observers. Strategic documents and official speeches rarely reflect real understanding of threat perception and its evaluation. Military planning frequently does not match political interpretation of threats. This article uses B. Buzans and E. Herrings understanding of deterrence, which is defined as making of military threats to prevent another actor from taking particular action. The deterrence concept assumes that states and non- state actors are at least semi-rational players that calculate the costs, risk, benefits, i.e. the behaviour that could be modified. Even terrorist organisations would fall into this category. Suicide bombers seem irrational from the first glance but they have clearly articulated objectives that are understandable from their perspective and normative system. All terrorist actions at the tactical level have at strategic level clearly formulated tasks and are understood as appropriate measure to achieve them. Deterrence strategy encompasses retaliatory and defensive elements. Deter- rence takes the assumption of rationality, in so far as the opponent is able to calculate or at least recognise relative costs and benefits. The determining factor for effective deterrence is whether the costs of the aggressors action will outweigh the benefits that he could expect to gain. The costs of aggression may vary from military losses to economical damage. Cost may be incurred by Lithuania, by its Allies or by the international community. The benefits may vary from national pride to seizure of territory. Political leaders always include into this equation implications of aggressive action for internal stability and survival of the ruling regime. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military capabilities to carry out their threat against potential aggressor, and the will to do so. Lithuanian defence planners must decide what kind of capabilities Lithuania must create in order to incur unacceptable costs for would-be aggressor. The use of these capabilities requires a creative psychological strategy, involvement of political leaders and the whole society. This article will provide an estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and will recommend direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. The cost and benefits equation will provide the general framework for analysis.

1. Military Capabilities the Core of Effective Deterrence

The ability to inflict costs using military and non-military means constitute the most important elements of the deterrence strategy. Lithuania can do it primarely using defensive means. A stout defence can fulfil the requirements of deterrence by displaying to potential enemies the huge costs needed to invade 172

the country4 . The deterrent can endorse this strategy by simply demonstrating or exercising his forces, but the promise to fight will be not credible unless he has real war fighting strategy5 . The deterrers objective is not simply to inform his opponents about his capabilities but impose the perception that he has the political will to fight hard and inflict costs upon the offender. Strategists distinguish two main ways how unacceptable costs upon the aggressor may be imposed: To inflict punishment on the opponent in response to an attack and to retaliate against him with offensive strike towards his territory by destroying his major cities, administration and industrial facilities. In this case even information about such ferocious plans may persuade potential aggressor to abstain from military action. This strategy is defined as deterrence by retaliation6 . Deter- rence by retaliation requires a state to have enough strength to fight the enemy back without putting to much attention to defensive means. To fight and prevent an opponent from achieving its objectives to hold and control states territory. In this case the deterrers task is to annihilate the opponents forces and break his will to fight. Marginot line in France or Manner- haim line in Finland were the primary examples of the strategy aimed at destroying opposing forces without carrying offensive actions into opponents territory. This strategy is called deterrence by denial. In military terms denial and defence have virtually identical meanings7 . In theory Lithuania can impose costs to potential aggressor in both ways although deterrence by retaliation seems a less likely scenario. Such a strategy would require acquiring substantial capabilities to strike into the enemys territory. Without weapons of mass destruction to implement such threats, for Lithu- ania it would be extremely difficult. Even conventional weapon systems that could be used for retaliation are outside the limits of the Lithuanian defence budget. The Lithuanian long term development plan approbed to the Parlia- ment by the Ministry of Defence foresees no acquisition of long range artillery, ballistic or cruise missiles, bombers, fighter aircraft or ships.8 Current capabilities of the Lithuanian armed forces allow it to act successfully on the home territory and participate in crises response operations, but it is not able to retaliate in case of attack. Similar situations exist in Latvia and Estonia. Baltic States can retaliate against potential aggressors only with non traditional means, e.g. organising acts of sabotage on the enemys territory or using other asymmetrical measures. Lithuanian abilities to conduct information operations, disrupt enemys chain of command, eliminate its leaders, and destroy lines of communication and computer networks may add to the effectiveness of

4 Buzan B., Herring E., The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, London: LynneRieners, 1998, p.136. 5 Osborne III G.K., The Nature of Deterrence. In J. Mearsheimer, ed., Conventional Deterrence, Toronto: Cornell University Press, 1985, p.10.. 6 Pierce A.C. The Strategic Defense Initiative: European Perspectives. In C. Kelleher, G.Mattox, ed., Evolving European Defense Policines, Lexington books, 1987, p.151. 7 Buzan B., Herring E., (note 5), p.135-136. 8 National Defence System Long Term Development Plan, http://www.kam.lt, 15 12 2005. 173 deterrence. All these capabilities are important but potential aggressor would start considering them only if he knows about their existence. Revealing these capabilities would allow potential aggressor to adapt military plans accordingly and decrease their deterrent value of strong defence. After NATO membership Lithuania obtained new means of retaliation military and non-military assets of her Allies. Their impact upon deterrence will be discussed in latter chapters. Before membership in NATO, the effectiveness of Lithuanian deterrence strategy was based not only on rough military power, i.e. the ability of the armed forces to execute effective defence, but also on the determination of all citizens to put up unconditional and unlimited armed and unarmed resistance. A potential aggressor was made aware that upon attacking he would encounter not only resistance from the armed forces, but the total defence from the whole nation, and will suffer heavy losses disproportionate to the desired result. This strategy rested upon several assumptions. Lithuanian defence planners thought, that: Lithuanian is too small to win a conventional war against more powerful nations; Lithuanian armed forces although small in size could resist and const- rain larger opponents for a certain period of time; Lithuanian population will resist aggressor by all available means and number of collaborators will be small; Resistance of civil population will last at least for a several years or maybe decades; Foreign countries will assist Lithuania by political, and maybe economic, but definitely not by military means; These assumptions were incorporated into Lithuanian strategic documents and defence plans. The Lithuania Military Strategy of 2000 declares that Lithuanian deterrence strategy is based upon total and unconditional defence: The essence of deterrence is defined by the concept that Lithuania will defend itself regardless of the nature of the aggression, the strength of the attacking forces and whether or not international assistance will be available. In case of an armed attack, Lithuania will prevent the adversary from achieving his goals to effectively control the territory of the State, its infrastructure and resources, and establish an occupation regime9 . Lithuanian deterrence strategy was aimed at convincing potential aggressors that Lithuania will not be able to occupy and control their country. Military occupation would require substantial costs, especially if one assumes that civilian resistance would last for decades. Informal study conducted by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence in 1999 estimated that to sustain a corps of 40 thousand occupational troops in Lithuania would cost 1 bln USD per year, control of all Baltic States would be approximately 1.8 bln USD.10 For potential aggressor to sustain such cost for many years could seem to be not an attracting

9 Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy, (note 2), p.9-10. 10 Atgrasinimo strategija II [Deterrence strategy II], Krato apsaugos ministerija, 1999. 174 alternative. Authors of nonofficial study suggested also considering effect of economic sanctions that would imply even higher costs for the potential aggressor. In making their plans, Lithuanian military planners acted on the estimation that Lithuania and other Baltic states are important militarily only on the regional not on the global scale. They assumed that just for the sake of occupying the Baltic States no country would be willing to be involved into a bigger crises. Only under exceptional circumstances in the case of renewed East West confrontation, could Lithuania become an object of primary importance. Lithuanian military planners rightly assumed that during military conflict in the region: Potential aggressor most likely would use only part of its resources, would seek limited objectives and would try to minimise costs of military actions; or Military conflict would be global, and actions of potential aggressor would be determined by the overall military balance, not by Lithuanian deterrence potential. From this analysis Lithuanian military planners concluded that probability of second scenario is extremely low, therefore Lithuania must concentrate its efforts to deter aggression with limited objectives. In such a scenario the Lithua- nian armed forces must be able to impose unacceptable costs and deny the potential aggressor the opportunity to control her territory. Defence requires fewer resources than offence; defender must possess at least one third of fighting power at any given point in the military theatre of actions11 . Lithuanian armed forces were tasked to restrain enemys freedom of action and deny him access to most populated areas. This would create time for total mobilisation and opportunities for reinforcement of regular forces. Lithuanian military planners understood that a would-be regional adventurer may decide to win at tolerable cost, before an outside power can intervene effectively. And that it has, or will have, the grand-strategic assets to hold on to its winnings. In other words, it expects to win the war, and then to win a peace. The adventurer may be quite wrong in these believes, but that does not matter for deterrence12 . In order to avoid such scenario Lithuania needs rapid reaction forces able to held potential aggressor and defend strategic objects and lines of communication. The Lithuanian Armed Forces development plans corresponded to these calculations. In 1998 Lithuanian Ministry of Defence planned to increase the active duty personnel in the armed forces up to 23 thousand in 2008, and up to 48 thousand in the next decades. Lithuanian military strategy of 2000 declared that: Regular Land Forces will include up to four combat brigades and one logistics brigade. One of the combat brigades will be prepared as a rapid reaction brigade. Each combat brigade of Regular Land Forces will usually be composed of three motorised or

11 Encyclopeadia Britannica. The Theory and Conduct of War. Conventional Strategy, http:/ /www.britannica.com/, 28 02 2005. 12 Gray C. Deterrence and Regional Conflict: Hopes, Fallacies, and Fixes, Comparative Strategy 17 (2), 1998, p.58. 175 mechanised infantry battalions and support elements. The Logistics brigade will consist of transport, supply, maintenance and medical battalions. Combat brigades will comprise elements of combat support (engineers, communications, etc.) and the attached combat service support units (transport, supply, maintenance, medical, etc.) from the Logistics brigade. Combat brigades and battalions will have air defence and artillery capabilities13 . In addition Lithuania planned to prepare about 100 thousand active reservist that would be able, in case of war, to augment the regular units. Such sizable Lithuanian armed forces supplemented by the police, border guard, Rif- lemens Union formations and also the local population would be able to wage successful guerrilla warfare. Lithuania also assumed that potential aggressors are typically not attracted by the promise of victory in a long guerrilla warfare - too much is uncertain and potential costs are too uncontrollable. A decision to undertake military aggression usually requires a perception that an option for rapid success exists. Given that a long war is a gamble, full of uncertainties and unknown and unanticipated dangers, decision-makers will ordinarily avoid starting a war unless they believe a quick victory is assured14 . Denial of ability to calculate cost is almost certain condition for deterrence to work. Lithuanian defence planners were seeking just that. What Lithuanian strategists emphasised is the importance of denying potential aggressors the ability to achieve a quick victory and control flow of events. Lithuanian threatened potential aggressors with a long guerrilla warfare, which by definition diminishes ability to calculate and control costs and creates situation of unpredictability and anarchy. The role of the National De- fence Volunteers (The Home Guard) was of utmost importance. Armed with light riffles volunteers were not able to fight on the modern battlefield but they were tasked with carrying out guerrilla actions. Lithuania hoped that tens of thousand volunteers would prevent aggressor from using her infrastructure, controlling transit roads and industrial facilities. Lithuanian deterrence strategy based on the concept of total und unconditional defence contained many weaknesses. First of all in order to deter it is not enough just to have capabilities. If the deterrer with defensive capabilities fails to communicate its capabilities on which deterrence rests, the offender could behave as if these capabilities do not exist. The conventional deterrer must reve- al critical information about its capabilities (armaments, mobilisation resources, personnel numbers and other information) while the potential aggressor does not. Such openness would expose Lithuanian defence plans and would allow aggressor to modify his plans accordingly. The defender is in a real dilemma: To deter, he must appear to be ex post superior, capable of executing his deterrent threats. But to really be ex post superior, he must keep most of his capabilities secret15 . The effectives of Lithuanias strategy was suffering from this weakness embedded in the logic of conventional deterrence.

13 Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy, (note 2), p.20. 14 Rhodes E. Review of Empirical Studies of Conventional Deterrence. Occasional Paper, Center for Global Security and Democracy, Rutgers University, 1999. http://www.ciaonet.org, 01 06 2005. 15 Ibid. 176 Secondly, such strategy was very expensive. Total defence principle requires preparing several hundred of thousand well trained reservist and volunteers, ammunition and armament storages, state mobilisation system able to convert civilian resources to military needs. On paper Lithuanian preparation for total defence received adequate allocations from the state budged in 1999 Lithuanian Parliament passed the Law promising from 2001 to allocate 2 percent of gross domestic product purely for defence purposes16 . Ministry of Defen- ce planned that in the following years defence budget would even reach 2.25 percent of gross domestic product. These plans have never been realised and defence budget never reached 1.5 percent. The Lithuanian total defence system always remained at the early stage of development and never came close to Finish, Swedish or Swiss model. Lithuanian mobilisation system has never been tested since legislative framework foresaw only total mobilisation in case of war and did not provide an opportunity to mobilise one district or municipality. Neither Lithuanian politicians nor potential aggressors really knew the real capabilities of the country to counter aggression. Thirdly, membership in NATO and the EU provided Lithuanian with the opportunity to assure effective deterrence using a more reliable and powerful means. Lithuania quickly found out that the concept of total defence is not compatible with a new understanding of collective defence. From 1999 NATOs Strategic Concept broadened the understanding of collective defence by including preventive measures outside NATOs territory. In order to fight new threats NATO is developing well trained expeditionary forces able to implement preventive measures and fight conventional war in case of attack against NATO. If Lithuania were to prepare its Armed Forces solely for self defence, it would become free rider inside NATO, the country that is able to enjoy NATOs security guarantees but not able to provide capabilities for the Alliance. Lithuania and other allies are not able at the same time to develop big territorial structures with huge amount of conscripts and to prepare themselves with the capabilities for the collective defence. Lithuania announced that priority will be given to capabilities that will strengthen collective defence. Lithuanian Armed Forces must be mobile and flexible, well trained, modern, deployable and sustainable. Guidance of the Minister of Defence for 2006 2011 clearly states that Lithuania will not invest into military units and capabilities designed for territorial defence that do not provide additional value to NATO17 . New guidance changed the conceptual framework of Lithuanian deterrence strategy denial elements are loosing importance and are being replaced by preventive deterrent measures.

