Going Transparent: Rebuilding Trust and Reducing Corruption in Afghanistan and

National Third-Place Winner Meredith Pochily PA Homeschoolers AP Online Conklin, NY Coordinator: Maya Inspektor

On August 18, 2003, following a month-long siege of , the Accra Peace

Agreement ended a brutal four-year conflict in Liberia. Nearly 150,000 people were dead.i Two years later, a newly elected president offered hope of revival for the country, while to the northeast in Afghanistan, a series of attacks sparked international fear of the Taliban's resurgence. In both countries, corruption damaged good governance, peace, and stability.

Afghanistan, even with a steady flow of assistance from third party groups, regressed. Liberia, however, pushed forward with concrete reforms that led to new stability. An examination of the conflicts in both countries shows that the "cancer of corruption"ii is best eliminated by enforcing transparency, accountability, strong leadership and confidence in government, and effective management of international aid. In order to accomplish these goals and gain trust, third parties must demonstrate an awareness of the needs and customs of the receiving region.

The 2005 Liberian presidential election that brought to power offered a hopeful future for the Liberian people, but achieving the "freedom, equality, and unity" that Sirleaf sought posed a challenge.iii Former President Charles Taylor had left the country in a state of corruption and disorder. In the wake of Taylor's exile and the signing of the Accra

Agreement, the United Nations National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) took control.iv Its purpose was to "[oversee] and [coordinate] implementation of... political rehabilitation programs" in pledging a commitment to the "restoration of peace and stability,"

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and launching an International Stabilization Force to embrace assistance and organize aid efforts.v The NTGL was plagued by corruption but with help from the United Nations (UN),

United States (US), and Nigeria, it succeeded in setting up the 2005 national elections that led

Sirleaf to the presidency.

In her inaugural address, President Sirleaf called for "national renewal" and promised her administration's "commitment to transparency, open government, and participatory democracy for all."vi She acknowledged the challenge of eliminating corruption and committed to leadership by example, requiring that everyone in her administration, including herself, declare his assets.vii

Working with the UN, President Sirleaf established programs such as the Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program to increase accountability of government officials, build capacity, and control corruption.viii The United Nations Mission in Liberia and the

Economic Community of West African States gave Liberia the means to enforce disarmament, establish new public services, and improve aid absorption capacity through the provision of thousands of military personnel and civil officers.ix These government-based, internationally- supported reforms resulted in a dramatic decrease in corruption; according to the World Bank,

Liberia moved from 185th to 113th in a country-ranking of corruption control in the two years after President Sirleaf's inauguration.x

In Afghanistan, distrust separated the people, government, and aid workersxi as confidence in President Hamid Karzai's leadership plummeted and violence increased.xii

According to a 2010 UN survey, 72% of respondents in Afghanistan believe that a bribe is necessary to gain access to a public service and 63% believe reporting corruption is useless because nothing would be done about it.xiii As citizens lost faith in their government, national unity -- essential to success in overthrowing the Taliban -- dissolved.xiv In an effort to reduce

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corruption, international donors channel only one third of aid through the Afghan government;xv this, however, actually feeds distrust, and thus corruption, by preventing the government from receiving credit for successes in aid distribution. One Afghan citizen said, "We're too used to expecting everything from the West. That makes me ashamed."xvi Another claimed Americans

"bomb the wrong kind of people."xvii President Karzai's attempts to explain away these accusations are superficial; resentment and distrust of government and foreign aid organizations continue to echo throughout the country.xviii

Between 35 and 40 percent of all aid to Afghanistan disappearsxix as a result of corruption-ridden subcontracting, inefficient distribution, and a lack of trust between citizens and aid workers that undermines international relations.xx The country has a multitude of anti- corruption and capacity building programs, including the Capacity Development Program, the

United Nations Development Programme Accountability and Transparency Program, and the

High Office of Oversight.xxi However, few of these programs are government-run, and they lack accountability.xxii Ineffective government involvement in aid distribution encourages

Afghanistan's dependency on foreign aidxxiii and decreases the people's investment in the government."xxiv Broken promises of reform only shatter fragile trust.

