You Get What You Share: Incentives for a Sharing Economy

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The Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-19)

You Get What You Share: Incentives for a Sharing Economy

  • Sreenivas Gollapudi
  • Kostas Kollias
  • Debmalya Panigrahi

  • Google Research
  • Google Research
  • Duke University

Abstract

their individual resources. The platform allows the agents to list and search for available resources, which enables them to identify partners and form sharing groups. More specifically, in workforce and educational applications, there are groups that work to complete a task or a project, while in ride sharing and room sharing applications, the notion of a group appears when agents get together to use a provided resource, e.g., a ride or a house.

In recent years, a range of online applications have facilitated resource sharing among users, resulting in a significant increase in resource utilization. In all such applications, sharing one’s resources or skills with other agents increases social welfare. In general, each agent will look for other agents whose available resources complement hers, thereby forming natural sharing groups. In this paper, we study settings where a large population self-organizes into sharing groups. In many cases, centralized optimization approaches for creating an optimal partition of the user population are infeasible because either the central authority does not have the necessary information to compute an optimal partition, or it does not have the power to enforce a partition. Instead, the central authority puts in place an incentive structure in the form of a utility sharing method, before letting the participants form the sharing groups by themselves. We first analyze a simple equal-sharing method, which is the one most typically encountered in practice and show that it can lead to highly inefficient equilibria. We then propose a Shapley-sharing method and show that it significantly improves overall social welfare.

A natural goal is to partition the users into sharing groups that maximize the overall utility or social welfare of the system. One may model this as an optimization problem, where a centralized authority computes the optimal partition of users. However, in typical environments, the information necessary for computing this partition is hard to obtain due to privacy issues or due to the sheer size of the population. Moreover, the central authority has only limited control over the participants, and often cannot enforce the partition. Hence, in this paper, we study the following question:

Consider a population of individuals, who can form sharing groups and share their individual resources with group members. What is the right way to distribute the welfare produced by each sharing group among its members so that the population self-organizes in a socially optimal manner? The

semantics of distributing welfare are different for each application. For instance, in online learning, utility is given in the form of course credits that depend on how students contributed to group projects. In the ride-sharing application, using a vehicle has some value that is the same for all agents and monetary transfers reward those providing resources and extract payments from those utilizing resources to adjust utilities accordingly.
We model instances of this problem as games that we call resource sharing games. The most natural way to split the produced welfare among the group’s members is to divide it equally. In fact, this is the method that naturally comes into play when there are no monetary or credit transfers in our applications of interest, i.e., everyone simply gets access to the resources available in the group. However, we show that this method can perform quite sub-optimally with respect to overall social welfare. We then propose an incentive structure derived from the well-known Shapley value in the economics literature (Shapley 1953), and show that the quality of the resulting outcomes is significantly improved.

Introduction

The sharing economy (Belk 2014) is a term used to describe the modern trend of using online platforms and applications to increase the value of certain resources (such as goods, services, or skills) by enabling the sharing and reuse of these resources. Carpooling and ride sharing applications (e.g., Uber, Lyft, RideWith) allow people to better utilize commuting resources (cars, fuel, etc.), lodging and room sharing applications (e.g., AirBnB) allow users to share their space when not using it, online learning platforms (e.g., Coursera, Udacity, edX) allow students to share knowledge and collectively learn, and workforce applications (e.g., Upwork, Amazon Mechanical Turk) allow workers to collaboratively complete requested projects by contributing complementary skills. In all such applications, there are natural limits on the extent to which the resources can be shared. In carpooling, each car can fit a small number of people; in lodging, each room or house has a fixed capacity; in crowsourced projects and online courses, there is a prescribed size for working groups. In effect, this means that the agents need to be organized in groups of limited size so as to effectively share

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  • Copyright ꢀ 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial

Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

In our model, each participant owns a subset of all possi-
2004 ble resource types and, when a group is formed, everyone in the group has access to all resource types that at least one of them owns. An important observation is that the resulting social welfare function is not submodular, but supermodular. (This is in contrast to an existing body of work that studies utility games for submodular welfare functions, e.g., (Vetta 2002; Gairing 2009; Marden and Wierman 2013).) Informally, this means that a group produces more utility than the sum of its individuals. While this is often the case in practice, it can be theoretically problematic because the only stable solution is typically one where all the agents join the same group. However, in real-world applications (we give some examples below), it is impractical to have very large groups. So, we will adopt a model where groups are subject to a cardinality constraint, and also show that it is possible to enforce such a constraint through incentives alone.
(in the form of a utility-sharing method) that will lead the agents to efficient outcomes.
We begin by studying the most natural and widely used utility sharing method, which dictates that each agent has utility equal to the number of resources available in her sharing group. This is equivalent to equally splitting the social welfare produced by a group among its members and, hence, we call it equal-sharing (EQUAL). For instance, in online course projects, EQUAL would mean all students in a group will get the same course credit, i.e., the problems that the group has solved. In the carpooling application, EQUAL means all agents get to take the ride and split any costs (e.g., fuel) equally. We show that, for any reasonable equilibrium concept, there is an equilibrium partition of agents into sharing groups that is k times worse than the optimal. We also explain that this inefficiency with respect to the optimal is the worst possible for any partition, independent of whether it is an equilibrium or not. In light of this observation, we seek an alternative utility-sharing method, which results in better equilibria. The method we propose is derived from the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) and, hence, we call it Shapley-sharing (SHAPLEY). SHAPLEY aims to improve on the main shortcoming of EQUAL, which is that it rewards agents based on their contribution to improving the social welfare by sharing their resources. Below we present our results for the various equilibrium concepts, which show that SHAPLEY leads to better equilibria than EQUAL. Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium (NE) is the most established equilibrium concept in the literature. An NE in our setting is a partition such that no agent can improve her utility by unilaterally deviating to a different group. It is clear that the set of equilibria of a resource sharing game depends on the utility-sharing method being used. The price of anarchy (POA) (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009) is used as a metric that quantifies the performance of a utilitysharing method by calculating the worst-case ratio of the social welfare in the optimal partition to the social welfare in an NE. As we mentioned earlier, the POA of EQUAL is k. Unfortunately, the POA remains Θ(k) for SHAPLEY as well. In fact, we show that this will be the case for any natural utility-sharing method. However, we observe that the examples that yield this universal POA lower bound are unnatural as they assume agents will form groups of very small sizes, even when they are allowed to form larger sharing groups with more resources available. To get past these unnatural pathological cases, we consider the following two equilibrium concepts.

Applications

First, we describe two concrete real world examples of our resource sharing games:

• Massive Open Online Courses – Suppose we are inter-

ested in partitioning the set of students into groups to complete an assignment comprising multiple problems. From a social perspective, we would prefer a partition of students such that every group in the partition completes as many problems as possible. Each student on the other hand, wishes to maximize the course credit she will receive. The goal of the central authority (teacher) is to provide the right incentives (in the form of a grading scheme) to the students so that effective groups grow organically and in a decentralized fashion.

• Carpooling – In a carpooling system, agents form groups and repeatedly share rides to and from work during rush hour. In this setting the resources of the game correspond to car rides from location to location and welfare is generated for each agent who takes a ride. From a social perspective, we wish that the commuting resources are put to good use. On the other hand, agents wish to optimize their individual rewards. Providing the appropriate incentives and inducing the organic formation of efficient sharing groups is important in achieving the social objective.

Several other applications such as crowdsourcing and labor markets similarly fit our proposed model.

Our Contributions

We consider a setting where a population of agents seeks to share resources in groups of size at most k. The value of k, the desired group size, is application specific (e.g., in (Davis 2009), values of 4, 5, and 6 are prescribed as appropriate for educational applications, while similar such constraints are natural in carpooling and other applications). Each group generates social welfare, which is then distributed as utility to the agents who generated it. We study this setting as a game, where the agents self-organize into groups. Each agent wishes to optimize her own utility share. We assume the role of the central authority, who cannot enforce the final sharing groups, but who can establish an incentive structure
Strong Nash equilibrium. The strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is an NE that is robust to deviations by coalitions of agents (Aumann 1959). This implies that a partition is an SNE when there is no subset of agents who can coordinate and deviate to other groups (or start groups on their own), thereby improving their individual utilities. The strong price of anarchy (SPOA) is the direct analog of the POA for the SNE. We prove that SHAPLEY results in a significant improvement of the SPOA, which is brought down to 2 (from k for EQUAL). Unfortunately, this equilibrium concept has the well-known drawback that it is not guaranteed to exist in many settings. Indeed, we give examples of resource shar-