16 The Law on the Financing Strategy of the Lithuanian National Defence System], 14 January 1999, Nr. VIII-1028, http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Condition1=71537&Condition2=. 17 Gudelines of the Minister of National Defence 2006 2011 m., Vilnius, KAM Leidybos ir informacinio aprûpinimo tarnyba, 2004, p.10 177 2. Military Capabilities Required for Extended Deterrence

The Lithuanian deterrence strategy experienced significant changes after the latest round of NATO and EU enlargement. NATO membership expanded the whole notion of national military capabilities now they include Allied forces. NATO and the EU have important economic, military and other tools that could be used against unfriendly countries or even non-state actors. Major challenge for deterrence provided by NATO and EU come from unreliability embedded in the concept of providing deterrence to the third countries (extended deterrence), in this case for Lithuania. To convince to the potential aggressor that a weaker state will use its military force for self defence is difficult but possible. To convince a potential aggressor that a third country will use military force for the benefit of the third nation is even more difficult. NATO countries agreed that if security guarantees will be extended to the Baltic States they must be strong and reliable. Weak security guarantees for the Baltic States could discredit the whole Alliance and would rise doubts about its commitment in other parts of the world. NATO has substantial advantage of military power in almost any part of the world but in the Baltic region this advantage is not so much obvious. Milita- ry strategist must always consider the worst case scenario Russia becomes antagonistic to the West and threatens the Baltic States with military force. In 1997 according to plans of Russian General staff the Baltic States could be occupied during the first stages of renewed global confrontation18 . In 1999 Russia started military reform of its armed forces with special attention given to the Ural and Western direction including Kaliningrad. Russia is creating smaller but more powerful and mobile military formations near the borders of NATO countries. In Kaliningrad two divisions were transformed into rapid reaction brigades. Similar tendencies could be observed in Belarus. Belarusian Armed Forces shrank in size but became more robust and effective. Major transformation started after exercises Neman 2001. Belarus was divided into two military districts West and North West with three rapid reaction brigades in each of them19 . Therefore reliable NATO security guarantees meant ability of the Alliance to assure effective defence under any scenario and coalition. Not surprisingly even in the beginning of 2002 most Western analysts were convinced that Lithuania will not be invited during the second round of NATO enlargement. For example, on 30 April 2002 the influential think-tank Stratfor published analysis called Baltic States membership in NATO unlikely. Stratfor argued that the military situation in the region prevents NATO from moving into the Baltics: Defending and reinforcing the region is difficult because of the regions broad front, limited depth and restricted lines of communication. In the event of war, the

18 National Defense University Strategic Assessment: Flashpoint and Force Structure, 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa97/sa97ch2.html, 01 06 2002. 19 Ïîëåâîé À. Â Áåëîðóññèè ðåôîðìèðóþò àðìèþ [Polevoj A. Belarus reforms her armed forces], Íåçàâèñèìàÿ Ãàçåòà, 25 October 2001. 178 Baltic States would need to be reinforced, as Russian forces would neutralize the Baltic States in their move to protect Kaliningrad and its port facilities. NATO would need to move reinforcements overland, because Kaliningrad would make air and sea re-supply difficult. The road networks, developed over years of Soviet rule, favour Moscow. Limited ability to reinforce the region would allow Russia to secure the Baltic States, leaving a large number of NATO troops waiting on the beach for rescue. 20 According to the Stratfor view, because of these vulnerabilities, any NATO security guarantee would be little more than a piece of paper. At most, NATO could offer a strategic deterrent - placing the Baltic States under the U.S. nuclear umbrella - but it is doubtful that Russia would believe the United States willingness to risk a nuclear confrontation over the Baltic States21 . The hypothetically worst case scenario was presented in greater detail at the study Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region prepared by the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). They concluded that should a worst-case scenario play out, the operational requirements for NATO and U.S. forces are likely to be similar to those that they would need in order to respond to a major threat in another theatre, such as the Persian Gulf. These would include core war fighting capabilities such as strategic lift, rapid reaction forces, the ability to deliver massed air-to-ground strikes in the early stages of a conflict, air-to- ground surveillance, and special operations forces (SOF). 22 According to the IFPA, the United States is likely to be the prime supplier of both the Allied air support and special operational forces units. The present capabilities the U.S. would allow fulfilling its commitments, but it is worth considering that the ability of the United States to respond could be taxed if U.S. forces were engaged elsewhere in another major operation. The main conclusion from the operational study on Baltic defence assumes, that as long as Russia confines itself to conventional options, the prospects for successfully defending the Baltic States under worst-case scenarios are good. However, the defensive equation becomes complicated when the potential for Russian use of weapons of mass destruction is considered. 23 The IFPA assumes that a hostile regime willing to attack the Baltic States outright, in all likelihood, would not limit itself to conventional options. At the very least, the Alliance and Baltic defence planners should not rule out the prospect of Russian WMD employment simply because it would violate international norms or risk provoking a broader conflict. In 2002 the issue of defensibility of the Baltic States was raised in official or academic circles. During official and unofficial discussions several basic models for Baltic defence come out. The first option could be labelled as the Polish model. It is premised on the existence of a sufficient base of indigenous forces

20 Strategic Forecasting Baltic States Membership in NATO Unlikely, Global Intelligence Update, 27 04 2001, http://www.stratfor.com 21 Stratfor, Baltic States Membership in NATO Unlikely, 30 April 2001, http://www.stratfor.biz, 01 09 2005. 22 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region, 2002, p.3. 23 Ibid. 179 that would be reinforced in a crisis from the outside. This model requires Lithu- ania to develop for or Allies to be ready to rapidly deploy, to Lithuania, a considerable quantity of conventional armaments (tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, attack helicopters, fighters). In the second technological model, reinforcements would come from over the horizon. They would be largely based on American air power and precision guided munitions. The third option is a hybrid model which rests upon the employment of modest reinforcements, but would also include over the horizon air strikes. In theory, there exists the deterrence by retaliation model. Attacks would be carried out against the aggressors civilian and economic targets using weapons of mass destruction. All options have a different level of support in the US and among their Allies. The deterrence by retaliation model draws least support among all nations and the Baltic States. The U.S. might prefer the technological model, assuming that financial costs associated with this model would be modest and the capabilities required already exist. The technological model is not acceptable for the Baltic States, because it rests solely upon political U.S. commitment and does not assure its physical presence in the region. European and NATO members would prefer the traditional Polish model. For Lithuania it would mean the creation of large territorial forces able to conduct large-scale operations inside the country, but barely able to participate in out of area NATO operations. Considering that NATO nations are moving towards small, mobile and rapidly deployable units, the territorial model of defence model does not seem to be a feasible model for the Baltic States. The reality after NATOs enlargement reflects a compromise between the needs of the Baltic States and the capacities of the Allies. Such a compromise means that reinforcements would come from European NATO members and from the United States. The hybrid model guarantees that deterrence would include the elements of the inevitability of defence and retaliation. For Lithuania it means that deterrence would be highly enhanced by the physical presence of the NATO troops in the region. This presence will be manifested in the form of common initiatives, military training, exercises or even the temporary location of NATO troops. This explains why Lithuania in highly interested in preserving the NATO air policing mission in Zokniai airport as it strengthens deterrence for the whole Baltic region. RAND study dispersed doubts about indefensibility of the Baltic region prior to NATO enlargement. The Study was further enhanced in 2004 under the title Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions24 . The Baltic scenario of this study analyses implications of a military conflict in the Baltic regions for U.S. commitments to this region and Americas ability to provide extended deterrence for the Baltic States. The scenario involves a Russian attempt to employ military coercion to separate the three Baltic States from NATO. According to this scenario the continued expansion of NATO towards Russias border in Northern, Cen- tral and Eastern Europe has led Russia to feel increasingly encircled and vul-

24 Larson E.V., Eaton D., Elrickn P., etc. Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions. Santa Monica: RAND, 2004, p.65-86. 180 nerable. The scenario assumes that the catalyst for the crisis in the Baltic States was the failure of Estonia and Latvia to fully integrate their ethnic Russian populations. According the scenario, ethnic Russians become increasingly hostile towards their governments, begin a protest campaign and to look toward Russia for support. As the crisis intensified, ethnic Russian extremists attacked government installations and provoked internal clashes. NATO, however, reacted strongly to Russias threats against its three newest members. The scenario assumes that Russia and Belarus successfully continue their political and economic integration. Belarus was willing to provide at least limited support for Russia in a confrontation with NATO over the Baltic States25 . Both sides deploy significant military resources to respond to this crisis: The Russian CONOP has four basic themes. The first is that the Russian military needs at least 30 days to mobilize if it is to have a chance of successfully achieving its strategic goals. As a result, no offensive anti-access operations can be conducted during this period. The second is to isolate the Baltic States in order to prevent the timely introduction of NATO forces. The third is to rapidly overrun the Baltic States so as to present NATO with a fait accompli and strengthen the Russian position in post-conflict negotiations. The fourth theme is to prepare to repel a NATO counterattack should it become necessary to do so. Russian airborne troops will seize and hold a series of coastal enclaves as well as the capitals of Latvia and Estonia26 . The Russian strategic objective was to separate the United States from its key European NATO Allies: Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Only by using information and psychological operations to create the proper conditions (or take advantage of existing conditions) could they exploit a strategic rift between the United States and its NATO Allies and Russia could hope to successfully implement a strategically meaningful anti-access strategy. In RANDs opinion it is difficult to foresee, circumstances under which European NATO countries, especially Poland, would be unwilling to give its full support for this American- sponsored operation. However Germany has a strong Green Party and well-organized and popularly supported peace movements that could be exploited by Rus- sian. German infrastructure is of particular importance because the allied forces commander would face two primary access requirements to the Baltic States: securing the major highways and railroad lines across Germany and Poland and securing and protecting major Polish Air Posts of Debarkation. Polish air bases would be essential to NATO and U.S. tactical air operations over the Baltics. The Air and Sea Port of Debarkation, highways, and rail- roads in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany would be indispensable to the reception of ground forces arriving from continental America and to the onward movement of both NATO ground forces. This requirement for full access in Euro- pe is the most important one that NATO force commander would place on our major the Allies. According to RANDs assessment NATO would be able to guarantee access via the narrow corridor of southern Lithuania near the Polish border. If the Baltic States will be able to secure access to the key debarkation

25 Ibid. 26 Larson E.V., Eaton D., Elrickn P., (note 25), p.69. 181 infrastructure on their own territory, NATO would be able to defend them against the armed aggression. From all the above mentioned Baltic defensibility studies, the conclusion could be drawn that NATO countries have enough military resources to defend the Baltic States. The RAND study emphasises that in case of regional conflict, the U.S. is able even without the support of NATO European Allies to defend the Baltic States. However support from Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Poland would increase American will and abilities to act. The biggest challenge for extended deterrence would come from ability of the Alliance to persuade the potential aggressor that military force will be used to protect the Baltic States. Therefore Lithuanian strategy must be aimed at preventing its Allies from becoming deterred by a potential aggressor to assist her in case of armed attack. During the regional conflict NATO European countries will become the object of harsh information and psychological operations. These operations would be aimed at discrediting the Baltic States and creating an unfavourable public opinion for participation in the conflict and assisting the Baltic States. Not the lack of military resources, but assuring psychological credibility, would constitute the biggest challenge for extended deterrence for the Baltic States.

3. Psychological Credibility of Extended Deterrence

Deterrence fails when the deterrer is unable to convince the potential aggressor about the fatal consequence of its behaviour. Lithuania together with her Allies may fail to deter potential aggressor if he thinks that Lithuania will not fight or will not fight very hard, or also if he thinks that war is unavoidable or he is indifferent to threats. Deterrence is not only a matter of absolute military capability but rather of political choice and the will to use military force. Security guarantees from third nations is difficult to assure. History provides many examples when extended deterrence fails, e.g. British and French security guarantees did not deter Germany from attacking Poland in 1939. Ex- tended nuclear deterrence is even more difficult to implement. For the U.S., the UK or France to prove to other nations that they are ready to risk nuclear holo- caust for the sake of another country is almost impossible. Lithuanian military planners must always take into account the unreliability of nuclear deterrence. Four major critical areas could be distinguished analysing psychological credibility of deterrence: The domestic political agenda may require political leaders of one or another state to invoke military measures, e.g. against Lithuania. Aggression may occur even if total loses will be greater when the results are sought. Political leaders of potential aggressor may feel that inaction may be even more painful alternative then a lost war, especially if the future of the ruling regime is at stake. Potential aggressors tend to focus on their own internal needs and tend 182 to ignore external signals such as behaviour of the deterrer. Aggression is less a function of opportunity than it is of need27 . Especially during crises potential aggressors are likely to neglect deterrers will or ability to act. Leaders may psychologically resist hearing enormously painful news that they would lose a war and that they must therefore abandon cherished goals or policies essential to their continued control of power. Psychological pressures to ignore warning signs will be particularly strong during periods of internal or external crisis. Such leaders are more difficult to deter. Bureaucratic organizations may have blinders imposed by their institu- tionalized cognitive framework that is, their deeply-rooted conception of how the world works and, more specifically, what another war would look like. This may result in unmotivated biases in interpreting new information28 . During crises growing pressure complicates rational decision making. For example the RAND study on the defensibility of the Baltic States assumed that the crises between the Baltic States and Russia were sparked by the Russian speaking minorities. In this highly emotional situation the Kremlin may disregard rational calculation and make emotional decisions. The above mentioned weaknesses of the deterrence strategy suggest that military capabilities per say or security guarantees by the third nations alone cannot deter aggressions. Lithuanians must convince the leaders of neighbouring countries that the military force will be used under any circumstance and aggression could bring no benefits, just looses. This task theoretically could be accomplished even without military forces by misleading the enemy with the wrong information and by other means showing capabilities that do not exist. This would be an extremely dangerous strategy in the area of global communications. Lithuanian strategic documents show that Lithuanian defence planners are fully aware of credibility issues in the deterrence strategy. The Lithuanian National Security Strategy and Military Strategy, the Law on the Fundamentals of the National Security, oblige each and every citizen to resist any aggression. Refusal to resist may lead even to criminal prosecution. Such a strict legal provision is intended to convey a message to all neighbours that use of military force in case of aggression is inevitable. The Law on the Fundamentals of the National Security even stipulates that if because of aggression a senior command-level official cannot freely exercise its responsibilities or pass orders, lower-level officials (commanders) may perform defence functions independently29 . The de- centralised decision making system assures that no potential aggressor would be able to subjugate the country by forcing senior leadership to surrender to political or military pressure. Confidence and security building measures, frequent high level visits

27 Lebow R. Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1981, p.274-277 28 Rhodes E., (note 15). 29 Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy, (note 2), p.16. 183 strengthen deterrence by reducing misunderstanding and misinterpretation factor between political and military leaders of the opposing states. Tight and unofficial contacts with leaders of all neighbouring countries would create atmosphere of openness and transparency. Unfortunately such a strategy is difficult to apply to Lithuanias eastern neighbours for a simple factor of strict hierarchy and reticence. However, such strategy could work with non-governmental organisations and academic institutions. Their representatives must be supplied with information on Lithuanian defence policy towards their region. Positive image of the state among the Allies and potential aggressors also effects deterrence. The more a country is conceived as strong, united, warlike, threatening or even revengeful, the better for deterrence. It is also important that the deterrer would not be perceived negatively among the population of would- be aggressor. Leaders could try to stabilise a regime by organising small and victorious campaign against a small and unpopular country. Lithuania is interested not to become a problem solving tool for the leaders of undemocratic regimes in her neighbourhood. Lithuania is not in a very pleasant situation for example Russian public polls indicate that Russians perceive the Baltic States as the most hostile countries towards Russia. Latvia is perceived as a hostile country by 49 percent of Russians, Lithuania - by 42 percent, Estonia by 32 percent (Georgia, the U.S. and Ukraine lag further behind).30 At the same time, 70.5 percent of Russian inhabitants believe that the annexation of the Baltic States was voluntary in 1940.31 The image of Lithuania in Belarus is better, although in recent years observers emphasise well orchestrated public relation campaign against NATO and the United States. The psychological reliability of NATO security guarantees greatly benefits from an advanced fixed and planned commitments to the Baltic regions. Lithuanian political and military leaders are fully aware that additional guarantees from the third countries given in the midst of crises do not achieve the desired effect. For example Peter Karlsten, Peter Howell and Artis Allen in their empirical analysis of conventional deterrence found that repositioning ones forces in conjunction with a threat may help one win the war if the target refuses to yield, but it has rarely been instrumental in bringing about the success of the threat itself The widely accepted notion, that the repositioning of naval forces is an effective means of communicating national commitment appears without general merit32 . Potential aggressors are likely to suffer from motivated biases in their evaluation of the deterrers new signals and actions. Therefore NATO should more frequently demonstrate its commitments to the Baltic States by the increasing number of exercises and other military activities in the region. Even before becoming a member of NATO, Lithuania started to transform major air-

30 The Levada Center, results available online: http://www.levada.ru/press/2005060100.html, 12 09 2005. 31 Bashkirova & Partners Were the Baltic States actually occupied?, 16 June 2005, results available online: http://www.bashkirova-partners.ru/eng/?m_plg=articles&act=view&id=91, 12 09 2005. 32 Rhodes E., (note 15). 184 ports and seaport to accommodate NATO reinforcements in case of a crises. The host nation support procedures were checked in practice during the biggest military exercises in the Baltic States Amber Hope or by assuring support to NATO air policing mission in iauliai air base in the Northern Lithuania. This suggests that Lithuania understands the potential value not only of clear pre- existing treaties and commitments, but also of forward military presence. Reliability of extended deterrence is highly enhanced by the consistency and continuity of in advanced established security commitments. The George G. W. Bush speech in Vilnius became an ambivalent symbol of NATO security guarantees Our alliance has made a solemn pledge of protection, and anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the Uni- ted States of America. In the face of aggression, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will never again stand alone33 . Such a clear and unambiguous commitment sends a very clear message to all potential aggressors that might one day think of attacking Lithuania. Ame- rican political leaders are fully aware of the extent of their commitment to the Baltic region. Even the big opponent of NATO enlargement, Ted Carpenter, emphasised in the Washington Post that this commitment given by Americans must be honoured - otherwise the global system of American alliances would become unstable and unreliable.34 Therefore the question would America risk nuclear confrontation for the sake of Vilnius should be rephrased would America risk its global system of Alliances for the sake of confrontation in the Baltic region. Lithuania and her Allies must strive that the answer would be no.

