Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2 0 1 7, 10, 209–230 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx005

Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age

Anna R. Daviesa, Betsy Donaldb, Mia Grayc and Janelle Knox-Hayesd aDepartment of Geography, Museum Building, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, [email protected] bDepartment of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada, [email protected] cDepartment of Geography, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EN, UK, [email protected] dSchool of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA, [email protected]

In periods of turbulence, the tendency to simplify messages and polarise debates is nothing new. In our hyper-mediated world of online technologies, where it seems that even national policy can be forged in the 140 characters of Twitter, it is more important than ever to retain spaces for in-depth debate of emergent phenomena that have disruptive and transformative potential. In this article, we follow this logic and argue that to fully understand the diverse range of practices and potential consequences of activities uncomfortably corralled under the ambiguous term ‘the sharing economy’ requires not a simplification of arguments, but an opening out of horizons to explore the many ways in which these phenomena have emerged and are evolving. It is argued that this will require attention to multiple terrains, from diverse intellectual traditions across many disciplines to the thus far largely reactive responses of government and regulation, and from the world of techno-innovation start-ups to the optics of media (including social media) reporting on what it means to ‘share’ in the 21st century. Building on this, we make the case for viewing ‘the sharing economy’ as a matrix of diverse economies with clear links to past practices. We propose that to build a grammar for under- standing these diverse sharing economies requires further attention to: (1) The etymology of sharing and sharing economies; (2) The differentiated geographies to which sharing econo- mies contribute; (3) What it means to labour, work and be employed in sharing economies; (4) The role of the state and others in governing, regulating and shaping the organisation and practice of sharing economies; and (5) the impacts of sharing economies. In conclusion, we suggest that while media interest may fade as their presence in everyday lives becomes less novel, understanding sharing economies remains an urgent activity if we are to ensure that the new ways of living and labouring, to which sharing economies are contributing, work to promote sustainable and inclusive development in this world that ultimately we all share.

Keywords: sharing economy, sharing, diverse economies, platform economy, gig economy, precarious work JEL Classifications: B5 Current Heterodox Approaches; J08 Labour Economic Policies; L26 Entrepreneurship; 018 Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected] Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes

Introduction emergent phenomena that have disruptive and transformative potential. In the last decade, the familiar concepts of ‘shar- In this article, we argue that to fully understand ing’ and ‘economy’ have become increasingly the practices and identify potential consequences co-joined in order to describe emergent, often of all activities currently uncomfortably corralled digitally mediated, means of enjoying, acquiring under the term ‘sharing economy’ requires not a or exchanging goods, services, knowledge and simplification of arguments, but an opening out of experiences together with others. Indeed, some horizons to explore the many ways in which this commentators suggest this new model of ICT- phenomena has emerged and is evolving. This will mediated sharing represents a ‘third great eco- require attention to multiple terrains, from diver- nomic revolution’ (Munger, 2016: 391), following gent intellectual traditions to the thus far largely on from the transition to settled agriculture and reactive responses of government and regula- the industrial revolution that harnessed fossil tion, and from the world of techno-innovation fuels and technology to facilitate the mass pro- start-ups to the optics of media (including social duction of consumer goods and services. Both media) reporting on what it means to share in the of these previous economic revolutions involved 21st century. Certainly, there is considerable work significant disruptions to the ways in which labour to be done to better understand the implications is organised, social relations shaped and natu- of this phenomenon for regions, economies and ral resources consumed. They both demanded societies. To do this, it is first necessary to build heightened levels of co-ordination and scales a grammar for understanding these diverse shar- of consumption, co-operation and interdepend- ing economies attending to: (1) The etymology of ence. The extent to which similar structural sharing and sharing economies; (2) The differen- dislocations will occur through the range of tiated geographies to which sharing economies activities often corralled under the term ‘shar- contribute; (3) What it means to labour, work and ing economy’ remains unclear and will require be employed in sharing economies; (4) The role of concerted transdisciplinary attention across and the state and others in governing, regulating and beyond the academy. Too often, the media and shaping the organisation and practice of sharing scholars understand the confluence of shar- economies; and (5) The impacts of sharing econ- ing and economy through simplified messages omies. For while media interest in the fusion of and polarised debates, casting such activities as sharing and economy may fade as its presence in either a panacea for addressing contemporary everyday lives becomes less novel, understanding malaise (Botsman and Rogers, 2010) or as a cyn- the practice and potential of what goes on under ical marketing tool symbolic of advanced capi- the broad and differentiated banner of sharing talism (Bulajewski, 2014). However, the fusion economies remains an urgent activity if we are to of sharing and economy is, as yet, under-theo- ensure that emergent ways of living and labour- rised and underdetermined, with responses from ing, to which sharing economies are contribut- scholars and governments tending to be both ing, work in ways that promote sustainable and reactive and fragmented (Cheng, 2016; Martin, inclusive development for all in this world that 2016). Essentially, established institutions are ultimately we all share. lagging behind the practical actions of entrepre- neurial actors, technological developments and those engaged in sharing. However, in a hyper- mediated world of online technologies, where it Etymology of sharing and sharing seems that even national policy can be forged in economy[ies] the 140 characters of Twitter, it is more impor- Considerable debate has been generated by the tant than ever to encourage in-depth debate of rising visibility of the term ‘sharing’ in relation to

210 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age economic activities, particularly its appropriation the concept and whether, in the context of this as a term to describe financialised transactions of article, every exchange activity might be consid- commercial business. This has stimulated numer- ered part of the sharing economy. For example, ous attempts to define what is and what is not a despite ongoing discussions around whether legitimate use of the term sharing with respect for-profit market exchanges can be counted as to the economy, with little agreement emerging sharing (Belk, 2014), these are not necessarily (Belk, 2014; Botsman and Rogers, 2010; Martin, barred from our definition of sharing. At least, 2016; McLaren and Agyeman, 2010). Under not on the grounds of the contradictions whereby such conditions of definitional disharmony it is a model of the sharing economy exists in which useful to look at foundational sources on the the distribution of resources is unjust or inequita- etymology of words. The Cambridge English ble. Side-stepping the ‘in-out’ definitional debate, Dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 2017), Ede (2014) suggests that attention should not be for example, defines sharing as: focused on whether money is involved, but rather whether the sharing is transactional or transfor- Having or using something at the same time mational. Here, ‘transactional’ refers to activities as someone else; dividing something (e.g. which are typically (but not necessarily) profit- food, money, goods etc.) and giving part of oriented and focused on achieving efficiencies it to someone else; undertaking some part of in existing systems but do not alter power struc- an activity with others; experiencing a simi- tures. Transformational sharing may also incor- lar feeling, quality or experience; telling oth- porate efficiency-seeking practices, but crucially ers about your thoughts, feelings, or ideas; or also seeks to change power and social relations putting something on social media so that around who benefits, who owns and controls the others can see it. processes through which sharing takes place, and whether it leads to greater development of The dictionary definition of sharing is then open social capital, relational bonding and resilience and broad rather than narrow and precise, mak- or increased commodification. Using these modi- ing ongoing contestation unsurprising. What fiers allows for a more nuanced analysis of activi- is dominant in this definition is the primacy of ties and outcomes, but as Ede (2014) argues, acting or using in conjunction, or experiencing there are no absolutes. However, a stronger things or feelings, with others. Sharing is then a potential boundary might be found in the tem- social process but it is not by necessity, at least poral dimension of the sharing definition: ‘having in definitional terms, prosocial or concerned with or using something at the same time as someone only gifts aimed at a more just [re]distribution of else’. This could come about from co-ownership resources. This is in contrast to more normative of a resource (i.e. owning a resource at the same readings of sharing in everyday use, such as in time) or from joint usage—whether simulta- relation to childhood development and socialisa- neous or sequential (McLaren and Agyeman, tion, which draw upon notions of fairness, equity 2015). Crucially, the temporal aspect ‘at the same and supportive group dynamics. While devel- time’ might necessitate simultaneous consump- opmental psychologists observe prosocial shar- tion for an event or a short-lived resource, but ing even in very young children across cultures could also include sequential consumption for (Brownell et al., 2009; Gurven, 2004; Olson and a long-lived resource. For example, sequential Spelke, 2008; Rochat et al., 2009; Sigelman and usage could arise from an informal tool sharing Waitzman, 1991), a key point is that sharing is not agreement between neighbours, who take turns by definition only related to such interactions. to use expensive goods, or could include a firm Unsurprisingly, such definitional openness renting out a resource to many users for profit. generates questions about the boundaries of Thus, the definition includes different potential

