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Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/8/29 Image Reference:0001 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT!

Printed for the . August 1940.

SECRET. Gopy No.

W.M. (40) 217th Conclusions.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET 217 (40).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Doivning Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, August 1, 1940, at 11 - 30 A.M.

Present : The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair). The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P. The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX^ . for Foreign Affairs. The Right Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P., Minister without Portfolio. The following were also present: The Right Hon. A. V . ALEXANDER, The Right Hon. , M.P., M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty Secretary of State for War (Items 1-7). (Items 1-7). The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of State for Air (Items 1-8). Home Security. The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CALDECOTE, The Right Hon. A. DUFF COOPER, M.P., Secretary of State for Dominion Minister of Information (Items 1-7). Affairs. The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., The Right Hon. LORD LLOYD, Secretary Secretary of State for India and of State for the Colonies (Items 5-8). Secretary of State for Burma (Items 8-8). The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Air Chief Marshal Sir CYRIL L. N. Permanent Under-Secretary of State NEWALL, Chief of the Air Staff for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-7). (Items 1-7). Admiral of the Fleet Sir DUDLEY General Sir JOHN DILL, Chief of the POUND, First Sea Lord and Chief of Imperial General Staff (Items 1-7). Naval Staff (Items 1-7). Secretariat. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. Major-General H. L. ISMAY. Mr. W . D. WILKINSON. Mr. L. F. BURGIS. WAR CABINET 217 (40).

CONTENTS. Minute No. Subject. Page 1 Naval, Military and Air Operations ... 181 Air operations. German bomb sights. Fighter strength and supply of pilots. Military operations—Middle Bast. Naval operations. French battleship Richelieu. U.S.S.E. 181 Anglo-Soviet relations. United States of America 182 Reported ban on petrol exports 4 Japan 182 Arrest of British subjects. 5 Far East 183 Proposed withdrawal of British garrisons in North China 6 The Middle East 183 Evacuation of service families. 7 India 184 service overseas. Preparation of more troops for 184 India 185 Aliens Advisory Committee. Internment of Dutchmen. Naval, Military 1. The Chief of the Air Staff said that there was nothing of and Air importance to report in regard to air operations. Operations. Air operations. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 214th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

German bomb The Prime Minister referred to a report that German aircraft sights. were being fitted with an improved bomb sight, and invited the Chief of the Air Staff to examine the possibility of carrying out a certain operation. Fighter strength The Prime Minister said he was glad that the supply of fighter and supply of aircraft was now much more satisfactory. He understood that in pilots. the near future the figures would show a still greater improvement. (Previous Reference: The Secretary of State for A ir said that the position in regard W.M. (40) 209th to the supply of pilots, though improving, was still not altogether Conclusions, satisfactory. He proposed in the immediate future to submit two Minute 1.) Papers to the War Cabinet on the question. Military The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that a strong operations— Italian force had now moved to the south of Moyale. We had made Middle East. the necessary counter-dispositions. (Previous Reference: The War Cabinet discussed the latest information as regards W.M. (40) 216th the position on the Libyan frontier. Conclusions, Minute 4.) Naval The First Sea Lord said that nothing had been heard of operations. H.M. submarine Narwhal, which had left the Humber on the (Previous 22nd July to lay mines off the coast of Norway, and she must Reference: therefore be regarded as lost. W.M. (40) 214th The Polish ship Kroman had arrived at Freetown on the Conclusions, 30th July, having broken out of Dakar on the 27th July. The Minute 2.) Captain had confirmed that the Richelieu had been hit by two French battle­ torpedoes, in addition to the damage to her stern during the attack ship Richelieu. on the 8th July. (Previous Reference: The War Cabinet took note of the above statements. W.M. (40) 198th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