4. Strengthening Extended Deterrence

After membership in NATO, collective security guarantees became the basis for Lithuanian security policy. Lithuanian military strategy of 2004 proc- laims that the aim of deterrence is to convince the potential aggressor that it will face not only the forces of Lithuania, but also of its Allies and will experience great damages which will not be worth the sought result35 . An extension of extended deterrence to Lithuania changed the character of her deterrence strategy and effected the Lithuanian armed forces development plans. Total defence concepts disappeared from Lithuanian security and military strategy. Several key remnants from the total defence era, such civil resistance remains, but even they were adapted to the new environment. Membership in NATO also implied that Lithuania is determined to contribute to defence of its Allies. Lithuania is too small to provide substantial military capabilities to defence for example of Turkey but it must bear appropriate share of commitments

33 Remarks to the Citizens of Vilnius by the President George W. Bush, November 23 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/15452.htm, 2005 06 01. 34 Carpenter Carpenter T. Casting NATO Line Perilously Far to East, Washington Times, 2002 m. sausio 12 d. 35 Lithuanian Military Strategy, (note 3), p.6-7. 185 to the Alliance. A shift from territorial to collective defence establishes new requirements for effective deterrence. NATO security guarantees strengthened Lithuanian security. At the same time, security guarantees by the third nations have several serious weaknesses that must be taken into account by Lithuanian military planners. For example, Lithuania instead of investing into preparations for guerrilla warfare is shifting resources to deployable and sustainable military units. This may send a wrong signal to potential aggressors that Lithuania is no longer planning to fight in a protracted asymmetrical conflict. The aim of this section is to offer concrete guidance on how to avoid possible misinterpretations and assure the reliability of extended deterrence.

4.1. Intelligence and Early Warning Systems

Intelligence and early warning systems contribute to deterrence by providing timely and accurate information on a potential aggressors behaviour, actions of its leaders, or the status of its military forces. The decision to launch a military attack is not made in one day and even if it is taken preparations for military action could take even several years. For example a RAND study on defensibility of the Baltic States assumed that Russia needs at least 30 day to start military action in the region. An effective intelligence network would allow Lithuania and its Allies anticipate an aggression or show of force and take countermeasures before the crises occurs. Countermeasure could include deployment of NATO and EU assets, strengthening of crises management bodies, preparation of citizens for unexpected events, partial or even total mobilisation. After becoming a member of NATO, Lithuanian capabilities to forecast behaviour of neighbouring countries increased substantially. Lithuanian intelligence bodies were connected to common NATO intelligence sharing system that provides ability to retrieve data of other Allies and present a Lithuanian analysis of events in the Baltic region. The Lithuanian air surveillance and control system was integrated into NATO air defence system that assures real time exchange of air picture over the whole region. These measures set the risk factor for unexpected contingencies to a minimum level in the region and provide enough breathing time to prepare countermeasures if they are needed. Despite significant improvement in the intelligence gathering sector, Lit- huanian academic and official institutions still possess some unimpressive analytical capabilities. Already for several year Lithuanians have tried at winning in NATO and the EU the reputation of experts on the Eastern European issues. Such attempts have already brought some results in the foreign policy field but the Lithuanian ability to offer fresh perspectives on development in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova or Georgia is staggering. Lithuania has no world wide known think tanks or universities. Vilnius University Institute of International Rela- tions and Political Science and Lithuanian Military Academy only partially fill this vacuum. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have no academic institutions that 186 specialises in defence sector. In the future Lithuania must more heavily invest into analytical tools to forecast decisions of political leaders in the neighbouring countries, foresee their foreign policy towards Lithuania, understand their political motives and signals send to domestic and foreign audience. The Lithuanian ability to the understand logic of potential aggressors would increase their effectiveness of deterrence. This information via crises management system must be quickly chan- nelled to appropriate bodies and lead to very concrete actions.

4.2. Participation in International Operations

Lithuanian participation in international operations increases the reliability of extended deterrence by raising moral costs of non-assistance in cases of an attack against Lithuania. The leaders of the United States, the United King- dom and other countries would find it increasing difficult not to use political, economic and even military measures in the Baltic area as Lithuanian soldiers every day risk their lives for common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Lithuanian armed forces have already proved their ability to participate in high intensity operations. Special operation forces three times so far have participated in operation Enduring Freedom. In 2005 Lithuania took a lead in establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province of Ghwor in Afghanistan. By taking this decision Lithuania, for the first time in her modern history, took a responsibility for the reconstruction and stability for this poor province of a distant country. One might expect that one day Lithuanians would find the bulk of their armed forces deployed somewhere in the Middle East or South Eastern Asia. In case of sudden military crises in the Baltic region Lithuania would completely rely on commitments of the Allies as the majority of its fighting power would be thousand miles away. European countries use different models as to how to prepare military units for international operations. Finland and Russia send in international operations identify units in advance that were created just for this purpose, for example, peacekeeping battalions. This model allows countries to conduct the best possible training for future peacekeepers and select the right people for international missions but on other hand this creates a two tiered military one for international, another for domestic use. Such a differentiation could create tensions among the military and decrease the unity of the armed forces. Another choice is to create a professional military for all imaginable missions. They pro- fessionally must serve anywhere they are sent. This guarantees that all armed forces are capable of generating military units for collective actions including collective defence. Such a model is more expensive but also more effective in collective defence organisations. In Lithuania elements from both models can be found. According to the Guidelines of the Minister of National Defence: upon the completion of current defence reform by 2014, Lithuania will seek to have at least 50% of its Land Forces structured, trained and equipped for deployed operations outside Lithu- 187 ania and at least 10% planned for or undertaking sustained operations at any time36 . This objective provides a clear indication for orientation towards a more professional armed forces although legal system has not been adjusted yet. Ac- cording to Lithuanian laws military personnel can be sent to international operations only on a volunteer basis unless it is collective defence operation. This means that deployed military unit would be supplemented by personnel from other units thus reducing its coherence. The principle of voluntarism leads to challenges for the effectiveness of extended deterrence in NATO. The concept of extended deterrence requires Al- lies to send reinforcements to a country in danger, prior to the start of military actions. Such deployment most probably would not be an Article 5 operation and a principle of voluntarism would be applied. If NATO would request to deploy the Motorised Infantry Brigade Iron Wolf, Lithuania would have to struggle to find adequately trained people to replace at least several hundred soldiers. Such legal restrictions limit Lithuanian capabilities in times of crises to render assistance and assure extended deterrence to her Allies.

4.3. Host Nation Support

Lithuanian ability to provide host nation support (HNS) to arriving NATO forces significantly contributes to effective deterrence. Lithuania so far has in- vested heavily into HNS capabilities but currently investments in this area are under strict review. During the Cold War era NATO countries, except for the United Kingdom and the United States, planned to defend themselves on their own territory. For this purpose countries like Germany developed substantial HNS support capabilities. A country providing HNS was responsible for development of effective medical support, for communication network, road and railroad controls and other capabilities. Already prior to their membership in NATO, Lithuania decided to follow an example of older Alliance members that have substantial HNS capabilities and made HNS support one of the key priorities. The Ministry of Defence looked at the civilian infrastructure that could be used for the military use, and tasked the National Defence Volunteers and Logistics command to provide respectively force protection and logistics support capabilities. Lithuanian applied this concept during the Baltic States largest military exercise called Amber Hope and for NATO air policing mission stationed in Zokniai airfield in the Northern Lithuania. These were small scale operations comparing to those if during a military crises should NATO decided to deploy to Lithuania several divisions or corps. Lithuanian defence planners are facing the dilemma whether to spend huge resources for such unlikely scenario or use them for other purposes like participation in international operations.

36 Guidelines of the Minister of National Defence 2006-2011, Vilnius: Leidybos centras prie KAM, 2005. 188 Consensus has not been reached so far as to the extent of HNS investments. On one hand this would allow to accommodate faster arriving NATO forces and provide logistical support. This factor was mentioned in the RAND study on the defensibility of the Baltic States. From another hand Lithuania must stop all investment into this expensive capability for the following reasons. Firstly, NATO is developing sustainable and deployable expeditionary forces that are able to operate in any geographical environment. For example, NATO Reaction Forces (NRF) can operate without any HNS all over the globe. If NATO decides to use NRF in Lithuania its requirements for HNS would be minimal. Secondly, NATO has huge advantage in military power over any potential enemies therefore Lithuanian preparations for HNS would not change the balance. Thirdly, in case of military threat NATO most probably would use preventive actions. As unofficially one NATO official said who told you that the Alliance will defend you on your own territory? The Alliance has military capabilities to strike anywhere in the world even and operate even in unfriendly environment. The conclusion could be dawn that Lithuanian investment increases reliability of deterrence but contributes less to its effectiveness comparing to participation in international operations or early warning capabilities. Lithuanian should continue investments into critical infrastructure facilities like Zokniai airfield or Klaipeda sea port but not invest into HNS capabilities that could be used only in large scale military conflict.

4.4. Arms Control Mechanisms

Arms control strengthens deterrence by allowing participating parties to observe and verify military equipment in neighbouring states. Participation in arms control regimes enables Lithuania to receive and verify information on the capabilities of her neighbours. An effective arms control regime diminishes security dilemma and the potential for an arms race in the Baltic region by elimina- ting military superiority of one state over her neighbours. Arms control is also important as a confidence and security building measure. However arms control regimes have many in-built weaknesses - established limitation could be avoided or inspections neglected. Effective arms control regimes strengthen the reliability of deterrence. Ac- cording to the logic of deterrence aggression could happen if one country feels that it is loosing advantage over another, its competitor. First of all, arms control regimes eliminates the element of surprise in development of military capabilities. Secondly, it creates balance of military power thus reducing to a minimum the possibility of participating countries to have the first strike capability. Arms control regimes and limitation of troops in the Baltic area provide additional guarantees to countries like Russia that in times of crises no huge military potential would be concentrated close to her borders. Lithuania is a party of most arms control treaties. Already in 1993, Lithu- ania joined the Vienna Document on confidence and security building measu- 189 res and exchange of military information. In the 1999 Istanbul Summit, Lithua- nia declared that it was considering the possibility of accession to the Conven- tional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, provided that the accession terms were in Lithuanias national interests. In September 2002, the President of Lithuania in his statement before the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the intention to accede to the CFE Treaty after the adapted treaty comes into force and is open to all European democracies. In addition, in 2002, Lithuania applied for membership in the Open Skies Treaty which creates the regime for aerial obser- vation37 . The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in 1997 also applies to Lithua- nia. It clearly states that The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATOs nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so38 . The biggest challenge for Lithuania in the foreseeable future will be joining the CFE treaty. The adapted CFE Treaty signed just prior to the first round of NATO enlargement envisaged that any upward revision of the national ceiling of one party must be compensated by a corresponding lowering of the national ceiling on the same territorial category of one or more other parties. This provides the guarantee for Russia that no major conventional weapon system will be accumulated in her neighbourhood. Russia will seek that similar logic will be applied to of the Baltic States. According to Zdrizdaw Lachowski the national and territorial ceilings of the Baltic states would be consistent with the military sufficiency rule, on the one hand, and would take account of Russias genuine security concerns, on the other. The Baltic national limits would be higher than the current holdings. The Baltic States would have only limited possibilities for permanently stationed foreign troops and armaments on their territory, but their territorial ceilings (higher than the national ones) would enable them to receive reinforcements and temporary deployments (up to an equivalent of two NATO divisions)39 . These limits would diminish the reliability of deterrence since they put limitations on the presence of the Alliance on the territory of the new members. The U.S. and its European Allies agreed to assure Russia that no substantial military force will be deployed in her neighbourhood. This is political prise of NATO enlargement process. On the other hand participation in the CFE Treaty would significantly benefit Lithuania through greater insight into Russian political and military activities. Lithuanian involvement into arms control regimes is considerable, albeit not a critical strategy to strengthen effectiveness of deterrence.

37 Uþsienio reikalø ministerija. Lietuva Prisijungë prie Atviro Dangaus Sutarties.{Ministry of Foreign Affaires Lithuania joint Open Skies Treaty 22 July 2002, http://www.urm.lt/ view.php?cat_id=3&msg_id=1266, 01 09 2003. 38 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm, 01 09 2003. 39 Lachovski Z. The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO. Stoc- kholm International Peace Research Institute, 2002, p.10.. 190 4.5. Development of Defence Capabilities

NATO security guarantees and national defence capabilities for many years will remain the core of Lithuanian deterrence strategy. Lithuania as a small state cannot cope alone with scenarios that involve extensive use of military force. In the case of a large case aggression, Lithuanian armed forces will act as a part of multinational joint task forces. Lithuanian military strategy emphasise that: The wartime concept of Lithuania rests on the assurance of all Allies to confront a potential aggression jointly. Lithuania will fulfil its commitments with a capability centred on a highly capable Reaction Brigade and its supporting units. This capability will be responsive to threats that arise at any time, with units that can deploy quickly to defend the country in conjunction with NATO reinforcements40 . After completion of military reform almost all Lithuanian armed forces units will be designed to be usable for international operations. Deployable military units will be modernised and re-equipped. They will constitute the core of Lithuanian defence potential. Still many shortages will remain. The long term plan for the development of Lithuanian armed forces acknowledges: Although Lithuanian armed forces modernisation plans are highly valued among our Allies and Lithuania takes part in many international operations, Lithuanian Ar- med forces still is have only limited capabilities to sustain military units on the modern battlefield. As military technologies advances at a very rapid speed, in the future, Lithuanian armed forces could find themselves unable to operate together with her Allies41 . In 1999 Lithuanian started the Strategic Defence Review which established a new slimmer yet more capable force structure. A number of infantry brigades were reduced to one rapid reaction brigade; territorial units were transformed into smaller but deployable formations. Lithuania started to create expeditionary logistics capabilities, reformed training systems. Lithuania plans to launch, from 2007, a major modernisation effort giving priority to military units assigned to NATO or other EU operations. In preparing modernisation plans, Lithuanian planners must take into consideration that recent military innovations favour the defence, which is important part of deterrence strategy. Extremely precise and comparatively simple guided weapons could be used to take on tanks and high-performance aircraft, the central actors in any offensive.42 Acquisition of anti-offensive weapon systems greatly enhances defence and deterrence. New technologies highly strengthen defence against tanks or fighter aircraft, central figures in all offensive operation43 . Modern equipment even allows Lithuania to strike into potential

40 Lithuanian Military Strategy, (note 3), p.10. 41 National Defence System Long Term Development Plan, (note 9). 42 Encyclopeadia Britannica, (note 12). 43 Ibidem. 191 enemies territory with conventional means. Lithuania in the long term perspective must consider procurement of similar systems. Lithuanian leaders must take into consideration that neighbouring countries are increasing their defence expenditure and their modernisation plans are extremely ambitious. Lithuania has to increase allocations for procurement of more sophisticated equipment; otherwise in the future she will be in danger and may rely exclusively on the security guarantees from the third nations without having anything to offer to her Allies.

4.6. Economic Measures

The reliability of deterrence strategy depends on ability of the detterer to impose economic costs to the aggressor. War means breaking economic relations with the target of aggression and its Allies; international sanctions may follow. In the interdependent world this implies huge costs to the war-prone states. In addition, breaking economic relations could seriously harm economic interests groups. Not surprisingly, the Independent Task Force in its report U.S. Policy Toward North-eastern Europe emphasised whether or not NATO could defend the Baltic States in a strict military sense may be less important than making it clear that any effort by Russia to use force in the Baltics would prompt a strong response by NATO against highly valued Russian assets. This could serve to deter Russia from taking military action against the Baltic States44 . In case of aggression against Lithuanian international sanctions would immediately follow. Sanctions could be of different nature termination of loans, trade restriction, and freeze of capital or investment projects. Credibility of international sanctions would be fostered by deeper integration of Lithuania into common European market, big investment and communication projects. Joining of Euro zone and Shengen zone would further increase reliability of deterrence. The EU does not provide formal guarantees of defence albeit it is hard to imagine European countries closing their eyes in the case of aggression against one or more EU members. The EU has the real power to influence political military decisions in other countries, especially Russia. EU countries account for over one half of all direct investment in Russia, and the EU is Russias largest creditor. The EU is Russias leading trading partner; 40 percent of Russias foreign trade is with the EU, and the figure rose to 50 percent with the enlargement of the EU. In contrast, trade with Russia accounts for only around 4 percent of the total foreign trade of the EU, and this level is only slightly higher after the enlargement of the EU. Russia is heavily dependent on the EU in economic terms, but the reverse is not true. The only exception is in the energy sector. Oil and gas supplies account for around 50 percent of total EU imports from Russia, and the EU demand is pro-

44 Brzezinski Z., Larrabee F. US Policy Towards Northeastern Europe, (Independent Task Forces Report), Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Northeastern_Europe.pdf, 28 02 2005. 192 jected to increase in the future, particularly in the case of natural gas (the EU oil market currently depends on Russia for approximately 20 percent of its supply, but the figure rises to approximately 45 percent for gas). In the enlarged EU, Europes reliance on Russian fuels has increased since, with the exception of Slovenia, all the Eastern European candidate states are almost totally dependent (between 70 and 100 percent) on gas and oil supplies from Russia45 . Thus in case of military conflict in the Baltic region the EU and Russia would suffer enormously. Economical measures are important but not critical for reliable deterrence. First of all, they bring costs to the aggressor when decision to start aggression has already been made. In case of irrational aggressor their impact is even of less importance. Secondly, authoritarian rulers tend to disregard economic costs and allocate more attention to military dynamics. Establishment of authoritarian regimes close to Lithuania makes deterrence more difficult. One of the biggest challenges to the Lithuanian deterrence strategy would be strengthening of the unpredictable authoritarian political and military elites in the neighbouring countries. The ability to impose economic costs, although important, will not deter such elites. Readiness to fight will remain the main component of a reliable deterrence strategy.

