« Not In Our Name »: Why Médecins Sans Frontières does not support the “Responsibility to Protect”

Fabrice Weissman

15 aout 2010

'“Not In Our Name”: Why Médecins Sans Frontières Does Not Support the “Responsibility to Protect”', 2010, Criminal Justice Ethics, 29: 2, 194 - 207

Le Centre de réflexion sur l’action et les savoirs humanitaires (CRASH) a été créé par Médecins sans frontières en 1999. Sa vocation : stimuler la réflexion critique sur les pratiques de l’association afin d’en améliorer l’action.

Le Crash réalise des études et analyses portant sur l’action de MSF dans son environnement immédiat. Elaborées à partir des cadres et de l’expérience de l’association, ces textes ne représentent pas la « ligne du parti » MSF, pas plus qu’ils ne cherchent à défendre une conception du « vrai humanitaire ». Leur ambition est au contraire de contribuer au débat sur les enjeux, contraintes, limites – et par conséquent dilemmes – de l’action humanitaire. Les critiques, remarques et suggestions sont plus que bienvenues, elles sont attendues.

The Centre de reflexion sur l’action et les savoirs humanitaires (CRASH) was created by Médecins Sans Frontières in 1999. Its objective is to encourage debate and critical reflexion on the humanitarian practices of the association.

The Crash carries out in-depth studies and analyses of MSF’s activities. This work is based on the framework and experience of the association. In no way, however, do these texts lay down the ‘MSF party line’, nor do they seek to defend the idea of ‘true humanitarianism’. On the contrary, the objective is to contribute to debate on the challenges, constraints and limits –as well as the subsequent dilemmas- of humanitarian action. Any criticisms, remarks or suggestions are most welco

Criminal Justice Ethics Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2010, 194 Á207

ARTICLE

‘‘Not In Our Name’’: Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’

FABRICE WEISSMAN*

Introduction

Should military forces be dispatched of Canada as part of the Interna- to a foreign country to save its tional Commission on Intervention population from massacre, famine, and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Es- epidemics, or oppression? While the tablished in the aftermath of NATO question is as old as war itself, there intervention in Kosovo and the has been a spectacular resurgence of heated argument over its legitimacy interest in the issue since the end and legality, ICISS was tasked with of the Cold War. 1 From Darfur to developing a normative framework Burma, Chad to Georgia, Zimbabwe that would forge international con- to the Democratic Republic of the sensus on ‘‘when, if ever, it is Congo, using armed force to protect appropriate for states to take co- civilians and humanitarian aid work- ercive *and in particular military * ers has been a recurrent topic of action, against another state for the controversy for policy makers, advo- purpose of protecting people at risk 2 cacy groups, and academics. in that other state.’’ The application of military might According to its supporters, the to rescue populations in danger was doctrine developed by ICISS goes argued in the 1990s as the ‘‘right well beyond the latest variation in or duty to intervene.’’ Today, it is the theory of ‘‘humanitarian inter- debated as the ‘‘responsibility to vention’’ developed by Mario Bettati protect’’ (R2P), a formulation inve- and Bernard Kouchner in the late 3 nted in 2001 by a panel of experts 1980s. The ICISS doctrine is sup- * brought together by the government posed to be more precise its scope is limited to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, *Fabrice Weissman works with the Doctors and ethnic cleansing *and more am- Without Borders/Me´decins Sans Frontie`res bitious: whereas humanitarian inter- (MSF) Foundation in Paris, France. vention advocated the use of force Email: [email protected] primarily to ‘‘protect humanitarian

ISSN 0731-129X print/ISSN 1937-5948 online # 2010 John Jay College of Criminal Justice of The City University of New York http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2010.504426 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P convoys . . . and victims facing their and, most recently, the United States. killers, ’’ R2P encompasses the ‘‘ pre- But southern countries have generally vention of conflicts ’’ and the ‘‘ re- met R2P with hostility, fearing a re- building of societies. ’’ 4 To this end, turn to imperialism in the name of law the doctrine calls for the use of ‘‘ mass and morality. atrocities tool boxes ’’ including hu- R2P is most controversial as a manitarian, diplomatic, economic, ju- theory of ‘‘ just war ’’ *that is, as a dicial, social, political, and, as a last rationale for warfare rather than, say, resort, military actions. R2P also an appeal to states to use diplomatic claims to respect state sovereignty, means to contain violence against recognizing that national govern- civilians. Arguments that link R2P ments have the primary responsibil- and the concept of a ‘‘ just war ’’ draw ity to protect their own citizens. It is on the same sources of moral and only in the event of a government legal legitimacy as humanitarian ac- failing to fulfill its ‘‘ responsibility to tion. 8 For partisans of R2P, the use of protect ’’ that the ‘‘ international com- violence is the ultimate means of munity ’’ would have to exert it on its offering civilians the security and behalf *even to the point of declar- assistance they deserve and are en- ing war on the perpetrators of vio- titled to *morally, in the name of our lence against civilians. common humanity, and legally, as a Canadian diplomats and the for- result of states ’ commitments to en- mer United Nations secretary-general sure compliance with International Kofi Annan have been among the Humanitarian Law (IHL). Humani- most vocal promoters of R2P, which tarian assistance and humanitarian is also actively supported by militant intervention are thus considered as networks linking diplomats, interna- part of a continuum of actions de- tional lawyers, liberal think-tanks, hu- signed to civilize wars so that they man rights NGOs, and humanitarian are conducted according to humani- organizations. 5 R2P was formally en- tarian norms. The vast majority of aid dorsed by 192 heads of state and organizations share this point of view governments at the World Summit in and consider R2P as the ‘‘ best nor- 2005. While reaffirming that only the mative framework to address the U.N. Security Council could authorize protection needs of civilian popula- the use of force, the world ’s leaders tions. ’’ 9 In practice, humanitarian sought to take coercive measures col- organizations regularly invoke R2P lectively, on a ‘‘ case-by-case ’’ basis, to call for the deployment of foreign against ‘‘ national authorities [that] are troops to protect civilians and hu- manifestly failing to protect their po- manitarian workers *in Darfur, in pulations from genocide, war crimes, Chad, and in the Democratic Repub- ethnic cleansing and crimes against lic of the Congo, to cite just a few humanity. ’’ 6 Encouraged by these de- examples. 10 velopments, the partisans of R2P now This humanitarian enthusiasm for intend to make it a ‘‘ full-fledged rule military might is not lost on the of customary international law. ’’ 7 This general public, journalists, or govern- initiative is officially supported by a ments. Doctors Without Borders/ number of Western governments, in- Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) is cluding Canada, Great Britain, France regularly asked whether it supports