U.S.S.R. 2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the Anglo-Soviet Cabinet the following information :—- relations. In a telegram dated the 31st July (No. 543) Sir Stafford (Previous Cripps had referred to the great difficulty he was experiencing Reference: in obtaining an interview with M. Molotoff,' and had suggested W.M. (40) 216th that he (the Foreign Secretary) should see M. Maisky and Conclusions, indicate to him that it was hardly necessary to maintain an Minute 1.) Ambassador to a Government whose Minister for Foreign Affairs declined to receive him. The Foreign Secretary said that, whilst he was perfectly willing to see M. Maisky, he did not feel inclined to go so far as to threaten withdrawal, nor yet to adopt the suggestion in the third paragraph of the Ambassadors telegram. The War Cabinet agreed with the Foreign Secretary's view. United States of 3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the America. announcement in the Press that morning that the United States of Reported ban on America had declared a complete ban on the export of aviation petrol exports. petrol to any country outside North and South America. It was not clear how this would affect supplies to this country. e.g., by the method of supplying oil to Canada for re-export to this country. The danger of the action taken by the United States was that it might provoke the Japanese to seize the Netherland East Indies. Until precise information had been obtained, no action was called for. The War Cabinet took note of this statement.

Japan. 4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Arrest of British Japanese had arrested fourteen British subjects in Japan and two subjects. * n Korea. Of the fourteen arrested in Japan, one had died and six (Previous had been released. Of these six, five had had their papers retained, Reference: ' an^ olle bad been informed that he might be called up for further W.M. (40) 216th examination. Sir Craigie had now stated that he favoured Conclusions ^he arrest of Japanese subjects in British territory as a reprisal, Minute 2.) ' and considered that, though the Japanese might reply by further reprisals, they would not regard our action as a casus belli (telegram No. 1409 from Tokyo). This coincided with his own view. Sir Robert did not favour the arrest of anyone against whom we could not make a case. The Foreign Secretary said he was informed that most of the people whom we had grounds for arresting did not occupy important positions. The Foreign Secretary added that he had discussed the matter on the previous day with the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand, who considered that we should make these arrests. If the War Cabinet agreed that certain Japanese subjects should be arrested, he thought no previous warning should be given to the Japanese Government. There was, however, the alternative policy of telling the Japanese frankly that we regarded the arrest of British subjects in Japan as an unfriendly act, and that, unless they liquidated the matter quickly, we should take reprisals. The Prime Minister said that he was in favour of arresting a number of Japanese without prior notice. An additional method of reprisal was an unostentatious hampering by administrative action of Japanese shipping in our ports. By obstructing their trade in an inconspicuous manner we should involve them in financial loss, and give them perhaps a foretaste of how their trade would suffer in the event of war with this country. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Sir Robert Craigie, in his telegram No. 1371 of the 30th July, had suggested that we should place as many difficulties and vexations as possible, short of actual detention, in the way of Japanese shipping. The War Cabinet agreed— (a) That steps should be taken to arrest a certain number of Japanese subjects in British territory against whom we could make a case; but that we should not give the Japanese Government prior notice of our intention, or indicate in any way that these arrests were made by way of reprisal. (V) That the possibility of placing difficulties in the way of Japanese shipping should be examined by the Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping in consultation. Far East. 5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Proposed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (40) 297). withdrawal of The Cabinet were informed that we had two battalions at British Shanghai; the other detachments were very small. These two garrisons in battalions were urgently needed at Singapore, and if withdrawn North China. we should give as our reason that they were required elsewhere. (Previous If we withdrew these troops now, we should suffer some loss Reference: of prestige; but a less serious loss than we should suffer if our W.M. (40) 189th garrisons should later be forced to surrender. Conclusions, Minute 12.) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought that, in view of the deterioration of the situation vis-a-vis Japan, the balance of argument was in favour of withdrawal now, irrespective of whether the Italian troops in Shanghai were also withdrawn. In reply to a question, he agreed that it would be useful to ask Sir Robert Craigie whether the Japanese would take a withdrawal as a sign that we were " on the run." In discussion it was agreed that, while it would be desirable to tell Australia and New Zealand if we intended to withdraw the garrisons, it was undesirable to consult them at this stage. The War Cabinet- Invited the Foreign Secretary to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo, and to report again to the War Cabinet.

