! ! ! ! Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress ! ! by! Ruth Frances !Bloch Rubin ! ! A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley ! Committee in charge: Professor Eric Schickler, Chair Professor Paul Pierson Professor Robert Van Houweling Professor Sean Farhang ! ! Fall 2014 ! Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress ! ! Copyright 2014 by Ruth Frances Bloch Rubin ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Abstract ! Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress by Ruth Frances Bloch Rubin Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Eric Schickler, Chair The purpose of this dissertation is to supply a simple and synthetic theory to help us to understand the development and value of organized intraparty blocs. I will argue that lawmakers rely on these intraparty organizations to resolve several serious collective action and coordination problems that otherwise make it difficult for rank-and-file party members to successfully challenge their congressional leaders for control of policy outcomes. In the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I will show that intraparty organizations empower dissident lawmakers to resolve their collective action and coordination challenges by providing selective incentives to cooperative members, transforming public good policies into excludable accomplishments, and instituting rules and procedures to promote group decision-making. And, in tracing the development of intraparty organization through several well-known examples of party infighting, I will demonstrate that intraparty organizations have played pivotal — yet largely unrecognized — roles in critical legislative battles, including turn-of-the-century economic struggles, midcentury battles over civil rights legislation, and contemporary debates over national health care policy. 1 ! ! “If you would understand anything, observe! its beginning and development.” ! ! ! — Aristotle! — ! ! For my family, Michele Bloch, Jeffrey Rubin, Ted Bloch Rubin, and Gregory Elinson ! ! ! i Acknowledgements ! I have incurred numerous debts in the course of writing this dissertation. It is my hope that acknowledging them here will be the first step in paying them forward. First, I am very grateful to Eric Schickler, for his steadfast encouragement, advice, and consistently constructive criticism. Another large debt is owed to Rob Van Houweling, a dedicated mentor, and in whose class this dissertation was born. Special thanks, as well, to Paul Pierson for providing incisive feedback and kindness at every stage of the project. I am also thankful for the strong support of Jack Citrin and Sean Farhang. For generous financial support, I am indebted to the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program, the Everett McKinley Dirksen Congressional Research Center, and the Institute for Governmental Studies here at Berkeley. Throughout my time at Cal, I have benefited from the camaraderie and humor of excellent colleagues. Credit especially to Matthew Gichohi, Adrienne Hosek, Morris Levy, John Hanley, Phil Rocco, and Kim Twist. Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Michele and Jeff for their love, patience, and editorial assistance. Thanks is also due to my brother Ted for providing much needed levity at critical junctures. And Gregory, with all my love, I know that you are (perhaps as much as I) grateful that this is (sort of) done. ii ! Table of Contents Chapter 1. Towards a Theory of Intraparty Organization 1 Chapter 2. Procedural Revolt and the House Insurgency, 1908-1910 19 Chapter 3. Senate Insurgents’ Quest for Economic Reform, 1909-1910 55 Chapter 4. Securing Southern Solidarity, 1937-1956 93 Chapter 5. Decline of Southern Influence, 1957-1964 132 Chapter 6. Making the Moderates Matter, 1994-2010 156 Chapter 7. Connecting Partisan Organization to Policy 192 Bibliography 197 Appendix A. Archival Sources 206 Appendix B. Interview Methodology 208 iii Chapter 1. Towards a Theory of Intraparty Organization ! ! Here is a mushroom. Yesterday when you passed it was not there. It has come up as by magic. “Wonderful!” you exclaim. “Out of nothing this great growth in a night!” Wonderful indeed; and yet the growth has not been as sudden as you think. Yesterday nothing was in sight, but the earth was filled with the fibers of the mushroom plant. The puffball you see is only the blossom. The real plant is below. It was there all the time. It has simply shoved up the puffball when it got ready. Things were working in the mysterious underground all the time. This mushroom growth of a single night is the result of slow preparation. It is !surprising because it comes into view so suddenly — that’s all. — Herbert Quick for La Follette’s Weekly Magazine1 ! ! In March 1910, a “little group of willful men” toppled one of the most powerful party leaders in congressional history.2 For nearly a decade, “Uncle Joe” Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives and leader of its Republican majority, had ruled the lower chamber with an iron fist. As Speaker, Cannon nimbly managed his Republican delegation, controlling the appointment of House committees and regulating the legislative agenda to minimize sectional conflict between vying Republican factions. Throughout his tenure, the Speaker labored to, in his own words, “bring forth the best results for the party.”3 But, determining just what results were best for the Republican Party proved controversial. Firmly allied with eastern finance-capital and industrial interests, Cannon spurned pleas for federal assistance from Republican farmers crippled by debt. Powerless to meet the farmers’ demands for assistance, reform-minded Republicans vowed to do away with the constellation of rules and procedures Cannon had long used to control the congressional agenda. Against all odds, after several failed attempts, they managed to do just that. Catching the Speaker and his loyal Republican allies off guard, the reformers forced Cannon to relinquish his seat on the House Rules Committee, and with it, his primary means to control floor activity and 1 Herbert Quick, “Draft: Here is a Mushroom,” enclosed in letter from Fred MacKenzie to Robert La Follette, February 20, 1911, Library of Congress Manuscript Division (LOCMD), Robert La Follette Papers, Box 68, Series B. 2 Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1964), 223. 3 Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon’s Experiment with Personal Power (New York: Norton & Company, 1951), 198. !1 the chamber body. Describing Cannon’s defeat the following day, journalists declared the reformers’ victory a “startling triumph,” “surprising,” and “sudden.”4 In truth, the Republican reformers’ triumph against their party leader was neither entirely surprising nor at all sudden. Rather, the reformers’ successful effort to reign in Cannon’s power as Speaker was the result of painstaking preparation. Indeed, their story is instructive. Beginning in 1908, the reformers joined ranks, forming a cadre of partisan insurgents committed to revising House rules. To effectively challenge Cannon, the lawmakers recognized, they had to counter the Speaker’s institutional power base with an organizational scaffolding of their own. Over the course of many months, the reformers relied on organization to plan their fight, determine the details of their proposed rules changes, and orchestrate their offensive. In short, Cannon’s defeat was the culmination of extensive, dissident organization. While scholars have since characterized the Cannon Revolt as a singular moment in American history, the episode is but one stitch in a larger pattern of congressional lawmaking.5 Marking every decade of the past century, dissident lawmakers have developed organizations — distinct from their party institutions and other so-called “congressional member associations” — to secure policies opposed by party leaders (see Figure 1.1).6 When and why do these intraparty organizations form? How do they structure congressional policymaking? The purpose of this dissertation is to supply a simple and synthetic theory to help us to to answer these questions and to understand, more broadly, the development and value of organized intraparty blocs. I will argue that lawmakers rely on intraparty organizations to resolve several serious collective action and coordination problems that otherwise make it difficult for rank-and- file party members to successfully challenge their congressional leaders for control of policy outcomes.7 In the empirical chapters of this dissertation, we shall see that intraparty organizations empower dissident lawmakers to resolve their collective action and coordination challenges by providing selective incentives to cooperative members, transforming public good policies into excludable accomplishments, and instituting rules and procedures to promote group decision-making. 4 “All Night Fight to Oust Cannon: Insurgents and Democrats Move Together,” The New York Times, March 18, 1910, A1. 5 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10. 6 As we shall see, intraparty organizations are characterized by substantively different membership requirements, internal procedures, and political objectives than so-called “congressional member organizations”