195 Fabrice Weissman the deployment of foreign troops conclusion and call for armed inter- committed to the protection of relief vention to protect civilians and those workers and civilians. In most con- who come to help them? Shouldn ’t flicts, populations suffer from hunger, it be campaigning for a legal mechan- disease, displacements, and above ism both to release such interventions all from the unchecked violence of from political opportunism and, in combatants. Shouldn ’t a humanitar- extreme circumstances, to make them ian organization draw the obvious compulsory?

The Fog of War

These would be simple questions to Peace was imposed at a price: a great answer if dispatching foreign troops tolerance toward the war crimes com- into the middle of a civil war auto- mitted by pro-government forces, an matically protected the population. embargo on vital humanitarian assis- Empirical observation of foreign tance to territories under RUF control, armed interventions conducted since and the transfer of the most intransi- the end of the Cold War, however, gent combatants to Liberia, some of shows that deploying troops and whom were encouraged to overthrow protecting civilians are two different Charles Taylor. 11 things. Offering military protection is In East Timor, the Australian an act of war in its own right, which troops who arrived under a U.N. means engaging in hostilities without flag in September 1999 fought wi- any certainty of success or of avoid- th anti-independence militias, thus ing a bloodbath for civilian popula- helping the Timorese free themselves tions. The three foreign interventions from Indonesian occupation *which generally cited as successes by parti- was responsible for the death of 40% sans of R2P *the British intervention of the population in the 1970s and in Sierra Leone (2000), the Australian 1980s. The Australian intervention intervention in East Timor (1999), did not, however, prevent the capital, and NATO in Kosovo (1999) *offer Dili, from being pillaged, nor did it many lessons. stop anti-independence militias from The British intervention in Sierra deporting 260,000 Timorese to the Leone ended the violence against a Indonesian-controlled western part population that had been subjected to of the island. 12 a particularly brutal war since 1991. The NATO intervention in Kosovo The 650 paratroopers who landed in in the spring of 1999 overturned the May 2000 to support pro-government apartheid-like regime imposed by forces and the 11,000 United Nations Serb nationalists and put an end blue helmets waged a war against the to their numerous abuses. It allowed rebels of the Revolutionary United the Albanian Kosovars to recover a Front (RUF). They forced them to greater degree of freedom and fulfill sign and abide by a final peace agree- their aspirations for self-determina- ment, enabling the government in tion. Achieving these ends involved Freetown to re-establish its sover- the invasion and long-term occu- eignty over the whole of the country. pation of this former Yugoslavian

