Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019 (1-15) (P-ISSN 2528-276X) (E-ISSN 2598-6465) http://dx.doi.org/10.31506/jog.v4i1.4874

POPULISM IN THE 2017 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

Abdul Hamid Government Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa [email protected]

Received: February 8 2019; Revised: March 13 2019; Accepted: March 31 2019

Abstract: The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was one of the most competitive local elections in . This election clearly used religious and ethnic populism strategy that divided Jakarta citizens into two groups: A Muslim Governor’s supporters Vs. Incumbent`s supporters. The root of the Muslim governor’s supporters was the rejection of some Islamic organizations against the rise of Chinese-Christian Incumbent Governor – or “Ahok”. This sentiment found a momentum when Ahok was accused of blasphemy against Islam that provoked Muslims furious. Moreover, became a successful candidate utilizing the sentiments and used mosques to echo the resistance against non- muslim Governor candidate. Keywords: Blasphemy, Democracy, Jakarta Gubernatorial election, Populism

Introduction "In the past, we pribumi (a term that were the victories of the could be loosely defined as “native Native Muslims against others. Indonesians”) were oppressed and It also confirmed the strategy of defeated; now we are independent, now Baswedan during the Jakarta Governor is the time for us to be masters in our own Election campaign. In a video circulating country.” (Anies Baswedan, Governor of at an internal meeting of Baswedan Jakarta Inauguration`s Speech, 16 October supporters, Fatah as his Political 2017). Consultant explained how the sermon in The victory speech of the 2017 the mosque as the FIS in Algeria elected Jakarta Governor, Anies effectively won the election. He Baswedan, seemed to be the culmination personally wanted this strategy to be run of all political fights in one of the most in Jakarta. (Johan SP, 2017) brutal local election involving religious So as in command, Friday prayers and ethnic sentiments. Despite being in Jakarta and surrounding areas were elected, Baswedan maintained his filled with Friday praying’s sermons position as a Governor supported by spreading hatred against the incumbent, “native” and Islamic circles, instead of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) who is above all diverse groups in Jakarta. A Christian and Chinese. Ahok became banner stated "Awakening of the Native- muslim`s enemy after his speech in Muslims" (Kebangkitan Pribumi Muslim) thousand islands considered as was installed not far from the location. blasphemy by Majelis Ulama Indonesia The day the narrative was clearly built, and made public anger. And impact the the victories of Anies Baswedan and anger of Muslims in Indonesia.

1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019

This strategy was a populist society between ‘the people’ (as the strategy, in which a candidate built a underdogs) and its ‘other’.” Furthermore, position in front of a ranks of he argued that the identification of “the homogeneous society by building people” and “the other” are political antagonistic relationships with other. As constructs, symbolically established Jakarta is the central of Indonesian through the relation of antagonism, a politics and became Jakarta Governor is mode of identification in which the the next step to be leader in the national relation between its form and its content level, it is very important to understand what happened in the 2017 Jakarta is given by the process of naming—that is, election. This paper explained the proses of establishing who the enemies of the of how the populism was built in the people, and therefore the people itself, Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial election and are. its impact to Democracy in Indonesia. Study by Spruyt, Keppens and Mude and Kalwatser (2012, pp. 3– Droogenbroeck (2016) show that 7) stated three main approaches to populism is embedded in a feeling of deep populism. The first is populism as a dissatisfaction, not only with politics but particular type of political movement. In also with people's lives in general. In this perspective, populism is a multiclass addition, we show that populism is most movement organized around a strongly supported by stigmatization charismatic leader (Germani, 1978). The groups who face difficulties in finding a main ingredient is not only the presence of a strong leader but also the formation positive social identity. of a movement that appeals to As Indonesia has been a heterogonous social groups. This democratic state since 1998, populism in approach is mainly used to explain Latin this paper refers to Canovan’s (1999) American populism and fascism in Europe explanation of a populist movement when regarding the emergence of within a mature, well-established extremist mass movement. democratic system. She argued that in The second approach is populism modern democratic societies, populism is as a political style, characterized by the best seen as an appeal to the people promotion of a particular kind of link against both the established structure of between political leaders and electorate, a power and the dominant ideas and values link structured around a loose and of the society. Populists claim legitimacy opportunistic appeal to “the people” to on the grounds that they speak for the win and/or exercise political power. people, to represent the democratic The third approach is – as used in sovereign, not a sectional interest of a this paper: populism as a discourse. specific economic class. Populist values Concerning this perspective, Laclau also vary according to the context, (2005, p. 18) explains that populism is depending upon the nature of the elite characterized by confronting the existing and the dominant political discourse hegemony by means of a discursive (Canovan, 1999, P. 3). construction capable of dividing the social Based on the current Europe’s into two categories: “the power bloc” experience, there are several main versus “the people.” features of populism (Fuest, 2017). Following this category, Panizza (2005, First, populists usually describe society pp. 3–4), defined populism as “an anti as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: people are often status-quo discourse that simplifies the juxtaposed with ruling elites who are political space by symbolically dividing seen as corrupt. The second is

