Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88

Statistics on Finland's military expenditure, as outlined in the following table, convey a slightly unrealistic picture of Finland's defence capabilities. Finland has consistently spent more money on defence than statistics reveal. For example, the appropriations of the border guard are not included in military budgets (since the border guard is under the Ministry of the Interior). Neither are major defence construction projects in central and northern Finland included in military budgets, as funds for these projects come from the budgets of other ministries. Furthermore, pensions are paid out of the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs and conscripts are paid even nowadays only a few pounds per day. It has been estimated that if Finland paid its conscripts the same rate that is paid in Denmark, Finland would have to increase its defence budget by 25 per cent. The adding of the expenditures of the Border Guard would increase the military budget by another 10 per cent.

163 164 Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure. 1960-88

Appendix 1:

Total Government military Year GNP expenditures expenditures

1960 16199 3998 203 61 18362 4465 282 62 19661 4967 420 63 21352 4874 320 64 24083 5745 351 65 26634 6821 371 66 28554 7167 402 67 31321 8058 455 68 35908 9784 559 69 40986 10210 541 1970 45743 10781 584 71 50257 11944 656 72 58625 13 970 783 73 71364 16961 886 74 90055 21307 1063 75 104209 27546 1317 76 117643 31094 1514 77 129790 35064 1733 78 143376 38938 1962 79 166992 45036 2264 1980 192825 50812 2737 81 218817 57797 3071 82 246187 68008 3899 83 275230 77190 4180 84 309567 85748 4528 85 336824 95803 4881 86 360319 105178 5423 87 393608 116704 5658 88 435550 114247 6316 Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88 165

Military Expenditures 1960-88

Defence Military Defence Total military material expenditures material expenditures acquisitions % of all govt. acquisitions % of GNP % of GNP expenditures

70.0 1.25 0.43 5.08 91.4 1.54 0.5 6.32 220.7 2.14 1.12 8.46 95.0 1.5 0.44 6.57 111.2 1.46 0.46 6.11 128.4 1.39 0.48 5.44 117.3 1.41 0.41 5.61 123.7 1.45 0.39 5.65 116.0 1.56 0.32 5.71 90.2 1.32 0.22 5.3 115.9 1.28 0.25 5.42 148.6 1.31 0.3 5.49 200.3 1.34 0.34 5.6 224.7 1.24 0.31 5.22 246.2 1.18 0.27 4.99 283.9 1.26 0.27 4.78 282.8 1.29 0.24 4.87 369.7 1.34 0.28 4.94 485.4 1.37 0.34 5.04 630.1 1.36 0.38 5.03 840.3 1.42 0.44 5.39 842.1 1.4 0.38 5.31 1275.9 1.58 0.52 5.73 1246.4 1.52 0.45 5.42 1337.2 1.46 0.43 5.28 1416.6 1.45 0.42 5.09 1713.9 1.51 0.48 5.16 1719.1 1.44 0.44 4.85 1990.0 1.45 0.46 5.53

NOTE: Figures in millions of Finnish marks or in percentages. Figures for 1987 and 1988 are unconfirmed estimates. SOURCE: Finnish Ministry of Defence, Department of Military Affairs. Notes

Introduction 1. One could not, for example, use the strategy of defence in depth if the enemy was only interested in extracting certain border areas from the defending state. See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton 1976, p. 488. 2. C. L. Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, Bloomington 1957. 3. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, pp. 377-78, 384. 4. Ibid., p. 384. 5. Sampo Ahto, Aseveljet vastakkain, Lapin sota 1944-45, Helsinki 1980, p. 109.

1 'The Years of Danger', 1944-47 l. Lauri Hyvamaki, Vaaran vuodet, Helsinki 1954. 2. Article 22 of the Armistice Agreement. 3. See Reijo Ahtokari, Punainen Va/po. Valtiollinen poliisi Suomessa vaaran vuosina, Helsinki 1969, pp. 186-87. 4. The 1945 Government Policy Declaration called for the prosecution of war criminals and for the democratisation and 'cleaning up' of the police and the military forces. Jussi Raumolin, Puolustuspolitiikka ja 'Turvallisuuspolitiikan' opetus varusmiehille Suomessa, Kehityspiirteitii ja ongelmia, Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunniltelukunta, Helsinki 1977, p.25. 5. Emil Skog, Sosialisti ja Patrioolti muistelee, Porvoo 1971, pp. 259-6l. 6. Even the location of the Control Commission Headquarters - in the tallest building in Helsinki, the Hotel Tomi - was psychologically imposing. 7. J. K. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat 1944-1956, I Osa 28.6.1944-24.4.1949, ed. by Blomsted and Klinge, Juva 1985, p.33. 8. Helsingin Sanomat, 22 September, 1985. 9. See Blinnikka, Valvontakomission aika, p. 69. For details on the Control Commission's operations, see The Finnish War Archives, SA/T 20362/l. lO. See, Warner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics. The Fall of Zhdanov and the defeat of Moderation 1946-1953, Ithaca 1982, p. 28 and pp. lOl-2. 1l. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 140. Molotov replied: 'Ach, Finland - that is a peanut'.

166 Notes to pp. 8-15 167

12. The US representative in Finland, Hamilton, reported to the Secretary of State on 17 March 1945 that the Control Commission had not 'taken any action vis-It-vis the Finnish Government which cannot be more or less clearly justified under the armistice terms'. Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, IV, p. 609. 13. 'Directive for British Section of Allied Control Commission in Finland', dated 12 October 1944, reproduced in J. H. Magill, Tasavalta tulikokeessa, Mikkeli 1981. 14. Stig Jagerskitild, Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, London 1986, p.182. 15. Paasikivi cited rumours about Soviet occupation still in March 1949. See J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjatl, pp. 702fT. 16. Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. Ill. 17. Minister Fagerholm's account of discussion with Mannerheim, cited in Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 111. 18. Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 234. Mannerheim referred to threatening movements by the German navy in the proximity of the Aland Islands. 19. Gustav Mannerheim's archives, kansio 614 VArk, cited in Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 235, reproduced in Jagerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p.129. 20. See: Martti Turtola, Heinrichs; Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 239; Jligerskitild, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 129; and Pekka Visuri, 'Puolustus• voimien sodanjaIkeiset linjaratkaisut kestaneet', Helsingin Sanomat, 4 September 1985. 21. Sampo Ahto, 'The War in Lapland' in Kanninen (ed.), Aspects of Security, pp. 226-7. 22. Zhdanov's letter in The Finnish War Archives. SA T 19498/8 a. 23. The Finnish War Archives, Ark/Tl9527/376, appendix 1: the letter of appointment from the Ministry of Defence. 24. Pekka Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa Toisen Maailmansodan jaIkeen vertailtuna vastaavaan kehitykseen Suomessa', Tutkimus Suomen Sotatieteelliselle seuralle, Helsinki 15 February 1985, p. 165. 25. Erich Heinrich, 'Esitys Puolustusrevisiolle Suomen sotilaspoliittisesta tilanteesta ja asennoitumisesta 19. 6. 1945', Gustav Mannerheim's Archives, kansio 614 VArk, partially reproduced in Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 237. 26. Visuri, 'Puolustusvoimien sodanjaIkeiset linjaratkaisut', Helsingin Sanomat, 4 June 1985. 27. Jussi Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikan ja "Turvallisuuspolitiikan" opetus varusmiehille Suomessa', p. 26. 28. The 1945 Teaching Instructions (Valistustohjeet), cited in Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikka ja 'Turvallisuuspolitiikan' opetus varusmiehille Suomessa, p. 27. 29. Ibid., p. 20. 168 NOles 10 pp. 16-20

30. Hannu Koskinen, 'Suomen Puolustusvoimat Iiittoutuneiden Val• vontakomission aikana', Sotakorkeak:oulu MSL 38, Helsinki 30 July 1985, p. 34, 39. 31. Ibid., p. 39. 32. Ibid., p. 34. Then: is no record of Lundqvist's resignation in The Finnish War Archives. It is therefore possible that the President simply told him in person that he had to resign. 33. Ibid., p. 36. 34. General Sihvo's 1949 memorandum on the tasks of the defence forces, cited in Kalle Lehmus, Kolme kriisiii, Helsinki 1971. 35. Koskinen, 'Suomen Puolustusvoimat liittoutuneiden Valvonta• komission aikana', p. 42. 36. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikiriatl, p. 148. 37. A summary of the work of the liaison committee and Zhdanov's letter to Paasikivi: SAlT 21 565/15, Finnish War Archives. 38. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikiriatl, p. 181. 39. The sentences met the minimum requirements set by the Control Commission, varying from two to ten years. 40. Jagerskiold, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 175, for fuller accounts see, Aladar Paasonen, Marsalkan tiedustelupiiiillikkbnii ja hallituksen asiamiehenii, Helsinki 1974, and Kakonen, Miehityksen varalta, Helsinki 1970. 41. The transfer was made 22 and 23 September 1944, see JagerskiOld, Viimeiset vuodet, p. 176. Rislakki puts the total number of the Finnish refugees at BOO, Rislakki, erittiiin salainen, p. 279. For an autobiographi• cal account of the operation see Harry Lewing, Oneraatio Stella Polaris, Helsinki 1977. 42. On the duration of the operation see Eduskunnan Pbytiikirjat 1950 IV, p.4184. 43. Rislakki, Erittiiin salainen, p. 275,279. 44. Ibid., pp. 273-4. See also Reijo Ahtokari, Punainen Valpo, pp. 172-4. 45. See e.g. Hyvamaki, Vaaran vuodel, p. 35; Lukkari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 21, 260, 265; Hannu Rautkallio, Suomen suunta 1945-48, Savonlinna 1974, p. 107-12. 46. Reijo Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, p. 54. 47. Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 222, Kairinen, Marttisen miehet, p. 11, Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 24, 28, and Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp.12-14. 48. Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 12-14. Same figures reproduced in Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 26, 27. 49. According to Kairinen preparations were begun on 22 September; according to Tervasmaki they were begun on 23 September; and according to Lukkari on 24 September. See, respectively: Kairinen, Marttisen miehet, p. 9; Tervasmaki, Mannerheim, p. 222; and Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 34. Ahtokari claims that initial preparations were begun on 15 September; see Ahtokari, Asekiitkentiijuttu, pp. 25-33. Notes to pp. 20-7 169

50. See, for example, Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 22-4 and Rautkallio. Suomen suunta, p. 107. 51. See EduskunnanpOytiikirjat 1950 IV, p. 4170-71. 52. Bartenjev and Komissarov, Kolmelcymmentii vuotta hyviiii naa- puruutta, p. 63. 53. Ahtokari, Punainen Valpo, p. 18. 54. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 137. 55. Paasikivi,l. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 154, 159. 56. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 5, see also Paasikivi, 1. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 164. 57. Arrested officers were not given adequate health care, they were isolated from each other, and their statements were often falsified. See for example, A. F. Airo, Liikekannallepano salaliitto, Tampere 1978. 58. See Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, Chapter 5. 59. TervasmIDd, Mannerheim, p.225; Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, pp. 270-5. 60. Tuomo Polvinen, laltasta Pariisin rauhaan, Suomi Kansainviilisessii politiikassa III: 1945-1947, Juva 1981, p. 227. 61. T. Polvinen, laltasta Pariisin rauhaan. p.239. The dispute over. torpedo boats began when France demanded that Italy should not be allowed to possess them. Subsequently, Greece demanded a similar prohibition for Bulgaria. Finally Great Britain wanted the prohibition to be extended to all former enemies. 62. The Aland islands were declared neutral by the League of Nations as long ago as 1921, after a dispute between Finland and Sweden. 63. If one takes into account all military-related expenditure then the range is between 4.9% (in 1949) and 7.4% (in 1955). In the 1930's (excluding 1939) the figure had been between 20% and 25%. Vilho Harle and Perui Joenniemi, Valkoinen kirja, p. 21. 64. Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kelintys' pp. 163, 167.

