Politics & Diplomacy

The Sarkozy Effect ’s New Presidential Dynamic J.G. Shields

Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign was predicated on the J.G. Shields is an associate professor of need for change in France, for a break—“une rupture”—with the French Studies at the past. His election as president of the French Republic on 6 University of Warwick in England. He is the first May 2007 ushered in the promise of a new era. Sarkozy’s pres- holder of the American idency follows those of the Socialist François Mitterrand Political Science Associ- ation's Stanley Hoff- (1981-95) and the neo-Gaullist (1995-2007), mann Award (2007) for who together occupied France’s highest political office for his writing on French more than a quarter-century. Whereas Mitterrand and Chirac politics. bowed out in their seventies, Sarkozy comes to office aged only fifty-two. For the first time, the has a president born after the Second World War, as well as a presi- dent of direct immigrant descent.1 Sarkozy’s emphatic victory, with 53 percent of the run-off vote against the Socialist Ségolène Royal, gave him a clear mandate for reform. The near-record turnout of 84 percent for both rounds of the election reflected the public demand for change. The legislative elections of June 2007, which assured a strong majority in the National Assembly for Sarkozy’s centre-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), cleared the way for implementing his agenda over the next five years.2 This article examines the political context within which Sarkozy was elected to power, the main proposals of his presidential program, the challenges before him, and his prospects for bringing real change to a France that is all too evidently in need of reform.

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The context. Three major events outpouring of anger was provoked by the marked the second presidential term of accidental death of two teenage boys flee- Sarkozy’s predecessor, Jacques Chirac. ing the police in the commune of The first was that Chirac won his second Clichy-sous-Bois, but it expressed a term against the leader of France’s far- much wider revolt against the failure of right Front National (FN), Jean-Marie the French Republic to honor its con- Le Pen.3 The unprecedented appearance tract of “liberté, égalité, fraternité” with of a far-right candidate in the presiden- France’s largely ghettoized immigrant tial run-off was but the latest indicator of communities and urban underclass. a political disaffection that had grown The above sequence of events present- more pronounced through the 1990s. ed many symptoms of the ills besetting The threat of Le Pen reaching the run- France in the run-up to the 2007 elec- off again hung like a specter over the tions. While the years following the liber- presidential campaign of 2007. ation of 1945 had favored economic Another defining event of growth and increased prosperity, those Chirac’s second presidential term was after the oil crises of the 1970s had been France’s vote against the European characterized by economic recession, Union (EU) constitutional treaty in the industrial restructuring, rising unem- May 2005 . Drafted by a ployment, worsening crime, and the dif- convention under former French Presi- ficulties of integrating large immigrant dent Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the treaty communities. Elected to implement was designed to give new impetus to the change, French governments were often process of . It was a impeded from doing so—then punished cause personally espoused by Chirac and for not having done so. In all six legisla- massively supported by the National tive elections between 1978 and 2007, Assembly and the . The disparity the governing majority was overturned,

For the moment Sarkozy has brought a new dynamic to the presidency.

between 90 percent parliamentary sup- while a succession of twelve prime minis- port and the 55 percent of French voters ters and their governments outdid one who rejected the treaty in the referendum another in unpopularity.4 highlighted the gulf between France’s Campaigning for election in 1995, governing elite and its citizens, many of Jacques Chirac lamented the “monarchi- whom saw the treaty as institutionalizing cal drift” of a Mitterrand presidency an unbridled across which, he charged, had neglected the the EU. needs of the , leaving the The third and most dramatic event of country “in a state of social emergency.”5 Chirac’s fin de règne was the outbreak of Then, throughout his own quasi- extensive urban rioting in Autumn 2005 monarchical presidency, Chirac failed by youths of mainly North African ori- on his promises to heal the “fracture sociale” gin, prompting the declaration of a caused by high and national state of emergency. This violent socio-economic inequalities.6 When