211 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes forms of organisation of resources—joint forms collective and public. Indeed back in the 1970s, of ‘having’ as well as the collective process or the Manuel Castells (1977) developed the concept mode of sharing—the joint ‘using’. Again, teas- of ‘collective consumption’ to distinguish those ing out these characteristics does not preclude goods and services in an urban area that require a particular organisational form of resource or collective provision (such as public transporta- mode of sharing. Thus, the commercial delivery tion, public housing and mass public education) of a for-profit market exchange is not impossible compared to those that are individually con- under this definition. These are important issues sumed. He argued that the ways in which these that deserve more consolidated attention than is services are managed and governed is impor- possible here, but it is highly likely that the invo- tant for understanding local urban politics in cation of ‘sharing’ will become increasingly polit- advanced capitalist societies. icised and its meaning ever more contested as More recently, information and communica- its use expands. Such contestation in itself is not tion technologies (ICT) have further stretched necessarily problematic if it also leads to ongoing the spaces over which such sharing can take societal debate about normative ideas embedded place far beyond kinship, familial and geograph- within sharing, such as justice and rights; for such ically bounded settings (Davies and Legg, 2017). normative ideas are themselves subject to ongo- The evolution of these extended spaces and ing debates over their interpretation and appli- practices of sharing deserve broader and more cation, but nonetheless remain important global concerted attention, or what Duncan McLaren touchpoints for societal development. and Julian Agyeman have called a ‘paradigmatic In addition to the ontology of sharing, there perspective’ (2015: 7). This requires a disman- is a well established body of work in the fields tling of frames that cast sharing as only a social of anthropology, psychology and behavioural or an economic activity and a wider perspective science around social practices of sharing, for as of sharing as a livelihood activity, with socio- Belk (2017) and others (Davies and Legg, 2017; cultural, and sometimes political, dimensions in Kovács et al., 2017) have noted, sharing is as addition to having economic and social compo- old as civilisation itself. Indeed, it was through nents. McLaren and Agyeman’s conception of a food sharing within and between families in ‘sharing paradigm’ highlights sharing things, ser- particular that specialisation, through divi- vices, activities or experiences; sharing between sion of labour, became possible and relational private individuals as well as through collective bridges constructed within communities; shar- or state provision; sharing material or virtual, ing has played a central role in shaping human tangible or intangible entities; sharing consump- life history, social organisation and coopera- tion or production; sharing simultaneously or tive psychology (Kaplan and Gurven, 2005; sequentially; sharing as rivalrous or non-rival- Jones, 2007). Since these early examples of rous; sharing in parts or sharing in turns. highly localised collaborative and co-operative Indicating the high level of attention to behaviour, other actors, institutions and tech- the confluence of sharing and economy, the nological developments have created complex Cambridge English Dictionary (2017) now ecosystems with many opportunities to share includes a definition of ‘sharing economy’, that are less spatially constrained. For exam- which is described as an economic system based ple, McLaren and Agyeman (2015), in their on people sharing possessions and services, book Sharing Cities, demonstrate how urban either for free or for payment, usually organ- sites have always embodied shared spaces with ised and mediated through the internet. As in possibilities for interaction, connection and this dictionary definition, technology is often the exchange of goods, services and experi- presented as the key driver behind the contem- ences across different territories—individual, porary sharing economy (Botsman and Rogers,

212 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age

2010; Kovács et al., 2017). However, sharing creating possibilities for people to participate activities in the very sectors now heralded as the as both buyers and sellers in what have been vanguard of the sharing economy, through the termed multi-sited marketplaces (Hagiu, 2009). commercial success of companies like Uber and Sundararajan (2016) has termed this ‘crowd- AirbBnb, existed before widespread personal based capitalism’, as in many cases the high- and mobile computing. From the 1960s, early value, venture-capital funded platform-based incarnations of shared mobility and co-hous- organisations have effectively become the new ing were primarily bottom-up, community-led market intermediaries. Crucially, despite the schemes located in alternative counter-cultures claim to directly link consumers and produc- and founded on ideals of communal prop- ers, these firms mediate between the two and erty. One of the White Plans for Amsterdam, create value as they do so. As these new inter- for example, developed in the mid-1960s by mediaries scale rapidly and internationally, it is a group of radical activists called the Provos, becoming increasingly difficult to transact with- included shared bicycle schemes, and the chief out engaging these companies. architect of the plan, Luud Schimmelpennink, To further distinguish types of sharing went on to found WitKar (Dutch for White economies, Kenney and Zysman (2016) have Car)—a car-sharing program in the early 1970s. adopted the term ‘digital platform economy’ These localised, placed-based practices struc- or simply ‘platform economy’ to describe the tured around common ideological goals were variety of economic activities that involve the transformed by digitalisation, and online tech- role that mobile and ICT technologies play in nologies in particular, which enable quick and the delivery of services. Uber, Airbnb, Amazon convenient match-making between those who and Facebook are most often cited as those wish to share. In these new incarnations there large companies that are transforming the way is no need to agree ideologically or even to be consumers connect with service providers. The co-located to participate. This digitally medi- Cambridge Dictionary, while not yet explicitly ated sharing also creates the potential for com- offering a definition of the ‘digital platform mercial value generation, not only for those economy’ has recently introduced the new verb who share, but also for those facilitating the ‘uberize’ to explain changes in business models sharing. For example, the provision of personal for buying, leasing, acquiring or accessing goods information often required as a pre-requisite and services, especially using mobile technolo- for participation in ICT-mediated sharing can gies. Kenney and Zysman (2016: 62) argue create a valuable corpus of ‘big data’ through that these activities ‘are not based on “shar- network effects, providing the scale of partici- ing”; rather, they monetise human effort and pation is large enough. This data may also be consumer assets … the advantage of platform- collected, analyzed, sold and re-sold, generating based companies rests on an arbitrage between revenue for various participants (Chen et al., the practices adopted by platform firms and the 2012; Frankel and Reid, 2008). rules by which established companies operate, The possibility for commercialising a previ- which are intended to protect customers, com- ously commons-based or informal means of munities, workers and markets’. accessing goods, services and experiences has It is unsurprising that large-scale, commercial been a major driver of investment in, and major ‘peer to peer’ sharing platforms have become focus of attention on, contemporary sharing the main focus of controversy, celebration and activities. Much has been made of the benefits policy within the sharing economy, because that peer-to-peer, ICT-mediated sharing can they most visibly challenge incumbent indus- create from minimising extended value chains, tries and governance structures (Martens and directly linking producers and consumers, and Codagnone, 2016; Stabrowski, 2017). However,

