Britain and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy

robbins devolution 10/12/97 2:10 pm Page 105 Britain and Europe: devolution and foreign policy KEITH ROBBINS The outcome of the referendums held in Scotland and Wales in September has opened up the certainty of a far-reaching, even fundamental, change in the government of the United Kingdom. In Scotland, the turnout was . per cent.Three-quarters of those voting (. per cent) voted in favour of the Scottish parliament proposed by the government and . per cent were in favour of it having tax-raising powers.The proportion of the total Scottish electorate voting ‘yes’ exceeded the per cent hurdle which had applied in and had nullified the majority ( per cent of the electorate) in favour of the scheme which had then been before it. Moreover, in all local author- ity areas in Scotland voted strongly for the parliament and only two areas (at opposite ends of the country: Orkney, and Dumfries and Galloway) voted against tax-varying powers. In the capital, Edinburgh, per cent favoured the parliament which would be located there. In Wales, however, where the result was declared a week later, the picture was substantially different. While the four-to-one majority against devolution in was reversed, the outcome was on a knife-edge until the last moment.The majority was achieved by only . per cent. The turnout was only per cent. Only a quarter of the electorate therefore positively backed the proposals, and they were rejected in Cardiff, the capital city and future home of the assembly. In so far as ‘devolution’ has been given sufficient scrutiny, this has largely and understandably focused on domestic implications. Politicians and commenta- tors have paid attention to the powers and responsibilities to be devolved to the Scottish parliament and the Welsh assembly. Particular controversy surrounded the ‘tax-raising’ capacity of the Scottish parliament, made the subject of a sep- arate question in the referendum, though in the event there was not the sub- stantial variation in responses to the two questions that some observers had pre- dicted. There was some resentment among supporters of devolution in Wales that the assembly was to be inferior in its powers to the Scottish parliament, For a historical account completed shortly before the referendums see V.Bogdanor, Devolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). International Affairs , () – robbins devolution 10/12/97 2:10 pm Page 106 Keith Robbins though Plaid Cymru took the view that something was better than nothing. Most opponents either had a rooted objection to the notion of ‘devolution’ or felt that the role envisaged for the assembly did not merit the expense of its establishment. What has not received much attention, however, either during the course of the campaigns or in the accompanying literature, is the consequence of the outcome for the conduct of British foreign policy.It is to this aspect of the subject that this article is devoted. It might be said that this lacuna is unsurprising since there is no problem to be discussed. In his preface to the White Paper Scotland’s parliament, the prime minister presented the proposals for Scotland as part of the government’s com- mitment to ‘modernize British politics’. It was right to decentralize power, open up government, reform parliament and increase individual rights. He described Scotland as ‘a proud historic nation in the United Kingdom’ and declared that it was within the United Kingdom that it would have ‘an excit- ing new role’. In his foreword, the Secretary of State for Scotland reiterated that the Scottish parliament would strengthen democratic control and make government more accountable to the people of Scotland. Scotland, however, would remain ‘firmly part of the United Kingdom’ and Westminster would continue to be responsible for those areas of policy which were ‘best run’ on a United Kingdom basis. These included ‘foreign affairs, defence and national security and macro-economic and fiscal matters’. In his preface to the Welsh White Paper, A voice for Wales, the prime minister spoke in very similar terms about the government’s overall objectives.The assembly would be a new voice for Wales. It would enable many more matters that affected Wales to be decided in Wales. In his foreword, however, the Secretary of State for Wales did not find it perti- nent to make the explicit reference to the fact that ‘foreign affairs’ would remain ‘best run’ on a United Kingdom basis (though that is stated in section . of the White Paper itself). However, unlike Donald Dewar, Ron Davies did give the argument for the proposals a specifically ‘European’ flavour. An elect- ed assembly,it was claimed, would give Wales a voice ‘in Britain and in Europe’ after ‘years of neglect’. It would enable the people of Wales to make a new beginning ‘alongside other successful economic regions of Europe’. Such declaratory statements would appear to be clear enough. ‘British’ foreign policy will continue as before.The responsibility for its formulation and execution will remain with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, together with the other Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ministers. They will be advised by the FCO within Whitehall. Scotland’s parliament, Cm (London: HMSO,), pp. v and vii. It is characteristic of the ambiguity which surrounds the question that while the prime minister had no difficulty in recognizing Scotland as ‘a historic nation’ within the United Kingdom,The Guardian ( September ) chose to make its banner headline above its front-page account of the referendum result in Scotland ‘The rebirth of a nation—or still a united kingdom?’ Endless legerdemain with words such as nation, state, self-government, independence was indeed characteristic of the media throughout this period, to an extent which might lead any political scientist to despair of ever achieving conceptual clarity. A voice for Wales, Cm , ,p.. robbins devolution 10/12/97 2:10 pm Page 107 Britain and Europe: devolution and foreign policy Ambassadors abroad will continue to represent the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to be referred to, in shorthand form, as ‘British’ ambassadors. Other bodies, from the British Council to the Confederation of British Industry,will continue to speak in their different ways for Britain on the world stage.Yet,though it is still too early to speak with certainty about the long-term implications of September , it is at least possi- ble to be sceptical about the extent to which it will altogether be ‘business as usual’ in the conduct of foreign policy. * The rationale for the foreign policy of British governments has naturally been supposed to be to discern, advance and defend ‘British interests’. There has always been dispute about what, in particulars, such interests may be held to be. In general, however, for most of this century, what ‘Britain’ itself is has not been contentious as far as foreign policy is concerned. The exception is the degree to which ‘Great Britain’ carried a responsibility for ‘Greater Britain’ of some kind, in the decades both before and before . It is arguable that there was an inherent tension in the demands placed upon foreign policy between those deriving from a view of Great Britain as primarily a European power and those driven by the assumptions of imperial/global power.This is not the place to examine what that meant in practice. It is sufficient to assert that in the world as it existed in at least the first half of the twentieth century ‘Britishness’ was bound up with the British empire in all its complexity. A sense of imperial mission may have been replaced, over time, by a sense of weariness, impatience and indifference—and of course there was no unifor- mity of sentiment on these matters—but, whatever particular individuals felt, there was a ‘British world’ stretching from Canada to Australia in which British politicians felt to a large extent ‘at home’. Different though ‘the Dominions’ were from ‘the mother country’, they were not ‘foreign’. Indeed, it has been noted, paradoxically, that it was in ‘the Dominions’ that Britishness flowered perhaps most fully.There, settlers from different parts of the United Kingdom mingled in the new colonies in a way that did not happen to the same degree in Britain itself. No doubt this was itself only a transient phase in their devel- opment, one that would give way,in time, before national sentiment, the asser- tion of indigenous peoples and ‘non-British’ immigration. However, we may broadly suggest that this ‘British world’ still persisted for a time after , though to a diminishing degree. I have written elsewhere on aspects of these issues: Keith Robbins, The eclipse of a Great Power: modern Britain, ‒ (London, New York:Longman, ); History, religion and identity in modern Britain (London, Rio Grande: Hambledon, ); Great Britain: Institutions, identities and the idea of Britishness (London, New York:Addison Wesley Longman, );‘“Experiencing the foreign”: British foreign policy makers and the delights of travel’, in M. Dockrill and B. McKercher, eds, Diplomacy and world power: studies in British foreign policy, – (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ). See also A. G. Hopkins, The future of the imperial past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ). robbins devolution 10/12/97 2:10 pm Page 108 Keith Robbins Such a ‘British world’, which has been no more than lightly sketched here, was of course a common enterprise of ‘the British people’. Its acquisition and defence was a ‘British’ achievement in which, in different ways and to different degrees, all had played their part. Domestically, two consequences can be dis- cerned, pointing, however, in opposite directions. On the one hand, the com- monality of the British empire strengthened ‘Britishness’ within Great Britain itself.

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