[104] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs SHIELDS Politics & Diplomacy labor-market or welfare reforms were ty, and exclusion. Nowhere is this dispar- attempted by his center-right premiers, ity more starkly illustrated than in the they were met with social and political treatment of France’s ethnic minorities, opposition. As Chirac’s would-be suc- drawn largely from North African immi- cessors rehearsed a new litany of electoral gration and often corralled in rundown promises in Spring 2007, many believed banlieues (outskirts) where unemployment, France to be a country in inexorable crime, and social alienation are rife. In decline. The term coined to describe this the name of a secular and theoretically pervasive mood of pessimism was “le colorblind state, French officialdom déclinisme,” and the growing number of refuses even to acknowledge the presence commentators articulating it even earned of a Muslim community estimated by their own neologism as “déclinologues.” some to be as high as six million, close to 10 percent of the population.8 It is a The challenge. In an unsparing principle deriving from the Revolution- assessment of France published in Octo- ary creeds of 1789 that all French citizens ber 2006, charted a persis- are indistinguishably French. No Euro- tently slow-growing economy and a pean country has been more resolute in faster-growing public debt as a share of refusing the “Anglo-Saxon model” of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than , effectively denying the that of any other EU-15 state.7 With its existence of its largely disadvantaged eth- bloated public sector, over-regulated nic minorities. labor market, high taxation, diminished In the judgment of its most severe purchasing power, low-ranking universi- (usually Anglo-Saxon) critics, the French ty sector, and intractable unemployment model has become a perverted expression of over 8 percent—over 20 percent of “good intentions, bad policies, and among those under 25—France was, vested interests,” which invoke the lan- despite many countervailing economic guage of solidarity to obstruct change.9 and social strengths, in danger of being While acknowledging the problems diagnosed “the sick man of Europe.” besetting the French Republic, let us keep Other depressing statistics recorded 3.7 a sense of proportion too. France is the million people living in poverty, 2.5 mil- ’s second largest, and by some lion on the minimum wage, and 2.4 mil- measures the world’s sixth largest, econ- lion unemployed. omy. The productivity of French workers These statistics can be read as an is high and the French healthcare system indictment of the failure by successive and public transit system remain the envy French governments since the 1970s to of foreign observers. Yet it is undeniable mold public policy to meet the changing that the workplace currently contains too social and economic realities. Developed many disincentives to work. Given the in a time of near-full employment, the social charges and rigidities of employ- French “social model” is ill-adapted ment contracts and the costs and com- today. Founded on a worthy notion of plexities of redundancy procedures, it is solidarity, it perpetuates an unbridgeable no surprise that employers often do not divide between those with secure jobs, recruit at all or hire temporary staff who pension rights, and special welfare privi- fall outside the protective employment leges, and those who live the daily realities regime. When, in the wake of the of unemployment, job insecurity, pover- Autumn 2005 riots, de Villepin’s gov-

Winter/Spring 2008 [105] THE SARKOZY EFFECT ernment passed legislation making it eas- outside world. Sarkozy’s program set out ier to hire and fire young employees, it the vision of a recovery based on job and responded to the needs of one disadvan- wealth creation, cuts in labor-market taged section of youth. However, anoth- regulation and taxation, increased com- er section, students, fearing for their petitiveness, and reductions in the future job security, protested so vehe- national debt and trade deficit. He mently that the legislation was withdrawn argued for a smaller public sector, the at President Chirac’s urging. curbing of trade-union power, reforms Herein lies the essence of the chal- to higher education, and the rationaliz- lenge confronting France’s new presi- ing of the “social model.” Work and the dent: to dispel the egalitarian myths that reward for work lie at the heart of entrench existing inequalities and retard Sarkozy’s prescription, where reform of economic and social development on a the labor market and fiscal regime is number of levels. The challenge is also to paramount. “Travaillez plus pour gagner plus” renounce the discourse of denial in (“Work more to earn more”) became the which political leaders have too readily defining slogan of a campaign resonant taken refuge, blaming outside forces—the with terms—travail, effort, mérite—to rally “la or European France qui se lève tôt” (“the France that gets (ECB), the International up early”). The 2007 elections revealed Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade that a clear majority of voters preferred Organization (WTO), or simply “global- this exhortation to the soothing nos- ization”—for France’s ills and fashioning trums of France’s first female présidentiable, policy to mitigate rather than eradicate with her defense of state-subsidized jobs, those ills. Even where the need to engage workplace security and generous welfare with the global economy has been provision for those fortunate enough to acknowledged, it has been too often enjoy these. couched in vacuous rhetoric, as in The plethora of reforms projected or Chirac’s declaration to the UN in Sep- underway includes creating a more flexi- tember 2003 that “there cannot be eco- ble employment contract with incremen- nomic globalization if it is not accompa- tal protection and circumventing the nied by a globalization of solidarity.”10 In thirty-five hour week by exempting over- rejecting the EU constitutional treaty in time from income tax and payroll May 2005, French voters expressed their charges. Other proposals are to cut fear of a “market society” as the dreaded income, corporation, inheritance, and alternative to the “social model,” an wealth taxes to an annual sum of over $18 alternative embodied by an imagined billion, while raising healthcare charges army of Polish plumbers poised to invade and potentially value-added taxes. The a deregulated French labor market. reform package includes measures to lower the personal tax ceiling to 50 per- Changing culture. Sarkozy’s task goes cent of earnings, make mortgage interest beyond political reform. It is about payments tax deductible, abolish special changing attitudes, perceptions, and cul- pension programs for certain public ser- ture. It is also about redefining the role vants, cut the civil service, and tighten of the state in French Republican psy- unemployment benefits while banning chology vis-à-vis the citizen, ethnic and “golden parachutes” for the bosses of other minorities, the economy, and the failing companies.11

