Partisanship Renewal. Evidence of the rise in partisanship of the electorate 1) The Crossover vote for the Presidency These are self-declared Democrats or Republicans who vote for the other candidate at an election. The lower the cross-over vote the higher the degree of partisan loyalty. However this is a weak measure of partisanship since in a presidential race a single man’s character and issues can easily affect the cross-over vote Republican vote for Democrat vote for 1988 D - Dukakis 8% 82% R – Bush 91% 17% 1992 D - Clinton 10% 77%* R – Bush 73%* 10% 1996 D - Clinton 13% 84% R – Dole 80% 10% 2000 D - Gore 8% 86% R – Bush 91% 11% (ouch!) 2004 D – Kerry 6% 89% R – Bush 93% 11% 2008 D - Obama 9% 89% R - McCain 90% 10% *The presence of Ross Perot significantly skews the 1992 figures These figures seem to show the solidity of the Republican vote behind Bush since 2000 which stayed true with McCain in 2008, or perhaps the increased levels of partisanship. The Democrat vote generally seems less firm and the coalition may be more difficult to hold together than the Republican one. However note that in each of the presidential elections 1988- 2004 (excluding the 1992 third party effect) the Democrat vote for the Democrat candidate also rose and it stayed at this high level of correlation with party identification in 2008. EV These are only figures from those who voted, it is possible that many Republicans expressed their dissatisfaction with McCain by not voting. The thesis of partisan decline is a little undermined by the fact that in 80% of the elections since 1952 the party that got the highest percentage support from its own party identifiers won the election. 2008 is thus a rare case when the Republicans showed greater cohesion (albeit by only one percentage point) than the Democrats but still lost. This emphasises once again the colossal importance of the effective campaign organisation of Obama in the field offices who ensured that the Democrat vote mobilised in much greater numbers than the Republicans did. 22 | Page 2) The decline in split-ticket voting from 1996 onwards. This went from 25% of districts in 1996 to just 14% of districts in 2004, although it has risen again by 24 split districts in 2008 (see CQ here). This would seem to indicate the growing partisanship of voters who had been increasingly voting a straight ticket up until 2008. Split ticket voting fell by 56% between 1984 and 2008 (although it rose 41% between 2004 and 2008!) 3) The increasingly partisan gap in the Obama job approval ratings figures (which may be a product of the ideological battle over health care and the role of the state). This partisan gap is at a record for a first term president. Job approval rating for Total % Rep % Dem % Ind % Rep - Dem Gap first year presidents Obama, March 9-12, 2009 59 27 88 57 -61 Bush, April 18-22, 2001 55 87 36 56 +51 Clinton, April 1-4, 1993 49 26 71 47 -45 Bush, May 4-7, 1989 56 79 41 48 +38 Reagan, March 13-16, 1981 60 87 41 61 +46 Carter, March 25- 28, 1977 72 56 81 70 -25 Nixon, March 16-18, 1969 65 84 55 65 +29 Sources: Combination of Pew and Gallup poll data. 4) From 2006 onwards the evidence seems to point to a growing partisan attachment to the Democrats among voters. Although the lack of party registration makes this difficult to see across all states there has been a marked rise in Democratic registration from 2006 onwards. This accelerated throughout the presidential primaries (USA Today article here) and continued into the presidential campaign period itself (Washington Post article here is excellent). Among the 29 states with registration data, the percentage of those who have signed on with Democrats has risen in 15 states since 2004, and the percentage for Republicans has risen in six, according to state data. The number of registered Democrats fell in 11 states, compared with 20 states where Republican registration numbers fell. (NY Times Graphic) Is this just an Obama factor, particularly as a product of the close primary battle which raised Democrat party registration? The fact that it seems to have begun before the 2006 midterms would argue against this explanation. A further counter-argument to the “Obama” effect argument would be to point to state and local elections, 23 state legislatures were controlled by the Democrats and 14 by Republicans, with 12 states with divided chambers (Nebraska has a nonpartisan legislature) in August 2008. After the 2000 election, 16 state legislatures were dominated by Democrats, and 17 by Republicans, with 16 divided. In 2009 there are 28 Democratic Governors and 22 Republican ones but in 2000 there were only 19 Democrats and 31 Republicans. The Democrats appear to be on the ascendancy from the grassroots upwards! 