Franklin D. Roosevelt's conservative opposition; from election to inauguration

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Authors Tilman, Lee Rickles, 1939-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318931 FRANKLIN .D, ROOSEVELT "S' CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION

v; ; . . :v;; ■ ' i FROM: ;SECTION> W' ; I N A U ^ ' r ;:

v-.,, : v V Lee R« Tilman. ' '

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

In Partial • Ftilf iIlment’hf the Requirements For the Degree of vR

'.■MAsm\OF-ARM . .

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ; '

, ■ . 1 9 6 3' ;. . , STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of re­ quirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in The University Library to be made available to bor­ rowers under rules of the Library.

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APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

V , / P ' i f? Herman E. Bateman Date Professor of History

ii -;v V ; '; ; : TABLE OF CONTENTS : V: jTNTEODNC-TION »o □ ©»»»^ o •»o ©.®'.*:® ® * © ® *»© © © @»® © © © © © © ©,« *»© © © © © © © © © ©..© © © © iv

■ ' : 1' v; I© SOME ASPECTS OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT®©©.:©, ©■,. .©i .. 1

II. "ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN". ©T©.;. ©.... © ©.... ®, .©.;'©©:© ©,'©27,

■ S:; III. fHE POLITICS OF THE INTERREGNUM. ©.©.©©.©.©©©.©.©©©:.© ..49

IV. DICTATOR OR DEMAGOGUE?...... ©©.65

CONCLU S lON .... oe, e ©•., © © e-o 0 © ..,.**.©©.SI

" BIBLIOGKAPHY © © ©. © * ©. © © © © © * ©...»* :* ©■ © ©.©.,* >©* ®, .© . ,©. * ©. ©... @ © © * © ©.«.,«.... 35,

111 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to' analyze;,, conservative opinion toward issues which were later to be raised by the New

Deal and to shed some light on conservative attitudes toward these issues before they became points of contention*

The groups and individuals designated here as conservative were those generally opposed to more governmental interest in the life, of the .individual* It is often difficult to'distinguish between the conservative and the non-conservative during the interregnum due to the fact that many former progressives had not yet had the opportunity to express themselves in regard to the liberalism of the

New Deals In general* however9 the conservative tended to dislike measures which he thought would increase the power of governmental organizations and thus subordinate the liberties of the individual to the welfare of the majority* Therefore:expressions of opinion which are categorized here as conservative represetitt the views of those who still cherished the relatively small role played by the federal government in local affairs in the nineteenth century*

The criteria used here t© evaluate'conservative attitudes were, the gold standards, inf lations, the - balanced budgets, ■ federal unemployment relief, anti-intellectualism, diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, .the Domestic Allotment Act, Roosevelt’s pro­ posals for the Tennessee Basin and the controversy over the foreign debts quest!ono : , ' ' . - ; V -;. ■ ■■ iv ■ '■ A problem which faces almost any historian attempting to

deal with Franklin Roosevelt's conservative opposition is that of

treating Arthur Schlesinger6s contentions in the Age of Roosevelt.

Schlesinger believes that "No one could seriously have supposed

that Roosevelt was pl'anning a .dotihothing administration". ^ there­

fore conservatives who claimed to have been taken by surprise by the legislative upheaval of the early New Deal must not be taken too seriously. Schlesinger feels that: most'of the major legislative enactments of the New Deal were foreshadowed in Rooseveltian speeches or statements .released to the press dtiring the presidential campaign and throughout the interregnum which followed his election. While

Schlesinger is undoubtedly, correct in asserting that the new admini=> stration was obviously going to be one of action^ it should be pointed out that millions of Americans were quite unsure about just what sort of action this was going to be. Many conservatives at the time be­ lieved that the anticipated action would have little connection with the more "radical" statements attributed to Mr. Roosevelt and his brains trust during the campaign and interregnum. They tended to look forward to an administration which would restore business conf idence by balancing the budget'and continuing to adhere to the gold standard. Then too, the American political tradition of unful­ filled promises after election day undoubtedly had a lulling effect upon many conservatives who refused to take seriously the "radical"

' 1 ' ' - ' V' . - V. ' , , ■ : Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. The Age of Roosevelt The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933 (Bostons Houghton Mifflin9 1957) p. 453. proposals of the genial President-elect; particularly when these proposals were accompanied by promises to reduce federal expendi­ tures by 25 per cent.

vi , . ' • : ’..V 1 CHAPTER I ' ' ' . ’

• , SOME ASPECTS OF CONSERVATIVE ,THOUGHT ■ .

In the fall of 1932 the Great: Depression was near,ittg the :

end of its third yearo Millions of unemployed workmen walked the

;stfeehs; in^se^rchVof ;;work or sat disconsolately at home wishing they

had a job. The national;; income had drdpped to almost half of. what

it had been in 1929. Newsboys in New York City were selling the .

Times for two cents a copy. Their counterparts in Portland, Oregoh

Were hawking the Morhing■ Oregonian for the same price.^ American

conservatives like almost everyone else were profoundly disturbed

by the economic paralysis which gripped the nation. .

:, ;. .i Editors of conservative newspapers and periodieals through­

out the country were busy formulating and propagandizing: hcuresh , .

for the ills of the American economy. These *’cures'*, however, were

Unemployment rose from 12,060,000 on July 1, 1932 to 12,830,000 on July 1, 1933. cfi His tor lea 1; St at ist ics of the- United States; Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington P« C. Govern­ ment Printing Office^ I960) p. 70. •

■ IBID. p. 139. The value of the gross national product declined f rom $104.4 bill ion in 1929 to $58. 5 billion in 1932. Per capita.income declined from $857.00 in 1929 to $468.00 in ^ 3 2 - " ' . ,/ ''" . ' . - ' . - . } C -: . / ,. r: .New York Times, November 9, 1932, p . 1«

Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 9, 1932, p. 1 . •

Chicago Daily Tribune, November 24, ,1932, p. 16. not; the panaceas or nostrums proposed by the allegedly nradiealH

members of either partyo. Instead they were the traditional pal­

liatives advoeated for decades by a large segment of the most .

influential members of the commercial and financial communities,,

There was general 'agreement among conservatives^of both

political parties' on two of the three measures most commonly believed

to be essential to economic recovery., Democrats and Republicans

alike staunchly believe^ in adhering to the gold standard in order

to maihtain a sound eufrency^ and in balancing/ the budget-.^ They

differed» however, in regard. to the tariff questldno Many former

Wilsonian Democrats were vehemently opposed to the high tariff rates

which had been imposed.by the Hawley^Smoot Tariff Act in 1930o They

regarded this tariff as an unfair dole to.American manufacturers and

as a virtual declaration of economic warfare upon the' rest of the

Joseph So Lawrence^ "An Editorial'Covenant"^ Bradstreets Weekly LX (December 31, 1932) 1744»

. David Lawrence, "Back to Gold", Saturday Evening Post CCV - (March 18, 1933) 2 1 . Vs;.,: vv. : \

• "See Steel Ready for a Quick Rebound from Banking: Crisis", y Steel,-March. '6 ,. 1933,-p^;:llo;;;':.;. • .-v ; / '

. .^^New York Times, January 3, 1933, p. lo -| i ' , ■ ■ ' ; "'C , * , ,, ' "The "Buy American" Movement"," •Li terary Digest, January ,7, 1933, po 5«. Also cf; "The "crisis'! of : Foreign Dumping Here", ■ ' . Literary Digest, February 1 1 , 1933, p. 9. : ■

• ’ ' Joseph Mo - Jones* Jr»: Tarif f Retaliation: Repercussions ■■ ■of the: Hawley Smoot Biil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylyania. Press, 1934); pp0 l-r33o " L, : y . - : They believed that the high tariff rates constricted trade

between natidns thws making impossible any satisfactory solution

of the war debts question which was vexing statesmen like Hoover3

MaCBonaId and:Herriot«, How could1 European debtors fulfill their

bbligatipns if the Uni fed States eontihued to make trade difficult

by maintaining the highest tariff rates in .American history»' they. .

asked?13 ' 1 •'

Most conservative Republicans were in diametrical opposition

to the large majority of Democrats in regard to the tariff« The Old

Guard of the Republican: Party believed that while it might be neees=

sary to make certain adjustments in the tariff schedules because.of

international economic fluctuations3 the ratesset by; the Hawley-

Smoot Bill in 1930 were;, if anything3 too low,^ Conservative

Republieahs tended to think that the depreciated currencies of the

European hafions;gave them an unfair advantage in international

exchange. In order to offset this advantage and protect the

American manufacturer- and: his- employees> high tariff rates;.were/

Cf, Lynn ’Ro Edminster and Benjamih B« Wa'llace. Inter- national Control of Raw Materials (Washington, D„ C, Ihe Brookings Institution, 1930) pp, 316-317. : ‘

' Tucsdn Daily Citizen, January 12^ 1933, pi 12, Also ef , ,; “The Crisis , of Foreign Dumping Here!', Li terary Digest, February 1 1 9 ■ 1933, p,.9..... ;v',; : -.vV'v...

■’ re *. ■ . ; .... . ■- : . ' . - '■ ; . ... Arizona Republic (Phoenix) January 30, 1933, p. 8 . viB,' :’:■ 1 ' ■ ’ ■ . . v ’. ■ : Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 20, 1932, p, 8 , ’Cons erv'afciyes of both', par ties were m i ted in ©ppos i t i on: to any 'tampering with the currency whieh might resu 11 from:, the abolition- of the gold standard? . They wished to avoid Germany6s disastrous experience with currency inflation, and they be 1 ieved that the only way to do this was by strict maintenance of the gold standard. For

.this reason they oastigated Great Britain for allegedly contributing - to the world~wide depression by going off: the gold standard in 1931 and for pursuing wasteful financial policies. ’

tv.The' conservative bogeyman was still the renewal of Populism parti cularly wi thin the ranks of the Democratic Party. , Judging ' ' by the conservatiye reaction to the cry for the free coinage of - , , silver at a ratio of sixteen to one raised by Senators Burton K.

Wheeler of Montana and Elmer Thomas of .Oklahoma» Bryanism was still feared and detested. • ;' To. tl^e conservative, inf lation. of the currency was "a patent medicine, a magical .Ineantation, which creates greater evils than those it is ^designed to .cure". Besides,diversity of . money standards was one of those obstructions that plagued commerce.

^ Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) January 4, 1033, p. 8 . Also . - - • cf» "Inflation - Curse or Cure66,,'Literary Digest, February 11, 1933, p. 5. ; ,

^ Chicago Daily Tribune, December 3, 1932,. p, 14. V : ' 19 ' '' • Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 1, 1933, p; 8 .

' ^William L. Chenery, "Mo Phony Dollars", Colliers, December 3i, 1932, p. 42. • : \ ■ , " • . 5

The more that nations returned to gold* which was the one immut- : '• ^ ^ ' ' 22 ■ ' able measure of value$ the quicker commerce would reviveo

By the fall of 1932 the cries of conservatives for a return to the balanced budget had become a ceaseless clamor. Influential members of the business and financial commuhities insisted that a renewal of business confidence was essential to economic recovery and that confidence could be renewed only if.the federal govern- ment could balance its budget* The budget was declared to be much too high, and conservatives continued to assail the cost of allegedly "widespread bureaucracies" which were supposed to be usurping the privileges and responsibili- ' ' 25 "< • ties of private enterprise* The federal government must get its hands out of the economic pie by giving up its unwarranted excursions 26 into the domain formerly occupied by private individuals * Expeh- ditures must be cut to the bone; this could be accomplished only if the "radical" members of Congress abandoned their pseudo-humani- 27 ' • . ■ . tarian impulses and returned to worship at the altar of fiscal , , " 28 ' '' ■■ ’ ; ' ! ■ orthodoxy*

22 . . ■ Morning Oregonian (Portland) January 14, 1933$ p. 4*. 23 % , Chicago Daily Tribune, December 2, 1932, p* 16«,

24 ' Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) January 4, 1933,, p» 8 * 25 Chicago Daily Tribune, December 4, 1932, p„ 14* 26 / • ' ' : ' • Arizona Paily Star (Tucson) March 4, 1933, p® 10* 27 ' ' Chicago Daily Tribune, January 6 , 1933, p„ 1 2 * 28 " , . Lionel Do Edie, "Confidence Hinges on Roosevelt6s position on Balanced Budget and Sound Money"$ Iron Age CXXXI, (February 9, 1933) 277o: ' . '■ , Conservatives in both parties believed that the problem

of balancing the budget was tied closely to the necessity for 29 , lowering federal3 state, and local taxes» Tax revenues had

reached the point of diminishing returns because taxes were so high

that entrepreneurs were discouraged from making full use of their

talents and enterprises* Thus the national income remained low,

tax returns proved inadequate, and .Congress continued to make

.appropriations in such an Extravagant fashion that it was impossible 3 0 . :;H;: : . to balance the budget* Rightists like .Robert R* McCormick, editor

of the Chicago Daily Tribune* believed that the heavy tax load and

the fiscal irresponsibility of Congress were all part of a dia­

bolical e,communisticn scheme to redistribute the national income - 1 : ; 31 by plundering the successful and thrifty citizenry*

"It is easily demonstrable that the most important little

aids whom Comrade Zack Foster could report to Stalin as acting for

him most tirelessly are the gentlemen on Capitol Hill who are raid­

ing the dollar and destroying the privileges of the American citizen 32 in possession and use of his property*M

Conservative American newspaper editors in almost any era

are staunch defenders of what they call the "free-enterprise system18* , . ■. / . ;

29 Chieago Dai1y Tribune, January 1, 1933, p*.6 *

Joseph S* Lawrence, • ’’Psychology and Recovery11' * Brads treats Weekly LX (November 19, 1932) 1520*

^^Chicago Daily Tribune, December 11, 1932, p® 1 2 * "32 Chicago Sunday Tribune, January 1, 1933, p* 6 . ; ' ^ ' ' 7 In accord with their faith in this, system they were inclined to blame the depression not upon the internal weaknesses and instab­ ility of American capitalism but upon the "socialistic" legislation enacted by the "radicals" in Congress. It was not the ”£ree=enter-

■'■v: ■ 3 3 prise system" which had failed but "socialistic experiments".

"The economic crisis is a failure of socialism*'' not of

;individualism. The way back to prosperity is the way back from

' socialism*. When governments set individual initiative free, with" draw from business and attend strictly to the function of governing, ' ■ \ ' , " ■■ . 3 4 prosperity will return and we shall have better government»"

There was some inconsistency among the ranks of conserva­ tives as, to a definition of what constituted the.' "free=enterprise system" of their forefathers to which they wished to return= This was due primarily to the variety of opinion which existed among individuals as to the desirability of incorporating various legi­ slative measures into the system* For example, the Old Guard of the Republican Party believed that a high protective tariff was an essential part of the American system* They thought that it pro­ tected Americans from the "dumping" of cheap goods on our shores which forced manufacturers to close their doors and dismiss their

3 5 ■ employees* Opposed to the Republican tariff policy were many

Morning Oregonian (Portland) December 31, 1933, p® 4*

3 4 ibid.

3 5 Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 20, 1932, p«, 8 * conservative Democrats who regarded themselves as the heirs of

Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson; they protested vehemently against the high tariff which they regarded as a chauvinistic device for the enrichment of manufacturers at the expense of the 36 American people6 Republicans tended to admire the high tariff as an integral part of American capitalism while many Democrats despised it as a perverted deviation'frdm what was becoming the 37 ■ - ' ' ' shibboleth of self=help»

Conservative opinion was also split in regard to the func­ tions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation which had-been created in order to lend federal money to banks$ businesses and industries which were in financial difficulty..Some opposed the operations of the R» F.' C« Newton Do Baker^ for example, believed that the federal government had no right whatsoever to lend money 38 to private individuals» On the other hand. President Hoover and many of his advisors felt that the R« Fo; Co was a necessity if the 39 economic situation was to be kept from further deterioration.