196 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P province, placing it under interna- in order to create ‘‘ safe areas ’’ admi- tional administration. Intended to nistered by international forces, preserve a multiethnic Kosovo with- where civilians under threat can seek out affecting the territorial integrity of refuge; and finally, the evacuation of the former Yugoslavia, the interna- civilians across the border into a tional operation eventually resulted neighboring country where refugee in Kosovo achieving independence camps would be secured *an option and the expulsion from the country rarely referred to by partisans of R2P, of a significant proportion of the Serb who never consider the right to asy- and Roma minorities by nationalist lum as a way to shield civilians from Albanian-speaking militias. violence. 14 It is not a question of disputing These scenarios describe the tan- the legitimacy of these operations but gible implications of the use of mili- emphasizing that these were wars tary violence to protect people in against specific enemies 13 in small conflict situations: invading and oc- countries where the overwhelming cupying all or part of a country and majority of the population supported imposing one ’s sovereignty. In other foreign intervention. Like any politi- words, protecting populations does cal undertaking, these operations had not mean restoring law and order in the their winners and losers, including same way that police forces do in a some among the civilian population. peaceful country, but creating a new Finally, they resulted in an improved political order through violence. security situation, because they ra- This is naturally a perilous under- pidly enabled the intervening force taking, which is subject to the ha- or its allies to take control of a zards of war and runs the risks of territory and exercise a quasi-monopoly failure, escalation, and the massacre on the use of physical violence *in of civilians. In Somalia, the American other words, to govern. and U.N. troops who landed in 1992 Á The highly political dimension of 1993 in order to ‘‘ secure humanitar- any protection enterprise is well illu- ian aid ’’ in a context of widespread strated by the work of American famine and insecurity proved incap- military planners participating in the able of protecting civilians. They Mass Atrocity Response Operation rapidly became a party to the conflict Project. Invited by the Carr Center at and were responsible for many IHL Harvard ’s Kennedy School to develop violations, including the bombing of an operational military concept that aid organizations ’ facilities, torturing would enable R2P to be translated into and murdering non-combatants, and action in the event of ‘‘ mass crime in massacring civilians. 15 In Bosnia, a landlocked sub-Saharan African people who had believed in the country ’’ they came up with three U.N. ’s promises of protection and options: first, invasion and total occu- had sought refuge in the ‘‘ safe areas ’’ pation of the country,the overthrow of of Zepa and Srebrenica were de- the criminal regime and the installa- ported and massacred in front of tion of a temporary government (in the U.N. peacekeepers. other words, an Iraq-style solution, The equation that military inter- which is their preferred option); sec- vention  protection for the popula- ond, partial occupation of the territory tion is no more a given when the

197 Fabrice Weissman intervening party arrives with a 200,000 military personnel and their strong political will and devotes con- modern equipment, the democratic siderable resources. According to the armies have not been successful in ‘‘ population-centered ’’ approach de- asserting themselves as the most ef- veloped by General Petraeus in Iraq fective or the most popular protector from 2007 and by General McChrystal in Afghanistan, as illustrated by the in Afghanistan since June 2009, the increasing number of insurgent at- ‘‘ protection of populations ’’ is now tacks and their progress in taking the main strategic objective of the U.S. over territory. armed forces ( ‘‘ the purpose of all There is no technical or legal counterinsurgency actions must be riposte to the violence of war that the protection of the indigenous po- will ensure that populations who are pulation, ’’ General Petraeus stated 16 ). supposed to be helped will actually For the new generation of American be protected and assisted. The calling strategists, counter-insurgency wars for the military protection of a popu- are won only with the support of the lation signals the desire for a ‘‘ just population. This, in turn, is won by war ’’ and for the advent through responding to their ‘‘ more primitive violence of a new political order * concern for safety. ’’ 17 The protection and this is an undertaking that al- of civilians is seen as the surest way to ways has uncertain outcomes and guarantee victory *he who protects, which inevitably creates victims wins. In spite of the presence of among the people it is trying to save.

The Autonomy of Humanitarian Action

At this point of time, Doctors Without the suffering of the Iraqi people. ’’ This Borders/Me´decins Sans Frontie`res re- is an operational principle and a pre- fuses to call for the use of force to requisite for defending a position as protect populations and relief work- a third party who demands not to ers because gaining access to the be targeted in carrying out relief battlefield and assisting non-com- operations in any conflict. What argu- batants with complete impartiality, ments could we use to counter the whichever side they may belong to, Congolese factions refusing access to means that we cannot make pro- the areas they control on the basis that nouncements on the legitimacy of we support international forces wa- the war aims pursued by the belliger- ging a war on them? ents. There is no reason why an Furthermore, ‘‘ distributing aid at intervention conducted in the name the point of a gun, ’’ as advocated of protecting civilians should consti- by Robert Kaplan following Cyclone tute an exception to this rule. Aid Nargis in Burma in reference to workers cannot be for or against R2P, 18 is incompatible with MSF ’s making war on Congolese factions, modus operandi. Militarizing huma- for example, in order to ‘‘ protect nitarian convoys or facilities simply civilian populations ’’ any more than transforms them into military tar- they can be for or against the war gets. The medical aid organizations started by the U.S. to ‘‘ put an end to currently operating in Afghanistan,