2 The Cold War Reaches the North, 1948-49 1. Dick Stenberg, 'F1ygvapnet 1927 -76', Kunliga Krigsvetenskaps• akademins Handlingar och Tidskrift, 4/1976, p.57, cited in Ren~ Nyberg, Pohjolan Turvallisuus ja Suomi, Ydinaseiden viihenevii merkitys, Helsinki, 1983. 2. Swedish Social Democrats in 1923 cited in Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1918-1939, London, 1949, p.159. 3. See Karl Molin, 'Winning the Pcacc' in Nielsen (ed.), Scandinavian Countries in the Second World War, p. 367. 4. Molin, 'Winning the Peace', p. 368. 5. Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfrihet och Atombomber, kontinuitet och foriindring i den svenska forsvarsdoktrin 1945-1982, Lund 1985, p.126. 6. Molin, 'Winning the Peace', pp. 368-9. 170 Notes to pp. 28-32

7. See 'Plan for en fj1jrste reising av Norges forsvar' in J. J. Holst. Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik i Strategisk Pespektiv, Bind l/: Dokumentasjon, pp.25-6. 8. Ibid., pp. 19-21. 9. Niels Jj1jrgen Haagerup, A Brief Introduction to Danish Foreign Policy and Defence, Copenhagen 1980, p. 8. 10. TItis build-up was motivated by a determination to prevent another military occupation. This was expressed in the much-used slogan 'Never again a Ninth of April'. Ibid., p. 8. 11. Ibid., p. 369. 12. Cars, Skoglund & Zetterberg, Svensk forsvarspolitik under efter• krigstid, Stockholm 1986, pp. 11-17 13. J. Raymond Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingistii Washingtoniin. Muistelmia ja dokumentteja vuosilta 1946-1948, Helsinki 1978, p.215. 14. J. SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, Helsinki 1970, p. 113. 15. Mannerheim's letter to Count Bemadotte, cited in Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingista Washingtoniin, p. 2:>A. 16. SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 113. 17. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 562. Turning down nego• tiations would have seriously damaged Finland's carefully cultivated relationship with the Soviet Union. 18. Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 177. 19. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsingistii Washingtoniin, p. 250. 20. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 558,579. 21. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat. I, pp. 562-567. 22. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 567; SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 117, 119. 23. See SOderhjelm, Kolme matkaa Moskovaan, p. 113, 124, and R. T. A. Luoto, 'Sopimus Ystlivyydestli, Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton viilisen Ystavyys-, Yhteistyo-, ja Avunantosopimuksen merkitys Suomen Turvallisuuspolitiikassa 1948-78', Tampere 1978, p. 17. 24. Luoto, 'Sopimus Ystavyydesta. Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton viilisen Ystavyys-, Yhteistyo-ja Avunantosopimuksen merkitys Suomen Tur• vallisuuspolitiikassa 1948-78', p. 23. 25. Sotilasaikakauslehti, 11/1971. 26. The USSR concluded bilateral treaties of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia in 1943, with Poland and Yugoslavia in 1945, with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in 1948. See Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties, Stanford 1962, p. 239. 27. The differences between the Finnish and other FCMA-type treaties are elaborated in Kalevi Ruhala 'Puolustussopimukset kansainvlilisessa oikeudessa', Tiede ja Ase, 30/1972. 28. The fact that Zhdanov, who had advocated the inclusion of Finland into the Soviet bloc, was rapidly losing his position in the Kremlin, may Notes to pp. 32-5 171

have contributed to the Soviet readiness to conclude a 'mild' treaty with Finland. The first signs of Zhdanov's fall from favour were detected in 1947. From the beginning of 1948 his public appearances became rare. He disappeared from the Soviet leadership in July 1948 and died in August 1948. See W. G. Hahn, Postwar Soveit Politics. The Fall ofZhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation 1946-1953, pp. 101-2. 29. To add to the Soviet uncertainty over Finnish reactions, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament deliberately leaked infor• mation to the Soviet representatives revealing that 'any negotiations for a FCMA Treaty were, from the Finnish view, 'very serious and our demands unconditional'. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 30. 30. Paasikivi, Paasikiven linja I. Puheita vuosilta 1944-56, pp.98- 101. After this he repeated in essence what he had said in February 1947: Finland would defend itself if an attack were attempted through Finland against the Soviet Union, if it did not have enough resources then it would get assistance from the Soviet Union. 31. See e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 14 March 1948: 'Sopimus ei aiheuta muutoksia Suomen kansainvalisissa suhteissa'. 32. Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, Repon no. 20 Helsinki 26 April 1948, cited in Osmo Apunen, Kansallinen realismi ja Puolueettomuus Suomen ulkopoliitlisina valintoina, Tampere 1972, Appendix 2. 33. Roy Allison uses the expression 'FCMA-type treaties' to convey that these treaties were not identical. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 24. 34. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision MielintO. Osa I, submitted 10 March 1949; Part II/I and Part 11/2 submitted 10 June 1949; Part III submitted 18 November 1948. 35. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision mietinto. Osa I, p. 15. 36. Ibid., p. 16. 37. See, Lauri Haataja, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' in Haataja et al., Paasikiven hirmuiset vuodet. 38. See e.g. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat, p.602. Paasikivi's diaries lack several entries around this time. This has led certain scholars in Finland to suggest that Paasikivi edited parts of his diaries for publication before his death. See also Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 297, and Ahtokari Punainen Valpo, pp. 158-61. 39. Repon by Scott, 29 April 1948, FO 371/11405/N5763. 40. See Helsingin Sanomat, 17 January 1986. 41. Zhdanov's report on the international situation, 22 September 1947. M. Rush (ed.), The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio 1970, p. 130. 42. See, A. F. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, London 1973, p. 290. 43. See, Haataja, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' in Haataja, et al. (ed.), 172 Notes to pp. 35-9

Paasikiven hirmuiset vuodet. Suomi 1944-48, Helsinki 1986, p. 31. 44. Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland in 1948', p. 237. 45. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat, pp. 601, 602. 46. Paasikivi gave his approval after an official request from the Commander-in-Chief. Finnish War Archives, SArkT23828/FI3: 'Esittely tasavallan Presidentille'. 47. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' pp.31-4. Most of Haatia's information on military measures taken at the time is based on Ari Raunio, 'Valmiuden kohottaminen Suomen puolustusvoimissa vuonna 1948', Proseminaariesitelma 10 November 1985, University of Helsinki, Department of Political History. 48. Ibid., pp. 31-4. See also Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, pp. 241, 247. 49. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodetja realismi', pp. 31-4. 50. Ibid., pp. 31-4. 51. Ibid., pp. 31-4. 52. Haatia, 'Vaaran vuodet ja realismi' pp. 32-4. Also see, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat, p. 580; Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland', p. 232: the new storage of arms was underneath the Helsinki Cathedral. 53. Ahtokari, Punainen Valpo, p. 161. 54. Krosby, 'The Communist Power Bid in Finland', p. 238. 55. Lukkari, Asekiitkentii, p. 297. 56. The chief of police related his concerns to President Paasikivi, see Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjal/, p. 601. 57. Lauri Haataja, 'Tie helvettiin on laskettu os. objektiivisilla tekijoilla', Suomen Kuvalehti, 12 July 1985. 58. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Helsinaislii Washingloniin, pp. 230-41. 59. Ibid., p. 231. 60. Nevakivi, Maanalaista diplomatiaa, pp. 104-5. 61. Hendersen, The Birth of NATO, p. 11. 62. Ibid., p. 11. 63. Ibid., p. 12. 64. A well-known example of the pessimistic attitude prevalent in the West is Lord Pakenham's speech in the House of Lords. Referring first to the coup in Czechoslovakia, Lord Pakenham concluded that in Stalin's letter the ill-fated Finnish government had received a 'kiss of death'. Ylitalo, Salasanomia Heisingistii Washingtoniin, p. 204. 65. Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 205. 66. Trumans's 'message to Congress' cited in Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, p. 137. See also Rautkallio, Suomen suunta, p. 204. 67. Henderson, The Birth of Nato, p. 12 68. Nikolaj Petersen, 'Danish and Norwegian Alliance Policies 1948-49, a Comparative Analysis', Co-operation and Conflict, 1979/14, p. 200. 69. Ibid., p. 201. 70. On Norwegian contacts with Western diplomats see Skodven, Norden Notes to pp. 39-43 173

eller NATO, pp. 96-107. On the Danish reaction to Stalin's letter to Finland see Harald Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i gar og i dag, p. 127, and W. G. Jones, Denmark, A Modern History, p. 175. 71. According to Agrell, the Swedish government now saw Finland as part of the Soviet sphere of interest. Agrell, Alliansfrihet och Atombomber, p. 62. 72. For a discussion of the Little Entente from the point of view of small states see Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, New York 1968, Chapter 4: 'The Little Entente and the Nature of Small Power Alliances'. Rothstein does not discuss the plan for a Scandinavian Defence Union. 73. See Rene Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, Ydinaseiden viihenevii merkitvs, Helsinki 1983, pp. 59-60. See also Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber, pp. 126-7. 74. See H. Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i qar og i dag, p. 127. 75. See Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik i Strategisk Perspektiv, Bind II, pp. 19-22. 76. Incidentally, it was the same reason that led to the disintegration of the Little Entente. In the interwar years the need for guarantees rose out of an increase in Italian, and later German, pressure against the small states involved. In 1948-49 the need for outside guarantees resulted from a perceived increase in Soviet pressure against the Nordic area. 77. See Izvestia, 15 February 1949. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VoI.I:7/311949. 78. For an account of the meeting see Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, pp. 235-44. 79. Viiyrynen, Conflicts in Finno-Soviet Relations, p. 55. 80. See Kari Mottola, 'Nordic Perceptions of the Great Powers and Nordic Security' in Huldt and Lejins (eds), Security in the North: Nordic and Superpower Perceptions, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Conference papers 5, Stockholm 1984, pp. 29-31. 81. Norway had been united with Denmark (1397-814) and Sweden (1814-905) and had thus enjoyed full sovereignty for a relatively short time. 82. J. J. Holst, 'Nordic Security Concerns', a speech given at a meeting of the Strategic Studies Group in Oxford on 10 March 1987. 83. For a full account of the Danish policy see Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-66 1, Chapter II. 84. Rene Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 23. 85. 'Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on the North Atlantic Treaty', 31 March 1949, Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967,pp.125-9.

3 'Do Not Tease the Bear', 1949-55 1. Literaturnaya gazeta, 14 January 1950, CDSP, Volume II, No. 2, p. 30. 174 Notes to pp. 43-6

2. 'Hidden schemes for Aland Islands', Izvestia, 14 February 1950, CDSP Volume II, No.8, p. 23. 3. 'Influx of 'Tourists into Finland', Pravda, 17 August 1950, CDSP, Volume II, No. 33. 4. Izvestia, 14 June 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No. 24, p. 19. 5. 'Intensification of American Propaganda in Finland', Trud, 30 Septem• ber 1951. CDSP, Volume ill, No. 39, p. 23. 6. 'Against Reactions Intrigues', Pravda, 2 October 1952, CDSP, Volume III, No. 40, p. 27. 7. 'In Finnish Diet', Pravda, 13 October 1951. CDSP, Volume III, No. 41, p. 16. 8. 'Gross Violation of Finnish Sovereignty', Izvestia, 14, October 1951. CDSP, Volume III, No. 41, p. 16. 9. 'Vigilance of the Finnish Working People', Izvestia, 8 December 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No. 49, p. 20. 10. 'On Fourth Anniversary of Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance', Izvestia, 6 April 1952. CDSP, Volume IV, No. 14, p. 22. 11. 'The Political situation in Finland', Bolshevik, No. 22, 1950, pp. 63-6. CDSP, Volume II, No. 50, p.8. The Soviet press used the term 'Schutzkorps', adopted from Swedish, to describe the outlawed Suojeluskunta organisation. This term was never used in Finland. 12. Izvestia, 6 February 1951, CDSP, Volume III, No.6, p. 18. 13. Pravda, 15 April 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 15, p. 16. Trud used the phrase 'the neo-fascist Finnish Federation of Reserve officers'; see Trud, 6 June 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 23, p. 15. 14. Pravda, 15 April 1951, CDSP Volume III, No. 15, p. 16. Vaino Tanner, according to whom the Tannerites were named, was a Social Democrat and the Finnish Foreign Minister during the war. He was convicted as a war criminal after the war. After serving his sentence he returned to politics as the chairman of the Social Democratic Party. 15. Conversation between President Paasikivi and Prime Minister Kekkonen on 23 May 1950 cited in Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 119. 16. The Commander-in-Chief kept Paasikivi informed through memoran• dums on important questions. See e.g. a memorandum on the military implications of the presence the Soviet troops in Porkkala and on Finland's military prepredness. Memorandum received on 27 July 1950. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 128. 17. Paasikivi on 11 April 1951, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p.209. 18. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat I, p. 697. 19. 10 April 1950, ibid., p. 106. 20. Ibid., p. 105. 21. 10 April 1950, Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 105. Notes to pp. 46-51 175

22. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 106. 23. Speech on 6 April 1951. Kekkonen, Puheita ja Kirjoituksia, Helsinki 1955, pp. 220-4. 24. Hiillcio, 'YYA-sopimuksen konsultaatioartiklan suomalainen tulkinta', p.43. 25. This speech is called the 'Pyjama speech' since, because of illness, Kekkonen did not deliver it orally. Urho Kekkonen, Neutrality, the Finnish Position, London 1970, trans. Ojansuu and Keyworth, p. 55. 26. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, Suomen turvallisuus• politiikka, Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkonen turvallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943-1979, Helsinki 1980, p. 27. 27. 'Speech by Finnish Prime Minister Kekkonen', Pravda, 27 January 1952. CDSP, Volume IV, No.4, p. 15. 28. 'On Fifth Anniversary of Soviet-Finnish Treaty', Pravda, 6 April 1953. CDSP, Volume V, No. 14, p. 16. 29. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjat II, p. 425, 21 June 1954. 30. Term used by Professor Viitasalo, Head of the Finnish Military Science Research Institute (Sotatieteellinen tutkimuslaitos) in Helsinki. Interview with Professor Mikko Viitasalo, Helsinki 18 June, 1985. 31. N. A. A. Simojoki, 'Nykytyyppisen ilmatorjuntatykiston ajankohtaista arviointia', Tiede ja Ase 8/1950, p. 189: the poor materiel preparedness of the anti-aircraft artillery was 'as much a crisis connected with the defensive capabilities of the air force'. 32. The term of service was one year for general conscripts and 15 months for those receiving reserve officer's or non-commissioned-officer's training. 33. Tervasmaki, Puolustushallinto, p. 265. 34. Y. E. Jiirvinen, 'Yleissotatieteellinen katsaus vuosien 1949 ja 1950 vaihteessa', Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950. 35. Ibid., p. 8. 36. Ibid., pp. 34, 40. 37. V. Koppinen, 'VesistohyokkayksisUi ja niiden torunnasta', Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950. V. Koppinen, 'Viivytystaktiikasta', SAL 1/1950.1. KiveliO, 'Rannikkojoukkojenkehityksesta', TiedejaAse, 8/1950. R. A. Rautasaari, 'Metslipuolustus vai avomaapuolustus', SAL 2/1949. 38. War Archives, PK 1084/38. 39. B. W. Kontiopliii, 'II Maailmansodan vastarintaliikkeista ja niistli tehtlivistli johtoplilitoksistli', Tiede ja Ase 9/1951. 40. For example, Nurmi, 'Sissitoiminta Talvisodassa ja sen kehitys vv. 1941-44 sodan loppuun mennessa', SAL, 4/49 and 'Sissitoiminta tulevaisuuden sodassa', SAL, 3/1950. 41. Nurmi, 'Sissitoiminta tulevaisuuden sodassa', SAL 3/1950. 42. A Permanent Directive Concerning Teaching in the Defence Forces, (Valistustyotli koskeva pysyvliisklisky), 6 May 1953, cited in Jussi Raumolin, 'Puolustuspolitiikka ja "turvallisuuspolitiikan" opetus varusmiehille Suomessa', p. 37. 176 Notes to pp. 52-5

43. Ibid., pp. 37-8. 44. Not everyone in the Finnish armed forces recalls these attempts to single out the West as a likely aggressor. For example, a group of ten Finnish air force officers who had all served in the early 1950s denied that such views were ever put forward - 'at least not with any seriousness'. Interview with the postwar commanders of the Karelian Wing of the Finnish Air Force, Helsinki, 2 April 19187. 45. War Archives PK 1084/38. Lectures in tactics at the Staff Col• lege 1946-1952 (dossier number 29). 'War and map exercises 1946-1952' (dossier numbers 38-43). 46. J. Pajula, 'Maamme eri osien sotilaallinen merkitys nykyisin yoimassa olevien ja Suomea velvoittavien kansainvalisten sopimusten valossa', Sotakorkeakoulu, MSL 19,524/1952, p. 9. 47. Ibid., p. 7. 48. Nils 0rvik,'Defence Against Help - A Strategy for Small States?', Survival, London, September-October 1973. 49. Asetus Puolustuslaitoksesta N:o 358, 31.10.1952; entered into force 1. 12. 1952, Asetuskokoelma 1952. Another law that was part of the 1952 Reorganisation was 'Laki puolustusministeri6n ja puolustuslaitoksen viroista ja toirnista' N:o 241, 6.6.1952; entered into force 1.10.1952, Asetuskokoelma 1952. 50. Tervasmliki, Puolustusneuvosto, p. 175 and Puolustushallinto, pp. 487-8. 51. 'In Finnish Diet', Pravda and Izvestia, 16 May 1952. CDSP Volume IV, No. 21, p. 18. 52. Ibid., p. 18. 53. Ibid., p. 18. 54. Visuri, 'Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa Toisen Maailmansodan jalkeen vertailtuna vastaavaan kehitykseen Suomessa', E. 175. 55. Paaesikunta, Jalkaviien taisteluohiesiiiinto 11. Patalioonan taistelu, Helsinki 1955, pp. 281-2. 56. Interview with General Koppinen, former Commander of the Finnish Border Guards and the developer of Finnish guerrilla warfare tactics. Espoo, 17 December 1987. 57. S. Enki6, 'Mita jokaisen upseerin tulee tiew atomipommista', Sotilasaikakauslehti 3/1947 and 6/1947. 58. Ibid. See also Jarvinen in Tiede ja Ase, 8/1950 p. 12. 59. R. Arimo, 'Atomipomminja vetypommin vertailua', SAL, 4/1952. 60. Cited in J. O. Valtonen, 'Sotakokemukset ja tulevaisuuden sota' SAL 4/1947. 61. V-P Somerkari, 'Pohjolan asema maailman sotilas-ja geo-poliittisessa voimakentassa' written for a Sotilasaikakauslehti competition in 1950, published in SAL 1/1952. For a later version of the same 'Great Circle Theory' see G. C. Magnusson, 'Lentoase ja Suomen Turvallisuus V', Uusi Suomi, 19 July 1956. Notes to pp. 55-8 177

62. The Great Circle Theory was popular until missiles replaced bombers as the primary nuclear delivery vehicles. 63. Somerkari, 'Pohjolan asema maailman sotilas - ja geopoliittisessa voimak.entassa', pp. 7-8. 64. The Soviet Union had occupied the island in the spring of 1945 but handed it over to Denmark in 1946. See Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 20-3. 65. Johan Jorgen Holst, Norsk Sik.lcerhetspolitik i Strategisk Perspektiv, Bind II: Dokumentasjon, Oslo 1967, pp. 71-2. 66. For Norway see 'Vapenhjelp' in Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolilik, Bind II, p. 23. For Denmark's military build-up see H. Westergard Andersen, Dansk Politik i gar og i dag, p. 148. 67. Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, pp. 23-4, 120. 68. See 'NATO's infrastrukturprogram' in Holst, Norsk Sikkerhelspolitik, Bind II, p. 23; also a chart on p. 22. 69. Ibid., p. 59. On the Swedish air force see: Dick Stenberg, 'Flygvapnet 1926-76', Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademins /landlingar och Tidskrift, 4/1976. 70. Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber, p. 168. 71. Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 59. 72. The Vampire de Havilland jet was sold to Sweden in the same year, 1946, as it became available for the RAF. Ibid., p. 60. 73. Interview with Colonel Pekuri, former Commander of the Karelian Wing of the Finnish Air Force, Helsinki 2 April 1987. 74. Tervasmliki, Puolustushallinto, p. 303. 75. Ilmavalvonta-asema opas, Paaesikunta, Helsinki, 1952, p. 13-14. The same instructions were repealed in the 1954 Swedish-language version of the same manual. 76. According to General Merio, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Air Force, the letter that initiated the planning was dated 30 April 1949. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 77. According to Merio this was communicated in a letter dated 11 October 1952. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 78. An air force memorandum dated 20 May 1953. Interview with General Merio, Tikkakoski, 18 July 1985. 79. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesla, p. 139. A modern combat radar network was developed in the 1960s. 80. See e.g. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 439. The Finnish government sent a memorandum to the Soviet government on 15 Septem• ber 1954 as a result of three Soviet jets flying across Finland. 81. G. Co Magnusson, 'Lentoase ja Suomen turvallisuus', Uusi Suomi, 19 July 1956. See also G. E. Magnusson, 'Suomen lentoaseen kehittliminen', Uusi Suomi, 31 January 1956. 82. 'Tutka olennainen osa nykyaikaiscssa ilmapuolustuksessa', Uusi Suomi, 25 November 1955. 'VaestOnsuojclua edellcen kehitettiiva', Uusi Suomi, 22 November 1955. 178 Notes to pp. 58-61

83. 'Vaestonsuojelua edelleen kehitettiivii' Uusi Suomi, 22 November 1955. 84. Paasikivi severely criticised these politicians for their suggestion. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, pp. 419,435. 85. Paasikivi feared that if Finland became dependent on Soviet trade the Finnish communists could disrupt the trade and create a situation in which they could use their good relations with the Soviet leaders as a lever for gaining power in Finland. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, 6 March 1954, p. 404, and 24 March 1954, p. 407. 86. Paasikivi told Torngren to receive the US Ambassador to Finland, Mr McFall, and explain the matter. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 419, 14 May 1954. 87. The invitation was presented by Lebedev, the Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 442. 88. In Paasikivi's view, foodstuffs and other necessary goods had to be stored even in peacetime. Paasikivi,J. K. Paasikivenpiiiviikirjatll, p. 419, 13 May 1954. 89. The note protested against an alleged co-operation between the Swedish and Norwegian governments in building a naval base in the Trondheim region in northern Norway. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat /I, p. 421-2, 1-2 June 1954. 90. 5 June 1954. Ibid., p. 424. 91. A discussion between the Minister of Defence Emil Skog, the Commander-in-Chief, General Sihvo and Paasikivi on 31 July 1954. Ibid., p. 433. 92. Nils 0rvik, 'Defence Against Help - A Strategy for Small States?' Survival, London, September:""October 1973. 93. Paasikivi on 18 January 1955. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 469. 94. Ibid.

4 The Soviet Withdrawal from the Porkkala Naval Base, 1956 1. Arguments to this effect were made frequently during the Finno-Soviet armistice negotiations. See T. Palm, Moskova 1944: Aseleponeuvottelut maaliskuussaja syyvskuussa 1944, Helsinki 1972, pp. 131-2. 2. Stalin to Paasikivi in 1939, .cited in Eino Kekaliiinen, 'Nain vuokraa• jamiehittiPorkkalaa', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. 3. Molotov in armistice negotiations in Moscow in 1944 . Palm, Moskova 1944, Helsinki 1972, pp. 131-2. 4. The size of a Soviet regiment at that time has been estimated at 2400 men, while a battalion is believed to have been 600 men, A. I. Radzdievskiji~s Taktika v boevyh primerah (Moscow 1976) cited in Eino KekaIiiinen, 'Niiin vuokraaja miehitti Porkkalaa', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. 5. A report by the Finnish Headquarters 28 May 1952, cited in Salminen, Porkkalan palautuksesta Noottikriisiin, p. 14. Notes to pp. 62-4 179

6. Eino KeldiUlinen, 'Nllin vuokraaja miehitti Porklcalan', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 January 1986. The article is based on the author's thesis at the University of Helsinki. 7. George Maude has presented a similar theory in 'Porklcalan palautus oli osa laajempaa "liennytysoffensiivia", Helsingin Sanomat, 8 December 1985. See also Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 37. 8. Maude, 'Porklcalan palautus oli osa \aajempaa "liennytysoffensiivia"', Helsingin Sanomat, 8 December 1985. 9. However, in strictly legal terms Porkkala could have been seen as a non-neutral enclave on neutral Finnish territory. 10. According to J. Suomi, who has access to President Kekkonen's archives, Lebedev had informed Prime Minister Kekkonen about the Soviet offer even before contacting Paasikivi. See Suomenmaa, 17 January 1987. 11. The fact that the Soviet offer was considered as a barter by Finnish political leaders is revealed in Paasikivi's diary. See Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven ptiivtikirjat II, e.g. 19 August 1955, p.503; I September 1955, p. 505; 8 September 1955, p. 507. 12. The former head of the Political Department of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Max Jakobson, has presented the return of Porklcala in terms of a direct barter: a 20-year extension of the FCMA Treaty in exchange for Porklcala. Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla, p. 87. 13. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 272. 14. Paasikivi dropped these items from the agenda almost one by one as the negotiations approached. Sec: J. K. Paasikiven ptiiviikirjat II, 6 September 1955, p. 506; 8 September 1955, p. 507; and 12 September 1955, p. 508. 15. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 99. 16. 'Falsehood in guise of restoring truth', Izvestia, 12 February 1955. CDSP Volume VII, No.6. 17. Max Jakobson, Kuumalla /injalla, Helsinki 1966, p. 192. 18. R. W. Pethybridge, A History of Postwar Russia, London 1966, p.43. 19. Jakobson, Kuumalla /injalla, p. 193. 20. For the content of Kekkonen's speech see Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 101. 21. It was Paasikivi who mentioned Finland's desire finally to become a member of the UN to Molotov. Molotov promised to keep the Finnish request in mind. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven ptiiviikirjat II, p.51O. 22. The Nordic Council on its part decided not to discuss security policy issues in its meetings. 23. Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat II, p. 503 and pp.508-9. 24. The same argument is made in connection with the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in William B. Baker, Austria Between East and West 1945-55, Stanford 1966, p. 200. 180 Notes to pp. 65-8

25. See, for example, Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power, Oxford 1977, pp. 46-56. 26. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, Balti• more 1970, pp. 74-5. 27. Pravda, 9 September 1954, cited in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p. 76. 28. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p. 76. 29. Finland was 'in principle' in favour of the conference. Osmo Apunen, Paasikivi-Kekkosen linja, Helsinki 1977, p. 99. 30. According to certain Finnish scholars this solution to the dilemma formed a model for subsequent Finnish diplomacy. See Jukka Tarkka and Allan Tiitta, /tseniiinen Suomi, Helsinki 1987, p. 207 and Max Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, pp. 39-40. 31. The concept of 'forward strategy' was introduced by the United States Secretary of State Dulles. Baker, Austria Between East and West, p.201. 32. See Baker, Austria Between East and West 1945-55, p. 201 and Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 76. 33. The recognition of this fact by both superpowers has been seen as the beginning of European d~tente. See e.g. Konrad Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union' in Ginsburgs and Rubinstein (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy toward Western Europe, New York 1978, p. 67. 34. Baker, Austria Between East and West, pp. 200-2. 35. See Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, The Years in Power, p.58. 36. Audrey E. Kurth argues that the Austrian State treaty was largely a product of unilateral actions by the Soviet Union. See A. E. Kurth, 'The Great Powers and the Struggle over Austria', D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1984. Other scholars have noted that the Austrian governrnent recognised the possibilities for a settlement already in January 1954, and began to launch initiatives of its own. See Hanspeter Neuhold, 'The Permanent Neutrality of Austria: A Status Similar to and Different from Sweden's "Not-alignment" in 80 Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, UI, Conference Papers 7, Stockholm 1987, p. 7. 37. See Hanspeter Neuhold, 'The Permanent Neutrality of Austria: A Status Similar to and Different from Sweden's 'Not-alignment' in Bo Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, p. 9. 38. Conrary to Stalin, Khrushchev declared repeatedly in the the 1950s and the early 1960s that any war originating in Europe would certainly escalate to a full scale nuclear war. Although he used strong rhetoric for its deterring effect, he consistently maintained Khrushchev believed that 'neither side would concede defeat before resorting to the use of all weapons, even the most devastating ones', Pravda, 8 March 1961, cited in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 211. See also Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente. Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations 1953-84, London 1985, p. 27. Notes to pp. 68-71 181

39. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.l06. 40. Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', p. 77. 41. Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', p. 77. 42. 'The Austrian Federal Government will make a declaration in a fonn which will obligate Austria internationally to practice in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland.' See, for example, Baker, Austria Between East and West, p. 185. 43. The Austrian interpretation of this reference as a justification for armed neutrality was an outgrowth of the fear that the Soviet Union might wish to force Austria into closer co-operation with it. See, Ginther, 'Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union', pp. 77-82. 44. Ibid., pp. 77-82. 45. US Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Volume I (/945-56), Washington D.C., 1960, pp. 456-66. 46. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, pp. 182-3. 47. This argument is presented in Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 255-6. 48. Bo Huldt, 'Strategy and the Neutral Buffer State' in Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, p. 53. 49. 'The return of Porkkala was one of the major moves in the neutrality campaign, which the Kremlin launched in the mid-1950s.' Bo Peters son, 'From Avoiding the subject to Outright Criticism: Soviet Commentators and the Vexing Case of Finnish Neutrality', Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, Volume 4: 1, 1987, p. 50. 50. See e.g. G. Ginsburg, 'Neutralism a la Russe' in Ginsburg and Rubinstein (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy towards Western Europe, New York, 1978, p. 23. 51. Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, p. 78. 52. A Pravda editorial on 15 September 1955, cited in a speech by Member of Parliament M. Rysma during a debate on the extension of the Finno-Soviet FCMA Treaty on 4 October 1955. Vaitiopiiiviit 1955, P6ytiikirjat 11, p. 1218-22. 53. Diplomaticheskii Siovar, Vol. 2., 1961, p.396, cited in P. H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, London 1975, p.180. 54. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 222-5. 55. Wolfe argues that Soviet Union sought to encourage domestic press• ures in the Western states for American withdrawals from Europe. See Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p.79. However, no evidence has emerged that the Soviet Union sought the American withdrawal from Central Europe in the mid-1950s. 56. Uusi Suomi, 18 September 1955. 57. See e.g. Matthew P. Gallagher. The Soviet History of World War 11: Myths, Memories and Realities, Chapter 3: 'The Military and the Interpretation of the War', pp. 64-78. 182 Notes to pp. 72-3

58. Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, Norman (Univ. of Oklahoma Press) 1968, p. 14. For the text of Stalin's speech in which he introduced these factors see Josef V. Stalin, 'Order of the People's Commissar of Defence, 23 February 1945, No. 55', in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (eds), The Soviet Art of War, Boulder, Colorado 1982, pp. 79-82. 59. The Soviet Union exploded an atomic device in 1949 and a thermonu• clear device in 1953, only nine months after the United States exploded its hydrogen bomb. 60. For a compact treatise on the mid-1950s changes in Soviet military thought see Harriet Fast Scott's introduction to V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Stanford 1975, pp. xvii-xxi: 'The Background to Contemporary Soviet Military Thought'. 61. Major General Talenskii was the editor of Military Thought from 1945 to 1954. See Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 65. 62. Nikolai A. Talenskii, 'On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science', in Scott and Scott, The Soviet Art of War, p. 85. 63. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130. 64. Most of the discussion was carried out in Military Thought, See: Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130; and J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, London 1962,p.94. 65. Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, New York, 1959, p.52. 66. Pravda 13 March 1954, cited in Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 130. 67. Malenkov's thesis contributed to his downfall and subsequent resig• nation in February 1955. 68. See Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London 1983, pp.145-9. 69. See Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms, p. 11. 70. A new version of the Bear, the TU-20 became available 1956/57. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 64. 71. Ibid., p. 13. 72. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 143. 73. Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, p. 131. 74. Military Thought, No.3 1955, p. 5, cited in Gallagher, Soviet History of World War II, p. 70. 75. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.104. 76. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 248. 77. J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.104. 78. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 146-7. 79. See ibid. p. 104; and H. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Notes to pp. 73-6 183

Death of Stalin, London 1972, p. 60. Both authors interpret the return of Porkkala as a withdrawal from exposed salients. 80. Khrushchev's envisioned a move from massive retaliation to the 'nuclearising' of the theatre forces that would allow for a more flexible response. However, this change did not take place before the early 196Os. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 145. 81. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbot, London 1974, p. 224. 82. 'Views on the intention of the fleet and its tasks were formed under the influence of Second World War experience and victory over a strong continental enemy.' Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, p. 179. 83. J. J. Holst, 'Norwegian Security Policy' in Holst (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, Oslo 1973, p. 92. 84. J. J. Holst. 'Norwegian Security Policy', in Holst (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, p. 92. For later trends in Soviet naval exercises, see Donald C. Daniel, 'Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises', Chapter 12 in Paul J. Murphy (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy, Washington D.C., 1978. 85. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, p. 179. 86. To secure the operations of the new blue-water fleet the Soviet Union began in mid-1950s the development of cruise missile submarines. The first submarines that could launch anti-ship cruise missiles while sub• merged were completed in the late 1960s. See, Paul J. Murphy, 'Trends in Soviet Naval Force Structure', Ch. 6 in Paul J. Murphy (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy, p. 113. 87. 'The problem of the defence of the Baltic Sea lanes had shsifted from the Gulf of Finland to the Danish Straits.' Allison. Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 37. 88. Ibid., p. 37. 89. This interpretation has become the official diplomatic interpretation of the return of Porkkala. Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen expressed it at the 25th anniversary of the return of Porkkala in 1981: 'The good bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were the primary reason for the return of Porkkala.' Finnish TV News 25 January 1985, 'Ulkomaat' News Archive of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. 90. See, Uusi Suomi, 22 September 1955. 91. Paasikivi, Paasikiven linja /, Puheita vuosilta 1944-56, pp. 192-4. 92. Krister Wahl back, Mannerheimista Kekkoseen, p. 211. 93. Haikiti, 'YYA-sopimuksen konsultaatioartiklan suomalainen tulkinta', p.41.

5 One-Armed Neutrality, 1956-61 1. 'Message from Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Bulganin to H. C. Hansen, Prime Minister of Denmark', Pravda, 31 March 1957 and 'Message from Chairman ... to -Prime Minister 184 Notes to pp. 77-81

Einar Gerhardsen of Norway', Pravda, 27 March. CDSP Volume IX, No. 12, p. 21. 2. For the complete text of the note warning Norway against permitting the establishment of military bases on Norwegian territory see, The New York Times, 27 March 1957, p. 4. 3. Kekkonen's speech at the National Press Club in Washington on 17 October 1961. UIA 1961, pp. 135-8. See also, Kekkonen, Neutral• ity, p. 89. 4. Kekkonen, 'Good Neighbourliness with the "Hereditary Enemy", Speech given in Stockholm, 7 December 1943, Neutrality p. 18; Broadcast 5 October 1945, Neutrality p. 38. He also made his position clear to the Finnish Commander-in-Chief General Simelius several times. See e.g. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 177. 5. A Finnish Military Journal intervicw with General Siilasvuo, who was involved in the Finnish peacekeeping missions from the beginning and later became the Commander of all UN forces in the Middle East, Sotilasaikakauslehti, 12/1986. 6. Despite the fact that the proposal to send UN troops to Suez came from Canada, Nasser was not prepared to accept a Canadian contingent. Neither did he accept troops from the superpowers. See Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez, The Dual War, London 1979, pp. 176-84. 7. D. J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 418. 8. The Finnish contingent was put together in a short time and was therefore not prepared for an open-ended commitment. See Tauno Kuosa, 'Finland's participation in UN Peacekeeping Activity' in Kanninen (ed.), Aspects of Security, p. 299 and Kalcla, 'The UN Peacekeeping opera• tions', p. 53. 9. Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla, p. 194. 10. General Siilasvuo in an interview with the Finnish military journal, SAL 12/1986, p. 891. 11. Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystiiviinii, p. 353. 12. Sirnelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 229. 13. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 211, 268 and 269. 14. See Paasikivi, J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat p. 469, 18 January 1955. 15. See for example, 'Infantry in Atom War', SAL 2/1956. 'The use of atom bomb places certain extra requirements on our Field Artillery', SAL 7/1956. 'The impact of nuclear explosives on army operations in our conditions', Tiede ja Ase 15/1957 and an article on protection against weapons of massive destruction in Tiede ja Ase, 18/1960. 16. Example cited in Aimo Pajunen, 'Nakokohtia suomalaisesta strategiasta ja puolustuspolitiikasta', a presentation at the Finnish Military Science Society on I March 1966. See also Pajunen's Sarjatulta. 17. Jakobson, Veteen piirrettv viiva, p. 107. 18. B. V. Ganyushkin, Sovremenny neytralitet: politika neytraliteta i nostoyanny neutralitet v usloviyakh borb' by za mir, Moscow: Inst. Notes to pp. 81-6 185

mezhdunarod. otnosheniy, 1958, p.27. Quotation provided by Roy Allison. 19. For example, A. A. Gromyko et al. (eds), Diplomaticheskij slovar', Moscow, 1961, p.394; V. V. Pohlebkin, Finlandija i Sovetskj Sojuz, Moscow 1961, p. 18; B. V. Ganjushkin, Sovremennyj nejtralitet, Mos• cow, 1958, pp.26-7. All cited in Bo Petersson, 'From avoiding the subject to outright criticism: Soviet Commentators and the Vexing Case of Finnish Neutrality', p. 50. The system of transliteration used here is as used by Bo Petersson. 20. See, e.g. Ju Daskov, 'Dobrye sosedi', Sel'skaja Zizn', 5 December 1968. Cited in Bo Petersson, p. 51. Transliteration as in Petersson. 21. Nihtilii, 'Our defence readiness is moving into the limelight', Sotilasaikakauslehti, April/1956. 22. Pekka Visuri, Totaalisesta sodasla kriisinhallintaan, Helsinki 1989, p.195. 23. Wolf H. Halsti, Suomen puolustuskysymys, Helsinki 1954, p.48, 73 and 47. 24. Tervasmiiki, Puolustushallinto, p. 371 and Tervasmiiki, Puolustus• neuvosto p. 43. 25. Tervasmiiki, Puolustusneuvosto, p. 303,377. 26. The answer of the Minister of Defence to an inquiry into the poor materiel situation of the air force by 11 members of parliament. Session of the parliament on 9 November 1957. Vaitiopiiiviit1956, Poytiikirjat II, p. 1357. 27. The order was placed on 17 October 1956. Ibid. 28. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, pp. 132, 138. 29. Certain American military observers have paid attention to the name of the Finnish recoil-less rifle and to the symbolism it seems to evoke. 'To the Finns the name Sinko (Sling) is reminiscent of the David-Goliath battle, and is particularly appropriate to a small country living in the shadow of a giant.' E. B. Atkeson, 'The Finnish Army-Nobody's Stooge', Army, August 1962. 30. Much of this section is based on interviews with Lieutenant General Halmevaara, who was involved in all procurement negotiations with the Soviet Union, and with Lieutenant General Arimo, who was involved at some stages. 31. The Soviet press still periodically criticized the Finnish armed forces for revanchism and Western orientation. See, for example, Izvestia, 17 October 1959: 'Finnish military officials fawn before Americans', CDSP Vol. X, No. 42, p. 16. 32. Viiyrynen, Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 94-6. 33. See Appendix 1. These figures exclude construction and renovation of military facilities. 34. According to General Simelius the opposition was particularly strong among the inspectors of different services. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 157. 186 Notes to pp. 86-93

35. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, pp. 159-60. 36. Uusi Suomi, 8 January 1963. 37. Heinz Danzmayr, 'The Conception of Austrian Security Policy and the Strategic Aims of Austria with Regard to the Current Situation', in Bo Huldt (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, Stockholm 1987, p. 39. 38. See Risto E. J. Penttilii, 'Totaalisesta maanpuolustuksesta turvallisuus• politiikkaan', Ulkopolitiikka, 3/1988. 39. 'Asetus Puolustusnevostosta N:o 137', 21 March 1957, Asetus• kokoelma 1957. 40. Article 3. See TervasmaId, Puolustushallinto, pp. 35-6. 41. Riuttola, Viisi vuolla maanpuolustuskursseja vv 1961-1965, pp. 11- 12. 42. TervasmaId, Puolustusneuvosto, p. 42. 43. Simelius, 'Maanpuolustuksen tehtavat ja mahdollisuudet', Yhteishyvii, 20 June 1956. 44. Kenlliiohjesiiiinto 1958, pp. 20, 67-70. 45. The ground forces were divided into army, army corps, division, and brigade, of which division and brigade were basic units. Kenttiiohjesiiiinto 1958, p. 24. 46. Ibid., p. 40. 47. Paaesikunta, Suomen Puolustusvoimat ennenja nyt, Helsinki 1959. 48. Ibid., p. 149. The source of these quotations was the 1955 Army Com• bat Manual. See lalkaviien taisteluohiesiiiinto /I, Pataljoonan taistelu, 1955, p. 216-21. 49. Paaesikunta, Sissisota ohjesiiiinto, Helsinki, 19 June 1957. 50. Eversti Veikko Koppinen, 'Sissisotamenetelma, Ehdotus', The Finnish Staff College, Helsinki, 8 March 1960. 51. For example, there was a map of the Tuohikotti region close to Finland's eastern border. 52. For example, A. Savunen, 'Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja mahdol• lisuudet', Tiede ja Ase, 18/1960. The author's conclusion was that Finland's forests and rough terrain were ideal for guerrilla warfare. 6 The Note Crisis: Its Strategic Reasons and Consequences, 1961-63 1. Khrushchev allegedly told a delegation of Finnish Communists of the possibility of a Soviet note already in August 1961 during the delegations visit to Moscow 7-11 August 1961. Uusi Suomi, December 1986. 2. For the full text of the Note see Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1961, pp. 210-213. 3. Phrase used in The New York Times, 18 November 1961: 'Turn to Military'. 4. The New York Times, 18 November 1961. 5. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 87, 17 October 1961. 6. The Guardian, 3 November 1961. 7. See, for example, Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 94. Notes to pp. 94-8 187

8. See R. M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1962, Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, Baltimore 1973; and Max Jakobson, Veteen piirretty viiva, pp. 248-51. 9. See, for example, Vayrynen, Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet Relations. 10. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, p. 44. 11. A. Pogodin, 'Dangerous Plans', International Affairs, Moscow, 4/1960, pp. 69-74. 12. Pogodin, 'Dangerous Plans', p. 70. 13. Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik: Bind I, p. 120. 14. V. Menshikov, 'Baltic Diversion by American Military', Pravda, 16 November 1960. CDSP, Volume XII, No. 46, p. 20. 15. In his speech Khrushchev warned Denmark and Norway of West German militarism. Uusi Suomi, 4 September 1960. 16. 'In honour of President of Finnish Republic', Pravda, 22 November 1960, CDSP, Volume XII, No 47, pp. 15-16. 17. Vayrynen, Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet Relations, p.62 and Nyberg, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi, p. 25. 18. N. Pavlovski, 'Silent Occupation - German Militarism and Scandina• via', Izvestia 4 May 1961, CDSP Volume XIII, No. 44, p. 25. 19. Speech on 27 September 1961. Helsingin Sanomat, 28 September 1961. Brezhnev said, for example, that 'the consequences of German militarism are familiar to Finnish, Soviet and Scandinavian people'. 20. The Soviet propaganda campaign bore a distinct similarity to the campaign against the possible introduction of nuclear weapons into the region in the late 1950s. See pp. 314-21. 21. International Affairs, Moscow, 9/1961. 22. Pogodin, 'Bonn's Strategic Plans' pp. 33-7. 23. Vayrynen, Conflicts in Finno-Soviet Relations, p. 62. 24. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p. 94. See also Jean Edward Smith, The Defence of Berlin, Baltimore 1963, pp. 235-325. 25. R. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis, p. 55. This meant a 1/3 increase in the Soviet military budget. 26. The Soviet nuclear tests were named the Arctic Test Series. The series caused the level of radioactivity in northern Finland to rise to 50% of the critical level. The War Archives, PK 1084/71, p. 105. 27. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 94. 28. See e.g Uusi Suomi, 31 Oct 1961. The Finnish newspapers featured a front-page story of the new Soviet nuclear explosion together with a story of the Soviet note to Finland. See e.g. Uusi Suomi and Helsingin Sanomat, 31 October 1961. 29. This argument is a continuous theme in R. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961. 30. Max Jakobson, who was the Head of the Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, holds this view. See, Jakobson, Veteenpiirretty viiva pp. 258-60, 278-9. The same view was presented already at 188 Notes to pp. 98-102

the time of the crisis by The New York Times: 'A Tum to the Military', 18 November 1961. According to this article the Soviet military leaders' desire to commence military consultation with Finland was published in Krasnaya Zvezda, the newspaper of the Ministry of Defence, well before the Note was sent to Finland. 31. R. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis, pp. 1O-1l. 32. According to Raymond Garthoff the military leadership had never been as cohesive as it was in 196O-196l. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, A Historical Analysis, London 1971, p. 56. 33. Ibid., p. 55. 34. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 95. 35. Vlkopoliittisia asiakirjoja ja lausuntoja 1961, p. 178. 36. Khrushchev had said that Soviet military leaders had been eager to test newly developed weapons, The New York Times, 18 November 1961. 37. The security of Leningrad must also have come into Soviet calcu• lations, but by this time the more sensitive area was Kola. Sweden's neutrality and the Soviet control of the Baltic Sea had greatly improved the securi ty of Leningrad. 38. Jakobson, Veteen piirretty viiva, pp. 217-8. 39. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 231. 40. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, pp. 172-3. 41. The same speech as in the previous quote. This part of the speech is not, however, reproduced in Simelius' memoirs. For the full text see: War Archives, PK 1084/71, p. 113. 42. Memorandum for the Defence Council. War Archives, PK 1084/71, pp. 100-1: This secret memorandum is directly quoted in Simelius' papers (but omitted from his memoirs). 43. See e.g. Kekkonen, Neutrality, pp. 103-4. 44. VIA 1961, p. 180. 45. Karjalainen, Kotimaani ompi Suomi, p. 65. 46. Izvestia, 16 March 1961, CDSP, Volume XIII, 1961, No. 11, p. 23. 47. Kekkonen, Puheitaja kirjoituksia, p. 167. 48. Ibid.,p.175. 49. Ibid., p. 176. 50. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 107,26 November 1961. 5l. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 103. 52. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 103, emphasis added. Ahti Karjalainen, the Foreign Minister at the time, presents the situation in the same light in his memoirs: 'The core of the issue was that the note had referred to the military provisions of the FCMA treaty. We did everything we could not to get involved in military consultations because they would have drawn negative attention abroad. We tried to solve the issue on a political level and were successful in doing so.' Karjalainen, Kotimaani ompi Suomi, p. 65. 53. Jakobson, Veteen piirretty viiva, p. 28l. 54. N. S. Hru§~ev, Neuvostoliitto ja Pohjola. Puheita ja lausuntoja Notes to pp. 103-13 189

vuosilta 1956-63, p. 156. 55. Kekkonen, Neutrality, pp. 111-112. 56. Ibid., pp. 112-13. 57. Ibid., p. 116. 58. Kekkonen himself quoted from his Kouvola speech in his later book, Tamminiemi - a book that was ghost-written by Ambassador Keijo Korhonen. 59. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesla, pp. 182-3. 60. Tomas Ries, Cold Will, p. 244. 61. TervasmIDci, Puolustushallinto, p. 375. 62. Cited in Uusi Suomi, 8 January 1963. 63. The Finnish War Archives, PK 1084/71, p. 124. 64. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 194. 65. Max Jakobson, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, on 13 November 1963, in a speech cited in ULA 1963, p. 41. 66. Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla, p. 168. 67. Niilo Riuttala. Viisi vuotta maanpuolustuskursseja vv 1961-1965, p.35. 68. Interview with General Ruutu, who taught at the National Defence Courses in the 1960s, Lahti, 16 July 1985. The view that the peace treaty did not apply to crisis situations was put forward already in 1958 by the Defence Council. See Chapter 5, 'Total Defence'. 69. Paaesikunta, Puolusluslaitoksen kehillliminen 1960-luvulla, Helsinki 1962. 70. Brundtland, 'The Nordic Balance, Past and Present', Co-operation and Conflict, 2/1966, pp. 30-1. 71. A. Brundtland, 'The Nordic Balance', p. 45. 72. Simelius, Puolustusvoimien puolesta, p. 176. 73. Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ysllivlinii, p. 381. 74. Juri Komissarov, Suomi loyllili liniansa, p. 150.

7 Security Through 'Active Foreign Policy', 1964-70 1. Simelius, Puduslusvoimien puolesla, pp. 209-10. 2. ULA 1963, p. 29. See also, Kekkonen, Neulrality, p. 143. 3. During Kekkonen's visits to the Soviet Union he was shown films depicting the horrendous <;!evastation caused by Soviet nuclear test explosions. These films evidently heightened Kekkonen awareness of the importance of nuclear arms control. 4. Halvard Lange's speech cited in Arne Olav Brundtland, 'Urho Kekkonen ja "Pohjolan tasapaino" in Korhonen (ed.), Urho Kekkonen, Rauhanpoliitikko, p. 128. 5. J. J. Holst, Norsk Sik.kerhelspolitik i Stralegisk Perspekliv, Bind I, p.108. 6. See K. Korhonen, Ydinaseellomal vyohykkeel maailmanpolilii/cassa. Helsinki 1966, p. 67. See also, Apunen, 'Urho Kekkosen Suomalainen rauhanpolitiikka' in Korhonen (ed.), Urho Kekkonen. rauhanpoliilikko, 190 Notes to pp. 113-16

Helsinki 1979, p. 48. 7. According to the assessment of Finnish security specialists Finland's strategic situation had improved in the early 196Os. See for example, Risto Hyvarinen, 'Suomen muuttuva sotilaspoliittinen aserna' and Simelius, 'Maanpuolustuksemme tehUivat ja mahdollisuudet', both in Helsingin Sanomat, 16 November 1964. 8. Kekkonen, Neutrality, p. 175 9. The group included among others Jouko Blomberg, Paavo Lipponen, Jaakko Kalela and Pertti Joenniemi. 10. This point of view resurfaced again in connection with the parliamen• tary defence committees in the 1970s. 11. VIA 1965 p. 36. 12. The discussion was triggered off by Basil Liddel Hart's speech in Sweden in which he advocated such a zone. Liddell Hart's speech was given conspicuous coverage in Helsingin Sanomat on 25 August 1963. 13. Yrjo Keinonen, Huipulla, pp. 157-8. 14. The purchase of a new interceptor aircraft, the J-35 Draken approved by the government in the mid-1960s, was delayed several years. In 1966 there was 'a 70 per cent cut in planned defence allocations and drastic reductions in the procurement programme, with acquisitions delayed by about ten years.' The only parts of the Development Programme that were carried out in the latter part of the 1960s were the procurement of a number of Plessey radar systems from Great Britain, the building and installation of a long-range radar and air defence C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) network, the construciton of a few corvettes, and the purchase of Soviet surface to surface missiles for the navy. For a fuller account see, Tomas Ries, Cold Will, pp. 192, 195. 15. Ermei Kanninen, 'Alueellisen puolustusjarjestelman periaatteista ja niiden toteuttamismahdollisuuksista meilla', speech given at the Sotatieteellinen Seura. 25 February 1964. 16. 'Asetus maan jakamisesta sotilaslaaneihin ja sotilaspiireihin N:o 145/66', 18 March 1966. Statute to enter into force on 1 June 1966. Asetuskokoelma 1966. 17. Lieutenant General Arimo was incarcerated for two years (1945-47) for his involvement in the case of the arms caches. 18. The best account of the history and modem usage of territorial defence is Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms. The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence. See p. 10. Roberts does not, however, discuss territorial defence in Finland. 19. 'A citizen army is a non-professional army whose members in peacetime (apart from specified training periods) pursue ordinary careers.' Adam Roberts, Total Defence and Civil Resistance, Problems of Sweden's Security Policy, FOAP Rapport C8335/M, September 1972, Stockholm, p. 55. 20. Ibid., p. 10. See also: Adam Roberts, Total Defence and Civil Resist• ance, p. 57. Notes to pp. 116-22 191