2005 ing games in our setting that have no SNE under SHAPLEY.
Toward the goal of characterizing equilibria with more desirable outcomes in the context of unilateral deviations, we focus on an equilibrium concept that we define here, and which we argue is the one that best predicts the behavior of selfish agents in our settings. We call this new concept a

balanced Nash equilibrium.

Each agent i in group G, on the other hand, receives an individual utility ui(G). Utility-sharing is budget-balanced, i.e.,

ui(G) = U(G).

i∈G

We now define the equilibrium concepts that we will study.

Balanced Nash equilibrium. We define a balanced Nash

equilibrium (BNE) as an NE such that all groups, except possibly one, have k agents, thereby ensuring balance in terms of their size. In many applications (such as in carpooling and online courses), this is an end in itself. In other settings, minimizing the number of groups subject to cardinality constraints is a desirable outcome. Note that merging small groups can only increase social welfare as more resources are added to the group and more agents benefit from them. We will also show that the BNE has the following properties:

Definition 1. A partition G is a Nash equilibrium (NE) when for every agent i in group G, it is the case that ui(G) ≥ ui(G0 ∪ {i}) for every other group G0 ∈ G . In other words, no agent can improve her utility by switching to any other sharing group unilaterally.

As mentioned earlier, we also use the coalition-resistant notion of strong Nash equilibrium.

Definition 2. A partition G is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if no coalition of agents S ⊆ N can deviate (move to another group, including forming a new group) to form a new partition G 0 such that ui(G0) > ui(G) for every agent i ∈ S, where G0 and G are the respective groups of agent i in G 0 and G . Intuitively, an SNE is a partition such that no coalition of agents can coordinate and move between groups in a way that benefits every member of the coalition.

• Ease of enforcement – It is easy for the central authority to slightly modify the SHAPLEY method so that every NE of the resulting game is a BNE of the original game, i.e., a BNE can be easily enforced.

• Existence – A BNE is always guaranteed to exist.
Finally we introduce the notion of a balanced Nash equi-

librium (BNE).

• Efficiency – The loss of efficiency in a BNE (we call this

the balanced price of anarchy (BPOA) by analogy) is at

most 3 in the SHAPLEY scheme (as against the BPOA of k of EQUAL).

Definition 3. A partition is a balanced Nash equilibrium (BNE) if it is an NE such that all groups, except possibly one, have k agents.

Finally, we perform simulations which show that the
SHAPLEY method improves on EQUAL in realistic settings, with respect to three metrics that measure our desiderata for forming sharing groups: performance (measured by the social welfare of the partition), participation (measured by the number of sharing groups of size k), and fairness (measured by the quality of the weakest group).
We will show existence of this equilibrium and demonstrate that it can be easily enforced by the central authority by modifying the utility-sharing method. We also note that BNE outcomes are desirable since they enforce groups of large size, where sharing is maximized and social welfare is increased.
Having introduced our three equilibrium concepts, we are ready to define the metrics that we use to measure the performance of a utility-sharing method.

Preliminaries

In this section, we describe our model and introduce the notation. There is a set of agents N and a set of resource types P. Let P ⊆ P denote the set of resource types that agent i ∈ N poissesses. Agents self-organize into groups so as to share their available resources. We denote the set of groups by G . The social welfare of a group G ∈ G is:
Definition 4. The price of anarchy (POA), the strong price of anarchy (SPOA), and the balanced price of anarchy (BPOA)

are the worst case ratios of the optimal social welfare to the social welfare of an NE, SNE, and BNE respectively, i.e.,

maxG U(G )

minG is an NE U(G )

maxG U(G )

minG is an SNE U(G )

maxG U(G )

minG is a BNE U(G )

S

(

POA = SPOA = BPOA =

...

|
P|·|G|,

i

if |G| ≤ k

i∈G

U(G) =

(1)

0,

otherwise where k is the cardinality parameter that represents the maximum group size. The expression encodes the fact that every agent in a group benefits from the presence of each resource available in the group. Note that this definition assumes that all resources have unit value. This assumption is without loss of generality since resources with non-uniform utility can be modeled by multiple resources with equal utility. The overall objective is to form sharing groups that maximize social welfare

Equal Sharing

The most natural way of sharing utility from resources in a group is to have every agent in the group receive utility equal to the value of the resources. Note that this is equivalent to equally splitting the welfare generated by the group among its participants and, hence, we call this utility-sharing

method equal-sharing (EQUAL).