198 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P closely protected by international cases. ’’ 20 In other words, ‘‘ shoot to forces or pro-government security feed ’’ or ‘‘ shoot to heal ’’ is incompa- forces, have bitter experience of this tible with humanitarian action. MSF logic. Seen as legitimate targets by does not want to become a new party insurgents, healthcare facilities have to a conflict where its own military become part of the battlefield and strategy would be set by public deserted by the local population. We health imperatives. Even if we are should remember that one of the great not pacifists, we are non-violent. innovations introduced by modern In our view, the aim of humanitar- IHL is to proclaim the demilitariza- ian action is to ‘‘ civilize wars ’’ through tion of health and relief facilities and the distinction between combatants their personnel, which is the only way and non-combatants. It is not to con- of guaranteeing impartial access to all duct ‘‘ wars of civilization ’’ that split victims of a conflict. the world into civilized people and But apart from operational con- barbarians, thus paving the way to straints, there is a more philosophical unbridled violence. It must be said reason for refusing the call to arms: if that the founding fathers of the ICRC the purpose of humanitarian action is and other modern originators of hu- to limit the devastation of war, it manitarian practices took a different cannot be used as a justification for view of this. Many of them believed new wars. This is what the Interna- that the ‘‘ primitive peoples ’’ should tional Committee of the Red Cross be civilized (including by force) be- (ICRC) felt necessary to state in 1994, fore they could take advantage of the after the Security Council had protection of IHL. At the end of the adopted two resolutions authorizing nineteenth century, Gustave Moynier, the use of force in Somalia to ‘‘ secure the co-founder of the Red Cross and conditions for humanitarian relief the instigator of the first Geneva Con- operations. ’’ 19 The ICRC emphasized ventions, judged the progress in IHL that it was under Chapter VII of the to be inaccessible to ‘‘ savage tribes United Nations Charter and not un- that practise cannibalism, engage ex- der IHL that the Security Council had cessively in war and give in to their authorized the use of force. Even brutal instincts without a second though the Council was acting with thought, while the civilised nations, the intention of combating violations which seek to humanise it, confess of IHL (in this instance, obstacles even in so doing that not everything to delivering humanitarian aid), it that happens is lawful. ’’ 21 These per- could not claim to act in the name ceptions would continue until well of humanitarian law: ‘‘ Because inter- after the Second World War, as illu- national humanitarian law starts strated by the ICRC ’s position in the from the premise that any armed face of the Mau Mau uprising in conflict entails human suffering, and Kenya (1952 Á59). 22 For a long time, undertakes to develop a set of rules the committee refused to concern designed precisely to alleviate this itself with the fate of the 80,000 people suffering. It would be logically and interned by the British authorities on legally indefensible to conclude that the grounds that the Mau Mau detai- this same law authorized the use of nees were too ‘‘ primitive ’’ to under- armed force, including in extreme stand ‘‘ the notions of charity and

199 Fabrice Weissman solidarity on which the Red Cross is by humanitarian laws. This opinion based. ’’ ‘‘ Humanitarian notions . . . dominated most of the humanita- are for the moment inaccessible to rian policy and practice of the time * the naturally cruel black masses, ’’ in France particularly, where the explained the ICRC delegate for Ligue des droits de l ’homme in 1931 Equatorial Africa in 1962. 23 pronounced itself in favor of ‘‘ demo- In the minds of a large number of cratic colonization, ’’ rejecting the idea humanitarians and philanthropists in of ‘‘ the right to conquest ’’ in favor of the nineteenth and part of the twen- the ‘‘ civilizing mission ’’ claimed by tieth centuries, savages needed to be the official colonial doctrine of the raised to the status of civilized people Third Republic. 26 to benefit from the protection of IHL. The refusal of MSF to call for just This is why they supported European wars needs to be understood in light colonization. In his book on the world of the imperial aspect of liberal uni- of international lawyers in Geneva at versalism since the nineteenth cen- the end of the nineteenth century, tury. We want to break away from a Martti Koskenniemi explains that humanitarian tradition that associates IHL practitioners considered coloni- the abolition of slavery with forced zation as a moral duty operating labor, human rights with colonization, within a framework of natural law humanitarian assistance with huma- and human rights. 24 Not that they nitarian military intervention, and the came close to treating those who had liberation of Afghan women with been colonized as the equal of the aerial bombardments. In a word, we Europeans, but ‘‘ like children, with want to distance ourselves unambigu- gentleness and persuasion ’’ according ously from the politics of force acting to lawyer Joseph Hornung of the under the banner of humanitarian Institute of International Law in Gen- universalism. eva in 1885, seen by his colleagues as a By attempting to subject the world ‘‘ radical humanitarian. ’’ 25 Believing to its own standard of humanity, that ‘‘ hegemony and guardianship armed universalism is as much a exercised by the strong ’’ were legit- process of inclusion as exclusion, imate provided they were exercised driving whatever resists it beyond ‘‘ in the interests of the weak, in view the boundaries of what is human. It of their future and complete emanci- conceals a tyrannical principle of in- pation, ’’ he criticized the colonial tegration: the inevitable eradication powers for their lack of ambition, of anything that obeys other stand- exhorting them to export administra- ards and resists inclusion. Alexis de tive structures and a legal system that Tocqueville ’s remarks on the fate of would allow uncivilized people to Native Americans in the American accede to sovereignty. Although colo- Revolution reveal this quite clearly, nization was seen by international as philosopher Alain Brossat re- lawyers as a historical necessity marks. 27 Described by the Declaration whose rigors it was right to mitigate, of Independence as ‘‘ the merciless as Koskenniemi explains, it was also Indian savages, whose known rule of thought of as a moral duty for the warfare is undistinguished destruc- purpose of creating a worldwide fed- tion of all ages, sexes and conditions, ’’ eration of sovereign states, governed Native Americans were seen as