Conclusion

Deterrence is the core element of Lithuanian security and military strategies. Its success ratio cannot be easily assessed mathematically, however, during the period after the declaration of independence Lithuania successfully resisted military and political pressure from outside powers to change its course towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Furthermore, disagreements over NATO enlargement did not lead to the serious military build-up in the region. Lithuanian foreign policy remained focused on integration into NATO and the EU, preservation of American interest and participation in international efforts to build stability in other parts of the world. Russian and Belorussian politicians failed in their attempts to persuade Western countries that application of extended deterrence in the Baltic region is unreliable and unstable. Before membership in NATO Lithuanian military strategy emphasised deterrence by denial. Lithuania had no capabilities to engage targets on an opponents territory. Lithuania was able to deter other countries only denying the potential aggressor control of the states territory and waging guerrilla warfare. In other words Lithuanian strategy was to increase costs of occupation and military control. This strategy had several serious weaknesses. First of all, it

45 Perovic J. Coming Closer or Drifting Apart? EU-Russia Partnership and EU Enlargement in Eastern Europe, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2003, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=61682&lng=en&id=6831, 28 02 2005; Stratfor, Russia Poised to Dominate European Energy, October 11 2005, http://www.stratfor.biz, 01 09 2003. 193 allowed the potential aggressor to have information superiority. Secondly, Lit- huania had no capacity to deny a fait accomply situation. Thirdly, costs of the military conflict would be unacceptable for future Lithuanian social and economic development. After NATO membership, the Lithuanian deterrence strategy shifted its focus towards assurance of extended deterrence. In military terms this means creation of expeditionary capabilities for the Alliance and abolishment of territorial forces. Defence reforms allowed increasing Lithuanian commitments to its Allies; this in turn implied more active involvement of other NATO nations in the Baltic region. Reliability of deterrence was assured by clear and unambiguous security guarantees; however membership in the EU strengthened deterrence by integrating Lithuania more closely into European economic area. In summary, the conclusion could be drawn that reliability of Lithuanian deterrence strategy is based on national and international means and procedures, membership in NATO and the EU. Deterrence could be further strengthened by portraying Lithuania in other NATO countries as reliable and strong partner, increasing its economic and financial integration in the EU, expanding participation in international outreach programmes or fostering other forms of military, economic and financial integration. These means increased costs for the Allianse of not acting in case of serious troubles in the Baltic region. But the most important item on the Lithuanian agenda is more intense efforts being made in potential aggressors societies in trying to convince their leaders that Lithua- nian is ready to fight any attempt to impose their will upon the Lithuanian government. This constitutes huge challenge for a small country that is surroun- ded by larger neighbours. Effective deterrence strategy requires united and well coordinated efforts from all governmental and non-governmental Lithuanian institutions. 195

Arvydas Anuauskas* Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Centre Faculty of History at the University of Vilnius

The Solution to the Problem of the KGB Reserve and/or National Security Interests

Although the KGB in Lithuania officially stopped existing on 1 October 1991, the assessment of the secret service legacy of the communist regime is constantly being revisited. Public researchers point out those aspects of the past that in one way or another continue into the present from peoples past recollections. They also explore those moments that are related to the unaddressed past problems, such as wrongs, a sense of guilt and responsibility, which end up persisting the longest. The article aims at surveying the attitude of the KGB legacy, the relationship to society and politicians, and to one more recent aspect of the KGB legacy that has lately emerged the so-called KGB reserve. With respect to the past legacy and memory, with the prevalence of unconstructive standpoints based on partial amnesia and relativism in political circles of the country, attempts to choose more effective action strategies concerning officials who got into the KGB reserve scandal and the heads of institutions responsible for national security of Lithuania. These are all analyzed. Reconsideration of the relationship to the KGB has been turned towards parliamentary research and improvement of legal acts. And though from the legal point of view no traces of any conscious cooperation have been detected in the publicized past of high state officials or KGB reservists, a considerable part of society does not justify the fact that the past of one or another person was connected with the activity of the KGB, an organization of repressions and terror.

Introduction

Post-totalitarian societies face a difficult task to coordinate the memory of different groups so that both the victims of the regime and the former organizers and executioners can live without tension in society and build upon a common future. With the restoration of the independence, the Republic of Lithuania has more than once appraised the Soviet State Security Committee (further KGB) as a repressive institution of the occupation power (Decisions of 4 March 1999 and 10 February 2000 of the Constitutional Court). Therefore, a person belonging to the KGB, or any other secret or private contact (or collaboration) with the KGB can be appraised negatively by society as a circumstance demeaning the honour and dignity of the person. Concealing from society the data known to high political-

* Doc. dr. Arvydas Anuauskas is a Director of the Department of the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Center and Associate Professor of the History Department of the Univer- sity of Vilnius. Address: Didþioji 17/1, LT-01128 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2791036, e- mail: [email protected] 196 power officials about the leaders of the Seimas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further MFA) and the State Security Department (further SSD) (or other institutions), who perform important functions in guaranteeing national security, belonging to the KGB reserve and or making this data public, could pose a threat to national security. This only confirms that after symbolic actions such as the condemning of various aspects of the Soviet past in rallies and the mass media, pulling down of monuments, changing of street names, reestablishment of symbols and institutions that were forbidden in Soviet times, rehabilitation of the repressed, etc. a consistent evaluation of the Soviet security legacy has to also follow. It is true that under conditions of radical breakdowns, social institutions and practices possess quite a few of continual aspects. Mentality and behavioural models, formed in the light of relations with the KGB (or the Lithuanian Communist Party), cannot be changed abruptly or gotten rid of. But all of this must be evaluated not only by reconsidering the past, but also by developing appropriate strategies for dealing with the KGB legacy. Limitation of the responsibility problem to the activity of only one institution - the KGB is hardly likely to completely solve the issue of responsibility for the wrong doings of the Soviet time. It should be considered more thoroughly. Assumption of a collective responsibility by members of a group or institution is considered a constructive strategy since it helps perceive and critically evaluate the villainous acts committed by the group, with no personal participation, and prevent them from reoccurrence (restitution in collective responsibility is mostly symbolic and moral, that is things such as an apology, identification of names and so on). Openness and telling the truth would not cause enmity in society. On the contrary, this would help reach the necessary agreement faster. But the KGB reservists problem (scandal) demonstrated that it is much more difficult to follow this path. The article addresses the objective to review the attitude of the KGB legacy, the relation of society and politicians to one of the KGB legacy has emerged the so-called KGB reserve. With these heads of institutions responsible for the national security of Lithuania, having gotten into the KGB reserve scandal, the chosen action strategies are being analyzed.

1. The KGB Legacy and Concept of the KGB Reserve

1.1. The KGB Legacy Assessment Problem

In many former socialist states, information from secret services archives would leak out and get into the press. At the beginning of 1990, for the first time in Lithuania, attempts were made to play the KGB card by accusing several Sàjûdis activists of cooperation with Soviet security in an anonymous letter to the editorial office of the Respublika. After the restoration of independence of 197 Lithuania, on 23 March 1990, the Government passed the decision which obligated the KGB to cut short its activity. The essential difference from other Eastern European states lays in the fact that the Soviet Security Institution was outla- wed, that is, it became an institution of a foreign state in the Republic of Lithua- nia. On 27 March 1990, the Supreme Council of Lithuania declared that the agents who refused to maintain further relations with the KGB of the USSR will experience neither moral nor legal nor any other persecutions by the power of the Republic.1 But the KGB agency network, though considerably depleted (the number of agents decreased from 6,377 to 5,598 as of 1 January 1991) and having almost lost the possibility of renewal (in 1989, in Lithuania, the KGB recruited 358 individuals, in 1990 117 new agents, in 1991 33)2 still remained a weigh- ty problem of home policy. The KGB legacy kept affecting the society of Lithua- nia to a rather large extent. Through the USSR Special Services Agency network alone aproximatly 100,000 inhabitants of Lithuania passed, about 50,000 of which were between the years 1956-1990.3 The number of people associated with the KGB through other ties as reliable persons (supplied the necessary help to the KGB due to the positions they held) or as representatives of the communist nomenclature in power (created favourable conditions for the activity of the KGB and used the power of the KGB to retain and strengthen their authority) - was not small either. In 1990-1991, the entire activity of the KGB ranging from the collection of secret information, indirect support for handy politicians and organizations, attempts at slandering and dividing consistent partisans of the independence of Lithuania, to dissemination of information unfavourable for Lithuania in international organizations and Western countries was directed towards preventing, at first, the restoration of the Lithua- nian State and later its international recognition. But on the other hand, KGB possibilities were considerably restricted due to the loss of most opportunities to collect information (disconnection of phone taps, loss of legal access to data bases of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, loss of possibilities to function through former front organizations and control relations with citizens of other countries, and also loss of punitive leverage). Only after 24 August 1991, did it become possible to radically solve the KGB problem. A special commission for taking over the KGB assets and carrying out investigations on their activity was set up.4 The KGB institution had to be liquidated within two months.

1 The Declaration of 27 March 1990 of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania; Collection of Documents I of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania and the Presi- dium of the Supreme Soviet, Vilnius, 1991, p. 346. 2 Endriukaitis A. The Cobweb, Lietuvos aidas, 16 January 1992 (in Lithuanian). 3 According to KGB specialists, influence agents made up 5-10% within the agency. One fifth (15-20%) were the so-called agents correspondents, i. e., those searching for confirming information, making the facts received more accurate according to KGB tasks. One tenth of all agents were keepewrs of secret and meeting places. The rest were agents-observers, i. e., those recording hostile activity. The KGB wasted the most time on them but the benefit they brought was most often short-lived. See: Äeíècoâ C. «Koíêpeòèçèpoâaòü ôyíêöèè êaæäoão aãeíòa», Cáoðíèê ÊÃÁ CCCP 53, Mocêâa, 1990, p. 68-69; Ëeãaí È., Aíäpeeâ B. «Kaêoé áûòü êëacèôèêaöèè íeãëacíûx ïoìoùíèêoâ», Cáopíèê ÊÃÁ CCCP 55, p. 64 4 Ðabajevaitë L. Social Transformation of Lithuania in 1990-1997, Vilnius: Vilnius University Publishing House, 1999, p. 32. 198 The beginning of the take-over of KGB archives and the adoption of the first special Law On Verification of the Mandate of the Deputies Suspected of Conscious Cooperation with Special Services of Other States5 , were followed by scandals of document disappearance and controversially estimated The Cobweb articles.6 According to Jurgis Jurgelis, then a member of the Commis- sion for the Investigation of the KGB Activity, because of unjust and inaccurate publications in the press, the procurators office finds itself in an awkward situation; yet, the Commission never once denied the untruth. Publishing of information and names was not regulated by law, discussed in the Commission and or coordinated with the Prosecutor Generals Office. Therefore, innocent people were also compromised.7 Several deputies of the Supreme Soviet were accused of collaboration with the KGB (Virgilijus Èepaitis, Kazimiera Prunskie- në, Jokûbas Minkevièius, Vladimiras Beriozovas and others). The Court recognized some of them as former secret KGB collaborators or they themselves renoun- ced the mandates of the Supreme Soviet deputies. By the new election, the mandate of the Supreme Soviet deputy had been taken away from Èepaitis alone. Article 97 of the Election Law, passed by the Seimas on 9 July 1992, provided for the obligation of candidates for members of the Seimas to publicly announce their conscious collaboration with special services of other states.8 The KGB legacy issue referred only to former secret collaborators. Possibilities of former and regular KGB officers to get employment in institutions important for national security were not restricted. But with strategies of amnesia (that is no need to look back into the past, etc.) and relativism (allegedly everyone collaborated, etc.) becoming prevalent in relation to the Soviet past, in 1993-1997, no other legal steps were taken. No institution for managing, saving and investiga- ting the KGB legacy was established or could even operate for a long time. Fea- ring for the security of the KGB archives and seeking to prevent their transfer, former political prisoners and deportees were on the watch in the KGB palace in 1993-1996.

5 Document Collection 1 of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania, p. 346. 6 Endriukaitis A. The agent Astra No. 35348 operated in Marijamplë Sàjûdis, Lietuvos aidas, 8 January 1992; Endriukaitis A. Operational combat platoon in akiai and Vilka- vikis, ibid., 4 February 1992; Endriukaitis A.People of Pakruojis zealously executed instructions, ibid, 12 August 1992; Endriukaitis A. KGB agents in Jurbarkas continue to work, Lietuvos aidas, 8 October 1992; Endriukaitis A.An agent for a special period, ibid, 9 November 1991; Endriukaitis A. A personal record of an agent, ibid, 23 November 1991; Endriukaitis A. Reliable persons (about filling in of recruitment documents), ibid., 29 No- vember 1991; Endriukaitis A. Against the Church, ibid, 30 November 1991; Endriukaitis A. The Cobweb, ibid, 4, 14, 20, 29 February 1992; Endriukaitis A. The Cobweb, ibid, 19 March 1992; Varanauskas P., A KGB agent planned to overthrow Vytautas Landsbergis by force, ibid, 26 September 1992; Varanauskas P., Ketas spies on the Jesuit, ibid, 22 Sep- tember 1992; Varanauskas P., Dþanatas in the encirclement of KGB sociologists, ibid., 26 August 1992; Varanauskas P., Dana an internationalist, ibid, 2 July 1992; Varanauskas P., Ket and Antanaitis, ibid, 5 June 1992; Endriukaitis A., Karalius, ibid, 24 April 1992 and so on. 7 Ðabajevaitë, (note 4), p. 34. 8 Ibid., p. 36. 199 In 1996, when the right-wing political forces won the elections to the Seimas, the solution of the lustration problem of KGB collaborators was reverted to again. In 1998-1999, a certain lustration system of KGB agents and regular personnel was set up. Its effectiveness and consequences (negative or positive) for Lithuania are controversial. The former Chairman of the Seimas National Security Committee Algirdas Katkus stated that the initial variant of the Lustra- tion Law was much stricter and more radical, yet it was met with great resistance and many suggestions for improvement: essentially it was such a law that would pass at the time it was adopted.9 A small group of KGB reserve officers was left aside programming a return to the unsolved KGB legacy assessment problems in the future. In 1999, lustration affected about 300 KGB regular personnel (then working in strategic enterprises, important state institutions, education system). In 1999, there was the adoption of the Law on Recording, Confession, Registration and Security for those who had Confessed to Secret Collaboration with Special Services of the Former USSR. The law defined the categories of individuals having secretly collaborated with special services of the former USSR, determined the order of their confessions as well as established restrictions for persons who had secretly collaborated with secret services of the former USSR but had not confessed to having collaborated with them in the order set by law; many former KGB agents came to confess. Meèys Laurinkus, the former Head of the SSD, claimed that the Lustration Law had solved very many problems; after it came into force, about 1,500 people expressed their trust in the Lithuanian State and admitted having collaborated with the KGB.10

1.2. The KGB Reserve

For what and how was the KGB creating officer reserve in Lithuania? To make the ideological grounding of the KGB activity clearer, I will quote only a small part of the KGB mobilization work regulations: One of the most important tasks of the USSR KGB, which defends the Soviet state and society from subversive activities of enemy special services, foreign anti-Soviet centres and adverse home elements, is early readiness to solve the set tasks at the period of threat or wartime. The period of threat or wartime was briefly named as a special period. The KGB had to be ready for urgent actions during the special period and under extreme peacetime conditions, when need for thoroughly pre- selected, pre-tested, at least minimally trained and most importantly, reliable new personnel for carrying out additional functions could arise. Officers of the armed forces of the Soviet Union were transferred to the KGB reserve on the grounds of the aforementioned mobilization and readiness plans for the special period. In selecting reservists for operational work in