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 2 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election overemphasizing the negative effects of Populism also cannot be released globalization. Populists reject from the media for the spread of the immigration and oppose the integration populits idea. Nowadays, internet - of politics and international institutions especially social media became the most that support and regulate economic important media, compare to the exchanges between countries. Third, conventional one. populists support expansive fiscal Research by Engesser, Ernst, Esser, policies and tend to override disturbing and Buchel (2015) found that populism government budget constraints. manifests itself in a fragmented form on Referring to Mudde (2017) there social media. Populist statements can be are three key core concepts of populism. First, the “people”. People in the populist` found in various countries, parties, and perception is usualy related to the self- levels of politician status. While a large perception (or self-idealization) of the number of politicians advocated for the targeted people as the construction of the people, attacks on the economic elite were populist. Second, general wills. They favored by populist left-wingers. Attacks on closely linked to homogenous the media elite and exclusion from others, interpretation of people who have same however, were mostly carried out by right- interests and preferences. Basic of the wing politicians. This shows that social general wills is common sense and media gives populist actors the freedom to anyone who opposes it, is devious and articulate their ideology and spread their part of the corrupt elite. Third, the elite. It messages. is distinghuished based on morality: good Study by Salgado (2018) in Portugal, people Vs. evil elite. found that the populist issues such as Populist can deploy a mixture of corruption and immigration spread by national, ethnic, class, regional, and social media. The mainstream media play a religious identities in order to define who role as “establish” media that counter the belongs within the category of ‘us’ and – issue. by extension – who is consigned to ‘them’. Gerbaude (2018) stated that the In several western countries, right wing compatibility between social media and politicians use Christianity as religious populist politics stems from the way the identity that used to confront Islam as ability of mass media social networks, when threat of the people wellbeing. 'mass networks' involving billions of people Several cases of religious based around the world, provide channels that are populism collected in the provocative appropriate for mass politics and appeal to book title: Saving the People, How people typical of populism. Social media in populist Hijack Religion. Since 9/11, populist movements play a role as a Muslim wanted to impose their religious people's voice channel and popular rally, values and traditions on the people as providing, on the one hand, a means for part of a surreptitious `Islamization` plan. dissatisfied individuals to express Ideas of invasion, infiltration, contagion, conspiracy, replacement and impending themselves, and on the other hand, with irreversible crisis represent key spaces where dissatisfied Internet users components of the populist imaginary, can gather and formed a partisan online and all of those are present in the notion crowd. that a deliberate process of islamisation is occurring under our noses in many Methods Western democracies. (Marzouki, This research is used a qualitative mcDonell, 2016: 5). method. Qualitative method is defined as an inquiry process of understanding

3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019 based on distinct methodological He was elected President, Jakarta Politics traditions of inquiry that explore a social became one of the most important or human problem (Creswell, 1998, p. political events.In 2012, 15). The researcher builds a complex, (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama holistic picture, analyses words, reports (Ahok) ran to be Jakarta Governor and detailed views of informants and Vice Governor, supported by PDIP and conducts the study in a natural setting. Gerindra Parties. Both of them were This qualitative research is political outsiders in Jakarta, yet famous classified as a case study: an exploration as success leaders in their hometowns: of a “bounded system” or a case over time Jokowi in Surakarta and Ahok in Belitung via detailed, in-depth data collection Timur. They capitalized on the frustration involving multiple sources of information of Jakartans, while offered hopes for a that is rich in context. (Creswell, 1998, p. new identity and possible solutions: the 61). Several interviews, observations and New Jakarta (Jakarta Baru). For many document analysis conducted to collect Jakartans, The New Jakarta was the the data. To analyse the data, this answer to their frustrations on Former research used the four forms of data Governor and formal political analysis and interpretation used in the institutions. They created oppositional case study by Stake (as cited in Creswell, relationship between the “New Jakarta” 1998, pp. 153–154): as symbol of his struggle in election, and the established “Old Jakarta” that was Result and Discussion represented by Foke as the incumbent Previously, Jakarta politics (Hamid, 2012). received less attention among scholars. But Jokowi governed Jakarta on Massaki and Honna (2014) provide short period, less than two years. In 2014, several reasons. First, it was understood he ran for Presidential election and won. that local politics independent of national Politics in Jakarta has become more politics did not exist in Jakarta. The interesting. It meant that the Governor of boundary between national and Jakarta Jakarta position was a strategic political politics is blurred and both are stepping-stone to be a national figure. considered closely related. Then on November 19th, 2014, Ahok was Second, Jakarta politics is very inaugurated as the . different from the politics in other parts The mandate to realize New Jakarta was of Indonesia. As the nation's capital, now under the leadership of Ahok. From Jakarta is too metropolitan and has the the beginning, the rise of Ahok as a non- highest percentage of the upper middle muslim Governor cause more rejection, class in the country. Political behavior especially from some Islamic groups. One and the pattern of selecting these groups of the biggest groups was Save Jakarta are very decisive in Jakarta and not the Movement (Gerakan Menyelamatkan same as those in other parts of Indonesia. Jakarta – GMJ) that claimed supports by Third, Jakarta's politics are openly visible 99 elements. The most important element to everyone. Every day, all major national of GMJ was Islamic Defenders Front media outlets research and cover the (Front Pembela Islam – FP). The tagline of activities of the governor, deputy GMJ was Rejecting Jakarta from a Non- governor and provincial parliament of Moslim Governor (“kafir”). They also Jakarta. questioned several Ahok's policy: However, after the 2012 election prohibition of slaughtering sacrifice when Joko Widodo won the election animals (Qurban) in public space, against Incumbent Fauzi Bowo, and then allowing alcohol drinks in hotel and