In 2005, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Afghanistan at 117th, while Liberia hung at 137th of 158 countries.xxv By 2010, Liberia had elevated itself to

87th; Afghanistan dropped to 176th of 178.xxvi Liberia transitioned to peace with relative success, while Afghanistan remains in a vortex of instability and corruption.

President Sirleaf demonstrated a clear vision of the future and a sharp determination to

"transform adversity into opportunity"xxvii as she led Liberia towards these improvements. Her commitment to reform gave her people confidencexxviii and her government's involvement in aid

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programs ensured that Liberian culture remained intact and respected by international aid groups.

With renewed trust linking Liberians to their government, Sirleaf's support of aid organizations led to their country-wide acceptance.

However, resentment and suspicion of aid in Afghanistan has lessened its impact. The nation's increased dependency on international support has led to a weakening of the political systemxxix as President Karzai struggles to unite a nation fighting a corruption epidemic that weakens aid capacity and kills trust. Afghan citizens are increasingly wary of foreign involvement, as aid organizations become more prominent and "soft targets" -- aid workers -- sparked increased Taliban attacks.xxx The US and NATO's "light military footprint" in

Afghanistan has given way to a solid boot-print as military forces overtake the region without

"convincing rationale."xxxi The United States also became heavily involved in training and overseeing the Afghan army.xxxii These actions undoubtedly remind Afghans of the 1980s Soviet occupation, creating suspicion of international motives. Fifty-four percent of Afghans believe that aid organizations are "corrupt" and "in the country just to get rich."xxxiii

Third party intervention can feed corruption, as in Afghanistan, or enhance peace- building, as in Liberia. How, then, can third parties maximize the effectiveness of their assistance? Daniel Kaufmann of the World Bank writes, "Unless there are improvements in capacity, accountability, and reducing corruption... other reforms will have only limited impact."xxxiv

The culture and history of the assisted country need to stand at the forefront of aid efforts.

Reforms must be consistent with basic principles of the local culture and social structure and third parties must be sensitive to hesitancies stemming from the past. Corruption in Afghanistan has been called a "framework" of society, rather than an exception to its standards.xxxv For

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example, 42% of citizens see nothing wrong with family connections determining civil service recruitment.xxxvi As a result, reforms must involve moderate, not drastic, change.xxxvii If corruption -- a means of survival in Afghanistan -- is eradicated without supplementary programs in place, the country's stability will disintegrate.

Additionally, international and non-governmental organizations need to work to unite the people and government, earning their trust and leading with transparency and accountability while establishing auxiliary programs. This strategy worked in Liberia as the government and third parties willingly agreed to "external verification," which boosted citizens' trust in their authority.xxxviii In Afghanistan, however, aid groups have become more powerful than the government,xxxix which threatens this trust. President Sirleaf identifies aid as assistance that

"daily labor(s) with us to keep the peace."xl Assistance must not be viewed as an "invasion of foreign NGOs,"xli as in Afghanistan, and cannot give ultimate power to either aid organizations or the assisted country. Instead, it must represent an effort based in trust between citizens, government, and aid workers.xlii

Finally, aid must match absorption levels in its recipient districts. According to UN

Development Programme administrator Kemal Dervis, "Capacity development must be taken into the core of development planning, policy, and financing."xliii In Afghanistan, lack of capacity led to a startling waste of funds. Some argue that the solution to this problem lies in a "[reduction of] aid inflows to better match absorption capacity," coupled with long-term capacity building.xliv

Wasted funds fuel distrust and feed corruption, but withholding available aid also raises suspicions. The immediate focus must therefore be on increasing capacity to meet aid inflows so available support reaches the people quickly and efficiently. Careful, efficient planning of distributions allows for further establishment of trust.xlv

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A nation must feel it has the power to decide its own future. As President Sirleaf affirmed in her inaugural address, "The future belongs to us because we have taken charge of it."xlvi A third party presence does not mean decreased governmental authority or the attempted restructuring of society that instead results in its collapse. At its core, third party intervention is about building trust between people and their leaders. Third parties can address this lack of trust through renewed transparency and accountability, leadership by example, and efficient, focused distribution of aid. In doing so, third party organizations assist in enhancing stability and transitioning governments from immediate aid dependency to new integrity and independence.