23 | Page This increase in registration could also be seen in a rise in party identification with the Democrats if you take the “leaning Democrats” into account as well as the solid Democrat voters. The Democratic partisan advantage opens up? 55 50 45 Democrat or lean Democrat % 40 Republican or lean Republican % 35 30 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 This point would argue that 2008 may well prove to be a re-aligning or “critical” election to use the phrase of V.O. Key. (see realignment section later) 5) There is some evidence of an emerging policy based divide in 2009 over the extent of the government’s role in the economy. Some of the anti-government sentiment has spread out into the Tea Party (Tax Enough Already) protest movement which is, at least nominally meant to be non-partisan, although in practice there is likely to be a degree of sympathy of Tea Partiers with the economically conservative positions of the Republicans or the Blue Dogs. This has particularly emerged over the healthcare debate. In the February 2010 Pew Research Survey there was a considerable divide between the Democrat and Republican voters who were concerned about the government becoming too involved in healthcare. 68% of Republican voters agreed that they were concerned that the government was looking to play too large a role in healthcare as opposed to just 29% of Democrats (a 39% point split which is an uncommon degree of partisan alignment in the electorate over a single policy issue). There has also been a considerable widening of attitudes over social security provision in recent years. (see Pew p. 99) 24 | Page Causes of Partisan Renewal? 1) The great sorting out of the electorate to cement the link between ideology and partisanship: 1940- present day. This itself can be seen as a product of the civil rights revolution, feminism, gays rights, questions about America’s place in the world and on the conservative side the growing popularity of evangelical churches from the 1960s onwards. 2) Changes in party discipline arrangements employed by liberals in wake of WWII such as the reforms to seniority rules. 3) The rise of primaries which tie the candidate to a more radical wing of the party as the membership of the party has become more polarised. Growth of right wing pressure groups enforcing discipline such as Club for Growth and their funding of ideological purists in closed primaries 4) Reagan. He wooed conservative Democrats away and made the Republican party more ideological, driven by monetarist goals of rolling back the state. He was ideological where previous incumbents, Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford had been centrists and compromisers. 5) End of the Cold War. Split the foreign policy consensus since then. Unilateralist Republican neo-conservatives have increasingly faced hostility from multilateralist liberal Democrats in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine. This internationalism has also emerged in environmental and international criminal court debates. 9/11 reopened the foreign policy cleavage in US politics that had been dormant since the end of the Cold War and became a clear delineator on party lines. (By 2003 Republican voters favoured a more aggressive foreign policy over Democrats by more than 25% points). 6) Clinton. Reopened the divisive moral issues sex, the role of women and the nature of authority while the Christian right was growing in strength simultaneously. 7) Bush and his officials rejected the idea of controlling the centre of politics to control the electorate in 2000 and 2004 and instead championed a 51% solution relying on turning out the Republican base to ensure victory. 8) The Rise of the Christian Right Republicans seeking to reverse decades of liberal government reforms from the 1980s onwards and in particular since the Republican Revolution in 1994 have ensured that their troops towed a much tighter line on policy by having a much more centrally directed party line. 2000- 2008 elections became more ideological with certainly a relatively right wing Republican campaigning against more liberal Democrats. The most important issue in 2004 was “moral values”. There has been an increase in the number of people calling themselves “liberal” or “conservative” since 1990. 25 | Page 9) The Rise in Democrat Party Registration since 2004 and Identification since 2002. This could be attributable to: • Bush disapproval and an unpopular war (short term factor) • Disenchantment with the whole idea of free-market capitalism left to its own devices without government regulation and intervention in the wake of the economic collapse which could totally undermine the ideological basis of Republican monetarist economics. (Greenspan – my paradigm model was flawed).