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 4 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election supermarket and also Ahok's idea about December 2014 with the tittle : Rally of 1 localization of prostitution. (Republika, milion people get rid of Ahok and to 01 June 2015) GMJ conduct a rally in 1 disseminate this invitation .

Figure 1: Rally of 1 million people to get rid of Ahok

In another rally, on December 1st Jakarta MTJB-GMJ), led by Habib Riziek 2014, the GMJ enthroned a Jakarta muslim Syihab. figure and member of FPI, Fahrurozzi MTJB-GMJ held convention of the Ishaq, as the Jakarta's muslim Governor. Governor of Jakarta in order to realize Then GMJ continuously campaigned for Jakarta with Syariah Implementation. muslim candidate to be Governor in the Beside MTJB-GMJ, there was also the next election. They made online campaign Jakarta Servant Assembly (Majelis Pelayan to support their idea through Jakarta, MPJ), a collection of Islamic gubernurmuslim.com. scholars who also aims to nominate candidates for governors, led by Didin The Battle Hafidhudhin, former President of Justice Religious and identity became main Party. issue, altogether with poverty issue also However, the process by MTJB-GMJ during the Governor Election. GMJ, besides and MPJ failed in bringing up candidates making anti Ahok campaign, also actively for Governor who can compete officially. campaigned and even initiated a selection All the official candidates who officialy of Muslim Governor Candidates. Muslim- registered through the Election native identity was confronted with Ahok's Commission came through political parties. Christian identity. MTJB-GMJ only succeed to propose GMJ with Islamic Community Forum Sandiaga Uno to be one of the alternatives (Forum Umat Islam, FUI) and Islamic of Governor or Vice Governor. Defenders Front (FPI) create the High Finally, there were three pair of Council of Jakarta for Syariah (Islamic Law) candidates in the 2017 Jakarta Governor to the Muslim Governor of Jakarta (Majelis election: Tinggi Jakarta Bersyariah Untuk Gubernur (Agus) - Sylviana Murni (Sylvi), Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) - Djarot Saiful

5 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019

Hayat (Djarot), and Anies Baswedan supported by Gerindra Party and (Anies) - Sandiaga Uno (Sandi) who will . At that time, fight in the election. Anies was a former minister of education Agus-Sylvi pair was nominated by and culture had just been removed from four political parties: the Democratic Party, Jokowi’s cabinet. Previously he was a , National political scientist and was once the Rector Awakening Party and National Mandate of Paramadina University. Sandy was a Party. Agus was the eldest son of the 6th young and wealthy entrepreneur in various , Susilo Bambang fields, especially investment and energy. Yudhoyono. He resigned as a military Various Islamic groups who joined middle officer to become a governor in JB-GMJ and MPJ, finally agreed that the candidate. Sylvi was a senior bureaucrat in most important thing to do is supporting Jakarta Local Government. Sylvi's position the candidate of Muslim Governor, both opened opportunities for bureaucrat Agus-Sylvi or Anis-Sandy.The priority was supports. to prevent non-moslem Governor winning Ahok-Djarot was nominated by the election (VOA Islam, 2016). Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, During the campaign, programmatic Party, Hanura Party, and National issues to solve various problems in Jakarta Democrat Party. Ahok was an incumbent, did not become important discourses. replacing Joko Widodo as the previous Furthermore, incumbent seemed to fail Governor. He previously was a member of showing its performance in fixing Jakarta National Parliament from Golkar Party and problems. Ahok’s success story was Regent of Belitong Timor. Djarot was the covered by religious and ethnic issues , replacing Ahok. dominated news surrounding the election. Previously he was Mayor of Blitar, East As a result, in the first round , for two periods. followed by three candidate pairs of The third candidate pair was Anies election, the following votes were obtained. Baswedan (Anies) - Sandiaga Uno (Sandi)