Notes

i "History." United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2008. Web. 17 Jan. 2011. http://unmil.org/1content.asp?ccat=history&zdoc=1. ii Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. "Inaugural Address of H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf." Capitol, Monrovia, Liberia. 16. January 2006. Web. 11 Dec. 2010. http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/inaugural_add_1.pdf. iii Ibid. iv "Liberian rebels end siege of Monrovia." Washington Times. 14 Aug. 2003. Web. 3 Jan. 2011.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/14/20030814-110345-2602r/. v Liberia. "Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Signed at Accra, Ghana, 18 August, 2003." Peace Agreements Digital Collection. United States Institute of Peace. Web. 1 Dec. 2010. n. p. http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf. vi Sirleaf. vii Ibid. viii Amara Konneh and Steve Radelet. "Liberia Shows Dramatic Improvement in Controlling Corruption." June 2008. Web. 12 Dec. 2010. n. p. http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Liberia_Corruption.pdf. ix "UNMIL Facts and Figures." United Nations Mission in Liberia. United Nations, 31 Oct. 2010. Web. 4 Jan. 2011. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/facts.shtml. 6

x Konneh. xi Astri Suhrke. "The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan." International Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego. March 2006. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. p. 23, 24. http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2135-the-limits-of- statebuilding.pdf. xii Ibid, p. 20 xiii United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. Statistics and Surveys Section. Corruption in Afghanistan: bribery as reported by the victims. January 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2010. p. 30.http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption- survey2010-Eng.pdf. xiv Ibid, p. 16. xv Nita Colaco. "Crooked Progress: Afghanistan Tackles Corruption." Harvard International Review (2008). n. p. 13 Dec. 2010. http://hir.harvard.edu/global-education/crooked-progress. xvi Anne Nivat. The Wake of War: Encounters with the People of Iraq and Afghanistan. Boston: Beacon Press, 2005. Print. p. 214. xvii Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 25. xviii Nivat, p. 214. xix Kevin Savage, Lorenzo Delesgues, Ellen Martin, and Gul Pacha Ulfat. "Corruption Perceptions and Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: a case study in Afghanistan." Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2007. Web. 18 Dec. 2010. http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3180.pdf. xx Ibid. xxi United States Agency for International Development. Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan. March 2009. Web. 7 Dec. 2010. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO248.pdf. xxii Colaco. xxiii Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 17. xxiv Colaco.

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xxv "Corruption Perceptions Index 2005." Transparency International, 2005. Web. 2 Jan. 2011. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005. xxvi "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results." Transparency International, 2010. Web. 2 Jan. 2011. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. xxvii Sirleaf. xxviii Liberia. xxix Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 20. xxx Ibid, p. 22, 29. xxxi Astri Suhrke. "A Contradicting Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan." International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2 (2008): 214-236. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3038-a-contradictory-mission.pdf. xxxii Suhrke, The Limits of Statebuilding, p. 14. xxxiii United Nations, p. 5, 10, 30. xxxiv Daniel Kaufmann. Myths and realities of Governance and Corruption. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005. Web. 2 Dec. 2010. http://mpra.ub.uni- muenchen.de/8089/l/Myths_Realities_Gov_Corruption.pdf. xxxv Rodieck. xxxvi United Nations, p. 10. xxxvii Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 15. xxxviii Transparency International. Business Principles for Countering Bribery: a multi- stakeholder initiative led by Transparency International. 5-14. February 2009. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. p. 14. http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles. xxxix Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 25-26. xl Sirleaf. xli Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 31. xlii John Weaver. Inside Afghanistan: the American who stayed behind after 9/11 and his mission of mercy to a war-torn people. Nashville, TN: W Publishing Group, 2002. Print. p. 95.

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xliii Kanni Wignaraja. "Capacity Development and Aid Effectiveness." United Nations Development Program, Nov. 2006. Web. 4 Jan. 2011. http://lencd.com/data/docs. xliv Suhrke, Limits of Statebuilding, p. 32. xlv Weaver, p. 85. xlvi Sirleaf.

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