200 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P foreign to democratic expansion. Fail- Liberia who were sacrificed for the re- ing to wage war humanely and to be establishment of peace in Sierra willing to be absorbed into the demo- Leone, as well as the ‘‘ collateral vic- cratic system, they were annihilated tims ’’ of operations committed ‘‘ to using the methods they themselves protect the Afghan population ’’ are were criticized for. ‘‘ It all seems as clear examples of the old adage, ‘‘ you though the inclusive movement [of can ’t make an omelette without break- democratic universalism] at the same ing eggs. ’’ But in our view, humani- time set a limit, a frontier, a line at tarian assistance is precisely about which the drive for inclusiveness ‘‘ the revolt of the eggs. ’’ 30 Our relief turned back in on itself: beyond that efforts are targeted at those who form boundary, we do not include any the ‘‘ silent residue of politics, ’’ 31 the more; we exclude, ’’ remarks Brossat. 28 men and women whose very exis- While in the West, the universalism of tence is called into question by the human rights is associated with the decisions of the political and military struggle for democracy and political powers. freedoms, it also harks back, in the Let us be clear that this is not about former colonies, to the experience of defending radical pacifism and even domination and exploitation. This is less about setting up ‘‘ humanitarian something that does not seem to be of virtues ’’ against ‘‘ political cynicism. ’’ concern to the co-president of the We simply want to assert the distinc- ICISS, Gareth Evans. In his seminal tion between two approaches that work on R2P, Evans, an indefati- have everything to lose by being gable advocate of the R2P, seems to confused with each other. First find it flattering to be compared to there is political and military power, Christopher Columbus and Vasco da which is tasked with ensuring the Gama, coming with the ‘‘ Bible and long-term interests of the community, the sword. ’’ 29 and which is necessarily called on to Dividing humanity into those who decide between competing interests are included and those who are ex- and sacrificing human lives, includ- cluded is certainly not the prerogative ing those of non-combatants. Second of liberal imperialism *although it there is humanitarian action, which is may provide an opportunity for it to resolutely on the side of losers, whose assert itself radically. Peacekeeping lives it seeks to protect here and now policies and the development of any while questioning the reasons for kind of political order inevitably pro- their sacrifice. A humanitarian orga- duce their own share of victims and nization cannot call for war without people who are excluded: the ‘‘ resi- abandoning its role as a counter- due ’’ that will suffer a slow or violent power within this system of checks death. The people of Sierra Leone and and balances.

Exceptional Circumstances

Is this to say that MSF will never international debate has reached, the call for the use of force in any situa- answer is never . . . except for the tion? Based on the point current exceptions. In fact, no one can say

201 Fabrice Weissman whether exceptional circumstances national troops could might prompt MSF to abandon its in itself establish order and security. humanitarian role, dive headfirst And when Oxfam, for example, into the political debate, and demand deplored the fact that the United the use of force. In this respect, MSF ’s Nations troops dispatched to Chad decision in June 1994 to classify the were proving incapable of guaran- massacres in Rwanda as genocide and teeing the safety of civilians, it de- call for immediate military interven- manded even more troops without tion against the government orches- questioning the reasons for their trating the genocide *and not for a failure or the policy and strategy neutral force to protect civilians * they were supposed to be imple- must be seen as an exception that menting. 33 proves the rule. Let us emphasize that the debate But one thing is sure, namely, that over the appropriateness of starting a anyone who issues a call to arms just war cannot be decided by apply- must explain their intentions: war, ing a standard or rule of formal law * certainly, but against whom, with for MSF or any partisans of R2P. 34 whom, at what price, for what policy, It would be particularly absurd to and why here rather than elsewhere? define a threshold of violence against Humanitarian organizations that reg- civilians which, if crossed, would ularly call for troops to be dispatched open the way to armed intervention. in the name of R2P rarely answer Prohibiting killings and deportations these questions and rarely specify beyond a certain level is tantamount what political order the war is meant to condoning them below that level. to produce and why it would be It is this Catch-22 that makes R2P a better equipped to guarantee a po- ‘‘ just war ’’ theory that is as vague and pulation ’s security. When eight non- subjective as the right to humanitarian governmental organizations (NGOs), intervention. References to genocide, including Human Rights Watch, Ox- crimes against humanity, war crimes, fam, Caritas-France, and CARE, and ethnic cleansing are of no great called on the European Union in help in defining the conditions for the December 2008 to fulfil its ‘‘ respon- use of force. This is recognized by sibility to protect ’’ using its ‘‘ military Gareth Evans himself: ‘‘ the range of and operational capacity ’’ to ‘‘ deploy conduct potentially covered by both a force that could effectively protect war crimes and crimes against the population now ’’ in the eastern humanity is extremely wide, ’’ 35 and part of the Democratic Republic of ‘‘ the notion of ‘ethnic cleansing ’ has the Congo (DRC), they did not spe- no formal legal definition. ’’ 36 Even the cify how. 32 Should it pacify all of the use of the term ‘‘ genocide ’’ has been eastern part and put it under inter- the subject of much controversy, as national supervision on behalf of the was the case in Sudan. U.N.? Send reinforcements for gov- Fearing that legal wrangling ernment troops to fight the rebels? could play into the hands of criminal Put an end to the interventions of powers, Evans therefore proposes neighboring Uganda and Rwanda? to ignore the categories that define All of these questions were ignored the scope of R2P and focus on situa- as though the deployment of inter- tions characterized by ‘‘ mass atrocity