Conservatives were less ambivalent in their opposition to the creation of any system.which would give federal aid either in

------^ : ■ V . ■ ■ cf„ C. Ho Cramer, Newton Do Bakers A Biography (Cleveland The World Publishing Company, 1961) p« 259, for a summary of the general attitude of conservative Democrats toward the tariff= .

^ Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) January 4, 1933, pv '8 ,.

Co Ho Cramer,' Newton Do Baker? A Biography, p, 258» 39 ' cfo Bascom No Timmons^ Jesse Ho Jones: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956) pp0 l62»244o V . believed that the needy should be taken care .of by, private chari­

table organizations, or if absoiutely necessary perhaps by state ,

• • agencies butt not by the federal gdvefnnient<> The U. S« Treasury :

.could not finance depressioh relief .in the states because welfare

%brk',pf '•thia sort could only lead to the bankruptcy of governments

which attempted to finance.it and thus,-to universal Insolvency*• f.

In such a vain attempt to support the idle in idleness those who

were supporting themselves and the government would be "ruined,

•' . ‘ and in turn,1 forced to- seek charity.”^ - -1'

.. . Some conservatives were also unalterably opposed t© the

creation of any agencies supported by tax. money for unemployment

relief*, :Robert R» .McCormick:was bne such individual= He believed

that. "In, the doctrine that needy, .people have a claim based on natural

,':•' rights enforceable against society ,1 s the necessary extinetlph: of ‘ ■ - ■ -1 . • Z a 4 ;■ \ - ■ ' Y’-..'•'• Y- '''' '' ' indlyidual choice*" - J* M* Spear, editor of the' i&rizona Republic,

thought that "The hunger,march on London proves that the dole sys­

tem ofsettling thepoverty question is not as satisfactory as a '.

George H a farimer, "Big Spending Plans” Saturday Evening ' - \^stGCV\.(^ehV4v^b3)d22:.;'\’' '. ,;Y ' . . : ,

: , Merle Thorpe, "With Charity for All", .Nation's Business : ; ;■ ': ::.mi':(March,;IgSS1)'-f 1»: v:• ■: : -: ■ -':::'. T:'• :.'::Y:

George H* Lafimer, "Consider the Euture”, Satorday Even­ ing PostCGV (November. 26, 1932) 20* ; ; ; V ^

’ ^ Chicago Dally Tribune, January 6 ,: 1933^ p* 12,

; ■ : 4 4 IBID, November 2l,, l'933s p, 12. , . : ; ; 1 : , 1 ; • , ...... ■ 4 5 ■ .: x- ■ • lot of omr radicals would have us beliew".

• The conservative attitmde toward federal economi'e aid to

private individuals or corporations may;be partially summed up by

saying that while,1 1 may or may not be right for the federal .govern­ ment to loan money to, the business, and financial community through

the'.Ro F., Co it is wrong to loan or give it to the unemployedo:

It is better to shore up shaky financial .structures before they j . collapse than to .wait until they do collapse and be forced to give relief to the unemployed, , ,

Misunderstanding and .confusion among the ranks of conserva­

tives was the result of their linabil i ty to: differentiate be We e n the political philosophy arid idealogy of American liberals3 democratic

socialists at home and abroad and Soviet■ Communists.' Conservatives

;e,bh:otfed;1ahd .detested, Karl Marx and his faith .in the inevitable

downfall:o,f Capitalism and the triumph of.■socialism9 'yet they were

firmly"convinced that if the views of American liberals became . i; ; ■ v- / \ : .:■■■ - > ■ :'■" 4 6 legislation the soyietization of America was inevitable. Many

conservatives fervently believed that liberalism, socialism and

communism were but slightly different forms of the same thing. The road to communism was .payed with liberal and socialist legislation..

? Arizona Republic (Phoenix);.November !9,1932, p.; 1 2 .

cfa. the editorial in the Chicago Daily Tribune, December 5, 1932, p. 12 j entitled “American Liberals as Marxian Brothers” " .■'%■ for a good illustration Of conservative misunderstanding. ' . , ' . . ' ■ ■ ■' ■ n

. . ■ ; ' ■ ■ ■ ■■ • .. 4 7 Once a nation started down this road there was no turning backo

■ , There were no intermediate stopping points.

These “foreign” ideologies were all alien to the American tradition of individualism. They could not be grafted on to our system and they.would not work in harmony with it because they were contrary to the "nature" of the American people,^ What could the heirs of Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln learn from the atheistic theories of collectivism propounded by men like H, G„ .

Wells, Sidney Webb and Vladimer Lenin? Those theories were not only alien to the American system they were antipathetical to human 50 nature in general, That was why Soviet Russia had been on the verge of collapse since the October Revolution of 1917,

It made no differende how many five-year plans the Com-- munists, tried because they would all fail. Men would not sacri* fice their own welfares for the sake Of future generations, Soviet peasants would not produce grain for unseen industrial workers,

To quote Paul R, Kelty^ editor of the Morning Oregonian, "It is against human nature",

ef, Lewis W, Douglas, The Liberal Tradition (New York ? D, Van Nostrand Company, Inc,, 1935) pp, 15~57, What Mr, Douglas calls the liberal traditions is closely akin to the liberalism of the 19th century and the conservatism of the opponents of the New Deal,

4 8 :iBiD,:yfs;v' ■ ■ ■■ '

4^Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New Yorki Random House9 1948) ppo 283-314o

500 IBID,

Morning bregonian (Portland.) January.2, 1933, p, 8 , . Conservatives tended to believe that the ownership and use

of private property were absolutely essential to the happiness and

wel 1 -being o f , the: individuals ' Thereforeail .systems whioh failed

to incorporate this fundamental tenet Were doomed to failure. To

the American conservative, the most objectionable part of the Soviet

.regime .was not,the suppression of civil liberties nor the execution

of uncooperative •kulaks.- Instead, ifcxvas the naked, repudiation

Of the,rights of the property owner. Robert R« McCormick said

on the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of the Bolshevik

regime that the occasion "marks the continuance of submission to

an economic tyranny, except where it represents an economic religion

worshipped with the enthusiasm given fetish. That this autocracy

will endure no sensible person believes."^

During the 1 9 3 0 * 3 many conservatives continued to regard the

Soviet'Union as one vast, slave camp in which the i imi ted property

rights which had existed during the^peflod of the New Economic

Policy were being abrogated. When property rights ceased to

exist or were .placed in a dangerous position then civil liberties

were;'likewise in jeopardy. . Civil liberties could not exist inde­

pendently of property rights. This was one of the reasons why

• Frederick L.' Schuman, Amerlcan Pol i cy Toward Russia Since- 1917 (New York; -;International Publishers, T928) pp. 324-377.

. ' Thomas 'A. baxleyl Ameri ca Faces Russ ia ( Ithaca , New YorkCornell University Press, 1950) pp„ 231-262.,

^ Chicago Daily Tribune, November- 13, 1932, p. 1 2 . . 55 K • ■ ' ■ Morning Oregonian (Portland) January.2, 1933, p. 8 . v.-;: v :: ... ' : ■. n

conservatives believed that American "radicals** should cease their

agitation for the extension of governmental regulation and owner­

ship within the economyo George Norris, the La JFollette brothers

and other "radicals" were urged to take a sober look at what had . 56 happened in the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was warned against suc- ; ■: • ' . 57 ■cumbing to the wiles of these men when he took office.

Conservatives, were horrified by most new proposals for

government ownership of any part of the economy. They believed

that the theories upon which these proposals were founded were in • : ■ ' ‘ '' ' ' ' gg' ' ' many respects little distinguishable from those of Moscow, They

insisted that what the country needed was less public ownership and / .... . ' . ■ - ... 5 9 , . more decentralization of federal authority6

The advocates of economic planning by means of governmental

agencies were ridiculed in the conservative press and urged to ex­

amine the condition of the Russian people who were the unfortunate victims9 conservatives believed,, of just such schemes,^

Conservatives were inclined, to scorn, most o f 'the new remedies

that were offered for America's economic ills as "quack cures”.

Many tended to look back to the "idyllic’’ conditions of another

era and to wish that the United States of 19.32 would again become

• ■ ■ : ''y-; v..^ ,' Chicago Daily Tribune, December 1, 1932, p, 12, :

' - .... . ■" Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 27, 1933, p, 4,

"'^Chicago Daily Tribune, November 24, 1932, p„ 16, ' 5 9 * Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) December 8 , 1932, p. 8 ,

^ Chicago Daily Tribune, December 1, 193.2, p, 12, - Y "as it had been". Senator Reed Smoot, a Utah Republican, and one

of the authors" of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff told 'the Senate in a

Lincolnts Birthday speech.that the.heritage of liberty

"which Lincoln preserved and handed down to us, is ;y. • ■ ''' scorned as a priceless heirloom in the hands of yokels,. ; r Millions of our citizens are ready to mortgage their ; ' liberty by having the govefnment take over private . - ' economic functioni.y6i

, Lincoln, Mr, Smoot belieyecl; had np thpught of opening the

- Federal Treasury to the people and “made no effort to force one

class or group to support anotherHo . ; . '

h./ ' These sentiments were echoed by William Guggenheim, American

: V capitalist and president - of the Benjamin Franklin Insti tute of

t America in a -speech in New York City when he Said; 6 „

In the old pioneer days, which have unhappily , . / passed, our people did not seek to be fed with a . • ;V spoon. They had the stamina, given the opportunity^ •; ' to get out and ■Work for themselves. With excessive ■ t. welfare work animating the minds and action of many of our good citizens, we are preparing our people for : . ■ a state of anemia that 'may indeed become pernicious- ; ' before the disease has run its course. -63 ' -

Many Americans, some of,whom were not conservatives, believed

that the answer to part of the economic problem lay in the migra- ,

tion; of ; the unemployed, from the cl tied to .the eountrysideIt

would,be less demoralizing for the unemployed to return to the

V; life their forefathers: led. than, to have to accept charity in the

' , ^-’-New York Times, January 13, 1933, p. 11. ' :

■:, - ■ . .

■ ' ■ ■ Z - : . y,. : cf^ "Roosevelt Steps Left and Right". New Republ ic LXXII .. (September 28, 1932) pp. •164-166. • • • ‘ . ■■■ ' city. The Mgood. life” vcbuld be led ,on a ranch or a farm or in a

small town close to the soil where the ^agrarian virtues” were

Sti;ll prized and preserved. Farming,: after all, was the basic

industry not manufacturihg, mining or bankingo This attitude

toward rural life and the solution of the pressing unemployment

relief problem was an .amalgam of laissez-faire economics and what

Richard Hofstadter has called the "agrarian myfh". - -

During, the interregnum it became clear to many Americans

that a number of European governments'which had borrowed money from

this country:during or after the war were-going to default on the

debt payments American conservatives reacted vigorously to the

anticipated defaults. The attitude of the right was well summed

up in the title of an editorial which appeared in the Tucson Daily

Citizen, “Let Europe Pay',o^ ' , ‘ .

: : J Although.there were conservatives who sympathizedvwi th the

plight of the debtor natibns most Of /.them thought that we had done ,

enough for ofher people and were now entitled to,concern ourselves

"primarily with otir own welfare, v,. v " .■ 1-;■ " •. - .

',;v' ■/X'.'; In the Midwest where isolationist sentiment was strong and

distrust of Europe great, the French were regarded as ingrates

Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 15, 1933, p. 8 .

. ^^Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform From Bryan to Fi . Rt (NesW. York s Vintage -Books, 1955)~p0 23o . y

y ■■ Tacsbn Dai 1 y Citizen, November 19, 1932^ p, 12, Also •cfe "Lausanne's Bitter Pill”, Literary Digest, July 23, 1932, pp,. 3-4. -.-,1 ■ ■.•v : - -i,' ■ : : : : - 16 when they threatened to default* Hadn't we come to France's rescue in 1917?69 ■ . - V

The editor of the Chicago Tribune advocated pressing the debtor •nations to disclose their assets and possessions in the

America^ so that we could decide for ourselves what their debt- paying capabilities were and at the same time determine whether or not they had violated the spirit of the Monroe Doctrines

Political cartoons appeared depicting Uncle Sam dressed up as Santa

Claus carrying a bag labeled "debt cance11ation"« Gleeful children labeled "The gimme nations of Europe" said "Hello Santa" as they slyly extended their greedy, grasping paws toward Santa's gift , 71 ' . • ' ' - ' ' , bags :/ ,> . .

Many isolationists, still resenting both Woodrow Wilson and the treatment he received at Versailles advocated an intran- sigent attitude for our negotiators in dealing with the debtor nationso If the debts were recdnsidered the Americanpeople would be justified in requiring that consideration of the debts be a consideration of payment and not cancellation.

Other conservatives took a different view. International financiers and businessmen involved directly or indirectly in

69 : ■' '' "• ' ■ - ■ ; : , Chicago Daily Tribune, January 5, 1933, p. 10. 70 ‘ ... IBID. December 29, 1932, p.. 8 .

: 7H b i d . December 16, 1932, p. 1 . . V" /

7 2 IBID. December 7, 1932, p. 12. foreign trade believed that the debt question was having an unset-

tling effect ©n world trade= The debts, should be settled in a manner that would be satisfying to both sides so that international

trade could flow more freely* International bickering would only cause the economic Crisis to’become intensified* Perhaps debt reduction or cancellation would be the best thing for all involved particularly if it were accompanied by changes in the tariff.

' Conservatives were divided into at least two different groups in regard to their attitudes toward the international machin­ ery which had been’erected for the arbitration of disputes between nationso. Republicans tended to take a dim view of what they con= : V ' ’ .. . 74 sidered to be any surrender of American sovereignty. They be~

1ieved . that advocates of joining the League of Nations should discover the answer to an important question. Where in the Consti­ tution were we told through what channel the American government would deal with the League if it were a member? The Constitution contained no answer because the framers of the Constitution never dreamed of such a surrender of sovereignty as was being proposed by the admirers of the.League.

Representative George H» Tinkham of Massachusetts summed

73 Arthur M. Hyde and Raymond L. Wilbur, The Hoover Policies (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) p. 520. 7 4 -\ ; ■ Tucson Daily Citizen, January 21, 1933, p. 16. : 75 ■ : ■ ■' '. - ’ ’ - 'i1' : ' ■■ ' ; ' ■ . Chicago Daily Tribune, December 20, 1932, p. 8 .; 18

up the attitude of many conservative Republicans when he said

, ‘The time is here to unmask those disloyal and seditious organizations and individuals x-yho are attempting to destroy the independence of the United States, to subvert her national integrity and to involve her in advance in the next European war . » . The League of Nations is a European political mech­ anism, the pawn, of the principal European powers, ■ bankrupt morally and physically by its conduct in relation to Japan, financially default of its guar-' anteed loans, and intellectually by its abandonment of reality for the pursuit of vain futilities « « , For the United States to join this » «... would be to ’ submit her questions to European decisions and to become involved for all time in the political affairs of Europe*.

There were some conservative Democrats whose memories of

Woodrow Wilson and his idealistic internationalism still lived on.

They had almost given up hope of persuading the United States to

join the League of Nations, but they continued to be irritated by

the indifference of their fellow Americans toward the rest of the ' % ,,77 ' world, ■ - ;■ !v - : ;--v' ' ' .

The attitude of conservative Republicans toward change can

be illustrated in part: by analyzing their attitude toward the mem­

bers of their own party.who advocated change. President Hoover,

for example, disliked the so-called “radical" members of the G.O.P.

because of their constant agitation for innovation in the form of

more federal intervention, in'ebonomie‘.a f f a i r s T h e editors of

U, S,, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong, 2d Sess,, 1933, LXXVI, Pdrt 8 , 3336-3337, - ' " ' 7/ ; ' • ^ : C, H, Cramer, Newton D, Baker,.A Biography, pp,209-233 ' - 78 '1 - ' . Hoover, Memoirs, pp, 54 and 101, • ■ ^ • 19 the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times charged the left wing of the Republican Party from time to time with advocating economic heresies» political' misehief-makings admiration for Bolshevism and 79 open efforts toward the permeation of the Party with socialism.