Table 1 Result of First Round Election 15 February 2017 No Candidates and Supporter Party Voters 1 Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono – Sylviana Murni 17.05% (Democrat Party, Unity Development Party, , dan National Mandat Party)

2 Basuki Tjahaya Purnama – Djarot Saiful Hayat 42.99% (Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, Golkar Party, Hanura Party, National Democrat Party)

3 Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno 39.95% (Gerindra Party dan Welfare and Justice Party)

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 6 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

As regulated in Law no. 29 of 2007 the second round of elections must be on the Provincial Government of the held. Basuki - Djarot and Anies - Sandi Special Capital Region of Jakarta, the drove into the second round, while Agus - winner of the Regional Head Election Sylvi was eliminated.The result of the must obtain more than 50% of the vote. final election could be seen in the tabel Since no one gets more than 50% votes, below as a comparison.

Table 2 Result of Final Round of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 19 April 2017 No Candidates Voters 1 Basuki Tjahaya Purnama – Djarot Saiful Hayat 42.04% 2 Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno 57.96% Total 100% Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

Observing results for each Sandi got overwhelming number of votes, district,this is very unexpected Ahok successfully hijacked almost all the voters almost got no additional votes in the Agus – Sylvi in the first round. Notice the second round. On the contrary, Anies- table below.

N Candid Voters for Each Candidate in Municipality/City Level o ates Agus-Sylvi Basuki-Djarot Anies-Sandi 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd

1 Thousa 3891 5.532 5.391(38 4.851 8.796(62%) nd (27.8%) (38.8%) %) (34%) Islands 2 North 142.142(15. 416.720(48. 418.096 301.256(35. 466.743(52. Jakarta 5%) 4%) (47.3%) 1%) 7%)

3 West 203.107(16. 613.194(48. 611.180(4 444.743(35. 685.079 Jakarta 1%) 6%) 7.2%) 3%) (52.8%) 4 Central 101.744(17. 244.727(43. 243.574(4 222.814 332.803 Jakarta 8%) 0%) 2.3%) (39.2%) (57.7%) 5 South 177.363(14. 465.524(38. 459.753 557.767(46. 754.140(62. Jakarta 8%) 7%) (37.9%) 5%) 1%) 6 East 309.708(19. 618.880(38. 612.630(3 665.902 992.946 Jakarta 4%) 8%) 8.2%) (41.8%) (61.8%) Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

The People Vs Other populism by establishing identity as a Populism in local politics new Jakarta, face-to-face with "Old especially in Jakarta was not a new Jakarta". This pattern succeeded to bring phenomenon. In the 2012 Jakarta Jokowi into the Governor of DKI Jakarta Gubernatoorial Election, Jokowi used (Hamid, 2014).

7 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019

In the 2017 Jakarta 1.Anti Ahok Rally Gubernunatorial Election, populism The MUI statement was then occured but with different packaging. responded by various Islamic groups by Religion, ethnicity, and poverty were forming the MUI Fatwa Support combined into commodities to build and Movement (GNPF-MUI). The GNPF strengthen the identity those became undertook a series of actions to defend antithesis of the incumbent. Islamic Islam and Ulama and support the groups - who feel as majority community enforcement of Al Maidah's letter: - didn’t feel having access to power and rejecting non-moslem as leaders, in this resources since 2014, the showing their case Governor Ahok. They also urged resistence and demonstrated opposition Ahok to be legally processed as a to Ahok's leadership. blasphemy suspect. GNPF MUI was led by The momentum was when Ahok in Bachtiar Nasir as Chairman and Habib his activities as Governor in Thousand Riziek Syihab as Chairman of the Board of Islands Regency, September 27 2016 Trustees. made a speech that contain the statement: At least seven massive Islamic In your inner hearts, ladies and Defense Rallies (Aksi Bela Islam) were gentlemen, you may feel you carried out not only involving the Islamic cannot vote for me, because community in Jakarta, but also from [you have been] lied to by the various regions of Indonesia (extracted use of Surah al-Maidah, Verse from various sources by the Author). 51. […] So, if you cannot vote for Hundred thousand people using Islamic me because you are afraid of attribute came to Jakarta to join the rally being condemned to hell, you do request for the Police to process Ahok`s not need to feel uneasy, because Blasphemy. In third and biggest rally on you are being fooled. It is 2nd December 2016 – knwons as 212 alright.” Action (Aksi 212) --, President Joko His statement uploaded in Widodo met the participants of the Rally Youtube by provincial official and the and followed Friday prayers led by Habib shorter version, only the statement Riziek Syihab. The massive and intensive above uploaded again in Facebook with rally against Ahok build massive public edited transcript by Buni Yani in opinion and became national headline for October 2016. This video became viral, long time. broadcasted 346,354 times and shared 11.033 times (Pamungkas and 2.Mosque as Basis and Intimidation for Octaviany, 2017). Ahok`s Supporters Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) As stated at the beginning of this responded and wrote reprimand letter paper, making the Mosque as the (surat teguran) to Ahok in October 9th, movement basis was a special strategy 2016. In October 11th, 2016, MUI made conveyed by its political consultant Anies Religius Opinion and Statement Baswedan. The strengthening of anti- (Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan): Ahok sentiment by using Al-Maidah verse “…the statement of Basuki 51 letter, is constantly voiced in various Tjahaja Purnama was activities in mosque, especially Friday categorized: (1) insulting the prayer, not only in Jakarta, but also Koran and or (2) insulting outside Jakarta. This reinforces the Ulama (Islamic scholars), that antagonistic position, between Muslim Vs (the statement) have legal Ahok Supporters. Muslims means using Al consequences.” Maidah verse 51 as a guide to vote, Ahok's