202 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P crimes ’’ *in other words, on moral- to protect. ’’ 40 Similarly, Russian Pre- ity. Furthermore, he specifies that sident Dmitry Medvedev justified the embarking on military action is not intervention of Russian troops in dependent on exhausting all diplo- South Ossetia as the ‘‘ only way to matic options or on atrocities having save lives ’’ faced with a power that already taken place. It is sufficient ‘‘ opted for genocide in order to ac- to have clear evidence that ‘‘ large- complish its political objectives. ’’ 41 At scale killing or ethnic cleansing ’’ is her first speech to the Security Council ‘‘ likely ’’ to happen, 37 and ‘‘ reason- on January 29, 2009, the new United able grounds for believing, in all the States ambassador to the United circumstances, that other less ex- Nations clearly lent her support to treme measures [than war] would R2P, stating that ‘‘ the international not have worked. ’’ 38 In the final community has a responsibility to analysis, he observes, deciding on protect civilian populations from vio- the countries where the use of vio- lations of international humanitarian lence is necessary is based on ‘‘ non law when states are unwilling or quantifiable and subjective judge- unable to do so, ’’ to the point of ments. ’’ 39 In order to establish a list ‘‘ acting early and decisively. ’’ 42 This of priority countries, he suggests responsibility, she explained, must be referring to the experts of the Inter- exercised in Afghanistan, where ‘‘ the national Crisis Group, of which he Taliban forces deliberately employ was once president. tactics designed to increase the num- Is there a conflict in the world in ber of innocent civilian deaths, ’’ and which civilians have no likelihood of in Gaza where ‘‘ violations of interna- being killed, raped, or forcibly dis- tional humanitarian law have been placed? Clearly not. R2P is therefore a perpetrated by Hamas ’’ and where doctrine of preventive war applicable ‘‘ there have also been numerous alle- to all countries involved in conflict or gations made against Israel, some likely to descend into it as soon as they of which are deliberately designed to fulfill the ‘‘ non quantifiable and sub- inflame. ’’ 43 jective criteria ’’ defined by those who In these conditions, one can un- advocate it. This is why it is open to derstand the resistance of weaker all kinds of interpretation. While it countries to the legalization of R2P. allows Evans to advocate for the How could they support such a world to be governed by experts vague standard that would authorize and philosophers *authorized to de- the five permanent members of the signate on which countries liberal Security Council to decide which democracies should declare war * country can be invaded and occupied R2P also lets states express their to protect civilians from excessive political preference in a universal violence, when the territorial integ- moral language. This was how the rity of these protective powers is Sri Lankan government defended to- fiercely defended by the threat of a tal war against Tamil Tiger separatist nuclear holocaust? The latter is a guerrillas, calling it the ‘‘ largest hu- crime against humanity if ever there manitarian relief operation in the was one. Given that implementation world ’’ and the most comprehen- of R2P is condemned to be condi- sive expression of the ‘‘ responsibility tioned by the power relationships

203 Fabrice Weissman and domination patterns that shape enthusiasm of the partisans of R2P the international stage, legalizing it for military means that is so perplex- would effectively be legalizing a new ing. Policies on taking in refugees form of imperialism *another reason (curiously absent from the R2P for MSF to distance itself from it. ‘‘ mass atrocities tool boxes ’’ ) as well Although MSF is opposed to the as policies on mediation and on use of violence for humanitarian providing relief in conflict zones ends, it cannot fail to support the certainly have their limitations, but general idea that states have a role they have their virtues too. In our to play in preventing and contain- view, the role of a humanitarian ing the violence of war. It is the organization is to cultivate the latter.