Senator George W. Norris :,of Nebraska$ a long time advocate of public ownership of hydroelectric power plants and a consistent agitator for.public works projects for the relief of the unemployed<, was regarded by many conservative Republicans as a member of the "luna­ tic fringe". Phil ahd Bob La Bbllette, Jr. of Wisconsin were 80 infamous for their allegedly dangerous experiments in that state.

. Charges of political mischief-making against the left wing of the G.0.P. had been frequent during the 1932 presidential cam­ paign, primarily because Senators Hiram Johnson of California,

George Norris of Nebraska $ Bronson Cutting of New Mexico and other progressive Republicans had publicly disavowed Mr. Hoover and thrown their support to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Naturally Old Guard Republi­ cans were enraged at this supposed betrayal and they rejoiced glee­ fully when several of the betrayers were defeated in the election.

-One of the marked benefits of the recent Democratic landslide and preceding admonitory political action is ... the defeat, of La. Guardia of New York, Brookhart of Iowa , and ,Blaine of Wiseohsino Thus three radicals, having no respect for the party whose prestige and organization they have made use of, have been.removed from office and from the opportunity, of mischief making in this troubled time „ o . It is a reminder that the American people are a

' 79 ■ Chicago Daily Tribune, December 12, 1932, p. 14. New York Times, February 12, 1933, p. 4E. 80 : Chicago Daily Tribune, December 1 2 , 1932, p. 14. . conservative people, at bottom ,. . « They have not been ' . the dupes of the charlatans and reckless purveyors of ■ ' - novel and untried nostrums. ■ ■ - , ■

Conservative Republican newspaper editors began to urge

' y that the Party be reorganized along Conventional conservative;', ;

lines minus the "radical element",' - Paul Kelty, editor of the

//y'l : Portland .Morning, Oregonian: advocated''a party, purge. .

; : " The Oregonian agrees , », » that the Republican Party ' ; • \ ;- - should be reorganized .but it should be reorganized wi th ; ; ... Johnsons Norris and the whole .er.ew: of insurgent bandi tti ' : on the outside. » » When the party is redrganized on ' ' : ' ’ these lines it will have no room for Johnson• or' any of . . • • ■ those who have betrayed 'it®'; ■ v .y ■ ,1 ».■= ;

■ ; ' - The editors.of the New, York Times, took' an equally dim view

.of: the' ''radicals^' ' ,. 'y-: I,-..

■ : ';A11 members /of Progress ive groups' reserve complete r ; ' ,,.v v ; . 'freedom., of action* ■ This is the very reason of their , ' ' being® They must fight somebody, and if they cannot ■ . . -. : - pick a quarrel wi th anybody else3 they will turn and ; V •. rend each other® • The spear of a good Progressive knows ^ \ ' \ no brotheriO:8*^ ,; : V ■ 1 ; ; ' : V ' ■ • . The possib'iiity of Progressive Republicans who supported ,

< Roosevelt being selected for his cabinet aroused protests from

-; ' «- / ; , ■ 85 '% ," ,t \, - members of both'parties® Republicans wished to see the Progres­

sives punished for deserting Hoover in his time of need while old-

81 IB ID ® , December30 , 1932, p«- 10® '

: . IBID. December' 12, 1932, ,;p*; 14®'-; ,

Morning Oregonian(Portland) December1 , 1932, p® 6.;

New York Times, February27 ', 1933, p ., 14. ; , ' , , ■■ ■■as 1 • • ' . ■ , . ' : Arizona Republic (Phoenix) February;'24, 1933, S e c tio n 2, line Democrats, who had borne the heat and toil of many a year believed that their services, to the party should give them pri­ ority over any Republicanso Roosevelt was warned repeatedly ' during the interregnum against rewarding outsiders before old / ‘ ■ 8 7 1 friends and against heeding the advice of these "radicals"*

The attitude of some conservatives toward theorists and intellectuals in general was reflected in their reaction to the seven point program enunciated early in February, 1933 by Columbia9 economist Rexford Tugwell in conjunction with part of the rest of the professorial Roosevelt ’’brain trust”. Many would have agreed with the dictum delivered by Frederick Henry Prince* "Professors*9 declared businessman Prince, "are one of the chief curses of the country# They talk too much. Most professors are a bunch of cowards and meddlers «, . . The sooner we get away from their influ­ ence the better . . . Chuck out the professors . » . forget about ' gg Europe#■ That will lead us somewhere«,86 Many a lesser , business­ man would undoubtedly have subscribed with admiration and respect to Mr. Prince9 s forthright statements \ . -

During the interregnum, however, many conservatives vented theif wrath not upon Rooseyelt9 s"brain trust" but upon other Intel lectuals whom they suspected of trying to undermine the foundations

8 6 ibido ■ '■ ; r:';■ ; /' •• f;.' 87 . Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 1, 1933, p= 8 .

'^“Business and Finance", Time, February 13, 1933, p, 42.

8 9 IBID. - \ ■ ■ : ■ ■ - ■ 2 2 o£ “Amerlcaiiism”> For. example, Sinclair Lewis4 who had come out

of a socialist past to become the first American author to win the

Nobel Prize in literature for his satirical assaults upon the

American business community was the object of much criticism in 90 ; the conservative press. He had recently published another novel

Ann Vickers9 but it was not this novel which had brought down upon his head the scathing indignation of the business community. It was the fact that he had not been■forgiven for his ridicule of the

American businessman and his ethics in Main Street and Babbitt. ^

Besides, what was really wrong with George F. Babbitt and his kind? Weren't most of the world's ills due to Bolshevism, trade unions, centralized government and professors who theorized about how to improve systems that already.functioned' adequately? Why ridicule our Babbitts when they were only telling the truth anyway?

Sinclair Lewis had come to be regarded in the conservative press as an agnostical malcontent who spent,his time undermining the moral : 93 . ■ . ' : ' . fervour of "patriots”. To quote Paul R<, Kelty "Mr. Lewis8 boy

. • 94 Sinclair » — he’ is a heller".

^cfo Alfred Kazin's "The New Realism: Sherwood Anderson arid Sinclair Lewis" in On Native Grounds\ An interpretation of Modern American Prose Literature (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942) 91 ■ . ' : ... ' ' ' - .. ' ■ ■ ■•■ri cfo Sinclair Lewis®. Main Street (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920) and Babbitt (New York: HarcOurt, Brace arid Company, 1 9 2 2 ) " ■ . ■ , . . . ' ■ ' , ■

^^New York Times, February 13, 1933, p. 16c. 93 ' ' - . '• ' • ■ Morning Oregonian (Portland) January 1^, 1933, p. 6 * .

9 4 IB1D„ . :V?.v- ' :V.>' ■ • ' ' y;- \ :

The forthcoming vlsitypf George Bernard Shaw to the United

States rehroused the latent antagonism of' some.American conservatives

toward the Britisher whose political opinion's and estimate of American

culture were suspect among those who regarded themselves as patriots«,

GonservatIves tended to place more emphasis upon Mr<> Shaw's member­

ship in the socialist Fabian ^society than upon his international /

reputation as a playwright, and a literary critic. To them George

Bernard Shaw was just another si1 ly oId man who had never said or " ' ''>:y , 1 .y"y ;»"• : vvv':- 1 ' •■■■■- • ■. : . y 9 ^ wrought one thingywhiCh Could be remotely Identified as constructive, •'

Mr, Shaw's views oh the American Constitution were notably suspect

because he had recently remarked;that"America is always talking .

about its constitution and it is also always amending its ycoAsti- , '

tution which looks as if it were not such ay fine and infallible . ■

thing as you seem to suppose," This remark seems to have offended:, y

a great' many American patriots 1 that it did not endear Mr, Shaw to

many consefyatives is a certainty,^ /'-.y:V:y';y.y'"-'y- -

The genera 1 conserva t iye, a t.ti tude; toward Intel leetuaIs., 1 ike y

Sinclair Lewis and George Bernard Shaw was later to be reflected in

the vehement conservative attacks onthe professorial Roosevelt

"brains trust". Authors and playwrights who try to undermine the . y y '

"American system" are■irritating but they are not quiteyas detest- y

: Morning Oregonian (Portland) December l?v:1932j p. 6 , • 'yrr-

George Bernard Shaw, American Boobs (Hollywood, Califbrnia; ■ E l l i s 0 , Jones Publishef s 1932) p. "61 yy' ' ly:yy ' ' ' -'■: -yy

' Morning, Oregoniah (Portland) December I, 1932, p, 6 , y ; ’ . ' ■ ■ : ■ 24 able as “academic theoriticians" who meddle with polities«

During the interregnum representatives of the entire politi­ cal spectrum were becoming caustically critical of new ideas such as 98 those put forth by Howard Scott and the cult of.technocracy= • They were disturbed by the increasingly wide influence exerted by the

Technocratso The impact of new ideas such as those propagated by Scott and his followers caused the conservative editor of the

Arizona Republic to write that ■ •

Marxianism is not alone in being "got out of a book," We have a myriad of citizens with nothing else to do and 1 capable of doing nothings who are spinning, theories , out of disordered brains $ and putting them into books or maga­ zines and the newspaperss and there are some people foolish enough to think they hear the voice of authority directing them to progress, or at/least change, 100

What the country needed was not Technocracy but a balanced budget; not intellectual theorizing but lower taxes» In short, not new ideas but traditional economies o ’

It was partly because of their dislike and distrust of intellectuals that the Women’s Patriotic Conference in New York

City recommended enactment of state laws requiring all teachers to take an oath of allegiance as a required preliminary to their

101' ' - ■ ' ’ V :'u . employment® It was alleged that schools and colleges were

AO George Souia, "Technocracy: Good Mediclae or a Bedtime Story?" New Republic LKXIXX (December 28, 1932) pp. 178-180o - ' 90 "The Financial Situation*?, Commercial and Financial Chronicle9 March 4* 1933, p* 1418.

-Arizona Republic. (Phoenix) November 11, 1932, p«> 8 *

York Times, February 2, 1933, p<, 7. ' “honeycombed” wi th propagandists who wi ttingly dr unwi ttihgly aided in the overthrow of our institutions by advocating Socialist or >

Communist “theories'in the training of youth”, '

The Jeffersonian-Jackson tradition of distrust and- dislike of strong central government was cherished nowhere more than _amqng conservatives, Ihdse. who considered themselves the heirs of these two men tended to believe that government was but a necessary evil, particularly the federal government whose tendencies were allegedly. toward.'notorious usurpations of private prerogatives, ' ' C

Ffanklin Roosevelt’s conservative opposition belleyed that the rights of the property owner were the basis of American civili<= zatidn, ' To impair or endanger these rights any more than was,: absolutely necessary for the limited functions which governments v ought to perform was tantamount to attacking the'“American way of ,

vy' V:'' ' " V ■ 'i-

The Constitution of the United States which protected prop­ er ty rights and limited governmental functions was therefore the bulwark of American society® . In ' the words of one conservative “our great and sacred constitution, serene and inviolable, stretches its behificent powers -over our land -- over Its lakes and rivers and fbrests, over every mother’s son of us, like the outstretched arm” of God himself. . « ,0 Marvelous Constitution! Magic Parchment!

Transforming Wordl Maker, Monitor, Guardian of Mankind!”

, - W ' ' . : . Henry Estabrodk, A NeW York, lawyer® Quoted in Ralph Gabriel’s The Growth of American Demdcratlc: Thought (New York: - Ronald Company, 1940) p® 402® . : : 26

. tjfhile. conservetl'y'es were not necessarily anti-humanitarian

they were inclined to take a dim view of increasing welfare services

because this involved strengthening goverhmental organizations which

were already oppressive, not to mention initiating legislative

action which might very well be unconstitutional» They preferred

lasteed to rely upon the principle of voluntarism or leaving welfare

services in the hands of private eheritable .organizations« The

administration of relief was not a legitimate function of a govern­

mental organ o It should depend instead on the initiative of inter­

es ted individuals.

Conservative distrust of certain intellectuals was due

primarily to the fact that conservatives believed that these intel­

lectuals were trying to undermine the foundations of the existing

order by casting ..aspersions on the sanctity of the Constitution,

,present property relationships, American, sovereignty and other

.sacrosanct "institutions". Thus they began to focus their attention

on Mr. Roosevelt6s %rai'ns trust8' because they were beginning to feel

that these men were attacking much of what was sacred to the conserva­

tive mindo CHAPTER II

"ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN" 1

. One of the most- useful of the President=eleet!s .political assets was his ability to conciliate both his political opponents and factions within his own campo The chief components of this ability were vagueness and evasiveness blended with a genial smile and a charming personality* It was in part this peculiar amalgam of Roosevelt8s personal talents which was responsible for preventing his conservative political opponents from coalescing their forces against him prior to the legislative onslaughts of the "Hundred

Days"* On the other hand9 it was. this ability of his td appear to be'hll things to all men" which drew fire from his critics both

1 • . . . I. Cor. . 9$I9-20-21-22e "For though..1 be free from all men* yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I become as a Jew, fchafc I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law; To them that are without law, as without law, (being not without law to God, butt under the law to Christ,) that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak become I as weak, that I might gain the weak; I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some", 2 "The Next Four Years", Bradstreet8s Weekly, January 8 , 1933, p, 117, 3 ' Madeline F„ Pare, "History of the Nomination of Franklin D» Roosevelt in 1932" (unpublished master’s dissertation. Depart­ ment of History, University of Arizona, 1956) p, 239,

27 left and righto^ William Allen White spoke for many who were dis­

satisfied with Roosevelt’s equivocation when he wrote

No one knows his heart and few have seen behind the masking smile that wreathes his face. We have had to be satisfied with urbanity when we needed •' wisdom, with mystery when we should have a complete understanding. We are putting pur hands in a grab bag. Heaven only knows what we shall pull out,

Vagueness had long since come to be accepted by many as a

qualification for being a successful politician but this did not

prevent conservatives from objecting to a speech made by Hiram

Johnson in Los Angeles in which he said that, he did not like Mr. • • 6 Hoover's philosophy of government as much as Mr, Roosevelt's.

Conservatives insisted that Senator Johnson should have gone farther

and told his audience just what Mr, Roosevelt's philosophy of govern­ ment was. They believed that if he could have told them he would

have been the only individual- in the whole country who could!

Many felt that the President-elect was facing a serious

problem which was causing confusion because he had drawn support

from various groups, many of whose attitudes and’demands were in

direct conflict. Pressure was being exerted on Franklin Roosevelt

Samuel G. Blythe, "John Citizen and. the Presidency", Saturday Evening Post CCV (November 5, 1932) 91. 5 ' - ;; , ■' ' ' '' /; : ... - Quoted in “Grave Problems the•New President Faces", . Literary Digest, March .4,. 1933, p. Si ‘ - r ■ v 6 - ■ ■' Arizona Republic (Phoenix) January 31, 1933, p. 8 . 7 ' ■ ' ' • ■ ■ ' ’ , . IBID. November .3., 1932, p. 8 , - to choose between policies that were in diametric opposition.

During the ihterregnHm both right and left tried sporadi­

cally to claim him for their own. Some liberals thought that he ,

:w(duld 'be a staunch supporter ofj their views^ while'many conserva- '

tives believed that Roosevelt was only mildly progressive and there-

fore represented a satisfactory compromised .Albert Ritchie, the

,conservative Democratic governor of Maryland came away from a con­ ference at Albany, New York with Governor;} Rpos eve It convinced that

the unequ i voca 1. pi edge f or a tweri ty- f i ve "per cent reduction in the •

budget made at the Democratic convention in Chicago in the summer ; of 1932 would be carried out by him with -^sincere;and vigorous actipn".11 •. , ..

The editors Of the “Arizona Daily Star William. R. Mathews and Claire E„ Ell inwood were becoming;, increasingly suspicious of.

Mf;. Roosevelt and they warned him not to propose a program of panaceas and nostrumsThey had supported him in the 1932 campaign partly because they were Democrats and partly because they had managed to convince themselves that he.was basically conservative;

■ New York Times, November 15, 1932, p. ISA.

Gedrge/Creel, "What Roosevelt Intends To Don Collier's ■ XIC (March 11, 1933). p. 1. .