9 Kuzmickaitë J. For those who confessed sanctions, for those that kept silent open ways, Atgimimas 2, 2005. 10 ELTA, M.Laurinkus: Materials of Soviet special services cannot be relied upon 100 per cent,19 February 2005. 200 KGB institutions, priority was given to those working in party-political institutions, having legal education, work experience in industrial and transport enterprises, belonging to the organizations of the Communist Party and the Kom- somol, and those meeting requirements for service in the KGB. The philosopher Vytautas Radþvilas claimed that persons, having chosen in Soviet times one or another method of collaboration with the KGB, had already identified themselves to the Soviet Union. I believe that all those people had one feature in common they truly did not believe that Lithuania could gain independence, - stated the philosopher. Being a reserve officer was partly a condition conducive to the accumulation of political capital; they could expect a fast career advancement.11 According to the journalist Valdas Vasiliauskas: However, even here the nomenclature had privileges. While enjoying career advancement, a reservist would also make career in the military registration: he was usually transferred to the category of political leaders. A person particularly reliable and loyal to the system was assigned to the KGB reserve. This meant rather another nomenclature privilege than collaboration with the KGB, and was particularly secret.12 In fact, it is possible to partly estimate being in the KGB reserve as both another privilege of the former nomenclature and a possibility to gain a faster position in the nomenclature. Careerism was one of the more distinct features of a part of reservists. On the other hand, a lot of people who had never belonged to the nomenclature were included in the KGB reserve. But their loyalty to the communist system and suitability to the KGB activity were undoubtedly verified. Those selected to the KGB reserve were of most the diverse civil specialties teachers, engineers, lawyers, heads of enterprises or establishments, employees of communist party organizational institutions, etc. This does not confirm the speculations, expressed during the reservists scandal, that it is dominated by the elite of Soviet society.13 At the beginning of February 2005, after TV3 television aired names of high officials who at some time had been included in the KGB reserve14 , the list held scarcely 70 names. Agreement to be in the KGB reserve was given orally. According to the USSR KGB mobilization work regulations: According to the wartime table of organization, selection of the USSR armed forces reservists to man KGB bodies is conducted by carrying out initial selection according to the KGB-MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) registrations. Candidates, designated for officer positions, are summoned to Military Commissariats with the aim of getting biographical data for a complete special verification and there they obtain an agreement from them to serve in the KGB institutions in wartime [ ], for all other positions without summons. Mobilization officials, employees of regular apparatu- ses, operatives of KGB bodies carry out the selection of reservists. [ ] After the special verification is finished and suitability to work for the KGB is established, the selected

11 Makaraitytë I. Estimation is but moral, Atgimimas 4, 2005. 12 Vasiliauskas V. Retaliation: the plan The KGB Reserve, Lietuvos rytas, 17 January 2005. 13 Ibid. 14 Barkauskaitë O. An investigation into who leaked information about KGB reservists will be conducted, www.delfi.lt, 17 February 2005. 201 are summoned to Military Commissariats for interviews during which their agreement to serve in the KGB in wartime is ascertained. The reservists have given their agreement in complete fixed-format questionnaires.15 A comprehensive special verification of the selected officers was carried out. Personnel of the KGB territorial subunits and special KGB divisions would collect characteristics about candidates for the KGB reserve and would always arrange meetings with them (if necessary, they met more than once). They would also look into personal qualities during interviews. Military Commissariats were obligated not to interfere with KGB representatives in carrying out selection of reserve officers for KGB purposes. The compilation and management of personal records of KGB reserve officers was conducted on the grounds of an Annex to the KGB of the USSR Soviet of Ministers order No. 0330 of 20 June 1978 Instruction about the Selection and Verification of Candidates for Regular Military Service and Work at the State Security Committee of the USSR Soviet of Ministers.16 Provisions of the same Law were also applied in selecting candidates for work in staff positions (regular personnel) and forming the contingent of KGB reserve officers. According to Chapter 7 of the Selection and Verification Instruction of 20 June 1978 by the KGB of the USSR: Personnel of operational subunits to whom this was assigned, must personally investigate the candidates, use operational forces and measures to this end, and also conduct such a form of their investigation as verification by assignments of operational character [ ] with the aim of determining suitability of the candidate for agential- operational work in the central apparatus of the KGB. In KGB bodies, they (except persons that are directly transferred from party, Soviet or Komsomol work) are requested by an employee of a respective subunit to help (if necessary conditions for that exist) with carrying out concrete assignments of operational character.17 Having received information that candidates are not suitable for service or work in KGB bodies and the military, the KGB would refuse to further work with them.18 According to the mobilization readiness report of 1988 of the KGB in the Lithuanian SSR, to man the KGB in compliance with a wartime (special situation) table of organization, they needed 903 people: 624 officers and 279 enlis-

15 USSR regulations for mobilization work (project of 1989), Special Archive of Lithuania (further SAL), stk. K-1, inv. 46, f. 2833, p. 217, 261. Completed forms of those who gave their agreement to be included into the KGB reserve are stored in their personal records in the present SAL. 16 The Instruction about the selection and verification of candidates for regular military service and work at the State Security Committee of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism (Republic of Latvia). 17 The Instruction, (note 16), Chapter 7. Personal records of KGB reserve officers contain hints of giving and execution of operational assignments. See: SAL, stk. K-1, inv. 52, f. 187; f. 82, p. 19-22; f. 176, p. 21-22; inv. 46, f. 2789, p. 35-1, 35-2. Subunits of the Soviet Union that operated in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania followed uniform instructions and laws, but KGB archives in these countries survived with a different structure. In Latvia mostly laws and instructions that regulated the KGB activity survived, whereas in Lithuania more documents of operational activity and personal records remained. 18 The Instruction, (note 16), Chapter 11. 202 ted personnel. Officers were categorized as KGB reserve officers, 72 and 552 reserve officers of the armed forces.19 This was the number of new personnel that was needed to replace regular KGB personnel who had to be transferred elsewhere, to take KGB staff officer positions for the execution of additional functions to command operational-combat elements in each district, to carry out preventive arrest plans of unreliable persons and so on. KGB reserve officer actions depended more on combat readiness degrees that territorial KGB institutions were assigned. For example having received the signal, territorial KGB institutions, supplemented by reserve officers, had to carry out special operational measures to detain persons who in wartime conditions would pose a particular threat to the state. On 29 September 1989, Eduardas Eismuntas, the LSSR KGB Chairman proposed to include in the list of persons to be detained leaders and activists of anti-socialist informal organizations who speak for the change of the existing state system, can organize and implement extremist actions including those of a coercive, group nature.20 But because of different assigned functions, not all reserve officers of the armed forces were transferred to the category of KGB reserve officers. All KGB reserve officers had to become KGB operatives. Besides, it was the plan to assign a part of them as operatives of special divisions of military units of the USSR KGB special divisions for the Baltic Military Di- strict (in 1985, 185 KGB reserve officers were to be assigned for that purpose)21 who had to spy on the mobilized, explore their disposition and spy on politically unreliable people. It was these needs that the formation of the KGB reserve officer reserve was orientated towards. On 1 January 1989, the KGB reserve held 357 officers, 232 from which were transferred from the armed forces reserve (others were former KGB staff personnel).22 On 27 December, in Lithuania, 420 reserve officers of the USSR KGB were registered (273 of them were transferred from the armed forces reserve), while on 25 March 1991 there were 370 KGB reserve officers.23 Even in 1990-1991, after a part of those transferred to the KGB reserve refused to stay in the KGB reserve, the number of reservists (excluding former regular KGB officers) amounted to more than 200. In 1989, with changes in the political situation in Lithuania, the first refusals to stay in the KGB reserve were registered in KGB documents.24 Why didnt the KGB reserve disappear after the restoration of independence of Lithu- ania? According to the opinion of the professor Albinas Bagdonas from Vilnius University Faculty of Philosophy, even though self-identification with the idea of statehood did not disappear in one instance During the last decade of the regime [Soviet A. A.], conformism and collaboration with the regime was seldom motivated on the ideological grounds. [ ] That decade-long oppression fostered the learned helplessness behaviour described by American psychologists. [ ] Such behaviour is usually followed by duplicity of cons-

20 Ibid., f. 2833, p. 261. 21 Extract No. M/0531 of 4 July 1985, ibid., f. 2711, p. 31-4. 22 The mobilization readiness report of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR, ibid., f. 2833, p. 7. 23 Report on work in 1990 (27 December 1990), ibid., f. 2767, p. 10-11. 24 Report of the Chief of Teliai district KGB division to the Chief of the mobilization division of the LSSR KGB, ibid, inv. 45, f. 2845, p. 74 rev. 203 cience [ ] Double-dealing of those in power was also clearly perceived. Ideological pomposity had little to do with everyday practice.25 Regarding a part of those in power in present-day Lithuania and who were included in the KGB reserve 16-25 years ago, it is possible to discern a certain psychological motivation determined by the learned helplessness (that is what could I do, I was only one out of many, others also behaved likewise or in some other way motivating their choice). In 1990, due to political motives, some officers included in the KGB reserve would refuse to accept military cards of KGB reserve officers and consequently would be excluded from the KGB reserve for the special period. After such refusals, on 28 September 1990, the LSSR KGB Chair- man, Maj. Gen. Romualdas Marcinkus issued the order to all chiefs of town and district KGB divisions: seeking for reliability of KGB reserve officers and armed forces reservists, designated for KGB institutions, additional verification of this contingent (that is of those belonging to Units No. 300/1400 and 300/1400B) is planned. For example, in Klaipëda, out of 30 interrogated officers 8 refused to stay in the KGB reserve, out of 30 enlisted personnel 8 also refused.26 In Kaunas, 34 persons were interrogated and, due to political reasons, 5 KGB reserve officers refused27 , etc. Sometimes reserve officers were interviewed individually28 or appraised according to their activity and the position they held (belonging to Sàjû- dis, leaving the ranks of the CPL, working in power institutions of the Republic of Lithuania29 ). Ignalina, Anykðèiai, Varëna, Kupikis, Pasvalys, Prienai, alèinin- kai, venèionys, irvintos and some other KGB divisions did not find any unreliable persons. In the report of 25 March 1991, 38 persons who refused to stay in the KGB reserve in 1990 are mentioned whereas in January-March of 1991, one more person refused to stay in the reserve and 43 were excluded from the lists due to motives that hindered their employment in the service.30 But at that time, membership in communist organizations was no more among the selection criteria and during the special period it was planned to use, in conjunction with military units, under special situations,31 166 KGB reserve officers in the positions of operatives32 (not including several dozen of them who planned for work

25 The Conformists, Atgimimas 3, 2005. 26 A note of 4 December 1990 by the Chief of Klaipëda city and the Lithuanian Sea Basin KGB division, SAL, stk K-1, inv. 46, f. 2727 p.84-86. 27 A letter of November 1990 by the Chief of Kaunas city KGB division to the Chief of the LSSR KGB mobilization division, ibid, p. 88. 28 A note of 12 November 1990 by the Chief of Varëna district KGB division, ibid., p. 63 rev.; A letter of November 1990 by the Chief of Kaunas city KGB division to the Chief of the LSSR KGB mobilization division, ibid, p. 88. 29 A note of 5 November 1990 by the Chief of Ðilalës district KGB division, ibid., p. 80-80 rev.; A note of 4 December 1990 by the Chief of Klaipëda city and the Lithuanian Sea Basin KGB division, ibid., p. 83 rev. 86. 30 Report on work in 1990 (27 December 1990), ibid., f. 2767, p. 10. 31 On 8 December 1989, the KGB Chairman E. Eismuntas requested the Chief of the USSR KGB mobilization division Maj. Gen. A. B. Suplatov to make an agreement with military units deployed in Lithuania to cover main KGB subunits during special situations:Vilnius and Kaunas KGB divisions were to be covered by the airborne division of the 7th Guards, Klaipëda KGB by the 23rd border platoon, Panevëþys KGB by the units of the 18th military-transport Guards division. 32 SAL, stk. K-1, inv. 46, f. 2727, p. 57. 204 in territorial KGB divisions). In 1990, reserve officer personal records began to be sent out of Lithuania; primarily records of those reserve officers who were 50 years of age and were excluded from the reserve. Thus, on 10 January 1990, 33 personal records were sent to the Omsk KGB archive. On 21 February 1990, in connection with the complicated operational situation in Lithuania 141 records of KGB reserve officers were sent to Omsk. Among them were records of the former regular KGB officers, mostly those of majors and officers with higher military ranks, which were the first to be transferred to the reserve. The rest of the records remained and are now stored in the Special Archive of Lithuania (stk. No. K-1, inv. No.52). But during the reservists scandal, the former SSD Director Laurinkus stated that no records of the Soviet time should be believed 100 percent. Accor- ding to Laurinkus, the issue of the KGB reserve was already discussed in preparing the Lustration Law. By that time, the SSD had already supplied information on the status and role of the KGB reserve during the Soviet time to the working group that was preparing the Law. The KGB reserve institution, I am deeply convinced, was a purely bureaucratic paper institution which itself I do not think realized what its role was, particularly during the future war, explained the former Head of the SSD. It is possible to agree that the KGB reserve was rather a formal institution, but had selection to it and there was verification of reliability, along with the extraction of the agreement to collaborate with the KGB and repeated selection and reliability verification procedures of the KGB staff individuals. Though belonging to the KGB reserve in society could be estimated negatively as a circumstance demeaning the honour of the person, reserve investigation did not go beyond the presentation of information. Five years after the presentation of information, society learned from the data published in the mass media (the weekly Atgimimas, the daily Lietuvos þinios), that the member of the Seimas Alfredas Pekeliûnas in 1985 was included in the mobilization documents of the territorial KGB subunit Panevëþys city KGB division and designated for operational work in the erritorial KGB subunit. In December 1989 Arvydas Pocius was included into the lists of the KGB special division for the Baltic Military District and designated as an operative of the special division of the military unit deployed in Vilnius. In 1981, Antanas Valionis was included into the lists of the KGB special division for the Baltic Military District and was designated as an operative of the special division of the military unit deployed in Sovietsk (Kaliningrad region). Lack of publicity in appointing persons with undisclosed and publicly un-assessed hardly representative biographical data to authoritative positions in institutions responsible for national security turned the solution of the KGB reserve problem into a scandal. 205 2. KGB Reserve Problem in 2004-2005

2.1. Genesis of the Scandal

In 2004, the political career of several high foreign state officials was ruined because of direct or indirect connections with Soviet security. For example, the Sejm of Poland discharged Josef Oleksy from the Chairman position of the Lower House of Parliament. The Court established that Oleksy collaborated with secret services of communist Poland but concealed this fact. In Lithuania, a similar problem with high state officials got ripe in November of 2004 (for the second time after 1991-1992). The Chairman of the Seimas Artûras Paulauskas was supplied with material by representatives of the oppositional Homeland Union which stated that in September of 1990, Pekeliûnas was included in the lists of KGB units 300/1400 B made up of reserve officers and soldiers. The Chairman of the Seimas Paulauskas addressed the State Security Department asking to check whether or not his deputy Pekeliûnas had concealed his connections with the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union the KGB.33 Pekeliûnas claimed he had never collaborated with the KGB and heard about his inclusion in the reserve list for the first time.34 This is the job of right-wing politicians. They seem to possess the archives and have found a piece of paper with my name on it35 , said Pekeliûnas. But the escalation of the right hand did not justify itself since the reservist scandal kept expanding and ever new actors were included in it. It was necessary to foresee new strategies regarding the relation with the legacy and memory of the past. At that time, strategies for further actions were only being formed and attempts were being made to either use official institutional ways (by requesting the SSD to verify the received information) or apply laws still in force and define the possibilities of persons that consciously collaborated with the KGB. The Chairman of the Chief Election Commission Zenonas Vaigauskas stated that, in case it turned out that Pekeliûnas had actually concealed his collaboration with the Soviet KGB, he would face his mandate being taken away through impeachment.36 According to commentators, it is very likely that because politicians set themselves an objective to defend people from the KGB ghosts. They may also urge them to let bygones be bygones or it could possibly be due to other reasons such as the fact that persons who are holding much more important positions among the KGB reserve officers have been concealed.37 In response to Paulaus- kas inquiry, the State Security Department (SSD) replied that the SSD had no data about Pekeliûnas collaboration with the KGB. The statement that birds

33 BNS, A. Paulauskas addressed the SSD in reference to A. Pekeliûnas connections with the KGB, 30 November 2004. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Makaraitytë I. The KGB Reservists Screen Pulled Away, Atgimimas, No. 1. 206

of a feather cover each other38 by the then leader of the Homeland Union, a member of the European Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis provoked further attention concerning this problem. When the information published in the weekly Atgimimas made it clear that the Director General of the State Security Department Pocius and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Valionis were included in KGB reserve lists, proposals to apply a fat-line strategy between the past and the present were by far most popular. Instead of racking our brains about how to use the EU support billions more effectively, we burrow ourselves in old KGB records39 stated Va- siliauskas, a journalist of the influential daily Lietuvos rytas. But, according to the journalist Indrë Makaraitytë, officials were appointed to high positions by consciously concealing biographical particulars that were far from representative.40

2.2. Choice of Action Stratagems

In relation to repressions and repressive institutions (KGB) of the past, in the memory and behaviour of societies, such strategies most often arise: collective amnesia, when more embarrassing moments are forgotten and in public memory speaking about them is avoided (specifically, this also manifests itself as the position of a fat line between the past and the present); the transfer of guilt to individual people groups and demonizing of these groups (for example, bourgeoisie, communists, Nazis); relativism of responsibility and suffering (everyone suffered, everyone was a collaborator, etc.); victimization, when a group or society that suffered are perceived as a victim; along with discussion and continual reconsideration of the memory, named by Jurgen Ha- bermus as memory work.41 Memory reconsideration strategy (it can also be called publicity and lustration strategy), in seeking societal harmony, is the most productive if this discussion is public, open, honest and experiences as well as memories of all societal groups are heard in it. The reconsideration of the reservists problem that happened at the turn of 2004-2005 can partly be called this, but the question arises as to whether it was done honestly and openly. Amnesia and relativism strategies identified by specialists are particularly unconstructive, postponing solution of problems important for people and societal harmony, and thus hindering concentration on the present42 and they begin to manifest themselves in much more refined forms than previously (first of all by laws limiting the possibility to explore, assess and publicize KGB documents to non-governmental institutions or pre-assessing such activity as political struggle or a possible tool of political struggle).