Notes

[Translated from French by Karen Stokes.] to Protect), ‘‘ R2P is broadly about the protec- tion of civilians, drawing from international 1 The idea that a sovereign has a duty humanitarian, human rights, and refugee to declare war on a tyrant who is massa- law for its legal foundation. ’’ Naomi Kikoler, cring his people is found as long ago as in ‘‘ Responsibility to Protect, ’’ (Keynote ad- ancient China. See Jean-Baptiste Jeange`ne dress, International Conference, Protecting Vilmer, ‘‘ L’intervention humanitaire arme´e People in Conflict and Crisis: Responding to en Chine antique, ’’ Revue des deux mondes the Challenges of a Changing World, (January 2006): 152 Á73, available at: http:// Refugee Studies Centre, ODI/Humanitarian www.jbjv.com/L-intervention-humanitaire- Policy Group, Oxford, September 22 Á24, armee.html 2009), 3. 2 International Commission on Intervention 9 Oxfam, ‘‘Responsabilite´ de prote´ger: un and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to principe qui doit devenir re´alite´,’’ press Protect (Ottawa: International Development release, February 14, 2008. Research Centre, 2001), vii, available at: http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp 10 See, for example, CARE Internat- ional, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, 3 See in particular, Mario Bettatti, ‘‘ Le droit Islamic Relief, IRC, Oxfam, and Tearfund, d’inge´rence: sens et porte´e, ’’ Le De´bat 67 ‘‘Joint Agency Statement Following Tues- (November ÁDecember 1991): 4 Á15. day’s Darfur Donor Conference,’’ press 4 Gareth J. Evans, The Responsibility to release (more funding for the African Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once Union force), July 19, 2006; Oxfam, ‘‘Tchad: and For All (Washington, DC: Brookings Les Etats membres de l’Union europe´enne Institution Press, 2008). tardent a` prendre une de´cision sur l’envoi d’une force au Tchad alors que 400 000 5 This applies in particular to the Interna- vies sont en jeu,’’ press release, December tional Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, 9, 2007; ACAT France/CARE/COSI/ Oxfam-International, and Refugees Interna- FIDH/HRW/LDH/Secours Catholique Á tional. Caritas France, ‘‘RD Congo: La France doit montrer l’exemple,’’ press release, 6 United Nations General Assembly, ‘‘ Re- December 10, 2008. solution adopted by the General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ’’ A/RES/ 11 See Fabrice Weissman, ‘‘Sierra Leone, 60/1 (October 24, 2005). Peace at any Price,’’ in In the Shadow of Just Wars: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian 7 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 52. Action , ed. Fabrice Weissman (London: 8 In the words of the R2P scholar Naomi Hurst, 2004; New York: Cornell University Kikoler (Global Center for the Responsibility Press, 2004), 43 Á65.

204 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P

12 See Gilles Gonzalez-Foerster, ‘‘ East Humanitarian Law, ’’ Revue internationale de Timor: Better Late than Never, ’’ in In the la Croix-Rouge , no. 805 (1994): 11 Á27. Shadow of Just Wars , 25 Á42. 21 Gustave Moynier, Les causes du succe`s 13 More speci fically, the targets were: the de la Croix-Rouge (Paris: Acade´mie des RUF and its backer, Charles Taylor, in Sierra sciences morales et politiques, 1888). Cited Leone and Liberia; the pro-Indonesian mili- in Alain Destexhe, L’humanitaire impossible tias in Timor; and the Yugoslav army and ou deux sie`cles d ’ambiguı¨te´ (Paris: Armand Serb nationalist militias in Kosovo. Colin, 1993), 38. 14 Mass Atrocity Response Operations 22 Nicolas Lanza, ‘‘ Le Comite´ international (MARO) Project, ‘‘ MARO Project Sample de la Croix-Rouge et le soule`vement des User ’s Guide, Scenario Number 1, Mass Mau-Mau au Kenya, 1952 Á1959, ’’ Relations Atrocity in Country X: A Land-Locked internationales , no. 133 (2008): 91 Á110. Country in Sub-Saharan Africa, ’’ February 23 Ibid. 18, 2009), available at: http://www.hks. harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/pdf/sub_saharan_ 24 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer scenario.pdf of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870 Á1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cam- 15 See Rony Brauman, Somalie: Le crime bridge University Press, 2002). humanitaire (Paris: Arle´a, 1993); Rony Brau- man, ‘‘ Somalia: A Humanitarian Crime ’’ 25 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Na- (Paris: Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, 1993), ava- tions , 129. ilable at: http://www.msf-crash.org/drive ´ /95d4-rb-1993-somalia-a-humanitarian-crime- 26 Matthieu Me ance, La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et les Africains _uk-p.10_.pdf (Paris: Collection les cahiers du Centre fe´de´ral Henri Aigueperse 16 David H. Petraeus and John A. Nagel, no. 44, 2006). ‘‘ Pre´face: David Galula, le Clausewitz de la 27 ‘‘ It all seems as though the inclusive contre-insurrection, ’’ Contre-insurrection. The´orie movement [of democratic universalism] at et pratique , by David Galula (Paris: Economica, the same time set a limit, a frontier, a line at 2008), viii. which the drive for inclusiveness turned 17 Galula, Contre-insurrection , 25. Accord- back in on itself: beyond that boundary, we ing to Galula, a former of ficer in the French do not include any more; we exclude, ’’ army who has become the posthumous L’e´preuve du de´sastre. Le XXe `me sie`cle et les mentor of American theoreticians of coun- camps (Paris: Bibliothe`que Albin Michel terinsurgency, ‘‘ the population ’s attitude in Ide´es, 1996), 36 Á37. For Brossat, the intract- the middle stage of the war is dictated not able link between the American democratic so much by the relative popularity and expansion and the destruction of the native merits of the opponents as by the more Indian civilization was described by Alexis primitive concern for safety. Which side de Tocqueville in the second part of Democ- gives the best protection, which is the most racy in America . In a chapter entitled ‘‘ The threatening, which is most likely to be present and probable future condition of victorious: those are the criteria that deter- the Indian tribes which inhabit the territory mine the population ’s choice in favor of one possessed by the Union, ’’ Tocqueville or the other. That is all the more true, of writes: ‘‘ None of the Indian tribes which course, if one side combines effectiveness formerly inhabited the territory of New * with popularity, ’’ ibid. England the Narangansetts, the Mohicas, the Pecots *have any existence but in the 18 Robert D. Kaplan, Op-Ed, ‘‘ Aid at the Point recollection of man. The Lenapes, who of a Gun, ’’ New York Times , May 14, 2008. received William Penn, a hundred and fifty 19 United Nations Security Council, Reso- hears ago, upon the banks of the Delaware, lution 794, S/RES/794 (December 3, 1992). have disappeared; and I myself met with the last of the Iroquois, who were begging 20 Umesh Palwankar, ‘‘ Measures Avail- alms; but a traveller at the present must able to States for Ful filling Their Obliga- penetrate more than a hundred leagues into tion to Ensure Respect for International the interior of the continent to find an

