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The Islam Defence Action: a Challenge of Islamic Movement to Democratic Transition in the Post 2014 Indonesia

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The Islam Defence Action: a Challenge of Islamic Movement to Democratic Transition in the Post 2014 Indonesia ISSN : 1411-0199 Wacana Vol. 20, No. 2 (2017) E-ISSN : 2338-1884 The Islam Defence Action: A Challenge of Islamic Movement to Democratic Transition in the Post 2014 Indonesia 1 2 3 4 Ari Ganjar Herdiansah *, Dian Arifiyati Putri , Latip Ashari , Rini Maduratmi 1234Department of Political Science, Padjadjaran University Abstract The Islam Defense Action in Jakarta during November to December 2016 was the largest protest movement that ever been held in Indonesia and brought national concerns over political instability. Hundred of thousands to millions of people overwhelmed the streets protesting the alleged blasphemy on Islam by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that has a close connection to President Joko Widodo. This article analyzes the outbreak of the protest movement as a depiction of the strategic influence of Islamic groups in the midst of political upheaval threat. The protest movement showed a struggle to defend their values, but on the other hand, its political impact cannot be disclaimed. Above all of the phenomena, Islam Defense Action implies that religious sentiment still interacts with the politics and challenging the role of Islamic civil society to democratic transition in the post-2014 Indonesia. Keywords: political Islam, civil society, democracy, protest action, political stability INTRODUCTION* Moon Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). The In understanding the relationship between second candidate, Jokowi, who is genuine cadres religion and politics in Indonesia lately, some of Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai conditions need to be examined and elaborated Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) coupled to describe the complexity of the issues related with Jusuf Kalla. They had support from PDIP, to Islamic movement. This paper scrutinizes the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan dynamic of Islamic civil society in interferring the Bangsa, PKB), National Democrat Party (Partai democratic transition in the post-2014. This Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem), Hanura Party period is interesting to be examined because the (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), and Indonesia Justice political tension was getting heat up since some and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Islamic groups consistently criticize the Indonesia, PKPI). Considering the ideological government of Joko Widodo or popularly known background of the mass and the supporting as "Jokowi." The mobilization of mass with a parties, we can observe that the Islamic parties, strong Islamic symbol was become a new such PKS and PPP and Muslim mass-based party, prominent opposing power and alarming the the PAN, were at the Prabowo-Hatta camp. democratic transition for social political Meanwhile, the PKB was the only Muslim-based fragmentations by religious base. parties that existed in the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla[• The sentiment from some Islamic groups coalition. }ÁŒ :}l}Á][• P}ÀŒvuv Á• v} •µvoÇ After the 2014 presidential election was over arrived. Since the 2014 presidential election and won by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, supporters there were polarization of the two camps of polarization was not necessarily meltdown candidates. The first candidat, Prabowo-Hatta although all the Islamic parties, except PKS, have have supporter from Gerindra Party (Partai joined the government. Suspicion and cynicism Gerindra), National Mandat Party (Partai Amanat from some Islamic groups remained to increase Nasional, PAN), Prosperous Justice Party (Partai as a result of the heat tension of presidential Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), National Development election at the mass root that divide Islamic Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), purist and the progressives. The disappointment Golkar Party (Partai Golkar), and the Crescent of some Islamic groups increasingly sharpened when President Jokowi allegedly defend Ahok in various legal case. The climax, when Basuki Correspondence address: Ari Ganjar Herdiansah Tjahaya Purnama, or known as Ahok, as the Email : [email protected] Governor of Jakarta was purportedly insulting the Address : Prodi Ilmu Politik, Gd D lt II Kampus FISIP Unpad Koran in an official speech at Kepulauan Seribu Jatinangor, Jl. Raya Bandung-Sumedang Km. 21 Jatinangor, Sumedang 45363 that became viral on social media. Delayed 57 The Islam Defence Action (Herdiansah, et al.) response of the government to the case led civil society is in its sphere that located between various Islamic organizations shed his grievance the family and the state, enjoyed autonomy from with mass demonstrations in Jakarta during