213 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes they represent only the tip of the sharing activities. Similarly, Mill Creek Farm2 in West economies iceberg. Following Gibson-Graham Philadelphia, an educational urban farm that (2008), we argue that an exclusive theoretical is dedicated to ‘improving local access to fresh and analytical focus on capitalist economic produce, building a healthy community and relations obscures and undervalues alternative environment, and promoting a just and sustain- economic forms. Extending a diverse econo- able food system’, is also a for-profit initiative, mies perspective into the remit of the sharing but engages in gifting, bartering as well as sell- economy better acknowledges the history and ing at different moments and with different evolution, as well as the range and scope, of the communities. sharing economy activities; a fundamental step Viewing the sharing economy as a matrix towards developing a fuller analysis and theo- of diverse economies allows an analysis of the retical explanation. Just as there are diverse sharing economy as a continuum both tempo- economies, so too are there diverse sharing rally (i.e. connecting with past sharing prac- economies. tices) and substantively, even when presented We argue that there is a ‘matrix of shar- with forms which appear binary. It allows us to ing’ which displays variations in the mode of see platform technology as an enabling factor sharing (gifts, barters, reciprocity, selling) and rather than a causal one and to examine the the organisational form of sharing (for-profit, numerous antecedents which predate the con- variation in for-profit, not for-profit, social temporary discourse about sharing. Thus, we enterprise, collective, co-op, association). This try to highlight some of the many elements of is illustrated in Figure 1 with respect to food the sharing economy that have roots in previ- sharing economies, which have been deline- ous economic eras and suggest an evolution of ated and categorised in the SHARECITY100 form and organisation rather than radical dis- database that collates more than 4000 food location from a previous model. A few schol- sharing initiatives in 100 cities in 83 countries ars have attempted to capture the scope and across six continents (Davies et al., 2016). While range of the sharing economy more broadly this matrix clearly highlights the differentiated (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015) and in specific nature of sharing activities between initiatives, sectors such as food (Davies and Legg, 2017) the food sharing initiatives were also internally and housing (Voytenko Palgan et al., 2016). variegated. As reported in Davies et al. (2017), Within these analyses it is not just consump- more than two-thirds of initiatives (70%) of tion, but also peer production models that are food sharing initiatives in the database share incorporated, both the production of goods and multiple things (e.g. meals, crops, seeds, grow- the production of informational services and ing or preparation skills, kitchens and garden content (Benkler, 2006). spaces etc.), 21% of initiatives use more than While Figure 1 is merely indicative of the one mode of sharing and 20% of organisations many variations in mode and organisational comprise more than one organisational form. form that are already being used in activities For example, there may be informal elements described as food-sharing, it provides a foun- in an organisation which adopts a co-opera- dation from which to consider the nuances and tive model, or there might be initiatives which varieties of sharing economies that currently have for-profit and co-operative activities. The exist in other areas and also to consider the dif- Joinery1 in Adelaide, Australia, for example, is ferences in opportunities to share which exist a for-profit organisation with the goal of being in particular activities. For example, the collect- a ‘space for South Australians to connect and ing dimension of food sharing emerges because create a better future together’, and employs of the existence of public crops and wild foods both gifting and selling in order to sustain its (e.g. fungi and fruit), but it is hard to identify

214 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age

Mode of Collecting Gifting Bartering Selling (NFP) Selling (FP) sharing Includinggleaning, Stuff, skills or spaces Stuff, skills and spaces Exchanging or renting Exchanging or renting foraging, food rescue, given for free are swapped without food or food related food or food related dumpster diving/skip stuff, skills, spaces for stuff, skills, spaces for money Organisational surLing money but not for money andfor proLit Form proLit For proLit: Gleaning, Fruit Community growing, Community garden, Community farm, Mill Mealsharing, Eat With, Commercial ventures magpie, London, UK The Joinery, Adelaide, Cityzen Gardening, Creek Farm, Global which seek to create a Australia Bengalaru, India Philadelphia, USA Linancial proLit Social Gleaning, SEND, Food redistribution, Community Meal sharing, Dinner Shared kitchens, enterprise: Tokyo, Japan Espigoladors, composting, Kokoza, Exchange, Berlin, Sambucus, Barcelona, Organisationswhich Barcelona, Spain Prague, Czech Germany Spain seek to create a social Republic or environmental good through trade Co-op: Food rescue, Fruta Food growing, The Community supported Co-operative gardens, Shared food Organisations that are Feia, Lisbon, Portugal dirty beanstalk, agriculture, Rooftop Garden, processing, Three jointly owned and Canberra, Australia Jivabhumi, Bengalaru, Johannesberg, South Stone Hearth, democratically India Africa Berkeley, USA governed by their members Charity, Not-for- Gleaning, Boston Area Food skills sharing, Seed swapping, Seed Food surplus City Farm, Newham ProLit: Registered Gleaners, Boston, USA 3000 Acres, Savers, Sydney, redistribution, Your City Farm, London, UK charities and non- Melbourne, Australia Australia Local, Copenhagen, proLits Denmark Association: Mapping harvests, Community growing, Seed swapping, Community gardens, Urban growing, Dallas Formal clubs, New Zealand Fruit Roots and Rays, Southern Seed Kleingärtnerverein Urban Farms, USA associations and and Food share map, Chicago, USA Exchange, Wellington, Köln-Braunsfeld, networksthat require Wellington, NZ New Zealand Cologne, Germany membership Informal: No Mapping urban Food gifting, Food not Collective food Informal food parks, Urban growing, Urban formal structure or harvests, Fruktkartan, bombs, Global processing, Houston Food Park, Oyster, Dublin, membership Stockholm, Sweden Preserving Traditions, USA Ireland requirements Anna Arbor, USA