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 8 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election supporters are also supporters of the attached a large banner stated "This Blasphemy. Mosque does not Hold Praying for One of its effects was the Muslim Supporters and Defenders of Blasphemy" society’s refusal to do corpse praying for with quotation of Koran’s letter, At- those who were supposed to support Taubah: 84 which legitimize such action Ahok. One example was Hindun, whose (Tabloid Bintang, 2017). corpse was rejected for worshipped in Al The same thing happened at Mu`minun Mosque Setiabudi, South Warung Jati, Pancoran, South Jakarta. The Jakarta. The people refused to inscribe his corpse of a resident can be worshiped body at the Mosque for knowing that in after his family sign the letter at the the first round of elections Hindun voted request of the RT Chairman to elect the Ahok. The religious figures said that Muslim Governor. Otherwise, his body Hindun was not worshipped in Al was refused to be worshiped. Mu'minun Mosque because of the heavy (liputan6.com, 2017) rain. In fact, in front of the mosque was

Figure 2 Banner, Not Praying for Ahok`s Supporter Corpse Source: Detik.com (2017)

This kind of phenomenon is a expelled Ahok and Djarot because Ahok response to the widespread use of the was the blasphemy perpetrator. As a Mosque as a means of campaign of anti result, Ahok and Djarot failed to carry out non-moslem governor candidate in the campaigns in several places, and the issue Mosque. of blasphemy widened (www.tempo.co, 2016).Furthermore, during voting period, Intimidation During Campaign and another another intimidation movement Voting Period happened. A movement called Al-Maidah Activities during the campaign Tour (Tamasya Al-Maidah) mobilized period – and never happened before – anti-Ahok volunteers to monitor the were the abandonment of Ahok and polling stations in Jakarta on the final- Djarot campaigns in several places in round vday. Each polling station was Jakarta. The mass using muslim attributes monitored by around 100 people.

9 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019

The volunteers didn’t only come movement provoked fears in Jakarta from Jakarta, but from outside Jakarta society to express their political support such as Tangerang, Surabaya and Ciamis. freely. Ahok's Muslim supporters were In social media messages circulating reluctant to get blasphemy supporters ahead of the second election, there were label once they admid they supported calls for Muslims to come to the TPS and Ahok. Morever, they faced consequences to escort the enforcement of Al Maidah not to be prayed in mosque if they died. verse 51 which prohibits Muslims to For Indonesian Muslims which religion choose a non-Muslim leader. In posters was not only private matters but social circulating online, it appeared Sightseeing affairs, the intimidation created deep fear, Al maidah was driven by GEMA Jakarta, because life as a Muslim would be GMMP and Exponent 212. considered imperfect by GEMA Jakarta, The abandonment of Ahok`s GMPP and Exponent 212 as an campaigns and Al Maidah Tour organization that opposes Ahok.

Figure 3.Leafet Al Maidah Tour

Populism and Democracy in Jakarta identities, was already tried in the 2012 In 2012, Jokowi used populism to Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Rhoma build differentiation and antagonistic Irama, who supported incumbent Fauzi relationships between New Jakarta and Bowo, used mosque to campaign not to Old Jakarta in a top-down manner. On the elect a non-moslem leader, in which Ahok contrary, the polarization over the 2017 was the vice governor candidate of Jakarta Elections was bottom-up built. Jokowi. Fauzi who claimed as Betawinese The Muslim community’s anger over made an effort to establish his Ahok's statement made Muslim identity religious image throughout his stronger, not only in Jakarta but in governorship. (Miichi, 2014) various places in Indonesia. Another - extreme one was when As a matter of fact, the kind of an intimidation and violence video pattern for using both Muslim and native broadcasted during campaign period in

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 10 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

