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Home , Conservative Democrat, Wayne Gilchrest

Partisanship Renewal.

Evidence of the rise in partisanship of the electorate

1) The Crossover vote for the Presidency These are self-declared Democrats or Republicans who vote for the other candidate at an election. The lower the cross-over vote the higher the degree of partisan loyalty. However this is a weak measure of partisanship since in a presidential race a single man’s character and issues can easily affect the cross-over vote

Republican vote for Democrat vote for 1988 D - Dukakis 8% 82% R – Bush 91% 17% 1992 D - Clinton 10% 77%* R – Bush 73%* 10% 1996 D - Clinton 13% 84% R – Dole 80% 10% 2000 D - Gore 8% 86% R – Bush 91% 11% (ouch!) 2004 D – Kerry 6% 89% R – Bush 93% 11% 2008 D - Obama 9% 89% R - McCain 90% 10% *The presence of significantly skews the 1992 figures

These figures seem to show the solidity of the Republican vote behind Bush since 2000 which stayed true with McCain in 2008, or perhaps the increased levels of partisanship. The Democrat vote generally seems less firm and the coalition may be more difficult to hold together than the Republican one. However note that in each of the presidential elections 1988- 2004 (excluding the 1992 third party effect) the Democrat vote for the Democrat candidate also rose and it stayed at this high level of correlation with party identification in 2008. EV These are only figures from those who voted, it is possible that many Republicans expressed their dissatisfaction with McCain by not voting. The thesis of partisan decline is a little undermined by the fact that in 80% of the elections since 1952 the party that got the highest percentage support from its own party identifiers won the election. 2008 is thus a case when the Republicans showed greater cohesion (albeit by only one percentage point) than the Democrats but still lost. This emphasises once again the colossal importance of the effective campaign organisation of Obama in the field offices who ensured that the Democrat vote mobilised in much greater numbers than the Republicans did.

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2) The decline in split-ticket voting from 1996 onwards. This went from 25% of districts in 1996 to just 14% of districts in 2004, although it has risen again by 24 split districts in 2008 (see CQ here). This would seem to indicate the growing partisanship of voters who had been increasingly voting a straight ticket up until 2008. Split ticket voting fell by 56% between 1984 and 2008 (although it rose 41% between 2004 and 2008!)

3) The increasingly partisan gap in the Obama job approval ratings figures (which may be a product of the ideological battle over health care and the role of the state). This partisan gap is at a record for a first term president.

Job approval rating for Total % Rep % Dem % Ind % Rep - Dem Gap first year presidents Obama, March 9-12, 2009 59 27 88 57 -61 Bush, April 18-22, 2001 55 87 36 56 +51 Clinton, April 1-4, 1993 49 26 71 47 -45 Bush, May 4-7, 1989 56 79 41 48 +38 Reagan, March 13-16, 1981 60 87 41 61 +46 Carter, March 25- 28, 1977 72 56 81 70 -25 Nixon, March 16-18, 1969 65 84 55 65 +29 Sources: Combination of Pew and Gallup poll data.

4) From 2006 onwards the evidence seems to point to a growing partisan attachment to the Democrats among voters. Although the lack of party registration makes this difficult to see across all states there has been a marked rise in Democratic registration from 2006 onwards. This accelerated throughout the presidential primaries (USA Today article here) and continued into the presidential campaign period itself (Washington Post article here is excellent). Among the 29 states with registration data, the percentage of those who have signed on with Democrats has risen in 15 states since 2004, and the percentage for Republicans has risen in six, according to state data. The number of registered Democrats fell in 11 states, compared with 20 states where Republican registration numbers fell. (NY Times Graphic) Is this just an Obama factor, particularly as a product of the close primary battle which raised Democrat party registration? The fact that it seems to have begun before the 2006 midterms would argue against this explanation. A further counter-argument to the “Obama” effect argument would be to point to state and local elections, 23 state legislatures were controlled by the Democrats and 14 by Republicans, with 12 states with divided chambers ( has a nonpartisan legislature) in August 2008. After the 2000 election, 16 state legislatures were dominated by Democrats, and 17 by Republicans, with 16 divided. In 2009 there are 28 Democratic Governors and 22 Republican ones but in 2000 there were only 19 Democrats and 31 Republicans. The Democrats appear to be on the ascendancy from the grassroots upwards!

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This increase in registration could also be seen in a rise in party identification with the Democrats if you take the “leaning Democrats” into account as well as the solid Democrat voters.

The Democratic partisan advantage opens up?