Figure 1. A matrix of food sharing economies (Source: Davies et al., 2016). such a category in the mobility sector, although as well as territorial geographies which relate it is possible to imagine a similar category to the spaces over which sharing takes place around accommodation which includes activi- (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015). Within analy- ties such as squatting or living nomadically in ses of sharing economies, however, there is public spaces. space to develop more geographically-sensitive approaches to better comprehend the relations between scale, space and place; particularly Geographies of sharing between the new geographies created between Given how sharing economies are embroiled in on- and off-line worlds (David, 2017) and shaping societies, economies and environments, between localities around the globe (Davies it is inevitable that they will create particular et al., 2017). Specifically, more attention to and peculiar geographies of sharing. It is already the spatial assemblages and multi-layered and well-established that there are diverse cultural multi-level ecosystems of sharing would better (Gabriel, 2013), developmental (Smith et al., indicate the interactions and interdependencies 2013; Tomasello and Warenken, 2008) and his- between the skills, spaces and stuff, which are torical geographies of sharing (Ivanova, 2011), stimulated through sharing economies. Such

215 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes work could help to bridge the gaps in knowledge pertinent—than before (Christopherson et al., between the global or supranational trend anal- 2008): Rather than diffusing opportunities ysis of sharing economies conducted primarily and productivity spatially, it is suggested that a on the commercial sectors of sharing (PWC, ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamic in many industries 2016) and the plethora of individual sharing has created greater concentrations of ‘frontier enterprise case studies (Cohen and Muñoz, firms’ in particular places, particularly large 2015). There is also scope to move beyond the cities (Andrews et al., 2015). With the OECD western-centric focus of much sharing econo- (2015) finding little trickledown of technologi- mies research (Tolkach et al., 2015) and the cal capabilities from frontier firms into the rest preoccupation with mobility and accommoda- of the economy in which they are located. tion sectors to areas which have long been the Similar issues confront the sharing economy. focus of sharing researchers previously such as While sharing economy digital platforms may food and finance (Allen, 2010; Davies and Legg, transcend local and national boundaries, they 2017; McClintock, 2010; Wekerle and Classens, are still enacted in locales; they have a mate- 2015) as well as new spaces of sharing created rial and territorial impact on the ground. For by technological developments (David, 2017). example, Uber is restricted or blocked entirely Certainly, sharing economies have profound from municipalities in 10 countries (Khosla, implications for the geography of economic 2015) and even where Uber can operate, it may activity. Traditional firms, particularly those in not be able to operate everywhere, exemplified ground transportation and temporary accom- by restrictions on airport access (McCartney, modation, confront substantial geographic 2016). Most starkly, Uber’s attempt to circum- impediments. They must build infrastruc- vent local political geography through a digital ture (buildings, backend operations, human tool called ‘Greyball’ (Isaac, 2017), that allowed resources, repair and maintenance capacity) to drivers to avoid law enforcement personnel, support expansion. Personnel must be hired, demonstrates just how important place (and trained and supported. Sharing economy firms regulation tied to place) remains for sharing by contrast face substantially lower barriers to economy platforms. geographic expansion because they blur the Indeed, it is far from the first time localities boundaries between public, corporate and pri- have been challenged by transnational actors vate space. When every personal car or home seeking entry into new markets, competitive becomes a potential professional vehicle or advantage and profit optimisation. Distinct room to rent, with costs of provision, repair parallels can be drawn to the rise of multi or and maintenance outsourced to the owner and transnational corporations starting in the 1980s. the costs of training outsourced to customers In many cases, these cross-national economic (through a ratings or reputation system), the actors had the financial and political heft to limits to expansion are much reduced. challenge and overrun local and national In some ways, this discussion parallels that regulations and homogenise culture. The which occurred during the rise of the internet. prominence of globalised fast food chains not- Digital technologies based on the internet, withstanding, the history of multinational cor- the logic went, would make geographic space porations is a case study in how local cultures irrelevant. As scholars noted early in the new reshape—and perhaps pull apart—global eco- millennium, however, the internet never made nomic processes and actors. It may be that the geography irrelevant; people, corporations and combination of digital platforms sitting at the other social actors using the internet still had intersection of the firm and the market (Uber to exist in the physical world where geography and similar sharing platforms are both firms remained just as pertinent—if not even more and facilitators of third party transactions) are

216 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age changing the relationship between territorial economy. In both cases, sharing is actually also scales, prompting anew questions of where the a mode of social isolation and exclusion, which global ends and the local begins. Going further, may ultimately lead to a cumulative weakening the reconstruction of the relationship between of social bonds at wider scales. individuals and markets by sharing economy While the social, and societal, implications platforms creates new concerns regarding how of sharing economies are profound, more often global actors and forces can subtly reshape analytical focus and political controversy sur- local cultures. rounds how they are reshaping business and These effects can be difficult to see at the labour practice. In short, does the rise of sharing macro level, requiring an analytical shift in sca- economies represent the beginning of a radical lar focus. For example, Belk (2017) probes the shift in how business is organised, questioning phenomenon of sharing at a distinctly smaller existing management theories and practices of scale: gated communities, an increasingly com- labour, employment, the firm and the nature of mon form of social exclusion which also relies economic enterprise? How will the wider range to a substantial degree on sharing to succeed. of stakeholders in sharing economies coalesce In Belk’s words, such communities ‘increasingly and who has the power and control to gov- bifurcate the world into geographic clusters of ern in these expanded ecosystems of sharing? haves and have-nots’ (2017: 248). Addressing Attention to the changing employment rela- sharing in the context of such enclavism allows tionships and governance challenges are placed Belk to explore the more social aspect of shar- under scrutiny in the following sections. ing, including the concepts of ‘sharing in’ and ‘sharing out’. Belk (2017) notes that sharing amongst families—routinised, non-exclusive Work in the sharing economy and without expectation of reciprocity—builds While there is an extensive and growing lit- strong social bonds. He argues that this ‘sharing erature on work in the sharing economy, inter- in’ differs from ‘sharing out’ in which material est in the changing nature of work is not the resources are gifted to outsiders, usually on a sole preserve of sharing economy analysts. As once-off or very limited basis. Gated communi- an on-going feature of 21st century capital- ties represent a test bed for how sharing inter- ism, academics have long debated the extent acts with social context. This form of sharing and character of changing working practices— resembles the ‘sharing in’ that predominates in practices which are assumed to vary from the families, but Belk argues that gated communi- paradigmatic ‘standard model’ of full-time, ties often do not produce strong social ties. The regular, contractually based work (Houseman key difference, he suggests, lies in the motiva- and Osawa, 2003; Kalleberg et al., 2000). It is tion for sharing. While ‘sharing in’ is a form important to note that even in the height of of social inclusion, sharing within gated com- the post-war Fordist boom, many jobs were not munities operates on the basis of social exclu- ‘standard’, and were instead firmly rooted in sion. Members of the gated community share the insecurity and lower wages of the second- resources to ensure that non-residents are ary labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; kept outside the community. Excluding others Reich et al., 1973). Despite this long history of may be motivated by fear of crime or disgust segmented labour markets, the non-standard at urban pollution or contamination, but the model of work is still seen as an aberration underlying motivation of exclusion remains. from the norm. However, in many countries Belk (2017) draws a connection between the more stable employment relationships have types of sharing that takes place in gated com- declined as a proportion of total jobs and many munities with for-profit ventures in the sharing of these jobs have transformed into something