. : 1: James Mo Burns , The hion and the Fox (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1956) pp. 154-157.

. ' ^Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) December ?, 1932, p. 8 « A' /

IBID. January 20. 1933, p. l6 . : •' ' \ ; ' 30

safe and sane for business =—“safety;, sanity and perfect decorum 13 at all costs", ■ - .

Republicans continued to urge the President-elect to take ' ' " an unequivocal stand on the issues of the day. They warned him ,

against taking advice from what they called the "lunatic fringe"

but they insisted that the members of Congress and a great multi­

tude of citizens craved reassurances about his intentions and that x " he was the only person who could reassure them. Bankers„ fin­

anciers and businessmen suspected him of having "radical" ideas

about a future new deal but they too begged for a sure word of

guidance,To the financial community it"was a matter of regret

that the President-elect did not give some impression as to his

definite intentions in the financial field. Absence of any such

declaration gave speculators the opportunity for vague and often ■ 17 wholly grotesque reports of what he was- contemplating. .

Franklin Roosevelt6s vagueness and evasiveness caused

confusion among the ranks of his conservative opponents. There

— — -v ;x ^

IBID. January 3 9 1933, p. 2. '

^^Mew York Times, December 5, 1932, p. 16. '15 ' x y - Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 11, 1932, p. .6 , -16 ' ' -■ ' - Chicago Daily Tribune, January 2, 1933, p. 14.

New York Times, January 23, 1933, p. 19.

' . 1 3 ' X " ' - - : ' ' . V . ' . " ...... Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Preparation of. a President", Western Political Quarterly I (March, 1948) pp. 131-153. . were great differences of opinion among conservatives as to what he represented* Was he conservatively progressive- in the Wilson­

ian fashion or was he going to ally himself with the "radical" 20 - wing of both parties2 All that could be said for certain during , 2 % the interregnum was that most conservatives did not know*

In December, 1932 Mr* Roosevelt announced to the press his plans for the social and economic rehabilitation of the Tennessee

Valley* These plans involved federal construction of a series of dams in the Tennessee Basin for the purpose of generating cheap power for public sale, flood control and a conservation program which would involve bringing marginal lands back into eultivationo

In addition, the nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals were to be reno­ vated and the federally owned Wilson Dam to be completed* The

President-elect invited Senator George Norris of Nebraska, a

Republican Progressive and a consistent agitator for public owner- 22 ship of power plants, . to visit Muscle Shoals with him in January,

1933 * : ' 1 '

The President-elect’s advocacy of public power had won few allies for him among tionservative Democrats because to them it

• ■ 19 ' .. Hersehell Bficknell, "The Literary Landscape", North Ameri­ can Review CCXXXIV (December, 1932) also efv ."The New Ax-Man Rolling up His Sleeves"* ' / ’ : ' :

20 ' ' - IBID. January, 1933, p. 87.

21 • - : James M. Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 156. <. 22 ' • • ' George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal The autobiography of George W. Norris (New York's The Macmillan Company, 1947) pp. 261-275. involved an invasion of private industry which they could not countenance* It explains9 in part, why the Raskob-Young«>Baruch group had come to regard Mr* Roosevelt to some extent as "social- 23 . ' „ ' ■ istio"* Their growing.opposition to him was not lessened by his friendship with Senator Norris and others whom they regarded as

"radical"* This opposition was counterbalanced, however, by the friends which his power .•policies won for him among Republican ' ' • ■. : • , 24 Progressives who were alienated from their own party* .

There were a number of reasons why conservatives objected to his proposal for the establishment'of the Tennessee Valley

Authority* First, they were opposed to what they considered to be an unwarranted extension of government ownership* The federal government had no constitutional or moral right to own a part of the : - ' ■ . " ' ' ' 26 ' American economy which might compete with private enterprise*

Secondly, it would be. difficult to balance the budget if the fed­ eral government embarked upon such a costly undertaking* If the budget could not be balanced then economic recovery would be retarded because the business community would not have its confi­ dence restored* Third, the flood control projects would bring

-• 23 Ray T* Tucker, The Mirrors of 1932 (New York: Brewer, Warren and Putnam, 1931) p* 97*

'^George W* Norris, Fighting Liberal, pp» 261-275. 25 "The Financial Situation" Commercial and Financial Chroni­ cle, February ll s .1933, p. 881.

2 6 '' "Smashing the Muscle Shoals Deadlock”, Literary Digest, February 4, 1933, p. 9* v. back into cul tivation, ,marginal land thus, increasing agricultural

, : prbduction and aggravating the farm surplus problemFourth,, .

the development and sale of cheap power when, applied to machinery ;

; , would result in a surplus of manufactured goods to be dumped upon

;'the; market:and add to the, problem of industrial overproduction.,

'■ v There were various other arguments sporadically advanced . ,

; by conservatives -against Roosevelt8s proposal., for example». William

, .. ; S. Lee, vice-president and chief engineer of the Duke Power Company ;

, : ■was horrified by his advocacy of government ownership and operation

;V; T ,of power plants 6 The, President-elect’s plan to put 200,000 idle

:';\;;:i/.:.;^men■•,.t^>;,work pn a giant project worried the power .company employee

so much that he warned that "The more people that work for the

government, the nearer we approach to socialism." \

. . Ip seemed a reasonable deduction to ,others, that any attempt

■ at large scale generation of power in the Tennessee Basin by the. ■

•, federal government and its delivery within the Same'region Could .

have but One effect - to force existing plants in the region into

- idleness thus .endangering, the economic welfare of the local citi- .v

■ ■■:-■

: » , .■■Ifew York Times, Febfuary 4, 1933, p. 14.' ■

“ a ® .

Tucson Daily Citizen, February 8 , 1933, p. 8 . .

. ^^David J. Guy "Muscle Shoals ~ Operate it or Scrap it?” . , ■ '■ Nation's Business XXI' (April, 1933) 2 2 1 ; ; ; .■ . . 34 believed that it was time to cease regarding Muscle Shoals as a

site for nitrate production because it was no longer needed for

that purpose. Its plants were now obsolete and the country was well supplied without them, not only with nitrate but with' potash and phosphorus„

On February 8 , 1933 a Committee of the House of Representa­ tives made a report condemming government competition with private business which was directed in part against Roosevelt®s plans for the Tennessee Basin, On the whole the Committee felt that the evidence indicated that the operations of the Federal Government in the field of private enterprise had reached a magnitude which threatened tb reduce private initiative, curtail.opportunity and infringe upon the earning powers of tax paying enterprises while 32 ■ ' - . simultaneously increasing their taxes,•

Opponents of public power believed that all the benefits from Muscle Shoals power which Roosevelt promised to the South could be more easily obtained and at lower cost under private ownership than under public;ownership. They believed that the

Tennessee Basin would soon become the seehe of a great and catask trophic experiment if Congress enacted the President-elect's pro­ posal-34 ■ '/ ■ ;'/■ y'V--' :■ . ./; v : -

31 . "Morning Or.egohian (Portland) January 10, 1933, p, 6 , ■ ' . 32 - : ‘ ■’ ' • : "The Financial. Situation", The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 1 1 , 1933, p. 881, . 1 1

33Morning Oregonian (Portland) January 23, 1933, p. 6 ,

; N v ' > v ..." As Governor of New York Franklin Roosevelt had recommended legislation which would have permitted- municipalities to form public utility districts3 with the consent of-their voterSg for the purpose of generating, distributing'and selling electricity. Republican-; ieadership in the state legislature under the influence of utility

Companies had prevented such legislation from being passed, which had ahtagonized the Governor. The utility companies were becoming convinced during the interregnum that the President-elect would use the threat of public ownership as a coercive measure. Now that

Mr. Roosevelt was going to be President, spokesmen for the power . interests feared that he would exact vengeance upon them all for the recalcitrant attitude Of the utility companies in New York

State.. L. W. H. Morrow, one such Spokesman, believed that as '

Governor of New York Mr. Roosevelt had not been fair in the treat- ment Of the. utilities because he did not. understand the fundamental technical problems involved and.because he differed with the manage­ ment as to the basic principles at iSsue, Morrow asked that

. ; Fdr an analysis, of F. P. R.es dealings with the power. . interests as Governor of New York, cf. Frank Freidel. Franklin P. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston: Li ttle Brown and Company, 1956) pp. 81-83; and 100-109. X ; k :;.v 1 y;.

^^Bernard Bellush, Franklin P. Roosevelt as Governor of New York (New York: Columbia -Oniversify Press, 1955) p. 239. ..

"The Next Four Years*8. Bradstreets Weekly January 28, 1933 p. '118. • - : .v ''' : k'-. -

L. W. W. MOrrow, "To a 'Newly-Elected President" Electrical World November 19, 1932, p. 682. . • • - ■■ ■' :: ' ' \ " . 36 the President-elect ’'consult more with enlightened utility manage­ ments and less with those who criticize and theorize about the

industry without a full, understanding of its organizations9 oper- ' ' . 40 ■ • - ■ ,: . " • . ■ ; at.ions and policies"* Representatives of the power interests thought that the answers to the questions raised by Mr* Roosevent0s proposal and by the collapse of Samuel Xnsull's public utilities empire lay not in federal ownership or federal regulation but in regulation by the states* "Federal regulation would mean more expensive, less responsive, less intelligent and less expeditious regulation," A Washington bureau for any purpose was the most ineffective, money-wasting, equivocating.agency that could be ’ 43 ' ' . '■ devised, . ' .

On the other hand state regulation was advancing and improv­ ing, It was effective and would become more effective* State regu­ latory bodies were more sensitive to changing local conditions and thus superior to federal regulationOne question, however, was left unanswered» Just how were,state commissions to regulate trans­ mission lines which crossed state boundaries? Roosevelt's proposal for the Tennessee Basin, was one of the few utterances he made during the interregnum which was coaorete* While his proposal gave heart

Aft IBID, p. 683, , ;

W, W. Morrow, "Power Board Suggests Federal Regulation", Electrical World, December 3, 1932, p,.747, ,

42ibidq p. 746, ; „

IBID, p, 747, , : : to .many liberals and progressives tiis thrusting,!aside his shield of evasiveness left him unguarded to conservative barbs for the : . 45 ‘ ! ^ ' ! ■ . ' !. "; ■. !!■ ■: ' moment. ; ' • f :

Other business and industrial, leaders had an antagonistic

.hangover from the 1932 presidential campaign. For example, owners and managers in the coal industry had become suspicious of him because in several campaign speeches he advocated or seemed to:be advocating federal interference in the, coal industry.^ Their sus» picions were intensified during the interregnum by Roosevelt8s advo­ cacy of the: federal ownership and operation of power plants. Might not the coal industry be next in line? Many of the leaders of the industry were unflinching in.their determination to resist federal regulation or control of!their industry. • •

Steel manufacturers indicated their dislike of government v

Competition with private enterprise at the convention of the National

Founders Association in New York.^ They also advocated the continue ous exertion of pressure to reduce governmental,, expenses by constantly decreasing the use of federal tax 'money for federal aid or regular

,:. x'; : 45 ■ / " ; ' " . • : Ellis Kimble. nThe Tennessee Valley Project". Journal of Land and PubliC Utility Economics IX (November, 1933).333.

^ E o R. GoOmbeSs ^Editorials", Mining; Congress Journa 1 XVIII (December, 1932) 8,<> ; . . . , - - . . .

"Founders Consider Taxation and Federal Legislation", : Steel, November 21, 1932, p. 13 ■ . ' - ' . '■ V :: v ' , Conservative criticism of Franklin Roosevelt was not due

entirely to conservative fear of further federal encroachment upon

the private domain. Conservatives'-were.also 'cri tical, of- him because :

they believed his motives largely political. While they had devel­

oped considerable respect for him,as a political strategist, they

believed that his proposals for the Tennessee Valley were not moti­ vated by his desire for sound economic policies but by his urge to • ' 50 - ■ ' feather his own political nest.

Criticism was often directed at the President-elect not

because of anything he actually said of did but because of conserva­

tive fear of what it was rumored he might do0 This suspicious atti­

tude was illustrated by the conservative reaction to the rumor that

the new administration would establish diplomatic relations with

the Soviet Union shortly after inauguration on March 4, 1933. Even

though Mr. Roosevelt said practically nothing about this issue nor

indicated any particular interest in it, a stream of protests began ■ . " ' . ■ . -V ' ■ - - - 53_. to flow from the conservative press against diplomatic recognition.

These protests, however, indicated a growing awareness among American

conservatives of the futility of withholding recognition from such a powerful and influential country simply because the Communists refused

50 “Business Looks at Roosevelt”, Business Week, March 1, 1933, p. 2. ' ; . /;/: V SI ■ ■■ . . Robert Browder, The Origins of Sovlet-Amefican Diplomacy (Princeton, New-Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953) pp. 75= 86 e ’ ■ _r ^ ^ ^ ^r * ^ *■ r tp genuflect, at the a.ltar of private property. This change in attitude was reflected- in a nexvspaper poll conducted by the Committee on Russian-American Relations which indicated that of 1.139 news­ papers, polled, 747 favored some soft of recognition while only 306 , : 53,; 'Vi V-: ■ f 4 ::- were opposedo , v v :vY ./> : .. .. "?,y '

•, ; Many' businessmen were now willing to recognize the Soviet...

Union not because they liked or approved of-its policies but be­ cause they believed that diploma tie recogrii tion mi ght 1 ead to the : opening of new trade outlets. : ■ • y .

' -Wile^'theie.was prdbably less opposition, to the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union during'the interregnum than at any time since the Octobep .Revolution in 1917y :there were still many who

'opposed recogni tion. In January, 1933. the New York Times reported that of fifty-one senators polled, twenty-two favored recognition* , ' ' 56 twenty deeiihed- to commit themselves and nine opposed it. Senator,

Cope landa New York Democra t» probabl y ' expres s ed the v lews of the , minority, when he said "I have been so outof sympa thyvwith the col lee- tivization syStern and the treatment, of the --chtirches and their failure

William A. $111 lams, American-Russian Relations 1781-1947 (New York; Rinehart and Company, Inc.■1952) pp.■231-238. •

■ .Robert Browder., The Origins of Spyiet-American Relations, pp. 75-86. . ■ y ; y.;.-. v ; • y ’ vyy:: V. ■ , 54 ., ' '/• ".yy . 1. ';y; .% ■ ■ y Paul F„ holler, "The Great Conspiracy of 1933: A study in Short Memories", Southwest Review XXXIV (Spring 1954) pp. 102-103.

/ Charles A. Beards American Foreign Policy in the Making 1932-1940 (New Havens Yale University Press,'1946) pp. 146-147.

~^New York Times, January 10, 1933, p. 2. to acknowledge certain obligations owed to us that my' inclination

is to oppose recogni tion," : 'v, ■ -

Conservatiyes wete gradually moying away ffoiii the position ; ;

of some, of the opponents of recognizing the Soviet 'Union' who had

: accepted the viewpoint of the anti-Bolshevik rightists who regarded

the ■ Soviet regime as" a' viciQUS and /immoral, establ ishement which no • ' : ' ;

‘ - honorable' gbvernmeht should recognize'. Conservatives for several ;

, years had been gradually adopting a more moderate viewpoint in re= . :

■ gafd to establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union®"

■ Other conservatives were sti 11 suspicious of the worldwide. ;

activities of the Comintern and"warned that any proposals to recog- '

' nize the Soviet Union- should be thoroughiy •investigated by .Congress» ^

: In December> 1932 rumors were circulating among;cdnservatives . ,

■ that the President-elect had given his support to the Voluntary • : . ■;

; Domestic'Allotment Act which was pending in Congress, The rumors ■

passed the whispering stage when M r R o o s e v e l t sent Henry Morgenthau, ;

_ ’ , IBID® also efo Thomas A.^Bailey, American Faces Russia® . . ■ ■ . Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca, N.Y® ■ ,> - Cornell University Press, i950):pp®262 - 272. . ' I- I'':

1 : Vera M. Dean 9 The Uni ted Sta tes and Russia . (Cambridge, : . .1: 11.'' Massachusetts: Harvard University Press^ 1948) 'pe 14® also cf» ■';/ 'I. • Frederick; 1® Schumans American Po11cy Toward Russia Since 1917 , ; ' . . ‘ (New Yorks international Publishers, 1928) p. 337. •

° Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert; Hoover : The Great Depression 1929-1941 "(NewYork's -The Macmillan Company, 1952) pp® 360- 363... . . / . ' . " ' . : . ' " , , ' . . - .-•. '..