U(G ) =

U(G).

G∈G

2006

Theorem 5. The POA, SPOA, and BPOA are all k under

EQUAL.

• If agent i owns a resource of type p, then she gets 1 unit of utility for p.
• If agent i does not own a resource of type p and the group

Proof. Consider the following setting. There is only one resource type. There are k agents who own the resource (we call them strong agents) and k · (k − 1) agents who do not (we call tham weak agents). The optimal solution G places every strong agent in a different group and adds k−1 weak agents to each group. Then all agents have access to the unique resource type in the game and the social welfare is U(G ) = k2. Now consider the partition G where all strong agents are in the same group and all other agents are arbitrarily partitioned into groups of size k. We will show that this partition is an SNE, an NE, and a BNE. We first argue that it is an SNE: Note that all strong agents receive the maximum possible utility of 1, and hence they have no incentive to deviate from this partition in any way. Furthermore, the weak agents have no way to improve their utility above 0, since if any subset of them were to join the strong group, its cardinality would increase beyond k leading to total utility of 0. This proves that G is an SNE. It follows that it is an NE as well, since every SNE is also an NE. Observing that the number of groups is equal to the ratio of the number of agents and the cardinality parameter, i.e., k, proves that G is also a BNE. Note that U(G ) = k. Then we get that the POA, the SPOA, and the BPOA are all at least k.
It is not hard to see that this is actually the worst possible ratio for any possible partition (not only for equilibria). For each resource an agent owns, the least social welfare earned by that resource is 1, in cases when only that agent receives utility for it. The maximum possible is k, in cases when she shares it with another k −1 agents in her group.

We note that this strong lower bound on the SPOA suggests that such inefficient equilibria can appear in many settings of interest, with weaker notions of stability. This includes situations where two agents can swap their group memberships or where a small number of agents can coordinate and deviate to a new group.

has n agents who have that resource and share it with her,

n

  • then she gets
  • units of utility for that resource. The re-

n+1
1

maining

n+1

units are shared uniformly among those who shared resource p with her (so each of them gets extra utility).

1

n(n+1)

• If the size of the group is larger than k, each agent is penalized for a unit of utility per resource type.

SHAPLEY is connected to the the standard definition of the Shapley value. The standard definition prescribes that each agent is rewarded with the expected increase she causes to the group welfare function U(·) over a uniformly random order of arrival of the agents in the group. In our setting the exact Shapley value we get when plugging in U(·) as the welfare functions is hard to work with and get a closed form expression. Our SHAPLEY instead is equivalent to the Shapley value under the following modification: Agents get utility equal to the expected increase they cause to the welfare function after removing the capacity constraint (i.e. the Shapley value with infinite capacity), but they also share a penalty equal to their cardinality if the size of the group is larger than k. This penalty is split evenly across agents since they all contribute equally to bringing the group size to larger than k.
SHAPLEY is an instantiation of the Shapley-value for the modified setting described above and, hence, guarantees the existence of an NE in every resource sharing game (Kollias and Roughgarden 2011). Intuitively, SHAPLEY is engineered to address the drawbacks that caused EQUAL to be very inefficient. It incentivizes strong agents to move to groups where they can offer more help and also incentivizes them to spread over multiple groups (since the bonus of an agent who shares is inversely proportional to the number of owners of the same resource type in the group). At the same time, it breaks symmetry in utility earned by the agents, allowing them to break away from very inefficient partitions that have groups of size k.