the state and driven by the volunteerism of the October to December 2016. members of the community [2]. In a democratic The event of a protest movement held in political system, civil society became an Jakarta on October 17, 2016, November 4, 2016, important element because it provides a vehicle and December 2, 2016, that involving hundreds to articulate and promote the interests of the of thousands to milions of people from various people dealing with the state and the Islamic groups. The action is known as The Islam government that are likely to be influenced by Defense Action (Aksi Bela Islam), which demand market forces and political elites. justice for alleged defamation committed by The development of civil society in religious Ahok, the incumbent candidate for 2017 Jakarta community experiencing a little paradox. Civil gubernatorial election. He and Djarot were society was originally formed to oppose the supported by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Golkar Party, regime who hold divinity ruling [3]. However, and Hanura. On another side, the challengers religious organizations eventually play a political come from Agus Yudhoyono-Silvyana (Democrat role in the public sphere [4]. In the context of Party, PKB, PPP, PAN) and Anis Baswedan- Muslim contries, the Islamic activism and Islamic Sandiaga (Gerindra Party and PKS). Looking at the movement is differentiated from political Islam. ŒÇ[• coalition composition, it is easily to The earlier concentrated in non-state realm, predict that the crisscrossing of religious and religiocivil community, and ideological basis, politics as happened in presidential election while the later has a clear political goals [5]. would reappear in Jakarta gubernatorial. At this Interestingly, the Islam Defence Action serve in level, the protest movement, whether intentional between nonstate realm and political ends or not, could interfere Jakarta gubernatorial dimension. Through a protest movement, the process that put Ahok in less fortunate position. Islamic organizations was not only struggle to During the demonstration, the protesters convey a message to the government as well as conducted peacefully act that in general still public that can be seen explicitly or implicitly [6], following the corridor of law and democratic but also could play a crucial role to determine the values. However, the abundant of mass who pole of political power in a winding manner. joined the protest were terrified the government. There are some questions need to be answered When milions of people overwhelmed the in this article regarding the phenomenon. First, streets, the situation could be politically how Islamic civil society in Indonesia faced a dangerous and put the government regime at a demanding situation when they are trying to great risk. As Porta & Diani [1] stated, the maintain a strategic political position? Second, disruption of daily routines increases with what is the significance of the Islam Defence vµuŒ• ]š } Z P]u[• ility to Movement to the practical politics both at local control crowds inevitably suffers as they grow (Jakarta) and national level? larger. Jokowi then responded with conducting intensive meeting with some major party leaders, MATERIAL AND METHOD key Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul The analysis of this article was built by Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Indonesia qualitative approach that used literature study Ulema Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) as combined with news investigation. Comparative Áoo • /v}v•][• u]v u]o]ŒÇ (}•X A set of historical explanation emphasized to the period circumstances that depict national stability was before 2014 and after 2014 in order to construct at stake. analytical framework about how the Islamic civil The political dynamics and religious society interact with democracy in Indonesia sentiment around the Islam Defence Action political context. The elaboration will be highlighted the role of Islamic civil society to presented in the first part of discussion. In the perform a counterbalancing power to meet their second part, the social base and ideology of party demand. /}v]ooÇU Z u}Àuv[• ]uš }v analysis is used to explain on how the new the practical politics cannot be avoided and the emerging power of Jokowi and his Nationalist-left positive role of Islamic civil society to democratic party, PDIP, was responded by some Islamic civil transition is in challenge. Civil society is a number organizations and in turn shaping political of organizations or institutions who asserted the contest in the post 2014 election. The third people's interests. The main characteristics of 58 The Islam Defence Action (Herdiansah, et al.) discussion will examine how the Islamic mass 1990s, as some of the prominent army elites actions against the allegedly Islam blasphemy started less support the New Order regime, depict the crisscrossing of politics and religion Suharto turned his attention to the conservative around the Jakarta gubernatorial that
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