21. See e.g. Vuorenmaa 'Defensive strategy and basic operational deci• sions in the Finland-Soviet Winter War', in Kanninen (ed.), Aspects of Security. 22. The new territorial organisation had certain similarities to plans advanced in the 1920s and 1930s by Generals Grundell and Airo. These regional mobilisation systems differed from the new system in one crucial aspect: they were designed only for mobilisation while the new system of territorial defence was designed for mobilisation and warfighting and was therefore accompanied by a strategy and tactics suitable for it. 23. Interview with Lieutenant General Ruutu. 24. See V. Koppinen, 'Eraitii sissitoiminnan mahdollisuuksia aseellisen maanpuolustuksen tukena', lalkaviien vuosikirja V, 1965-66, Mikkelf 1965. 25. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 205. 26. Heikki Nikunen, 'Hiivittlijatorjunta tlinlilin', Tiede ja Ase, No. 44, 1986. 27. See e.g. Reino Nyklinen, 'Taktillisten ilmavoimien tOlmmta maaVOlmla vastaan erityisesti rynnlikkohyokkliyksili silmlillli pitiin', Tiede ja Ase, 14/1957. 28. Interview with Colonel Rajamliki, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Lapland Wing of the Finnish Air Force, Helsinki, 9 Septem• ber 1985. 29. A. Savunen, 'Guerrilla methods as supplement to national defence', SAL 5/1966. The article was a response to Koppinen's article in the Infantry Yearbook 1966 on the same topic. 30. V. Koppinen, 'Sissitoiminta maanpuolustuksen tukena" SAL 8/1966. 31. See e.g. N. Suhonen, 'Miksi taktiikasta ei keskustella', SAL 4/1968. 32. In 1968 the Finnish military journal published a series of articles entitled: 'Why is there no discussion about tactics?' See for example, Martti Suhonen, 'Minkli takia taktiikasta ei keskustella?', SAL 1/1968; J. K. Usva, 'Eiko taktiikasta keskustella?', SAL 4/1968, Niilo Suhonen, 'Minkli takia taktiikasta ei keskustella', SAL 4/1968; K . Vuorikari, 'Taktiikan opetuksesta', SAL 4/1968. 33. Ahto, 'Erliitli nlikemyksili sotakokemuksista ja niiden hyvlisikliytostii', SAL 3/1969. 34. Tomas Ries and Johnny Skorve, Investigating Kola. A Study of Mili• tary Bases Using Satellite Photography, London 1987. 35. Aimo Pajunen, 'Nlikokohtia suomalaisesta strategiasta ja puolustus• politiikasta', a speech given at the Finnish Military Science Society (Suomen Sotatieteellinen Seura) on I March 1966. 36. Fall-out shelters should nevertheless be built for the worst-case scenario. 37. Minister of Defence, S. Suoruanen, in the introduction of Puolustusministerio, Maanpuolustuksemme tienviitat, Helsinki, 1967. 38. Puolustusministerio, Maanpuolustuksemme tienviitat, Helsinki 1967. 39. Ibid., p. 1. 192 Notes to pp. 122-33

40. Ibid., p. 4. 41. Ibid., p. 9. 42. After this publication the General Headquarters have been prolific publishers of defence infonnation. For example, half a dozen editions have been published of a book titled 'Information on National Defence' (Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta). 43. Paaesikunta, Puolustuskykymme materiaalinen perusta 1968, Helsinki 1968. 44. Defence allocations in percentages of the GNP in the 1960s. 1961:1.9%; 1962:1.8%; 1963:2.1%; 1964:2.l%; 1965:l.8%; 1966:1.7%; 1967:1.6%; 1968:1.6%; 1969:1.5%. Keinonen, Huipulla p. 165. 45. Aimo Pajunen, 'Tarvitaanko meillli parlamentaarista puolustus- korniteaa?', Maanpuolustus 5/1968. 46. Keinonen, Huipulla, p. 38. 47. Keinonen, Huipulla, pp. 63, 83, 130. 48. Lalli, 16 January 1969. 49. Urho Kekkonen, Kirjeitii myllystii. II, p. 32.

8 Neutrality Under Pressure, 1970-81 1. See, for example, Bo Peterson, 'From avoiding the subject to outright criticism: Soviet commentators and the vexing case of Finnish neutrality' , Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies 4: I, 1987. 2. 625 per cent, to be precise: from 115.9 MFlM in 1970 to 840.3 MFlM in 1980. See Appendix. 3. Bo Peters son, p. 51. 4. Max Jakobson and Jukka Tarkka, 'Finnish ... ' in Aspects of Security, ed. Kanninen, p. 261. 5. Bartenev & Kornissarov, Tridcatiilet dobrososedstva. Moscow, 1976, p. 106, cited in Petersson, 'From avoiding the subject ... " p. 53. 6. Cited in Petersson, p. 55. 7. For a discussion of these developments see Max Jakobson, 38.kerros, pp. 231,235,238. 8. Max Jakobson, 38.kerros, p. 317 9. UIA 1978, p. 41. 10. See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, 1 February 1980, and Hufvudstadsbladet, 31 January 1980. 11. Yuri Komissarov, 'Problems of Peace and Security in Northern Europe',lnternational Affairs (Moscow), 1985b/7, p. 64. 12. During the same period (1970-88) Finland's GNP increased from 45,743 MFIM to 435,550 MFlM. In real tenns the increase in military procurement 1970-88 was 250 per cent. 13. The United States had refused to let Sweden resell the Sidewinder missile to Finland in the beginning of the 1960s. 14. The only other preset goal for the Committee was, according to Lieutenant General Pajunen, that the final report should be less than 100 pages long: 'otherwise nobody will bother to read it'. Notes to pp. 134-44 193

15. The total basic procurement programme recommended for 1972-76 amounted to c. 1000 MFIM at the price level of the first quarter of 1971. 16. Tomas Ries, Cold Will, p. 245. 17. The authors argued that for the political leadership the prospect of Finland losing its neutrality through military co-operation with the Soviet Union in a crisis was not a catastrophy but the best avaiiable option. Blomberg and Joenniemi, Kaksiterdinen miekka, p. 8. 18. Katarina Brodin, 'Qua vadis, Finlandia', lnternationella Studier, 4/1973. A year later Brodin followed up her thesis by publishing a book called Hot och Forsvar (Threat and Defence). 19. The peace researchers emphasised the need to develop Finland's sur• veillance capabilities. An interview with Lieutenant General Kanninen, Professor Osmo Apunen and reseacher Pertti Joenniemi, RUK 144, Hamina 1973. 20. Gustav Hagglund and Hannu Sarkio, Mita tapahtuu jos ... , Helsinki 1975. 21. ULA 1978, pp. 20-6. 22. Yuri Komissarov, 'Naton eurostrategia ja Pohjois-Eurooppa', Suomen Kuvalehti, 1979/47. 23. Alee Sparring, "Kekkonenplanen och SALT III", lnternationella Studier, 1979. 24. For example, Gustav Hagglund, 'Eurorobot osannolik finlandskt luftrum', Hufvudstadsbladet 22 February 1981. Ermei Kanninen, 'Puolustuskykymme uusien haasteiden edessa' in Juhani Suomi (ed.), NiikOkulmia Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikkaan 1980-luvulla. 25. See Pertti Joenniemi, Risteilyohiukset ja Suomen turvallisuus• politiikka, Tampere 1984, pp. 40-8. 26. For example, Bjorklund asked the Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen about this in the Parliament on 26 March 1981. 27. Max Jakobson, 'Joku pelkaaa, etta myohiistymme seuraavasta sodasta', Uusi Suomi, 15 March 1981. Much of the debate was carried out in the pages of Uusi Suomi. See also Erik Appel, 'Debatt om fOrsvarsbetankandet: har bistandstroskeln sanks?', Hufvudstadsbladet, 17 April 1981. 28. For a full description of the programme see Tomas Ries, Cold Will, pp. 254, 287-317. 29. Tomas Ries, Cold Will, p. 246. 30. Bjame Stenquist, 'Minskat forsvar endast i Sverige', Dagens Nyheter, 13.11.1988. 31. See, for example, Joseph Kruzel, 'New challenges for Swedish secu• rity policy', Survival, November/December 1988, p. 535. 32. From 1958 to 1972 Sweden increased its defence expenditure by almost 50%. The Swedish GNP increased by 60% during the same period making the large defence contribution easily affordable. See Cars, Skoglund & Zetterberg, Svensk forsvarspolitik under efterkrigstid, 194 Notes to pp. 145-56

Stockholm 1986. pp. 11-17. 33. On the nuclear weapon project see, Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber, 344-61. On the Wiggen project see, ibid. pp. 361-371, and Ingemar Dlirfer, System 37 Viggen - Arms Technology and the Domestication of Glory, Oslo 1973. 34. See Cars, Skoglund & Zetterberg, Svensk Forsvarsoolitik under Efterkrigstiden, Stockholm 1986. 35. Incidentally, the same opinion was propounded by one of the leading Finnish social democratic academics, Professor Osmo Apunen as late as in 1973. 36. These alternatives are described in the report of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee. Kolmannen pariamentaarisen puolustuskomitean mietinto, pp. 56-8.

9 Towards Symmetric Defence, 1982-89 1. The debate was begun by the publication of Puolustuslinjat (Lines of Defence) by the this author in October 1988 and facilitated by the publication of Tomas Ries' Cold Will - the Defence of Finland a few months later. Pekka Visuri's Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan (From Total War to Crisis Management), 1989, also dealt with questions of defence. 2. There were also tactical reasons for supporting Kekkonen. No party wanted to alienate the president and thus worsen its own position by announcing that it was against Kekkonen. 3. According to Ahti Karjalainen, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under Kekkonen, Kekkonen had occasional memory lapses from the early 1970s onward. It seems clear that from 1978 onwards his health deteriorated so much that it seriously impaired his work. See Ahti Karjalainen and Jukka Tarkka, Presidentin ministeri, Helsinki 1989. 4. According to Koivisto's statistics, 93 per cent of the population considered Finland's foreign policy to be well handled, while 81 per cent thought that the FCMA Treaty made a positive contribution to Finland's security. 5. ULA 1981, p. 32; ULA 1982, p. II and 13. 6. See Dag Anckar, 'Finland och vsp-pakten', and Krister Stiihlberg, VSB-pakten och siikerhetspolitiken, in Finsk Tidskrift 3/1982. 7. See Demari, 5 May 1981. 8. 'Koivisto luopuisi kommunikeoista', Helsingin Sanomat, 26 October 1987. 9. 'Sorsa: KommunikeavaIikohtaus johtui ehka vaarinkasityksesta', Helsingin Sanomat, 25 November 1987. 10. Tomas Ries, Cold Will. The Defence of Finland, London 1988. 11. Ruotuviiki, p. 10-11 /1989 12. Rene Nyberg, 'Torjuntahiiviuiijiit ja uhkakuvat', Sotilasaikakauslehti 1989/5 p. 379. 13. See Ren~ Nyberg, Suomija Pohjolan turvallisuus, Helsinki 1983. Notes to pp. 156-61 195

14. Paavo Vliyrynen, Finland's utri/cespolitik - den nationella doktrinen ochframtidens miinsklighetspolitik', Juva 1988, p. 104. 15. /lkka, 21 July 1989. 16. The most detailed source on procurement programmes is Tomas Ries' Cold Will. Although the book contains a few errors it is by far the most accurate account of the materiel development of the Finnish Defence Forces. 17. Commander in Chief General Valtanen has repeatedly turned his attention to budget cuts. See for example Ruotuviiki 12/1989. 18. Mauri Mikkola, 'Sodanajan puolustusvoimat: puoli miljoonaa taistelijaa', Ruotuviiki 10-11/1989. 19. See, for example, Tomas Ries, Cold Will and 'Finland', The Mili• tary Balance 1987-88, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies. Select Bibliography

Official Documents, Speeches, Reports Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 IV, Washington 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 IV, Washington 1974. Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 IV, Washington 1976. Holst, Joban Jorgen, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitik i Strategisk Perspektiv. Bind II: Dokumentasjon, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo 1967. Hrustsev, N., Neuvostoliitto ja Pohjola. Puheita ja lausuntoja vuosilta 1956-63, Helsinki 1964. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukuma, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka. Tasavallan Presidenlli Urho Kekkosen turvallisuuspoliillisia puheita vuosilta 1943-1979, Helsinki 1980. Paasikivi, J. K., President Paasikivi's speeches 1944-1956, the Archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Paasikivi, J. K., Poasikiven linja I: Puheita vuosilta 1944-1956, Porvoo 1962. Paasikivi, J. K., J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat 1944-1956. I Osa: 28. 6. 1944-24. 4. 1949, (edited by Y. Blomstedt and M. Klinge), Juva 1985. Paasikivi, J. K., J. K. Paasikiven piiiviikirjat 1944-1956. II Osa: 25.4. 1949-10.4. 1956, (edited by Blomstedt and Klinge), Juva 1986. Puolustuskomitea, Parlamentaarisen puolustuskomitean mietinto, Komitean- mietinto 1976:37, Helsinki 1976. Puolustusministerio, Maanpuolustuksemme materiaalinen perusta, Helsinki, Puolustusministerio, Maanpuolustuksemme Tienviitat, Helsinki 1967. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision mietinto Osa I, 10 March 1949. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision mietinto. Osa II /1, 10 June 1949. Puolustusrevisio. Puolustusrevision mietinto. Osa 11/2, 10 June 1949. Puolustusrevisio, Puolustusrevision mietinto. Osa lll. "Asevelvollisuus', 18 November 1948. Pruiesikunta, Puolustuslaitoksen kehilliiminen 1960-luvulla, Helsinki 1962. Paaesikunta, Jalkaviien taistelu ohjesiiiinto I-V, Helsinki 1957-58. Paaesikunta, Jalkaviien taisteluopas /, Helsinki 1945. Paaesikunta,Jalkaviien taisteluopas II-/V, Helsinki 1947. Paaesikunta, J alkaviien taisteluopas V, Helsinki 1954. Paaesikunta, Kenlliiohjesiiiinto /, Helsinki 1954. Paaesikunta, Kenlliiohjesiiiinto II, Helsinki 1954. Paaesikunta, Kenlliiohjesiiiinto /, Helsinki 1963. Paaesikunta, Suojeluohjesiiiinto /, # 2208, Mikkeli 1960. Paaesikunta, Suojeluohjesiiiinto 1/, # 3798, Mikkeli 1961.