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45 Democrat or lean Democrat % 40 Republican or lean Republican % 35

30 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

This point would argue that 2008 may well prove to be a re-aligning or “critical” election to use the phrase of V.O. Key. (see realignment section later)

5) There is some evidence of an emerging policy based divide in 2009 over the extent of the government’s role in the economy. Some of the anti-government sentiment has spread out into the Tea Party (Tax Enough Already) protest movement which is, at least nominally meant to be non-partisan, although in practice there is likely to be a degree of sympathy of Tea Partiers with the economically conservative positions of the Republicans or the Dogs. This has particularly emerged over the healthcare debate. In the February 2010 Pew Research Survey there was a considerable divide between the Democrat and Republican voters who were concerned about the government becoming too involved in healthcare. 68% of Republican voters agreed that they were concerned that the government was looking to play too large a role in healthcare as opposed to just 29% of Democrats (a 39% point split which is an uncommon degree of partisan alignment in the electorate over a single policy issue). There has also been a considerable widening of attitudes over social security provision in recent years. (see Pew p. 99)

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Causes of Partisan Renewal?

1) The great sorting out of the electorate to cement the link between ideology and partisanship: 1940- present day. This itself can be seen as a product of the civil rights revolution, feminism, gays rights, questions about America’s place in the world and on the conservative side the growing popularity of evangelical churches from the 1960s onwards. 2) Changes in party discipline arrangements employed by liberals in wake of WWII such as the reforms to seniority rules. 3) The rise of primaries which tie the candidate to a more radical wing of the party as the membership of the party has become more polarised. Growth of right wing pressure groups enforcing discipline such as and their funding of ideological purists in closed primaries 4) Reagan. He wooed conservative Democrats away and made the Republican party more ideological, driven by monetarist goals of rolling back the state. He was ideological where previous incumbents, Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford had been centrists and compromisers. 5) End of the Cold War. Split the foreign policy consensus since then. Unilateralist Republican neo-conservatives have increasingly faced hostility from multilateralist liberal Democrats in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine. This internationalism has also emerged in environmental and international criminal court debates. 9/11 reopened the foreign policy cleavage in US politics that had been dormant since the end of the Cold War and became a clear delineator on party lines. (By 2003 Republican voters favoured a more aggressive foreign policy over Democrats by more than 25% points). 6) Clinton. Reopened the divisive moral issues sex, the role of women and the nature of authority while the was growing in strength simultaneously. 7) Bush and his officials rejected the idea of controlling the centre of politics to control the electorate in 2000 and 2004 and instead championed a 51% solution relying on turning out the Republican base to ensure victory. 8) The Rise of the Christian Right Republicans seeking to reverse decades of liberal government reforms from the 1980s onwards and in particular since the in 1994 have ensured that their troops towed a much tighter line on policy by having a much more centrally directed party line. 2000- 2008 elections became more ideological with certainly a relatively right wing Republican campaigning against more liberal Democrats. The most important issue in 2004 was “moral values”. There has been an increase in the number of people calling themselves “liberal” or “conservative” since 1990.

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9) The Rise in Democrat Party Registration since 2004 and Identification since 2002. This could be attributable to: • Bush disapproval and an unpopular war (short term factor) • Disenchantment with the whole idea of free-market capitalism left to its own devices without government regulation and intervention in the wake of the economic collapse which could totally undermine the ideological basis of Republican monetarist economics. (Greenspan – my paradigm model was flawed). This would be a devastating and realigning long term blow to the Republicans were this to be true. • Support for Keynesian/ interventionism at a time of economic collapse i.e. will the reform now that the circumstances support it and the liberal agenda of the Democrats is playing towards this (Blue Dog fiscal might halt this in its tracks) • Demographic factors – such as the rise in the number of younger voters and the increasing spread of urbanisation into the suburbs as the urban population grows.

10) Technology. Increasingly media is chosen rather than being forced upon consumers. Now people “tune in” to like-minded news channels, talk radio stations, weblogs etc. which endorse and affirm opinions rather than questioning them. Figures from October 2008 on the partisanship profile of different news organisations and media made interesting reading: Rep % Dem% Ind % 52 17 30 MSNBC 11 50 36 CNN 13 45 38 Internet 24 34 38 Newspapers 22 41 34 Radio 31 31 34 General Public 25 35 35 Source: Pew Research Centre Perhaps these figures also lend weight to the and Bruce Keith thesis about the mythical “independent” voter. Are 30% of the Fox News audience really “independent” or are they more likely to be silent Republicans?

11) It never really declined?