The Middle 6. The War Cabinet had before them a Report by the Chiefs East, of Staff (W.P. (40) 293) recommending the compulsory evacuation Evacuation of of Service families from the Middle East. It was contemplated Service families, that the families should be sent to India, in the first place, and (Previous thence to South Africa, and that they should leave for India in a Reference: convoy which was due to sail from Egypt on the 25th August, W.M. (40) 175th subject to the passage of the Red Sea being reasonably secure at Conclusions, that time.

Mmute 10.) j n discussion the following points were made :— (i) The recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff applied to Service families in Palestine, as well as in Egypt, (ii) The view of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was that the presence of Service families in Egypt would be a serious military liability in the not unlikely event of serious internal disorder, (iii) On the other hand, the evacuation, unless it coincided with the arrival of strong reinforcements, might look like the first step in the withdrawal of British forces and have a bad effect on Egyptian morale. and Malta were small fortresses, in which families were a real liability, but there were possibilities of dispersion in the Middle East, and the argument for evacuation would not be so clear to the general public. The War Cabinet- Deferred a decision on this proposal pending discussion with the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, who would be visiting this country in the near future. India. 7. The War Cabinet had before them— Preparation of A Report by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (40) 291), the recommen­ more troops for dations of which are set out in the Appendix to the present service overseas. Conclusions. (Previous A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India Reference: (W.P. (40) 290) asking for - W.M. (40) 189th Conclusions, (i) Authority to communicate the recommendations of the Minute 10.) Chiefs of Staff to the Government of India, and to ascertain that Governments ability to comply with the requirements detailed therein, (ii) Permission to authorise the Government of India to prepare forthwith to form the three divisions mentioned in recommendation (c) of the Chiefs of Staff, and also to raise such units in replacement as might be necessary in order to meet India's own defence requirements. The Secretary of State for India explained that India had already either sent overseas, or earmarked for service overseas, the equivalent of three divisions and had. offered to make three more divisions available. The three divisions now recommended (making nine in all) would be additional to these. The Government of India would have no difficulty in going even further, so far as man-power was concerned. The difficulty would be to equip further forces on the E.D.T. scale. The Secretary of State for War gave the War Cabinet certain (Previous information, which is recorded in the Secretary's Standard Pile of Reference: War Cabinet Conclusions, on the progress which was being made W.M. (40) 40th with the formation of the Divisions forming part of the approved Conclusions, programme. Minute 1.) The War Cabinet­ (a) Approved the Recommendations by the Chiefs of Staff contained in W.P. (40) 291. (b) Authorised the Secretary of State for India to communi­ cate with the Government of India on the lines proposed in W.P. (40) 290.

India. 8. The War Cabinet had before them—' (Previous (a) Two Memoranda by the Prime Minister (W.P. (40) 294 and Reference: 295) containing the Prime Ministers remodelling of W.M. (40) 212th the draft statement prepared by the Viceroy (contained Conclusions, in W.P. (40) 283), together with the lattets comments Minutte 1.) on this further draft. (b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (G.) (40) 201) covering a telegram from the Viceroy outlining his ideas for the expansion of his Executive Council and for the proposed War Advisory Council. The Prime Minister said that it would be seen that the Viceroy accepted his revision of the draft, subject to one amendment. The following amendments were agreed to, in the course of discussion, in the new paragraph 7 drafted by the Prime Minister (W.P. (40) 295) : - Paragraph 7, page 3, line 4.—Omit the words in italics. Paragraph 7, page 3, line 8.—After " structure of Indian life" insert "His Majesty's Government are in sympathy with that desire, and wish to see it given the fullest practical expression, subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations which Great Britain's long connection with.India has imposed on her and for which His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of responsibility." 185 W.M. 217 (40), Paragraph 7, page 3, line 12.—After " conclusion of the war " insert "with the least possible delay." Paragraph 7, page 4, line 4.—After "should take" insert " and the methods by which it should arrive at its conclusions." The War Cabinet­ (1) Approved the draft statement, subject to the amendments set out above. (2) Authorised the Secretary of State for India to make the necessary arrangements with the Viceroy as to the method and date of publication. (3) Agreed that the Viceroy should have discretion to determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the numbers and other details of the expanded Executive Council and of the proposed War Advisory Council.