217 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes more arms-length—removing the direct rela- accounts which try to capture the explosion of tionship between employer and employee and new forms of non-standard working arrange- inserting an intermediary—as seen in many of ments with terms such as ‘platform work’, the platform business models of work in the ‘on-demand work’ and the ‘gig economy’ sharing economy. While many observers have (Brinkley, 2016). One of the major debates celebrated and embraced these new models in both academic and popular accounts is the of work as enhancing creativity and flexibility, significance for workers of this increasingly others have criticised the sharing economy for popular business model followed by many the precarious nature of new working arrange- for-profit sharing economy firms, where firms ments—the potential drag on wages, low regu- subcontract work to self-employed independ- latory structures and lack of institutions, such ent contractors, who do not have the legal as unions, to set a wage and standard floor rights and benefits afforded to an employee. (Richardson, 2017). Critics argue that sharing economy employers Crucially, we argue that it is impossible give their workers independent contractors or to analyse working practices in the ‘shar- self-employment status in order to cut wages, ing economy’ as a homogeneous whole—the reduce benefits and avoid legal responsibility variation and distinctiveness of the different for their employees (Bernhardt, 2014). Clearly, organisational structures which include for- the evidence shows that non-standard work- profit and not-for-profit activities and a range ing is more contractually insecure and offers of ownership models from shareholding pub- less access to paid leave, sick pay or mater- lically traded companies to worker coopera- nity leave as well as training opportunities tives (Rutkin 2015; Scholz, 2014). The matrix and career development (Dekker and Van der in Figure 1 highlights the potential variation Veen, 2015; Office for National Statistics ONS, in working practices with different organisa- 2016). However, other research points to the tional forms and modes of sharing. In a similar high levels of job-satisfaction amongst the self- vein, Chris Benner’s research on new forms of employed due to high levels of autonomy and working in the ‘new economy’ reminds us of independence (Blanchflower, 2000; Benz and the importance of distinguishing between flex- Frey, 2008; Lange, 2012). ible ways of organising work and the changing It is difficult to establish the extent and scope nature of the contractual relationship between of these new work arrangements. The growth of the firm and workers (Benner, 2002). That is, we this work model is difficult to quantify as exist- must examine the changes in the organisation ing data sources do not completely capture the of work in the sharing economy as distinct from phenomena, although some national statistic changes in the organisation of for-profit firms. agencies are trying to respond to the data gap.3 Below, we examine the working practices of the However, there have been a few high profile for-profit firm models, which have been the first attempts to estimate the scale of these new to increase in scale and received the most popu- types of working practices. For example, Katz lar and academic scrutiny, although many of the and Krueger’s (2015) study of alternative (or issues differ for the cooperative end of the shar- nonstandard) work in the US finds that work- ing economy spectrum. ers engaged in all alternative work arrange- There are a large number of scholars who ments (temporary work, on-call work, contract explore the scale and significance of self- work, and independent contractors) increased employment, fixed term, temporary and from 10.1% of all workers in 2005 to 15.8% in part-time work over the last 30 years (Carré, 2015. They show that all of the net employment 2000, Cappelli and Keller, 2013; Kalleberg growth in the USA from 2005 to 2015 involved et al., 2000). There are also numerous popular alternative working arrangements.

218 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age

However, Katz and Krueger encourage cau- Although single indicators cannot com- tion about extrapolating this data to estimate pletely capture the changing contours of work the size of the sharing economy workforce. in the sharing economy, many scholars use self- They find that only ‘0.5% of workers are work- employment data as an important proxy. The ing through an online intermediary, such as justification being that the changing nature of Uber or Task Rabbit’. Thus, they conclude that the employment relationship should result in ‘the online gig workforce is relatively small more self-employment. For example, in the UK compared to other forms of alternative work the data from the Office of National Statistics arrangements’ (2015: 3). Crucially, Katz and shows that self-employment increased its share Krueger only collected data on each indi- of total employment from close to 13.0% in vidual’s main job, while other studies suggest 2008 to 14.9% in 2015. The ONS data also that many workers use sharing economy work shows that about half of the growth in self- to supplement their existing income (Schor, employment was part-time and half full-time 2017). Others are also critical of overestimat- (Office of National Statistics, 2016). ing the extent to which we see a reorganisation Studying self-employment across OECD of work. Bernhardt (2014) shows that existing countries, Blanchflower (2000) finds that self- aggregate data in the USA does not show a employment tends to create bifurcated labour strong, unambiguous increase in key measures markets with the least educated having the of nonstandard work. In particular, she argues highest probability of being self-employed, that ‘on-demand platform work’ is far less prev- while the most highly educated also having alent than current media accounts suggest. relatively high probabilities. This is reinforced It is also difficult to measure the extent of by analysis in the UK which shows that 60% changing working patterns associated with the of the growth in self-employment since 2009 sharing economy in the UK. A report by the has been in ‘privileged’ sectors such as adver- Work Foundation (Brinkley, 2016: 3) states ‘we tising and banking, while the remaining 40% have no direct measures of the gig economy, of the growth in self-employment has come but all the evidence tells us that it accounts for in more ‘precarious’ sectors, such as construc- a modest share of employment’. They estimate tion and cleaning (Resolution Foundation, that regular and occasional participants in the 2017). These broad contours are given shape by gig economy ‘account for no more than 6 per recent studies of workers in the sharing econ- cent of total employment at most’ and that omy (Ravenelle, 2017; Schor, 2017). Schor finds ‘we find no evidence that the gig economy has that many sharing economy workers are highly increased the share of insecure employment in educated workers with other sources of income, the labour market’. Their findings are strength- who augment their incomes by taking on tradi- ened by their inclusion of occasional work tional blue and pink collar manual labour tasks. in the ‘gig economy’ as well as more regular This, she argues, suggests that the allocation work. Certainly, their data shows that sharing of these jobs in the sharing economy is likely economy work has not reduced the aggregate to increase inequality by crowding-out tradi- supply of permanent and full time employee tional blue and pink collar workers. Ravenelle jobs. They state that in the UK, ‘at the start of (2017) finds that while some sharing economy 2016, the non-permanent workforce accounted workers use the experience to become fully- for about 20% of total employment (self- fledged entrepreneurs, most experience a sense employed, temporary workers, unpaid family of stigma in regards to their sharing economy workers, and those on government schemes). work. Like Schor, she argues that the work- This is very similar to the share at the start of ers who succeed in the sharing economy often 1996’ (Brinkley, 2016: 7). possess significant skills or capital that would

