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Pols & Polls

The Hyperpresident

Philip Gordon

t would be easy to predict the coming will trip up, exhaust itself, or create too many implosion of ’s still-new enemies before it gets anything done. I presidency. The French, after all, are noto- All that would be easy to predict but is, I riously averse to change and have a proven track think wrong. Sarkozy got elected running on record of stopping reforms in their tracks—just an explicit platform of major change and praise ask former President , who in for hard work, discipline, tax cuts—and even 1995 saw his modest plans for reforming the the United States. His victory by a comfortable, welfare state rejected by hundreds of thousands second-round margin of 53 percent to 47 per- of angry protesters. Or ask former Prime Min- cent for the candidate Ségolène ister , whose even more Royal suggests that the French may be more modest efforts to tweak the French youth labor open to change than conventional wisdom had market ten years later were similarly rejected, suggested. Moreover, Sarkozy is blessed with a this time by the very young people the reforms hopelessly divided and demoralized opposition, were designed to help. unlikely to be able to challenge him anytime Even when the French do not bring down soon (in part because of his own cleverness in governments with their feet they bring them co-opting some of the most popular members down with their ballots—prior to 2007, in of the Socialist Party). And for all the rhetoric every parliamentary election since 978 the about making a “clean break” with the past, French had voted out of office whichever party an image reinforced by the frenetic pace of the they had voted in the previous time. (Two pres- workaholic new president, Sarkozy has already idents during that period, François Mitterrand shown a willingness to compromise on issues and Jacques Chirac, did get re-elected, but in like the 35-hour work week, university reform both cases not until after the majority in parlia- and “minimum service” for public transport. ment had gone to the opposition.) Add to all Remarkably, Sarkozy’s popularity has actually this the non-stop pace of the ambitious Sarkozy grown since taking office. His stunning approv- and his defiant attitude toward French political al rating, over 60 percent, is higher than that of and social conventions (for example, by vaca- any French president since General Charles de tioning in America, taking boating trips with Gaulle after his return to power in 1959. rich friends, and jogging in shorts), and all the Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last conditions seem to be in place for a regime that forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the Philip H. Gordon is a senior fellow at the government will inevitably make mistakes, Brookings Institution. He is author of Winning and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet War (2007) and translator of Nicolas (and new leaders). Most important, if recent Sarkozy’s book Testimony: , Europe and signs that the French economy is slowing bear the World in the 21st Century (2007). out, the government’s popularity—and its abil-

Holidays (November/December) 2007  Pols & Polls ity to implement its promised reforms—will have to work harder if they wanted to get paid take a severe hit, as and bud- more, promised to cut taxes to stimulate the get deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid economy, insisted on the need for labor mar- the conclusion that something significant has ket reform and expressed his admiration for happened in France. The French have elected the United States—all potentially unpopular a leader who has promised to break with thirty positions in France. He was an outsider who years of welfare-state stasis at home and conven- did not attend the prestigious École Natio- tional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose nale d’Administration like most other French energy, dynamism and ambition have not been politicians and whose father had immigrated to seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic France from . He had first appeared in 1958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France on the French political scene as an ambitious over the next five years is far from guaranteed. twenty-year-old youth leader, challenged and More certain is that this determined hyperprési- defeated a Gaullist “baron” in his run for dent is going to try, and that France will never of Neuilly-sur-Seine at age 28 (a job in which be the same again. he later risked his life by personally negotiat- ing with a bomb-carrying hostage-taker), and rolled the dice again (unsuccessfully, this time) The Road to Sarkozy in 995 by splitting with his former mentor Chirac and backing a rival, Edouard Balladur, y all logic, or at least all recent precedent, in the presidential election that year. BNicolas Sarkozy should not have won the So if it was true that the French liked the 2007 French presidential election. As already appearance of change (new faces in office) but noted, the French have for a generation not actual change (that might threaten their shown an unparalleled proclivity for pleasant but ultimately unaf- kicking out their leaders, and fordable way of life), why vote Sarkozy was not only from for someone like this? The the incumbent governing alternative candidate, the party but a major figure in youthful and attractive Roy- it. The French electorate had al, offered the appearance of no reason to be more forgiv- change the ing in 2007 than in previous were believed to want. She years, and it would have been would certainly look dif- reasonable to expect voters to ferent from Chirac, but she turn to the Socialist Party after wouldn’t depart much from five years of rule by the Gaullist his policies—the perfect com- Jacques Chirac and his majority bination of attributes according in parliament. The Socialist-led gov- to the conventional wisdom. ernment of 1997–2002, after all, had But Sarkozy did win, and by performed reasonably well and a margin of more than 2.2 mil- had now been out of power for lion votes. His victory can in the seemingly mandatory one part be attributed to Royal, a electoral cycle. weak candidate who did not have Moreover, Sarkozy was running Sarkozy’s leadership skills, experi- on a platform of major change—a ence or mastery of issues, and who did “clean break” with the past—and not have the unqualified support of her had demonstrated such boldness in Socialist Party (including First Secretary his career to date that French vot- François Hollande, her then partner and ers had good reasons to suspect (or father of her four children). Sarkozy also fear) that he might actually mean benefited from the role played by the what he said. Sarkozy told centrist François Bayrou, who won the French they would nearly 20 percent of votes in the