YouTube threatened that if the Chinese- This cleavage was reinforced by Indonesian participated in the election, the massive use of internet, both websites the 1998 riot in Jakarta would happen and social media. Disbelief of some again. mainstream media emerged news However, this effort was websites reflected Muslim aspirations unsuccessful because after all the such as VoAIslam, nahimunkar.com, governor candidate was Jokowi, a Muslim etc. Furthermore, in some anti-Ahok and a Javanese. The situation changed rallies, journalists from the media when Ahok replaced Jokowi. Ahok considered as “enemy”, i.e. Metro TV or however represented double-minority in Kompas, got various acts of intimidation Indonesia: a Christian and a Chinese. and violence. Meanwhile, the Defending Thus, rejection of Ahok on Islam Actions were greatly supported by religious grounds was built long before media owned by Ahok's political the 2017 Gubernatorial Election. Then it opponents, such as TVOne and INews found the momentum of the Ahok’s (Merdeka.com, 2017). statement in Thousand Islands Regency. Spreading the issue of religious The blasphemy issue became a major blasphemy was a major factor to make political one in the 2017 Jakarta election, Ahok as Muslim’s enemy, spread quickly replacing the programmatic issues. Ahok, through social media such as various a Chinese descent, was closely associated whatsapp groups and facebook accounts. with minority who mastered the The social media action is also the economic sector in Indonesia. In contrast, backbone of Islamic defenders who could that image was dealing with “native”, the gather hundred thousands of people over majority identical with poverty and and over in the name of defending marginalization. religion (Pamungkas and Octaviani, Religious identity, ethnicity and 2017). poverty issues merged into one identity, Populism is always evolving by native- Muslim Vs. Ahok. The Muslim means of mass media. The anti-colonial community felt that supporting a Muslim movement developed through print and governor candidate and fighting Ahok radio technology. Thaksin in Thailand and was not just political choice, but a form of Koizumi in Japan popularized themselves defending Islam. Therefore, the Muslim and his ideas by using television. demonstrations demanded Ahok to be (Hawkins and Selway, 2017) Estrada in punished in a case of blasphemy called as the Philippines was building image as a “the Defending Islam Actions”. defender of the poor with action films Succesfully, the actions became source of (Mizuno and Pongpaichit, 2009). references for voters in Jakarta. Currently, information and ideas promote The strengthening of religious- populism are disseminated using the based identities managed by various internet, especially social media. Islamic organizations met the political Not only religious issue, the interests of the governor candidates. poverty one was also played by Anies Hence, it created deals between Islamic through attacking Ahok’s eviction policy. mass organizations and two pairs of In fact, some evictions Jakarta were Muslim Candidate Candidates: Anies- funded by private sector (developer) such Sandi and Agus-Sylvi. It was reflected on as Podomoro Group. Anies built alliances February 11th, 2017, in which all muslim by signing political contracts with Urban governor candidates became part of the Poor Network (JRMK) Jakarta and Urban action at Istiqlal Mosque. Poor Consortium (UPC). The political contract contained: the change of the

11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019 village spatial plan, the legalization of the to lead Jakarta was considered as the village land, the affordable shelter general will of people. program for the poor, the business It was proved by the Exit Poll licensing for street vendors and the conducted by Indicator Indonesia, that transfer of profession for pedicab drivers. showed t the main reason for choosing In its release, it was stated that the Anies-Sandi was because "Religion same signing of a political contract with Anies with Me" equal to 57%. This was paradox was a punishment for Ahok who violated with satisfaction level of Ahok the political contract that had been made performance which is high enough equal with UPC (UPC and JRMK, 2017). to 71,8% and equal to 58.4% assuming The whole process then made better condition of Jakarta economy Anies emerge as a populist leader, met his (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2017). interests to become a governor candidate, Yet, populism built by Anies by using religious and ethnic identities as combining three elements: Muslim- well as poverty one. After qualifying for native-poor identities didn’t end after the the final round election, Anies became the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was only candidate for Muslim Governor, head over. Being a Governor of Jakarta was to head with Ahok, the non-moslem now considered a stepping point to Governor Candidate. So here, the issue of become the number one figure in religion was getting stronger. The use of Indonesia. So Anies's inauguration with Friday prayers as mean of campaign to racist speech and banners with the words reject Ahok was widespread. The "The awakening of Muslim-Natives" was intimidation movement in the form of the first start for the fulfillment of Anies's banning of the corpse praying for Ahok`s next political ambitions. supporters and voters was more open. Al Anies's speech that confirms his Maidah Trip on election day made Ahok ‘s victory as a Native-Muslim victory, votes stagnant at the final round of against colonization, is typical and similar elections. to the speech of populist leaders like Ros Referring to Panizza (2005: 6), Perot who says: "We (the pople) 're the intimidation as a form of violence is an owners of this country." Or Hugo Chavez extreme form of antagonism. However, (Panizza 2005) : such violence is more of a mode of “I declare the people to be the only identification, how one group and the true owners of the distinguishes itself from another (other) sovereignty. I declare the group by being physically opposite. venezulean people the true owners Voters of Agus and Sylvi in the first round, of their own history. “ shifted into Anies – Sandy in the final round. The number of Anies-Sandy's In addition to the religion used as votes in the second round was the sum of the basis for building antagonistic Agus-Sylvi and Anies Sandi's votes in the relationships, as well as ethnicity. In this first round. case, refer to Mudde (2017) such populist This means that Muslim voter’s leader is called nativist populist, blocks (facing Ahok voters' blocks) in the distinguish different groups based on first round have indeed been formed. their nativism and their populism. Ahok was regarded as "the other" who “People” in Jakarta context did not only must be defeated, and the voice of Muslim refer to muslim, but also for native people, voters who initially polarized, merged in and ethnic minorities excluded from the the final round. Having Muslim Governor people. In Jakarta elite as an enemy, not only became enemy of the “people”