38 Gorienë G. A. Paulauskas will take possession of Lithuania by using the Russian mass employment psychic weapon, Laisvasis laikratis, January 2005. 39 Vasiliauskas, (note 12) 40 Makaraitytë, (note 39). 41 Ðutinienë I. The Post-Soviet Dilemma, www.delfi.lt, 27 January 2005. 42 Ibid. 207 Proponents of the reconsideration of memory and relation to the past strategies (identified as the most productive) were accused of having caused total confusion, political chaos, destructive passions which would stir up society, along with undermining its solidarity and mutual trust. Here a political game of a much higher level was started43 , stated commentators of the daily Lietuvos rytas. Having evaluated the presence in the KGB reserve as only an additional privilege of the nomenclature but not as an additional possibility to seek careers among the communist regime nomenclature which was then the verification of loyalty to the system, was the objective of the sprung up scandal and was considered as the result of the antithesis between the right-left-wingers as a political struggle. The right-wingers intended to strike a blow to both other graduates of the party educational institutions and entire nomenclature who had returned to power with the Labour party44 , and destroy the ruling coalition. In the KGB reservist scandal a multitude of interests coincided: the right- wingers wanted to stop the nomenclature, the paksists to take revenge on Paulauskas.45 On the other hand, the publicity of the KGB reserve data was also assessed as an action of an internal and invisible, to the broad public, political struggle in order to, by some extent, weaken the political power of the Chairman of the Seimas taking over from him the Prosecutor Generals Office and the State Security Department.46 Sometime before the Lustration Commission made the decision about the character of the KGB reserve officer and collaboration with the KGB, the minister Valionis claimed to Atgimimas that he did not want to make any comments because he had received an answer from a responsible Lithuanian institution that such activity is not considered as secret collaboration with the KGB.47 An agreement given in secret to be included in the KGB reserve, participation in reserve trainings held by the KGB, beyond doubt indicated an agreement to collaborate when appropriate situations occurred. But as mentioned, the SSD did not realistically investigate the genesis of the reserve emergence and associate the presence of secret (and private) information about KGB reserve officers in the archives of Russian secret services with possible threats to national security. Meanwhile, the Chief of the SSD Pocius stated to Atgimimas that he did not know anything about his inclusion in the KGB officer reserve and only during the period of Lithuanias independence realized that the KGB had started his personal record. [ ] Between 1993-1994 I learned about the existence of some KGB documents and that they could be used against me.48 Those that found themselves under the scrutiny assessed their situation as either conscious provocation still prepared by the KGB or as a problem discussed by only highest-level politicians yet insignificant.

43 Vasiliauskas, (note 12). 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Rubavièius V. The Golden KGB Reserve, www.omni.lt, 11 January 2005. 47 Makaraitytë, (note 39). 48 Ibid. 208 The fact that a negative attitude of society to relations with the KGB had an impact on the work of MFA and SSD authorities and could indirectly pose a threat to national security, destabilize the political situation or atmosphere within institutions responsible for national security was made more apparent by commentaries in the mass media about the situation in the SSD. According to the commentators, Pocius lost control of the situation in the Security Department and not all subordinates are loyal to the present Head. After the information about the former relations with the KGB of the Director General of the SSD, Pocius was published in the political weekly Atgimimas. Copies of the personal record held at the Special Archive were passed by other means to the mass media by mysterious and helpful hands. Lietuvos þinios prepared several exhaustive publications from the materials included in the personal record. But the internal friction at the SSD was but only one consequence of the fight that started much earlier for influence over the authorities of the SSD. Observers of the political process noticed that tension with reference to who can head the State Security Department started building towards the end of the term in office of the former SDD Director Laurinkus. It reached its climax when the then Presi- dent Rolandas Paksas, who had then been already removed from office, proposed Gintaras Bagdonas, the Head of the 2nd MoD Department, to the post of the SSD Director. In the spring of 2004, when the impeachment came to an end, the acting President Paulauskas appointed Pocius, who was proposed by Laurin- kus and had been his former deputy, as the Director General of the SSD. While Atgimimas was preparing material about the connections of Pocius and politicians with the KGB, some interviewed persons feared that publishing this information would be useful for individuals fighting for influence in the SSD. That competition within the SSD, manifesting itself in leaking information, concealing problems or publicizing them when it was useful for a faction competing for influence, could pose a threat to state security.49 Since the reservists scandal was expanding and included heads of institutions responsible for the national security of Lithuania, it was necessary to foresee new, more effective action strategies. The emerged KGB reserve scandal showed a special quality of our ruling elite, certain attributes of the state of society and new unending actions of political struggle.50 In other words, connections with the former communist nomenclature and direct or indirect ties with the KGB that defended its interests indicated both the state of some ruling elite and possibilities to influence it. Shortly, attitudes of political party leaders with reference to reservists started shaping, meanwhile providing for possible further actions. Proposals were made for officials to retire, appeal to the Lust- ration Commission, publicize names of all reservists, and or set up a parliamentary investigation.

49 A Look, Atgimimas 4, 2005. 50 Rubavièius, (note 46). 209 2.3. Reconsideration of the Memory Lustration and Publicity Strategy

Following the publicity strategy, assessment of the reservists status had to be attributed to the Commission evaluating the activity of persons that secretly collaborated with special services of the former USSR. Representatives from the SSD, the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania and the Prosecu- tors Office were delegated to this interdepartmental Commission. As early as the beginning of the KGB reservists scandal, when the Prime Minister Algirdas Bra- zauskas requested the Lustration Commission to assess the relations of Valionis and Pocius to the KGB, the Chairman of the Commission (representative of the SSD) Vytautas Damulis mentioned that the Lustration Commission had no legal basis to look into the activity of KGB reservists. According to him, the Lustration Commission had been authorized to look into the activity of only those that collaborated with the KGB, whereas being in the reserve, according to laws in force then, was not regarded as conscious collaboration with this organization.51 The Opposition party the Liberal and Centre Union (the LCU) demanded that the assessment should be given by the Lustration Commission. In the opinion of the LCU Chairman, Artûras Zuokas, having taken this measure and having received conclusions of the investigation of the Lustration Commission, high officials could peacefully continue their work, thus avoiding different interpretations of their reliability that might arise in society.52 In fact, laws in force in Lithuania define belonging to the KGB reserve in an ambiguous way. According to the Law On Recording, Confession, Registra- tion and Security of those who Confessed of Secret Collaboration with Special Services of the Former USSR that came into force in 2000, KGB reservists contrary to regular Soviet security personnel, did not have to appeal to the special Lustration Commission. However, the Law On the Verification of the Manda- tes of Deputies Suspected of Conscious Collaboration with Special Services of Other States that came into force at the end of 1991 stipulated that the concept of collaboration comprises inclusion of a person in the lists of KGB (MGB) or other special services or his recruitment or other conscious and consistent (two and more times) activity provision of information to the KGB or other special services, setting or execution of tasks was not included. A member of the Lustra- tion Commission Birutë Burauskaitë stated that reserve officers were not included in the Law possibly due to the circumstance that their ties with the KGB seemed different, having a smaller degree of loyalty to this service.53 Yet, though the Lustration Commission intended to self-determine whether belonging to the KGB reserve should be assessed as conscious collaboration with Soviet security,

51 BNS, The Lustration Commission Loses its Head, 8 February 2005. 52 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of State Security Have to Go for a Lustration X-ray, Lietuvos rytas, 10 January 2005. 53 Kuzmickaitë J. For Those who Confessed Sanctions, for Those that Kept Silent Open Ways, Atgimimas 2, 2005. 210 the material available was insufficient to make an unambiguous appraisal of the status of the Soviet security reserve54. It was impossible that a person included in the reserve would not be aware of it; however, the definition of conscious collaboration was in this case essential. Having started to deal with this issue, the Lustration Commission soon became inoperative. Further developments stimulated discussions about the effectiveness of the activities of the Lustration Commission. The Head of the State Security Department (SSD) Pocius was among the first to state that, the Lustration Commission, which had so far been subordinate to the Department, in the future would have to become an independent institution, whereas the Department should render assistance to it. The composition of the Commission had to be renewed and the person to be designated its new chairman had to be well known to society. The Commission should be completely independent, make independent decisions in assessing the activity of the working group and materials presented by it55, claimed Pocius. In fact, all members of the Commission delegated by the SSD were, at the same time, members of the working group and could not be fully independent and unbia- sed. Damulis, the Chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the SSD, who was the Head of the Commission, resigned from the position of the chairman of his own free will. Other members of the Commission were also urged to resign. The Commission, which until then could not boast of the effectiveness of its activity, managed to evade dealing with the issue of the KGB reserve. The Lustration Commission approved its conclusion that individuals included in the KGB reserve were not to be identified as secret collaborators of Soviet security. The Chairman of the Lustration Commission Damulis claimed that this conclusion was not specially meant for any particular institution and was made after KGB-related documents stored in archives were analyzed, persons who in the past kept records of KGB reservists as well as archivists were interroga- ted56. This, however, did not ease the tension. The parliamentary working group, which was preparing amendments to the laws regarding the assessment of the activity of Soviet special services, suggested that the lustration deadline should be extended. The working group tends to believe that the confession deadline should be repeated and exten- ded57, said the Chairman of the National Security and Defense Committee (NSDC) Alvydas Sadeckas. Considerations also began as to how to raise the status of the Lustration Commission and change its formation principles while transforming it from departmental to departmental-public. According to Sa- deckas, a variant that the highest officials of the state the President, the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Seimas could also delegate members for the Lustration Commission; this was considered.

54 ELTA, The Lustration Commission will Appraise the Status of the KGB Reserve, 7 February 2005. 55 ELTA, Aleknaitë K. A.Pocius: The Lustration Commission cannot be Subordinate to the SSD, 21 February 2005. 56 BNS, KGB Reservists are not Secret KGB Collaborators, 21 February 2005. 57 BNS, The Lustration Deadline is Suggested to be Extended, 21 February 2005. 211 The problem of publicity of KGB archives was closely related to the lustration process. Making KGB archives secret had been an instrument for special services, for the ruling nomenclature to control a part of society making it a hostage in their fight for power and political influence58. The Liberal Centrists, the Conservatives, and the Labour Party, all having different interests and goals, supported the idea of publicizing the KGB archives. Lists of KGB reserve officers should be publicized to society59 in order to avoid blackmail of foreign states special services, said Zuokas60. To this end, it was suggested to improve legal acts and, first of all, the controversial Law on the Regulations of the Use of Archives restricting access to the archives of Soviet special services for several decades61. The Labour Party faction also stood for publicizing the materials of the Special Archive and lists of former KGB collabo- rators62. According to the stance of the Labour Party faction, the Special Archive had to be completely open. Juozas Olekas, one of the leaders of the Social Democ- rats, said that he supported the opinion that all reservists of Soviet security should be made public so that no one kept prying63. At the same time, he said, people who had had an opportunity to browse through KGB records would be prevented from occasionally exposing to the public information on one or another high official or public figure. The SSD Director General Pocius, who found himself in the centre of the scandal, held a similar view. He suggested that the issue of publicizing lists of KGB reservists should be dealt with immediately in order to put an end to the witch hunt. The Minister of Foreign Affairs did not object to publicizing KGB records kept in the archives, either64. Commonality of propositions made by the Liberal Centrists, the Social Democrats and the La- bour Party referred to the attempts at seeking publicity in order to protect people from blackmail and stop speculations on this issue. A discussion and continual reconsideration of the past, i. e. memory work, was not suggested. During the so-called KGB reserve scandal, Andrius Kubilius, the Chair of the Homeland Union faction of the Seimas, put forward a proposal to make the materials of the Special Archive public and publicize lists of former KGB collaborators: follow the example of the Czechs and Slovaks and put personal records of the Special Archive on the Internet websites. In 2003, the Czechs publicized 75,000 names of former collaborators with secret services on the website of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Slovaks put information with 21,000 names of former collaborators on the Internet65. According to Kubilius, the order existing in Lithuania and attempts at making the archives secret for the

58 Rubavièius, (note 46). 59 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of State Security Must Go for a Lustration X- Ray, Claim Liberal Centrists, Lietuvos rytas, 10 January 2005. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 The Labor Party Urge to Publicize KGB Reserve Lists, www.delfi.lt, 11 January 2005. 63 J. Olekas: If a Radical Decision is Made, A. Pocius Could Live more Peacefully, ibid. 64 State Authorities Knew about the Belonging of A. Valionis and A. Pocius to the KGB Reserve, www.delfi.lt, 7 January 2005. 65 BNS, Andrius Kubilius: The Archives should be Open to Society, 10 January 2005. 212 next 70 years could not resolve any problems that we face today, but aggravate them: we will face the same problem when new facts about collaboration of some officials come out66. Publicity in this field was imported from Poland. On 13 January 2005, the Internet website ABCnet.com.pl propagating right-wing ideas published a document translated into Polish which, as was stated was the order of 26 De- cember 1989 signed by Eismuntas, the then Chairman of the State Security Com- mittee of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as some earlier decrees issued by him concerning the inclusion of Soviet army officers in the KGB reserve. The mentioned list contained 61 individuals, including Pocius, the Director General of the State Security Department of Lithuania67. Until then, the list of KGB reservists had never been publicized because it was confidential. Skirmantas Pabedins- kas, who headed the Special Commission of the Seimas on the Investigation of Circumstances of the Inclusion of High State Officials in the KGB Reserve, warned that this will only do harm to society because the list is inaccurate and even obviously forged in some places68. The mass media of Lithuania published the list. Afterwards, it started getting clear that members not only from the New Union, but also from the Labor, Social Democratic and other parties might have been involved in the vortex of the reservists scandal.