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Rl>nldi, R. (ed.), Suomenja Neuvostoliiton valiset voimassa olevat sopimukset, Publications of the Soviet Institute, Series B/11, Helsinki 1972. Tervasmllid, Vilho, Puolustushallinto sodan ja rauhan aikana /939-1978, IDimeenlinna 1978. Tervasmaki, Vilho, Puolustusneuvosto vuosina 1958-1983, Helsinki 1983. Tyrkkl>, and Korhonen, K. (ed.), Urho Kekkonen: Kirjeitii myllystiini I: 1956-1967, Helsinki 1976. Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-1966, I Fremstelling, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1968. Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-1966, ll, Bilag, Copenhagen 1968. Ulkoasiainministeril>, Suomen Aseidenriisuntapolitiikka, Helsinki 1982. Ulkoasiainministeril>, Suomi ja Aseidenriisunta 1982-87, Helsinki 1988. Ulkoasiainministeril>, Ulkopoliitlisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja, 1955-1989, Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vilkuna, T. (ed.), Urho Kekkonen: Puheita ja kirjoituksia I: Puheita vuosilta 1936-1956, Helsinki 1967. Vilkuna, T. (ed.), Urho Kekkonen: Puheitaja kirjoituksia ll: Puheita vuosilta 1956-1967, Helsinki 1967.

Books in English Allison, Roy, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union 1944-1984, London 1985. BjOl, E., Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers 181, London 1983. Clark, D., Three Days to a Catastrophe, Britain and the Russo-Finnish War, London 1966. Fox, A. B., The Power 0/ Small States, New York 1959. 1983. Hahn, Werner G., Postwar Soviet Politics. The Fall o/Zhdanov and the De/eat of Moderation 1946-53, Ithaca 1982. Hakovirta, Harto, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, Oxford 1988. Henderson, Sir Nicholas, The Birth of NATO, London 1982. Hodgson, J. S., Communism in Finland. Princeton 1967. Holst, Johan Jorgen (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, Oslo, 1973. Hom, Mattila, Santavuori (eds.), The Security of the North. Thoughts about the Neutrality of the Northern Countries on a Common Basis, Tampere 1969. Huldt, Bo (ed.), Neutrals in Europe: Austria, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm 1987. Huldt, Bo and Lejins, Atis (eds) , Security in the North: Nordic and Superpower Perceptions, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm 1984. Jacobs, T. B., America and the Winter War 1939-40, New York 1981. Jakobson, Max, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the War, London 1968. 198 Select Bibliography

Jervell, S. and Nyblom, K. (ed.), The Military Buildup in the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives, Lanham 1986. Jones, W. Glyn, Denmark, A Modern History, Dover, N.H., 1986. JagerskiOld, Stig, Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, London 1986. Kanninen, Ennei (ed.), Aspects of Security, the Case of Independent Finland, Vaasa 1985. Kekkonen, Urho, Neutrality, the Finnish Position, London 1970. Kirby, D. G., Finland in the 20th Century: A History and Interpretation, London 1979. Klenberg, Jan, The Cap and the Straits, Problems of Nordic Security, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 18, February 1968, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs. Langdon-Davies, John, Finland: The First Total War, London 1940. Lundestad, Geir, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949, Oslo 1980. Lundin, C. L.,Finland in the Second World War, Bloomington 1957. Maude, George, The Finnish Dilemma, Neutrality in the Shadow of Power, London 1976. Mazour, Anatole, Finland between East and West, Princeton 1956. Nevakivi, Jukka, The Appeal that was never made: The Allies, Scandinavia, and the Finnish Winter War 1939-40, London 1976. Nissen, Henrik S. (ed.), Scandinavia during the Second World War, Minneapolis 1983. Ogley, Robert (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, London 1970. 0rvik, Nils, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Mass. 1963. 0rvik, Nils, Semialignment and Western Security, London 1986. 0rvik, Nils, The Decline of Neutrality, London 1964. Palm, Thede, The Finnish-Soviet Armistice Negotiations of 1944, Stock• holm 1971. Polvinen, Tuomo, Between East and West, Finland in International Politics 1944-1947, Minneapolis 1986. Ries, Tomas, Cold Will, The Defence of Finland, Brassey's, London 1988. Ries, Tomas and Skorve, JohImy, Investigating Kola. A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photography, London 1987. Roberts, Adam, Nations in Arms; The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence, London, 1976. Roberts, Adam (ed.), The Strategy of Civilian Resistance, London 1977. Roberts, Adam, Total Defence and Civil Resistance, Problems of Sweden's Security Policy, F(jrsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Report C8335/M, Sepember 1972. Rothstein, Robert, L., Alliances and Small Powers, New York 1968. Schwartz, Andrew, J., America and the Russo-Finnish War, Washington D.C. 1969. Select Bibliography 199

Shtemenko, S. M., The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-45, Moscow 1986. Slusser, R. M., The Berlin Crisis of 1962, Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, Baltimore 1973. Tanner, Vrun6, The Winter War, Finland against Russia 1939-40, Stanford 1957. Upton, A. F., Finland in Crisis 1940-41, London 1964. Upton, A. F., The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, London 1973. Vital, David, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, Oxford 1967. Vital, David, The Survival of Small States, Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict, London 1971. Vloyantes, John, Silk Glove Hegemony: Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1944-74: A Case Study of the Theory of the Soft Sphere of Influence, Kent 1975. Vliyrynen, Raimo, Conflicts in Finno-Soviet Relations, Tampcre (Acta Universitatis Tamperensis, Ser. A 47) 1972.

Other Books Adaridi, K. Sissitoiminta, (Upseerin kiisikirja XXX!), Helsinki 1925. Agrell, Wilhelm, Alliansfrihet och Atombomber, Kontinuitet och forandring i den svenskaforsvarsdoktrinen 1945-1982, Lund 1982. Ahlmark, Per, Den Svenska Atomdebatten, Stockholm 1965. Ahto, Sampo, Aseveljet vastakkain, Lapin sota /944-45, Helsinki 1980. Ahto, Kilkki, Tervasmliki (eds.), Suomen Puoluslusvoimal, Helsinki 1971. Ahtokari, R. Asekiitkentajuttu, Porvoo 1971. Ahtokari, R. Punainen Valpo, Valtiollinenpoliisi Suomessa 'Vaaran vuosina', Helsinki 1969. Airo, A. F., Liikekannallepanosalaliitto, Tampere 1978. Airo, A. F., Puolustustaisteluni v. /947, Tampere 1979. Apunen, Osmo, Kansallinen realismi ja puolueettomuus Suomen ulkopoliittisina valintoina, Tampere 1972. Apunen, Osmo, Paasikivi-Kekkosen linja, Helsinki 1977. Bartenev, T. and Komissarov, J. Kolmekymmenta vuotta hyvaa naapuruutta, Helsinki 1977. Bartenev, T. and Komissarov, J. Yhteistyon taipaleelta, Keuruu 1979. Blinnikka, Aulis, Valvontakomission aika, Porvoo 1969. Bjomestedt, Rolf (ed.), Svenska karnvapen problem, Stockholm 1965. Blomberg, Jaakko and Joenniemi, Perni, Kaksiterainen miekka, 70-luvun puolustuspolitiikkaa, Helsinki 1971. Cars, Skoglund & Zetterberg, Svensk Forsvarspolitik under Efterkrigstiden, Stockholm 1986. Fagerholm, K. A., Puhemiehen aani, Helsinki 1977. Haataja, HentiUi. Hietaniemi, Hietanen, Nevakivi, Rentola, Tarkka. Paasikiven hirmuiset vuodet, Suomi 1944-1948, Helsinki 1986. 200 SeleCI Bibliography

Hakovirta, Harto, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka, Helsinki 1971. Hakovirta, Harto, Suomettuminen - Kaukokonlrollia vai rauhanomaisla rinnakkaiseloa, JyvaskyUi 1975.' Hakovirta and Koskiaho, Suomen halliluksel ja hallilusohjelmal 1945-1973, Helsinki 1973. Halsti, Wolf H., Me. Veniijiija muul. Kuopio 1969. Halsti, Wolf H., Suomen Puoluslaminen, Helsinki 1939. Halsti, Wolf H., Suomen puolusluskysymys, Kuopio 1954. Harle, Vilho and Joenniemi, Pertti, Valkoinen kirja, Helsinki 1978. Holst, Johan Jorgen, Norsk Sikkerhetspolilik i Slralegisk Perspekliv. Bind I: Analyse, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo 1967. HyvlimIDd, Lauri, Vaaran vuodel 1944-48, Helsinki 1954. Hyytinen, Timo, Arma Fennica, Jyvliskylli 1985. Jakobson, Max, Diplomaattien lalvisota, Juva 1955, 1979. Jakobson, Max, Kuumalla linjalla: Suomen ulkopoliliikan ydinlcysymyksiii 1944-1968, Porvoo 1968. Jakobson, Max, Veleen piirretty viiva. Havainloja ja merkinlojii 1953-1965, Helsinki 1980. Jalanti, H., Suomi puristuksessa, Helsinki 1966. Joenniemi, Pertti, Risteilyohjukset ja Suomen turvallisuuspoliliikka. tutkimus kiiydyn keskuslelun kahdesta aallosta, Rauhan- ja konftiktintutkimuslaitos, Tutkimuksia, No. 28. 1984. Junnila, Tuure, Noollikriisi luoreeltaan tulkittuna, Helsinki 1962. Junnila, Tuure, Suomen taislelu lurvallisuudestaan ja puolueeuomuudeslaan, WSOY, Porvoo 1971. Jussila, Osmo, Terijoen hallitus. 1939-1940, Porvoo 1985. JligerskiOld, Stig, Viimeisel vuodet. Mannerheim 1944-1951, Keuruu 1982. Kairinen, Paavo, Maruisen miehel. asekiilkijiiveljet. Porvoo 1987. Karjalainen, Ahti, Kotimaani ompi Suomi, Espoo 1981. Keinonen, Yrjo, Huipulia. Muistelmia puolustusvoimain komentajakaudelta, J yvaskylli 1977. Kekkonen, Urho, Kirjeitii myllystiini. /. 1956-1967, Helsinki 1976. Killinen, Kullervo, Demokratia ja totaalinen sota, Porvoo 1959. Killinen, Kullervo, Puolueettomuuden miekka, Porvoo 1964. Kivimliki, T. M., Suomalaisen poliitikon muistelmat, Helsinki 1964. Komissarov, Juri (pseudonym for Deryabin, Yuri), Suomi lOytiiii linjansa, Helsinki 1974. Korhonen, Arvi, Barbarosssa suunnitelma ja Suomi, Helsinki 1961. Korhonen, Keijo, Naapurit vaslen tahtoaan. Suomi Neuvosto-diplomatiassa. Tartosta Talvisotaan. Helsinki 1966. Koronen, Keijo (ed.), Urho Kekkonen. Rauhanpoliitikko, Helsinki 1975. Krosby, H. P., Kekkosen linja, Jyvaskylii 1978. Krosby, H. P., Suomen valinta 1941, Helsinki 1967. Kuosa, Tauno, A. F Airo. Legenda jo eliiessiiiin, Porvoo 1979. Klikonen, U. A., Miehityksen varalta, Helsinki 1970. Select Bibliography 201