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 12 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election because putting the interests of ethnic Stepan and Linz (1996) said, the only minorities, but representation of them. game in town. As Mude and Kalwatser (2012) So, populism can certainly be convey in his writings, populism can regarded as influencing the quality of strengthen or become a threat to democracy. Populism by using religion democracy. In the context of Indonesia, and identity and using the issue of populism occurs during a consolidated poverty is a threat to democracy. From democratic situation, characterized by some negative aspects of populism to elections as a means of gaining power, as democracy, what may happen was know populism can use the notion and praxis of Muslim communities should be led by majority rule to circumvent and ignore Muslim leaders. The momentum is the minority rights. blasphemy by Ahok's that emerging The history of majority and various movements: demonstration minority relations in Indonesia is full of involves large masses, intimidation of problems. Jakarta was the center of Ahok's supporters, and the use of violence against minorities in 1998 mosques as a mouthpiece to reject non- during the Majority. Religious identity moslem leaders. politicization and ethnicity, can trigger Second, Ahok supporter. The case similar sentiments and events at other of blasphemy makes Ahok's supporters times in other places and in the future. called supporters of blasphemy, and if Second, populism can promote the Muslims are considered hypocritical. establishment of a new political cleavage. Ahok's voters, especially from the Instead of positioning itself as a unifying Muslims, have difficulty expressing their society and as a leader of all classes, Anies expressions, because of their built a bloc of its own as a pribumi- concentration on social life, for example, Muslim leader. Islam, indigenes and they refused to be worshiped when they poverty became a commodity where died.The movement encourages the Anies would stand there, building emergence of Muslim leaders to meet the positioning as indigenous Muslim leader, interests of candidates who use this defender of the poor. Given the issue of strategy. Anies Baswedan became a religion in the Jakarta elections, extending successful leader utilizing this sentiment to the regions, this is an opportunity for and using the mosque to echo the the use of the issue in the next political resistance against non-moslem leaders. momentum, the 2019 presidential The pinnacle of victory in the form election. of a speech confirms that his victory is a victory of the pribumi-Muslim against the Conclusion Occupation, not the victory of the whole Populism using religious and Jakarta citizen. Anies populism is not the ethnic identity plus the issue of poverty end. When expressed in an explicit managed to divide the citizens of Jakarta victory speech, he is the beginning of a during Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial further escalation in politics at the election. Society split in two. First, the national level. In this context, the supporter and voters of the Muslim populism poses a threat to democracy, Governor. The idea of Muslim governor is since the use of a majority identity rooted in the rejection of some Islamic (Muslim-native) will threaten minorities organizations against the rise of Ahok and promote division in the Indonesian replacing Jokowi who was elected life order and society that unity has been President. They succeed to manage the formed and hurt democracy system in sentiment that Jakarta inhabited by Indonesia.