205 Fabrice Weissman

Indian. Not only have these wild tribes democracy ’ or ‘a world from which power receded, but they are destroyed; and as politics will have disappeared. ’ ’’ And they give way or perish, an immense and Aron, borrowing from George F. Kennan, increasing people fills their place. There is concludes: ‘‘ We must be gardeners and not no instance upon record of so prodigious a mechanics in our approach to world af- growth, or so rapid a destruction, ’’ Alexis fairs. ’’ Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vo- Theory of International Relations (London: lumes 1 and 2, Unabridged), trans. Henry Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), 585. Reeve (Stilwell: A Digireads.com Book, 2007), 242 Á43. 35 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect , 12. 28 Ibid. 36 Evans gives no de finition of ethnic cleansing, simply explaining: ‘‘ It can be 29 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect , 4. In accomplished in a number of ways, includ- order to emphasize the key role he played ing outright killing, expulsion, acts of terror in developing and promoting the R2P, designed to encourage flight, and rape Evans highlights this comment from a Sri when perpetrated either as another form Lankan propagandist: ‘‘ Just like in the past of terrorism or as a deliberate attempt to when Columbus in 1492 and Vasco da change the ethnic composition of the group Gama in 1498 came with the Bible and the in question. ’’ Evans, The Responsibility to sword, the likes of Gareth Evans now come Protect , 13. in 2007 with R2P. ’’ 37 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect , 144. 30 See Jean-Herve´ Bradol, ‘‘ The Sacri ficial International Order and Humanitarian Ac- ‘‘ It is absolutely clear that military action tion, ’’ in In the Shadow of Just Wars , 1 Á22, can be legitimate as an anticipatory mea- available at: http://www.msf-crash.org/ sure in response to clear evidence of likely en/publications/2009/06/04/275/in-the- large-scale killing or ethnic cleansing. ’’ shadow-of-just-wars 38 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect , 144 31 According to the expression used by 39 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect , 75. Michel Foucault. Foucault, ‘‘ Face aux gou- vernements, les droits de l ’homme, ’’ in Dits 40 See, for instance, Sri Lanka Ministry of et e´crits , vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 708. Defense, ‘‘ Sri Lanka *the only nation to have defeated LTTE & ended Terrorism, ’’ 32 ACAT France et al., ‘‘ RD Congo: La http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname  France doit montrer l ’exemple. ’’ 20090518_12 (accessed on March 15, 2009), 33 Oxfam, ‘‘ Tchad: l ’ONU incapable de and Ambassador Palitha Kohona, Perma- prote´ger les civils, ’’ press release, September nent Representative of Sri Lanka to the 9, 2008. United Nations, ‘‘ Statement on the Protec- tion of Civilians, ’’ (Security Council Debate 34 In this respect, Raymond Aron ’s recom- on Protection of Civilians in Armed Con flict, mendations in the chapter of Peace and War November 11, 2009), available at: http:// between Nations (1962) devoted to morality www.slmission.com/statements/security- in international relations strike us as being council/86-security-council/380-statement- particularly apt: ‘‘ the best conduct *the on-protection-of-civilians.html (accessed on best with regard to the values which the idealist himself wishes to achieve *is that March 15, 2009). dictated by prudence . To be prudent is to act 41 ‘‘ Medvedev ’s Statement on South in accordance with the particular situation Ossetia and Abkhazia, ’’ New York Times , and the concrete data, and not in accor- August 26, 2008, available at: http://www. dance with some system or out of passive nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/ obedience to a norm or pseudo-norm; it is 27medvedev.html?_r 1 to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the presumably guilty party 42 USUN, ‘‘ Statement by Ambassador Rice or to a so-called absolute justice; it is to on International Humanitarian Law, ’’ press establish concrete accessible objectives . . . release, January 29, 2009, available at: http: and not limitless and perhaps meaning- //www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/ less objectives, such as ‘a world safe for 2009/January/20090130083551eaifas0.5116

206 Why Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Does Not Support the R2P

693.html #ixzz0iHX5PixD (accessed March the U.S. in Afghanistan and Israel. Interna- 15, 2009). tional Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘‘ US Ambassador to the UN Susan 43 The retranscription of Susan Rice ’s Rice Voices US Support for RtoP, ’’ available speech on the website of the International at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect /index.php/crises/37-the-crisis-in-darfur/ reproduces the passages in which the 2109-us-ambassador-to-the-un-susan-rice- ambassador supports the R2P but omits voices-us-support-for-rtop (accessed March those in which she claims its application by 15, 2009).

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