^Chicago Daily Tribune, December 10, 1932, p® 12. . ■ 1 ' Jrt to Washington, as his persona 1 representative to .help promote

the passage of .the bill.

: The Domestic Allotment Act, or the Jones Bill as it was

known, was envisaged by the President-elect as a proposal to make ■ y -

the tariff effective on American produce, the domestic price of

which was set in wprld markets by virtue; of an exportable surplus

This surplus could be reduced by paying farmers who agreed to rediice

their production a bounty. The bounty would be paid only on wheat,

cotton, fobaccO and hogs and then only on'that part of the production

Required for domestic consumption. ;;,

The bounty which was to be paid to cooperating farmers was

to be raised by means of a processing tax which Would be levied on

all processors- of agricultural products. For this reason conserva=

tive opposition to the plan came not so.much from the farmers them«

selves as from the,food processors. Their criticisms of the bill

and Franklin Roosevelt who had given his Support to it were many

and caustic. ' " ; • ' ■ : ; • , .

- The president of the American Agricultural Chemical Company

called the Jones Bi11 hWhite rabbit legislation", and asked, "Is it

hot visiohary to expect, almost overnight, that we can “socialize1*

. John M. Blum, From the Morgehthau’ Diaries Years of Crisis 1928-1938 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959) pp. 38=42. - : ■

. 'National Af fairs". Time.. Magazine, Jahuary 23, 1933, p. 13,.

"Important Busihess Developments", Bradstreet's Weekly IXI (January ■ 7, 1933) p . / 3 . ' i ': /Y, : ■' ' '. : . " "•' ■■ 42

dmr most highly dual ized industry?" ’ i . v

The board of directors of the Merchants Association of New

York denounced the bill for a host of reasons. They believed that

farmers would benefit at the rest of the community’s expense; that

experience had shown that price-fixing was "economic folly"; and that

the bill Would pave the way for the: dumpingof'Ameriean agricultural

produce in other countries and thus for reprisals. .Besides it was

of doubtful eonstitutionat ity and wou1d create immense administrative

difficulty and wholesale graft

Conservative newspaper editors both Democrats and Republicans

were highly critical of both Mr. Roosevelt and the Jones Bill. William

ilo Mathews and Claire E. Ellinwood of the Democratic Arizona Daily Star,

wrote: that :: j', ': ,. , ^ . ' t-v;, ■ -

, ,S-Mr. ‘.Rodseyelt looks upon the plan as an experiment .. worth trying. He does not say it will succeed = . After this final experiment has fafledj the farmers of • the cbuntry and Congress will . . . realize that , ■ i it is futile, and a waste of precioUs time to attempt • to try foolish and unsound experiments. 70

^ The Republican editor of the Chicago Daily Tribunesaid that

"to call this scheme utter madness is to flatter . i t " . ^ Republican

"Critics of the Domestic Allotment Act", Fortune Magazine,

:^Fe^xcuafy,'^T'S33.!,■ :p.;, " 4 5 . : . ' / %

New York Times, January 13, 1933, p> 2. : * •

Atlzona Daily Star (Tucson) January 14, 1933, p. 10.

■, Chicago Dai 1y Tribune, January 7, 1933, p. 10. ' - " - . : 43

Paul Keity of the Portland Morning Oregonian believed that - the col­ lection of the processing tax from all who handled allotted products would be a tremendous task which would add thousands of employees ' V;. : . : - 72 . to the already overgrown-internal revenue bureauo In addition, it would make the Secretary of Agriculture a sort of farmer's Czar ' 73 similar to Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union*

The processors of agricultural products.were almost unani­ mous in their detestation of the pending Domestic Allotment Acto

They blatantly stated their dislike of the measure in their testi­ mony before the House Agricultural Committee, Charles A. Cannon, a Concord, North Carolina cotton manufacturer said that instead of receiving the predicted bounty of five cents a pound the producer; ■. ' '' " ' ■ ■ ■ v ■ 74 v . v: , would receive only two cents a pound« The consumer in turn would pay 6% cents a pound which would in fact represent a sales tax of

33 1/3 to 40 per cento the result would be that domestic consump- • ' . ■ ■ ; : ' ; . " . ' ' ■’ 7 tion would be curtailed and'employment in the mills thereby reduced1

In addition the consumer would be forced to use/untaxed substitutes.

Mr* Cannon also predicted ruin for American cotton manufacturers. competing with British producers for world.markets.^

Fred L. Lingham, Chairman of the Miller's National Federation

72 Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 19, 1932, p 9 4®

^ IBIDo January 11, 1933, p® 8®

^^"National Affairs" Time Magazine, November 21, 1932, p. 8.

- - ; 75IBID.

; 76IBID® . 44

and. president of Federated Mills, InCo $ of Lockporf, New York,

asserting that he; spoke for the milling trade as a whole, contended

that the allotment plan was unconstitutional and spelled social

injustice and economic suicide,He warned that bread prices might

double and untaxed flour become a profitable bootleg commodity "unless ' . . " - . yg there was a policeman at every grinding mill".

Predictions that the Jones Bill would prove a boomerang to

the hog producer by lowering instead of boosting his income were made, before the House Agricultural Committee by representatives of the packing industry,^ .. C . - ■

George Putnam, economist for Swift and Company, and Frank

Hunter$ president of the Hunter Packing Company of East St, Louis,

Illinois, both testified that the processing.-tax, proposed to raise

funds for paying the producer a bounty on his share of the domestic -

consumption, would come out of the. farmer9s -purse, "Hunter viewed

■ - V ■ ■' ' ■ go . "the entire proposition as an exorbitant tax on food", Putnam : 81 ' ' ' ' called it "an aggravated sales tax", ,

' In an opeii telegram to Chairman Jones of the House Committee on Agriculture, the Institute of American Meat Packers said

The revised proposal now being considered by the

— : y r ;"v; New York Times^ Dedember 17, 1932, p. 27.

^^nNational Affairs69, Time Magazines November 21, 1932s p. 8. 79 ' Arizona Republic (Phoenix) December 20, 1932, p. 16

80ibid,

8 1 ibid.' : ' "r House Committee on Agricultures which at the maximum rate proposed would levy a tax of hundreds of millions of dollars against hogs, would if. enacted impair if itdid not actually destroy the adequate daily cash market for hogs which has existed in the United States for many years „ . Our opposition = . cannot be considered strictly self-interested,. We regard the proposal as an injustice and danger.to the live stock . .industry'',82;

The Jones Bill also-met opposition in testimony before the

Senate Agricultural Committee, Chaos in the cotton industry was predicted by William D, ^nderson, president of the Bibb Manufac­ turing Company of Macon, Georgia and by Earnest N, Hood of Salem,

Massachusetts, president of the National Association of Cotton Manu- . _ ' go facturers, if the Jones Bill should be passed, Mr, Anderson fore­ cast a consumer’s strike due to a price increase while Mr, Hood warned of a boycott on all the products contained in the bill.

In a telegram from Thomas R. Cain of Bloomington, Illinois, president of the Farmer’s National Grain Dealers Association to the

Senate Agriculture Committee the bill was assailed as "a huge, costly experiment, a price-fixing, tax increasing measure doubtful in accom- ' ■ ■ ■ ' 85 plishment and requiring huge administrative machinery".

During the period in which the bill was pending in the House •: and Senate, Congressmen criticized both Franklin Roosevelt and the farm relief bill to which he had given his support® Representative

8? ' . - New York Times, January 2, 1933, p, 20, ' - 88 ' • ' ■ : IBID. January 28, 1933, p® 3 o

' . . . . :

8 5 ibid» . .. . John Co Schafers a Wisconsin Republicans, denounced the bill as, a

^monstrous super sales tax". He had opposed the sales tax measures which had been brought before the House in other years but he be= lieved that they were "picayunish" compared to the processing tax , which would be levied by the Jones Bill, He wondered how Frank1 in

Roosevelt could oppose the sales tax and yet support the Jones Bill,^

Representative William L, Nelson of Mississippi was critical of the bill in his report as a member of the House Committee on Agriculture primarily because it was his ambition to get the government to leave ■ ■ ■ 88 ■ ' : ' ; ' - ' '' .' , - ' r - the farmer alone. Representative John D, Clark, also a member of the Agricultural Committee of the House, believed that the processing ■ 81 . • ' tax was really a sales tax on food, He, too, felt that the President­ elect was being hypocritical in opposing a direct sales tax and at the same time giving his support to the Jones Bill which was really the same thing in disguise. Off the record one skeptical member of the

House Committee asked: "How are you going to control hog production?

The hogs can't control themselves and can0t read the bill anyway,"

Some conservatives regarded Mri Roosevelt's support of the

Jones Bill as just another example of the political machinations which

8 6 ISIP, January 4, 1933, p, 10, "

87 IBIP, Y . . . go "Would the Domestic Allotment Plan Help the American Farmer?" Congressional Digest, February, 1933, p, 41, ' ' ./ . ■ ■■■■■■ ■ ; ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ 47 had won him the Presidency. He was a 1 den.^tongued soothsayer*6 whose aversion to sound economic policies, was exceeded only by his regard for sound politicking. 93 The Hoover Administration flatly opposed the Jones Bill.

President Hoover strongly criticized the bill in a message to Congress saying that "It seems clear that the domestic allotment plan is wholly : - - ' ; ’ unworkable. It will do far greater harm than good to Agriculture".

In a letter to Senator Charles McNary of. Oregon, Secretary of Agricul­ ture Arthur M» Hyde said "this bill would not afford substantial relief to agriculture and contemplates such drastic regulation as to ' 95 , be impossible of effective administration".

The Jones Bill was finally prevented from passing the Senate because Senator Ellison D. Smith of South Carolina, Chairman of the

Senate Committee on Agriculturesj opposed its passage. He did not think the bill really represented the views of Mr. Roosevelt in spite ' 97 of the President-elect's endorsement of it. Also he resented

Roosevelt's endorsement of the bill because he felt that such an endorsement represented an infringement on what he considered to be

92 / ; Joseph Stagg Lawrence, "Editorial Comment". Bradstreet's Weekly IX (December 10, 1932) 1638.

^ Arizona Republic (Phoenix) February 21, 1933, p. 1. 94 ' - • ‘ . New York Times, February 21, 1933, p. 1.

^ Arizona Republic (Phoenix) February 18, 1933, p. 1.

^"Congress and the Domestic Allotment Plan". Congressional Digest, February, 1933, p. 33.

97 IB ID. 48 his rightful prerogatives. He was not going to let any newcomer

to the White House tell him what to do.

Qg ' ' , . This is the cbnclusion reached by Mr, Roosevelt’s advisor Rexford Tugwell in his biography The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, N, Y,: Doubleday and Company, Inc,, 1957) p, 266, ; . ■ ' CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF THE INTERREGNIM v

On November 22? 1932 President-elect Roosevelt met with

, '■ . - i ■ '• ' President Hoover at the White Houseo The principal objective of

this meeting was to discuss the current international economic situ= ation with regard to the foreign government debts owed to the United

• . 2 ' - States and the international monetary problem« The President-elect was accompanied by his advisor Raymond Moley while Hoovervs Secre=

tary of the Treasury Ogden Mills was present to advise the Presidento

Hoover suggested that he and Roosevelt cooperate in appointing a - commission ;to-negotiate a settlement on the.debts. He believed that only through the joint appointment of a commission could the commis­ sion’s efforts avoid being jeopardized by the change of administration 3 on March 4» Moley and Roosevelt answered Hoover°s plea for the crea­ tion of such a commission by indicating that the appointment of such a commission as the President suggested would cause so much uncer­ tainty about the future that economic recovery would be retarded

1 - - . ' ■. < Tucson Daily Citizen^ November 23, 1932s p, I« ■ 2 Franklin D» Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Roosevelt: The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932 (New Yorkt Random House, 1938) p» 867» Also cf<> Hoover, Memoirs, pp. 176-185. ■ 3 ' , ■. ' : . Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1939) p. 75. not accelerated. T h e y ’b.elieyetj that the country's basic problem . was that-of, doinestip reform and they felt that the repercussions'

of the ■appointment of such a committee as Pfesident Hoover suggested, might jeapordizethe success of the Roosevelt Administration after

March 4„ Both Moley and Roosevelt were;steadfast in their refusal to commit the incoming :administrattion to. Mr„ Hoover's proposals; . they felt that the debt problem could be solved satisfactorily through

independent negotiations with the individual debtor nations«

• .■ . The meeting broke up without any tangible agreements having been made except that the President and President-elect would keep in touch in ease of further developments which might alter the debt

C U . , ? ■ . V-'"'- ' -■ ■■

President Hoover and Secretary of the Treasufy Mill’s atti“ tude toward Roosevelt and his advisor' represented an illustrative if inconclusive portrayal of the attitude of some conservatives toward the President-elect and his ”Intel1ectua1” assdciates.

■ ■ •-Rooseyelt,^ s ■ ad visor at the meeting 1 Professor Raymond ■Moley . : of Columbia University, thought that "it was clear that you could have scoured the country .without finding two people who distrusted •

W - ...

/ ' Arthur Schlesinger» Jr, Tlie ’Age of Roosevelt; The Crisis o f .; the Old Order 1919«1933 (Boston: Houghton Miff1 in Company,' 1957) pp. 442-443. / y -."V-

Mo ley s After Seven Tears, p, 75. '■ '■ ■- h;,.;.

W • . ~ .

Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 444-445, ' y;.."' ' ' - ■ 51 Roosevelt as a h u m n being and as President-elect more than that pair. I take it that I was regarded with contempt that changed into cold anger as the afternoon passed."

The morning after the first conference Ogden Mills came to the Mayflower Hotel where Moley and Roosevelt were staying to discuss the statement he and Mr. Hoover had prepared for release to the press ■ T O about the conference. The discussion concluded and agreement reacheds

Mills said goodbye to Roosevelt and rose to go. Raymond Moley walked 1'' 1 1 to the door with him. As they reached the door Mills whispered to

Moley, "I wish you would do what you can to impress upon Mr. Roose­ velt the seriousness of this matter and the need of his developing ■ 12 ‘ - ' ‘ ' ■ ' ■ a constructive policy about it". According to Moley, Millgs atti­ tude toward Roosevelt was like that of a schoolteacher urging a mother to make her naughty child do his homework. Mills and Hoover regarded Roosevelt "as inexcusably irresponsible, on occasion a prevaricator, and not to be trusted with serious affairs^

As a result of the f irat White House conference between

Hoover and Roosevelt many conservatives assumed that Roosevelt didn't quite know what the meeting was about and that he could have been ,

... 9 : , >.. : ' , ■ ■■ ,. / *■ . . • , ... , • . Moley, After Seven Years, p. 77. . in • . y ' ” IBID. p. 78.

1 1 IBID. ' ,

12 IBID.

:"V- ,

^^Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists2 Roosevelt and Hoover", Antioch Review XIII (December, 1953 ) 442. persuaded to "cooperate" with the Administration if only Moley hadn't been there to advise him* There was considerable comment ■ 35 about "impractical professors" and "provincial academicians"^ .

According to Moley9 the conservative criticism was instructive because

it was one of the first instances of the tactics New Deal critics were

to use from that time on =>=■ attack upon those around Roosevelt rather

1 6 . than on Roosevelt himself= Nevertheless^ the conservative press believed that Roosevelt's attitude toward the debt conference was not the sort one would expect from a public figure who would soon have a ■ 17 profound responsibility as chief executive.