2.4. Parliamentary Investigation and Improvement of Legal Acts

Suggestions were made that the problem of conscious and unconscio- us collaboration with the KGB as well as the belonging to the KGB reserve should be dealt with by primarily improving legal acts. Thus starting with the Law on Recording, Confession, Registration and Security of those who Confes- sed to Secret Collaboration with Special Services of the Former USSR, thus the problem of KGB reserve officers be resolved69. Other proposals were connected with adoption of legal acts providing access to all KGB archives, promoting in this way self-establishment of a free civic society. This was emphasized by the oppositional Homeland Union: to initiate such amendments to the Law on the existing order and Archives which would make the Special Archive completely open70. With new political forces being involved in the discussion about the problem of the KGB reserve, parliamentary investigation eventually became a dominating strategy. When the Liberal Democrats faction of the Seimas came up with the initiation of a parliamentary commission, which would investigate

66 Gorienë, (note 38). 67 ELTA, BNS, A. Anuauskas: The List of KGB Reservists on the Internet is Genuine, 16 February 2005. 68 Verification of the document confirmed its authenticity, it was found in the Special Archive of Lithuania. 69 Olekas, (note 63). 70 BNS, (note 65). 213 facts about the relations of high officials with KGB institutions71, other political parties for some time remained sceptical about the efforts of their opponents in the former Presidential scandal. The Liberal Centrists were also sceptical about the establishment of a parliamentary commission and suggested that Valionis and Pocius should be invited to be interviewed by Parliament members in the Seimas. The Chair of the Homeland Union faction Kubilius, had urged the aforementioned officials to answer the question themselves if they could further perform their job at a proper level72. In the middle of January 2005, it turned out that the ruling majority was going to set up a commission. Parliamentary investigation had to glean information about the ties maintained with Soviet security by the three state officials the Minister of Foreign Affairs Valionis, the Director General of the State Security Department Pocius and the Vice-Chairman of the Seimas Pekeliû- nas73. According to the Liberal Democrats, the decision to establish the commission in which the questions were formulated more correctly implied that the commission was not going to elucidate whether the officials who were in the KGB reserve did not lie when they claimed that they did not know that. Besides, the issue regarding a moral right of the officials to work for the state after their ties with foreign special services had been revealed was not to be discussed. Also, no interest would be taken in the fact whether state officials were aware that the designated officials had belonged to the KGB reserve74. It is likely that both the ruling parties and the opposition did not consider the KGB reserve a serious problem to national security due to the predominant attitudes to draw a fat line between the present and the past and judge the individuals that had once got in the reserve by their present merits.

2.5. The Fat Line and Indications of Collective Amnesia

The historical experience of the 20th century shows that sooner or later society goes back to the unresolved problems of the memory. Even having clearly assessed the criminal past on the public plane, there still remain quite a few hush-ups in peoples private lives and their relationships. The forgotten or denied personal experience that is important to the individual has a destructive effect on both the personality and, as a frequent phenomenon, society. However, this was not taken into account in applying amnesia and relativism with respect to the Soviet past. An elaborate manifestation of that became the tactics used of awareness of KGB reservists chosen by the highest state officials (allegedly important only in position designation).

71 R. Paksas Claims that Officials Ties with the KGB were Deliberately Concealed, www.delfi.lt, 11 January 2005. 72 Mazuronis V. Who and Why Should Forget the Past?, www.omni.lt, 10 January 2005. 73 ELTA, The Lustration Commissions will Appraise the Status of the KGB Reserve, 7 February 2005. 74 Valentinas Mazuronis: The Alternative Commission is Going to Elucidate the Alternative Truth, www.delfi.lt, 18 January 2005. 214 Not having estimated to what extent the publicly unresolved problems related to the assessment of the past, can destructively affect society and the institutions involved in the scandals. Whether or not this can become a serious problem to national security, was why the so-called fat-line policy was adopted: the past was separated from the present and the only criterion for assessing officials had to be competence and loyalty to the new government. Before Pocius was approved as the Head of the SSD, on 27 March 2004, in the Seimas, he was asked if he had collaborated with the KGB, either as an agent or as a doverennoje lico (Russ. a reliable person) or in any other way. Pocius answered: Certainly not. I am not connected with this institution75. Back in 1992-1993, I heard rumours that there were certain documents related to me, but I did not respond to that. [...] Later, I asked the authorities to investigate the circumstances, but they assured that that was not a problem76, said the Director of the SSD Pocius. The Chairman of the Seimas Paulauskas claimed that the facts related to the past of both the Minister and the Director General of the State Security Depart- ment (SSD) were being made public for certain purposes, including the political ones. This was in order to, i.e., cast aspersions on these officials, to question their loyalty and increase tension within the ruling coalition. According to the Chair- man of the Seimas, the biography of the present Director General of the SSD was no secret to those officials who either appointed or recommended him nor to those authorities that he had previously worked with77. The SSD had allegedly known about that before Pocius was invited to work in this institution. Moreover, the fact that Pocius belonged to the KGB reserve had already been publicly announced. The Chairman of the Parliament reminded them that the year before, prior to desig- nating the official the Director General of the SSD, a publication appeared in the press disclosing this fact of his biography. Afterwards, this material was verified and submitted to the then acting President Paulauskas. We did not consider this an important circumstance in his life78, said the Head of the Parliament. Actual- ly, before the appointment of Pocius as the Director of the SSD, Paulauskas said he had no information that this official had been included in the lists of KGB reserve officers (the temporary Commission, however, was not authorized to investigate the facts of awareness- unawareness). Clarity and unconditional publicity, when appointing responsible positions, was eliminated. Information concerning former contacts of responsible officials with the KGB (no matter how they themselves assessed them) had to be publicized before they were nominated for the posts, even though according to Lithuanias laws, being included in the KGB reserve is not considered to be secret and conscious collaboration with secret services of the Soviet Union79.

75 Gorienë, (note 38). 76 Barkauskaitë O. A. Pocius: My Case was Falsified, www.delfi.lt - Lithuanian radio, 17 February 2005. 77 State Authorities Knew about the Belonging of A. Valionis and A. Pocius to the KGB Reserve, www.delfi.lt, 7 January 2005. 78 Ibid. 79 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of State Security Must Go for a Lustration X- Ray, Claim Liberal Centrists, Lietuvos rytas, 10 January 2005. 215 Minister Valionis assured that both in 1994, when he was appointed the ambassador in Warsaw, and in 2000, when he was to be appointed minister for the first time, he did not conceal his past80. He said that both in 1994, before becoming the ambassador of Lithuania to Poland, and in 2000, before being designated the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had consulted with others about the issue whether this fact of his biography might raise certain legal, ethical or other problems. [...] I was told that this was not regarded as collaboration. The authorities of the state knew about that, they had been informed81, pointed out the head of the Lithuanian diplomacy. He claimed that he had confessed to belonging to the KGB reserve even to President Adamkus. President Adamkus claimed that he did not know this fact, though later he specified that Valionis was appointed minister several years ago, therefore he could not remember everything well82. The impeached President, the Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party Paksas expressed great surprise that during the time when he held the positions of the Prime Minister and the President of Lithuania, neither the Chairman of the Seimas nor other responsible officials provided information on the ties of Valionis and Pocius with the KGB83. When the investigation in the Seimas started, it turned out that the awareness-unawareness problem concerned judges too. Vytautas Greièius, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Head of the Courts Council, stated that in KGB reserve lists, three names of judges were mentioned who were included there in order to avoid constant summons to military trainings84. Since the parliamentary Commission did not look into these circumstances, there was no precise answer with evidence testifying to awareness-unawareness. The former Head of the State Security Department (SSD) and present ambassador of Lithuania to Spain Laurinkus stated that it was strange that at that time the focus is on the individuals who have demonstrated to Lithuania their very sincere and effective work85. [...] It is humiliation to these people and on such a basis which from the point of view of Lithuanias security makes no sense86. Laurinkus claimed that he had been informed about the belonging of both Pocius and Valionis to the KGB reserve and he had informed the then President Adamkus and later when appointing Pocius as Head of the SSD the acting President Paulauskas about the inclusion of Pocius in the KGB reserve under vague circumstances87. As the former Director of the SSD, he once again gave assurance that he had not considered and did not consider that

80 Olekas, (note 63). 81 Note 82. 82 Olekas, (note 63). 83 Note 71. 84 Among those included in the KGB reservists list were the Deputy Chairman of Kaunas City Circuit Court, a member of the Courts Council Edmundas Inokaitis and the judge of the Criminal Cases Division of Klaipëda District Court Valentinas Janonis. See: ELTA, V. Greièius: Two Judges Asked to be Included in the KGB Reserve, 21 February 2005. 85 BNS, The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head of the SSD by their Work Proved Loyalty to Lithuania, 8 January 2005. 86 Ibid. 216 the fact of being in the KGB reserve or possible information about that, when it was possibly in the hands of special services of a foreign state, might cause a threat to national security. Before the publicizing, the general trend in assessing the KGB reserve was to observe the policy of the fat line between the past and the present. It seemed that the past could be forgotten without having been appraised. State authorities and some other influential politicians explained that the inclusion in the KGB reserve was of little significance, it was like some kind of formality dictated by life circumstances, it was not any crime, it did not pose a threat to our state and did not equal to conscious collaboration. Whereas those who had once been bound to the KGB reserve now were people with great merits to Lithuania. According to present laws, these people should not be regarded as violators, although there was no doubt that laws were made with many exceptions, most often choosing compromise variants. Such attitudes could be looked upon as both a clear policy regarding the past (the memory) and expression of collective amnesia. In sum, both Valionis and Pocius were appointed to the state posts while keeping away or concealing from society and even the Seimas, their former belonging to the KGB officer reserve. Belonging to this reserve was not considered an important matter, therefore, it was thought sufficient that only a few state officials who were in charge of appointing to positions knew about that. Aspects of the verified loyalty were related to the impact of the reservists scandal on the international position of Lithuania. Although Lithuanian laws do not treat the inclusion in the KGB reserve as secret and conscious collaboration with secret services of the Soviet Union, according to Valionis, the shadows of collaboration can be part of a political game attempting to undermine our position in negotiations with Russia. The Chairman of the Seimas Paulauskas declared that so far in relations with Russia, Valionis had a clear and principled stand and demonstrated that interests of Lithuania were important to him88. It is interesting to note that the daily Lietuvos rytas that had never been known for Russophobia and the paranoia of total spying, assessed the reservists scandal as the most successful operation of the decade in Lithuania89 or manipulation of public opinion performed by Russian special services90. It is obvious that special services of Russia were and are trying to penetrate into the most important state institutions, armed forces, parties, institutions related to NATO and the European Union, while intensifying their activity and increasing their capabilities in Lithuania91. After the role that Lithuania had taken during the orange revolution, the strengthening of Russias positions in Lithua- nia was predicted. According to the French daily Le Figaro, it might be im-

87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Vasiliauskas, (note 12). 90 Vainauskienë B. KGB Ghosts Refuse to Go on Holiday, Lietuvos rytas, 10 January 2005. 91 Jakilaitis E., Covert Tentacles of Moscow wont Let Lithuania Go, Lietuvos rytas, 13 January 2005. 217 portant to Russia to raise discord with Lithuania, the relations with which have always been tense92. The Director General of the State Security Department, Pocius, declared that there are certain directions in the activities of special services following which efforts are made to devalue the membership of Lithua- nia in the EU and NATO. Attempts are also made to make our country become an insignificant member of international organizations93. However, there were no facts to confirm the unequivocal answer that Russian special services do not play second fiddle. Quite the contrary, Russian special services, still employing some KGB methods and having the KGB legacy at their disposal, did not comment on the ongoing scandal and, most likely, used the opportunities offered by the possession of the remaining part of the KGB archives and the internal political scandal which then was at its climax in Lithuania.

3. The Temporary Investigation Commission and its Conclusions

3.1. Establishment of the Commission and Formulation of its Objectives

By decision No. X-98 of 20 January 2005 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (Þin., 2005, No. 12-365), a temporary Commission was set up to investigate the facts and circumstances regarding the inclusion of the Deputy Chair- man of the Seimas Pekeliûnas, the Director General of the State Security Depart- ment Pocius and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Valionis in the lists of the State Security Committee of the USSR. Skirmantas Pabedinskas, a member of the La- bor Party, was appointed its chairman. The Commission was obligated to appraise the status of KGB reserve officers, establish under what circumstances the three aforementioned officials that were included in the lists of Soviet security reserve, as well as determine whether legal acts were not violated by appointing them to their current positions, and whether their being in present positions did not pose a threat to national security interests, and whether other present day politicians, judges or state officials were included in the lists of the KGB reser- ve94. Besides, the Commission had to establish if being in the KGB reserve could

92 ELTA, Le Figaro: the Past Keeps Hold on Lithuanian Politicians, 20 January 2005. 93 The SSD Points out to Greater Attention of Special Services of Certain States to Lithuanian Affairs, Lietuvos rytas BNS, 13 January 2005. 94 BNS, The Seimas Approved the Composition of the Temporary Commission on the Investigation of the Relations of Officials with the KGB, 21 January 2005. The objectives of the temporary Com- mission were formulated: What is the status of the KGB reserve and individuals included in the lists of the KGB reserve: what functions the KGB reserve performed, in what way individuals were included in these lists, what impact this inclusion had and has on their positions. Under what circumstances were Alfredas Pekeliûnas, Arvydas Pocius and Antanas Valionis included in the lists of the KGB reserve? Are there any other state politicians, judges or persons holding the positions of state officials included in KGB reserve lists? 218 be equalled to conscious collaboration, which is assessed more seriously, providing for restrictions in holding positions in state service. The Deputy Chairman of the Commission Rimantas Dagys pointed out that in some cases the activity of KGB reservists could pose a threat, but each case must be investigated as a concrete one95. Had the Seimas temporary Commission on the investigation of the KGB reserve stated that the agreement to be included in the KGB reserve was equal to conscious collaboration with the Soviet special service, this would cause very serious consequences. Had the temporary parliamentary Commission confirmed the fact of conscious collaboration, the members of the Seimas who were in the KGB reserve would be under a threat of losing their mandates. Ho- wever, according to a member of the Chief Election Commission (further CEC), the fact of conscious collaboration should further be confirmed by the Lustration Commission or court. Had the Lustration Commission or court recognized the fact of conscious collaboration, the CEC would have to acknowledge that while filling in the form of as a candidate for the member of the Seimas, they concealed this fact. When standing for the Seimas, the Deputy Chairman of the Seimas Pekeliûnas and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Valionis did not indicate their conscious collaboration with special services of other states carrying out tasks assigned not by the state of Lithuania96. However, since the Lustration Commission did not consider the belonging to the KGB reserve as conscious collaboration, the Chief Election Commis- sion analyzed a letter of application written by Saulius Peèeliûnas, a member of the Homeland Union faction97 concerning the application of the Law of 1991. Peèeliûnas suggested that the Law on the Verification of Mandates of the De- puties Suspected of Conscious Collaboration with Special Services of other Sta- tes that came into force at the end of 1991 should be used as a basis. In this law, the notion of collaboration was specified as inclusion of an individual in the lists of the KGB (MGB) or other special services; or recruiting a person as a resident, agent, authorized agent, confidential agent or informer as well as evidence of corresponding activity; other conscious and systematic (two and more times) activity, such as provision of information to the KGB or other special services, task assignment or execution, etc.98 The CEC declared that it could not establish the fact whether or not during the Soviet period these parliamentarians collaborated with the KGB or other special services for it was within the competence of court. Members of the CEC claimed that they did not and could not have documents which, following the order established by law, would confirm the juridical fact that Valionis and Pekeliûnas collaborated with special institutions of other states. The State Security Department was inquired and