In 1992 Bruce Keith et al wrote The Myth of the Independent Voter which challenged how “independent” those who proclaimed to be so in opinion polls really were. They believed that these “independents” retained a leaning for one party and that the number of true independents has in fact remained relatively constant over time. This is the thesis favoured

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by Karl Rove for the Republicans and certainly between 2000 and 2008 he built an expert winning coalition of support behind Bush.

Positive aspects of increasing partisanship of parties:

1) Voters are offered distinct choices. In 1980 less than 50% of voters told polls that they saw a clear difference between the policies of the parties. In 2008 75% of voters say they see a marked difference between the parties. This could be a cause of the increased levels of participation in elections (129 million in 2008 – 63%), nearly 26 million more than in 2000. The American Political Science Association published a report in 1950 calling for a more responsible 2 party system which would allow parties to pass “coherent programmes” and James Macgregor Burns wrote of “The deadlock of democracy” compelled to govern “by consensus and coalition” in 1963. 2) More people volunteering for campaigns and donating money than ever before. Between 2000 and 2008 the number of small donors has increased more than sixfold in the presidential campaign. 3) More cohesive congressional parties may make political accountability at elections easier to ascribe. It may also make legislating an easier process. (although 2009- does not seem to suggest this is the case)

Negative consequences of the “hyper-partisanship” of parties – term invented by Ken Mehlmann Chair of RNC 2005-07 and Campaign Manager Bush 04:

1) Disaffected middle ground could result in low participation and turnout. 2) Big switches in policy direction should the party in power change suddenly. 3) Toxic environment which empowers the most flagrant activist and encourages adversarial politics regardless of the sense spoken by the other side. 4) Can create divided government and gridlock (Clinton 94-96, Bush 06-08) 5) Produce a failure to address the most important questions because they cause too much internal division within the party in power – such as reform/ Social Security reform and the ageing population impact on pensions/ the lack of sustainable funding for Medicare/ the size of the national debt. 6) It means that neither mainstream party can really claim to speak for the whole nation.

(See Senator ’s resignation announcement here on his dislike of the partisan nature of the congressional system on 15th February 2010.)

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The Red–Blue Nation and 50/50 nation debates

The Red State/ Blue State phenomenon refers to the conventional Republican RED shading of states on electoral college maps and the Democratic BLUE shading (some maps are reversed so be careful), but it also has come to be used since 2000 to refer to an increasing divide in US Politics. This is the increasingly conservative/ liberal and geographical divides in the support for the parties.

This article from the National Post is one of the best summaries of the standard red state/ blue state argument BUT note that these are both COUNTIES within the state of one of the most symbolic swing states that voted for Obama in 2008.

Arguments for the 50/50 nation – polarised and (equally) divided?:

1) Popular Voting Figures and other institutions.

The Fifty-Fifty Nation in 2000:

In 1996 Clinton won 49.2%, the House vote was 48.9% Democrat in 1996 and 1998.

In 2000 both major candidates got 49% of the popular vote, separated by only 539,947 votes out of 103 million. The Electoral College was even 271- 267. The House was 221 – 212- 2 a majority of just 7. The Senate was 50 -50. Even the Supreme Court only voted to stop the recounts in by 5 -4 !

The House vote was 48.3% Republican and only 52.9% in 2002.

Even in 2004 the presidential vote was 50.7% R 48% D and only 286-252. Only New Mexico, and Iowa changed hands and 419 of the congressional districts voted for the same party for president as they had in 2000.

(EV: Although the House went 232- 202- 1 Republican, and the Senate was 55- 45 Republican so the 50/50 was already disappearing at congressional level – BUT the House vote was still 50.4% Republican)

The Senate went 49 – 49 -2 in 2006 and the House simply reversed to 232-202-1 Democrat.

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2) In 2002 the party identification figures were 31% Democrat, 30% Republican and 30% independent. In 2009 they have again moved back towards closer PI between the parties when you include leaning party identifiers. Party identification tightens in 2009

% Democrat or lean Democrat % Republican or lean Republican

51.7 48.8 48.2 47.2

42.4 42.2 38.7 39.6

3) RED America is white or Hispanic (Cuban), male, rural or surburban, older, wealthy, Protestant or sometimes Catholic until 2008 and conservative. It goes to church once a week or more and lives in the South and the Midwest.

As can be seen in the above Pew Research survey findings in October 2008, the notion that these states were “red” was possibly true in the 1990s but the figures for party identification became much tighter in 2004 and again in 2008.

(FUN: It is perhaps not quite so bad as the caricatures of the Red State update though!)

