Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019 (1-15) (P-ISSN 2528-276X) (E-ISSN 2598-6465) http://dx.doi.org/10.31506/jog.v4i1.4874 POPULISM IN THE 2017 JAKARTA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION Abdul Hamid Government Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa [email protected] Received: February 8 2019; Revised: March 13 2019; Accepted: March 31 2019 Abstract: The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was one of the most competitive local elections in Indonesia. This election clearly used religious and ethnic populism strategy that divided Jakarta citizens into two groups: A Muslim Governor’s supporters Vs. Incumbent`s supporters. The root of the Muslim governor’s supporters was the rejection of some Islamic organizations against the rise of Chinese-Christian Incumbent Governor – Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or “Ahok”. This sentiment found a momentum when Ahok was accused of blasphemy against Islam that provoked Muslims furious. Moreover, Anies Baswedan became a successful candidate utilizing the sentiments and used mosques to echo the resistance against non- muslim Governor candidate. Keywords: Blasphemy, Democracy, Jakarta Gubernatorial election, Populism Introduction "In the past, we pribumi (a term that Sandiaga Uno were the victories of the could be loosely defined as “native Native Muslims against others. Indonesians”) were oppressed and It also confirmed the strategy of defeated; now we are independent, now Baswedan during the Jakarta Governor is the time for us to be masters in our own Election campaign. In a video circulating country.” (Anies Baswedan, Governor of at an internal meeting of Baswedan Jakarta Inauguration`s Speech, 16 October supporters, Fatah as his Political 2017). Consultant explained how the sermon in The victory speech of the 2017 the mosque as the FIS in Algeria elected Jakarta Governor, Anies effectively won the election. He Baswedan, seemed to be the culmination personally wanted this strategy to be run of all political fights in one of the most in Jakarta. (Johan SP, 2017) brutal local election involving religious So as in command, Friday prayers and ethnic sentiments. Despite being in Jakarta and surrounding areas were elected, Baswedan maintained his filled with Friday praying’s sermons position as a Governor supported by spreading hatred against the incumbent, “native” and Islamic circles, instead of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) who is above all diverse groups in Jakarta. A Christian and Chinese. Ahok became banner stated "Awakening of the Native- muslim`s enemy after his speech in Muslims" (Kebangkitan Pribumi Muslim) thousand islands considered as was installed not far from the location. blasphemy by Majelis Ulama Indonesia The day the narrative was clearly built, and made public anger. And impact the the victories of Anies Baswedan and anger of Muslims in Indonesia. 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Journal of Governance Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2019 This strategy was a populist society between ‘the people’ (as the strategy, in which a candidate built a underdogs) and its ‘other’.” Furthermore, position in front of a ranks of he argued that the identification of “the homogeneous society by building people” and “the other” are political antagonistic relationships with other. As constructs, symbolically established Jakarta is the central of Indonesian through the relation of antagonism, a politics and became Jakarta Governor is mode of identification in which the the next step to be leader in the national relation between its form and its content level, it is very important to understand what happened in the 2017 Jakarta is given by the process of naming—that is, election. This paper explained the proses of establishing who the enemies of the of how the populism was built in the people, and therefore the people itself, Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial election and are. its impact to Democracy in Indonesia. Study by Spruyt, Keppens and Mude and Kalwatser (2012, pp. 3– Droogenbroeck (2016) show that 7) stated three main approaches to populism is embedded in a feeling of deep populism. The first is populism as a dissatisfaction, not only with politics but particular type of political movement. In also with people's lives in general. In this perspective, populism is a multiclass addition, we show that populism is most movement organized around a strongly supported by stigmatization charismatic leader (Germani, 1978). The groups who face difficulties in finding a main ingredient is not only the presence of a strong leader but also the formation positive social identity. of a movement that appeals to As Indonesia has been a heterogonous social groups. This democratic state since 1998, populism in approach is mainly used to explain Latin this paper refers to Canovan’s (1999) American populism and fascism in Europe explanation of a populist movement when regarding the emergence of within a mature, well-established extremist mass movement. democratic system. She argued that in The second approach is populism modern democratic societies, populism is as a political style, characterized by the best seen as an appeal to the people promotion of a particular kind of link against both the established structure of between political leaders and electorate, a power and the dominant ideas and values link structured around a loose and of the society. Populists claim legitimacy opportunistic appeal to “the people” to on the grounds that they speak for the win and/or exercise political power. people, to represent the democratic The third approach is – as used in sovereign, not a sectional interest of a this paper: populism as a discourse. specific economic class. Populist values Concerning this perspective, Laclau also vary according to the context, (2005, p. 18) explains that populism is depending upon the nature of the elite characterized by confronting the existing and the dominant political discourse hegemony by means of a discursive (Canovan, 1999, P. 3). construction capable of dividing the social Based on the current Europe’s into two categories: “the power bloc” experience, there are several main versus “the people.” features of populism (Fuest, 2017). Following this category, Panizza (2005, First, populists usually describe society pp. 3–4), defined populism as “an anti as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: people are often status-quo discourse that simplifies the juxtaposed with ruling elites who are political space by symbolically dividing seen as corrupt. The second is I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 2 Hamid, Populism in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election overemphasizing the negative effects of Populism also cannot be released globalization. Populists reject from the media for the spread of the immigration and oppose the integration populits idea. Nowadays, internet - of politics and international institutions especially social media became the most that support and regulate economic important media, compare to the exchanges between countries. Third, conventional one. populists support expansive fiscal Research by Engesser, Ernst, Esser, policies and tend to override disturbing and Buchel (2015) found that populism government budget constraints. manifests itself in a fragmented form on Referring to Mudde (2017) there social media. Populist statements can be are three key core concepts of populism. First, the “people”. People in the populist` found in various countries, parties, and perception is usualy related to the self- levels of politician status. While a large perception (or self-idealization) of the number of politicians advocated for the targeted people as the construction of the people, attacks on the economic elite were populist. Second, general wills. They favored by populist left-wingers. Attacks on closely linked to homogenous the media elite and exclusion from others, interpretation of people who have same however, were mostly carried out by right- interests and preferences. Basic of the wing politicians. This shows that social general wills is common sense and media gives populist actors the freedom to anyone who opposes it, is devious and articulate their ideology and spread their part of the corrupt elite. Third, the elite. It messages. is distinghuished based on morality: good Study by Salgado (2018) in Portugal, people Vs. evil elite. found that the populist issues such as Populist can deploy a mixture of corruption and immigration spread by national, ethnic, class, regional, and social media. The mainstream media play a religious identities in order to define who role as “establish” media that counter the belongs within the category of ‘us’ and – issue. by extension – who is consigned to ‘them’. Gerbaude (2018) stated that the In several western countries, right wing compatibility between social media and politicians use Christianity as religious populist politics stems from the way the identity that used to confront Islam as ability of mass media social networks, when threat of the people wellbeing. 'mass networks' involving billions of people Several cases of religious based around the world, provide channels that are populism collected in the provocative appropriate for mass politics and appeal to book title: Saving the People, How people typical of populism. Social media in populist Hijack Religion. Since 9/11, populist movements play a role as a Muslim wanted to impose their religious people's voice channel and popular rally, values and traditions on the people as providing, on the one hand, a means for part of a surreptitious `Islamization` plan. dissatisfied individuals to express Ideas of invasion, infiltration, contagion, conspiracy, replacement and impending themselves, and on the other hand, with irreversible crisis represent key spaces where dissatisfied Internet users components of the populist imaginary, can gather and formed a partisan online and all of those are present in the notion crowd.