 The American Interest The Hyperpresident

first round but then refused Royal’s offer to join pand employment. He has also set a ceiling for forces for the second, in which two thirds of the state’s overall tax take from any individual his support went to Sarkozy. Certainly Bayrou’s at 50 percent and eliminated the estate tax for impressive first-round score—more than three almost all taxpayers, again to try to put more times the votes he had received in 2002’s first money back in taxpayers’ hands. Unusually for a round—reflected voter discontent with both French politician, Sarkozy has no qualms about Sarkozy (who scared them) and Royal (who did “helping the rich”, and believes the French, like not impress them). the Americans he so admires, should reward None of these factors, however, under- and honor success rather than resent it. mines the interpretation of Sarkozy’s victory as The biggest domestic test for Sarkozy will a genuine French desire for change. It cannot come if he tries to liberalize France’s generous be said that Sarkozy was somehow elected by welfare state and notoriously inflexible labor accident (as Jacques Chirac may have been in market laws. He insists that France can never 2002, when he found himself facing far-right fulfill its ambitions if some workers are allowed leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in the second round), to start taking full pensions at age fifty and com- or that the majority of French voters did not panies are burdened by overly restrictive rules know what they were doing. The genuine poli- on hiring and firing. Remarkably for a French cy differences between Sarkozy and Royal were politician, when critics question the French the greatest between two French presidential readiness to accept such changes, he favorably candidates since François Mitterrand proposed cites the example of none other than Margaret “breaking with capitalism” in his 1981 face-off Thatcher, who faced down massive protests and with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. In 2007 the strikes with an “unbreakable will to get things French choice was between Royal’s reassuring moving”, leading to decades of prosperity in status quo and Sarkozy’s risky pitch for change. the UK. The analogy may be somewhat over- The French knew what they were getting when stated: For all its troubles France today is not as they chose the latter. badly off as was Britain in the late 1970s. But Sarkozy’s embrace of the Thatcher model does suggest a seriousness of purpose that should not A Not-So-Clean Break be underestimated. Sarkozy may not succeed in facing down the strikes that are sure to ma- he essence of Sarkozy’s domestic message terialize if he proposes major pension or labor Tis that the French must work more and reforms, and he may ultimately be obliged to harder if they are to reverse their relative de- compromise. But the prospects for at least some cline. During the election campaign, Sarkozy economic are better than they brutally pointed out that, while France’s GDP have been for decades. was 25 percent greater than Britain’s in the One area in which Sarkozy is decidedly not late 1970s, it was now 10 percent lower, mean- like Thatcher is on the question of Europe. In- ing that France was falling behind as a world deed, on the very evening of his election, Sar- power, the British were buying up the French kozy announced that France had “returned countryside, and a French “brain drain” toward to Europe” and pledged to lead the European London was underway. His remedy was “more Union out of the institutional crisis that be- pay for more work”, a concept he claimed would gan with President Chirac’s failed increase French buying power and create jobs, on a new EU constitution in May 2005. Sar- and a break with the Socialists’ previous efforts kozy supports a stronger European defense and to create jobs by cutting the work week (without opposes Turkey’s accession, which he argues an equal cut in pay). In his first few months in would dilute the EU and prevent the possibil- office Sarkozy has taken modest steps to imple- ity of a common political agenda. In Sarkozy’s ment this plan, notably by eliminating the tax analysis, it was not the French rejection of the on overtime earnings—though critics point out proposed EU constitution that provoked the that this will simply encourage employers to ex- crisis, but rather the French public’s lack of faith tend hours for current workers rather than ex- in the EU that led to the rejection. Upon taking

Holidays (November/December) 2007  Pols & Polls

Finally, as France’s first President born after World War II, Sarkozy appears to have none of his re- cent predecessors’ at- tachment to the EU as a means of ensur- ing intra-European peace—something his generation takes for granted. Sar- kozy will thus work with Europe’s other