Wall Street was disappointed because the President-elect refused to agree to Mr. Hoover's proposal. Financiers were unhappy when no conclusive announcement was made as to whether or not the debt payments would be remitted or scaled down.^

The business community regarded with great disfavor the renewed agitation over the subject of the debt payments and wanted the whole problem disposed of without delay. It believed that the incessant argumentation over the debts was disturbing to the busi =. . / ■ -V. — : 19 ness world and was impeding.economic recovery.

. ^^Mo ley .After Seven-. Years, p.: 79.

■ V 1 6 ibido ;

I? : > ■ , Morning Oregonian (Portland) November 25? 1932, p. 4. 1 O New York Times, November 24$ 1932, p. 41.

"The Financial Situation". Commercial and Financial Chronicle. .November 26, 1932, p. 3563. On December 17, 1932 President Hoover tried to reopen nego=

tiations by sending a telegram to the President-elect urging him to

join in the selection of a delegation for the. World Monetary and , : 20 Economic Conference which was scheduled to meet in April, 1933-

Most of the international issues under debate during the interregnum would be discussed == debts, disarmament, price stabilization, and

tariffs- ^ 1 :

In his reply Roosevelt said no to Hoover0s request primarily

because he and his advisors did not feel that these questions could

22 be lumped together- They believed that each would require separ- - '23' ■ ' , ate treatment- , :

Hoover replied that.he was asking only that preliminary 24 studies be undertaken not that policies be agreed to- In an

undiplomatic thrust at the "braihs trust", he suggested that Owen

Young, Colonel House or any other men of the party familiar with

the problems he selected to sit with his own representatives to see what steps could be taken to avoid further delays- Roosevelt again

replied saying that cooperation was possible only about exploratory 25 work- He said that the selection of men of such eminence as Mr,

; ; - 0 ' : ' Tucson Daily Citizen, December 19, 1932, p, 1 ,

21 Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, p- 260- o o - New York Times, December 21, 1932, p- 1,

2 3 ibid.' ' 24 Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, p.•260, . ______

New York Times, December, 23, 1932 , p- 2 - Hoover suggested would imply not mtere exploratory work; it would

indicate that these men were empowered t© exchange views "on matters 26 of large and binding policy". In short, the President-elect flatly 27 refused once again to commit himself to Mr, Hoover’s proposals.

On December 22, the President handed the correspondence between himself and the President-elect since December 17 to the press, together with a statement which indicated that he was highly : ' ' : .v • '■ 28 ' ' displeased by Roosevelt’s failure to agree to his proposal, Mr,

Hoover said "Governor Roosevelt considers that it is undesirable for him to assent to my suggestions for cooperative action on the foreign. ■ ' " :■ ' 29' ■" ' problems outlined in my recent message to Congress,"

Franklin Roosevelt replied in a statement issued to the press later in the day saying "I am rather surprised by the White House statement issued this afternoon. It is a pity not only for the country but for the solution of world problems that any statement or intimation should be given that I consider it undesirable to assent 30 to cooperative action on foreign problems,"

Conservative Republicans tended to take Mr,Hoover’s side

in the controversy. They believed that he had given the whole economic situation much deeper study than his successor, that he had a better

“ jEffi.:' • ' / y " ' • 27 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 89.

' 2 8 ibid. ; ; , . ; : v ■ :...

^^Arizona Republic (Phoenix) December 23, 1932, p. 4.

3 0 ibid. ; ' : „ : V ^ grasp of its complexities, and that his leadership was the only one ' 1 ■■ 31 ■■■ which could be safely relied upon. -Some professed to believe that the kindest wish which could be made for Roosevelt was that he speed- ily get over what they considered to be his "popular hero" attitude, recognize that there might be Some wise Counsel obtainable from his defeated opponent and realize the significance of his profound respon­ sibilities,,^ v'- . -'0 . .

Wall Street again attributed the irregular weakening of the stock market to Mf;. Roosevelt's refusal to subscribe to the President's . ■ - 33 - - : . - ■. , - r : v- ■ V' -■ . • . ' , . policies. the business community gave vent to its distrust of intel­ lectuals by sneering at "Roosevelt's professors". It justified its attitude by pointing to the supposed political ineptitude, clumsiness and "impracticability" of certain young professors who came to Wash- ■ 34 V ington to represent the President-elect.

A number of Washington politicians thought that the attitude - 35 of the President-elect was lacking in wisdom. Senator Arthur Capper, a Nebraska Republican, said "I regret very much.that Governor Roosevelt declined to cooperate with President Hoover in the appointment Of the commission to restudy the foreign debts. I do not agree with him

' •" ■ . ■ ‘ Morning Oregonian (Portland) December 24, 1932, p. 4. 32 . . IBID. 3% ' - ’ . ' . ' '■ ■ . • New York Times, December 23, 1932, p. 27. ,

M. Kiplinger, "What's Ahead in Washington", Nation's Business XXI (February, 1933) p. 17. .. 35 • . . "The Month in Congress", Congressional Digest, January, 1933, p. 25. that such a commission would have committed his administration to 36 ' ", ■ - - ■ ; ■ •. ■. - ' a policy,’' Senator Reed Smoot, a conservative Utah Republican remarked that ’’The attitude of Governor Roosevelt makes perfectly useless any further moves toward a reconsideration of the debt Q 7 ' terms’’, ..

Many Republican supporters of Mr, Hoover believed that the

'President-elect was afraid to join forces with the President because he did not.faant to exhibit pbblicly his own lack of a debt plan,

”I-told-you-so" Republicans repeated their pre-election predictions that President Hoover’s defeat would produce just such ah impediment-/., to economic recovery, ;/':/ ■.

Roosevelt?s critics within his own party said that he listened to Democratic-politicians and theorists instead of to some able busi­ ness and financial leaders who really understood the international economic situation. Business advised him that he would save valuable time and accomplish much by committing himself to Hoover’s proposals and approaching the foreign debt situation in an ’’all-American and 39 nonpartisan spirit”.

In spite of his lack of success in persuading Roosevelt to accept his policies at their first conference in November and despite

,36 ■ ' ■■ ■ 1 ' ■ v ' :'/..■ ' New York Times, December 23, 1932, p, 2,

37 - IBID, 38 ’’National Affairs”, Time Magazine, January 2, 1933, p, 7, 39 ’’The Month in Congress”, Congressional Digest January, 1933, p, 26. . ' ' : : ,■■■ ■ '■ ■■ 57 the President-elect's reluctance to take part in the joint appoint­

ment of a commission to make prelimihary investigations for the

World Monetary and Economic Conference, President Hoover continued

to negotiate for another conference with'the President-elect, Finally

his efforts met with success and on January 20, 1933 Roosevelt again

visited the White House to confer With.-the President,

The foreign debt situation was again discussed. President

Hoover and Secretary’ of the Treasury Mills believed that a solution

to the debt question would act as an aid to the solution of American

economic problems, that it was an essential preliminary to the Econ­

omic Conference, and that the countries which owed us money were in

a position to make a satisfactory settlement,

Roosevelt did not discourage the President from making the

necessary surveys and obtaining practical proposals from the debtor 42 ■ . ■ nations. He felt, however, that the world economic situation would

prevent any foreign proposal being made which would meet with,Con­

gressional approval. Therefore a wholly different approach was

necessary. Emphasis should be placed on a broad domestic program with

reform as the keynote. When the whole economic structure of the country

needed overhauling he believed that it would be insufficient to repair

40 - * Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin "D. Roosevelts The Genesis of the New Deal 1928=1932, p. 8 6 8 , 41 " ' Edgar E. Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership 1933-1945 (Philadelphia 5 J. B. Lippincott Company, 1955) pp. 91=94, 42 - . Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt; The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932, p, 8 6 8 . what he considered to be a minor part of teeflean economic ills.

President Hoover was exasperated by Mr. Roosevelt’s - tude at 'the second White House. conference, ■ thought that ’ \

Roosevelt5 s refusal to "cooperate” made further debt negotiations and subsequent Cbngressiqnalappfbvai impossible, prevented the re= erectipii of a War Debt Commission and pe'stpbned the World Economic

Conference indefinitely. Anxiety and fear about the, future was greatly increased throughout the country. Hoover believed that

Roosevelt was to blame for the failure of the Economic Conference and the repudiation of the debts. ' „

Rumors were circulating among the conservafiye proponents of the high tariff that what the Roosevelt Administration intended to do after March 4 was to seek tariff concessions and trade agree-? ments in return for scaling down the war debts or even outright cancellation. : v-v./; ; r.:. \ , . ■' ■

There was growing restiyeness' among protectionists after the rumor got around that the President-elect regarded war debts as "chips in the epming diplomatic poker game”.^ 'They believed that little in the way Of trade concessions could be gained. They became even more conv1nced\of this after reading excerpts from a speech of Neville Chamberlain, British Chancellor of the Exchequer

■ . AZ , . : V.- . , ‘ ■■ ' Hoover^, Memoirs,, loll91, p. 191.

4 5 IBID,

Arizona Republic (Phoenix) January 25, 1933^ p. 1,

v^New' York Times, January 26, 1,933,. p, I, > - ,r 59 in which he refused to consider any debt conference a ,eswapping

deal" because of the:preferential trade agreements among members

of the Coimqnweaith which put ah almost insuperable obstacle in

the way of such concessions* Besides, wouldn't tariff reduction •

force Arnerican manufac tufers to elose the i r doors and thus • aggra■

vate the employment situation'

. Oh January 29, 1933' in keeping with his earlier pronounce-

mehts on the feasibility and desirability of independent,.individual

negotiations with the debtor nations. President-elect Roosevelt met ■ ' ■' ■ . ■ V ' - - . . ' ■ -'. ' 50 1 . with Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay of.Great Britain. They reached

a :tentative understandihg in regard to the. forthcoming March meetings'

on waf debts and international economic recovery* Shortly after­

ward Mr. Roosevelt had a similar conference with the I’rench. Ambas- " ■ ■ 52 ' ; ■ ■ ; . ■ ' . :v - ; :1 , ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ' •• ' .. / .. Conservatives objected vigorously to Mr* Roosevelt personally

conducting negotiations with the debtor na tions for two reasons * Firs

because they believed■fhat he should appoint a committee composed of

members of both parties. In doing this,he would follow the precedent

set by McKinley? Harding and Hoover which allegedly had-good results

Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 3, 1933, p. 6 .'

• "Tariff Adjustments", Business Meek, February 15, 1933, P" 4- . . ' -. . -.: ^ " - ' M ' ' , ', - ' . ' ^ ^ '■ sn ■ ■ ' :■.- ;t:: : ; ... ■ . ; . 1 Arizona Daily, Star (Tucson) January 30, 1933-,: p, i.:

New York Times, Februafy 1, 1933, p. 1. ' , ;

Arizona Daily Star (Tucson). January 30, 1933, p. 1. , and broken by Woodrow Wilson with evil results.^

' Senator Reed^ a Pennsylvania Republican, feared that the '

President-elect was about 'to repeat the; mistakes of Presiderit Wilson;

at Versailles in negotiating personally w,ith ,foreign governments«

■ Senator JY Hamilton Lewis8 an Illinois■Democrat, said that Wilson V

had been /'Outdone by the tricks and frauds of European diplomacy".

He added that he was unhappy Over Roosevelt6s personal negotiations

with representatives of the debtor nations because he feared that

; ' the same thing.which had happened to Woodrow Wilson would also happen

to the President-elect. ^ -v ; .fj ;■

; Secondly, many were suspicious pfMr, Roosevelt6s intentions

and suspected him of wanting to scale down the debts o r cancel them •

altogether in si>ite of his repeated assurances to the Contrary.

Senator Arthur Robi.hsony an Indiana Republican, believed that the

President-elect had more regard for Europe and European, welfare Chan^ '

: ,; f or the .weifare of- the .'American people. - He suggested that Roose­

velt’s intent to negotiate with the debtor nations personally was a ;\

usurpation of Congressiona1 authority against which Congress should

protest. .Representative John C», Schafer, a Wisconsin Republican,

. Morning Oregonian. (Portland) February 3, 1933, p. 6 .

. ^-Arizona Republic (Phoenix) February 1, 1933, p. 1. ;

55New York Times, February 1, 1933, p. 1. • '

56 IBID. ' .. ■ '

v . Arizona Daily Star (Tucson). January 26, 1933, p..1. New York Times, January 22, 1933, p. 20.

■ ' 5w " ■ - ■ . ' thought that ‘’La Marseiliaise. and God Save the King will be sung as popular airs after March;A”;, and that, "the British flag, instead ; of the star-spangled, banner ' would float from f lagpoles all over the -.

United States”. ^ “Before Roosevelt has been President two •months the country will be wishing to God Hoover was still President" isaid

Schafer, ^ ^ ^

v As the financial' crisis became more and more acute through^ .. out the month of February, the President-elect drew more and inore criticism from business and financial leaders because he refused to give them reassurances that he would take no "radical“ action after ,

-Marci

The intensification df the crisis.led President Hoover to make further efforts to persuade the President-elect to commit him- self to his policies» . . He continued these-efforts right Up to eleven o ’clock on the evening of March 3 without successHoover believed that there were two reasons why Roosevelt wouldn"t cooperate.

New York Times, February 2, 1933, p. 1. -.

/ 61 IBID. : ' ..:vv.vV v- :

' Hoover, •Memoirs j pp. ■201-216. • ; -- - * " ■1;.. -. 63 'v .V v .' I,.: ' .. . " . I : ■ / - - ' In a personal memorandum to Senator David A. Reed of Pen- -, nsylvania, dated February 20, 1933 President Hoover said "I realize -that if these declarations be made by the President-elect, he will have ratified the whole major program of,the Republican Administration that is, i t means the abandonment of: 907. of the so-called new deal. But' unless this is done, they fun a' grave danger of precipitating a -, complete financial debacle. If it is precipitated, the.responsibility lies squarely With them for they have had ample warning — unless, of course, such a- debacle is part of the "new deal", cf. Oil1 iam S. Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930) p« 341. -. , . : Firstj he dida't realize how serious'the situation was. Second, he

preferred to let condit'iohs deteriorate and gain for himself the

entire credit for the rescue operation, .: , . _ . ■

Mr, Hoover professed to believe that the, financial crisis :

was a panic among bank depositors induced by Roosevelt’s own behav-

ior. ; v. :Ha thought that fears of possible inf lation by the new admin»

'i strati on 'were; causing American citizens to buy to reign currencies

with intentions of holding them until the dollar was devalued,

and then reap the full ampuht.of the devaluation. Foreign banks ;

and governments had begun turning their,deposits in the United States

into gold at the Federal Reserve Banks which was' then held for future

shipment.' Thus, "the camouflaged flight increased in volume and ,67 :' ' - - speed.^ The financial crisis raced toward its climaxjj ghe depres- -

sion deepened and Herbert Hoover believed that this was due to the

conduct of Franklin D. ROoseyelt,, ' • ’’ : v*. v, .

,When the Fresideht-elect and part of his family made the

customary pfe-inaugural call at the White House on March 3 to .pay

their .respecfs to the outgoing President, Roosevelt found that Hoover planned to use the meeting'for a final plea for joint action to stop

'. .^MeGeofge Bundy and Henry L„ Stimson, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York i Harper and Brothers, 1947.) ,p,/ 295= . .

Hoover, Memoirsh Vol'., I, p= 216= V-h'" .: ■ - ' ■ ' ' 63

the. bank panic6 Mr. Hoover's efforts were in vain, howevers‘

because the President-elect had by now determined to declare a bank

holidy shortly after inauguration. As Mr. Roosevelt rose .to go

he said that since he knew the President was busy he would under- :

stand if Mr. Hoover did nbt return the .call. The: President replied,

••Mr. Roosevelt, when you have been in Washington as long as 1. have

been, you will.learn that the President of the United States calls *

on nobody.11/U ,■ :»v v - :; ^ : ■ i.