95 The Lustration Commission is Going to Reassess the Belonging to the KGB Reserve, www.delfi.lt, 4 February 2005. 96 BNS, Members of the Parliament who of their own Will Got into the KGB Reserve Can Lose their Mandates, 3 February 2005. 97 BNS, A. Valionis and A. Pekeliûnas did not Violate the Law on the Election to the Seimas, 3 February 2005. 98 Ibid. 219 did not confirm the fact of collaboration; consequently the candidates had been registered legitimately. However, if even now the fact was confirmed, the law would not give the right to the CEC to take their mandates away, said Victoras Rinkevièius, a member of the Commission. To pronounce that someone belonged to the reserve is not to pronounce conscious collaboration99, stated the members of the CEC. Records of the KGB reserve were compiled in accordance with instructions given then according to which personal contacts of KGB officers, with a potential KGB reserve officer aiming at extracting an agreement to belong to this reserve and confirming reliability, were of the utmost importance. In their explanations provided to the temporary investigation Commission of the Seimas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Valionis and the Director of the State Security Depart- ment Pocius confessed to their belonging to the KGB reserve in the Soviet period. As Valionis said, the LSSR KGB gave me an already completed form [...] and informed me that I had already been included in the KGB reserve of reserve officers. [...] I could not see possibilities to protest against such a decision because nobody had asked me to give an agreement to be transferred to the KGB reserve of reserve officers100 [from reserve officers of the armed forces of the USSR A. A.]. In his evidence given to the temporary parliamentary Commission inves- tigating the connections of high officials with the KGB, while answering addition questions, the Head of the State Security Department (SSD) Pocius stated that there are lots of discrepancies, and my record was plotted behind my back. [...] The only document testifying to my agreement was the impression someone else had that I agreed101. According to Pocius, he got acquainted with his record before he started working in the SSD102. First of all, the members of the Commission expected to get the official list of all KGB reservists. The list was requested from the SSD, the interdepartmental Lustration Commission and the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania (further GRRCL). Had it turned out that the reserve list contained more officials holding high positions, then they according to the Chairman of the Commission Pabedinskas, would be made public. It was expected that we would find out if those included in KGB reserve lists had given their written agreement to be included, if they made commitments to carry out tasks of the Soviet security department, and what for incentives were given. The members of the Commission expected to discover if these individuals had to keep information about their belonging to the reserve secret, if there were those who refused to be included in the reserve, if after the restoration of Lithuanias independence they continued their activities and whose instructions they followed: were they given by the officials who lived and worked in Lithuania or these instructions

99 Ibid. 100 DELFI-BNS-ELTA, A. Valionis and A. Pocius Confessed the Belonging to the KGB Reserve, 7 February 2005. 101 Barkauskaitë O., (note 76). 102 Ibid. 220 used to come from Moscow. The Commission requested each institution to state their opinion on what kind of security mechanism should be set up for the individuals included in the reserve lists. At that time, the law did not obligate KGB reservists to appeal to the special Lustration Commission. The latter was required to provide a report on how the Law on Lustration, that came into force in 2000, was so far being enforced103. The obtained answers raised doubts to the members of the temporary investigation Commission of the Seimas concerning the impartiality of histo- rians of the country and a suggestion was made to request the estimation of the activity of the KGB reserve from Russia [i.e. in fact, from the Federal Security Service that had the rest of the KGB archives at its disposal A.A.]. The Liberal Centrist Raimundas ukys, the originator of this initiative, stated that this was a way to use every possible source of information. Representatives of the Genoci- de and Resistance Research Center of Lithuania (GSRCL) hold a categorical opinion, said ukys providing motives for his suggestion. After the voiced criticism that the request that Moscow estimate the activity of the KGB reserve would undermine the authority of Lithuanias institutions and primarily, that of the Seimas, this proposition was rejected. Finally, it was decided to leave it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself to answer which states should be requested to provide information on the activities of the KGB reserve104. The Commis- sion decided to request information from the Head of the Department of Opera- tional Activity of Mykolas Riomeris University Kestutis imkus (the adviser to President Adamkus on the issues of organized crime and corruption preven- tion) 105. No official requests for additional information were made even from the closest neighbour Latvia, whose archives still have, most probably, the most comprehensive base of normative acts which regulated the KGB activity.

3.2. Conclusions of the Commission: the KGB Reserve Equals to Compulsory Military Service

In its meetings held in the period from 28 January to 28 February 2005, the Commission established that in the analysis of the issue of the KGB reserve and the status of individuals included in KGB reserve lists, attention should be paid to the fact that laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania define neither the status of the KGB reserve nor individuals included in KGB reserve lists. The inclusion in the KGB reserve had no impact on work or official activity because there were no commitments, pledges, etc. [though nothing was said as to how to appraise the agreement to be in the KGB reserve A. A.]. The necessity for corresponding positions would arise only in the case of the outbreak of war. Being in the KGB reserve should be compared to doing compulsory military service (this conclusion was made on the basis of the 11 February 2005 letter

103 Gudavièius S., New Names in the KGB Vortex , Kauno diena, 29 January 2005. 104 An Unofficial KGB Reserve List Wandering in the Seimas, www.delfi.lt, 29 January 2005. 105 Autoriaus faile nëra iðnaðao teksto 221 written to the Commission by assoc. Prof. imkus). However, no explanation was given as to why a person who avoided compulsory military service would be brought under penal code, whereas no sanctions were imposed for the one who refused to be KGB reserve officers. On the other hand, no estimation was given to the fact that service (or work) in KGB institutions was equalled to the service in the armed forces. The Commission concluded that: The USSR KGB reserve was a mobilization part of the KGB designed for cases of the special period (threat of war, beginning of war, natural disasters and mass riots) and war. [...] The Commission has no accurate data available as to whether the inclusion in KGB reserve lists had an impact on the positions held by the persons included (though no comments are given on whether this helped make a career in the then communist nomenclature A. A.). People who agreed to be included in the KGB reserve had various motives career possibilities, avoidance of military service. Accor- ding to the data of the Commission, refusal to be registered in the KGB reserve did not cause any consequences106. Based on the available data, the Commission drew a conclusion that Po- cius was included in the list of KGB reserve officers, but the Commission did not possess sufficient data to conclude whether he knew that. The Commission decided that Valionis was included in the KGB reserve, which he was later informed about. Trying to determine if the order of appointing to posts provided for in legal acts was not violated when the individuals who had been included in KGB reserve lists were appointed to their current positions, the Commission established that the fact of inclusion in the lists of the State Security Department (KGB), i. e. a special service reserve, was not sufficient to claim that the person actually collaborated with special services. Besides, apart from the objective indication of secret collaboration with special services actual execution of tasks and assignments a subjective attribute was necessary, i. e. while carrying out tasks and assignments, the person must act consciously according to a written or verbal commitment. Thus, a person who performed assignments given by special services had to be consciously aware of whose tasks and assignments he was executing. Taking this into consideration, the Commission made a conclusion that when Valionis was designated Minister of Foreign Affairs and Pocius was designated Director General of the State Security Department, the requirements provided for in legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania were not violated. The Commission had no data to confirm that Valionis, Pocius or Pekeliû- nas carried out any tasks or assignments or in any other way committed themselves to fulfil them in the future. According to the Commission, this presupposes the fact that none of the aforementioned persons had to admit their inclusion in the KGB reserve lists.

106 Conclusions of the temporary Commission on the investigation of the facts and circumstances related to the inclusion in the lists of the State Security Department Reserve of the USSR of the Deputy Chairman of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Alfredas Pekeliûnas, the General Director of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania Arvydas Pocius and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania Antanas Valionis, 1 March 2005, http://www3.lrs.lt/. 222 But one of the most controversial (from the legal point of view) decisions of the Commission concerned the application of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania On the Verification of Mandates of Deputies Suspected of Conscious Collaboration with Special Services of Other States. The Commission decided that, regarding the circumstances and content of its passage, it could not in fact be any longer applied. According to the Commission: Norms [but not all A.A.] analogous to the provisions of the aforementioned law are provided for in the special Law passed in 1999. The law on Recording, Confes- sion, Registration and Security of those who Confessed to Secret Collaboration with Special Services of the Former USSR. The aforementioned law is applied not only to members of the Seimas but also to other state officials, state employees and persons employed in state establishments and institutions. Therefore, with the emergence of the fact about secret collaboration of the members of the Seimas with secret services of the former USSR, the law does not comply that with, the formed current social relations governed by law, that it should be applied107. Taking this into account, the Commission concluded that the responsibility for not informing the state of Lithuania about the fact of secret collaboration with secret services of the former USSR, which is provided for by law can be applied neither to Valionis nor Pocius nor Pekeliûnas. According to the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, one of the key objectives of national security is human and civic rights, freedom and persons security. It also comprises a persons security when freedom of action is restricted while threatening to publicize data compromising him. According to the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, the authorities of the state are bound to secure Lithuania from subversive activity of secret services of foreign states. This activity can be characterized by the application of conventional and unconventional methods and new technologies in order to illegally obtain information, destructively affect and influence military capabilities, political processes and other areas of social and economic life. The Commission decided that due to the fact that the Seimas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the State Security Department carry out particularly important functions in guaranteeing national security, illegal restriction of freedom of action of heads of these institutions threatening to publicize data compromising them might have an impact on the activity of these institutions. Therefore, considering the importance of the functions performed by these institutions, in this way, it is a threat to national security could be posed. After the restoration of independence to the Republic of Lithuania, in Lithuanian legal acts, the KGB has more than once been evaluated as a repressive institution of the occupational power. Thus, belonging to the KGB reserve could be unfavourably estimated in society and considered to be a circumstance demeaning a persons honour and dignity. For this reason, and based on the aforementioned facts, threatening to publicize the data about the heads of the Seimas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Security Department belonging to the KGB reserve could illegally restrict their freedom of action and thus,

107 Ibid. 223 alongside the activity of foreign special services, could pose a threat to national security. On the other hand, after the Commission established that Pocius and Valionis belonged to the KGB reserve, these data became public [though they became public not due to the Commission A. A.]. That is why there was no possibility to restrict freedom of these persons in the above-discussed way. So the Commission confirmed that while being in office Pocius and Valionis posed no threat to the interests of national security. Having analyzed and evaluated the submitted documents, the Commis- sion made a conclusion that at present some of the individuals included into the KGB reserve lists hold the positions of state politicians, judges or state officials. The Commission proposed that the Seimas should prepare and pass legal acts, regulating the order and conditions of publicizing individuals included in the KGB reserve108. When the Seimas temporary Commission on the investigation of the activity of the KGB reserve confirmed the conclusion of the investigation and stated that the KGB reserve was a mobilization part of Soviet security and the fact that high officials of the country belonged to it did not pose a threat to national security, the Liberal and Center Union gave a critical estimation to these conclusions. According to the politicians, the Commission that investigated connections of high politicians with the KGB did not announce anything new and the conclusions it made were belated and did not, in essence, solve the ongoing KGB problem109. The Liberal Centrists were convinced that the previously proposed idea, to reform the temporary Commission on the investigation of the activity of KGB reservists and transform it into a permanent institution, should be reverted to. By the end of the term of the present Seimas, a newly formed and extended commission should complete the process of familiarization, investigation, and official announcement of all available information on Soviet repressive institutions and their personnel that operated in Lithuania. The Liberal Centrists claimed that only systemic, continual and comprehensive investigations of Soviet repressive institutions would make it possible to avoid the occasional witch hunt and finally bury the KGB ghost that had been wandering around the country for over a decade110.

3.3. The Difference between the Public Opinion and the Position of the Political Elite

The Social Research Institute conducted a survey of the attitudes of ordinary people the senior generation of Lithuanian villages and small towns who lived during the Soviet period towards the Soviet past. The majority of respondents were in favour of the telling the truth strategy the past should

108 The Commission confirmed the conclusion of the investigation results in the meeting of 1 March 2005. Voting results: for 9, against 1, abstained 0. 109 Both Politicians and Clergymen Unraveling the KGB Reserve, Lietuvos rytas, 7 March 2005. 110 Ibid. 224 be identified and estimated from todays perspective. The major part of victims of the Soviet regime former political prisoners and deportees shared the same position. They would be satisfied, in their words, with a symbolically expressed implementation of the truth identification and assessment and, preferably, a public apology from the responsible organizers and performers of the crimes of the communist regime. This group of people are particularly vulnerable to the spread of responsibility relativism within power institutions and official discourse. Some are hurt by the fact that the former ones have taken high positions without having honestly evaluated their collaboration with the Soviet regime. Prior to the decision taken by the Seimas temporary Commission, the attitude of the Lithuanian population towards individuals who had been included in the KGB reserve was appraised. The majority of Lithuanian people held the opinion that those who in the Soviet period were included in the KGB reserve should not take high state posts. This was indicated by a sociological survey conducted by the Market Analysis and Research Group (MARG) at the request of the news agency BNS. Having been asked if individuals who in the past were in the KGB reserve had a moral right to hold high state posts, 63.3 % of the respondents said they were against it, 28.6 % believed they had such a moral right and 8.1 % gave no answer to this question. A negative opinion about the fate of the former KGB reservists holding high posts was more often expressed by men (66.1 %), within age groups between 30-49 and 70-74 (68.5 %), by respondents living in the centres of regions (68.1 %) or counties (67.2 %). More tolerant to the possibilities of the former reservists to be employed in state posts were young people of the age of 16-19 (33.3 %) and residents of major cities (57.8 %) as well as those earning over 600 Litas a month per family member.111 According to the Sprinter Research survey, ordered by DELFI and conducted 3-12 February 2005, 74 % of the population of the country thought that it was important to publicize the names of people who had belonged to the KGB reserve, 13 % expressed the opposite opinion, and 14 % had no opinion on this issue. Senior people approved of publicizing the lists, while young people more often did not have a clear opinion on this matter. Respondents did not state a clear opinion on how high state officials included in KGB reserve lists should be treated (or how they themselves should behave). There were 27 % who said that such people must unconditionally resign, the biggest group 38 % - thought that the possibility to further hold their positions should be related to the level of their collaboration with the KGB, 11 % were of the opinion that merits of these people to Lithuania after the restoration of independence should be taken into account. The Lithuanian population does not approve of the restriction on the access to KGB archival documents. There were 80 % of the respondents who gave a negative opinion on such actions of the authorities. Representatives of the senior generation showed strong disapproval of such restrictions, whereas younger respondents tended not to express their opinion112. It can be stated that

111 The majority are against KGB Reservists to Hold High Posts, Lietuvos rytas, 18 February 2005. 112 The majority of the countrys population think that it is necessary to publicize the names of KGB reservists, www.delfi.lt, 21 February 2005. 225 the prevalent public opinion did not correspond to the position of the highest state officials in appointing persons included in the KGB reserve to the positions important for national security, although features of dissociation from the solution of the problems of the past are also evident in the public opinion.

Conclusions

In the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, when the KGB was making preparations in advance to deal with tasks planned for the special period and was ready for urgent actions in peacetime extreme conditions, the KGB reserve of reserve officers was formed. This from which no more than 273 reserve officers were transferred from the armed forces reserve and were registered as KGB reserve officers. Selection to the KGB reserve, verification of reliability, extraction of an agreement to collaborate with the KGB and other repeated procedures of selection and reliability verification of a regular member of the KGB personnel was preformed. The verified loyalty of KGB reserve officers to the communist system and their suitability to implement KGB tasks could guarantee a faster way to get to the communist nomenclature or career advancement. Due to the negative attitudes towards the KGB prevailing among the majority of Lithua- nian society, any kind of secret connections with this communist secret service were in advance regarded as capable of posing a threat to national security of Lithuania. Hence, a negative attitude of society towards relations with the KGB might have an impact on both the activity of the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the SSD. It could also pose as an indirect threat to national security as well as destabilize the political situation, or the situation in the institutions responsible for national security. Regarding the legacy of the past, in the political circles of the country (due to relations of some of the representatives of the legislative and executive bodies with the former communist nomenclature, this due to the unimplemented de- Sovietization), unconstructive partial amnesia and relativism started to prevail. The discussion that followed added to a more distinctive manifestation of the attitude towards the past that hitherto existed in the highest political circles. The fact of being in the KGB reserve, as well as a possible existence of information in the hands of Russian special services, was not related to potential threats to national security. Reconsideration of the relationship to the KGB was turned towards parliamentary investigation and improvement of legal acts. Even though, from the formally legal point of view, in the publicized past of the high state officials-KGB reservists no traces of conscious collaboration were detected. But from the moral point of view, however, the involvement of one or another persons past in the activity of the KGB, an organization of repression and terror, for a greater part of society still remains hardly justifiable. The need to deal with the past by identifying those who in the name of the former regime whom committed crimes, violated human rights, or had connections with the institutions that executed all this, is still felt among a certain part 226 of society. The temporary Commission of the Seimas did not discover any threats to national security regarding the membership of high officials to the KGB reserve. However, this position differed from the public opinion expressed during sociological polls. This demonstrates that a societal accord on this issue has not yet been reached.

Vilnius, 13 September 2005 227

STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER of the Lithuanian Military Academy and Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2005

Managing Editor Gediminas Vitkus Make-up editor Amy Elizabeth Jankauskas

Signed for printing 2006 10 16. Circulation 350 copies. Order GL-488. Published by Lithuania Military Academy Ðilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, http://www.lka.lt Designed and printed by the Publishing and Information Provision Service of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania Totoriø 25/3, Vilnius, http://www.kam.lt

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