Shapley Sharing

In light of the poor performance of EQUAL in terms of the three inefficiency metrics, we seek a utility-sharing method that addresses the main shortcoming of EQUAL, which is that agents who significantly increase social welfare by sharing with their peers are not rewarded for it. The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) from the economics literature provides a method for splitting social welfare among those generating it. We propose applying the Shapley value in our setting, which yields a natural way of partially transferring utility from the agents who do not have a resource to the agent sharing it with them. In this section, we analyze the performance of Shapley-sharing (SHAPLEY) and show that it results in a significant improvement in the quality of equilibria.

Nash Equilibria

By equivalence to Shapley value, we get that an NE is guaranteed to exist in our game for SHAPLEY utility sharing (Kollias and Roughgarden 2011). Indeed, we show in our full version (Gollapudi, Kollias, and Panigrahi 2018) that better-response dynamics always converges to an NE.
However, it turns out that any utility-sharing method, including SHAPLEY, that has an agent split her utility with those who shared resources with her has a POA of Θ(k). We call such methods share-rewarding. Due to space limitations, we omit the proof, which appears in our full version (Gollapudi, Kollias, and Panigrahi 2018).

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  • Creative Destruction and the Sharing Economy: Uber As Disruptive

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    JOBNAME: Schneider PAGE: 1 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Dec 6 09:02:54 2016 Creative Destruction and the Sharing Economy Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Schneider-Creative_destruction_and_the_sharing_economy / Division: Prelims /Pg. Position: 1 / Date: 19/10 JOBNAME: Schneider PAGE: 2 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Dec 6 09:02:54 2016 NEW THINKING IN POLITICAL ECONOMY Series Editor: Peter J. Boettke, George Mason University, USA New Thinking in Political Economy aims to encourage scholarship in the intersection of the disciplines of politics, philosophy and economics. It has the ambitious purpose of reinvigorating political economy as a progressive force for understanding social and economic change. The series is an important forum for the publication of new work analysing the social world from a multidisciplinary perspective. With increased specialization (and profes- sionalization) within universities, interdisciplinary work has become increasingly uncommon. Indeed, during the 20th century, the process of disciplinary specialization reduced the intersection between economics, philosophy and politics and impoverished our understanding of society. Modern economics in particular has become increasingly mathematical and largely ignores the role of institutions and the contribution of moral philosophy and politics. New Thinking in Political Economy will stimulate new work that combines technical knowledge provided by the ‘dismal science’ and the wisdom gleaned from the serious study of the ‘worldly philosophy’. The series will reinvigorate our understanding of the social world by encouraging a multidisciplinary approach to the challenges confronting society in the new century. Titles in the series include: Economic Futures of the West Jan Winiecki Entrepreneurial Action, Public Policy, and Economic Outcomes Edited by Robert F.
  • What If Cities Could Create a Truly Inclusive Local Sharing Economy?

    What If Cities Could Create a Truly Inclusive Local Sharing Economy?

    METROPOLITAN HOUSING AND COMMUNITIES POLICY CENTER What if Cities Could Create a Truly Inclusive Local Sharing Economy? Solomon Greene and John McGinty June 2016 This essay is part of a five-part series that explores how city leaders can promote local economies that are inclusive of all their residents. The framing brief, “Open Cities: From Economic Exclusion to Urban Inclusion,” defines economic exclusion and discusses city- level trends across high-income countries (Greene et al. 2016). The four “What if?” essays suggest bold and innovative solutions, and they are intended to spark debate on how cities might harness new technologies, rising momentum, and new approaches to governance in order to overcome economic exclusion. What’s the Big Idea? The sharing economy works best when it works for everyone. A system built around the sharing of resources, the sharing economy uses online peer-to-peer platforms to connect owners of goods and producers of services with consumers of those goods and services in real-time.1 It can lead to more efficient use of resources, drive down costs of expensive assets, supplement incomes, and enhance social interaction. The sharing of goods and services is not new—informal sharing has long been a feature of urban life, particularly among the poor, immigrants and minority groups. But new technologies have formalized sharing, facilitating its monetization and allowing for strangers to engage in commercial sharing of underused goods and services through new marketplaces. As the sharing economy continues to expand and disrupt traditional business models across a broad range of industries—from transportation to financial services, from housing to home care—its benefits could accrue to the excluded groups that face the most stubborn barriers to participation in local economies.
  • The Opportunities and Risks of the Sharing Economy”

