Limited Intervention
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Limited Intervention Evaluating the Effectiveness of Limited Stabilization, Limited Strike, and Containment Operations Stephen Watts, Patrick B. Johnston, Jennifer Kavanagh, Sean M. Zeigler, Bryan Frederick, Trevor Johnston, Karl P. Mueller, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Nathan Chandler, Meagan L. Smith, Alexander Stephenson, Julia A. Thompson C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2037 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9848-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Staff Sgt. Bertha A. Flores/U.S. Army; JoeLena/Getty Images; U.S. Department of Defense; Senior Airman James Richardson/U.S. Air Force Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents the results of the project “Limited Interventions— Will They Work?” The project analyzed the strategic effects of low-cost and small-footprint military options across a range of irregular warfare operations and in a range of operational environments. The findings should be of interest to a wide audience in the for- eign policy and defense communities with an interest in the stabiliza- tion of fragile states, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and related issues. The report should be of particular interest to strategists, force planners, and the special operations community. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorse- ment by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146862. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 An Overview of Recent Policy Debates on Limited Intervention ............ 3 A Framework for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Limited Interventions .... 8 CHAPTER TWO Limited Stabilization ...........................................................11 The Policy Debate .................................................................13 Research Approach ............................................................... 26 Findings ........................................................................... 38 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications ................................52 CHAPTER THREE Limited Strike ....................................................................55 The Policy Debate .................................................................57 Research Approach ................................................................61 Findings ............................................................................71 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications ............................... 77 v vi Limited Intervention CHAPTER FOUR Indirect Options: Interdiction, Mitigation, and Containment .........83 Containment ...................................................................... 84 Mitigation: Safe Areas and NFZs .............................................. 92 Interdiction ...................................................................... 107 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications .............................. 120 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions and Policy Implications ...................................... 123 What Limited Interventions Can and Cannot Accomplish ............... 123 Costs of Military Interventions ................................................ 129 Concluding Thoughts on Intervention ....................................... 132 APPENDIXES A. Models for Limited Stabilization ........................................ 141 B. Limited Strike Statistical Models and Results ....................... 171 C. Statistical Models Assessing U.S. Containment Efforts ............ 201 D. Case Studies for Mitigation .............................................. 211 E. Case Studies for Interdiction ............................................. 227 F. Costs of U.S. Military Interventions .................................... 235 Online Appendix. Visualization of Limited Strike Statistical Results Available for download at www.rand.org/t/RR2037 References ....................................................................... 241 Figures and Tables Figures 1.1. Mapping Limited Intervention Options for Irregular Warfare ................................................................. 8 2.1. Intervention Sizes and Troop-Contributing Countries in Selected Interventions ...............................................29 2.2. Force-to-Population Ratios for Selected Foreign Military Interventions ........................................................ 30 2.3. Propensity for Foreign Military Intervention as a Function of Insurgent Strength ............................................... 36 2.4. Intervening Force Size and the Probability of Favorable Outcomes ............................................................ 40 2.5. Foreign Military Intervention and Conflict Intensity .......... 44 2.6. Foreign Military Intervention and Conflict Duration ..........45 2.7. Foreign Military Intervention and Conflict Duration, by Intervening Country ............................................... 46 2.8. War Recurrence After Foreign Military Intervention .......... 48 2.9. War Recurrence Associated with Different Interveners .........49 2.10. War Recurrence Associated with Different Scenarios .......... 50 3.1. Count of U.S. Drone Strikes by Year ..............................57 3.2. Distribution of Drone Strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, 2004–2015 ............................................................63 3.3. Scale of U.S. Drone Campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen ...... 64 3.4. Levels of Violence in Pakistan and Yemen ........................65 3.5. Changes in Militant Attacks in Pakistan over Time ............71 A.1. Troop Effects Across Different Thresholds...................... 159 B.1. Number of Militant Attacks in North Waziristan and Other FATA, Pakistan, 2004–2014 ............................. 174 vii viii Limited Intervention B.2. Number of Militant Attacks in Yemen, 2011–2014 ........... 175 B.3. Number of Propaganda Statements in Pakistan, 2007–2014 .......................................................... 177 B.4. Number of Propaganda Statements in Yemen, 2007–2014 ... 178 E.1. Opium Production and Prices in Afghanistan, 1999–2015 .......................................................... 229 E.2. ISIL Revenue Sources, 2015 ...................................... 233 Tables 3.1. Marginal Effects of Drone Strikes on Militant Activity and Propaganda Output in Pakistan and Yemen .....................73 3.2. Marginal Effects of HVI Removals on Militant Activity and Propaganda Output in Pakistan and Yemen ...............75 3.3. Marginal Effects of Civilian Casualties on Militant Activity and Propaganda Output in Pakistan and Yemen .... 77 4.1. Safe Areas ............................................................ 96 4.2. NFZs ................................................................. 97 4.3. Interdiction Typology ............................................. 111 5.1. Approximate Costs of Selected U.S. Interventions ............ 130 A.1. Conflict Outcomes and Foreign Intervention .................. 146 A.2. Conflict Recurrence and Foreign Intervention ................. 147 A.3. Summary Statistics ................................................ 150 A.4. Logistic Models of Pro-Government Intervention ............. 154 A.5. Logistic Models of Conflict Outcomes.........................