, Raymond Holey, who had also been present at the meeting, ,, v

later remarked to Rexford Tugwell about the fear .and suspicion in

the .President9s face."He seems to me to be close.to ;deateh"^ Moley •

. said.\. ...■;V,MHe;^s!;the;.. lqQk\b.f -b'eing\.dpn5e». but still going on: and.on, driven by some damned duty.The duty was, in Hoover5s estimation,

to minimize as far as he could the "disaster" to the.nation involved

in the Roosevelt .accession. "It had frightened him during the cam-

paign; it had ravaged his spirit in the months which had followed;

.68 ■ ' I ' v ■ ' : " 'V" : ■ ' >. : James'M, Burns, .Robsevelt; The Lion and the Fox (New York; Hareourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1956jp. 162, ^ .

.' . ■ 69^ : r . /'Vc"} V '•

' : 7 0 IBID.

For a description of Er> Hooveres. mental state at this time cf. Eleanor Roosevelt's, This I.Remember (New Yorks. Harper

Rexford G. Tu^ell, "the Protagbnistss Roosevelt; and Hoovef". Aritldeh Review XI11 (December, 1953) 419. ' 4, '.y ,V'

v . ' & '

64 .74 and' he did indeed look, at: the end completely spent."'

. , . The personal struggle during the interregnum between

and Roosevelt was due primarily-to the -fact'that the President was ' >v ; "■■■V: \' Y:'' :75." : most interested in recovery and the President-elect more in reform. ;

, Rqoseyelt’s repeated refusals to accept either 'the foreign or domestic

proposals of President Hoover indicated thatthe emphasis in the new ;

■ administration would be on' a program of•reform.In, all prpbabilify • ;

the President-elect was torn between two, impulses -= to “cooperate"_ .

*:• with Hoover or.;not to "cooperate" with him. That he chose not to :

commit,himself, to the - President®s, suggestions was one of the themes - - .

of the -interregnums •' v .'' V ' /v:/ : - ■ : ': , • • ^

. • ■ 74 i b i s . . ■ •' ':-’,ry'75 Edgar S.- Robinson. The ROosevelt Leadership 1933-1945„ p. 98.

76 IBID» . : 77 IBID, p, 100,;

„ v . 'v ' '■ i ' •: .. c h a p t e r i v : ^ ^

DICTATOR OR DEMAGOGUE?

in February, 1933 John NaAce Caraer, Vice-President-eleet

and SpeaRer of the;House of Representatives;,and his aides iwere pro­

posing an economy act which would give the new/President the power

after inauguration to cut salariess veterans.benefits and other

gratuities prescribed by statute. Rumors were spread that this

act would give Mr. Roosevelt the:power of a •dictator and President x ' " /; -v;. ^ ; : '''yr : : ' h , /: Hoover responded to the rumors by publicly declAring that the act„■:

if passed„ would be. contrary to the spirit of the ConStitutidri.

He believed that the struggles in early American history.to gain the

right for the people’s representatives to have the final word in - - ;

Spendihg their ta^’bioney would be reenacted in modern America against

the authoritarian Mr. Roosevelt. ' .. - : / :

• Business and industrial leaders were generally opposed to

granting the President-elect any such powers'. They aPPr°y®d of .

drastic reductions in the budget but they did not l ike •the method ,

which was being proposed. They conceded that while it would probably

. . ; ; I ' y: • ■■ • : ... ■ . : " Tucson Daily Citizen, February 10, 1933, p. 1.

/" ' 2 IBlb.- \ \ ; 'V;V ■

. . 'Walter tippman. Interpretations 1933-1935 (New York: The Macmillan Company* 1936) p. 7. 1 be necessary for Roosevelt fcohave and. to exercise more power than

any President sihbe Wlson, it was absurd to' talk about giving him

the power of a dictator. Such a change$ in the absence of war,, could

not endure::'ift'ytoieri0M'»:‘^'-\';The:'editOirs of the New York Times believed

that if such an economy act were passed, as was being proposed$ "It

would be very much as if the members (of the House of Representatives) ■ ■■■■ . 1 . ' : v ' j - ■ : : ' ' ' ' ■■ . ' ' ' ■ agreed to sign a suicide pact". ■ ' : : . . - ' : : .

It was not just the proposal to place arbitrary authority in

the hands of Roosevelt which alarmed many Americans. It was the

willingness of so many to accept siidh; developments without qualms -

of any sort.® Indeed, the atmosphere engendered by the Great Depres­

sion made many willing; to accept radical chariges in the American

system which were repugnant to conservatives .and which caused colum­

nists. 1 ike. Arthur Brisbane to write that whi1e there might be certain •

advantages in having a Stalin;or a: Kemal Pasha or a Mussolini running

'the country dictatorship should have no place in the minds of Amer-

loans.^ Representative Bertrand' H. Snell of' New York, Republican

leader, of the House wrathfully declared nI done t think the country is

yet ready for a Mussolini, If we are, we’d better go the whole route

• ^W» M. Kiplinger, "What’s Ahead in Washington", Nation’s Business XXI (March, 1933) 18. / L;

L. W. Moffet, "New Administration Must Plunge At dnce into .Many Problems" Iron Age CXXXI (March 2, 1933) 366.

- New York Times, February 11, 1933, p. 14. ' •

®Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 248=269.

-Tucson Daily Citizen, February 15, 1933, p. 10. . and abolish Congresso":■ ‘'" i d ■ ■ • ” '

Republican opposition in the House of Representatives to

giving a new Democratic president powers which were called dicte^brlal

‘ ■ • . . . was aided by a number of Democrats, not willing to go so far, and by

the support of President Hoover, so that even if Congress approved

the economy act would be vetoed.- John Nance Garner and other

advocates of the bill backed down for the time being. Later the bill

, was revived and again drew criticism.

During the interregnum Mr. Roosevelt issued an invitation to

the governor of every state in the Union to meet with him shortly

after inauguration to discuss the general economic situation and

possible methods of alleviating it. Zealous conservatives, jealously

guarding against federal usurpation of state prerogatives, were ■ 12 • - suspicious of his proposal. J, W. Spear, editor of the Arizona

Republic believed that closer cooperation between the state and

federal governments might be all right but only if it did not take

the form of further federal encroachment upon the rights of the 13 , , . states. : Arthur. Brisbane thought there was little point in trying ■ ' :■ ' ' . \ 14 to run a government by consulting with a conference of governors.

^"To Hand F. D. R. The Economy Ax", Literary Digest, February 25, 1933, p. 7. ' ,

11 . Arizona Republic (Phoenix) February 12, 1933, p. 1 ,

12 '. IBID. January 18, 1933, p. 8 . ‘W ■ ■ ■ ' r v:.V: ' :

I A V , : v'' Tucson Daily Citizen. February 10, 1933, p. 10. : ; .... ■■■i.viV • \ ; /'yx :.;r/ . He slyly suggested to his readers that what Mr* Roosevelt really

needed were ideas and wi 11 power:oi his own, not a lot of conflicting ' ..... ' _ ’ . p: ' / 1 " ' opinions from £orty^Sight governors. If anything was & be done, it ■ , ■■■/; ; / 'x] : must be dope by the only, individual who would, have the authority =

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 15 ' • '

Immediately after election day in November rumors began to

circulate about the composition of the hew' cabihet which was in the •: '■ .. . ." • 16 ■■■■ %: ' .process Of being; constrhcted by the President-elect. Ip order to

cnuntbract the effects of these rumors and to discourage newsmen from

: ■ asking unanswerable or embarrassing question's, Mr. Roosevelt issued .

the following statement to the press. • v. .. V

In the weeks and months ahead further unauthorized ind unfounded suggestions may appear in print and other- ■ wise. I desire to make 'i t clear that no:,decision has been reached apd no decision will be reached.in regard to any ■. appointments for at least two months... I shall neither confirm nor deny any such reports. Here and now I ask ,^ ,■ the public to disregard any and all.such speculations.

■ ’ This statement did not squelch.the rumors about who was going

% to be ih Roosevelt's Cabinet. Conservatiyes although confused about

the- Presidedfcieleet's political philosophy believed that .the cabinet

' appointments would determine whether he would inaugurate a conserva­

tive or a "radical" program after March 4» Would he appoint as :

Attorhey-General a Sane administratbr of quiet pollcy or would he

New York Timesy February 9, 1933, p. 1 6 .

. Lynne M. .Lamm, "Recovery, of Busihess to Take .Measure of Roosevelt Regime" Steel XIIC (Januar.y 2, .1933.) 71. ■ : - . . " • ■ j.7 ■ ■ : ■ ' ; ;. ' ' • ' ■ ... . : ^National Affairs^, Time Magazine, November 2 1 , 1932, p. 8 , appoint a trust-buster? Wpuld a staunchly conservative Democrat

like Governor Ritchie of Maryland or a professional prosecutor from

the.left wing of the party 1 ike Senator Thomas:Walsh of Montana■be

chosen? . 'X'.;' ' \ % ... - ' ■; v; . ■ . ' .. -- : " •■V:--'.. ' '

Conservative Democrats thought they saw a chance to set

Robseveltfs policy for him. They continued to believe that thO 1

important thing was to balance the budget, adhere to the gold stand­

ard and thus "cure" the depression by restoring the Confidence of

the business commuhity^^% : :

But first the Deipocratio party would have to make one of .

the most important decisions, in its history. It would have to decide what kind of party it was gOing to be because its liberal and conserv- ative elements were.Widely- and deeply at variance. Alfred S.' Smith . who had ihcfeasIngly aligned himself with the conservative wing of his party since his defeat in the presidential campaign of 1928 ■

.illustrated the conservative view of this conflict when he said ",

''The Democratic party . . . must rid itself, of the ; ; counsels of the minority of bigots,, fanatics9 populistss demagogues» mopntebanks and .crackpots who masquerade as leaders and"gave the party a bad namewith sensible ' people the fanatics who dragged religion and Ifqtior : ; , ' into politics, the populists who blighted.the party for so many years with their free' siIver and other economic . heresies, the demagogues who support the opposing party more than half the time . . ». the mountebanks with their clownish- antics,and their irresponsible raving against millionaires and big business. ' '

. ^Schlesinger, The Crisis of the did Order, p. 449.

The People^s Mandate and i ts Effects on Business, Steel* November 14, 1932, p. 18. , ' /C: . '' .'v;'' ;'V :; v

' Alfred E. Smith, "Democratic Leadership at the Crossroads"^ New Outlook CLXI (March, .1933) 9. ■ . : v " : • Conservative Democrats like Newton D= Baker and Owen Young .■ : "■.--/■■v.. ■vz/ 7 ':"' ■ ^ ^ ^ - - / - : . had supported fl0osevBlt in the 1932 campaign and were expected by

conservatives in both parties to be member's of his cabinet because ' / ' 1 1 - - ^ .. , ' V - ; ri ; : - v 2 2 ' ■ : "■ ‘ of their prestige and .their recognized ability. ■ The attitude of .

wel1 known conservative; Democrats toward being appointed to Roosevelt’s

cabinet was illustfafive of their distrust of his allegedly ’’radical

tendencies". For example, iAl Smith who was still antagonistic toward

his rival for the Democratic'nomination in 1932 and:suspicious of his

liberal views as wellj when asked about the possibility Of his becoming,

a, member of the Roosevelt cabinet curtly - retorted h.No-no-noi That’s

out-out". Bernard Baruch, another conservative Democrat and old

acquaintance of Roosevelt?S was not offered a cabinet post but he , -/r explained this by remarking that he had never "received a political

^preferment- ffom,the ;hands of my friends and that is the way 1 would ..

like it to be to the end of my days".^ Baruch,' however, as an -

advocate of fiscal Orthodoxy had his doubts about joinihg forces , " '' ' ' ' ' 25 ' '' - ..'v - :; with the proponents of fiscal heresies. •

. ■ Senator Carter Glass of Virginia had long been recognized

■; • ' ^V.^..v/\v^:Arlgbha:vDaii.y^g^r..'-(Tucson)'! November 3. 1932 , p. I. ' -1' ' ■ ; .;.v ■ l/ / - : ' \ : - - :V:' ; : - ' - ' - ' /"Serviceable/Cabinet", Business Week, March 8, ,1933, p. 7.

: - ;./ ; ^National /Affairs,: Time :Magaz.ine^ February 20,1933, p. 20. /'•

^Befhard Baruch, The Publ ic Years (New . York: Hoit, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) pp. 248-249. . / - ^

/., New York Times, February 14, 1933, p.'' 1. also of. Henry : ■/ F. Ashurst, A Many-Colored Toga; The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst / (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962) p. 324. • . />; ; as the Demppratic Party's expert on financial iiiatters. Although

his staunchly conservative views on financial matters were well known • . /.

to Roosevelt, the President-elect felt that it was necessary toat

least ask Senator Glass to enter the Cabinet as Secretary of the

Treasyryvie orde conciliate the.conservative wing of the party,

J • v Using: both Raymond Moley and James Farley as intermediaries in an

, ' effort to persuade Glass to enter the cabinet,-Mr. Roosevelt was ' v : finally fbrced to discuss the matter with him persona11yiafter pre- ^

■ 1 iminary negotiations conducted by Mo ley - and Farley failed. Senator

Glass:proved adamant, ■however1 in his refusa1■to serve under Mr.' /

%oseyelt. . While Glass gave as a reason for not accepting a cabinet

, post‘poor health on the pairt of himself and his wife his biographers •

have ■concluded that the real reason was the fundamental differences ,

' between him and the President-elect on economic issues. . /; Mr..

Roosevelt would not give him satisfactory assurances about main- ,

, • taining the gold standard and Glass was feairful of the inflation which

might result from tampering with 'it.; . ; Also 'Glass believed he could ;

■ best serve the interests' of the country: by remaining in the Senate : ■

and opposing all "radical" financial legislation.

■■r’:"--- Moley, Af ter; Seven. Years, pp. 118-119. 'f-v;: :■ V^'

James Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York; Harcouft, Brace, and Company, 1938) p. 202. i • r , :

■ I ':k . \ Norman Beasley and - Rixey Smith, Carter Glass, (New York; v : v; : ■' ] ; Longmans, Green and Company, 1939) pp. 337,“338, . . v ; ;

Hoover, Memoirs'^ p. 204. ' / ■ ' '■■ ■ . " ' " •

' Ne%y York, Times, February 21, 1933 , p. 1. - .' / : The business community was disgruntled throughout the inter-

.regnuiri • because Roosevelt refused to announce his cabinet selections

until shortly before inauguration.; ;Theiearly naming of cabinet ; : i : ;

•members would have, in the opinion,of many businessmens-removed

, , doubts about the soundness of the incoming administration and thus ., .

facilitated business recoyery. ; A-" ' -

A ; When Roosevelt finally began releasing the names of his cabinet •

, , selectidhs to the press in late February there were immediate protests

. • ' from conservatives. They believed that the President-elect was being . . -

'hypocritical in'Selecting William Woodin as' Secretary of the Treas- ■ •

A, ury. Some of his ■advisors' and supporters had complained about ' A !

Andrew Mel Ion’s connection's with aluminum and oil interests during

the Hoover .admin i s tra t i oh and now, Rooseve lt had. set ec ted . a man who A •

had similar connections, with industrial and financial corporations. A --

-: : A.:, to be Secretary of the . Treasury^A' - A '• AA " ' -A ' ' ; ;

Republicans in the House of Representatives staged a mild ' '

attack on the selection Of Frances Perkins9 a woman, as .Secretary - .

'A. of Labor. . Representative Horr-of Washington described the choice A-

A-A of Miss Perkins "as a widespread gesture" for the benefit "Of the ■■■ : ■ ■ A ; : ■■ "3ft . " mothers and sweethearts Of the nation". . !:A ' A ' ' 'A: A ' ; ,

f . The appointment which probably"drew„the most criticism from

IBID., November 15, 1932, p. 9F • • ' ■' .

• ’ Morning Oregonian (Portland) February ,26, 1933, p. i2A'v,r;,A' A, '• :

' • 'AA ■ : A', ■ IBID. March 5, 1933, -p., 2. A A A A :A : " : AAA,,;';. ' ’ . ■ ■ A-, - ' '

. New York Times, February 26, .1932, p.'.T2F.A'/ .'AA A/AA:.,; :'aaA .A':'AA:AA,:;:..;AAA conservatives was that of Henry Wallace as- Secretary of Agriculture.