13 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019

References https://indikator.co.id/uploads/20 Canovan, M. (1999) Trust the people! 170421215057.Exit_Poll_DKI_2017_ Populism and the two Faces of Putaran2_logo_pdf Democracy, Political Studies (1999), Iskandar, RA (2017) Panwaslu Kaji Surat XLVII, p.2-16 Pilih Gubernur Muslim Agar Jenazah Creswell, John W. (1998) Qualitative Dishalatkan, liputan6.com, Online: Inquiry and Research Design, http://pilkada.liputan6.com/read/2 Choosing Among Five Traditions. 886871/panwaslu-kaji-surat-pilih- California: Sage Publication. gubernur-muslim-agar-jenazah- Detik.com (2017) Spanduk Tolak Salatkan disalatkan Jenazah Terpasang di 3 Mesjid Karet Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota Jakarta and Jaksel. Online: Urban Poor Consortium (2017) https://news.detik.com/berita/3431 JRMK-UPC Kontrak Politik (Lagi). 781/spanduk-tolak-salatkan- KPU DKI Jakarta (2017) Data dan jenazah-terpasang-di-3-masjid-di- Infografik Pilkada DKI Jakarta, 2017. karet-jaksel Jakarta: KPU DKI Jakarta. Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser,F., and Laclau, E (2005) On Populist Reason, New Buchel, F (2015) Populism and York, London: Verso. Social Media, How Politicians Linz, J and Stepan, A (1996) Problems of Spread A Fragmented Information, democratic transition and Communication and Society, Vol. 20, consolidation. Baltimore: Johns No.8, 1109-1126. Hopkins University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/136 Marzouki, N., McDonell, D. (2016) 9118X.2016.1207697 Populism and Religion, in Marzouki, Fuest, C. 2017: The Year of European mcDonell, and Roy, Save The People, Populism? Intereconomics (2017) How Populist Hijack religion, New 52: 2. York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/s102 72- Merdeka.com, 2017. Saat Wartawan 017-0634-2 Metro TV Jadi Sasaran Massa di Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and Berbagai Aksi Bela Islam, Online: populism: an elective affinity? https://www.merdeka.com/peristi Media, Culture & Society, 40(5),745- wa/saat-wartawan-metrotv-jadi- 745. https://doi.org/10.1177/0 sasaran-massa-di-berbagai-aksi- 163443718772192 bela-islam.html Hamid, A. (2014). Jokowi’s Populism in Miichi, Ken (2014), The Role of Religion the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial And Ethnicity in Jakarta’s 2012 Election. Journal Of Current Gubernatorial Election, in: Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs, 33(1), 85- Current Southeast Asian 109. Retrieved September 8, 2016, Affairs,33,1,55-83. Retrieved From http://journals.sub.uni- September 8,2016, From Hamburg.de./giga/jsaa/article/view https://journals.sub.uni- /738 Hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view Hawkins, K., and Selway, J. (2017) /737/735 Thaksin The Populist? Chin Polit. Mizuno, K and Phongpaichit, P (2009) Sci. Rev. (2017) 2:372-394 DOI Introduction, in Mizuno, K and 10.1007/s41111-017-00732-z Phongpaichit, P(Ed), (2009) Indikator Politik Indonesia (2017) Exit Populism in Asia Singapore: NUS Poll Pilgub DKI Jakarta Putaran Press, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press Ke-2, 19 April 2017. Online:

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 14 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

Mudde, C. (2017) Populism: An Ideational Supports Populism and What Approach. In Kaltwasser, CR, Attracts People to It? Political Taggart, P, Espejo, P.O, and Ostiguy, Research Quarterly, 69(2), 335– P. (2017) The Oxford Handbook of 346. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065 Populism. Oxford: Oxford 912916639138 University Press. Syaukani, AR(2017) Penjelasan Mengapa Okotomo, M and Honna, J (2014) Jenazah Nenek Pendukung Ahok- Introduction: “Local” Politics in Djarot ini tidak Dihsalatkan di Jakarta: Anomaly from Indonesia’s Mushola. Tabloid Bintang. Online: Local Politics? Journal of Current https://www.tabloidbintang.com/b Southeast Asian Affairs,33, 1,3-6, erita/peristiwa/read/62549/penjel Panizza (2005) Populism and the Mirror of asan-mengapa-jenazah-nenek- Democracy, New York: Verso pendukung-ahokdjarot-ini-tidak- Pamungkas, AS and Octaviani, G (2017) dishalatkan-di-musala Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang Publik SP, Johan (2017) Eep Saefulloh Fatah Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring ke Umat Islam dan Kontestasi Politik Komunitas Luring, Jurnal Pemikiran Jakarta, Online: Sosiologi, Vol. 4 No. 2, Agustus 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v p.65-87 =csZJSVeg5FQ Republika.com (2015). Demo Ahok, GMJ Tempo.co, 10 November 2016. Di Selamatkan Jakarta dari Pemimpin Tempat-tempat Ini Ahok Kafir. Online: Dihadang, Kampanye pun http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ Batal Online: nasional/jabodetabek- https://metro.tempo.co/read/819 nasional/15/06/01/np9039-demo- 332/di-tempat-tempat-ini-ahok- ahok-gmj-selamatkan-jakarta-dari- dihadang-kampanye-pun-batal pemimpin-kafir VOA Islam, 2017, Muzakarah Ulama Salgado, (2019) S. Where’s populism? Putuskan Dukung Kedua Pasang Online media and the diffusion of Calon Muslim, Online: populist discourses and styles in http://www.voa- Portugal . Eur Polit Sci. 18:53–65 islam.com/read/indonesiana/2016 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304- /09/30/46466/muzakarah-ulama- 017-0137-4 putuskan-dukung-kedua-pasang- Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., & Van calon-gubernur- Droogenbroeck, F. (2016). Who muslim/#sthash.EE7Yomki.dpbs

15 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I