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Other measures aim to guarantee a world markets. The choice of as minimum service during transport Sarkozy’s first foreign campaign trip in strikes and secret balloting for extended January 2007 was a mark of his respect strikes, and to give universities more for British economic success and a bid to autonomy and incentive to compete for encourage up to 300,000 mostly young, staff, students, and funding. In keeping highly qualified expatriates in Britain to with Sarkozy’s previously tough line on take their skills back to France. Though law and order, sentences for youth crime an avowed believer in the market econo- and multiple offenders have been stiff- my, Sarkozy makes a distinction between ened. The new Ministry for Immigra- “fair” (what benefits France) and tion, Integration, National Identity and “unfair” (what does not) competition. As Co-development has been created to finance minister in 2004, he displayed a oversee the integration of immigrant very Gaullist penchant for industrial communities, to clamp down on illegal intervention and the protection of immigrants, and to ensure that new “national champions.”12 As president, he arrivals should be competent in French showed the same interventionist impuls- language, respectful of French values, es over the merger agreement in Septem- and have adequate means of financial ber 2007 between the state-owned Gaz support. Those seeking to join relatives de France and the private utilities group in France may be subject to DNA testing, Suez. He has blamed EU monetary poli- while the government has set a deporta- cy for some of France’s economic woes tion target of 25,000 illegal immigrants and called for “community preference” for 2007 alone. A cross-party commis- for EU products.13 In his victory speech, sion has been established to look into Sarkozy warned of the EU’s image as a institutional reform, considering such “Trojan horse” for globalization, and his

Sarkozy’s task goes beyond political reform. It is about changing attitudes, perceptions, and culture. questions as the representativeness of protracted timetable for balancing parliament and the accountability of the France’s budget threatens to undermine executive. Other objectives on the new the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, the president’s agenda encompass restoring fiscal requirements underpinning the authority in schools, celebrating nation- euro. He will oppose foreign takeovers of al identity, ending the “culture of repen- French companies and may seek to deter tance” surrounding French history, and factory relocations by penalizing compa- stifling the legacy of student and worker nies moving jobs out of France. This uprisings in May 1968. combination of economic liberalism and While the public sector requires the nationalism, though a winning formula most urgent remedial attention, much of with French voters, may make France an the private sector, by comparison, unpredictable partner within the EU and thrives, as many French companies and WTO. entrepreneurs are highly competitive in