BLUE America is a rainbow coalition of white, black, Asian and Hispanic. It is more female than male. It is younger, poorer, urban and liberal and churchgoing is not that important to many of them. They live in the West and the Northeast. The notion that these were blue states did seem borne out by the same Pew Research in October 2008 though.

See Gallup article here from February 1st 2010 arguing for the continued Red State/ Blue state divide.

4) Partisanship has increased in Congress (also see History of Partisanship notes)

This argument fits in here if partisanship in Congress mirrors the partisanship in the country. This thesis is fiercely contested by some commentators such as Morris Fiorina.

See this fascinating map/ study of roll-call voting in the 111th Congress looking at the party unity and presidential support ratings of all of the members of Congress to show how broad

29 | Page the 2009 coalitions of the parties are from but also how PARTISAN the 111th Congress appears to have been already. Remember that in US Politics the party label tends to be far less important than in the UK and perhaps nowhere is this seen more than in the voting records of Congressmen and Senators. Although this has become increasingly partisan in recent years as shown by the votes above it is still very true that there is a geographical divide within the parties with Northern Republicans tending to vote in a more moderate fashion (they would NEVER allow the term liberal to be used) and particularly tending to vote in a much more conservative fashion than their party label. In other words the party whip is not strong and the different demands of different electorates place strains on the broad ideological coalitions that are present within both parties (but in particular the Democrats in Congress). Congressmen owe primary allegiance to their constituents as patronage powers of the president are weak to non- existent given the separation of powers and candidates run and fund their own campaigns in a far more individual manner, less tied to the party than in virtually any other democracy due to the huge importance of primaries and the restrictions on campaign finance. This is certainly being stretched under Obama over healthcare with the strength of the Blue Dog caucus on the rise. See article: will healthcare provoke a Republican Revolution as in 1994

Congressional partisanship in 2008

The following fantastic extensive interactive resource from the National Journal magazine analyses how liberal and conservative House and Senate members are compared to their peers on the Economy, Social and Foreign policy roll call votes in the 2008 session. It gives scores for how liberal or conservative the members voting record has been over 2008 and can rank the chamber on any of the data:

House roll call votes 2008 Senate roll call votes 2008

The 10 most conservative The 10 most The 10 most The 10 most Democrats in the House conservative moderate moderate 2008 Democrats in the Republicans in the Republicans in the Senate 2008 House 2008 Senate 2008 1 Nick Lampson (Tex22) Evan Bayh (Ind) Wayne Gilchrest (Md1) Olympia Snowe (Maine) 2 Jim Marshall (Ga8) (Neb) Chris Smith (NJ4) Susan Collins (Maine) 3 (Okla2) (La) Chris Shays (Conn4) Gordon Smith (Ore) 4 (Ind8) Claire McCaskill (Mo) Michael Castle (Del AL) (Penn) 5 John Barrow (Ga12) Tim Johnson (SD) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Lisa Murkowski (Alaska) (Fla18) 6 (Ind2) (Ark) Jim Ramstad (Minn3) Ted Stevens (Alaska) 7 Don Cazayoux (La6) (ID Conn) Jon Porter (Nev3) Chuck Hagel (Neb.) 8 (Utah2) Thomas Carper (Del) Mark Kirk (Ill10) John Warner (Va) 9 Melissa Bean (Ill8) Jon Tester (Mont) Jim Gerlach (Penn6) Elizabeth Dole (NC) 10 Jason Altmire (Penn4) Jim Webb (Va) Lincoln Diaz-Balart Norm Coleman (Minn) (Fla21) Defeated or did not run!

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Analysis of the House figures

• There were 219 Democrats ranked with a more liberal voting record than the most moderate Republican Wayne Gilchrest of , who was especially liberal in his foreign policy voting record. • There was no Democrat ranked less liberal than Jon Porter (the 7th most moderate Republican) indicating a VERY partisan House. • There were 191 Republicans ranked with a more conservative voting record than the most conservative Democrat Nick Lampson of . • Wayne Gilchrest (R Md) ranked as less conservative than 11 House Democrats. • Note the geographic split that would be expected, 5 of the most conservative Democrats are Southern Congressmen (the others will be due to the composition of specific districts). The top 4 most moderate Republicans are all from the Northeast and 3 more are from the Upper Midwest, a region trending more Democrat. • 8 of the 10 conservative Democrat Congressmen are current members of the “Blue Dog” coalition and the other two Cazayoux (was a special election member) and Lampson (also a Blue Dog) were both defeated in 2008. • 2 of the 4 House incumbents defeated in primaries in Maryland in the 2008 congressional elections were removed for not toeing the party line enough. (Wayne Gilchrest for not being conservative enough, he had supported a timetable for a phased withdrawal from Iraq). House Roll Call Votes throughout the Bush presidency: (click to interact)