Conservative Republicans Were opposed -to his "selection because: he -y belong to the progressive wing of their party, 1 Democrats disliked the appointment because they felt.that he had usurped a position whiehrightfully belonged to a leading Democrat, Some opposed him ■ because he was known to advpcate legislation similar to the Domestic

Allotment Act which they "heartily •disliked.^"* Others found him ' objectionable because he'h#d never before held public office and because they; believed ' that his .'’radicalisin4! would probably need checking b^ the conservative elements in the cabinet. Still others regarded him as an Inflationist whose finahcial views were subject - 37 • 1 - ■■ . V - ■ to suspicion, y.; ; ; i' /

The appointment of Cordell Hull to the Secretaryship of State brought protests from the protectionists.who were familiar with the

Tennessean"s long time advocacy of low.tariffs. For example$

Republican Paul Kelty Of the Po K11 and Morn ihg Oregon Ian d i sl-lked- -

Hull"s, position oh the tariff and yet he was optimistic enough to. believe that Hull would change his views bn* it' af ter, he tried to negotiate.tariffvreduction agreements with other, nations. ;

•Some members .of the business Community regarded the selection

Arizona Dai 1 y Star (Tucson) February 243 1933V o, ■ 6<./ 35" ~ “ ■. : ■ ; ''National Affairs"9 'Time Magazine, March 6 , 1933, p. .15. ' .• 1; " ;.y''y ' "Serviceable Cabinet”, Business Week, March 8 , 1933s p., 7, 38 . ■■■■-'-. ■' ■ ’ •; % NCw York Times, February 23, 1933, p, 21.

Mbrning Oregonian (Portland) February. 26s 1933, pv 12V / 7 4 of Daniel C« Roper as Secretary of Commeree as a distinct insult ; 40 f : '- to business. Since Mr. Roper was not well knowns businessmen

believed that the Secretaryship of Commerce was being deflated to match the deflation of business in the eyes of the public. Arthur

Krock of the New York limes wrote that if the Department of Commerce was not to be reorganized into a mere statistical bureau, a chief more in the tradition of Oscar Strauss, Robert P. Lament and Herbert

Hoover was absolutely indicated in such" a time as this.^ Many businessmen thought that the Secretary of Commerce should be a man of extensive industrial"and.commercial experience whereas Mr. Roper6s career had been concentrated in the practice of law and political : ' ' . 43 ' ' ■■■'' ' ' ' - ■ ' organ!zation.

Conservative Republicans who had been fierce in their denun­ ciation of the progressive members of their own party had little to say about the appointment of Republican Progressive Harold Ickes who was made Secretary of the Interior because he was a comparative unknown. Instead they were inclined to jest about the ,f small-time cabinet" and ask "Where are Young, Baruch, Smith and Baker?"

During the'interregnum many conservatives were vociferous in their denunciation of what they called Mr. Roosevelt5s "shabby

^Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, p. 268.

41IBID.

42New York Times, February 26, 1933, p. 1, Sec. 4.

43IBID. February 23, 1933, p. 2L.

44IBID. ' '' : pollticking1’» They' believed that he had few principles of any sort

upon which, to stand and that he had few scruples when it came to:

political maneuvering. For"example, in January,. 19335 enough Demo­

crats in the House of Representatives voted against a reorganization

M i l to defeat it thus making inoperative eleven executive ’orders

of President Hoover reorganizing 58 different functions of the govern-

ment into fewer agencies. This partisan vote gave Bertrand Snell,

Republican floor leader, an opportunity to accuse Franklin Roosevelt

of influencing the Democratic vote through unsavory political machin­

ations. In a speech' in the House of Representatives. Mr. Snell, criti­

cized the Pfedident-e1ect for interfering in Congressional affairs

.and at the same time made,a. vitriolic attack bn Mr. Roosevelt’s,

record as : Governor of New York saying ’’If there.-is anything in the

record of the next Pres ident to. show that he . . . has ever separated

.’ from the payroll of New York State one deserving .Detnocrat, t want you

X ' ’’.; . ■■■■-xv ; ..x, - ' ' -x ' -'' - x / ’x:- - xi- ^ . v h ’x'7 .x to give me his name and the amount of his salary". . • .. ,

x Roosevelt’s conservative political opponehts suspected him

.of intending to dangle the patfdnage list before Congress in order - x X • ' X :• ■ ; ■ X,;,.: ■ ...... : . ■ ' . .’x X /,v.'XX..; X; - ." n y x XxX.xX'x'/, v y to force through his prospective 1egislatiye program. ' ' His cabinet

selections were thought by conservatives- to be based primarily on ,

political expediency and not upon the; actual capabili ties Of . the

'Xv: J Z. S X ;;x, x ; X’- x-x; , x| X . . - , _ ■ X y ^ x Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) December 30, .1932, p. 6. . : Zfi ■ ’ , ; ‘■x’"- • ' : • x New York Tjmes*x January 20, 1933, p. 2. ■- . x

' ' Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 7, 1933, p. 6. .xxx-Xx individual selected. ’

: • Conservatives,, particularly Republicans, ..were suspicious of what he might do in the .various governmental departments in the.way of purging Republicans arid replacing them with ^deserving. Democrats".

A standard joke was making its way around. Washington about a, moving company official who telephoned the Civil;Service,Commission. "Please give me a list:of government officials who will be leaving 'Washington on March 4", he asked. "Sorry", was the reply. "You911 have to ask

Governor Roosevelt",30 Uv-;, A,;-: • ■ i:.: ':.. ; -

Since most conservatives fegafded a balanced budget-as essen­ tial for economic recovery arid since many of them believed that the enactment of a federal sales tax was: the only feasible method of.' i' % v--. raising #Pre> revenue for balancing the; budget, •they were disturbed by the Pfesldent-elect.* s anriduncemerit late in December that he was

"horrified" by reports that he had eridofsed the sales tax. Con­ servatives were even more upset a few days later when Roosevelt arid . the DemocratiC Congressional leaders:met together in New fork City and seemirigly agreed among;themselves that a raise in both the . income tax .and-the inheritance tax would be necessary to finance a

K. Ratcliffe, "President Roosevelt8s Team", Spectator, March-10, 1833, p/ 328. ; .x ... , ,

•. Lynne M. Lamm, "Recovery of Business to Take,Measure of Roosevelt Regime", Steel RCII (January,2,'1933) 7.3. v ^ .

^^"By the Way!' Bradstreet’s Weekly, Noyembef 19, 1932, p. 1529.

Tucson Daily Citizen, December 27., 1932, p. 1. ; ' 77 1 : 52 ' •^new dealM . ■ •

r Conservative newspaper editors were particularly indignant,

about the tentative agreement ;ataong the Dembc'raitic. leaders' Oyer tax raises. A tax raise instead of producing more revenue would produce

less because the internal revenue reports on corporation incomes

indicated that they were just another,' “squeezed lemon".What was more seriouss the tax: raise would unsettle business and, retard.economic recovery. If Roosevelt should persist in rejecting the sales tax and relying on the income.tax his administrafidn'was doomed to a ' series of deficitsi He would, be forced eventually to adopt the sales tax. in order to balance the budget: and restore business eonf!«=

, The conference'between'Roosevelt and the Democratic leaders : : ••■■■ • ' ' - ' - ' ' ; ' ' - . . ' , - . ./v:'--■' ■■ 57 ' ■ was met by a roar of disapproval within 24 hours of the meeting.

The Democratic; leaders were quick to'.disavow the whole project because of'.opposi tion to their plan and because they could not agree as' to ,' what they had agreed uponlv v The whole episode left the Democratic

leadership looking foolish, and conservatives .suspecting that fhe . .'- v:

^hNatiqnal Affairs", Time Magazihe-j, January 16, 1933, p. 11,

^ Morning Oregonian (Portland) January 10, 1933, p> 6.

TuCson Daily Citizen, January 9 j 1933, p. 10.

. Morning Oregonian (Portland) February 5, 1933, p. 12.

56IBID. December.29, 1932, p. 6. ! :'y''

''The Democratic Confusion"Christian Century, January 18, 1933, p.; 76 \ : , '.' 58 New York Times, January 9, 1933, pv 18. Democratic Party had no real program ready to put before Congress shortly af ter March 4>. ' y :/ ' • : - -

; The Democratic leaders in Congress appeared to be in a state of confusion for several days afterward ever the budget balancing ■ proppsals". The Democratic disagreement over fiscal policies was the subject of more jibes from Bertrand Snell9 Republican House leader, who said, hit looks as if the President-elect is running out on his Congress! ona 11 ead'ers before: they even get - s tar ted. Is thi s % the much heralded cooperation ibetweeh the iPresMe® t”Sl®Gfe' ®hd- GongreS'» ; sional leaders that/we heard so much about'during the last campaign?

The President-elect says he is only, ^ clearing house for ideas / «. , if he is to lead his party during these ,strehuous times he must be /. ■ something more than a clearing house".Representative Britten, ; , . . an Illinois Republican called Mr, Roosevelt's attitude "the first great disappointment of the American people over the election of a

Democratic President". He also believed that Roosevelt had gone but of his way- to offend his alleged jCrea-torr William Randolph Hearst, - whose: pet legislative desire for the last four years had supposedly been the enactment of a federal sales taxV^^ Britten suspected that .

Rooseyel t ihtended to dOniiriate the next Congress wi th an iron -hand

Chicago Daily Tribune, January 9, 1933, p. 12.

: ^ % e w York Times, January 11., 1933, p. 4.

: 61 IBID, December 27, 1932, -p;: if ' ;:V . v ■ f

;6^ibid, : - ■ -,.v;.v' ’ v " i - . / " ■ . -,'-y \ ; / ' ' ' : W ' ko'.. . y'. / ' . and, if need be, to use the famous Rooseveltian "big stick*'. - ' / - -V-r '. ' .. -" ' . \ Other conservatives added to^Mr. Britten's suspicions their own : . ' ■' h ' :/ :? / -"/-M - -'A:'64 '. belief that the President-elect had dictatorial ambitions.

; As hints of discord and disharmony appeared in the ranks of . '

the Democracy there came from Republican quarters signs that .if any ■ ' . ' ' '' new income and inheritance taxes were to be proposed,' a'Republican

drive would be made for the sales tax to which Mr, Robseveit was 65 . V . ■ : opposed, VV

. Senator .King, a Utah Democrat,cas tigated his own party about \ ' ' ' ' '' ; , . ' the taxboost.prbposals by asserting that they demohstrated "lack - ■ ■ - ■ ' • . 66 : :: ■ of statesmanship and courage" among the leadership. Instead of

new or higher taxes he called for a one Bililon dollar cut in federal

expenditures,^- . : \ . : ; ■ , ; ■ . ' .■ . .. . ■ ' / : There.was a feeling among some members of Congress that if i the Presideht-Clect had kept his.nose ont of the Sales,tax controversy '68 there might have been some new tax legislation. It Would not have y. .. .V'/:/-/ 69 been sufficient to bhlance the budget, but it would have helped. r.

Conservatives were asking themSelves if this was the. sort of leader-

^ Morning Oregonian (Portland) January 11, 1933, p. 8,

v'3 . . ^^TucSon Daily Citizen,, January 7y 1933, p, 1. ■ ' '

66IBiD. , January 7, 1933; p, 1. ■ v ,

68 : "Lame Ducks Can61 Balance", Business Week, January 18, 1933, p. 3. ship to which the Democratic Party mupt look forward to in facing

the task.Of trimming federal expenditures'aad increasing its

income. '.V '

: ■ , "The Hullabaloo 'and the Democratic Tax Plan'V Literary Digest* January ”21, , 1933, p. 4. : 7:' V . :

4" 'V :0 :-- i:conclusion ' ' "''V;'. ■ .' " , ' /"'I:''' ■

Much of the criticism leveled at Mr. Roosevelt was based v

not on what :{ie said or did but upon speculative■ rumors about what ;

he intended to do. Some extremists were convinced, for example$

that the President-elect had distinct dictatbriai ambitions of a

Bolshevistic or Easelstic nature. There wasno tangible evidence

to support these convictions yet those who held them were to persist

: in their promulgation throughout the New Deal. :

.. . During, the interregnum the President-elect spent, much of :

hi S t ime demons trating his capacity to be "al l things to al l men".

/Some have, attributed,his equivocation to his own fuzzy thinking and ,

lack of a coherent .legislative program. Others have insisted' that

his ambivalence was the'calculated vagueness:of a master political

strategist. The one thing that could be said for certain was

his general refusal to commit himself: to anything definite till near :

inauguration prevented his conservative opponents from marshalling

their forces against him. . . : ' '

Most of the conservative criticism aimed at Frariklin Roose- ;

. • . . Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Politics of Upheaval (Boston; •' Houghton .Mif flin Company, 1960) pp. 601-644. .; , • ; .

^"The New Deal - What it Means to Us”, Literary Digest, November 19, 1932, ,p..:.$^.. ; : t \ , V--

James M. Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. ' 4 / "v; • . 82 - velt and hissupporters during the interregnum was simply ati expres­ sion of the. “ideology11 to which his conservative opposition adhered»

Because of the wide variety of opinion which exists in most Western. political parties, it would be a mistake to regard this “ideology” as a monolithic and inflexible body of dogma, A conservative Demo­ crat like Newton Do Baker might have completely different views on a subject like the tariff than a conservative Republican like Senator

Reed Smoot of Utah, yet be solidly united with the Republican in opposition to def icit spending for.federa1 unemployment rellef*

Herbert Croly in his book The Promise of American Life which was once regarded as one of the Bibles of Progressivism, advocated the adoption of Hamiltonian methods to achieve ends which were partly ' 74 ' - Jeffersonian, He proposed strengthening the federal government in order to help the comman man attain more equal opportunity for his social and economic betterment. Many conservatives during the inter­ regnum were diametrically opposed to Mr,- Crolyls proposal. What they believed desirable and attainable was the use of Jeffersonian methods to achieve Hamiltonian ends; diminishing the powers of the federal government in order to protect the property rights'of the minority* =. ,

The conservative advdcay of .protection for the rights of the property owner coupled with dislike of strong central government provided a major part of the idealogical foundations of conservative opposition to the New Deal, The conservative mania for budget-* balancing, tax cuts and blocking alleged, federal usurpations of

74cf, Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1909) • • indtvlyual prerogatives was an outgrowth of these foundations. The

conservatiye*s attitude toward intellectuals whom he suspected of .

being contemptuous of. these "sacred" American ideals was later to

be reflected in the abuse which was heaped upon:the heads of the iprofessGrial "ba^aihs trust

; The unfavorable reaction of conservatives during the inter- -

regnum to .Mr. Roosevelt8s proposa1 for the social and economic- rehab?

ilitatidh Of the Tennessee Basin and the support he gave to the

Domestic Allotment Act was an indication Of what their attitudes were going to be toward the T. V. A„ and the Agricultural Adjust- ment Act of the hew Deal. ■ / ... ; -- ; . :i -;v . I'

The vacillating behavior of Franklin Roosevelt during the

interregnum left most conservatives quite uncertain as to what his political.philosophy was but their uncertainty did not prevent them

from denouncing him when he did take a stand on some issue. The :• one conservative who was sure what Roosevelt represented was Presi- dent Hoover and he continued consistently, and resolutely to oppose . almost every major legislative effort of-the!first RooseveltrAdmin- istrationo, .. ' ./ . ■

• ' .The dogmatic adherence of the American' conservative to what

Thurman Arnold has called "the folklore of capitalism" was largely.

, ; ■ - According to Arhold part of .this ^folklore" is the ^curious myth that permanent public improvementss conservation of resources^ utilization of idle labor, and distribution of available goods are a burden on, posterity if accomplished by ah organization called • government" withbut balancing the federal budget, cf. Thurman Ao... Arnold, The Folklore of Gapitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937) p. 311.. 'responsible for the insensiti,vity of conservatives in regard to the

needs and aspirations of;their fellow Americans, Those who seriously

believed that future generations would be better off if one-fourth

of the present working force remained idle so that the budget could

be balanced ..were not likely to concern themselves unduly with the ‘

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