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France and the world. Foreign pol- President Chirac’s lucidity in foreseeing icy hardly featured in the presidential a disastrous outcome in , which he campaign of 2007, but Sarkozy’s election declared a “historic mistake.”15 A new has important consequences for France’s Atlanticist spirit was evident from the standing in the EU and wider world. His address in his victory speech to “nos amis first weeks in office saw a flurry of initia- américains,” and in his decision both to tives: talks with over civil nuclear spend his first holiday as president on technology, pressure for a Lake Winnipesaukee and to share a picnic deal at the G-8 summit, calls for ending with the Bush family in Kennebunkport. the genocide in Darfur, and an arms and This sentiment was also evident in the nuclear energy deal with . This deal recall from Washington of former occurred in conjunction with the high- French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte profile release of six Bulgarian and Pales- to serve as Sarkozy’s diplomatic adviser- tinian medics imprisoned in Tripoli, an in-chief. act for which Sarkozy’s (then) wife Cécil- At a moment when American foreign ia snatched after months of quiet policy is deeply discredited, a friendlier European diplomacy. Sarkozy has pro- voice in Paris will be welcome, but its ear- posed and secured a simplified EU insti- ly value may be more symbolic than sub- tutional treaty to be ratified by parlia- stantial. Though French troops remain ment, and voiced his opposition to engaged in Afghanistan, and though Turkey’s accession. He has called for a Sarkozy’s administration firmly opposes “Mediterranean Union” to strengthen Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the White commercial and political links between House will draw no sympathy from the Europe, North Africa, and the Middle Elysée on Iraq.16 Speculation, too, about East, seeing here perhaps an alternative France rejoining the integrated military for Turkish admission to the EU. In an structure of NATO is premature, despite address to French diplomats on 27 Sarkozy’s hints at resuming a full role. In August, he declared the “construction of the same victory speech that hailed the Europe” to be an “absolute priority,” United States as friends, the incoming and, with the EU presidency returning to president added, “Friendship is about France in 2008, he will have an early accepting that one’s friends can think opportunity for a leading role in EU differently.”17 When affairs. asked Sarkozy what she could do for him, Described by one opponent as an he reportedly replied, “Improve your “American neo-conservative with a image in the world,” stressing the diffi- French passport,” Sarkozy is an culty of being an ally to “the most power- unabashed admirer of American eco- ful,” yet “one of the most unpopular nomic dynamism and has signaled his countries in the world.”18 At the same intention to repair Franco-American time, a poll showed the ambivalence of relations damaged by the rift over the French public opinion towards the Unit- U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.14 Speaking in ed States, with 40 percent of respondents Washington in September 2006, wishing to maintain the Franco-Ameri- Sarkozy, as interior minister, criticized can relationship as it is, 33 percent want- the “sterile grandiloquence” of an “arro- ing closer links, and 26 percent wanting gant France,” though he later praised a more distant relationship.19

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A reformed and reforming gov- have expected Sarkozy to be as abrasively ernment. The government charged right-wing in office as he had been in his with implementing President Sarkozy’s campaign, but thus far he has assumed reform program is itself a conspicuous the role of the more astute, pragmatic expression of renewal. It is led by and consensus-building president. François Fillon, a former social affairs Despite some twenty-five years in pol- and labor minister best known for steer- itics, with the past five of them spent as ing through a modest pension reform in interior and finance minister, Sarkozy the Raffarin government of 2003. Of has managed to appear as a new man. He the fifteen other senior ministers, seven combines sharp political intelligence are women, and three hold the key Min- with seemingly boundless energy. Terms istries of the Interior, Finance and Jus- commonly used to describe him include tice. The latter, , is of Mus- “hyperactive” and “omnipresident,” but, lim working-class Moroccan-Algerian for all his populist instincts, he is no man origin. She brings a very rare element of of the people. This long-time of ethnic, religious and social inclusiveness the affluent Ile-de-France commune of to the government, as do the junior min- Neuilly-sur-Seine inhabits a rarefied isters and Fadela Amara, of world, with a weakness for ostentatious Senegalese and Algerian origin respec- wealth and strong personal connections tively. Yade is in the office of Foreign to business and high finance. He is also Affairs and Human Rights, while Amara, on intimate terms with some of France’s a feisty Muslim feminist and anti-racist, most powerful media barons, prompting is in the office of Urban Affairs, con- worrisome comparisons with ’s Silvio fronting the pressing problems of Berlusconi. France’s multi-ethnic banlieues. Welcomed by business leaders and The government’s inclusiveness investors, Sarkozy’s first steps in office is also evident in the nomination of some also won approval across French public leftists to major posts. Most eye-catching opinion. His energetic, hands-on style is the appointment of Bernard Kouchn- and sheer appetite for work proved a er, the former Socialist health minister refreshing change from the regal self- and popular humanitarian activist, as indulgence of his predecessor. Opinion foreign minister. Other leftists in polls showed resounding support for his Sarkozy’s government include former animated style and for almost all of his Socialist Culture Minister Jack Lang and government’s early priority reforms. A ex-Premier . Centrists poll in late July recorded that 82 percent and non-political figures such as former of respondents appreciated this “new national rugby coach type of presidency,” and 78 percent—at a also have representation in government time of diminished faith in politicians— posts or consultative bodies. The aim of judged Sarkozy “capable of reforming the this ouverture (opening) is to forge some country.”21 cross-party legitimacy for government action, to respond to calls for more The prospects. What, then, are the bipartisan politics, and to confound and prospects of this new French president further divide an already divided Social- and government succeeding? On some ist opposition.20 Socialist leaders may reforms—the thirty-five hour week, uni-