219 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes also enable them to succeed outside the sharing (ground transport, taxis and accommoda- economy. tions) is that they have found success in cities Additionally, the potentially disruptive new and sectors which have over decades accrued employment relationship between employer and regulatory and institutional structures which worker may be concentrated in certain places traditionally functioned as a wage floor or to and sectors. Davidson and Infranca (2016) argue maintain labour standards. Different sectors that the sharing economy must be understood as can develop distinctive institutional and cul- primarily an urban phenomena, where ‘a critical tural configurations, such as unions and sec- mass of providers and consumers who are suffi- toral licensing, that can mediate the impact of ciently close to each other or to other amenities changes in working practices and labour mar- to make their platforms work’ (Davidson and ket structures, and influence the forms these Infranca, 2016: 218). Hathaway and Muro (2016) take (Gray, 2004; Gallie, 2017). For example, the also argue that the ‘gig economy’ in the US is not taxi industry in many urban areas is highly reg- evenly spread but is found in large metro areas, ulated by licensing laws, which cover fare struc- and that it is further concentrated in particu- tures, rules of competition and working rules. lar sectors, such as ground transport, taxis and Additionally, parts of the hotel sector in US accommodations. In a study of San Francisco metro areas, such as New York, San Francisco between 2009 and 2013, they found that non- and Las Vegas, have seen high rates of unionisa- employee firms (a proxy for individual contrac- tion amongst hotel workers. In some US cities, tors) in transport and accommodation services unions in this sector have developed an insti- increased between 40 and 80%. tutional infrastructure, such as internal hiring Reflecting the visibility of this growth, halls and formalised training mechanisms, to changes to the working practices in the taxi maintain a particular relationship between the industry have dominated the popular debate union and the employer which allow workers around the sharing economy. Uber is often con- to earn premium wages (Gray and DeFilipis, sidered a flagship for-profit firm of the sharing 2015). Many of the urban labour markets which economy, particularly in its relationship with its have accrued these regulatory and institutional drivers. In 2015, the firm had annual revenue structures are the same urban areas where of $1.5 billion, and had over 1 million drivers Hathaway and Muro have tracked the success worldwide, but only employed 6,700 workers of non-employer firms, their proxy for the ‘gig (Lazo, 2015). Under this model, every single economy’, in traveller accommodation, taxis ‘driver-partner’, as Uber calls them, is consid- and ground transportation (Hathaway and ered an independent contractor without any Muro, 2016). rights to sick pay, paid holidays or employer While not causal, the existence of local insti- contributions to a pension. However, there is tutions which raise the wage floor and enforce- growing debate and legal challenges in many ment of rules around the labour market, may countries over whether Uber drivers are actu- create opportunities for sharing economy firms ally self employed or employees. Recent legal which use different employment structures rulings in the UK and the US have sided with (self-employment, independent contracting) to the drivers that they are indeed employees. avoid these costs and undercut existing firms. These debates around nature of the employ- This suggests that these working practices of ment contract are fundamental to understand- the for-profit sharing economy firms may flour- ing the potential significance of the sharing ish in urban areas and sectors which display economy. high levels of regulation and institutions, which One striking feature of the urban and sec- functioned to set a wage and standard floor for toral focus of for-profit sharing economy firms workers. In a similar vein, a report on ‘illegal

220 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age hotels’ in New York City’s accommodation sec- that if higher educated workers accept a job tor argued that the changes in this sector were requiring a medium level of education, this can undercutting the regulated hotel industry and push medium educated workers to accept jobs undercutting the wages of the unionised work- requiring little or no education, which leaves force with non-union wages and unregulated few jobs for those with low education levels. working conditions (IHWG, 2008). Thus, while not new, these trends suggest that As the above suggests, low wages and income the growth of the for-profit side of the sharing volatility clearly account for a large portion of economy has exacerbated issues of insecure work in the for-profit sharing economy. This ‘nonstandard’ work. The positive sides of entre- is partially a result of the low returns to self- preneurial opportunities are outweighed by the employment. A study in the UK shows that the skewed distribution of work, income and risk typical weekly earnings of self-employed work- for sharing economy workers. While this may ers were less in 2014–15 (after adjusting for infla- be embraced by educated workers supplement- tion) than in 1994–95 (Resolution Foundation, ing their existing income, it may be detrimental 2017). The low wages and income volatility are for workers who rely on the work as their pri- also partially explained by the prevalence of mary source of income. Furthermore, the rise part-time work in the self-employed popula- in for-profit sharing economy firms may have tion. Surveys consistently find that a majority of a detrimental effect on incumbent workers in the workers on platforms are working on them existing regulated and unionised industries. only part-time and part-year, to smooth over periods of unemployment or to supplement incomes (Bernhardt, 2014). Similarly, in the Governing sharing economies USA, JP Morgan Chase conducted research to As mentioned above, much of the sharing econ- estimate the size of the sharing economy. They omy operates outside the normal workings of found extreme income volatility, of more than a the state. However, there are instances where 30% month-to-month change in total income, the state has had to react to dramatic changes in especially amongst younger workers and those the delivery of services at the local level, espe- in the bottom income quintile (JP Morgan cially in the realm of less ‘sharing’ activities and Chase, 2016). Juliet Schor comes to a similar more platform-related ones like ride-sharing conclusion in her study of workers interacting and housing (Belk, 2017). These state reactions with different online platforms, which found have varied considerably across space—from that sharing economy workers, often middle the full-scale embrace of re-writing state regu- income professionals, use the opportunities of lations to facilitate new operating models to additional part-time work to supplement their outright rejection. regular income (Schor, 2017). They found that The most obvious example has been the middle or high income professionals were more dramatic rise of peer-to-peer ride services like successful in supplementing their income in Uber in cities around the world. Uber, like this way than low income workers. This sug- many of the other platform services, owns very gests that the model may promote job-hoard- few physical assets (Stone, 2017). Uber does not ing rather than job-sharing and may increase own any cars, does not have many employees or income inequality rather than decrease it offer any benefits; it is essentially an advanced (Schor, 2017). This argument reinforces Ponds brokerage system. The business model is based et al.’s (2016) research on over-education on a US-style market regime that rewards which finds that lower-educated workers may those companies that pass risk onto communi- be ‘crowded out’ by higher educated work- ties, try new things and seek permission later. ers in urban labour markets. The argument is At first launch, Uber made the case it was not