Lassila. Eino, S., Vuosi Valpon vieraana, Helsinki 1971. Lewing, Harry, Operaatio Stella Polaris, Jyvliskylli 1977. Lehmus, Kalle, Kolme kriisiii, Helsinki 1971. Leonhard, Wolfgang, Kreml ohne Stalin, KOIn 1959. Lukkari, Matti, Asekiitkentii, Helsinki 1984. Luoto, R. T. A., Sopimus ystiivyydestii. Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton viilisen Ystiivyys-, Yhteistyo-, ja Avunantosopimuksen merkitys Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikassa 1948-78. Tampere 1978. Lyth, Einar, Militiirt Forsvar i Norden, Stockholm 1979. Magill, J. H., Tasavalta tulikokeessa, Muistelmia Suomesta kuuman ja kylman sodan vuosilta. Weilin Goos, Mikkeli 1981. Mannerheim, C. G. E., Muistelmat II, Helsinki 1952. Manninen, Ohto, Suur-Suomen iiiiriviivat. Kysymys tulevaisuudesta ja turvallisuudesta Suomen Saksan politiikassa, Jyvliskylli 1980. Mikkola, Tervasmliki, Salokannas (cds.), Suomen puolustusvoimat ennen ja nyt, Porvoo, 1959. Nevakivi, Jukka, Maanalaista diplomatiaa vuosilta 1944-48, jolloin Icylmii sota teki tuloaan Pohjolaan, Helsinki 1983. Nevakivi, Haataja, Hentini., Hietanen, Saraste, Seppanen, Turtola. Suomi 1944, Helsinki 1984. Nyberg, Rene, Pohjolan turvallisuus ja Suomi. Ydinaseiden viihenevii merkitys, Helsinki, 1983. Nygiird, Toivo, Suursuomi vai liihiheimolaisten auttaminen, Helsinki 1978. Paile, G., Pelin siiiinnOt: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton suhteet vuodesta 1944, Helsinki 1967. Pajari, Risto, Jatkosota ilmassa, Helsinki 1982 Pajunen, Aimo, Sarjatulta, Helsinki 1966. Palm, Thede, Moskova 1944: Aseleponeuvottelut maaliskuussa ja syyskuussa 1944, Helsinki 1972. Pohlebkin, V. V., Suomi vihollisena ja ystiiviinii 1714 -1967, Porvoo 1969. Polvinen, Tuomo, Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan: Suomi suurvaltojen politiikassa 1111945-1947, Porvoo 1981. Polvinen, Tuomo, Teheranista Jaltaan, Suomi suurvaltojen politiikassa II, Juva 1980. Puntila, L.A., Suomen kansainviilinen kehitys toisen maailmansodan jiilkeen, Porvoo 1966. Puntila, L.A., Suomen itseniiisyyden aika Moskovan horisontista; reunamerkintojii Juri Komissarovin kirjaan Suomi LOytiiii lin jansa, Helsinki 1975. Raumolin, Jussi, Puolustuspolitiikka ja ' turvallisuuspolitiikan opetus varusmiehille Suomessa, Kehityspiirteitii ja ongelmia, Maanpuolust• ustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, Helsinki 1977. Rautkallio, Hannu, Suomen suunta 1945-/948, Savonlinna 1974. Rislakki, Jukka, Erittiiin salainen, vawilu Suomessa, Helsinki 1982. Salminen, Esko, Porkkalan palautuksesta noottikriisiin, Keuruu 1982. Salminen, Esko, Aselevosta kaappaushankkeeseen, Sensuuri ja itsesensuuri 202 Select Bibliography

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Finnish Army; Admiral Klenberg, Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces from 1990 onward; General Koppinen, Former Commander of the Border Guards; Ambassador Keijo Korhonen, former security advisor to President Kekkonen; Reijo Lindroos, member of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee, General (ret.) Merio, former commander of the Air Force; General Aimo Pajunen, Permanent Under Secretary for Defence, Ambassador IIkka Pastinen, Finnish Ambassador to London; Colonel (ret.) Pekuri, Finnish Air Force; Colonel (ret.) RajamaId, former Commander of the Lapland Wing of the Finnish Air Force; General (ret.) Ruutu, Finnish Army; Dr. Juhani Suomi, the official biographer of President Kekkonen; Commodor Visa, head of Finnish National Defence Courses; Colonel (ret.) VaIirnaa, Finnish Army.

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Principal Newspapers and Journals Cooperation and Conflict, The Nordic Journal of International Relations. Helsingin Sanomat, Helsinki. Hufvudstadsbladet International Affairs, Moscow. New Times, Moscow. Sotilasaikakauslehli, 1948-1987. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press for: Pravda, Izvestia, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Bolshevik, and Trud. The Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, Helsinki. Tiede ja Ase, 1950-1987. U lkopolitiikka, 1965 -1988. Uusi Suomi, Helsinki. Vapaa Sana, Helsinki. Index

Aerospace engineering in Finland 83, Berlin Crisis 1960-61 94,97-98 135-36 see also 'Note Crisis' Afghanistan War 1979-89 British section of the Allied Control influence on Finnish defence Commission 1944-47 8-9 planning 132 Bundeswehr 95-97 Ahvenarunaa, see Aland 'Bridge building' Air defence 48,57,83,94,99, Norway and Denmark 1945-49 105-6 27 problems of air defence in Brezhnev doctrine and Finland 130 Finland 120 see 'cruise missiles' Civil Defence 89 Air Force, the Finnish 83 Civil Guards, see 'Suojeluskunta' the doctrine of fighter intercep• Civil War in Finland in 1918 3 tion 119-20 Clausewitz, Carl von I Air-to-air missile 106-7, 158 Cold War Ch.2 Airo, A. F. Lieutenant General 19, Communist Party of Finland 6-9, 21 34-37 Aland (Ahvenarunaa) 24, 43-44, Conference on Security and Coop• 108 eration in Europe (CSCE) 127 Allied (Soviet) Control Commission Congo crisis in Finland 1944-47 5,6-9, Finnish decision not to send 9-25 peacekeeping forces 79 see also 'British section of the Continuation War 1941-44 3-4 Allied Control Commission' Control Commission, see Allied Armistice, Finnish-Soviet Armistice Control Commission Agreement of 1944 5, 6-9, 17 Cruise missiles Arms caches (1944-45) 17-23 Finnish view on 140-42 Armament procurement Cuban missile crisis from Great Britain 57,83, 106, and President Kekkonen's view 139,157 of nuclear weapons 112 from the Soviet Union 58, 85-89, Czechoslovakian crisis 1948 105-06,157 as a precursor to Finnish• from Sweden 133, 156-8 Soviet negotiations in 1948 35 from the United States 133, 158 Czechoslovakian crisis 1968 Armed neutrality influence on Finnish defence Finnish view of 33-34, planning 117 107, 123, 126, 133-38, 142 Austria Dairen, and the Soviet campaign of Soviet decision to return military neutralisation in 1955-56 facilities to China in 1955 71, 74 66-69 Declared defence policy, the 'Autumn manoeuvres' 14 officially declared defence see the Lapland War policy 1-2, 12, 15,42,45,51,

205 206 Index

104, 107, 122-23, 134-35, 143, Mannerheim's proposal in 155 1944 12-14 also 'declaratory defence policy' conclusion 29-32 see 'Military defence policy' interpretation 32-34,45-47, 76, 'Defence against help' 81-82, 136, 139, 142-43, 150-1, a concept developed by Nils 156 Orvik 52, 59-60 Fouga Magister 84 Defence alliance Finnish views on the possibil• ity 13 Germany 4-5, 10, 14 Defence Council 89-90 Guerrilla warfare the revitalisation of 89 in Finnish defence planning19, 50, Defence preparedness 117-18, 120-21 Beginning procurement plan 84 see also territorial defence Emergency procurement plan 84 see Explosive Emptiness Development plan 107 Gulf of Finland see also Parliamentary Defence the strategic importance of 12, 61 Committees Defence Revision (Puolustusrevisio) Halsti 82 14-15,33-34 Heinrichs, General, Commander-in• Detente 128-46 Chief 1944-45 15 Djilas, Milovan 8 Heiskanen, General, Commander-in• EUREKA 152 Chief 1953-59 79-80 European Community (EC) 151 Explosive Emptiness by Koppinen 91-92 lagers, a description of Finnish guerrilla Finnish activists in 1914-18 warfare methods, not published due Finnish special troops 3 to intervention by lakobson,Max 107,132,143 the Finnish Headquarters lansson, lan-Magnus 134

Fast Deployment Forces 143-59 Kalashnikov, assault rifle FCMA Treaty Finnish copy of (Valmet ml58) 84 see Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Karjalainen, Ahti 98 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Keinonen, Yrjo, General, Commander• Assistance of 1948 in-Chief 1965-69 124-26 Finnish model (for Eastern Kekkonen, Urho, President Europe) 153 1956-82 Finnish-Soviet Relations, tension in and the Finnish High Command see the conclusion of the FCMA 79-82,138 Treaty view of defence policy 78, 83, 'Night Frost' period in 1958-59 103-05, 111, 127 85 view of nuclear weapons 81, see also Note Crisis in 1961 112-13,138 Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Khrushchev, Nikita Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual and Finnish neutrality 69-70, 93 Assistance of 1948 (The FCMA Klenberg, lan, Admiral, Commander• Treaty) in-Chief since 1990 123 Index 207

Koivisto, Mauno, President since 'declared defence policy' 2, 9-22, 1982 149-53 35-36,48-51,78,82-92,103-8, Komissarov, Juri (Yuri Derjabin's 115-20, 133-40, 153-59 pseudonym) 131, 133, 140-41 Military exercises Soviet Finnish specialist Soviet proposal for joint Soviet• Koppinen, Veilcko, Lieutenant Finnish military exercises in General 91-92, 120 1978 131-32 Korean War Military procurement, see armament and the development of the procurement Finnish air force doctrine 119 Military provinces Korhonen, Keijo 142 main organisational structure of Kuusinen, Ono Wille 13 the territorial defence system 116-17 Missile clause Lapland, reinterpretation of the 1947 Peace defence of 90, 114, 122 Treaty in 1962-63 which made Lapland War 1944-45 11-17 it possible for Finland to acquire Leino, YrjlS, Minister of Interior missiles 106-07 1944-48 35 Modernist defence policy line, Leinonen, General, Commander-in• a view according to which Finland Chief 1969-74 126 had to cooperate with the Soviet Lundqvist, J. F., Lieutenant Union in security issues after the General, Commander -in-Chief war 2,9-17,51-55, 107, 123, 1945-46 16 156 Molotov 4, 23 Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil Murmansk Commander in Chief, President the strategic importance of 123 1944-46 Ch. 1-2 Mannerhemim Cross (a military NATO decoration) 16, 125 and Finland I, 42-48, 55 Marshal Aid, and Sweden Finland's decision not to participate and Finnish defence forces in 8 formation of NATO 37-41 Meretskov, Kiril, Soviet General, 4, Navy, the Finnish 83-84, 107-8, 5 119 Commander of the Karelian Front Neutrality MiG-21 87, 120 Austrian and Finnish 69-70 procurement of MiG-21 after Soviet view of 69-70,93, the Note crisis 105-06, 120 128-33, 153 Military consultations the view of the Finnish Defence Finnish-Soviet consultations Forces 34 under the military provisions of the 'New Foreign Policy', see 'young FCMA Treaty, never entered into social democrats' although suggested in 1961, see Nordic Council, Note crisis 58-59 Finland's membership in 63 Military defence policy 2, 9 Norrback, Ole Minister of Defence the military component of Finland's 156 defence policy (as opposed to Nordic balance 108-10 the declaratory component), see Nordic nuclear-free zone 112-13 208 Index

Note crisis of 1961 Ch. 6 Commission 1944-47 7,17 Soviet proposal for Soviet• Scandinavian Defence Union (plan) Finnish consultations under the negotiations on 39-41 military provisions of the 1948 Shutzkorps, term used by the Soviet FCMA Treaty press to refer to the Suojeluskunta Nuclear arms organisation 53 Finnish attitude towards 54-55 Sihvo, Aame, General, Commander• see also Kekkonen and nuclear in-Chief 1946-53 16-17,35, arms 45 Simelius, Sakari, General, Paasikivi, Juho Kusti, President Commander-in-Chief 1959-65 80, 1946-56, Ch. 1-5 115 Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, a term Social Democratic Party of Finland used to refer to Finland's attitude towards defence 9, 127, official foreign policy in the 136, 146-7, 154 postwar era 130 Social Democratic Party of Sweden Pajari, Major General, Commander of attitude towards defence 137, the Finnish troops in the Lapland 144-47 War in 1945 16,20 Sorsa, Kalevi, Finnish statesman 147 Pajunen, Aimo, Lieutenant General Soviet Union 121-22, 134 and Finnish neutrality 128-33 Palme, Olof, Swedish statesman 146 Stalin 4-5,29-31, 63 Paris Peace Treaty, Finnish-Soviet Stella Polaris Peace Treaty of 1947 23-25 a secret evacuation operation in Parliamentary Defence Committees 1944 17-19 (PDC) 133-40 Suez Crisis First PDC in 1971 135 Finland's decision to send Second PDC in 1976 137 peacekeeping forces 78-79 Third PDC in 1981 142 Surface-to-air missile Peacekeeping Sutela, Lauri, General, Commander-in• Finnish participation in United Na• Chief 1974-83 124, 138, 155 tions peacekeeping forces 78-79 Suojeluskunta, Finnish Home Porkkala naval base 8, Ch. 4 Guard Organisation 8,116, 132 Puolustusrevisio, see Defence Revision Sweden 26-27,50 Port Arthur, 71-74 defence policy 56-57, 144 a comparison to Porkkala and Scandinavian Defence Alliance 39-41 Red forces, see Civil War in Finland in 1918 Territorial defence 115-20 Ries, Tomas 155 Traditionalist defence policy line, Rumania 30 a view according to which the Ruutu, Juhani, Major General 115 Soviet Union continued to pose the one of the main architects of the greatest threat to Finland even after Finnish system of territorial defence the war 2, 10, 13-23,49, 107, Ryti, Risto, President 1940-44 4 115-20,123,134,156

Savonenkov, Grigori, Major General, United Nations peacekeeping, see second in command in the Control peacekeeping Index 209

Valpo, Finland to the war in 1941 (a term Firmish state police 'Valtiollinen used by Soviet officials) 8 poliisi' 6-9,20,21 Winter War 1939-40 3,4 Valtanen, J aakko General 'Young social democrats', a group of (Commander-in-Chief 1983-90) younger generation social demo• 159 crats advocating a 'new foreign policy' in the 1960s and in the Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty early 1970s 136 Organisation) 95-100 White Forces Zhdanov, Andrei, Colonel General, see Civil War in Finland 1918 Head of the Allied Control 'War CUlprits' Commission 1944-47 6-17, those responsible for leading 21.35