Winter/Spring 2008 [109] THE SARKOZY EFFECT versities, minimum public transport ser- al will wait to capitalize on their disap- vice, and tax relief on mortgages—con- pointment should Sarkozy falter. A wors- cessions have already been made. These ening international economic climate early retreats disappointed proponents of could hamper economic growth and job more radical reform but helped defer the creation, while the government’s package inevitable social unrest, which did not of tax cuts and threatens to stretch gather pace until November. Even union an already excessive budget deficit.22 Most leaders seemed at first oddly beguiled by ominously, the melting pots of discon- the bold confidence of this new presi- tent that are France’s banlieues continue to dent, but they will now fight to protect simmer and will surely boil over again the public-sector jobs, working condi- unless drastic intervention improves the tions and droits acquis (entitlements) that quality of life and economic prospects are under threat. Students, too, will for their inhabitants. The burning of oppose any moves towards increased some 21,000 vehicles in the first half of selection or competition in a higher 2006 dispelled any notion that the ills education sector that remains, with its underlying the riots of the previous lofty grandes écoles, among the most selec- autumn had been cured. tive in the world, but where egalitarian For the moment, Sarkozy has brought ideals have long stood in the way of sen- a new dynamic to the presidency. In all, sible reform. he has been dealt a strong opening hand The composite nature of the to implement his policies. Despite its support on which Sarkozy has come to municipal and regional strength, the left power is another potential problem. is too weak nationally to block his pro- Siphoning votes from Le Pen ensured gram, while his arch-rivals on the centre- Sarkozy’s wide margin of victory, but it right, de Villepin and Chirac, have been makes his task as president all the harder, too busy fending off judicial investiga- since he must now satisfy the liberal, tion for their own alleged misdemeanors free-market, pro-European centre- to create mischief. The new president has right, as well as the nationalist, protec- enjoyed approval ratings comparable tionist, anti-European hard right only to those of de Gaulle in the early Popularity in politics is a fragile commodity, however, and Sarkozy knows from the fate of other incoming presidents how quickly support for reform can evaporate. attracted by his more populist pro- days of his presidency, with even Le Pen nouncements. These largely blue-collar joining in the initial approbation.23 and lower white-collar voters will look Unemployment fell in July to 8 percent, for early results on purchasing power, its lowest level for 25 years, with the aim immigration control, law and order, and being its reduction to 5 percent by 2012. the protection of French jobs and inter- A poll in late August gave a positive rating ests, while Le Pen and the Front Nation- of 71 percent for Sarkozy’s first 100 days

[110] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs SHIELDS Politics & Diplomacy in office, and 75 percent for his initia- recover some ground and begin to tives relating to “France’s place in the mount a more credible challenge. world.”24 Beyond potential opposition from the Popularity in politics is a fragile com- political left and far right, unions, stu- modity, however, and Sarkozy knows dents, and other groups whose vested from the fate of other incoming presi- interests may be threatened, Sarkozy will dents how quickly support for reform can also face what former British Prime Min- evaporate. As a candidate, he clearly ister Harold Macmillan famously feared spelled out his intentions, and his party most in government: “the opposition of and he won backing in four election events.” Almost all of the political initia- rounds. Presidents of the Fifth Republic tive has so far been with the new presi- have always set the governmental agenda, dent. This has now begun to change, but Sarkozy is already more exposed than however, with the succession of public- his recent predecessors through his visibly sector strikes, university student protests, activist approach. By maximizing his and localized rioting in outskirts of Paris authority he also maximizes his personal in November. The way in which Sarkozy responsibility. As a president setting out responds to such events will be as impor- to liberalize France’s economy, he might tant in defining his presidency as the reflect upon a survey conducted in 2005 scheduled implementation of his reform which found that, whereas 71 percent of program. As France prepares to mark the American, 66 percent of British, and 74 fiftieth anniversary of its Fifth Republic, percent of Chinese respondents support- one thing is certain: this presidency will ed a , only 34 percent of not be uneventful. French respondents concurred.25 Finance Minister might also warily reflect that she is the tenth minister AUTHOR’S NOTE: Dr. Shields acknowledges the British to hold that office in ten years.26 Academy for its award of a generous grant to support The municipal elections of March research in France on the 2007 presidential and legisla- 2008 may allow the to tive elections and their political consequences.