221 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes a ride-sharing company but a technology com- criticised by business and Uber’s policy leaders pany; initially, governments were largely unable as ‘backward’ and ‘outdated’. to stop its operations because the business was As detailed previously, like so many digi- primarily conducted over the internet. Over tal technologies promising a geography-free time, however, questions of employment law, world, sharing economy firms have been geo- consumer protection, unfair commercial prac- graphically constrained. As Stabrowski (2017) tices, tax law and insurance became common rightly notes, the sharing economy to date has state concerns (Belk, 2017; Sun and Edara, largely been a phenomenon of urban spaces 2015). because of the need for mass participation to Uber has since changed its tune and has create network effects and then convert those spent large amounts of money in advocacy, effects into economic value for investors. This is lobbying and marketing activities associated evidenced in a 2016 report from the Brookings with campaigns to re-write municipal regu- Institution found that both ride (Uber and Lyft) lations that are more permissible to its ride- and room (Airbnb) sharing economy firms are sharing activities (Brail, 2017). Levintova overwhelmingly concentrated in major cities in (2015) estimates that Uber has spent over the USA (Yaraghi and Ravi, 2016). Stabrowski $1 million US fighting local regulations in (2017) turns our attention to the ways that this California and has plans to spend up to $1 urban focus and the erosion of the private and billion in jurisdictions across the world. Uber public that the sharing economy demands have has had many success stories in convincing important implications for urban governance. In municipalities to re-write their regulations to particular, the sharing or ‘platform’ economy in facilitate their operating model. In the spring housing can be understood as a continuation of of 2016, Uber successfully lobbied Toronto a trend in which housing has increasingly come city council to create a new class of trans- to be incorporated into public policy as a basis portation activity that competes alongside for wealth generation and social welfare. Thus, the older taxi service model. The new class is before the first booking took place on Airbnb, called the private transportation company housing had entered the public space as sites of (PTC) and operates under a lighter set of economic entrepreneurship. The further com- regulations than taxis, requiring less training modification of the private space undertaken of drivers and lower licensing fees. Needless by Airbnb in the context of New York City to say, the taxi industry is not pleased with the raises substantial issues of equality and govern- changes and there have been many local pro- ance. Should Airbnb be able to benefit from tests and push-backs. regulations that have sought to ensure afford- In some cases, municipalities have allowed able housing to as many residents as possible? Uber to enter but clearly laid out their own What of the homemakers in multi-residence requirements for ride-sharing business to pro- buildings? Do they have the right to an exten- tect local jobs, public safety and the municipal- sion of sorts of their private accommodation ity. In Austin, Texas ride-sharing regulations (for example, leaving shoes and coats outside were developed that Uber and Lyft found too their door), because they know and have estab- burdensome so they left, but in their place lished relationships with their neighbours? emerged a new locally sourced firm that offered Airbnb, by reconstituting a private home similar services in the city (Brail, 2017). In other as a public commercial space, challenges the jurisdictions, Uber has yet to enter. At the time social fabric within which the home is situated. of writing, Vancouver has put a moratorium Because Airbnb constitutes property in terms on ride-sharing operations until more research of the relationship between guests and hosts, is done but while they do, the city has been the broader social relationships are severed.

222 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age

Returning to the expectations of a homeowner temporary shared offices in personal homes) in a multi-unit building, Airbnb encourages a and Wikipedia (digital commons for sharing reconstruction of the home as a commercial information and media). Ostrom’s approach enterprise separable from the rest of the build- highlights the importance of institutions (rules ing. Thus, a building of 200 units is reconstructed and norms) in governing commons and outlines not as a community of 200 families but rather seven elements that guide successful commons- as 200 separate (and separated) business enter- management institutions. These design princi- prises simply sharing a single roof. In addition ples focus on defining the relevant community to the impacts on social life and welfare, Airbnb using the resource, empowering that commu- has the potential to disrupt geographically fixed nity to participate in making and enforcing economic processes. Specifically, Stabrowski the institutions governing the commons, and (2017) cites work arguing that Airbnb has, or ensuring those outside the community respect can easily, disrupt the rental market in urban the institutions. Taking off from this premise, spaces—though those conclusions are difficult Bradley and Pargman (2017) identify seven to make definitively (Stulberg, 2016). There is points (what resource, who can access, degree no doubt however that the leasing of short-term of subtractability, user dependency, rules gov- accommodation through Airbnb is radically erning use, rule enforcement, and who sets changing the occupancy of buildings in some rules of use) to compare collaborative com- cities such as Reykjavik, and by association mons with the more traditional environmental changing the composition of residential spaces. commons. The authors identify commonalities Here, the thriving market for short term tourist but also substantial differences that suggest accommodation is driving up rental prices and Ostrom’s design principles need to be adapted pushing out traditional tenants, young educated to the modern sharing economy if they are to professionals who need access to urban spaces be useful for governance. and are still unable to purchase their own home. The above examples of regulation and the In light of these problems, the central question platform economy raise some interesting ques- becomes, how to best govern the eroding dis- tions about how scholars have thought about tinction between private and public in the best the state in the context of neoliberalism and interest of the public? Certainly, greater atten- rapid technological change. Morozov (2015, tion to how spaces of domesticity and home are online) has characterised some aspects of the being colonised by the instrumental rationality sharing economy as ‘neoliberalism on steroids’ of financialisation demands further research. because it ‘creates markets everywhere while If Stabrowski (2017) raises the question, also producing a new subjectivity in its par- Bradley and Pargman (2017) offer a partial ticipants’. One can see how even the local state answer. They look to a concept that has been has not been immune to a new subjectivity as instrumental in discussing shared environmen- it is continually compared to other jurisdic- tal spaces and resources: the commons. The tions in which local governments are made to authors turn to Ostrom’s (1990) institutional feel backwards if they seek to regulate once design principles, applied so successfully to locally-grown services and to protect the public natural resource commons, for insight on gov- interest. It also speaks to a new scalar phenom- erning the collaborative commons. Bradley and enon in which local states are once again the Pargman (2017) address the sharing economy recipients of broader macro-structural changes. (as distinct from the gig or on-demand econ- While in the past local states were left reacting omy of Uber and Airbnb) and examine three to the downloading and offloading of nation- collaborative commons: Bike Kitchen (non- state restructuring, now they are the recipi- profit open bike repair studio), Hoffice (pop-up ents of broader technological changes and the

223 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes particular US-style market governance regimes of labour, work and employment they create, that enable global technology companies to affecting livelihood options (Ravenelle, 2017; test local markets without regard to local rules Schor, 2017) and social relations of property and norms. (Richardson, 2017; Stabrowski, 2017), but oth- In their effort to stay relevant, local states are ers relate more fundamentally to how systems re-writing regulations, but not always within the of trust are built in data-rich contexts, particu- public interest. As mentioned above, there are larly in relation to security and privacy (Celata concerns about workers’ rights, access to ser- et al., 2017; Cheng, 2016). Already, reputational vices by more vulnerable populations, and the ranking is widely adopted as a tool intended loss of local jobs and money circulating in the to build crowd security, while blockchain tech- local economy. Unfortunately, many of these nologies are being rolled out in diverse settings platform activities are thriving in a broader to create public and verifiable records through unequal society and precarious labour market algorithms, but both of these present challenges and these factors are making conditions ripe to existing systems of governance. for many aspects of the so-called sharing econ- The implications of sharing activities for the omy. It seems many of these new forms of eco- environment are less easy to delineate due to nomic activity are here to stay; what form they a lack of data and robust studies. While advo- will take, however, is not clear. Are cities that cates suggest that the access over ownership permit these platforms indicating openness and dimension of sharing could reduce demand innovation to a new way of doing business and for, and create more efficient usage of, natural living? Or are they only creating more precari- resources, others identify how sharing might ous jobs, less economic activity and more une- actually be generating additional demand for qual cities in the future? resources (Rayle et al., 2014). For example, there is some evidence to suggest that peer- to-peer ride sharing might be generating addi- Impacts and sharing economies tional demand for mobility by car which will Attention to the economic power and poten- lead to increased congestion on roads, local tial of commercial sharing practices dominate air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions policy literature (EC, 2016), with consultants (Fitzsimmons and Hu, 2017). As noted in a such as Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) sug- recent New York Times article (Fitzsimmons gesting that in the five dominant sectors of the and Hu, 2017), there is evidence that not only sharing economy that facilitate transactions are peer-to-peer ride sharing apps compet- between individuals and organisations through ing with taxis, they are also drawing people online platforms in the accommodation, trans- away from more sustainable forms of public portation, finance and freelancer marketplaces, transport such as buses and underground train revenues are projected to grow around 35% travel. Schor (2014) also found that cheaper annually up to 2025. This is far faster than the accommodation through sites such as AirBnb predicted growth of the wider economy over are encouraging people to take more trips, with the same period. However, it is important to knock-on environmental resource impacts and emphasise that while the economic dimensions overall higher carbon emissions. of sharing economies are clearly generating So while sharing to increase use of ‘idling’ interest in the media and amongst venture- resources appeals to ecologically modern capitalists, such activities also have significant notions of resource efficiency and mechanistic implications for society and the environment. understandings of resilience—and makes sense Some social implications may be related directly when applied to little-used tools or material to the new business models and the patterns goods such as drills and lawnmowers—questions