Associated Press new leaders, such as and 43 and 23 at the Bush family compound in Maine in August to office he immediately campaigned to persuade promote a strong Europe, but in an entirely un- other EU members to adopt a more modest sentimental way. And he will do so only when it EU “reform treaty” and claimed a leading role is consistent with his interpretation of the French in negotiating it at the June 2007 Berlin EU national interest and his own political needs. summit—in the process almost overshadowing the German EU presidency and Angela Merkel arkozy is also sure to leave his mark on herself. Like most French presidents before him, SFrench foreign policy more broadly, most Sarkozy recognizes that France is too small on notably on the issue of France’s historically dif- its own to be a major global player, but believes ficult relationship with the United States. In that the can be leveraged to his newly revised book, Testimony, he stresses support French designs. his admiration for the United States and says Sarkozy’s attachment to the EU, however, he has “no intention of apologizing for feeling should not be misinterpreted. Deep down, the an affinity with the greatest democracy in the new French president is a nationalist who puts world.” As an outsider in France who rose to French interests first. He will pragmatically the top on the back of his drive and talent, Sar- support the EU when it serves French interests, kozy adores America’s meritocracy, work ethic, but he will not hesitate to challenge it if it does social mobility and respect for entrepreneur- not: hence his promotion of a merger between ship. He took a great risk during the campaign French energy giants and by paying a personal visit to President George to prevent an Italian takeover of the former, his W. Bush and praising the unpopular United populist criticism of the European Central Bank States—steps then assumed to constitute politi- for refusing to ease monetary policy, and his cal suicide—but he won nonetheless, suggest- unilateral intervention in the case of five Bulgar- ing that French anti-Americanism is both over- ian nurses held hostage in , who were freed stated and more limited to Parisian elite circles just prior to the announcement of French arms than commonly believed. and nuclear energy deals with Tripoli. Sarkozy’s attitude toward the United States For all his liberalism and admiration of has already had an impact. In meeting with Thatcher, Sarkozy is also clearly a big believer in U.S. Secretary of State after the state and a relative protectionist at heart. As his election, Sarkozy reportedly told her that, his role in the Suez-Gaz de France merger shows “We will sometimes disagree with you. But (following similar interventions while finance when we disagree with you it will be because minister in the early ), he has no inten- we actually disagree with you.” After decades of tion of passively accepting the vicissitudes of the apparent French efforts to oppose some Ameri- global market, or even the European one. can policies simply to contain American power,

 The American Interest The Hyperpresident

this attitude marks a sea change that opens up a role in international efforts to stabilize . important possibilities for constructive coop- More than any other so far, that gesture helped eration between the two countries. More sub- turn the page on a relationship that had deeply stantively, Sarkozy has signaled his willingness soured but now is on the road to repair. to consider rejoining NATO’s integrated mili- At a time when majorities in all European tary commands, from which France withdrew countries—including France—are highly criti- in 1966. The new French logic is that America cal of U.S. foreign policy, it would be unreason- and its Atlanticist allies in NATO will never able to assume that longstanding difficulties in trust or support European Union efforts to the French-American relationship are behind develop more defense autonomy unless France us. Still, the opportunity created by Sarkozy’s can show itself to be a loyal NATO ally and that election is historic. French foreign policy is EU and NATO defense efforts should both be driven from the Elysée, France’s presidential strengthened. The deal is far from done, but palace, and the clear signal coming from that Sarkozy’s openness to the principle of NATO direction is that the era when France could be reintegration is a huge step forward toward a assumed to be America’s most difficult ally in more trusting U.S.-French relationship. Europe is over. France under Sarkozy is also likely to see eye- to-eye more often with the United States on the critical question of the Middle East. Sarkozy is Can it Work? a strong supporter of Israel (while also a deter- mined promoter of an independent Palestinian ill Sarkozy’s ambitious plans to trans- state) and an opponent of Syrian intervention Wform France succeed, or will they go up in . Like the United States, he argues in smoke along with previous (and far less am- that an Iranian is “unaccept- bitious) efforts? The latter scenario is certainly able” and supports stronger economic sanctions plausible, but for all the inevitable difficulties against the Tehran regime, which he denounces he will face I think the stage has been set for a for its support for terrorism, repression of human lasting presidency that will have a major impact. rights and opposition to Israel. Sarkozy has pub- Sarkozy has already been compared to everyone licly warned that a failure by the international from to , but a community to deal with the Iranian nuclear is- more apt, contemporary comparison might be sue through diplomacy and sanctions could lead Britain’s . Like Sarkozy, the youthful to military conflict, though he makes clear that Blair also challenged party and political “sacred everything possible must be done to avoid such a cows” in his first months, and he was similarly “catastrophic” outcome. Unlike his predecessor, accused of accumulating too much personal he is open to the principle of imposing economic power, ignoring the parliament, manipulat- sanctions outside the context of the UN Securi- ing the media, cozying up to dubious tycoons ty Council, if and are unwilling to and aligning his country’s foreign policy too go along. Also unlike Chirac, he has appealed to closely with that of the United States. But Blair major French energy companies like Total and won three consecutive elections, destroyed his Gaz de France to stop investing in Iran. political opposition, modernized the British On Iraq, the source of the greatest French- economy, passed major domestic reforms and American dispute since the 956 Suez crisis, helped Britain “punch above its weight” on the Sarkozy has endorsed his predecessor’s opposi- international stage. By the end, Blair had be- tion to the war (while also arguing that Chirac’s come deeply unpopular, particularly because diplomacy was over the top). But he believes his bold support for the finally proved now is the time for France and America to put a bridge too far. But that was not until after he that dispute behind them. Foreign Minister had lasted more than a decade in power and led —one of the few French his country through a period of major change. politicians to have supported regime change Can Sarkozy make a similar run? I wouldn’t in Iraq—traveled to in August 2007 bet against it—or against his chances of bring- and announced that France was ready to play ing about a minor revolution in France.

Holidays (November/December) 2007