Aliens. 9. The War Cabinet were informed that Lord Lytton would Advisory probably accept the Chairmanship of the Advisory Council on Council. Aliens. Sir Walter Citrine could not himself serve as a member of (Previous the Council. Eeference: W.M. (40) 216th The Prime Minister undertook to explain to Sir Walter, Conclusions, whom he was seeing that afternoon, that, while the T.U.C. could Minute 3.) not be asked to nominate a member, the War Cabinet would be glad if he would submit one or two names privately. Internment of Further reference was made to representations made by the Dutchmen. Netherlands Minister that two prominent Dutchmen had been interned. The said that two complaints only had been made by the Dutch Minister, one of which had since been with­ drawn. The Home Secretary undertook to explore the suggestion that Vigilance Committees should be appointed, representative of the different nationalities concerned. He thought that some arrangements on these lines could be made and would prove helpful. The Prime Minister said that our position was now con­ siderably more secure than it had been some two months earlier. At that time we had had very few trained and equipped troops in this country, and considerable numbers of aliens had been at large. He thought that it would now be possible to take a somewhat less rigid attitude in regard to the internment of aliens. The Home Secretary agreed, but thought that it would be undesirable that there should be too violent a reaction from the policy previously enforced. The War Cabinet took note of these statements.

Richmond Terrace, S.W.1, August 1, 1940. APPENDIX.

PREPARATION OF MORE TROOPS IN INDIA FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS.

Recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (40) 291) (see Minute 7).

9.—(a) We recommend that we should ask the Government of India to prepare and replace the following units for service overseas :— 1 Brigade Group—by end of July 1940. 1 Brigade Group—by the end of September 1940. 1 Motor Cavalry Brigade—by the end of January 1941. 6 Infantry Brigade Groups—by May 1941. (If the artillery and ancillary troops for these brigade groups cannot be found, the infantry brigades should be prepared without them. The field artillery regiment offered can be accepted on a horsed basis. If the provision of drivers and technical personnel presents no difficulty, the first-line transport of all infantry brigades should be on M.T. basis and early steps should be taken to provide the necessary vehicles.) (6) We consider that, in principle, forces required to fight a first-class enemy should be equipped to E.D.T. scale. Forces sent overseas to carry out internal security or L. of C. duties, or to a theatre where a first-class enemy is unlikely to be met, may be equipped to the highest scale which India herself can provide. We suggest that His Majesty's Government undertake to provide all equipment required from United Kingdom or foreign sources up to full E.D.T. scale, and also to replace all such equipment that has already been supplied to forces overseas by India from her own stocks. This should be completed by April 1941 or as soon as possible after that date, taking into account our responsibility in other parts of the world.* (c) We recommend that the Government of India should be informed that, in addition to forces already earmarked in India and the forces mentioned in Appendix " A," His Majesty's Government anticipate having to request the preparation of further forces amounting to three divisions, the first by August 1941 and the other two by the end of that year. (e) We consider that, for the present, Middle East requirements take prece­ dence over all plans for assistance to Afghanistan. In any case, such assistance should be limited to the forward move to Jalalabad-Kandahar. It is recognised that the despatch of forces overseas from India must be dependent upon the retention in India of adequate forces for the defence of the North-West Frontier and for internal security.

* Training scales of weapons (e.g. Mortars, A/T rifles, &c.) should be sent to India as and when such equipments become available.