Analysis of the Senate figures:

• There were 44 Democrats and the 2 Independents ranked with a more liberal voting record than Olympia Snowe the most moderate Republican Senator. • No Democrat was ranked as being less liberal than Gordon Smith of Oregon, again indicating a VERY partisan Senate. • There were 46 Republicans ranked with a more conservative voting record than the most conservative Democrat Evan Bayh of . • The moderate voting record of the Coleman, Dole, Smith and Stevens did not save them from incumbency defeat in 2008, Hagel (led the blocking of the Kyoto Protocol signing in the Senate) and Warner (once married to Elizabeth Taylor) both retired and Arlen Specter switched to the Democrats. Thus the moderate Republican Senate was decimated in the 2008 Democratic surge in the Senate, probably making the institution even more partisan in 2009.

Senate Roll Call Votes throughout Bush presidency: (click to interact)

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Another useful site measuring ideological affiliation of members of Congress is the ratings provided by the very influential American Conservative Union (ACU).

It seems true that the parties are more polarised in Congress and perhaps the party activists are more polarised but this does NOT mean that the American public as a whole are more polarised. (This is Morris Fiorina’s - Myth of the Culture War contention that individuals are not any more partisan but that as groups America has become so – i.e. stance of most people on abortion is similar from both parties and fairly centrist).

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Arguments against the 50/50 Nation:

1) Popular Voting Figures and other institutions.

America has become more partisan since 2000 but is also leaning more towards the Democrats. The key facts in favour of the 50/50 nation are now blown out of the water by 2008 results:

Presidency: Obama took 53% to McCain’s 46% a clear margin that is no longer 50/50. (EV: the MALE vote is now 49% D 48% R in 2008) Obama won the electoral college by 365- 173, no longer a close win as in 2000 and 2004.

Congress: The House is now overwhelmingly Democrat after 2006 and 2008 combined they have a majority of 79 (257- 178) rather than the majority of 7 in 2001-03. (EV: The popular vote was closer but still a 53% D – 45% R split in 2008 rather than 47.3% R – 47% D). The Senate is now overwhelmingly Democrat, in 2009 they have 58 (and the support of the two independents) and a SUPER MAJORITY for the first time since 1977 rather than the 50 – 50 split that exemplified the 50/50 nation in 2000. (EV: The popular vote is much closer but still a 51% D – 45% R split in 2008 rather than 48.3% D- 47.7% R in 2000).

State level:

The Democrats now lead the Republicans in Governorships by 28- 22 in 2009.

2) The era of equal party identification is over? Since 2002 the gap between the Democrats and Republicans widened with firm Democrats in 2009 at 35%, Republicans 23% and independents 36%. (see Pew research figures in party identification notes) When leaners are taken into account as well this trend is magnified, see chart below. 55

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45 Democrat or lean Democrat % 40 Republican or lean 35 Republican %

30 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

This increasing trend towards “leaning” one way or the other is a key factor in the argument against the idea that the US has become increasingly polarised. In 1960 only 6% of

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independents were identified as leaning Democrat and 7% as leaning Republican. In 2009 these were 17% and 12% respectively. Thus the strong affiliation with the party may have gone but there is still a weak affiliation – hardly polarised sentiment. If anything this argues for more centrist tendencies and not a RED/BLUE divide at all.

However in 2009 the move towards the Democrats began to slip away and reverse in the light of the recession, unpopular wars and Obama’s interventionist state agenda (healthcare/stimulus/cap and trade) and this saw the growth in the and the rise in independents again (see argument 2 in pro-50/50 case).

So perhaps we are moving back towards more even party identification again?

See this 2010 Gallup evidence on PI here on a state by state basis.

Critique of this Gallup analysis of PI as partisanship from Rothenburg report here

3) The 50/50 hypothesis is and was only really valid in suburban areas. The nation as a whole is red/blue in rural and urban areas

District 2008 Republican % 2008 Democrat % Urban 28 70 Rural 53 45 Suburban 50 48 Mixed 39 59

District 2004 Republican % 2004 Democrat % Urban (90) 38 61 Rural (61) 54 43 Suburban (220) 51 48 Mixed (64) 57 42 EV: these were more than half of the districts 220/435 in 2004 and 49% of them in the 2008 figures! Even in the year meant to be the “height” of the split 50/50 nation in 2000 only the suburbs had 49% R – 47% D.

District 2000 Republican % 2000 Democrat % Urban 26 71 Rural 59 37 Suburban 49 47 Mixed 40 57

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