NOTES 1 Sarkozy is the son of an aristocratic Hungarian Pedder, “The Art of the Impossible: A Survey of émigré father and a French mother of Greek-Jewish France,” The Economist, 28 October 2006). descent. 8 U.S. Department of State figures (August 2 The UMP won 313 seats out of 577, returning a 2007). Other estimates are closer to four million, or governing party to power in France for the first time 6-7 percent, demonstrating the lack of hard statistical in almost 30 years. evidence on this important question. 3 J. G. Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to 9 Timothy B. Smith, France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality Le Pen (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), and Globalization since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge 281-290. University Press, 2004), 1. 4 See J. G. Shields, “Political Representation in 10 Sophie Meunier, “Free-falling France or free- France: A Crisis of Democracy?,” Parliamentary trading France?,” French Politics, Culture and Soci- Affairs 59, no. 1 (2006), 118-137. ety 22, no. 1 (2004), 103. 5 Jacques Chirac, La France pour tous (Paris: Nil Edi- 11 The government aims to shed 22,700 fonction- tions, 1994), 9-15, 35, 45-52. naires in 2008, and 100,000 over five years, from a 6 Ibid., 81-83, 87-92. civil service of some five million. 7 French public spending stood at 54 percent of 12 Most notably, he rescued the engineering com- GDP, compared with an OECD average of 41 percent, pany , makers of the high-speed TGV train, while public debt in France amounted to 66 percent brokered the merger of Aventis and Sanofi-Syn- of GDP, compared with 42 percent in Britain (Sophie thélabo to avert a takeover by the Swiss Novartis group,

Winter/Spring 2008 [111] THE SARKOZY EFFECT and helped fend off a potential bid for Danone by 21 Arnaud Folch, “Sarkozy: l’été de grâce,” Valeurs PepsiCo. actuelles, no. 3687 (27 July 2007), 12-13. Another 13 Sarkozy advocates, inter alia, protection for poll in mid-August revealed approval ratings of 87 European farm policy and barriers against “dumping” percent for tax relief on mortgages, 84 percent for from cheaper markets. tougher sentences for multiple offenders, 72 percent 14 The former Socialist economic adviser who for a minimum service during transport strikes, 66 coined this description, Eric Besson, subsequently percent for tax exemption on working overtime, 64 joined Sarkozy’s campaign team and now serves in the percent for lowering the personal tax ceiling, 61 per- government as secretary of state for public policy. cent for a simplified EU treaty, and 58 percent for 15 Reported in The (12 September increased university autonomy. In contrast, the pro- 2006) and International Herald Tribune (28 February posal to cut civil service posts found only 38 percent in 2007). favor and 61 percent opposed. See Le Journal du dimanche 16 Untainted by the Iraqi debacle, France is now (11 August 2007). positioning itself as a potentially influential mediator 22 Growth of only 0.3 percent in the second within and beyond Iraq. See the article by Foreign quarter set the government back on its full-year Minister , “What France can do in growth target of 2.25 percent; job creation, too, Iraq,” International Herald Tribune (26 August 2007). stalled in the second quarter, after a first-quarter rise 17 (8 May 2007). of 0.6 percent. 18 Adam Gopnik, “Letter from France: The 23 Le Monde (9 August 2007). human bomb – The Sarkozy regime begins,” The New 24 TNS-SOFRES poll, “Le bilan des 100 jours de Yorker (27 August 2007), 45. ” (22-23 August 2007). 19 Le Journal du dimanche (11 August 2007). 25 Gideon Rachman, “France braces itself for a 20 Sarkozy neutralised another dangerous Social- stiff dose of Thatcherism,” The Financial Times (8 May ist opponent, former Finance Minister Dominique 2007). Strauss-Kahn, by engineering his nomination in July 26 The incautious suggestion during the legislative 2007 to head the IMF–the fourth Frenchman cur- election campaign that payroll tax cuts might be offset rently to head a large international institution, along- by a rise in VAT appears to have cost Sarkozy’s party side Jean-Claude Trichet at the ECB, Pascal Lamy at some seats and certainly cost Lagarde’s predecessor, the WTO, and Jean Lemierre at the European Bank Jean-Louis Borloo, his ministry after barely a month for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). in post.

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