224 Sharing economies: moving beyond binaries in a digital age remain about how far this approach can be possibly precisely because of their diversity, extended. As technology dramatically reduces there are few unambiguous answers to the fun- transaction costs, it is possible to envisage a damental questions about the likely impact of future where almost every product and service sharing economies. For example, precarious is commodified as an asset with the potential working conditions of those labouring in shar- to earn rental income for its owner. This raises ing economies through gig-type work have other underexplored questions. Who will own generated much discussion, but precarity itself what assets in the future and how will the allo- is neither new nor restricted to sharing econo- cations of ownership in a sharing economy be mies. Bernhardt (2014: 15) in particular is cau- organised and governed? The implications of tious of over-defining the importance of Uber’s this process are also unclear when applied to effect: ‘Uber is standing in for a problem— less material qualities that are characteristic technology destroying standard jobs—that it of many sharing economy practices. There are does not actually describe, because many taxi concerns that extending this narrative of idling drivers were independent contractors before resources into areas such as on-demand house- the advent of Uber’. She reminds us that a sub- hold or professional services consolidates the stantial portion of the workforce still works in ‘always-on’ nature of contemporary life, blur- standard employment relationships (some at ring boundaries between work and leisure contractor firms), ‘but with the low wages, inse- and commodifying and financialising activities cure hours, and few benefits that are commonly that would have previously been seen as con- associated with gig work’. tributing to communities or being neighbourly Until recently research has been too limited (Bradley and Pargman, 2017; Richardson, 2017). and patchy to give a definitive picture of cur- Overall, there is a general paucity of research on rent practices and while a surge in scholarship the environmental impacts of sharing activities, is attempting to address some of these concerns not only in terms of identifying direct and indi- (Cheng, 2016; Martin, 2016), data is still limited rect impacts but also tracing the potential for and assumptions about future trends remain rebound effects, where savings made through speculative at best (Nesta, 2016; PWC, 2016). At sharing in one sector increases consumption the same time, the social, economic and environ- elsewhere (Davies and Legg, 2017). The posi- mental implications of emergent sharing activi- tive impacts of sharing (reducing consumption) ties are intertwined with and embedded within having knock-on effects elsewhere, for exam- wider socio-technical and socio-economic assem- ple, reducing jobs in manufacturing goods for blages or ecosystems (Davies et al., 2017) that are consumption (Sundararajan, 2016: 394–5). constantly evolving, leaving states playing regula- tory catch-up. Much attention has been focused on a few large commercial platform-focused Conclusion sharing activities in specific sectors, such as Uber The coincidence of a particular suite of techno- and Airbnb, because they have managed to scale logical, political, economic, environmental and up their activities and grasp market share from social developments during the early decades incumbent industries. Focusing solely on such of the 21st century have been read as indicating organisations, however, ignores the diversity in an impending period of intense socio-economic sharing modes and organisational forms; what we transformation; a transformation that will have term the matrix of sharing. In addition, some sug- considerable impacts on territories, economies gest the dominance of these intermediaries may and society, not least with respect to the ways in only be temporary. These companies currently which people interact to create and exchange function as crucial gatekeepers for those who goods, services and experiences. However, and are seeking to connect. They mediate access to

225 Davies, Donald, Gray and Knox-Hayes their marketplaces, dictate terms of any transac- agencies—may overcome these challenges, but tions and lead actors in negotiations with govern- they are also likely to confront substantial hur- ing authorities over how regulatory landscapes dles in terms of rationalising actors and activi- might respond to their activities. However, with ties in the sharing economy. technological development, some are already There remains a politics of hope around the envisaging how sharers will be able to connect potential for sharing economies to redistribute easily, directly and quickly peer-to-peer, using resources more equitably, to create a greater decentralised marketplaces that are owned and sharing of prosperity and greater socio-eco- operated by the participants themselves rather nomic and environmental security. However, we than intermediaries (Nesta, 2016). have also witnessed the ways in which for-profit A key challenge for regulators is then to deal sharing economy models have contributed to effectively with the present landscape, while increased inequality. The progressive potential ensuring governance frameworks are able to of the sharing economy will not be realised with- accommodate new terrains as the activities out constant vigilance and more agile systems inevitably evolve. Legal and regulatory frame- of adaptive governance. As such, while media works will certainly require modernisation to interest may fade as the presence of sharing reflect new configurations of economic power, economies in everyday lives becomes less novel, but there are a range of factors that make gov- understanding their evolution, practices and ernance difficult, from defining the regulatory impacts remains an urgent activity if we are to limits of the new economic entities to calcu- ensure that the new ways of living and labour- lating the costs and benefits of regulation and ing, to which sharing economies are contributing, governance and how they should be distrib- work to promote sustainable and inclusive devel- uted. Another question centres on the source opment in this world that ultimately we all share. of governance. Bottom-up governance, through collective action, is impeded by the atomising and isolating effects of digital platforms. While Endnotes reputational ranking systems seem to offer the 1 promise of bottom-up governance, in practice Details of the Joinery can be found at: http://www. these provide a measure of governance within thejoinery.org.au/. systems, not of systems, and focusing on an 2 Further details of Mill Creek Farm can be found at: individual’s ranking serves to catalyse atomisa- http://www.millcreekurbanfarm.org/. tion rather than reverse it. Another potential 3 There are few direct sources of data which allows avenue of governance, crowd-based decision us to track working arrangements in the shar- making, also faces problems. As Surowiecki ing economy. In the USA, the Bureau of Labor (2004) outlines in his book, The Wisdom of Statistics discontinued their survey of contingent work in 2005. It is being reinstated in 2017. In the Crowds, crowd-based decision making is not UK, most estimates come from existing data on a form of collective governance but rather a self-employment. process of aggregating analysis from multiple, independent observers (crowds) to inform decision-making. This is bottom-up in the sense Acknowledgements that assessments are collected from individu- This paper draws on research conducted as part of als, and the final assessment may form the basis the SHARECITY project which has received fund- of governance, but on its own, crowd-based ing from the European Research Council (ERC) decision making does not appear to embody a under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research mechanism of collective action. Top-down gov- and innovation programme (grant agreement n° ernance—from political entities or regulatory 646883).

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