    The Opportunities and Risks of the Sharing Economy”

    “The Opportunities and Risks of the Sharing Economy” Written testimony of Dean Baker Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) For the hearing on "The Disrupter Series: How the Sharing Economy Creates Jobs, Benefits Consumers, and Raises Policy Questions" Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce September 29, 2015 I would like to thank Chairman Burgess and Ranking member Schakowsky for inviting me to testify on issues stemming from the growth of the sharing economy. The range of innovations that have collectively come to be known as the sharing economy offer both significant benefits to consumers and the economy more generally. Ideally, the sharing economy allows for idle assets to be more fully utilized. The sharing economy should make it easier for a household to rent out an empty house or room. It should also give people the option to do work in their spare time to earn extra income. In these and other ways the sharing economy can offer substantial benefits. However, the sharing economy also presents substantial risks. The country has built up an extensive regulatory structure over many decades to protect workers, consumers, and property owners. The sharing economy will require the modernization of this regulatory structure. In some cases, regulations have outlived their usefulness and should be eliminated. However, many of these regulations serve important public purposes. If the sharing economy is used as a way to circumvent them, then it will impose substantial costs on society. Testimony of Dean Baker, CEPR September 29, 2015 Page 2 I will use my testimony to outline the sorts of issues that sharing economy firms have raised.
  • Trust in the Sharing Economy: a Behavioral Perspective on Peer-To-Peer Markets

    Trust in the Sharing Economy: a Behavioral Perspective on Peer-To-Peer Markets

    Trust in the Sharing Economy: A Behavioral Perspective on Peer-to-Peer Markets Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) von der KIT-Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften des Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) genehmigte DISSERTATION von M.Sc. Florian Hawlitschek Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 08.08.2018 Referent: Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Henner Gimpel Karlsruhe, 2018 I II Trust in the Sharing Economy A Behavioral Perspective on Peer-to-Peer Markets 1 2 Abstract The sharing economy has shaped consumer behavior around the globe and disrupted a broad variety of traditional industries. The rapid development of this technology-driven phenomenon has led to a plethora of platforms and business models that are subsumed under the blurry sharing economy umbrella term. From a scientific point of view, pinning down and understanding this broad, complex and constantly evolving socio-technical system is not an easy task. This cumulative dissertation sheds light on consumer motives for and against the participation in the sharing economy. In particular, trust is identified as a key driver of sharing economy adoption. Consequently, a conceptualization and different means of measurement for trust in the sharing economy are introduced. Furthermore, two approaches for building trust through platform design are investigated and discussed. The work is concluded with an outlook on the possible role of blockchain technology for the sharing economy and suggestions for future research. 3 4 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my colleagues and friends at the Institute of Information Systems and Marketing at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology for their advice and support.
  • Does the Sharing Economy Share Or Concentrate?

    Does the Sharing Economy Share Or Concentrate?

    February Economic Analysis 2020 FRONTIER TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY DOES THE SHARING ECONOMY SHARE OR CONCENTRATE? The sharing economy is perhaps the most ubiquitous mani- with services, but not sharing or renting physical assets— festation of the rapid technological change we have been operate in the on-demand economy.2 Customers selling experiencing. Through smartphones and the internet, sharing or giving away their physical assets to peers, as opposed to economy platforms are facilitating the creation of markets and granting temporary access to others, fall into the realm of better use of underutilized assets. The estimate that private second-hand economy.3 vehicles typically go unused for 95 per cent of their lifetime While a decade of rapid expansion of the sharing has come to symbolize the significant underutilized resources economy increasingly enable better utilization of assets, it that are waiting to be shared in society (Knack, 2005). By shows little signs of delivering fair and equitable welfare reducing search and transaction costs, the sharing economy gains for all participants in the sharing economy. Instead unlocks these resources through cheaper and more accessible it has generated unchecked externalities and unintended options for consumers. Amateur and professional cooks can consequences. Externalities to industry incumbents, service now offer sporadic dinner experiences in their own kitchens; providers, consumers and cities have been reflected in head- non-professional drivers can complement their incomes at lines in the